3. 8. and 2. 2. Matth. 23. 33. 2 Pet. 2. 3. and multitudes of other places But Gods purpose of punishing is no act of Justice Both these Propositions doth Dr. Twisse prove Vind. lib. 1. par 1. digr 10. cap. 1 2 3. 5. That which destroys not a sinners obligation to punishment is not his Justification The reason is because Justification is causa câ—rrumpens obligationis ad poenam a discharge and acquittance from sin and condemnation saith Mr. Eyre see Rom. 8. 1 33 34. and 5. 8 9. But Gods velle non punire destroys not a sinners obligation to punishment which I thus prove The obligation which this Will of God destroys either is that which lies upon them from eternity by some immanent act of God I speak now in Mr. Eyres Dialect for to me 't is very absurd to talke of an actual obligation upon a person not existing but this will never be endured that Gods immanent acts should destroy one another or else it is the temporal obligation which comes upon them by the Law other obligation in time there is none Now the foresaid Will of God destroyes this legal obligation either from eternity or in time How it should do it from eternity I cannot imagine because neither the Law nor the sinner nor the obligation do exist from eternity and what it is to destroy an obligation that is not nor never was upon a person that is not nor never was by a Law that is not nor never was is a mystery beyond humane comprehension If in time I would know when either as soon as the Law is made or as soon as it is broken or in some period of time after Not as soon as the Law is made for a sinner is not obliged to punishment by the Law till he hath broken the Law and where there is no obligation there can be no destruction thereof If as soon as the Law is broken I would know how for if notwithstanding the foresaid Will and Purpose of God the Law have power to oblige the sinner to punishment it hath power also to hold him under the same obligation notwithstanding the same purpose If it can oblige him for a minute then for two then for ten then for an houre then for a yeare then for ever unlesse there be some other act besides the bare purpose of God to abrogate or relaxe the Law Causa eadem semper facit idem Gods purposes make no changes immediately upon his Lawes or any other external objects 6. If there may be a will or purpose not to punish where yet there §. 13. is no Justification or pardon for these two words are of the same importance in this debate then Justification doth not consist essentially in a purpose not to punish But there may be a will not to punish where there is no pardon Ergo. The Assumption is manifest There may be hundreds of men at an Assizes suppose they all resolve not to punish the Malefactors that are then and there to be tried Are the said malefactors therefore pardoned No. Then there may be a will not to punish which is no pardon Ergo. Pardon is not essentially a will not to punish Definitio reciprocatur cum definito If it be said that pardon is not an act of the will as a natural power or faculty but as the will of a man under some other moral condition or qualification namely as having jus ad poenam exequendam a right to inflict punishment which because it is peculiar to the Judge therefore his will not to punish is pardon but not the will of the rest that may be present in the Court this is as much as I expect for hence it follows if the case be applied to God that the name of Justification cannot be given to his eternal Will or Purpose I will not meddle with the Question An Deus possit creaturam immerentem affligere But jus puniendi a right of punishing accrews to none whether God or man but upon supposition of some offence committed But from eternity there was no sin Ergo the will or purpose of not punishing was not voluntas habentis jus ad poenam infligendam Ergo it may not be called by the name of Justification When I speak of a right of punishing which results from an offence committed understand it not de jure potestatis as if the said offence gave any authority to God or man which they had not before but de jure exercitii inasmuch as that authority cannot be justly exercised in the punishment of a person but upon such offence committed by him 7. If notwithstanding this velle non punire God be bound in justice to punish the Elect for their sins unlesse his justice be satisfied some other way then his velle non punire is not their Justification The reason is 1. Because Gods justice doth not binde him to punish those whom he hath justified but rather not to punish them 2. Because his justice doth not binde him to punish another for their sins whom he already hath justified supposing their Justification to be as well in order of nature as of time before the others punishment But Gods justice bindes him to punish the elect for their sin unlesse his justice be satisfied in some other way as namely by the death of Christ This appears because de facto Christ bare that punishment which in justice was due to sinners Ergâ— this velle non punire was not their Justification One thing more I long to know Whether velle non punire do define Justification in general as it containes these two notable species Justification by works and Justification by faith or grace or whether it define Justification by grace only particularly and in specie If the former shew us that special forme by which Justification by works and by grace are immediately differenced and opposed If the latter shew us the genus or common nature wherein they agree If neither of these can be done as it is impossible either should then we have here a definition without genus and forma that is a thing defined without a definition or a definition that defines nothing SECT V. BEsides these Arguments there be found more which Mr. Eyre §. 14. objecteth against himselfe as disproving his position that Justification is the Will or Purpose of God not to punish which though they be not of my making yet because they are all very material for support of the truth I shall here undertake their defence The first objection then which Mr. Eyre proposeth against his owne doctrine of eternal Justification is this viz. That it confounds Justification and Election His answer is That Election includes the end and all the means but Gods Will not to punish precisely and formally only some part of the meanes Reply 1. Then the act of Justification is precisely nothing as we have above demonstrated 2. And the effects of this act are like it selfe just
c. 6. circa princip a cause which is also made the condition Moreover we must also distinguish of that which Mr. Eyre calls a §. 15. due debt for u Hug. Grot. de jure Belli l. 2. c. 7. § 4. Covarr◠v. 2 ae part relect §. quartus n. 5 p. 288. Debitum vel strictè sumitur c. A debt is either taken strictly for such an obligation as ariseth from commutative justice or largely for that which is due in point of honesty and faithfulnesse though it be not due in justice so that if it be not done there is no injustice to any other person but he that doth it not is defective as what is due by vertue of a free Promise And such an obligation as this God himself refuseth not 1 John 1. 9. Tit. 1. 2. Heb. 6. 10. and 10. 23. Nor is that which is given by vertue of such an obligation any whit lesse free or lesse of grace then if it were given without it x Lessius de just jur L. 2. c 40 d. 8. p. 548. Si obligatio orta sit ex liberali promissione quod ex eâ datur etiam gratis datur non enim obligatio quae nascitur ex promissione liberali repugnat liberalitati sed est ejus effectus What is given by vertue of a free Promise is also freely given because an obligation arising from such a Promise is not repugnant to grace or liberality but is the effect thereof And that conditional promises may be such not only all I say all thar ever I could get sight of our Protestants stand for but the Papists themselves yield it y Snarez opus relect delib divin d 2 n. 44. A Sanct. Clara. de Nat. Grat. p. 135. 136. Durand in 2. d. 27. q. 2. n. 12. 13 14. Promissio beneficii sub conditione alicujus operis requisiti solummodo ex quadam decentia vel dispositione non quia in eo invenitur valor respectu mercedis non impedit quin collatio boni promissi sit simpliciter liberalis etiam tali conditione praestita ita ut donum sit gratuitum quia tale opus non est sufficiens ad fundandam justitiam ac proinde non excludit gratiam The Promise of a benefit on condition of a work required only as of decency or as a disposition and not because of its worthinesse in reference to the reward doth not hinder but that the giving of the promised benefit is simply free even when the condition is performed because such a work is not sufficient to ground an obligation of justice and so doth not exclude grace These things being thus premised we shall now cast Mr. Eyres Argument §. 16. into forme and turne it going If faith be the condition of our Justification then upon our believing we are justified of debt not of grace The reason is because what is promised upon condition the condition being performed becomes a due debt But the consequence is false Ergo so is the antecedent Answ To the Proposition I answer 1. In general that Mr. Eyre himself denies it when he thought it might be for his advantage pag. 190. No man saith he will say that the condition required of Adam was meritorious of eternal life in a strict and proper sense And yet urgeth here that if faith be the condition Justification must needs be of debt 2. I distinguish if the meaning of the Proposition be that Justification becomes due in that larger sense which we spake of but now if faith be the condition of it then I grant it But if the meaning be as I believe Mr. Eyre intends by quoting Rom. 4. 4. that it becomes due in justice then I deny it And what 's the proof why a condition performed makes the thing promised a due debt The substance of this axiome I meet with I think not lesse then twenty times in Mr. Eyres book but no where else in all the books I have Civilians or Canonists And as often as 't is used he doth not once attempt to prove it but leaves it naked to the world to shift for it selfe Conditions are either causal such as have proportion of worth to the benefit promised and these being performed make the thing promised a due debt As when I promise my servant five pounds if he will serve me for such a terme of time Some be meerly illative or dispositive as when I promise a man to give him twenty pounds if he will come and fetch it And these conditions of which kinde is faith do not make the reward due in justice which I thus prove Where there is not aequalitas dati accepti an equality between §. 17. the thing received and promised there can be no obligation of justice But it is supposed that between these conditions and the things promised there is no equality Ergo. I suppose it will be said that though the things of themselves be not equal yet they are made equal by the promise or contract the condition being performed To which I answer that it is impossible Indeed I think the Civil Law allowes an action upon such promises when the condition is performed z Vide Vigel de Dreys Jnst Jur. l. 3. c. 8. Wessemb paratit D l. 50. tit 12. and so it doth also in some cases upon the most absolute promise but we enquire not what is just justitiâ civili but what is just justitiâ naturali And I say again that a work which hath of it selfe no proportion to such or such a reward receives no increase of worth by the Promise that settles such a reward upon it or by being made the condition of such a Promise If it doth then the value of the work is to be measured by the reward that is promised to it and so the mercy and liberality of the Promiser excludes his mercy and grace in fulfilling his Promise For if the Promise make the condition equal to the reward then in fulfilling his Promise he doth but aequalia aequalibus rependere proportion the reward to the worth of the action and so cannot exercise grace and liberality in performing his Promise for example A King promiseth a condemned Traitour that if he will but acknowledge his offence and accept of his royal favour he will not only give him his life but advance him to such honour wealth and power as shall make him the second man in the Kingdome yea and leave him his successour in the Throne That such a Promise is of special grace and favour he is not a reasonable creature that shall deny but if the Traitours acknowledgement and acceptance of the Kings favour by being made the condition of his deliverance and advancement become forthwith proportionable thereunto then is it no mercy nor grace in the King to bestow these favours upon him Yea the same work will be of more and lesse value Suppose another Traitour upon the same condition be promised his
promise to the same purpose 1. If every conditional promise be contrary to grace then neither can God encourage us to any act of obedience by a promise of rewarding it nor may we take encouragement to obey out of respect to the reward without prejudicing the Grace of God The Reason is because do thus or thus and I will give thee this or that is a conditional promise more then such a forme of words we have not to prove that God ever made a conditional promise But the consequence in both the parts of it is grossely false for God doth make conditional promises to encourage us to obey his will and we are to take encouragement from them for that end For example he promiseth Lev. 26. 3 12. If ye walk in my statutes and keep my commandments and to them I will walk among you and will be your God and ye shall be my people Which that it pertaines to Christians as well as to the Jews the Apostle expresly teacheth 2 Cor. 6. 16 17 18. And from thence inferres immediately Chap. 7. 1. Having therefore these promises let us cleanse our selves from all filthinesse of the flesh and Spirit c. The promises he mentions aâ—e Gospel promises therefore promises of grace Yet out of respect to the good promised are we to come out and separate from all filthinesse of flesh and Spirit and God hath given us these promises for this end Moses rejected the pleasures of sin because he had respect to the recompense of reward Heb. 11. 25 26. So Paul 2 Cor. 4. 16 18. So Christ himself Heb. 12. 2. Multitudes of conditional promises we have in the Gospel which therefore surely are not inconsistent with grace Mat. 6. 14 15. Joh. 14. 21 23. Rom. 8. 13. Mat. 7. 7 c. If a man promise another to whom he hath no natural relation but out of a meer desire of his good that he will make him heire to five hundred per annum on condition he will go no more into an Alehouse or into none of the Popes dominions in such a promise there would be found every thing which according to Scripture or Philosophy as we have shewed before chap. 5. is required to an act of grace and yet the promise is conditionall If Mr. Eyre shall use his old evasion and say that in the places forementioned there is no proposing of a condition but onely a declaring of the persons who shall enjoy such and such blessings besides what hath been spoken against it before I shall onely adde this that then the said places and innumerable others like them do not declare that faith or righteousnesse or prayer or any other duty to which the promise is made is any whit more acceptable to God then unbelief or unrighteousnesse or neglect of prayer but onely that the person beleeving the person that keeps the Commandements of Christ the person that prayeth c. is more acceptable to God then he that doth not these things which is such a prodigious assertion that till I know whether Mr. Eyrâ— will own it I will not go about to confute it 2. If the condition being performed be it of what kind it will be the thing promised do eo ipso become a due dept then is it unjust to make the full price of a thing the condition of any contract The reason is Because whatsoever becomes a debt by contract supposeth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 repassum as they call it or an equality between that which I part with and that which I receive for it If then the full price be the condition another is bound to then have I double as much as what I part with is worth For if the condition had been the payment of six pence for what is worth a 100. l. the six pence being paid it becomes by virtue of the contract proportionable to that which is worth a 100. l. otherwise it could not make it a due debt If then I have in six pence what is proportionable to that I part with then if the said 100. l. had been the condition of the contract I had had double as much as that I part with is worth because the said 100 l. is in it self proportionable and againe it becomes proportionable by being made the condition of the contract so that it hath a double proportion of worth to that I part with for it In the next place Mr. Eyre brings in his adversaries as objecting §. 5. against this his third argument and clearing themselves from any impeachment of Gods grace though they assert the covenant to be conditional But in none of his objectionss doth he take notice of what he might very well suppose would be principally insisted upon for wiping off his aspersions As 1. That the Covenant of grace is not made with righteous persons but with sinners and enemies and children of wrath who if they had had their due and the rich grace of God had not prevented had been past all capacity of having any new terms of life and peace proposed to them 2. That the conditions required are neither so much as is Gods due nor yet so much as man was once able to performe which the Apostle mentions as a glorious difference between the righteousnesse of the Law and the righteousnesse of faith Rom. 10. 5 8 9. God accepteth the heart though in many things we sin all Therefore these conditions are such as are indeed available for our good through the acceptance of a gracious and mercifull governour as Benhadads servants prevailed with the merciful Kings of Israel when they supplicated for life with sackcloth upon their loyns and ropes about their heads 1 Kings 20. 31 32. though they availe us nothing in the tryal of justice But let us see Mr. Eyres objections First he supposeth us objecting thus We ascribe no meritoriousnesse §. 6. to these conditions as the Papists do unto works His answer is 1. The Papists assert no other works and conditions to be necessary to justification and salvation then we do 2. They ascribe no more meritoriousnesse to works then we do for Mr. Baxter says that the performers of a condition may be said to merit the reward 3. The condition required of Adam himself was not meritorious in a strict and proper sense Rep. 1. The first is a calumny The Papists some of them dispute that it is a thing possible to keep the Law of God and that facile parvo negotio they are Bellarminâ—s words dâ— Jâ—stif lib. 4. cap. 11. 2. The second is a calumny as Mr. Baxter a man borne to reproaches hath sufficiently shewed in his admonition to Mr. Eyre Reader if thou art not read in the fathers do but peruse Vâ—ssâ—â— Theses De bonor opâ—r merit or Bp. Vshers answer to the Jesuits challenge or any other Protestant who replies to the testimonies of the fathers which the Papists are wont to boast of and thou wilt find that they do all
the same in our justification before God which consists in a Law of grace and in sentence passed according to that Law which because we must purposely prove by and by I shall here supersede for a while One thing more I added for illustration in these words It is God §. 28. that glorifies us and not we our selves yet surely God doth not glorifie us before we beleeve Mr. Eyres answer consists of two parts the one is a concession of what I say with an explanation how glory is called a reward and sayes That a reward is for a work two wayes 1. When a work is proportionable to the wages 2. When it is not answerable to the wages yet is due by Promise as when a poor man hath twenty shillings for an houres labour though the work be not worth it yet it is a due debt and he may challenge it as such Rep. Against which I have not much to oppose yet if the houres work neither in respect to its selfe nor any circumstance that attends it as the Art Danger Detriment of the Labourer or the necessity pleasure profit c. of him for whom he labours all which corne into the m Less de just jured 2 c. 18. d. 3. value of the work deserve the said twenty shillings then is the reward though partly of debt quia operanti aliquid abest because the workman puts himself to expence of time and strength and he for whom he worketh hath the benefit and advantage thereof yet is it also of grace n Azor. Insiit Mor. p 3. l. 11. c. 3. quatenus excedit meritum inasmuch as it exceeds the value of the work And that the Labourer may challenge it ariseth from civil not from natural justice But I readily grant that glory is not our reward in this sense But how then is it a reward Because it comes after and in the place of the work saith Mr. Eyre Rep. Of which I shall speak more hereafter for the present what is said sufficeth me viz. That the reward follows the act whereof it is the reward for hence it follows that if Justification be given as the reward of faith then must it needs follow faith But we have proved before that Justification even the imputation of righteousnesse is the gracious reward of faith Ergo it must needs be consequent to it His second answer is this Though the blessings of the Covenant be given us freely and not upon conditions performed by us yet God hath his order in bestowing them first he gives grace imputed and then inherent Rep. My Argument is à pari we are not glorified unlesse we believe §. 29. yet by beleeving we cannot be said properly to glorifie our selves so though we beleeve that we may be justified yet will it not follow that we may be therefore said to justifie our selves properly the reason is the same on both sides Now whereas Mr. Eyre will have us when beleevers yet to be passive in our glorification meerly because God doth first give faith and then afterwards give glory I wonder he sees not the insufficiency of such answers and how the Arminians get ground by them Say plainly Doth God require and charge us to beleeve and repent that we may be saved or doth he not If he doth then doth he require a condition to be performed on our parts in order to our Justification though he give it us for as o Dr. Twisse observes often Medium ad aliquid obtinendum o Vindic. Grat. de crrat p. 163. ex contractu vel foedere illud demum est conditio A means ordained to obtain any thing by Contract or Covenant is a Condition If he doth not what shall become of those many places wherein God exhorts and commands men to repent and beleeve that they may be saved Then unbelief and impenitency are no sins nor are men thereby the causes of their own ruine and destruction contrary to Scriptures John 3. 19 and 8. 24. passim The reason is plain because man 's not being the object of a gift of God precisely cannot be meritorious of his damnation Indeed Mr. Eyre told us before that he that doth the least work towards the procuring of a benefit is not only physically but morally active in obtaining it I wonder at my heart then why we pray for grace and salvation or why we do or suffer any thing for obtaining a Crown and Kingdom p Authores elus primi fuere Sadoc unde Sadducaei Baythos de quibus videsis Joh. Drus de trib sect Judaeor l. 3. c. 3. 4. Joh. Cameron Myroth in Mat. 22. 23. This very conceit was that which drew many in former ages to deny any resurrection other then what was past already and by some improvement may bid faire for a resurrection of that and like consequences The very substance of Religion and the vital act of faith consists in looking to the reward promised in Heaven Heb. 11. 6 26. 2 Cor. 4. 16 18. And had I not known some Christians fallen and falling off from prayer and ordinances and other spiritual duties upon this very ground that they are passive altogether in their salvation and that they neither can nor must do any thing toward it I would not have lost so much time as to have taken notice of it CHAP. VI. A Reply to Mr. Eyres tenth Chapter My first Argument against Justification before faith vindicated from all Mr. Eyres exceptions SECT I. HAving now asserted the antecedency of faith to Justification §. 1. from many expresse testimonies of Scripture and discovered the fruitlesnesse of all Mr. Eyres attempts against them We proceed to the Vindication of the Reasons added in my Sermon for proof of the same point These Mr. Eyre undertakes in his tenth Chapter They are five in number and the first is this If there be no act of grace declared and published in the Word which may be a legal discharge of the sinner while he is in unbelief then no unbelieving sinner is justified But there is no act of grace declared and published in the Word that may be a legal discharge of the sinner while he remains in unbelief Ergo. Mr. Eyre first denies the Assumption For the Gospel declares that God hath transacted all the sins of the Elect on Jesus Christ and that he by his offering hath made a full and perfect atonement for them whereby they are really made clean from all their sins in the sight of God as of old carnal Israel were typically clean upon the atonement made by the High Priest Lev. 16. 30. Rep. 1. Supposing the tenour of the Gospel or New Covenant to be such a declaration as this yet I deny that this declaration hath the forme or force of a Law to absolve the sinner from the sentence of a former Law The Reason's plain because it is but narratio rei gestae a meer historical narration of what
may be justified faith goes before Justification here as works before it there And this was plainly enough expressed in the Argument to any one but Mr. Eyre As to all the Arguments he hath against it they are such grosse non-sequitur's that I know not whether it will be worth while to answer them yet out of civility I will take some notice of them First saith Mr. Eyre works were meritorious of eternal life §. 8. faith is not Rep. Very true though the former part about the meritoriousnesse of works Mr. Eyre himself contradicts in terminis page 190. but that 's common and therefore we compare not faith and works in point of worth and value but only in point of place and order or we compare them in the general nature of a condition wherein they agree not in the special nature or in what is accessory to either wherein they differ as much as buying with money Rom. 4. 4. and buying without money Isa 55. 1. If a commodity may be had for taking or buying he that takes it hath as sure a title as he that buyes it yet taking is not buying A genere ad speciem non valet Argumentum affirmativè Mr. Eyre 2. Works in the first Covenant are the matter of our §. 9. Justification faith is not Answ This is all one with the former If it were not it would only shew another difference between faith and works notwithstanding their agreement in point of place and order and in the geneneral nature of a condition in their respective Covenants Works were such a condition as that withal they were that very righteousnesse for which a person was justified but faith is the condition of our being justified by the righteousnesse of a Mediatour Mr. Eyre 3. If faith hath the same place in the second Covenant as works in the first then must God account saith to be perfect righteousnesse which is contrary to his truth and justice Ans I deny the consequence What manner of Readers did Mr. Eyre promise himself when he puts down such sayings as these without one word or pretence of proof that which made works man's perfect righteousnesse was not the place and order which they had by the Covenant to his Justification but their own essential natural perfection as being a punctual and exact conformity to the rule of his Creation the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of that rule of Divinity which by Creation was implanted in the frame of mans nature That it was the condition of his Justification was ex accidenti by vertue of the Covenant promising a reward of life upon the doing of such works May not therefore faith have the same place and order that is be in like manner the condition of the Justification of a sinner because it is not mans natural perfect righteousnesse Titius will let Sempronius have a farme if he will give him to the worth of it He lets Maeveus have another if he will ask him for it Here asking is the condition there the payment of the full price both have the same place and order to the obtaining of the farme yet surely begging is not the payment of the full price Mr. Eyre 4. Then is the second Covenant a Covenant of works §. 10. seeing faith is a work of ours Answ 1. We have already shewed at large that the grace or act of faith is perpetually opposed to works in Scripture-language 2. However this Argument is inconsequent for it will by no means follow that if faith have the same place and order in the New Covenant as works in the old then the New Covenant is a Covenant of works Suppose God had made the world a promise of pardon upon the condition of the existence of some contingent event v. g. That if Paul be converted within seven years after Christs Ascension all the world shall be justified Pauls conversion in this case would have the very same place and order to the Justification of the world as workes had in the old Covenant though it be not a condition of the same nature and quality yet surely this latter promise could not therefore be proved to be a Covenant of workes M. Eyre 5. This assertion makes faith to be not of grace because not from the Covenant of grace seeing the Covenant it self depends on it Ans 1. This assertion supposeth that nothing can be of grace which is not by the Covenant of grace Was not the Covenant it self of grace 2. Of the dependance of faith upon the Covenant of the Covenant upon faith we dispute purposely below Here we speak only of one blessing of the Covenant namely justification And as soon as ever Mr. Eyre hath proved that faith cannot be given us of grace if it be the condition of justification I will write a book of retractations as long as Augustines if I live to it In the mean time he deals not like a disputant to charge such a consequence upon us and never go about to prove it And whereas he suggests to his reader that my proposition is contrary to all Protestants 't is a vaine and empty flourish to speak the best of it He that hath any acquaintance in their writings cannot but know it to be so Of all Protestants Mr. Eyre quotes two in his margine Calvin and Pemble of which the former in that very h Instit l. 3 c. â— sect 2. place which Mr. Eyre refers to speaks as plainly to the overthrow of what he is brought to prove as can be Nam quum dicit Apostolus c. For when the Apostle saies with the heart man beleeveth unto righteousnesse and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation he shews that it is not enough if a man beleeve implicitly what he understands nâ—t nor makes any search into sed explicitam requirit divinae bâ—nitatis agnitionem in quâ consistit nostra justitia but he requires an explicit acknâ—wlâ—â—gement of the divine goodnesse in which consists our righteousnessâ— This is somewhat more then is any where said in my Sermon Pâ—mblâ— also is as expresly against him as I think is possible and that very frequently I shall transcribe but i Of justâ—â— sect 4. c. 1. p 1. 7 â— one place of multitudes From hence saith he we conclude firmly that the difference between the Law and the Gospel assigned by our Divines is most certaine and agreeable to Scriptures viz. That the Law gives life unto the just upon condition of perfect obedience in all things the Gospel gives life unto sâ—nners upon condition they repent and believe in Christ Jesus Mr. Eyrâ— the is out or Mr. Pemble when the one sayes this is the judgement of our Divines and the other sayes it treads Antipodes to the current of all our Protestant writers SECT IV. THe proposition namely that faith hath the same place and order §. 10. to justification in the covenant of grace as workes in the covenant of workes was
justifie the sense in which the fathers use the word merit though they disclaime the terme as Mr. Baxtâ—r also doth The Fathers indeed intending no more thereby then simply to obtainâ— As when they say of the Virgin Mary Mâ—ruit â—sse mater redemptoris Shee obtained this honour or priviledge to be the mother of the Redeemer Sine merito nostro meruimus we have obtained it without our merit and the like 3. The third I confesse is to me a very difficult question viz. Whether Adam in the state of perfection did or could merit any thing of God on the one hand I see the Apostle asserting roundly that to him that workâ—th the reward is imputed of dâ—bt nâ—t of gracâ— Rom. 4. 4. On the other hand I am not able to conceive how the creature can lay an obligation of justice upon his maker Rom. 11. 35. Who hath first given to him and it shall be râ—compensâ—d to him againâ— Nor am I certaine what life it was that was promised to Adam Some Divines are of opinion that it was the same and â—o other which is now promised through Christ to them that beleeve others and particularly Mr. Bâ—rrâ—â—gâ—s are peremptory that the a Gosp converâ— â—er 3. pag. 43. Law to Adam had onely the promise of a naturall life to be continued I shall wave all dispute concerning it and deliver my opinion in these foure conclusions 1. There is a proportion between a spotlesse perfect sinlesse righteousnesse and the reward of a happy and an unafflicted life That he that never did any evil should never suffer any evil unlesse he become a surety for another that hath wrought evil is but just So much at least is signified by the Apostles expression Râ—m 4. 4. To him that worketh the reward is imputed of debt not of grace And the law of nature the rule of naturall justice written and acting in mens consciences in their excusations and justifications of themselves for what they have well done Rom. 2. 15. attests the same 2. God as author of his creatures being and all his faculties and abilities hath a right of absolute soveraignty and dominion over him by virtue of which he may justly challenge the utmost service the creature can performe without engaging himself to give him a reward It was therefore I do not say of grace but oâ— his goodnesse and bounty that he would condescend to promise a reâ—ard to man for his obedience to the Law This â—â—ay down as a concession 3. Gods promise of rewarding mans obedience doth not make himself a debtour to man properly but makes the life promised to become a debt Life may be legally and in justice due and yet God not a debtour For there is dâ—bitum reale as well as personale suitable to the distinction of actions in the b Uâ—pian l. Action Gen. ff de oblig Act. Law into real and personal the former per quam remâ—â— stram quae ab â—liâ— pâ—ssiâ—â—â—r pâ—timâ—s though he be c Justit l. 4. c. 6. §. omnium autem â—â—lâ—o jure nobis obligatus of which they give d Ibid. § aeque si agâ—t severall instances The latter Quâ— cum eo agimâ—s qui â—â—ligatus â—st nâ—â—is ad faciâ—ndum aliquid vel dandum e Inst eod §. omnium aâ—tem idque vel ex câ—ntractâ— vel â—x 〈…〉 lâ—ficio Whence it is manifest that an action purely reall and not mixed with a personall as sometimes it is supposeth no person to be in justice obliged as a debtour and yet the thing a due debt In like manner life might have been given to Adam as a due debt he being worthy of such a reward and yet God in promising it become a debtour to none but to himselfe onely 4. Therefore Gods rewarding Adam supposing him to have continued perfectly righteous is an act of goodnesse and faithfulnesse quoad exercitium but an act of justice quoad specificationem That is it was Gods goodnesse to promise a reward of life to him and his faithfulnesse to execute it but upon supposition that he deale in rewarding him jure rectorio as a good and equitable Governour 't is just that he reward him with a life as perfectly free from all mixture of evill as his obedience was free from all mixture of sin Gen. 18 25. That be farâ—e from thee to do after this manner to slay the righteous with the wicked and that the righteous should be as the wicked that be farre from thee â— all not the Judge of all the earth do right The next objection he thus proposeth The conditions required §. 7. of Adâ—m were legall but the conditions of the New Covenant are evangelicall He answers All conditions performed for life are legall conditions the precepts both of Law and Gospel have the same matter Rep. Repentance towards God and faith towards the Lord Jesus Christ were neither required in the Law given to Adam nor in that given to Israel Gal. 3. 12. 2. The conditions required of Adam were as much as justice it self could exact of him The conditions required of us are such as neverthelesse justice might condemn us and availe us nothing but in Gods gracious and mercifull acceptation Jer. 3. 1 12. Thou hast played thâ—â—â—rlot with many lâ—vers yet return again to me 〈◊〉 and I will not cause miâ—â—â—ngâ—r to fall â—pon you for I am mâ—rcifull saith the Lord. Hence thirdly perfect sinlesse obedience of it self commended man unto God his equitable Governour as worthy not onely not to be punished but to be rewarded suitably to his nature that it did not merit of God so as to lay an obligation of justice upon him to reward it is meerly by accident because of the infinite distance and supremacy of God over man But faith and repentance do onely dispose us to be enriched enlivened and perfected by the fulnesse and sufficiency of another even the Lord Jesus Christ even as poverty may be said to commend one to a liberall man inasmuch as it disposeth him to be a fit object for liberality to exercise it self upon And this is intimated in the place which Mr. Eyre quoated but now Isa 55. 1 2. if his exposition of it be true viz. the conditions which men performe are their money for v. 1. it is said come buy wine and milk without money and without price which coming is saith and this faith as it is the condition upon which we partake in the blessings promised is therefore metaphorically called a buying and thus farre forth it agrees with legall conditions but as it is a buying without money or price it supposeth the said blessings to be freely given as Rev. 22. 17. it is expounded and thus farre forth it is opposed to legall This I put here because I had forgot to do it in its right place which was § 4. Thirdly he supposeth us thus objecting Evangelical conditions are more facile and easie then legal were His answer is