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A36551 A synopsis of Quakerism, or, A collection of the fundamental errors of the Quakers whereof these are a taste, viz. 1. That there are not three persons in the God-head, 2. That Christ did not make satisfaction for the sin of man, 3. That justification is not by imputed righteousness, 4. That our good works are the meritorious cause of our justification, 5. That a state of freedom from sin, is attainable in this life, 6. That there is a light in every man, sufficient to guide him to salvation, 7. That the Scripture is not the word of God, nor a standing rule of faith and life, 8. That there is no resurrection in the body, 9. That there's no need nor use of ordinances, baptisme, Lords Supper, &c. : collected out of their printed books : with a brief refutation of their most material arguments, (and particularly, W. Pens, in his late Sandy foundation shaken) and an essay towards the establishment of private Christians, in the truths opposed by those errors / by Tho. Danson ... Danson, Thomas, d. 1694. 1668 (1668) Wing D218; ESTC R8704 44,296 95

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and being an Application to Grace supposes that satisfaction to be Solutio recusabilis refusable payment for in Obligations which arise ex delicto from an Offence committed Dum alius solvit aliud solvitur as Grotius speaks De Satis Chr. c. 7. when another Person then what was originally obliged makes payment of the Debt of punishment due to Justice another thing is paid then what the Law required As suppose for one man to offer to die for another is no more in the Eye of the Law than to offer himself to be Whipped to save the others Life For the Judge can no more admit of Exchange of Person than of Penalty 4. Another act of Grace is in the means of Application of that Satisfaction he exacts of Christ I mean Faith in Christ the formal Act whereof as Justifying seems best placed in an Acceptance of Christ for Justification that being the correlate of the offer of Christ for that end in the Gospel Here appears a double act of Grace 1. In the choice of this Means of Application an acceptance looking least like a Meritorious Act. 2. In the bestowing of it Faith being the gift of God The Apostle suggests both when he says We are saved by Grace through that Faith which is not of our selves Eph. 2. 8. W. Pens Scriptures from p. 16. to 20. proves only what we grant viz. That God does freely pardon Sin but not that he pardens Sin without Satisfaction only we may observe how in the Enumeration of those Names of God which import free Forgiveness he leaves out that Name which is sub-joyned to them as a Limitation That will by no means clear the Guilty Exod 34. 7. That is not contrary to the order of Justice which he hath prescribed which order is to require that Satisfaction of the su●ety wh●ch is remitted to the Principal From Mat. 6. 12. Forgive us our Debts as we forgive our Debtors he seems to offer at an Argument Arg. If it be our duty to forgive without a Satifaction received and God is to forgive us as we forgive them then is a Satisfaction totally excluded p. 18. Answ 1. There is an agreement between Gods Forgiveness and ours 1. In respect of the causae Proegumena or inward moving Cause called Kindness Tender-Heart●dness Eph. 4. 32. 2. In respect of the Effect which in both is the Offenders Impurity But it will not follow there must be a similitude every way Pen might with as much shew of Reason infer from Eph. 4. 32. Forgiving one another even as God for Christs sake hath forgiven you that seeing we are to ●orgive as God does us therefore we are not to forgive another but for the sake of some Third Person who hath interest in us Answ 2. We are not bound in all cas●s to forgive another without Satisfaction I● be repent forgive him if he t●rn again to thee saying I repent thou shalt forgive him Luke 17. 3 4. Man as a Judge may not forgive without Satisfaction to Law Arg. From Mat. 18. 27 33. he infers that it had been no fault in the Servant not to have forgiven his Brother without Satisfaction if the Kings Mercy had not been proposed for his Example Answ 1. That wherein the Comparison lies is the Forgiveness it self not the manner of Forgiveness There is ground enough for a Co●p●rison between Persons or things if there be a likenesse in any one respect See vers 35. 2. If we stick in the Letter of the Parable God is represented under another 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 habitude or Consideration than in the Doctrine of Satisfaction now under debate For here he i● considered as Rector or Governour but there as a Creditor and so as a private Person In the Doctrine of Satisfaction God discharges from Obligations Ex delicto or debts due to Justice by Offence committed against the Law In the Parable God discharges from an Obligation Ex contractu arising from Covenant on Contract So is a man made a debtor to a private Person And there 's not the sam● reason in many r●spect for Forgiveness without Satisfaction in both cases not to Execute Penal Laws is to disparage the Legislative Authority Hence the Rule in Politicks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not easily to relax Laws once Established His first Absurdity p. 20. I pass by having declared my sence about the possiblity of pardoning sin without Satisfaction Abs 2. That the Creature is more capable of extending Forgiveness than the Creator Answ All that will follow from our Doctrine is that there is great difference between Gods condition and ours his Majesty and our meannes● that we have no reason to stand so much upon our Terms and to have such a Sentiment of affronts done to us there being an equality between us and our Brethren but an Infinite inequality between God and us Abs 3. That God so Loved the World as to give his only Son for to save it and yet that God stood off in Displeasure till Christ satisfied his Justice page 20. Answ To clear this observe that Divines distinguish of Tria momenta Divinae voluntatis three s●eps or degrees of Divine Love to Mankind 1. Before Christs Satisfaction God is not wholly averse from Reconciliation on good Terms though he be throughly angry with us For if he had been resolved to stand to the Rigor of the Law and not admit of any Satisfaction there had been an end of our Salvation 2. Upon Christs Satisfaction he does not only determine but promise to lay his Anger aside 3. Upon Actual Faith he layes aside his Anger quite and becomes our Friend W. Pens Reasons why Christ could not satisfie Gods Justice as man or as God singly I pass by though I might except against some of them as not cogent though the thing be true and owned by us But his reason why Christ could not satisfie as God-man is absurd in phrase and sence For where two Mediums or middle Propositions are singly inconsistent with the Nature of the end for which they were at first propounded their Conjunction does rather Augment than lessen the difficulty of its accomplishment His meaning is I think that where two things singly will not attain any end for which they are used as means much less will they attain it together As if he should say two men can much less bear a Burden when joyned together which neither of them alone can bear or rather as if he should say Lazarus Soul without his Body could not speak nor his Body without the Soul in their Separation therefore in their Union or Conjunction at his Resurrection muc● less could he speak I refer you to what hath been said before of the value of Christs Obedience arising from the Dignity of his Person To his Consequences I●religious and Irrational I shall say a little In the two first I am not concerned because they militate against the Impossiblity of Forgiveness without Satisfaction which I do not
Creature But in God Three Perso● notes a subsisting of Three in one Individu●● Nature in Man a subsisting of Three Pet●● James and John suppose for instance i● Thr●e divided or several Natures of the sam● kind Arg. 2. Either the Divine Persons are Finite 〈◊〉 Infinite if Infinite then Three distinct Infinites and so three Gods Ans 1. We may deny the Disjunction finit●ness and infiniteness are not Personal but Essential properties For in the Notion of the Nature these properties are coutained before you consider that Nature as in a Person So finiteness in respect of man and infiniteness in respect of God And hence though all the properties of the Divine Nature whereof infinit●ness is one agree to each Person subsisting in that Nature yet will it not follow that there are three ●nfinites but only one because there are not three Divine Natures but only one of which one Nature Infiniteness is a property Ans 2. Suppose we grant that these three Persons may be said to be Infinite t is no more in effect than to ●ay that these three Persons are God we may as well attribute to the Person the property included in the Divine Nature as the Divine Nature which includes the property the Nature and Property b●ing one re though not ratione Ans 3. Yet will it not follow that Father Son and Spirit be three distinct Infinites or which is all one three distinct Gods the property and Nature being really one though different according to our way of apprehension as I said above because those three subsist not in three sever●l but in one Individual Nature Arg. 3. If each Person be God and that Go● subsists in Three Persons then in each Pe●son ar● Three Persons or Gods and so from Three they will increase to nine Ans 1. If he understands the Terms God 〈◊〉 we do in the Antecedent of God essentially no such consequence will follow no more than i● this instance If Peter James and John each Person b● Man and that Man subsists in those three Persons then in each of those three Persons 〈◊〉 three Persons or Men and so from three the will increase to nine Take Man here not so a Person but the Nature as we do God in th● Antecedent of Pens Hypothetical Syllogism●● and t is evident that we mean no more then th● the name Man may be attributed to Peter Jame and John because the same humane Nature 〈◊〉 mean specifically agrees to them and so is th● name God attributed to each Person because th● same Divine Nature subsists in each of them 〈◊〉 rather each of them subsists in the same num●rically Divine Nature There is no Cons●quence in Pens Argument unless we held th● each person in the God-Head subsists in 〈◊〉 persons which he goes about unworthily to i● finuate Ans 2. I rather think he hath catched at som● what in our Writers which he did not well u●derstand which he would represent as our Judgments and thence deduce his absurd Conse quence viz that Nature and Person in the God-Head or God are one thing For the Nature of God is so simple that it admits of no parts or Accidents The three Persons are not three parts either essential or Integral of the God-Head nor can the relative properties begetting being begotten proceeding be accidents but substantial attributes as the absolute properties Wisdom Merey Justice for instance yet will it not follow that there are three Persons in each Person that is that the Persons includes each other any more then that these three absolute Attributes include each other For the Conception or Notion that we have of the Father suppose as a subsistent or Person is in●dequatus conceptus in respect of the Divine Es●ence considered as affecta Subsistentia or subsisting in divers manners and so does not include the Son and spirit who subsist in two different manners from him And as we cannot say that he Notion of Justice does include Mercy or the Notion of Mercy include Justice though the Divine Essence or God be the same with both those properties so nor can we say that the Notion of the Father as one Person in the God-Head includes the Son nor the Notion of the Son as one Person in the God-Head includes he Father though each of those Persons are he Divine Essence or God and so nor does he Father nor Son include the Spirit or the Spirit include them by the like Reason which w● may thus Ill●st●ate and indeed confirm by comparing the Acts of those absolute Attributes and the properties of those relative Attributes A● punishing is not an Act of Mercy nor sparing 〈◊〉 Act of Justice nor does the one Act include th● other So nor does the Attributes of Mercy and Justice include each other So as begettin● is not being begotten nor being begotten is 〈◊〉 begetting so nor does the Notion of the Fath●● include the Son nor of the Son include the F●ther 4. The fourth is answered in the answer to t●● second and we do not affirm the Person in the God-Head to be finite but infinite 5. If those three distinct Persons are one wit● the God-Head then are they each one with another That 's the sum though he multiplie● words Answ That Argument is grounded though 〈◊〉 does not express nor perhaps understand it upon that rule Quae conveniunt in uno tertio con●●niunt inter●se Those things which are one 〈◊〉 some third thing are one among themselv●● And I answer That rule is to be understood that they are one among themselves only in r●spect of that wherein they agree not simply 〈◊〉 in this plain instance David was a Man and S●lomon was a Man they two agree in a third thin● viz. in the humane nature Will it therefore f●●low that they are one Person nothing les● 〈◊〉 though the Father be God and the Son God it will not follow that they are one Person for in personality or manner of subsistence they differ but only it will follow that they are one God or one in that Divine nature in which third these two meet And now I shall take notice of my Answer to his Question mentioned p. 10. of his Sandy Foundation shaken and his reply thereto Where first the Reader is to know that W. P. conceals his ignorance or falshood in denying that Person was a Scripture term and his front in demanding an instance with that eagerness as if none could be given when I gave him that Heb. 1. 3. Again whereas he relates my Answer to his Question of whom Christ was the express Image that Christ was the express image of Gods subsistence or manner of being he does me wrong for my answer was that Christ was the express image of God the Fathers Person That which I spake of a subsistence or manner of being was in answer to his question What a Person was From whence he then infer'd that if Christ was the image of his Fathers Person he must
be the image of a mode or manner of being to which he received this reply that Christ was the image of the Father subsisting in the divine nature not of the personality or manner of the Fathers being nor yet of the divine nature in the abstract which was illustrated by the Childs bearing the image of his Father And so my answer to his two absurd consequences will be needless But if he thinks them deducible from this answer I gave him I reply thus to them To the first It makes God a Father only by subsistence that if he means that the relation of a Father arises from a personal not an essential act I see no absurdity the immanent act called begetting is not an act of God absolutely but relatively considered that is of the first Person subsisting in that God-head To the second That Christ is then a Son without a substance I answer that though the Son as God is from himself yet as God the Son he is from the Father the person and substance being inseparable As for the place he refers me to Col 1. 15. Who is the Image of the invisible God I see not how it opposes my exposition God is taken there personally for the Father not essentially for the God-head or divine nature which I prove because Christ is said to be the Image of God which if meant of God essentially then Christ must be the image of himself which cannot be And that Christ is God by nature appears by v. 16. where he is said to be the first cause and last end of all things For the translation it is good enough 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used by the Greek Phylosophers for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Aristotle uses for substantia prima and secunda the the former of which is when the common nature expressed in the definition is restrained by certain proprieties to an individual which is called Person● or a Person when the nature is indued with reason Suppositum when it is not And so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may by a Metalepsis yea must be rendered Person or subsistent or some word to that effect because Christ as God is of himself and so is not the image of any other there being no multiplication of the divine nature but of Persons in the nature three Vid. Amyrald de myst Trin. p. 462 c. And he that reads Justin Martyr who flourished about A. D. 150. will finde that he applies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the Father Son and Spirit which answers W. P. s cavil that 't is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is used Heb. 1. 3. and that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was not used in that sense till Athanasiu's time Errour 2. The impossibility of God's pardoning sinners without plenary satisfaction refuted So Pen. Title page WHere I observe that he argues against the impossibility of God's forgiveness of sin without Satisfaction Concerning which stating of the Question I shall say that either he did or ought to have known that many of us who deny any forgiveness without satisfaction do not affirm any impossibility of forgiveness without it And for my own part though I know some worthy persons do deny W. P's affirmative yet I cannot joyn with them therein For to me it seems evident that God is free in his determinations what attribute he will manifest and in what degree and manner Had Man stood God had only manifested remunerative justice as he does in the elect Angels when Man fell God might only have manifested vindictive justice as he does upon the reprobate Angels or Devils or sparing mercy only as he does in the Persons of elect Men. This variety gives ground to believe that between these properties or attributes of justice and mercy not to speak of others and their effects an act of his meer will intervenes And neither of these is wronged by the manifestation of the other and concealment of it self For the internal glory of none of the divine attributes receives either addition or diminution by the external glory or manifestation of them in their proper effects And as for the way of redemption by Christ we may well conclude it to be a free choice by those emphatical phrases whereby it is set forth The counsel of Gods own will Eph. 1. 11. The mystery of his will his good pleasure v. 9. He that desires may in my weak judgment receive much satisfaction in this point by that short but scholastick Tract of the learned Gilbert intituled Vinditiae Supremi Dei Dominii c. In this we all agree that God does not pardon sin without satisfaction first made to his justice by Christ and he that can make clear proof of this assertion hath won the Goal from the Socinians and their partakers As for the possibility or impossibility of forgiveness without satisfaction we need not much contest seeing the cause does not depend upon either apprehension It was a wise observation of Aquinas Cumquis ad probandam fidem Christianam inducit rationes quae non sunt cog●ntes cedit in irrisionem infidelium credunt enim quod hujusmodi rationibus innitamur propter eas credimus c. Sum. par 1. Q. 32. art 1. Q. 46. art 2. I need not English the passage for they who are concerned understand the School-man without an Interpreter But because W. Pen does also oppose the fact and affirms that God pardons sin without satisfaction made by Christ to his justice I shall therefore briefly explain the terms and then give you my sense in answer to four Questions By pardon of sin we understand a gracious absolution or dissolving of the obligation the sinner is under to sustain punishment for his sin That absolution which is not some way gracious cannot be call'd a pardon Satisfaction is not a Scripture phrase but the thing is found there viz. a compensation or recompence made to God for the injury done him by our sin which may be by doing or suffering or both Justice that is Vindictive God must be considered as a supream Rector or Judge and not as Pars Laes● the party offended only in the satisfaction made and if any thing be done for satisfaction when the letter of the Law requires suffering or undergoing of a penalty therein expressed it must in some respect or other have rationem poenae as suppose in regard of the person by w●om be penal and in merit equivalent to what the Law required and so esteemed by the person to whose acceptance it is tende●'d The Q●erys I shall answer to are Qu. 1. What did Christ tender to God for Satisfaction Answ His obedience or subjection to the Law in its penalties or curses Therefore he is said to be made a curse for us Gal. 3. 13. And also to the Law in its precepts whence he is said to be made under the Law ipso facto upon his being