Modern Reports OR SELECT CASES Adjudged in the COURTS OF Kings Bench Chancery Common-Pleas and Exchequer since the Restauration of HIS MAJESTY King Charles II. Collected by a Careful Hand LONDON Printed for T. Basset J. Wright R. Chiswell and S. Heyrick MDCLXXXII THE PUBLISHER TO THE READER THese Reports the first except the Lord Chief Justice Vaughans Arguments that have been yet printed of Cases adjudged since His Majesties happy Restauration though they are not Published under the Name of any Eminent Person as some other Spurious Ones have been to gain thereby a Reputation which in themselves they could not Merit yet have been Collected by a Person of Ability and Judgment and Communicated to several of known Learning in the Laws who think them not Inferior to many Books of this Nature which are admitted for Authority A great and well-spread Name may be Requisite to render a Book Authentick and to defend it from that common Censure of which this Age is become so very liberal But it s own worth is that only which can make it Vseful and Instructive The Reader will find here several Cases as well such as have been Resolved upon our modern Acts of Parliament as others relating to the Common Law which are primae Impressionis and not to be found in any of the former Volumns of the Law and the Pith and Substance of divers Arguments as well as Resolutions of the Reverend Judges on many other weighty and difficult Points And indeed though in every Case the main thing which it behoves Vs to know is what the Judges take and define to be Law yet the short and concise way of reporting it which is affected in some of our Books doth very scantily answer the true and proper end of reading them which is not only to know what is Law but upon what Grounds and Reasons 't is adjudged so to be otherwise the Student is many times at a loss and left in the dark especially where he finds other Resolutions which seem to have a tendency to the contrary Opinion In this respect these Reports will appear to be more satisfactory and inlightning than many others several of the Cases especially those of the most important Consideration containing in a brief and summary way what hath been offered by the Counsel Pro and Con and the Debates of the Reverend Judges as well as their Vltimate Resolutions than which nothing can more Contribute to the Advantage of the studious Reader and to the setling and guidance of his judgment not only in the Point controverted but likewise in other matters of Law where the Reason is the same Ubi eadem ratio idem jus As to the truth of these Reports though the modesty of the Gentleman who Collected them hath prevailed above the importunity of the Book-Seller and he hath rather chosen to see his Book than himself gain the Publick Acceptation and Applause whereby it hath lost some seeming Advantage which the prefixing of his Name would have undoubtedly given it yet the Reader may rest assured that no little Care hath been taken to prevent any Mistakes or Mis-representations The Judgments having been examined and the Authorities here cited industriously compared with the Books out of which they were taken A TABLE of the Names of CASES contain'd in this Book A. ABbot and Moor. 12 Jacob Aboab 107 Addison versus Sir John Otway 250 Alford and Tatnel 170 Amie and Andrews 166 Anonymus 75 81 89 105 113 163 169 170 180 185 200 209 211 213 216 249 253 258 272 Daniel Appleford 82 Atkinson and Rawson 208 Austin and Lippencott 99 B. BAker and Bulstrode 104 Bascawin and Herle versus Cook 223 Bassett and Bassett 264 Barker and Reate 262 Barrow and Parrott 246 Barry and Trebeswycke 218 Sir Anthony Bateman's Case 76 Bear and Bennett 25 Beckett and Taylor 9 Benson and Hodson 108 Birch and Lake 185 Bird and Kirke 199 Birrel and Shaw 24 Blackburn and Graves 102 120 Blissett and Wincott 13 Blythe and Hill 221 225 Bonnefield 70 Boswill and Coats 33 Bradcatt and Tower 89 Brooking and Jennings 174 Brown versus 118 Brown versus London 285 Buckly and Turner 43 Buckly and Howard 186 Bucknal and Swinnock 7 Butler and Play 27 Burgis and Burgis 114 Burnett and Holden 6 Burrow and Haggett 219 C. CAlthrop and Philippo 222 Caterall and Marshall 70 Clerk versus Rowel and Phillips 10 Clerk and Heath 11 Cockram and Welby 245 Cole and Forth 94 Compton and uxor versus Ireland 194 Coppin and Hernall 15 Cox and St. Albanes 81 and Crisp versus the Mayor of Berwick 36 Crofton 34 D. COrporation of Darby 6 Darbyshire and Cannon 21 Davies and Cutt. 231 Daw and Swaine 4 Deering and Farrington 113 Delaval versus Maschall 274 Dodwell and uxor versus Burford 24 Draper and Bridewell 121 Sir Francis Duncomb's Case 285 Dyer and East 9 E. ELlis and Yarborough 227 Edwards and Weeks 262 F. FArrer and Brooks 188 Farrington and Lee. 268 Fettyplace versus 15 Fitsgerard and Maschal 90 Fits and al. versus Freestone 210 Fountain and Coke 107 Fowl and Doble 181 Fox and al. Executors of Pinsent versus Tremayn 47 72 296 Franklyn's Case 68 Furnis and Waterhouse 197 Fry and Porter in Chancery 300 G. GAvel and Perked 31 Gayle and Betts 227 Glever and Hynde 168 Goodwin and Harlow 2 Gostwick and Mason 3 Grafton 10 Green and Proude 117 H. HAll and Wombell 7 Hall and Sebright 14 Jacob Hall's Case 76 Hall and Booth 236 Haley's Case 195 Haman and Truant 72 Haman and Howell 184 against the Hambourough Company 212 Owen Hanning's Case 21 Harwood 77 79 Haspurt and Wills 47 Hastings 23 Healy and Warde 32 Heskett and Lee. 48 Higden versus Whitechurch 224 Holloway 15 Horn and Ivy. 18 Horn and Chandler 271 Horton and Wilson 167 Hoskins versus Robins 74 Howell and King 190 Hughes and Underwood 28 Humlock and Blacklow 64 I. JAmes and Johnson 231 Jefferson and Dawson 29 Jemy and Norrice 295 Ingram versus Tothill and Ren. 216 Jones and Tresilian 36 Jones and Wiat. 206 Jones and Powel 272 Jordan and Fawcett 50 Jordan and Martin 63 Justice and White 239 K. The King versus Baker 35 Morrice 68 Leginham 71 Holmes 73 Sir Francis Clark 195 Thornbor ' and Studly 253 The Bishop of Worc. Jervason and Hinkly 276 Leginham 288 Neville 295 King versus Standish 59 Sir John Kirle versus Osgood 22 Knowles versus Richardson 55 L. LAke versus King 58 Lampiere and Meriday 111 Lassells and Catterton 67 Lee and Edwards 14 Doctor Lee's Case 282 Legg and Richards 77 Leginham and Porphery 77 Lepping and Kedgewin 207 Liese and Satingstone 189 Love versus Wyndham and Wyndham 50 Lucy Lutterell versus George Reynell George Turbervile John Cory and Anne Cory 282 M. MAddox 22 Magdalen-Colledge Case 163 Major and Stubbing versus Bird and Harrison 214 Maleverer and Redshaw 35 Manby and Scot. 124 Martin and Delboe 70 Medlicot and Joyner 4 Gabriel Miles's Case 179
the Lady Ann Countess of Newport all that my House called Newport-house and all other my Lands c. in the County of Middlesex for her life And after her death I give and bequeath the premisses to my Grand-child Ann Knollis viz. the Plaintiff and to the heirs of her body Provided always and upon condition that she marry with the consent of my said Wife and the Earl of Warwick and the Earl of Manchester or of the major part of them And in case she marry without such consent or happen to dye without Issue Then I give and bequeath it to George Porter viz. the Defendant The Earl dyed Ann the Plaintiff married Charles the Plaintiff she being then about fourteen or fifteen years old without the consent of either of the Trustees And thereupon now a Bill was preferred to be relieved against this Condition and Forfeiture because she had no notice of this Condition and Limitation made to her c. To this the Defendant had demurred but that was over-ruled Afterwards there were several Depositions c. made and testified on each side the effect of which was this On the Plaintiffs part it was proved by several that it was always the Earls intention that the Plaintiff should have this Estate and that they never heard of this purpose to put any Condition upon her and believed that he did not intend to give away the Inheritance from her But that this Clause in the Will was only in terrorem and Cautionary to make her the more obsequious to her Grandmother The two Earls swore that they had no notice of this Clause in the Will but if they had they think it possible such reasons might have been offered as might have induced them to give their consents to the Marriage and that now they do consent to and approve of the same Some proof was made that the Countess of Newport had some design that the Plaintiff should not have this Estate but that the Defendant should have it But at last even she viz. the Countess was reconciled and did declare that she forgave the Plaintiffs Marriage and that she shewed great affection to a Child which the Plaintiff had and directed that when she was dead the Plaintiff and her Child should be let into the possession of the premisses and should enjoy them c. It was proved also that when there had been a Treaty concerning the Marriage betweén my Lord Morpeth and the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff would not marry him her Grandmother said she should marry where she would she would take no further care about her the Countess was dead at the time of this Suit It was proved that Mr. Fry was of a good Family and that the Defendant had 5000 l. appointed and provided for him by his Grandfather by the same Will On the Defendants part It was sworn by the said late Countess of Newport viz. In an answer made formerly to a Bill brought against her by the now Defendant for preferring of Testimony which was ordered to be read that the Marriage was private and without her consent and approbation and that she did not conceive it to be a fit and proportionable Marriage he being a younger Brother and having no Estate The like was sworn by the Earl of Portland the said Countesses then Husband and that it appeared she leapt over a Wall by means of a Wheel-Barrow set up against it to go to be married and that as soon as the Trusteés did know of the Marriage they did disavow and dislike it and so declared themselves several times and said That had they had any hint of it they would have prevented it Others swore that the Earl of Portland declared upon the day of her going away That he never consented thereto and that the Countess desired then that he would not do any thing like it and that the Earl of Warwick said He would have lost one of his Arms rather then have consented to the said Marriage On hearing of this Cause before the Master of the Rolls viz. Sir Harbottle Grimstone Baronet the Plaintiff obtained a decretal Order viz. That Anne the Plaintiff and her Heirs should hold the Premisses quietly against the Defendant and his Heirs and that there should be an Injunction perpetual against the Defendant and all claiming under him And now there was an Appeal thereupon and re-hearing before Sir Orlando Bridgman Knight then Lord-Keeper assisted by the two Lord Chief Justices and the Chief Baron before whom it was argued thus Serjeant Maynard The Plaintiff ought not to have relief in this Case The Plaintiffs Mother had a sufficient provision by the Earl of Newport's Care And therefore there is less reason that this Estate should be added to the Daughter The noble Lords the Trusteés when the thing was fresh did disapprove the Marriage however they may consent thereunto now The Devise was to the Plaintiff but in tail and afterwards to the Defendant We disparage not Mr. Fry in blood nor Family But people do not marry for that only but for Recompence and like Fortune There was a publique Fame or Report it is to be presumed of this Will in the house and were there not yet it was against her Duty and against Nature that she should decline asking her Grand-Mothers consent and Mr. Fry in Honour and Conscience ought to have asked it And therefore this practice ought not to receive the least encouragement in Equity 'T is true when there was a Demurrer it was over-ruled because the Bill prayed to be relieved against a Forfeiture for which there might be good cause in Equity But now it does not appear there is any in the Case The Estate is now in the Defendant and that not by any act of his own but by the Devisor and the Plaintiff this is a Limitation not a Condition For my Lord Newport had Sons It is somewhat of the same effect with a Condition though it is not so We have a Title by the Will of the dead and the act of the other party without fraud or other act of us and therefore it ought not to be defeated I take a difference betweén a devise of Land and money For Land is not originally devisable though Money is By the Civil Law and amongst civil Lawyers it has beén made a question Whether there shall be Relief against such a Limitation in a Devise But be that how it will Chattels are small things but a Freéhold setled ought not to be devested thus No man can make a Limitation in his Will better and stronger to disappoint his Devise conditionally than this is made If my Lord Newport had béen alive would he have liked such a practice upon his Grand-daughters as want of Notice In Organ's Case and Sir Julius Caesar's Case there was a Grant to an Infant on condition to pay 10 s. and no Notice given thereof before 't was payable yet because no body was bound to give notice it was adjudged
Husband as those persons should approve and this marriage is so approved I rely upon this matter but especially upon the word of Notice Serjeant Ellis There was a Case of a Proviso not to marry but with the consent of certain persons first had in writing Consent was had but not in writing and yet you rul'd it good Had this been a Condition in Law as 't is in fact the Law would have helped her If the Estate had been in her there might have been some reason that she should have 〈◊〉 taken notice how it came to her and of the Limitation c. Had the Earl been alive and consented to the Marriage after it was solemnized he would have continued his affection and the Plaintiffs have had the Estate still Why now the consent of the Lords and Countess is as much as his consent he had tranferred his consent to them This is a Ratihabitio you cannot have a Case of more Circumstances of Equity 1. An Infant 2. No notice 3. Consent after 4. Their Declaration that they thought my Lord meant it in terrorem c. What if two of the Trusteés had died should she never have married surely you would have relieved her Serjeant Baldwin Here is as full a consent to the Marriage as could well be in this Case For since the Plaintiff had no notice of the necessity of the Earls consent before the Marriage it had been the strangest and unexpectedest thing in the world that she should have gone about to have askt it The Heir should not have taken notice of such a Forfeiture and why should a man that is named by way of remainder In case of a personal Legacy this were a void Proviso by the Civil Law For I have informed my self of it It is a Maxim with them Matrimonium esse Liberum This amounts to as much as the Condition that the person should not marry at all For when 't is in the Trustées power they may propose the unagreeablest person in the World 't is a most unreasonable power and not to be favoured Sir Thomas Grimes setled his Land so that his Son should pay portions and if he did not he demised the Lands over and it was adjudged relieveable If I limit that my Daughter shall marry with the consent of two c. if each of them have a design for a different Friend if you will not relieve she can never marry Is it not more probable that if the Earl had lived he would rather have given her a Maintenance than have concluded her under perpetual misfortune and disherison Keeling Chief Justice I do not sée how an averment or proof can be received to make out a mans intention against the words of the Will 4 Co. 4. a. 5 Co. 68. Plo. 345. In Vernon's Case though it were a Case of as much Equity as could be it was denied to be received and so in my Lord Cheney's Case Here was a Case of Sir Thomas Hatton somewhat like this Case wherein no Relief could be had Vaughan Chief Justice I wonder to hear of citing of Presidents in matter of Equity For if there be equity in a Case that Equity is an universal Truth Vi. 1 In. 216. and there can be no President in it So that in any President that can be produced if it be the same with this Case the reason and equity is the same in it self And if the President be not the same Case with this it is not to be cited being not to that purpose Bridgman Lord-Keeper Certainly Presidents are very necessary and useful to us for in them we may find the reasons of the Equity to guide us and beside the authority of those who made them is much to be regarded We shall suppose they did it upon great Consideration and weighing of the matter and it would be very strange and very ill if we should disturb and set aside what has been the course for a long Series of time and ages Thereupon it was Ordered That they should be attended with Presidents and then they said they would give their Opinions Three weeks after they came into Chancery again and delivered their Opinions Seriatim in this manner viz. Hale Chief Baron The general question is whether this Decrée shall pass I shall divide what I have to say into these three questions or particulars First I shall consider whether this be a good Condition or Limitation or conditional Limitation For so I had rather call it It being a Condition to determine the Estate of the Plaintiff and a Limitation to let in the Defendant I think it is good both in Law and Equity and my reasons are first because it is a collateral Condition to the Land and not against the nature of the Estate and she is not thereby bound from Marriage Secondly it obliged her to no more then her duty she had no Mother and in case of Marriage she ought to make application to her Grandmother who was in loco Parentis and since the Estate moved from the Grandfather she was Mistris of the disposition and manner of it 'T is true by the Civil Ecclesiastical Law regularly such a Condition were void And therefore if the question were of a Legacy there might be a great deal of reason to question the validity of it because in those Courts wherein Legacies are properly handled it would have been void But this is a case of Land Devise Indeed it is agreed that this is a good Condition and not to be avoided in it self Secondly This being a good Condition and Limitation over The Question is whether there be relief against it in Equity admitting it were a wilful breach I think there ought not to be any I differ from the reasons pressed at the Bar as first That it was a devise by Will by virtue of the Statute c. but that doth not stick with me For if there may not be a relief against a breach of a Condition in a Will there would be a great shatter and confusion in mens Estates and some of those settled by great advice and there have been Presidents of relief in such cases 2 Car. Fitz versus Seymour And 10 Car. Salmon versus Bernard Secondly It has been urged there should be no relief because there is a Limitation over But that I shall not go upon neither There have been many reliefs in such Cases I will decline the latitude of the Objection for that would go a great deal further then we are aware But yet I think there ought to be no relief in this Case It is not like the case of payment of money because there the party may be answered his debt with damages at another day and so may be fully satisfied of all that is intended him But here my first reason is That it is a Condition to contain the party in that due Obedience which Law and nature require 2 'T is a voluntary settlement to the Grandaughter in
it was said that the Act of Parliament only takes away a Writ of Error in such case but there is no day in Bank to plead It was order'd to stand in the paper Corporation of Darby THe Corporation of the Town of Darby prescribe to have Common sans number in grosse Sanders I conceive it may be by prescription what a man may grant may be prescribed for Co. Lit. 122. is express Keel In a Forest the King may grant Common for Sheep but you cannot prescribe for it And if you may prescribe for Common sans number in grosse then you may drive all the Cattel in a Fair to the Common Sanders But the prescription is for their own Cattel only Twisd If you prescribe for common sans number appurtenant to Land you can put in no more Cattel then what is proportionable to your Land for the Land stints you in that case to a reasonable number But if you prescribe for common sans number in grosse what is it that sets any bounds in such case There was a case in Glyn's time betwéen Masselden and Stoneby where Masselden prescribed for common sans number without saying levant couchant and that being after a Verdict was held good but if it had been upon a Demurrer it would have been otherwise Livesey said he was agent for him in the case Bucknall Swinnock INdebitat Assumpsit for money received to the Plaintiffs use the Defendant pleads specially that post assumptionem praedictam there was an agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant that the Defendant should pay the money to J. S. and he did pay it accordingly The Plaintiff demurrs Jones This plea doth not only amount to the general issue but is repugnant in it self It was put off to be argued Hall versus Wombell THe question was whether an Action of Debt would lie upon a Iudgment given by the Commissioners of Excise upon an Information before them Adjornatur Vaughan Casewell A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment given at the grand Sessions in Wales in a Writ of Quod ei deforciat Sanders The point in Law will be this whether a Tenants vouching a Vouchee out of the line be peremptory and final or that a Respondeas ouster shall be awarded Mr. Jones In an Assise the Tenant may vouch another named in the Writ 9 H. 5. 14. and so in the Com. fo 89. b. but a voucher cannot be of one not named in the Writ because it is festinum remedium In Wales they never allow foreign vouchers because they cannot bring them in If there be a Counterplea to a Voucher and that be adjudged in another Term it is always peremptory otherwise if it be determined the same Term. An Action of Trover and Conversion was brought against husband and wife and the wife arrested Twisd The wife must be discharged upon Common bail so it was done in the Lady Baltinglasse's case And where it is said in Crook that the Wife in such case shall be discharged it is to be understood that she shall be discharged upon Common bail So Livesey said the course was It was said to be the course of the Court That if an Attorney be sued time enough to give him two Rules to plead within the Term Iudgment may be given otherwise not Russell Collins AN Assumpsit was brought upon two several promises and entire damages were given Moved by Mr. Sympson in arrest of Iudgment that for one of the promises an Action will not lie It was a general indebitatus pro opere facto which was urged to be too general and uncertain But per Cur ' it is well enough as pro mercimoniis venditis pro servitio without mentioning the Goods or the Service in particular And the Plaintiff had Iudgment Dyer versus East AN Action upon the Case upon a promise for Wares that the wife took up for her wearing Apparel Polyxfen moved for a new Trial. Keel The husband must pay for the wives Apparel unless she does elope and he give notice not to trust her that is Scott Manby's case which was a hard Iudgment but we will not impeach it The Plaintiff had Iudgment Beckett Taylor DEbt upon a Bond to submit to an Award Exception was taken to the Award because the concurrence of a third person was awarded which makes it void They award that one of the parties shall discharge the other from his undertaking to pay a Debt to a third person and it was pretended that the third person being no party to the submission was not compellable to give a discharge But it was answered that he is compellable for in case the debt be paid him he is compellable in equity to give a Release to him that had undertaken to pay it Rolls 1 part 248. Giles Southwards case Mich. 1653. Judgment nisi Seventéen Serjeants being made the 4th of November a day or two after Serjeant Powis the Junior of them all coming to the Kings Bench bar the Lord Chief Iustice Keeling told him that he had something to say to him viz. That the Rings which he and the rest of the Serjeants had given weighed but 18 s. apiece whereas Fortescue in his book de laudibus legum Angliae says That the Rings given to the Chief Iustices and to the Chief Baron ought to weigh 20 s. apiece and that he spake this not expecting a recompence but that it might not be drawn into a president and that the young Gentlemen there might take notice of it Clerke versus Rowell Phillips A Trial at bar in Ejectment for Lands settled by Sir Pexall Brockhurst The Court said a Trial against others shall not be given in Evidence in this cause And Twisden said that an Entry to deliver a Declaration in Ejectment should not work to avoid a Fine but that it must be an express Entry Vpon which last matter the Plaintiff was non-suit Redmans Case IT was moved that one Redman an Attorney of the Court who was going into Ireland might put in special Bail Twisd A Clerk of the Court cannot put in bail You have filed a Bill against him and so waved his putting in bail Keel You may remember Woolly's case that we discharged him by reason of his priviledge and took Common bail Twisd You cannot declare against him in custodia But though we cannot take bail yet we may commit him and then deliver him out by mainpernancy Jones If he be in Court in propria persona you cannot procéed against his bail The Court agréed that the Attorney should not put in bail Grafton GRafton one of the Company of Drapers was brought by Habeas Corpus In the Return the cause of his Imprisonment was alledged to be for that being chosen of the Livery he refused to serve Per Cur ' they might have fined him and have brought an Action of Debt for the sum but they could nor imprison him Keel The Court of Aldermen may imprison a
have but one Elegit At another day the Iudges gave their Opinions severally that Iudgment ought to be given in this Court upon the whole Record for that it is an entire Record and the Execution one and if Iudgment were to be given there upon the demurrer there must be two Executions And because the Record shall not be remanded Twisden said the Record it self was here and that it had been so adjudged in King and Holland's case and in Dawkes Batter's case though my Lord Chief Baron being then at the Bar urged strongly that it was but the tenour of the Record that was sent hither And it is a Maxim in Law that if a Record be here once it never goes out again for that here it is coram ipso Rege so that if we do not give Iudgment here there will be a failer of Iustice because we cannot send the Record back The Iury that tries the Issue must assess the damages upon the demurrer The Record must not be split in this case Accordingly Iudgment was given here Willbraham Snow TRover Conversion Vpon Issue Not-guilty the Iury find a special Verdict viz. that one Talbot recovered in an Action of Debt against one Wimb and had a Fierr facias directed to the Sheriff of Chester whereupon he took the Goods into his possession and that being in his possession the Defendant took them away and converted them c. and the sole point was whether the possession which the Sheriff has of Goods by him levied upon an Execution is sufficient to enable him to bring an Action of Trover Winnington I conceive the Action does not lie An Action of Trover and Conversion is an Action in the right and two things are to be proved in it viz. a Property in the Plaintiff and a Conversion in the Defendant I confess that in some cases though the Plaintiff have not the absolute property of the Goods yet as to the Defendants being a wrong-doer he may have a sufficient property to maintain the Action against him But I hold that in this case the property is not at all altered by the seizure of the Goods upon a Fieri facias for that he cited Dyer 98 99. Yelvert 44. This case is something like that of Commissioners of Bankrupts they have power to sell and grant and assign but they cannot bring an Action their Assignees must bring all Actions It is true a Sheriff in this case may bring an Action of Trespass because he has possession but Trover is grounded upon the right and there must be a Property in the Plaintiff to support that whereas the Sheriff takes the Goods by vertue of a nude Authority As when a man deviseth that his Executors shall sell his Land they have but a nude Authority Cur. The Sheriff may well have an Action of Trover in this case As for the case in Yelvert 44. there the Sheriff seiz'd upon a Fieri facias then his Office determined then he sold the Goods and the Defendant brought Trover And it was holden that the Property was in the Defendant by reason of the determining of the Sheriffs Office and because a new Fieri facias must be taken out for that a venditioni exponas cannot issue to the new Sheriff They compared this case to that of a Carryer who is accountable for the Goods that he receives and may have Trover or Trespass at his Election Twisden said the Commissioners of Bankrupts might have an Action of Trover if they did actually seize any Goods of the Bankrupts as they might by Law Rainsford said let the Property after the seizure of Goods upon an Execution remain in the Defendant or be transferred to the Plaintiff since the Sheriff is answerable for them and comes to the possession of them by the Law it is reasonable that he should have as ample remedy to recover damages for the taking of them from him as a Carryer has that comes to the possession of Goods by the delivery of the party Morton said if Goods are taken into the custody of a Sheriff and the Defendant afterward become Bankrupt the Statute of Bankrupts shall not reach them which proves the Property not to be in the Defendant Twisd I know it hath been urged several times at the Assizes that a Sheriff ought to have Trespass and not Trover and Counsel have pressed hard for a special Verdict Morton My Lord Chief Justice Brampston said he would never deny a special Verdict while he lived if Counsel did desire it Gavell Perked ACtion for words viz. You are a Pimp and a Bawd and fetch young Gentlewomen to young Gentlemen Vpon Issue Not-guilty there was a special Verdict found Jones The Declaration says further whereby her Husband did conceive an evil Opinion of her and refused to cohabit with her But the Iury not having found any such special damage the question is whether the words in themselves are Actionable without any relation had to the damage alledged I confess that to call one Bawd is not Actionable for that is a term of reproach used in Scolding and does not imply any act whereof the Temporal Courts take notice for one may be said to be a Bawd to her self But where one is said to be a Bawd in such actions as these it is actionable 27 H. 8. 14. If one say that another holds Bawdry it is Actionable 1 Cro. 329. Thou keepest a Whore in thy House to pull out my Throat these words have been adjudged to be Actionable for that they express an act done and so are special and not general railing words In Dimock's case 1 Cro. 393. Two Iustices were of Opinion that the word Pimp was Actionable of it self But I do not relie upon that or the word Bawd but taking the words all together they explain one another the latter words show the meaning of the former viz. that her Pimping and Bawdry consisted in bringing young men and women together and what she brought them together for is sufficiently expressed in the words Pimp and Bawd viz. that she brought them together to be naught And that is such a Slander as if it be true she may be indicted for it and is punishable at the Common Law The Court was of the same Opinion and gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff Nisi c. Healy Warde ERror of a Iudgment in Hull Weston The Action is brought upon a promise cum inde requisitus foret and does not say cum inde requisitus foret infra Jurisdictionem Twisd Though the agreement be general cum inde requisitus foret yet if he does request within the Iurisdiction it is good enough and so it has been ruled and this Error was disallowed Boswill Coats TWo several Legacies are given by Will to Alice Coats and John Coats the Executors deposit these Legacies in a third persons hand for them and take a Bond of that third person conditioned That if the Obligor at the request of
such power nay if he have Children they must be living at his death Further by these Provisoes if the Contingencies do happen he hath but a power to declare the Vses he hath no Interest in him at all Litt. Sect. 463. It is one thing to have a power or possibility of limiting an Interest another to have an Interest vested 7 Rep. 11. Moor's Reports 366. about the delivery of a Ring where they hold that if it had been to have been done with his own hand it had not been forfeited The case of Sir Edward Clere is different from ours for if a man make a feoffment to the use of his last Will or to the use of such persons as shall be appointed by his last Will in this case he remains a perfect owner of the Land But if a man makes a Conveyance with power to make Leases or to make an Estate to pay Debts he hath here no Interest but a naked power The Duke of Norfolk's case is full in the point A Conveyance to the use of himself for life the Remainder to his Son in Tail with power to revoke under Hand and Seal adjudged not forfeited and yet he had a power to declare his mind as in our case Pagett's case Moor 193 194. Keeling If this way be taken a man may commit Treason pretty cheaply Twisden Whoever hath a power of Revocation hath a power of Limitation The reason is because else the feoffées would be seized to their own Vse Sir William Shelly's case in Latch Twisden There is no difference betwixt the Duke of Norfolk's case and this only here it is under his hand writing and there under his proper hand writing Afterward Term. Pasch 23 Car. 2. 1671. the Court delivered their Opinions Hales being then Chief Iustice Morton I conceive the Iudgment in the Common-Pleas is well given As for the first point whether this Conveyance made by Sir Simon Mayn be fraudulent or not the Counsel themselves have declined it and therefore I shall say nothing to it For the second I conceive no larger Interest is forfeited then during the Life of the Father If it be objected that the Father had by this Proviso jus disponendi I answer it is true he had a power if he had been minded so to do but it was not his mind and Will Now animus hominis est ipse homo but he must not only be minded so to do but he must declare his pleasure Hobart saith if a man will create a power to himself and impose a Condition or Qualification for the Execution of it it must be observed Now here is a personal and individual power seated in the heart of a man And it seems to me a stronger case then that of the Duke of Norfolk put in Englefield's case where yet the Condition was not given to the King by the Statute of Hen. 8. There was a later case adjudged in Latch betwéen Warner and Hynde a case that walked through all the Courts in Westminster-hall there by reason of the ipso declarante it could not be forfeited Rainsford I hold it is not forfeited My reason is because the Proviso is at an end and determined for when he dyed and made no Will there 's an end of the Proviso The altering of the old Trust is to be done by Sir Simon Mayn and it is inseparable from his person nothing can be more inseparable then a mans Will Moor 193. Twisd I am of the same Opinion Hales was of the same Opinion that nothing was forfeited but during Sir Simon 's life The Proviso he said did not create a Trust but potestatem disponendi which is not a Trust He said he did not understand the difference betwéen the Duke of Norfolk's case and this Accordingly the Iudgment was affirm'd In a cause wherein one Aston was Attorney Keeling said That a man may discontinue his Action here before an Action brought in the Common-Pleas But if he do begin there and then they plead another Action depending here and then they discontinue I take it the Attorney ought to be committed for this practice Twisden When I was at the Bar Error was brought and Infancy assigned when the Man was thirty years old and the Attorney was threatned to be turned out of the Roll. Serjeant Newdigate moved for a Certiorari to remove an Indictment hither from Bedford against several Frenchmen for Robbery Keeling Will it remove the Recognisances there to appear Twisden I never knew such a motion made by any but the King's Attorney or Solicitor Rainsford There is no Indictment yet before a Iudge of Assise Keeling You may have a Certiorari but it must not be delivered till the Indictment be found and then the Iudge hath the Prosecutors there and may bind them over hither and so the Trial may be here Keel A Iury was never ordered to a view before their appearance unless in an Assise Twisd Neither shall you have it here but by consent Nosworthy versus Wyldeman THe Plaintiff declares in an Indeb Assumpsit that the Defendant was endebted to him in 50 l. for so much money received of the Plaintiff by one Thomas Buckner by the appointment and to the use of the Defendant After a Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the Plaintiff could not have an Action for money received by the Defendant to the use of the Defendant But because it might be money lent which the Defendant received to his own use though he was to make good the value to the Plaintiff the Court will presume after a Verdict that it appeared so to the Iury at the Trial. For where a Declaration will bear two constructions and one will make it good and the other bad the Court after a Verdict will take it in the better sense And accordingly the Plaintiff had Iudgment Willams versus Lee. AN Action of Account It was prayed that the Court would give further day for giving the Account the matter being referred to Auditors Twisden The Auditors themselves must give further day Keeling The Auditors are Iudges whether there be a voluntary delay or not If they find the parties remiss and negligent they must certifie to the Court that they will not account Roberts Mariott MOved to discontinue an Action of Debt upon a Bond. Keeling We will not favour Conditions Ruled that the other side should shew cause why they should not discontinue Buckly versus Turner ACtion upon the case upon a Promise The case was that Edward Turner Brother to the Defendant was endebted to the Plaintiff for a Quarters Rent and the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintiff mitteret prosequi praedictum Edwardum Turner so the words are in the Declaration promised to pay the money After a Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment that here is not any consideration for there is no loss to the Plaintiff in sending to prosecute c. nor any benefit but
of the great Sessions have power to try all Murthers as the Iudges here have and the Statute of 26 H. 8. for the Trial of Murthers in the next English County was made before that of the 34 H. 8. Twisden I never yet heard that the Statute of 34 H. 8. had repealed that of 26 Henr. 8. It is true the Iudges of the Grand Sessions have power but the Statute that gives it them does not exclude this Court. To be moved when the Chief Iustice should be in Court Franklyn's Case FRanklyn was brought into Court by Habeas Corpus and the Return being read it appeared that he was committed as a Preacher at Seditious Conventicles Coleman prayed he might be discharged he said this Commitment must be upon the Oxford Act for the last Act only orders a Conviction and the Act for Vniformity Commitment only after the Bishops Certificate And the Oxford Act provides that it shall be done by two Iustices of the Peace upon Oath made before them and in this Return but one Iustice of Peace is named for Sir William Palmer is mentioned as Deputy Lieutenant and you will not intend him to be a Iustice of Peace Nor does it appear that there was any Oath made before them Twisden Vpon the Statute of the 18th of the Queen that appoints that two Iustices shall make Orders for the keeping of Bastard-children whereof one to be of the Quorum I have got many of them quash'd because it was not exprest that one of them was of the Quorum Whereupon Franklyn was discharged Vpon a motion for time to plead in a great cause about Brandy Twisden said if it be in Bar you cannot demand Oyer of the Letters Patents the next Term but if it be in a Replication you may because you mention the precedent Term in the Bar but not in the Replication Yard Ford. MOved by Jones in Arrest of Iudgment an Action upon the Case was brought for keeping a Market without Warrant it being in prejudice of the Plaintiffs Market He moved that the Action would not lie because the Defendant did not keep his Market on the same day that the Plaintiff kept his which he said is implied in the case in 2 Rolls 140. Saunders contra Vpon a Writ of Ad quod dampnum they enquire of any Markets generally though not held the same day In this case though the Defendants Market be not held the same day that ours is yet it is a damage to us in forestalling our Market Twisden I have not observed that the day makes any difference If I have a Fair or Market and one will erect another to my prejudice an Action will lye and so of a Ferry It s true for one to set up a School by mine is damnum absque injuria Ordered to be moved again Pawlett moved in Trespass that the Defendant pleaded in Bar that he had paid 3 l. and made a promise to pay so much more in satisfaction and said it was a good plea and did amount to an accord with satisfaction an Action being but a Contract which this was Twisden An Accord executed is pleadable in Bar but Executory not Twisden There are two clauses in the Statute of Vsury if there be a corrupt agreement at the time of the lending of the money then the Bonds and all the Assurances are void but if the agreement be good and afterward he receives more than he ought then he forfeits the treble value Bonnefield HE was brought into Court upon a Cap. Excom and it was urged by Pawlett that he might be delivered for that his name was Bonnefield and the Cap. Excom was against one Bromfield Twisden You cannot plead that here to a Cap. Excom You have no day in Court and we cannot Bail upon this but you may bring your Action of False Imprisonment Caterall Marshall ACtion upon the Case wherein the Plaintiff declares that in consideration that he would give the Defennant a Bond of sufficient penalty to save him harmless he would c. and sets forth that he gave him a Bond with sufficient penalty but does not eppress what the penalty was This was moved in Arrest of Iudgment Jones After a Verdict it is good enough as in the case in Hob. 69. Twisd If it had been upon a Demurrer I should not have doubted but that it had been naught Rainsford Morton But the Iury have judged the penalty to be reasonable and have found the matter of fact Twisden The Iury are not Iudges what is reasonable and what unreasonable but this is after a Verdict And so the Iudgment was affirm'd the cause coming into the Kings Bench upon a Writ of Error Martin Delboe AN Action upon the Case setting forth that the Defendant was a Merchant and transmitted several Goods beyond Sea and promised the Plaintiff that if he would give him so much money he would pay him so much out of the proceed of such a parcel of Goods as he was to receive from beyond Sea The Defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations and doth not say non assumpsit infra sex annos but that the cause of Action did not arise within six years The Plaintiff demurs because the cause is betwéen Merchants c. Sympson The plea is good Accounts within the Statute must be understood of those that remain in the nature of Accounts now this is a sum certain Jones accorded This is an Action upon the Case and an Action upon the Case betwéen Merchants is not within the exception And the Defendant has pleaded well in saying that the cause of Action did not arise within six years for the cause of Action ariseth from the time of the Ships coming into Port and the six years are to be reckoned from that time Twisden I never knew but that the word Accounts in the Statute was taken only for Actions of account An insimul computasset brought for a sum certain upon an Account stated though betweén Merchants is not within the Exception So Iudgment was given for the Defendant The King versus Leginham AN Information was exhibited against him for taking unreasonable Distresses of several of his Tenants Jones moved in arrest of Iudgment that an Information would not lye for such cause Marlebr cap. 4. saith that if the Lord take an unreasonable Distress he shall be amerced so that an Information will not lye And my Lord Coke upon Magna Carta says the party grieved may have his Action upon the Statute but admit an Information would lye yet it ought to have been more particular and to have named the Tenants it is not sufficient to say in general that he took unreasonable Distresses of several of his Tenants And the second part of the Information viz. that he is communis oppressor is not sufficient Rolls 79. Moor 451. Twisden It hath so been adjudged that to lay in an Information that a man is communis oppressor is not good And a Lord cannot be indicted
receive the bodies of James Earl of Salisbury Anthony Earl of Shaftsbury and Philip Lord Wharton Members of this House and keep them in safe custody within the said Tower during his Majesties pleasure and the pleasure of this House for their high Contempt committed against this House And this shall be a sufficient Warrant on that behalf To the Constable c. John Browne Cler ' Parl ' The Earl of Shaftsbury's Counsel prayed that the Retorn might be Filed and it was so And Friday following appointed for the debating of the sufficiency of the Retorn and in the mean time directions were given to his Counsel to attend the Iudges and the Attorny-General with their Exceptions to the Retorn and my Lord was remanded till that day And it was said that though the Retorn was Field the Court could remand or commit him to the Marshal at their Election And on Friday the Earl was brought into Court again and his Counsel argued the insufficiency of the Retorn Williams said That this cause was of great consequence in regard the King was touched in his Prerogative The Subject in his Liberty and this Court in its Iurisdiction The cause of his Commitment which is retorned is not sufficient for the general allegation of high Contempts is too uncertain for the Court cannot judge of the Contempt if it doth not appear in what act it is Secondly It is not shewed where the Contempt was committed and in favour of Liverty it shall be intended they were committed out of the House of Peers Thirdly The time is uncertain so that peradventure it was before the last Act of general Pardon 1 Roll 192 193. and 219. Russells case Fourthly It doth not appear whether this Commitment were on a Conviction or an Accusation only It cannot be denied but that the Retorn of such Commitment by any other Court would be too general and uncertain Moore 839. Astwick was bailed on a Retorn Quod commissus fuit per mandatum Ni. Bacon Mil. Domini Custodis magni Sigilli Angliae virtute cujusdam Contempt ' in Curia Cancellariae fact ' and in that book it appears that divers other persons were bailed on such general Retorns and the cases have been lately affirmed in Bushells case repeated by the Lord Chief Iustice Vaughan where it is expresly said that on such Commitment and Retorns being too general and uncertain the Court cannot believe in an implicite manner that in truth the Commitment was for causes particular and sufficient Vaughans Rep. 14. accord 2 Inst 52 53 55. and 1 Roll 218. And the Commitment of the Iurors was for acquitting Pen and Mead contra plenam manifestam Evidentiam and it was resolved to be too general for the Evidence ought to appear as certain to the Iudge of the Retorn as it appeared before the Iudge authorized to Commit Russells case 137. Now this Commitment being by the House of Peers will make no difference for in all cases where a matter comes in Iudgment before this Court let the question be of what nature it will the Court is obliged to declare the Law and that without distinction whether the question began in Parliament or no. In the case of Sir George Binion in C. B. there was a long debate whether an Original might be Filed against a Member of Parliament during the time of priviledge and it was urged that it being during the Sessions of Parliament the determination of the question did belong to the Parliament But it was resolved an Original might be Filed and Bridgman then being Chief Iustice said That the Court was obliged to declare the Law in all cases that come in Iudgment before them Hill 24 E. 4. Rot. 4. 7. 10. in Scacc ' in Debt by Rivers versus Cousin The Defendant pleads he was a Servant to a Member of Parliament and ideo capi seu arrest ' non debet and the Plaintiff prays Iudgment and quia videtur Baronibus quod tale habetur privilegium quod magnates c. et eorum familiares capi seu arrestari non debent Sed nullum habetur privilegium quod non debent implacitari Ideo respondeat oustr ' So in Treymiards case a question of priviledge was determined in this Court Dyer 60. In the 14 E. 3. in the case of Sir John and Sir Geoffrey Staunton which was cited in the case of the Earl of Clarendon and is entred in the Lords Iournal an Action of Waste depended between them in the Common-Pleas and the Court was divided and the Record was certified into the House of Parliament and they gave direction that the Iudgment should be entred for the Plaintiff Afterwards in a Writ of Error brought in this Court that Iudgment was reversed notwithstanding the Objection That it was given by Order of the House of Lords for the Court was obliged to proceed according to the Law in a matter which was before them in point of Iudgment The construction of all Acts of Parliament is given to the Courts at Westminster And accordingly they have adjudged of the Validity of Acts of Parliament They have searched the Rolls of Parliament Hob. 109. Lord Hudsons case They have determined whether the Iournals be a Record Hob. 110. When a point comes before them in Iudgment they are not foreclosed by any Act of the Lords If it appears that an Act of Parliament was made by the King and Lords without the Commons that is Felo de se and the Courts of Westminster do adjudge it void 4 H. 7. 18. Hob. 111. and accordingly they ought to do If this Retorn contains in it that which is fatal to it self it must stand or fall thereby It hath been a question often resolved in this Court when a Writ of Error in Parliament shall be a Supersedeas And this Court hath determined what shall be said to be a Session of Parliament 1 Roll 29. and if the Law were otherwise there would be a failour of Iustice If the Parliament were Dissolved there can be no question but the Prisoner should be discharged on a Habeas Corpas and yet then the Court must examine the cause of his Commitment and by consequence a matter Parliamentary And the Court may now have cognisance of the matter as clearly as when the Parliament is Dissolved The party would be without remedy for his Liberty if he could not find it here for it is not sufficient for him to procure the Lords to determine their pleasure for his Imprisonment for before his enlargement he must obtain the pleasure of the King to be determined and that ought to be in this Court and therefore the Prisoner ought first to resort hither Let us suppose for it doth not appear on the Retorn and the Court ought not to enquire of any matter out of it that a supposed contempt was a thing done out of the House it would be hard for this Court to remand him Suppose he were committed to a Forreign prison during the
Man brings an Action of Debt against B. Sheriff of the County Palatine of Lancaster and sues him to an Outlawry upon mean Process and has a Capias directed to the Chancery of the County Palatine who makes a Precept to the Coroners of the County being six in all to take his body and have him before the Kings Iustices of the Court of Common-Pleas at Westminster such a day One of the Coroners being in sight of the Defendant and having a fair opportunity to Arrest him doth it not but they all return non est inventus though he were easie to be found and might have been taken every day Hereupon the Plaintiff brings an Action against the Coroners and lays his Action in Middlesex and has a Verdict for 100 l. Serj. Baldwin moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the Action ought to have been brought in Lancaster he agreed to the cases put in Bulwer's case 7 Rep. where the cause of Action arises equally in two Counties but here all that the Coroners do subsists and determines in the County Palatine of Lancaster for they make a Return to the Chancery of the County Palatine only and it is he that makes the Return to the Court He insisted upon Dyer 38 39 40. Husse Gibbs 2. He said this Action is grounded upon two wrongs one the not arresting him when he was in sight the other for returning non est inventus when he might easily have been taken now for the wrong of one all are charged and entire damages given He said two Sheriffs make but one Officer but the case of Coroners is different each of them is responsible for himself only and not for his Companion Serjeant Turner Pemberton contra They said the Action was well brought in Middlesex because the Plaintiffs damage arose here viz. by not having the body here at the day They cited Bulwer's case Dyer 159. b. the Chancery returns to the Court the same answer that the Coroners return to him so that their false Return is the cause of prejudice that accrues to the Plaintiff here The ground of this Action is the return of non est inventus which is the act of them all that one of them saw him and might have arrested him and that the Defendant was daily to be found c. are but mentioned as arguments to prove the false Return And they conceived an Action would not lie against one Coroner no more then against one Sheriff in London York Norwich c. But to the first exception taken by Baldwin they said admitting the Action laid in another County then where it ought yet after Verdict it is aided by the Statute of 16 17 Car. 2. if the Ven. come from any place of the County where the Action is laid it is not said in any place of the County where the cause of Action ariseth now this Action is laid in Middlesex and so the Trial by a Middlesex Iury good let the cause of Action arise where it will Cur̄ That Statute doth not help your case for it is to be intended when the Action is laid in the proper County where it ought to be laid which the word proper County implies But they inclined to give Iudgment for the Plaintiff upon the reasons given by Turner Pemberton Adjornatur Bird Kirke IT was resolved in this case by the whole Court 1. That if there be Tenant for life the Remainder for life of a Copy-hold and the Remainder-man for life enter upon the Tenant for life in possession and make a surrender that nothing at all passeth hereby for by his entry he is a Disseisor and has no customary Estate in him whereof to make a surrender 2. That when Tenant for life of a Copy-hold suffers a Recovery as Tenant in Fee that this is no forfeiture of his Estate for the Free-hold not being concern'd and it being in a Court-Baron where there is no Estoppell and the Lord that is to take advantage of it if it be a forfeiture being party to it it is not to be resembled to the forfeiture of a Free-Tenant that Customary Estates have not such accidental qualities as Estates at Common Law have unless by special Custom 3. That if it were a forfeiture of this and all other forfeitures committed by Copy-holders the Lord only and not any of those in Remainder ought to take advantage And they gave Iudgment accordingly North Chief Justice said that where it is said in King Lord's case in Cr. Car. that when Tenant for life of a Copy-hold surrenders c. that no use is left in him but whosoever is afterward admitted comes in under the Lord that that is to be understood of Copy-holds in such Mannors where the Custom warrants only Customary Estates for life and is not applicable to Copy-holds granted for life with a Remainder in Fee Anonymus A Writ of Annuity was brought upon a Prescription against the Rector of the Parish Church of St. Peter in c. the Defendant pleads that the Church is overflown with the Sea c. the Plaintiff demurs Serjeant Nudigate pro Querente The Declaration is good for a Writ of Annuity lies upon a prescription against a Parson but not against an heir F. N. B. 152. Rastall 32. the plea of the Church being drowned is not good at best it is no more then if he had said that part of the Glebe was drowned it is not the building of the Church nor the consecrated ground in respect whereof the Parson is charged but the profits of the Tythes and the Glebe Though the Church be down one may be presented to the Rectory 21 H. 7. 1. 10. H. 7. 13. 16 H. 7. 9. Luttrel's case 4 Rep. Wilmote contra The Parson is charged as Parson of the Church of St. Peter we plead in effect that there is no such Church and he confesseth it 21 Ed. 4. 83. Br. Annuity 39. 21 Ed. 4. 20. 11 H. 4. 49. we plead that the Church is submersa obruta c. which is as much a dissolution of the Rectory as the death of all the Monks is a dissolution of an Abbathie It may be objected that the Defendant has admitted himself Rector by pleading to it but I answer 1. An Estoppel is not taken notice of unless relyed on in pleading 2. The Plaintiff by his demurrer has confessed the Fact of our plea. By which mean the matter is set at large though we were estopped The Court was clearly of opinion for the Plaintiff The Church is the Cure of Souls and the right of Tythes If the material Fabrick of the Parish-Church be down another may be built and ought to be Judicium pro Quer ' nisi c. Term. Trin. 27 Car. II. in Communi Banco Vaughton versus Atwood alios TRespass for taking away some Flesh-meat from the Plaintiff being a Butcher The Defendant justifies by virtue of a Custom of the Mannor of c. that the Homage used
be Deputy to the party that would avoid the Patent Twisd If a man promise another that if he recover his Land the other shall have a Lease of it he is no good Witness so neither is this man But by the Opinions of the thrée other Iudges he was allowed because the Suit here is between the King and the Patentée Worthy Liddall SAunders moved for a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court in a Suit there for calling the Plaintiff Whore Twisd Opinions have been pro and con upon this point The Spiritual Court has a Iurisdiction in cases of Whoredom and Adultery but if Suits there were allowed for such railing words they would have work enough from Billingsgate Saunders relyed upon this that they were only words of heat Keel They are Iudges of that Saunders In Mich. 11 Jac. Rot. 664. Cryer versus Glover in Com. B. The suggestion was that she struck him and he said thou art a Whore and I was never struck by a Whores hand before there a Prohibition was granted and I conceive the reason was because there was a provocation so in our case it appears that they were Scolding According 15 Jac. Rot. 325. Short versus Cole 15 Car. 2. between Loveland Goose The Court refused to grant a Prohibition Maddox WAllop moved for a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court for one Maddox Incumbent of a Donative within the Diocess of Peterborough who was cited into the Spiritual Court for marrying there without a Licence and cited Fairechilds case Yel 60. But per Keeling Moreton Rainesford the Prohibition was denied Twisden doubted but said if they might punish him in the Ecclesiastical Court pro reformatione morum at least they could not deprive him Doctor Poordage BArtue moved for a Writ of Priviledge for him he being a practising Physitian in Town and chosen Constable in a Parish The Court said if the Office go by Houses he must make a Deputy But upon consideration the motion was refused and a difference made between an Attorney or Barrister at Law and a Physitian the former enjoy their Priviledge because of their attendance in publick Courts and not upon the account of any private business in their Chambers and a Physitians Calling is a private Calling Wherefore they would not introduce new Presidents Sir John Kirle versus Osgood AN Action for words viz. Sir John Kirle is a forsworn Justice and not fit to be a Justice of Peace to sit upon the Bench and so I will tell him to his face Moved in arrest of Iudgment because to say a man is forsworn is not Actionable for it may be understood of swearing in common discourse Jones They are Actionable because applied to his Suite Stukely's case 4 Rep. Fleetwood's case in Hob. Though a mans Office is not named yet if the words do refer in themselves or are applyed to it they are Actionable so in our case Winnington They are not Actionable for they admit of a construction in mitiori sensu in Stukely's case that has béen cited corruption in his Office is necessarily implyed but not in this case Rolls 56. Keeling He calls him in effect a corrupt Iustice and that supplies the communication concerning his Office words must be construed according to common acceptation Morton I sée little difference betwéen this and Sir John Isam's case 1 Cro. 14. Sir William Massam's case Rainsford accorded He cited 1 Rolls 53. 4 Rep. Stukelies case Twisden was of the same Opinion for the words read to disgrace him in his Office Iudgment for the Plaintiff Hastings Attorny of the K. B. WInnington complained to the Court an his behalf that he being an Attorney of this Court was not suffered to appear for his Clyent in the Court at Stepney That Court he said was erected by Letters Patents within these two years and the Attornies of this Court being an ancient Court ought not to be excluded On the other side it was urged that they had a certain number of Attornies appointed by their Charter as there is at the Marshals Court Keeling This is a new Court and for my part I think our Attornies cannot be excluded Hastings may bring his Action If a Patent erecting a new Court may limit a certain number of Attornies that shall practise there it may as well limit a certain number of Counsel Coleman They have so in the Marshalsey and in London Keeling Their Courts in London are ancient and their Customs confirmed by Acts of Parliament The now Court of the Marshalsey is indéed a new erected Court for the old Court of the Verge was another thing and as for their having a certain number of Counsel or Attornies the question is the same with this before us whether they can legally exclude others I do not see how the King by a new Patent can ouâ—â—e any man of his priviledge Twisden said it was a new point and that he had never heard it stir'd before Afterwards being moved again Keeling said they should have their Iudgments quickly if they stood upon it Twisd I have known this ruled if you say you will refer the cause to such a man that ex consequente the cause must stay because that man is made Iudge and that the staying of the cause is implyed in the reference Dominus Rex versus Vaws MOved to quash a Presentment for refusing to be sworn Constable of an Hundred because the Presentment does not mention before whom the Sessions were held which was quash'd accordingly and Twisden said the Clerk of the Peace ought to be fined for returning such a Presentment Birrell Shawe SCire facias against the Bail The Defendant pleads that before the return of the Writ of Scire facias there was a Capias ad satisfaciend against the principal by vertue whereof he was taken and paid the money but alledges no place where the payment was Twisd You cannot make good this fault Dodwell Ux. versus Burford THe Plaintiffs in an Action of Battery declared that the Defendant struck the Horse whereon the Wife rode so that the Horse ran away with her whereby she was thrown down and another Horse ran over her whereby she lost the use of two of her Fingers The Iury had given them 48 l. damages and they moved the Court upon view of the maihem to increase them whereupon the Declaration was read but the Court thought the damages given by the Iury sufficient Smith versus Bowin ACtion upon a promise The Plaintiff declares that the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintiff would suffer him to take away so much of the Plaintiffs Grass which the Defendant had cut down promised to pay him so much for it and also to pay him six pounds which he owed him for a Debt After a Verdict for the Plaintiff Williams moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the Plaintiff was an Infant and he not being bound by the agreement that the Defendant ought not to be bound by it
Trespass was brought for taking away a Cup till he paid him 20 shillings The Defendant pleads that ad quandam curiam he was amerced and that for that the Cup was taken Hales We cannot tell what Court it is whether it be a Court-Baron by Grant or Prescription if it be by Grant then it must be coram Seneschallo if by Prescription it may be coram Seneschallo or coram Sectatoribus or coram both Then it does not appear that the House where the Trespass was laid was within the Manor Then he doth not say infra Jur. Cur ' It was put upon the other side to shew cause Jacob Hall's Case ONe Jacob Hall a Rope-dancer had erected a Stage in Lincolns-Inn-fields but upon a Petition of the Inhabitants there was an Inhibition from Whitehall now upon a complaint to the Iudges that he had erected one at Charing-cross he was sent for into Court and the Chief Iustice told him that he understood it was a Nusance to the Parish and some of the Inhabitants being in Court said that it did occasion Broyles and Fightings and drew so many Rogues to that place that they lost things out of their Shops every Afternoon And Hales said that in 8 Car. 1. Noy came into Court and prayed a Writ to prohibit a Bowling-Ally erected near St. Dunstans Church and had it Sir Anthony Bateman's Case IN the Trial at Bar the Son and Daughter of Sir Anthony Bateman were Defendants the Action was an Ejectione Firmae The Defendants admitted the point of Sir Anthony's Bankrupcy but set up a Conveyance made by Sir Anthony to them for the payment of 1500 l. apiece being money given to them by their Grandfather Mr. Russell to whom Sir Anthony took out Administration Hales It is a voluntary Conveyance unless you can prove that Sir Anthony had Goods in his hands of Mr. Russell at the time of the executing it So they proved that he had and there was a Verdict for the Defendants Legg Richards EJectment Iudgment against the Defendant who dies and his Executor brings a Writ of Error and is non-suited It was moved that he should pay Costs Twisden An Executor is not within the Statute for payment of Costs occasione dilationis Hales I am of the same Opinion Harwood's Case HE was brought to the Bar by Habeas Corpus being committed by the Court of Aldermen for marrying an Orphan without their consent Sol. North. We conceive the Return insufficient and that it is an unreasonable Custom to impose a Penalty on a man for marrying a City-Orphan in any place of England Now we marryed her far from London and knew not that she was an Orphan Then they have put a Fine of 40 l. upon him whereas there is no cause why he should be denied Marriage with her there being no disparagement Twisden Mr. Waller of Berkingsfield was imprison'd six months for such a thing So the money was ordered to be brought into Court Vide infra 79. Leginham Porphery REplevin and Avowry for not doing Suit The Plaintiff sets forth a Custom that if any Tenant live at a distance if he comes at Michaelmas and pay eight pence to the Lord and a penny to the Steward he shall be excused for not attending and then says that he tendred eight pence c. and the Lord refused it c. Polynxfen I know no case where payment will do and tender and refusal will not do Hales Have you averred that there are sufficient Copy-holders that live near the Mannor Polynxfen We have averred that there are at least 120. Hales Surely tender and refusal is all one with payment Twisden An Award is made that super receptionem c. a man should give a Release there tender and refusal is enough Iudgment for the Defendant Waldron versus c. HAles It is true one Parish may contain thrée Vills The Parish of A. may contain the Vills of A. B. and C. that is when there are distinct Constables in every one of them But if the Constable of A. doth run through the whole then is the whole but one Ville in Law Or where there is a Tything-man it may be a Ville but if the Constable run through the Tything then it is all one Ville I know where three or four Thousand l. per annum hath béen enjoyed by a Fine levied of Land in the Ville of A. in which are five several Hamlets in which are Tythings but the Constable of A. runs through them all and upon that it was held good for all Here was a case of the Constable of Blandford-Forum wherein it was held that if he had a concurrent Iurisdiction with all the rest of the Constables the Fine would have passed the Lands in all In some places they have Tythingmen and no Constables Polynxfen Lambard 14. is that the Constable and the Tything-man are all one Hales That is in some places Praepositus is a proper word for a Constable and Decemarius for a Tything-man An Indictment for retaining a Servant without a Testimonial from his last Master Moved to quash it because it wants the words contra pacem 2. Becausâ—â—â—ey do not shew in what Trade it was So quash'd Moved to quash another Indictment because the year of our Lord in the Caption was in Figures Hales The year of the King is enough Moved for a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court for that they Sue a Parish for not paying a Rate made by the Church-wardens only whereas by the Law the major part of the Parish must joyn Twisden Perhaps no more of the Parish will come together Counsel If that did appear it might be something Hales A Writ of Error will lie in the Exchequer-Chamber of a Iudgment in a Scire facias grounded upon a Iudgment in one of the Actions mentioned in the 27 of Eliz. cap. 8. because it is in effect a piece of one of the Actions therein mentioned Harwood's Case HE was removed out of London by Habeas Corpus the Return was That he was fined and committed there for marrying a City-Orphan without the consent of the Court of Aldermen Exception 1. They do not say that the party was a Citizen or that the Marriage was within the City and they are not bound to take notice of a City Orphan out of the City for their Customs extend only to Citizens in the City Exception 2. They have not shewed that we had reasonable time to shew cause why we should not be fined Twisden These Objections were over-ruled in one Waller's case Afterward in the same Term Weston spake to it There are two matters upon which the validity of this Return doth depend viz. The Custom and the Offence within the Custom The Custom is laid that time out of mind the Court of Aldermen have had power to set a reasonable Fine upon such as should marry an Orphan without their leave and upon refusal to pay it to imprison him I conceive this Custom as it is laid to
pleaded A special Verdict that the Lands are Copyhold Lands and surrendred to the use of one for eleven years the Remainder for five years to the Daughter the Remainder to the right heirs of the Tenant for eleven years The eleven years expire the Daughter is admitted the five years expire And there being a Son and Daughter by one Venter and a Son by another Venter the Son of the first Venter dies before admittance and the Daughter of the first Venter and her Husband bring Trover for cutting down of Trees And the question was if the admittance of Tenant for years was the admittance of the Son in Remainder Levings I conceive it is and then the Son is seized and the Daughter of the whole blood is his heir and he cited 4 Rep. 23. 3 Cro. 503. Bunny's case Wyld The Estate is bound by the Surrender Hales If a man doth surrender to the use of John Styles till admitted there is no Estate in him but remains in the Surrenderor but he hath a right to have an admittance If a surrender be to J. S. and his heirs his heir is in without admittance if J. S. dies About this hath indeed been diversity of Opinion but the better Opinion hath been according to the Lord Coke's Opinion I do not see any inconvenience why the admission of Tenant for life or years should not be the admittance of all in Remainder for Fines are to be paid notwithstanding by the particular Remainders and so the Books say it shall be no prejudice to the Lord. Twisd I think it is strong that the admission of Lessee for years is the admission of him in Remainder for as in a case of possessio fratris the Estate is bound so that the Sister shall be heir so here the Estate is bound and goes to him in Remainder Hales I shall not prejudice the Lord for if a Fine be assessed for the whole Estate there is an end of the business but if a Fine be assessed only for a particular Estate the Lord ought to have another If a surrender be to the use of A. for life the Remainder to his eldest Son c. or to the use of A. and his heirs and then A. dies the Estate is in the Son without admittance whether he takes by purchase or descent And Iudgment was given accordingly Draper versus Bridwell Rot. 320. ALL the Court held that an Action of Debt would lye upon a Iudgment after a Writ of Error brought Twisden They in the Spiritual Court will give Sentence for Tythes for rakings though they be never so unvoluntarily left which our Law will not allow of Wyld said that Actions personal transitory though the party doth live in Chester yet they may be brought in the Kings Courts Hales Shew a President where a man can wage his Law in an Action brought upon a Prescription for a duty as in an Action of Debt for Toll by Prescription you cannot wage your Law Pybus versus Mitford Postea THe Chief Iustice delivered his Opinion Wyld Rainsford and Twisden having first delivered theirs Hales I think Iudgment ought to be given for the Defendant whether the Son take by descent or purchase I shall divide the case 1 Whether the Son doth take by descent 2 Admitting he doth not whether he can take by purchase We must make a great difference betweén Conveyances of Estates by way of use and at Common Law A man cannot convey to himself an Estate by a Conveyance at Common Law but by way of Vse he may But now in our case here doth doth retorn by operation of Law an Estate to Michael for his life which is conjoyned with the Limitation to his heirs The reason is because a Limitation to the heirs of his body is in effect to himself this is perfectly according to the intention of the parties Objection The use being never out of Michael he hath the old use and so it must be a Contingent use to the heirs of his body But I say we are not here to raise a new Estate in the Covenantor but to qualifie the Estate in Fee in himself for the old Estate is to be made an Estate for life to serve the Limitation Further Objection It shall be the old Estate in Fee as if a man deviseth his Lands to his heirs the heir is in of the old Estate But I answer if he qualifie the Estate the Son must take it so as in Hutton fo So in this case is a new qualification Roll 789. 15 Jac. If a man makes a Feoffment to the use of the heirs of the body of the Feoffor the Feoffor hath an Estate Tail in him Pannel versus Fenne Moor 349. Englefield and Englefield 2 I conceive if it were not possible to take by descent this would be a Contingent use to the heirs of the body Objection It is limited to the heir when no heir in being Why I say it would have come to the heir at Common Law if no express Limitation had been and it cannot be intended that he did mean an heir at Common Law because he did specially limit it Fitz. tit Entayle 23. An Assise for the Serjeant at Mace's place in the House of Commons The Plaintiff had his Patent read The Court asked if they could prove Seisin They answered that they had recovered in an Action upon the case for the mean profits and had Execution Court For ought we know that will amount to a seisin Twisden Vpon your grant since you could not get seisin you should have gone into Chancery and they would have compelled him to give you seisin Hales A man may bring an Action upon the case for the profits of an Office though he never had seisin So the Record was read of his Recovery in an Action upon the case for the profits Hales This is but a seisin in Law not a seisin in Fact The Counsel for the Plaintiff much urged that the Recovery and Execution had of the profits was a sufficient seisin to entitle them to an Assise It was objected that the Plaintiff was never invested into the Office Hales said That an investiture did not make an Officer when he is created by Patent as this is but he is an Officer presently But if he were created an Herald at Arms as in Segars case he must be invested before he can be an Officer a person is an Officer before he is sworn Hales You are the Pernor of the profits and they have recovered them is not this a Seisin against you They shall find it specially but they chose rather to be Non-suit because of the delay by a special Verdict And the Court told them they could not withdraw a Iuror in an Assise for then the Assise would be depending The Roll of the Action sur le case fuit 19 Car. 2. Mich. Rot. 557. Term. Trin. 15 Car. II. 1663. Judge Hide 's Argument in the Exchequer-Chamber Manby versus Scott A Feme Covert departs
this whole Court in the case of Barnadiston and Soames that the Action for the double Retorn could not be brought in this Court before the Parliament had determined the right of the Election lest there should be a difference between the Iudgments of the two Courts When a Iudgment of the Lords comes into this Court though it be of the reversal of a Iudgment of this Court this Court is obliged to execute it but the Iudgment was never examined or corrected here In the case of my Lord Hollis it was resolved that this Court hath no Iurisdiction of a misdemeanour commited in the Parliament when the Parliament is determined the Iudges are Expositors of the Acts and are intrusted with the lives liberties and fortunes of the Subjects And if the Sessions were determined the Earl might apply himself to this Court for the Subject shall not be without place where he may resort for the recovery of his liberty but this Session is not determined For the most part the Royal Assent is given the last day of Parliament as saith Plow Partridges case Yet the giving of the Royal Assent doth not make it the last day of the Parliament without a subsequent Dissolution or Prorogation And the Court Iudicially takes notice of Prorogations or Adjournments of Parliament Cro. Jac. 111. Ford versus Hunter And by consequence by the last Adjournment no Order is discontinued but remains as if the Parliament were actually assembled Cro. Jac. 342. Sir Charles Heydon's case so that the Earl ought to apply himself to the Lords who are his proper Iudges It ought to be observed that these Attempts are primae Impressionis and though Imprisonments for Contempts have been frequent by the one and the other House till now no person ever sought enlargement here The Court was obliged in Iustice to grant the Habeas Corpus but when the whole matter being disclosed it appears upon the Return that the case belongs ad aliud examen they ought to remand the party As to the limitation of the Imprisonment the King may determine his pleasure by Pardon under the Great Seal or Warrant for his discharge under the Privy Seal as in the case of Reniger Fogassa Plow 20. As to the Exception that no Commitment is returned the Constable can only shew what concerns himself which is the Warrant to him directed and the Writ doth not require him to return any thing else As to the Exception that he is otherwise named in the Commitment then in the Writ the Writ requires the body of Anthony Earl of Shaftesbury quocunque nomine Censeatur in the Commitment The Court delivered their Opinion and first Sir Thomas Jones Justice said such a Retorn made by an ordinary Court of Iustice would have been ill and uncertain but the case is different when it comes from this high Court to which so great respect hath been paid by our Predecessors that they deferred the determination of doubts conceived in an Act of Parliament until they had received the advice of the Lords in Parliament But now instead thereof it is demanded of us to comptroll the Iudgment of all the Peers given on a Member of their own House and during the continuance of the Session The cases where the Courts of Westminster have taken cognizance of Priviledge differ from this case for in those it was only an incident to a case before them which was of their cognizance but the direct point of the matter now is the Iudgment of the Lords The course of all Courts ought to be considered for that is the Law of the Court Lane's case 2 Rep. And it hath not been affirmed that the usage of the House of Lords hath been to express the matter more punctually on Commitments for Contempts And therefore I shall take it to be according to the course of Parliament 4 Inst 50. it is said that the Iudges are Assistants to the Lords to inform them of the Common Law but they ought not to judge of any Law Custom or usage of Parliament The objection as to the continuance of the Imprisonment hath received a plain answer for it shall be determined by the pleasure of the King or of the Lords and if it were otherwise yet the King could pardon the Contempt under the Great Seal or discharge the Imprisonment under the Privy Seal I shall not say what would be the consequence as to this Imprisonment if the Session were determined for that is not the present case but as the case is this Court can neither Bail nor discharge the Earl Wyld Justice The Retorn no doubt is illegal but the question is on a point of Iurisdiction whether it may be examined here this Court cannot intermeddle with the transactions of the high Court of Peers in Parliament during the Session which is not determined and therefore the certainty or uncertainty of the Retorn is not material for it is not examinable here but if the Session had béen determined I should be of Opinion that he ought to be discharged Rainsford Chief Justice This Court hath no Iurisdiction of the cause and therefore the form of the Retorn is not considerable we ought not to extend our Iurisdiction beyond its due limits and the Actions of our Predecessors will not warrant us in such Attempts The consequence would be very mischievous if this Court should deliver the Members of the Houses of Peers and Commons who are committed for thereby the business of the Parliament may be retarded for perhaps the Commitment was for evil behaviour or undecent Reflections on the Members to the disturbance of the affairs of Parliament The Commitment in this case is not for safe custody but he is in Execution on the Iudgment given by the Lords for the Contempt and therefore if he be bailed he will be delivered out of Execution because for a Contempt in facie Curiae there is no other Iudgment or Execution This Court hath no Iurisdiction of the matter and therefore he ought to be remanded And I deliver no Opinion if it would be otherwise in case of Prorogation Twisden Justice was absent but he desired Justice Jones to declare that his Opinion was that the party ought to be remanded And so he was remanded by the Court. Term. Trin. 26 Car. II. 1674. in B. R. Pybus versus Mitford ante 121. THis case having been several times argued at the Bar received Iudgment this Term. The case was Michael Mitford was seised of the Lands in question in Fee and had Issue by his second wife Ralph Mitford and 23. Jan ' 21 Jac. by Indenture made betwéen the said Michael of the one part and Sir Ralph Dalivell and others of the other part he covenanted to stand immediately seised after the date of the said Indenture amongst others of the Lands in question by these words viz. To the use of the Heirs Males of the said Michael Mitford begotten or to be begotten on the body of Jane his wife the
Reversion to his own right Heirs after which Michael dyed leaving Issue Robert his Son and Heir by a first Venter and the said Ralph by Jane his second wife after the death of Michael Robert entred and from Robert by divers Mesne Conveyances a Title was deduced to the Heir of the Plaintiff Ralph had Issue Robert the Defendant And in this special Verdict the question was If any Vse did arise to Ralph by this Indenture 23 Jan ' 21 Jac ' Hales Rainsford and Wyld against the Opinion of Twisden Michael Mitford took an Estate for life by implication and consequence and so had an Estate Tail Hales 1 said it were clear if an Estate for life had been limited to Michael and to the Heirs males of the body of Michael to be begotten on the body of his second wife that had been an Estate Tail 2 Which way soever it be the Estate is lodged in Michael during his life 3 There is a great difference between Estates to be conveyeyed by the rules of the Common Law and Estates conveyed by way of Vse for he may mould the Vse in himself in what estate he will These things being premised he said This Estate being turned by operation of Law into an Estate in Michael is as strong as if he had limited an Estate to himself for life 2 A Limitation to the Heirs of his body is in effect a Limitation to the Vse of himself for his Heirs are included in himself 3 It is perfectly according to the intention of the party which was that his eldest Son should not take but that the Issue of the second wife should take His intent appears to be 1 Object that it should take effect as a future use When a man limits a Vse to commence in futuro Respons and there is such a descendible quality left in him that his Heirs may take in the mean time there it shall operate solely by way of future Vse as if a man Covenant to stand seized to the use of J. S. after the expiration of 40 years or after the death of J. D. there no present alteration of the Estate is made but it is only a future use because the Father or the Ancestor had such an Interest left in him which might descend to his Heir viz. during the years or during the life of J. D. But when no Estate may by reason of the Limitation descend to the Heir until the Contingency happen there the Estate of the Covenantor is moulded to an Estate for life This would be to create an Estate by implication 2 Object We are not here to create an Estate Respons but only to qualifie an Estate which was in the Ancestor before That the old Fee-simple shall be left in him 3 Object Yet the Covenantor had qualified this Estate Respons and converted it into an Estate Tail viz. part of the old Estate That the intention of the parties appears that it should operate by way of future use 4 Object for that of other Lands he covenanted to stand seised to the use of himself and his Heirs of his body It is not the intention of the party that shall comptroll the operation of Law Respons and to the case 1 Inst 22. though it be objected that it was not necessary at the Law to raise an Estate for life by implication yet my Lord Coke hath taken notice what he had said in the case of Parnell and Fenn Roll Rep. 240. if a man make a Feoffment to the use of the Heirs of his body that is an Estate for life in the Feoffor and in Englefields case as it is reported in Moore 303. it is agreed that if a man Covenant to stand seised to an use to commence after his death that the Covenantor thereby is become seised for life As to the second point Twisden Rainsford and Wyld held that no future use would arise to Ralph because he is not heir at Common Law and none can purchase by the name of heir unless he be heir at Common Law But Hales was against them in this point and he held that it Ralph could not take by descent yet he might well take by purchase 1 Because before the St ' de Donis a limitation might be made to this heir and so he was a special heir at Common Law 2 It is apparent that he had taken notice that he had an heir at the Common Law Litt. Sect. 35. 1 Inst 22. So his intent is evident that the heir at the Common Law should not take But on the first point Iudgment was given for the Defendant Term. Mich. 25 Car. II. in Communi Banco Anonymus IF a man be lyable to pay a yearly sum as Treasurer to a Church or the like to a Sub-treasurer or any other and dies the money being in arrear an Action of Assumpsit cannot be maintained against his Executors for these arrears For although according to the resolution in Slade's case 4 Report which Vaughan Chief Iustice said was a strange resolution an Assumpsit or an Action of Debt is maintainable upon a Contract at the parties Election yet where there is no Contract nor any personal privity as in this case there is not an Assumpsit will not lye And in an Action of Debt for these Arrears the Plaintiff must aver that there is so much money in the Treasury as he demands and in this case of an Action against Executors that there was so much at the time of the Testators death c. for the money is due from him as Treasurer and not to be paid out of his own Estate As in an Action against the Kings Receiver the Plaintiff must set forth that he has so much money of the Kings in his Coffers Magdalen Colledge Case INdebitat ' Assumpsit against the President and Scholars of Magdalen Colledge in Oxford for thréescore pounds due for Butter and Cheese sold to the Colledge The Chancellor of the Vniversity demanded Conisance by virtue of Charters of Priviledges granted to the Vniversity by the Kings Progenitors and confirm'd by Act of Parliament whereby amongst other things power is given them to hold plea in personal Actions wherein Scholars or other priviledged persons are concerned and concludes with an express demand of Conisance in this particular cause Baldw. Their priviledge extends not to this case for a Corporation is Defendant and their Charters mention priviledged persons only Their Charters are in derogation of the Common Law and must be taken strictly They make this demand upon Charters confirm'd by Act of Parliament and they have a Charter granted by King Henry 8. which is confirm'd by an Act in the Queens time but the Charter of 11 Car. 1. which is the only Charter that mentions Corporations is not confirm'd by any Act of Parliament and consequently is not material as to this demand For a demand of Conisance is stricti Juris But admitting it material the Kings Patent
Defendants as Executors also they pleaded severally plene administravit Vpon one of the Issues a Special Verdict was found viz. that the said Defendant being Executor durante min ' aetate of an Infant had paid such and such Debts and Legacies and had delivered over totum residuum status personalis of the Testator to the Infant Executor when he came of Age. Iustice Atkyns This special Verdict does not maintain the Defendants plea of fully administred for that cannot be pleaded unless all Debts c. are discharged as far as the Assets will reach which is not done here for residuum status personalis is delivered over c. and that residuum is lyable to the payment of this Debt which is yet undischarged But Vaughan Wyndham and Ellis held that however an Executor dischargeth himself of the Estate that was the Testators he may plead fully administred and that it is his safest plea. It was found by the same Verdict that the Testator left a personal Estate to the value of 2000 l. that there were owing by him 500 l. in Debts upon specialties 500 l. more upon simple Contracts and that he had disposed of 400 l. in Legacies and that this Defendant was Executor durante minor ' of the Testators Son that he had paid 1400 l. in discharge of the Debts and Legacies aforesaid and had accounted with the Infant Executor when he came of age and that upon the payment of 91 l. to him the Infant Executor released to him all Actions c. and whether upon this whole matter this Defendant should be said to have administred was the question Vaughan When an Infant Executor comes of age the power of an Executor durante minore aetate ceaseth and the new Executor is then lyable to all Actions if the former Executor wasted the new one hath his remedy against him but he is not lyable to other mens Suits Nor is there any inconvenience in this for still here is a person lyable to all Actions It is objected that possibly the new Executor is not of ability to satisfie I answer if in some particular case it fall out to be so that is by accident and to argue from the possibility of such an accident is to suppose the Law fitted to answer all emergencies Atkyns accorded Vaughan It is said that here are 1500 l. lyable to pay this Debt for to pay debts upon simple Contracts or Legacies before it is a devastavit especially the Defendant having notice of this debt which was also found That is a mistake upon which some books run but it is certainly no Law Debts upon simple Contracts may be paid before Bonds unless the Executors have timely notice given them of those Bonds and that notice must be by Action Atkyns and Ellis agréed with Vaughan Wyndham dubitabat The case was put off to be argued next Trinity Term but in the mean time the Plaint discontinued Scudamore Crossing Exch. Chamber EJectione firmae A special Verdict it was found that a man by Deed did give and grant bargain and sell alien enfeoff and confirm to his daughter certain Lands but no consideration of money is mention'd nor is the Deed enroll'd there is likewise no consideration of natural Affection expressed other then what 's implyed in naming the Grantee his daughter there is no Livery endorsed nor any found to have been made nor was the daughter in possession at the time of the Deed made The question was whether this were a void Deed or had any operation at all in the Law and what was wrought by it In the Kings Bench it was adjudged by the whole Court to be a good Deed and that it carried the Estate to the daughter by way of covenant to stand seized Vpon a Writ of Error before the Iustices of the Common-Pleas and the Barons of the Exchequer the case was argued at Sergeants-Inn by Sir William Jones against the Deed aud by Sir Francis Winnington in maintenance of it Jones Before the Statute of Vses a man might either have retained the possession and have departed with the use or he might have departed with the possession and have retained the use or he might have departed with them both together The Statute unites the possession to the use but leaves men at liberty to convey their Estates by putting the possession out of themselves and limiting an use or by raising an use and let the possession follow that Now how shall it be known when an Estate must pass one of these ways and when the other That must appear by the intention of the party expressed in the Deed. Some Conveyances contain words that look both ways some one way and some another If the words look both ways then has he to whom the Estate is intended to be conveyed election to take it whether way he likes best Sir Rowland Heyward's case 2 Rep. Adams Steer 2 Cr. 210. so in Mich. 9 Jacob. a man in consideration of money did grant enfeoff bargain and sell and in the deed there was a Letter of Attorney to make Livery resolved to be a good Conveyance by way of bargain and sale if the deed were enrolled Rolls second part 787. Where the words are only proper to pass an Estate by way of use there you shall never take an Estate at Common Law Cr. Jac. 210. in Adams Steer's case Denton Fettyplace's case 30 Eliz. is there cited that by the words of bargain and sale without attornment a Reversion passeth not Vide ibid. 50. Dr. Atkyns case The King bargains and sells c. no use can rise because the King cannot stand seized to an use Moor 113. On the other side where the words are proper to pass the Estate at Common Law there nothing shall pass by way of use Dyer 302. b. a quaere is there made whether or no if a man in consideration of natural affection c. release to his brother who is not in possession whether an use hereby ariseth to the relessee but this Quaere is resolved in a manuscript Report that I have of that case viz. That no use does arise He cited Ward Lambert's case Cr. Eliz. 394. Osburn Churchman's case Cr. Jac. 127. which is the case in question In Rolls second part fol. a man in consideration of marriage did give and grant to his wife after his decease to her and the heirs of her body c. and it was resolved that nothing passed This case is much stronger then ours for there is but one way to make this good viz. by raising an use for as a Conveyance at Common Law it cannot be good because a Freé-hold cannot be granted to commence in futuro and yet rather then recede from the words of the party the deed was adjudged to be void He cited Foster Foster's case Trin. 1659. which himself had argued In the deed here in question there are words proper to pass an Estate in possession give and
grant There is likewise a clause of warranty of which the Grantee should lose the benefit in a great measure if he were in the Post for then he shall not vouch and there are Opinions that he cannot rebut as in Spirt Bence's case There is also a Covenant that after the sealing and delivery and due execution of c. the party shall quietly enjoy c. now what execution can be meant but by Livery of seisin Foxe's case 8 Rep. has been objected in which it is resolved that the Reversion in that case should pass by way of bargain and sale though the words of grant were demise grant set and to Farm let all words proper to a Common-Law-Conveyance I answer the consideration of money there expressed is so strong a consideration as to carry it that way but the consideration of natural Affection is not so strong and so the cases are not alike the consideration of money has been held so strong as to carry an Estate of Fee-simple in an use without words of Inheritance Winnington contra He insisted upon the intention of the party the consideration of blood and natural affection and the necessity of making this deed good by way of Covenant to stand seized because it could not take effect any other way The clause of warranty and covenant for quiet enjoyment he said were but forms of Conveyances and words of Clerks but the effectual words are those that contain the inducement of the party to make the Conveyance and the words that pass the Estate he cited Plowd queries placito 305. Rolls 2 part 787. placito 25. 1 Inst 49. Poph. 49. in Fosters case which had been cited against him he said the deed was as unformal to pass the Estate one way as another In Osburn Churchman's case he said this point was started but that the resolution was not upon this point it came in question neither upon a special Verdict nor a demurrer Tibs Purplewell's case 40 41 Eliz. Rolls 2 part 786 787. answers all Objections against our case and is in form and substance the same with it He cited one Saunders Savin's case adjudged in the late times in the Common-Pleas viz. That where a man seiz'd in Fee of a Rent-charge granted it to a Kinsman for life and the grantor dyed before attornment it was resolved that upon the sealing and delivery of the deed an use arose Wherefore he prayed that the Iudgment might be affirmed Turner Chief Baron of the Exchequer Turner and Littleton Barons and Atkyns Wyndham and Ellis Iustices of the Court of Common-Pleas were for affirming the Iudgment Vaughan Chief Iustice of the Common Pleas and Thurland puisne Baron contra The six Iudges argued 1. That in a Covenant to stand seized those words of covenanting to stand seized to the use of c. are not absolutely necessary and that it is sufficient if there are words that are tantamount 2. That no Conveyance admits of such variety of words as does this of a Covenant to stand seized 3. That Iudges have always endeavoured to support Deeds ut res magis valeat c. 4. That the grantor in this case by putting in plenty of words shews that he did not intend to tye himself up to any one sort of Conveyance 5. That if the words give and grant had been alone in the deed there would have been no question and that if so then utile per inutile non vitiatur 6. That every mans deed must be taken most strongly against himself 7. That the words give and grant enure sometimes as a grant sometimes as a Covenant sometimes as a Release and must be taken in that sense which will best support the intent of the party 8. That the very point of this case has received two full determinations upon debate and that it were a thing of ill consequence to admit of so great an uncertainty in the Law as now to alter it 9. That there is here a clear intent that the daughter should have this Estate a Deed a good consideration to raise an use and words that are tantamount to a Covenant to stand seized Wherefore the Iudgment was affirm'd Thurland said The intention of the party was not a sure rule to construe deeds by that if Lands were given in connubio soluto ab omni servitio the intent of the giver is to make a gift in Frank-marriage but the Common Law that delights in certainty will not understand his words so because he does not say in libero maritagio In our case the first intent of the Father was to settle the Land upon his Daughter his second intent was to do it by such or such a Conveyance what Conveyance he meant to do it by we must know by his words the words give and grant do generally and naturally work upon something in esse strained constructions are not favoured in the Law Nor ought Heirs to be disinherited by forced and strained constructions If this Deed shall work as a Covenant to stand seized it will be in vain to study forms of Conveyances it is but throwing in words enough and if the Lands pass not one way they will another He cited Crook 279. Blitheman Blitheman's case And 34 35 Dyer 55 he said Pitfield Pierce's case in March was later then that of Tibs Purplewell and of better Authority Vaughan accordant It is not clear that the words give and grant are sufficient to raise an use but supposing that they are by a forced Exposition when nothing appears to the contrary will it thence follow that they may be taken in a sense directly contrary to their proper and genuine sense in such a place as this where all the other parts of the deed are wholly inconsistent with and will not by any possibility admit of such a construction he mentioned several clauses in the deed which he said were proper only to a Conveyance at Common Law He appealed to the Law before the Statute of Vses and said that where an use would not rise by the Common Law there the Statute executes no possession and that by such a deed as this no use would have risen at the Common Law but the Iudgment was affirmed Gabriel Miles his Case HE and his Wife recovered in an Action of Debt against one Cogan 200 l. and 70 l. damages the Wife dies and the Husband prays to have Execution upon this Iudgment The Court upon the first motion enclin'd that it should not survive to the Husband but that Administration ought to be committed of it as a thing in Action but this Term they agreed that the Husband might take out Excution and that by the Iudgment it became his own debt due to him in his own right And accordingly he took out a Scire facias Beaumond Long 's case Cr. Car. 208. was cited Anonymus THe Plaintiff in an Ejectione firmae declared upon a Lease made the tenth day of October habend '
the Wife does but nominate what person shall take by the Will This is a plain case and free from uncertainty and ambiguity which else the word dispose will be liable to But Iudgment was given ut supra Howell versus King TRespass for driving Cattel over the Plaintiffs ground The case was A. has a way over B's ground to Black-Acre and drives his Beasts over A's ground to Black-acre and then to another place lying beyond Black-acre And whether this was lawful or no was the question upon a demurrer It was urged that when his Beasts were at Black-acre he might drive them whither he would Rolls 391. nu 40. 11 H. 4. 82. Brook tit chimin On the other side it was said that by this means the Defendant might purchase a hundred or a thousand Acres adjoyning to Black-acre to which he prescribes to have a way by which means the Plaintiff would lose the benefit of his Land and that a Prescription presupposed a grant and ought to be continued according to the intent of its original Creation The whole Court agreed to this And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Warren qui tam c. versus Sayre THe Court agreed in this case that an Information for not coming to Church may be brought upon the Stat. of 23 Eliz. only reciting the clause in it that has reference to Stat. 1. of the Queen and that this is the best and surest way of declaring Term. Hill 26 27 Car. II. in Com. Banco Williamson Hancock Hill 24 25 Car. 2. Rot. 679. TEnant for life the Remainder in Tail Tenant for life levies a Fine to J. S. and his heirs to the use of himself for years and after to the use of Hannah and Susan Prinne and their heirs if such a sum of money were unpaid by the Conusor and if the money were paid then to the use of the Conisor and his heirs And this Fine was with general warranty The Tenant for life died the money unpaid and the warranty descended upon the Remainder-man in Tail And the question was whether the Remainder-man were bound by this warranty or not Serjeant Maynard argued that because the Estate of the Land is transferred in the Post before the warranty attaches in the Remainder-man that therefore it should be no Bar. He agréed that a man that comes in by the limitation of an use shall be an Assignee within the Statute of 32 H. 8. cap. 34. by an equitable construction of the Statute because he comes in by the limitation of the party and not purely by Act in Law but this case of ours is upon a collateral garranty which is a positive Law and a thing so remote from solid reason and equity that it is not to be stretch'd beyond the maxime That the Cestuy que use in this case shall not vouch is confessed on all hands and there is the same reason why he should not rebutt He said the resolution mentioned in Lincoln Colledge case was not in the case nor could be the warranty there was a particular warranty contra tunc Abbatem Westmonasteriensem successores suos which Abby was dissolved long before that case came in question He said Justice Jones upon the arguing of Spirt Bence's case reported in Cr. Car. said that he had been present at the Iudgment in Lincoln Colledge case and that there was no such resolution as is there reported Serjeant Baldwin argued on the other side that at the Common Law many persons might rebutt that could not take advantage of a warranty by way of Voucher as the Lord by Escheat the Lord of a Villain a Stranger a Tenant in possession 35 Ass placito 9. 11 Ass placito 3. 45 Ed. 3. 18. placito 11. 42 Ed. 3. 19. b. a fortiori he said he that is in by the limitation of an use being in by the act of the party though the Law co-operate with it to perfect the assurance shall rebutt The Court was of Opinion that the Cestuy que use might rebutt that though Voucher lies in privity an abater or intruder might rebutt F. N. B. 135. 1 Inst 385. As to Serjeant Maynard's Objection that he is in the Post they said they had adjudged lately in Fowle Doble's case that a Cestuy que use might rebutt So it was held in Spirt Bence's case Cr. Car. and in Jones 199. Kendal Foxe's case That Report in Lincoln Colledge case whether there were any resolution in the case or no is founded upon so good reason that Conveyances since have gone according to it Atkyns said there was a difficult clause in the Statute of Uses viz. That all and singular person and persons c. which at any time on this side the first day of May c. 1536. c. shall have c. By this clause they that came in by the limitation of an use before that day were to have the like advantages by Voucher or Rebutter as if they had béen within the degrees If the Parliament thought it reasonable why was it limited to that time Certainly the makers of that Law intended to destroy Vses utterly and that there should not be for the future any Conveyances to Vses But they supposed that it would be some small time before all people would take notice of the Statute and make their Conveyances accordingly and that might be the reason of this clause But since contrary to their expectations Vses are continued he could easily be satisfied he said that Cestuy que use should rebutt Wyndham was of Opinion that Cestuy que use might vouch he said there was no Authority against it but only Opinions obiter They all agreed for the Defendant and Iudgment was given accordingly Rogers versus Davenant Parson of White-Chappel NOrth Chief Justice The Spiritual Court may compell Parishioners to repair their Parish-Church if it be out of Repair and may Excommunicate every one of them till it be repaired and those that are willing to contribute must be absolved till the greater part of them agrée to assess a Tax but the Court cannot assess them towards it it is like to a Bridge or a High-way a Distringas shall issue against the Inhabitants to make them Repair it but neither the Kings Court nor the Iustices of Peace can impose a Tax for it Wyndham Atkyns Ellis accorded The Church-Wardens cannot none but a Parliament can impose a Tax but the greater part of the Parish can make a By-Law and to this purpose they are a Corporation But if a Tax be illegally imposed as by a Commission from the Bishop to the Parson and some of the Parishioners to assess a Tax yet if it be assented to and confirmed by the major part of the Parishioners they in the Spiritual Court may proceed to Excommunicate those that refuse to pay it Compton Vx. versus Ireland Mich. 26 Car. 2. Rot. 691. SCire facias by the Plaintiffs as Executors to have Execution of a Iudgment
to chuse every year two Surveyors to take care that no unwholsome Victuals were sold within the Precinct of that Mannor and that they were sworn to execute their Office truly for the space of a year and that they had power to destroy whatever corrupt Victuals they found exposed to sale and that the Defendants being chosen Surveyors and sworn to execute the Office truly examining the Plaintiffs meat who was also a Butcher found a side of Beef corrupt and unwholsome and that therefore they took it away and burnt it prout eis bene licuit c. The Plaintiff demurs North. This is a case of great consequence and seems doubtful It were hard to disallow the Custom because the design of it seems to be for the preservation of mens health And to allow it were to give men too great a power of seizing and destroying other men's Goods There is an Ale-taster appointed at Leets but all his Office is to make Presentment at the Leet if he finds it not according to the Assize Wyndham Atkyns Ellis It is a good reasonable Custom It is to prevent evil and Laws for prevention are better then Laws for punishment As for the great power that it seems to allow to these Surveyors it is at their own peril if they destroy any Victuals that are not really corrupt for in an Action if they justifie by virtue of the Custom the Plaintiff may take issue that the Victuals were not corrupt But here the Plaintiff has confessed it by the demurrer Atkyns said if the Surveyors were not responsible the Homage that put them in must answer for them according to the rule of respondeat superior Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff unless c. Thredneedle Lynham's Case UPon a special Verdict the case was thus The Iury found that the Lands in the Declaration are and time out of mind had been parcel of the demesnes of the Mannor of Burniel in the County of Cornwall which Mannor consists of demesnes viz. Copy-hold tenements demisable for one two or three lives and services of divers Free-hold Tenants that within the Mannor of Burniel there is another Mannor called Trecaer consisting likewise of Copy-holds and Free-holds and that the Bishop of Exeter held both these Mannors in the right of his Bishoprick Then they find the Statute of 1. Eliz. in haec verba They find that the old accustomed yearly Rent which used to be reserved upon a demise of these two Mannors was 67 pounds 1 s. and 5 d. then they find that Joseph Hall Bishop of Exeter demised these two Mannors to one Prowse for 99 years determinable upon three lives reserving the old and accustomed Rent of 67 l. 1 s. and 5 d. that Prowse living the Cestuy que vies assigned over to James Prowse the demesnes of the Mannor of Trecaer for that afterwards he assigned over all his Interest in both Mannors to Mr. Nosworthy excepting the demesnes of Treacer then in the possession of James Prowse That Mr. Nosworthy when two of the lives were expired for a sum of money by him paid to the Bishop of Exeter surrendred into his hands both the said Mannors excepting what was in the possession of James Prowse and that the Bishop Joseph Hall's Successor redemised unto him the said Mannors excepting the demesnes of Trecaer and excepting one Messuage in the occupation of Robert and excepting one Farm parcel of the Mannor of Burniel for three lives reserving 67 l. 1 s. 5 d. with a nomine poenae and whether this second Lease was a good Lease and the 67 l. 1 s. 5 d. the old and accustomed Rent within the intention of the Statute of 1 Eliz. was the question After several arguments at the Bar it was argued at the Bench in Michaelmas Term Ann. 26 Car. 2. And the Court was divided viz. Vaughan Ellis against the Lease Atkyns Wyndham for it This Term North Chief Justice delivered his Opinion in which he agreed with Atkyns Wyndham so that Iudgment was given in maintenance of the Lease and the Iudgment was affirmed in the Kings Bench upon a Writ of Error The Chapter of the Collegiate Church of Southwell versus the Bishop of Lincoln and J. S. Incumbent c. IN a Qua. imp the Incumbents Title was under a grant made by the Plaintiffs who were seized of the Advowson ut de uno grosso in the right of their Church of the next avoidance one Esco being then Incumbent of their Presentation to Edward King from whom by mean assignments it came to Elizabeth Bley who after the death of Esco presented the Defendant Vpon a demurrer these points came in question 1. Whether the grantors were within the Statute of the 13 Eliz. or not 2. Whether a grant of a next avoidance be restrained by the Statute 3. If the grant be void whether it be void ab initio or when it becomes so And 4. Whether the Statute of 13 Eliz. shall be taken to be a general Law for it is not pleaded Serjeant Jones For the first point argued that the Grantors are within the Statute the words are Deans Chapters which he said might well be taken severally for of this Chapter there is no Dean If they were to be taken joyntly then a Dean were not within this Law in respect of those possessions which he holds in the right of his Deanry but the subsequent general words do certainly include them and would extend even to Bishops but that they are superiour to all that are expressed by name For the second he said the Statute restrains all gifts grants c. other then such upon which the old Rent c. He cited Cr. Eliz. 440. 5. Co. the case of Ecclesiastical persons 10 Co. the Earl of Salisbury's case For the third point he held it void ab initio it must be so or good for ever For here is no Dean after whose death it may become void as in Hunt Singleton's case the Chapter in our case never dies For the fourth point he argued that it is a general Law because it concerns all the Clergy Holland's case 4 Rep. Dumpor's case ibid. 120. b. Willmote contra North Chief Justice Atkyns Wyndham Ellis Iustices all agreed upon the three first points as Serjeant Jones had argued Atkyns doubted whether the 13 of Eliz. were a general Law or not but was over-ruled They all agreed that the Action should have been brought against the Patron as well as against the Ordinary and the Incumbent but that being only a plea in abatement that the Defendant has waived the benefit thereof by pleading in Bar. And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Nisi causa c. Hunt Singleton's case being mentioned Atkyns said he thought it a hard case considering that the Dean and the Chapter were all persons capable that a grant should hold in force as long as the Dean lived and determine then He thought they being a Corporation aggregate of
persons who were all capable that there was no difference betwixt that case and this Ellis said that in Floyd Gregories case reported in Jones it was made a point and that Jones in his argument denied the case of Hunt Singleton he said that himself and Sir Rowland Wainscott reported it and that nothing was said of that point but that my Lord Coke followed the Report of Serjeant Bridgeman who was three or four years their puisne and that he mistook the case Milword Ingram THe Plaintiff declares in an Action of the case upon a quantum meruit for 40 shillings and upon an Indebitat Assumpsit for 40 shillings likewise The Defendant acknowledged the promises but further says that the Plaintiff and he accounted together for divers sums of money and that upon the foot of the Account the Defendant was found to be endebted to the Plaintiff in 3 shillings and that the Plaintiff in consideration that the Defendant promised to pay him those 3 shillings discharged him of all demands The Plaintiff demurred The Court gave Iudgment against the demurrer 1. They held that if two men being mutually endebted to each other do account together and the one is found in arrear so much and there be an express agréement to pay the sum found to be in arrear and each to stand discharged of all other demands that this is a good discharge in Law and the parties cannot resort to the original Contracts But North Ch. Just said if there were but one Debt betwixt them entring into an account for that would not determine the Contract 2. They held also that any promise might well be discharged by paroll but not after it is broken for then it is a Debt Jones Wait. SHrewsbury Cotton are Towns adjoining Sir Samuel Jones is Tenant in Tail of Lands in both Towns Shrewsbury Cotton are both within the Liberties of the Town of Shrewsbury Sir Samuel Jones suffers a Common Recovery of all his Lands in both Vills but the Praecipe was of two Messuages and Closes thereunto belonging these were in Shrewsbury and of c. mentioning those in Cotton lying and being in the Ville of Shrewsbury in the Liberties thereof And whether by this Recovery the Lands lying in Cotton which is a distinct Ville of it self not named in the Recovery pass or not was the question Serjeant Jones argued against the Recovery He cited Cr. Jac. 575. in Monk Butler's case Cr. Car. 269 270. 276. he said the Writ of Covenant upon which a Fine is levied is a personal Action but a Common Recovery is a real Action and the Land it self demanded in the Praecipe There is no President he said of such a Recovery He cited a case Hill 22 23 Car. 2. Rot. 223. Hutton 106. Marche's Reports one Johnson Baker's case which he said was the case in point and resolved for him But the Court were all of Opinion that the Lands in Cotton passed And gave Iudgment accordingly Ellis said if the Recovery were erroneous at least they ought to allo 〈…〉 t till it were reversed Lepping Kedgewin AN Action in the nature of a Conspiracy was brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendant in which the Declaration was insufficient The Defendant pleaded an ill plea but Iudgment was given against the Plaintiff upon the insufficiency of the Declaration Which ought to have been entred Quod Defendens eat inde sine die but by mistake or out of design it was entred Quia placitum praedictum in forma praedicta superius placitat ' materiaque in eodem contenta bonum sufficiens in lege existit c. ideo consideratum est per Cur ' quod Quer ' nil capiat per billam The Plaintiff brings a new Action and declares aright The Defendant pleads the Iudgment in the former Action and recites the Record verbatim as it was To which the Plaintiff demurred And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff nisi causa c. North Chief Justice There is no question but that if a man mistakes his Declaration and the Defendant demurs the Plaintiff may set it right in a second Action But here it is objected that the Iudgment is given upon the Defendants plea. Suppose a Declaration be faulty and the Defendant take no advantage of it but pleads a plea in bar and the Plaintiff takes issue and the right of the matter is found for the Defendant I hold that in this case the Plaintiff shall never bring his Action about again for he is estopped by the Verdict Or suppose such a Plaintiff demur to the plea in bar there by his demurrer he confesseth the fact if well pleaded and this estops him as much as a Verdict would But if the plea were not good then there is no Estoppel And we must take notice of the Defendants plea for upon the matter as that falls out to be good or otherwise the second Action will be maintainable or not The other Iudges agreed with him in omnibus Atkinson Rawson THe Plaintiff declares against the Defendant as Executor The Defendant pleads that the Testator made his Will and that he the Defendant suscepto super se onere Testamenti praedict c. did pay divers sums of money due upon specialties and that there was a Debt owing by the Testator to the Defendants Wife and that he retained so much of the Testators Goods as to satisfie that Debt and that he had no other Assets The Plaintiff demurred because for ought appears the Defendant is an Executor de son tort and then he cannot retain for his own debt The Plaintiffs naming him in his Declaration Executor of the Testament of c. will not make for him for that he does of necessity he cannot declare against him any other way and of that Opinion was all the Court viz. that he ought to entitle himself to the Executorship that it may appear to the Court that he is such a person as may retain And accordingly Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Term. Hill 27 28 Car. II. in Com. Banco Smith's Case A Man dies leaving Issue by two several Venters viz. by the first three Sons and by the second two Daughters One of the Sons dies intestate the elder of the two surviving Brothers takes out Administration and Sir Lionel Jenkins Iudge of the Prerogative Court would compell the Administrator to make distribution to the Sisters of the half-blood He prayed a Prohibition but it was denied upon advice by all the Iudges for that the Sisters of the half-blood being a kin to the Intestate and not in remotiori gradu then the Brother of the whole blood must be accounted in equal degree Anonymus AN Action was brought against four men viz. two Attornies and two Solicitors for being Attornies and Solicitors in a cause against the Plaintiff in an inferiour Court falso malitiose knowing that there was no cause of Action against him and
also for that they sued the Plaintiff in another Court knowing that he was an Attorney of the Common-Pleas and priviledged there Per tot ' Cur ' there is no cause of Action For put the case as strong as you will suppose a man be retained as an Attorney to sue for a debt which he knows to be released and that himself were a witness to the Release yet the Court held that the Action would not lye for that what he does is only as Servant to another and in the way of his Calling and Profession And for suing an Attorney in an inferiour Court that they said was no cause of Action for who knows whether he will insist upon his priviledge or not and if he does he may plead it and have it allowed Fits al. versus Freestone IN an Action grounded upon a promise in Law payment before the Action brought is allowed to be given in Evidence upon non Assumpsit But where the Action is grounded upon a special promise there payment or any other legal discharge must be pleaded Bringloe versus Morrice IN Trespass for immoderately riding the Plaintiffs Mare the Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff lent to him the said Mare licentiam dedit eidem aequitare upon the said Mare and that by virtue of this Licence the Defendant and his Servant alternatim had rid upon the Mare The Plaintiff demurs Serj. Skipwith pro Quer ' The Licence is personal and incommunicable as 12 H. 7. 25. 13 H. 7. 13. the Dutchess of Norfolk's case 18 Ed. 4. 14. Serj. Nudigate contra This Licence is given by the party and not created by Law wherefore no Trespass lyeth 8 Rep. 146 147. per Cur ' the Licence is annexed to the person and cannot be communicated to another for this riding is matter of pleasure North took a difference where a certain time is limited for the Loan of the Horse and where not In the first case the party to whom the Horse is lent hath an interest in the Horse during that time and in that case his Servant may ride but in the other case not A difference was taken betwixt hiring a Horse to go to York and borrowing a Horse in the first place the party may set his Servant up in the second not Term. Pasch 28 Car. II. in Communi Banco Anonymus A Man upon marriage Covenants with his Wives relations to let her make a Will of such and such Goods she made a Will accordingly by her husbands consent and dyed After her death her Will being brought to the Prerogative Court to be proved a Prohibition was prayed by the Husband upon this suggestion that the Testatrix was foemina viro cooperta and so disabled by the Law to make a Will Cur ' Let a Prohibition go Nisi causa c. North. When a question ariseth concerning the Iurisdiction of the Spiritual Court as whether they ought to have the Probate of such a Will whether such a disposition of a personal Estate be a Will or not whether such a Will ought to be proved before a peculiar or before the Ordinary whether by the Archbishop of one Province or another or both and what shall be bona notabilia in these and the like cases the Common Law retains the Iurisdiction of determining there is no question but that here is a good surmise for a Prohibition to wit that the woman was a person disabled by the Law to make a Will the Husband may by Covenant depart with his right and suffer his Wife to make a Will but whether he hath done so here or not shall be determined by the Law we will not leave it to their decision it is too great an invasion upon the right of the Husband In this case the Spiritual Court has no Iurisdiction at all they have the Probate of Wills but a Feme-covert cannot make a Will If she disposeth of any thing by her Husbands consent the property of what she so disposeth passeth from him to her Legatee and it is the gift of the husband If the Goods were given into anothers hands in trust for the wife still her Will is but a Declaration of the trust and not a Will properly so called But of things in Action and things that a Feme-Covert hath as Executrix she may make a Will by her Husbands consent and such a Will being properly a Will in Law ought to be proved in the Spiritual Court. In the case in question a Prohibition was granted against the Hambrough Company THe Plaintiff brought an Action of Debt in London against the Hambrough-Company who not appearing upon Summons and a Nihil being returned against them an Attachment was granted to attach Debts owing to the Company in the hands of 14 several persons by Certiorari the cause was removed into this Court and whether a Procedendo should be granted or not was the question Serjeant Goodfellow Baldwin and Barrell argued that a debt owing to a Corporation is not attachable Serjeant Maynard Scroggs contra Cur ' We are not Iudges of the Customs of London nor do we take upon us to determine whether a debt owing to a Corporation be within the Custom of forrein Attachment or not This we judge and agree in that it is not unreasonable that a Corporation's debts should be attached If we had judged the Custom unreasonable we could and would have retained the cause For we can over-rule a Custom though it be one of the Customs of London that are confirmed by Act of Parliament if it be against natural reason But because in this Custom we find no such thing we will return the cause Let them proceed according to the Custom at their peril If there be no such Custom they that are aggrieved may take their remedy at Law We do not dread the consequences of it It does but tend to the advancement of Iustice and accordingly a Procedendo was granted per North Chief Justice Wyndham Ellis Atkyns aberat Anonymus PEr Cur ' if a man is indicted upon the Statute of Recusancy Conformity is a good plea but not if an Action of Debt be brought Parten Baseden's Case PArten brought an Action of Debt in this Court against the Testator of Baseden the now Defendant aâ—d had Iudgment After whose death there was a devastavit returned against the Defendant Baseden his Executor he appeared to it and pleaded and a special Verdict was found to this effect viz. that the Defendant Baseden was made Executor by the Will and dwelt in the same house in which the Testator lived and died and that before Probate of the Will he possest himself of the Goods of the Testator prized them inventoried them and sold part of them and paid a Debt and converted the value of the residue to his own use that afterwards before the Ordinary he refused and that upon his refusal administration was committed to the Widow of the deceased And the question was whether or no the
Defendant should be charged to the value of the whole personal Estate or only for as much as he converted Serjeant Barrell argued That he ought to be charged for the whole because 1. He is made Executor by the Will and he is thereby compleat Executor before Probate to all intents but bringing of Actions 2. He has possession of the Goods and is chargeable in respect of that 3. He caused some to be sold and paid a Debt which is a sufficient administration There is found to discharge him 1. His refusal before the Ordinary But that being after he had so far intermeddled avails nothing Hensloe's case 9 Co. 37. An Executor de son tort he confessed should not be charged for more then he converted and shall discharge himself by delivering over the rest to the rightful Executor But the case is different of a rightful Executor that has taken upon him the burden of the Will The second thing found to discharge him is the granting of Administration to another but that is void because here is a rightful Executor that has administred in which case the Ordinary has no power to grant Administration Hob. 46. Keble Osbaston's case The third thing found to discharge him is the delivery of the Goods over to the Administrator but that will not avail him for himself became responsible by his having possession and he cannot discharge himself by delivering the Goods over to a stranger that has nothing to do with them If it be objected that by this means two persons will be chargeable in respect of the same Goods I answer that payment by either discharges both Cr. Car. Whitmore Porter's case The Court was of Opinion that the committing of Administration in this case is a mere void act A great inconvenience would ensue if men were allowed to Administer as far as they would themselves and then to set up a beggarly Administrator they would pay themselves their own Debts and deliver the residue of the Estate to one that 's worth nothing and cheat the rest of the Creditors If an Administrator bring an Action it is a good plea to say that the Executor made by the Will has administred Accordingly Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Major Stubbing versus Birde Harrison REsolved that a plea may be a good plea in abatement though it contain matter that goes in bar they relyed upon the case in 10 H. 7. fol. 11. which they said was a case in point and Salkell Skelton's case 2 Rolls Reports and Iudgment was given accordingly Term. Trin. 28 Car. II. in Communi Banco PEr North Chief Iustice if there are Accounts betwéen two Merchants and one of them becomes Bankrupt the course is not to make the other who perhaps upon stating the Accounts is found endebted to the Bankrupt to pay the whole that originally was entrusted to him and to put him for the recovery of what the Bankrupt owes him into the same condition with the rest of the Creditors but to make him pay that only which appears due to Bankrupt on the foot of the Account otherwise it will be for Accounts betwixt them after the time of the others becoming Bankrupt if any such were Wing Jackson TRespass Quare vi armis the Defendant insultum fecit upon the Plaintiff was brought in the County Court and Iudgment there given for the Plaintiff But it was reversed here upon a Writ of false Iudgment because the County Court not being a Court of Record cannot fine the Defendant as he ought to be if the cause go against him because of the vi armis in the Declaration but an Action of Trespass without those words will lie in the County Court well enough Anonymus A Vicar libell'd in the Spiritual Court for Tythes of of young Cattle and surmised that the Defendant was seised of Lands in Middlesex of which Parish he was Vicar and that the Defendant had Common in a great Waste called Sedgemore-Common as belonging to his Land in Middlesex and put his Cattle into the said Common The Defendant prayed a Prohibition for that the Land where the Cattle went was not within the Parish of Middlesex The same Plaintiff libelled against the same Defendant for Tythes of Willow-Faggots who suggests to have a Prohibition the payment of 2 d. a year to the Rector for all Tythes of Willow The same Plaintiff libelled also for Tythes of Sheep The Defendant to have a Prohibition suggests that he took them in to feed after the Corn was reaped pro melioratione agriculturae infra terras arabiles non aliter As for the first of these no Prohibition was granted because of that clause in 2 Edw. 6. whereby it is enacted that Tythes of Cattle feeding in a Waste or Common where the Parish is not certainly known shall be paid to the Parson c. of the Parish where the owner of the Cattle lives For the second they held that a modus to the Rector is a good discharge against the Vicar For the third they held that the Parson ought not to have Tythe of the Corn and Sheep too which make the ground more profitable and to yield more Per quod c. Ingram versus Tothill Ren. REplevin Trevill leased to Ingram for 99 years if Joan Ingram his wife Anthony John Ingram his Sons should so long live rendring an Heriot or 40 shillings to the Lessor and his Assigns at the election of the Lessor his heirs and Assigns after their several deaths successive as they are named in the Indenture Trevill deviseth the Reversion John dyes and then Joan dies and the question was whether or no a Heriot were due to the Devisee upon the death of Joan. The Court agreed that the Avowry was faulty because it does not appear thereby whether Anthony Ingram was alive or not at the time of the distress taken for if he were dead the Lease would be determined North. Though Anthony were alive the Devisee of Trevill could not distrain for the Heriot for that the reservation is to him and his Assigns and although the Election to have the Heriot or 40 shillings given to the Lessor his heirs or Assigns yet that will not help the fault in the reservation Ellis There is another fault in the pleading for it is pleaded that Trevill made his Will in writing but it is not said that he dyed so seized for if the Estate of the Devisor were turned to a right at the time of his death the Will could not operate upon it Also it is said that the Avowant made his Election and that the Plaintiff habuit notitiam of his Election but it is not said by whom notice was given for these causes Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff It was urged likewise against the Avowant that no Heriot could be due in this case because Joan did not die first but the course of succession is interrupted and that a Heriot not being due of
another Bond in full satisfaction of the former Vpon this issue being joyned it was found for the Defendant It was said for him that one Bond might be taken in satisfaction of another and 1 Inst 212. b. 30 Ed. 1. 23. Dyer 29. were cited North Chief Iustice If the second Bond had been given by the Obligor himself it would not have discharged the former but here being given by the Administrator so that the Plaintiffs security is bettered and the Administrator chargeable de bonis propriis I conceive it may be a sufficient discharge of the first Bond. Wyndham accord ' else the Administrator and Heir might both be charged Scroggs accord Atkyns There are many Authorities in the point and all directly that one Bond cannot be given in satisfaction of another So is Cr. Eliz. 623 697 716. 727. and many others But yet I hold that Iudgment ought to be given for the Defendant for though it be an impertinent issue yet being found for him he ought by the Statute of 23 H. 8. to have Iudgment If no issue at all had been joyned it would have been otherwise 2 Cro. 44. 575. Serjeant Maynard cites 9 H. 6. but that case was before the Statute so I ground my Iudgment upon that point North. I took it that unapt issues are aided by the Statute but not immaterial ones And so said Scroggs Judic ' pro Defendente Nisi c. Southcot Stowell Intrat ' Hill 25 26 Car. 2. Rot. 1303. COvenant for non-payment of money The case was thus viz. Thomas Southcote had issue two Sons Sir Popham and William and in consideration of the marriage of his Son Sir Popham covenanted to stand seized to the use of Sir Popham and the heirs Males of his body and for default of such issue to the use of the heirs Males of his own body the remainder to his own right heirs Sir Popham dies leaving issue Edward his Son and four Daughters then Thomas the Father died and then Edward died without issue and the question was whether Sir Pophams Daughters or William had the better title Two points were made 1. Whether the limitation of the Remainder to the Heirs Males of the body of the Covenantor were good in its creation or not 2. Admitting it to be good originally whether it could take effect after the death of Edward he leaving Sisters which are general heirs to the Covenantor North Wyndham Atkyns upon admission of the first point were of opinion for William and that he should have the Estate not by purchase but by descent from Edward for after the death of the Father both the Estates in tail were vested in him and he was capable of the remainder by purchase and being once well vested in a purchaser the Estate shall afterwards run in course of descent Scroggs doubted But they all doubted of the first point and would advise V. infr ' Pasch 29 Car. 2. It was said by the Iustices in the Countess of Northumberlands case That if a Knight be but returned on a Iury when a Nobleman is concerned it is not material whether he appear and give his Verdict or no. Also that if there be no other Knights in the County a Serjeant at Law that is a Knight may be returned and his priviledge shall not excuse him Gayle Betts DEbt upon a Bond. The Defendant demands Oyer of the Bond and Condition which was to pay forty pounds per annum quarterly so long as the Defendant should continue Register to the Arch deacon of Colchester and says that the Office was granted to A. B. C. for their lives and that he enjoyed the Office so long as they lived and no longer and that so long he paid the said 40 l. quarterly The Plaintiff replies that the Defendant did enjoy the Office longer and had not paid the money The Defendant demurs supposing the replication was double Cur ' The Replication is not double for the Defendant cannot take issue upon the non-payment of the money that would be a departure from his plea in bar so if upon a plea of nullum fecit arbitrium the Plaintiff in his Replication set forth an award and a breach the Defendant cannot take issue upon the breach for that would be an implicite confession of what he had denied before North. If the Defendant plead that he did not exercise the Office beyond such a time till which time he paid the money the Plaintiff may take issue either upon the payment till that time or reply upon the continuance but if he do the latter he must shew a breach for the continuance is in it self no breach Ellis Yarborough ACtion upon the Case against a Sheriff for an Escape The Plaintiff declares that one G. was endebted to him in 200 l. and that the Defendant took him upon a Latitat at the Plaintiffs suit and afterward suffered him to escape The Defendant pleads the Statute of 23 H. 6. cap. 10. and that he let G. out upon Bail according to the said Statute and that he had taken reasonable Sureties A. B. persons having sufficient within the County The Plaintiff replies and traverses absque hoc that the Defendant took Bail of persons having sufficient within the Country the Defendant demurs Skipwith The Sheriff is compellable to take Bail If he take insufficient Bail the course is for the Court to amerce the Sheriff and not for the party to have an Action upon the case Cr. Eliz. 852. Bowles and Lassell's case and Noy 39. if the Sheriff takes no Bail an Action lies against him and all Actions brought upon this Statute are founded upon this suggestion 3 Cro. 460. Moor. 428. 2 Cro. 280. but if he take insufficient bail it is at his own peril and no Action lies the Sheriff is Iudge of the bail and the sum is at his discretion Cr. Jac. 286. Villers Hastings and so are the number of the persons he may take one two or three as he pleaseth He cited Cr. Eliz. 808. Clifton Web's case Besides the traverse is pregnant for it implies that the persons have sufficient out of the County and the Sheriff is not bound to take bail only of persons having sufficient within the County Serjeant Barrell contra The Court not agreeing in their Opinions upon the matter of Law it was put off to the next Term to be argued Baldwin for the Defendant cited 3 Cr. 624. 152. 2 Cr. 286. Noy 39. Rolls tit Escape 807. Moor 428. that the Sheriff is compellable to let him to bail and is Iudge of the sufficiency of the Sureties The Statute was made for the Prisoners benefit for the mischief before was that the Sheriff not being compellable to bail him would extort money from him to be bailed and the word sufficient is added in favour of the Sheriff and so are the words within the County The Sheriff is not compellable to assign the bail Bond and then if the Plaintiff cannot
the Sheriff because he is compellable to let him to bail but this is an Action at the Common Law for a false Return which if it should not be maintainable the design of the Statute would be defrauded for the Plaintiff cannot controll the Sheriff in his taking bail but he may take what persons and what bail he pleaseth and if he should not be chargeable in an Action for not having the body ready the Plaintiff could never have the effect of his Suit and although the Sheriff be chargeable he will be at no prejudice for he may repair his loss by the bail-bond and it is his own fault if he takes not security sufficient to answer the Debt The last clause in the Statute is That if any Sheriff return a Cepi corpus or reddidit se he shall be chargeable to have the body at the day of the Return as he was before c. that if implies a Liberty in the Sheriff not to return a Cepi corpus or reddidit se But notwithstanding by the opinion of North Chief Justice Wyndham Atkyns Justice the Plaintiff was barred Bowles Lassel's case they said was a strong case to govern the point and the return of paratum habeo is in effect no more then if he had the body ready to bring into Court when the Court should command him and it is the common practice only to amerce the Sheriff till he does bring in the body and therefore no Action lies against him for it is not reasonable that he should be twice punished for one Offence and that against the Court only Scroggs delivered no Opinion but Iudgment was given ut sup Cockram Welby ACtion upon the Case against a Sheriff for that he levied such a sum of money upon a Fieri facias at the Suit of the Plaintiff and did not bring the money into Court at the day of the return of the Writ Per quod deterioratus est dampnum habet c. the Defendant pleads the Statute of 21 Jac. of Limitations To which the Plaintiff demurs Serjeant Barrell This Action is within the Statute It ariseth ex quasi contractu Hob. 206. Speak Richard's case It is not grounded on a Record for then nullum tale Recordum would be a good plea which it is not it lies against the Executors of a Sheriff which it would not do if it arose ex maleficio Pemberton This Action is not brought upon the Contract if we had brought an Indebitatus Assumpsit which perhaps would lie then indeed we had grounded our selves upon the Contract and there had been more colour to bring us within the Statute but we have brought an Action upon the case for not having our money here at the day Per quod c. North. An Indebitatus Assumpsit would lie in this case against the Sheriff or his Executor and then the Statute would be pleadable I have known it resolved that the Statute of Limitations is not a good plea against an Attorny that brings an Action for his Fees because they depend upon a Record here and are certain Next Trinity Term the matter being moved again the Court gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff Nisi causa c. if the Fieri facias had been returned then the Action would have beén grounded upon the Record and it is the Sheriffs fault that the Writ is not returned but however the Iudgment in this Court is the foundation of the Action Debt upon the Stat. of 2 Edw. 6. for not setting out Tythes is not within the Stat. for oritur ex maleficio so the ground of this Action is maleficium and the Iudgment here given In both which respects it is not within the Statute of Limitations Barrow Parrot PArrot had married one Judith Barrow an Heiress Sir Herbert Parrot his Father and an ignorant Carpenter by vertue of a dedimus potestatem to them directed took the conusance of a Fine of the said Judith being under age and by Indenture the use was limited to Mr. Parrot and his wife for their two lives the remainder to the Heirs of the Survivor about two years after the wife died without issue and Barrow as heir to her prayed the relief of the Court. Vpon examination it appear'd that Sir Herbert did examine the woman whether she were willing to levy the fine and asked the husband and her whether she were of age or not both answered that she was She afterwards being privately examin'd touching her consent answered as before and that she had no constraint upon her by her husband but she was not there question'd concerning her age Sir Herbert Parrot was not examined in Court upon Oath because he was accused and North said this Court could no more administer an Oath ex Officio then the Spiritual Court could North Wyndham There is a great trust reposed in the Commissioners and they are to inform themselves of the parties age and a voluntary ignorance will not excuse them But Atkyns opposed his being fined he cited Hungates case Mich. 12 Jac. Cam. Stell 12. Cook 122 123. where a Fine by Dedimus was taken of an Infant and because it was not apparent to the Commissioners that the Infant was within age they were in that Court acquitted But North Wyndham Scroggs agreed that the Son should be fined for that he could not possibly be presumed to be ignorant of his Wifes age Atkyns contra But they all agreed that there was no way to set the Fine aside Term. Trin. 29 Car. II. in Communi Banco Searle Long. QUare Impedit against two one of the Defendants appears the other casts an essoyn wherefore he that appear'd had idem dies then he that was essoyn'd appears and the other casts an essoyne Afterward an issued for their not Attachment appearing at the day and so Process continued to the great distress which being return'd and no appearance Iudgment final was ordered to be entred according to the Statute of Marlebr cap. 12. It was moved to have this rule discharged because the party was not summoned neither upon the Attachment nor the great distress and the Sureties returned upon the Process were John Doo Richard Roo an Affidavit was produced of Non-summons and that the Defendant had not put in any Sureties nor knew any such person as John Doo Richard Roo It was objected on the other side that they had notice of the suit for they appeared to the Summons and it appeared that they were guilty of a voluntary delay in that they forched in essoyne and the Stat. of Marlebr is peremptory wherefore they prayed Iudgment Serjeant Maynard for the Defendants If Iudgment be entred against us we have no remedy but by a Writ of Deceit Now in a Writ of Deceit the Sumners and veyors are to be examin'd in Court and this is the Trial in that Action but feigned persons cannot be examined It is a great abuse in the Officers to return such
feigned names The first cause thereof was the ignorance of Sheriffs who being to make a return looked into some Book of Presidents for a form and finding the names of John Doo and Rich. Roo put down for examples made their return accordingly and took no care for true Sumners and true Manucaptors For Non-appearance at the return of the great Distress in a plea of Quare Impedit final Iudgment is to be given and our right bound for ever which ought not to be suffered unless after Process legally served according to the intention of the Statute In a case Mich. 23. of the present King Iudgment was entred in this Court in a plea of Quare impedit upon non-appearance to the great Distress but there the party was summoned and true Summoners returned upon non-appearance an Attachment issued and real Sumners return'd upon that but upon the Distress it was return'd that the Defendants districti fuerunt per bona catalla manucapti per Joh. Doo Rich. Roo and for that cause the Iudgment was vacated Cur ' The design of the Statute of Marlebridge was to have Process duly executed which if it were executed as the Law requires the Tenant could not possibly but have notice of it For if he do not appear upon the Summons an Attachment goes out that is a command to the Sheriff to seize his body and make him give Sureties for his appearance if yet he will not appear then the great distress is awarded that is the Sheriff is commanded to seize the thing in question if he come not in for all this then Iudgment final is to be given Now the issue of this Process being so fatal that the right of the party is concluded by it we ought not to suffer this Process to be changed into a thing of course It is true the Defendant here had notice of the Suit but he had not such notice as the Law does allow him And for his fourching in essoyn the Law allows it him Accordingly the Iudgment was set aside Anonymus FAlse Judgment out of a County Court the Record was vitious throughout and the Iudgment reversed and ordered that the Suitors should be amerced a Mark but the Record was so imperfectly drawn up that it did not appear before whom the Court was held and the County Clark was fined Five pounds for it Cessavit per biennium the Defendant pleads Non-tenure He commenceth his plea quod petenti reddere non debet but concludes in abatement Serjeant Barrell He cannot plead this plea for he has imparled Cur̄ Non-tenure is a plea in bar the conclusion indeed is not good but he shall amend it Barrell Non-tenure is a plea in abatement The difference is betwixt Non-tenure that goes to the tenure as when the Tenant denies that he holds of the demandant but says that he holds of some other person which is a plea in bar and Non-tenure that goes to the Tenancy of the Land as here he pleads that he is not Tenant of the Land and that goes in abatement only The Defendant was ordered to amend his plea. Addison versus Sir John Otway TEnant in tail of Lands in the Parishes of Rippon Kirby-Marleston in the Towns of A. B. C. Tenant in Tail makes a Deed of bargain and sale to J. S. to the intent to make J. S. Tenant to the Praecipe in order to the suffering of a common Recovery of so many Acres in the Parishes of Rippon Kirby-Marlestone Now in those Parishes there are two Towns called Rippon Kirby-Marlestone and the Recovery is suffered of Lands in Rippon Kirby-Marlestone generally all this was found by special Verdict and further that the intention of the parties was that the Lands in question should pass by the said recovery and that the Lands in question are in the Parishes of Rippon Kirby-Marlestone but not within the Townships and that the bargainor had no Lands at all within the said Townships The question was whether the Lands in question should pass by this Recovery or not Shaftoe They will pass The Law makes many strained constructions to support common Recoveries and abates of the exactness that is required in adversary Suits 2 Rolls 67. 5 Rep. Dormer's case Eare Snow Plo. Com. Sir Moyle Finche's case 6 Rep. Cr. Jac. 643. Ferrers Curson In Stork Foxe's case Cr. Jac. 120 121. where two Villes Walton Street were in the Parish of Street and a man having Lands in both levied a Fine of his Lands in Street his Lands in Walton would not pass but there the Conusor had Lands in the Town of Street to satisfie the grant but in our case it is otherwise He cited also Rolls Abridgm Grants 54. Hutton 105. Baker Johnson The Deed of bargain and sale and the Recovery make up in our case but one assurance and construction is to be made of both together as in Cromwells case 2 Report The intention of the parties Rules Fines and Recoveries and the intention of the parties in our case appears in the Deed and is found by the Verdict Rolls Abridgm 19. 2 part Winch. 122. per Hob. Cr. Car. 308. Sir George Symond's case betwixt which last case and ours all the diffreence is that that case is of a Fine and ours of a Common Recovery betwixt which Conveyances as to our purpose there is no difference at all He cited Jones Wait's case Trin 27 Car. 2. in this Court and a case 16 Reg. nunc in B. R. when Hide was Chief Iustice betwixt Thynne Thynne North. The Law has always stuck at new niceties that have been started in cases of Fines and Common Recoveries and has gotten over almost all of them I have not yet seen a case that warrants the case at Bar in all points Nor do I remember an Authority expresly against it and it seems to be within the reason of many former resolutions But we must be cautious how we make a further step Wyndham I think the Lands in question will pass well enough and that the Deed of bargain and sale which leads the uses of the Recovery does sufficiently explain the meaning of the words Rippon Kirby Marlestone in the recovery I do not so much regard the Iuries having found what the parties intention was as I do the Deéd it self in which he expresses his own intention himself and upon that I ground my Opinion Atkyns agreed with Wyndham Indeed when a place is named in legal proceedings we do prima facie intend it of a Ville if nothing appears to the contrary stabitur praesumptio donec probetur in contrarium In this case the Evidence of the thing it self is to the contrary The reason why prima facie we intend it of a Ville is because as to civil purposes the Kingdom is divided into Villes He do not intend it of a Parish because the division of the Kingdom into Parishes is an Ecclesiastical distribution to Spiritual purposes
But the Law in many cases takes notice of Parishes in civil affairs and Custom having by degrees introduced it we may allow of it in a Recovery as well as in a Fine Scroggs accordant If an Infant levy a Fine when he becomes of full age he shall be bound by the Deed that leads the Vses of the Fine as well as by the Fine it self because the Law looks upon both as one assurance So the Court was of Opinion that the Lands did pass It was then suggested that Iudgment ought not to be given notwithstanding for that the Plaintiff was dead But they said they would not stay Iudgment for that as this case was For between the Lessor of the Plaintiff and the Defendant there was another cause depending and tryed at the same Assizes when this issue was tryed and by agreément between the parties the Verdict in that cause was not drawn up but agreed that it should ensue the determination of this Verdict and the title to go accordingly Now the submission to this Rule was an implicite agreement not to take advantage of such occurrences as the death of the Plaintiff in an Ejectione firmae whom we know to be no wise concerned in point of interest and many times but an imaginary person It was said also to have Iudgment that there lived in the County where the Lands in question are a man of the same name with him that was made Plaintiff This the Court said was sufficient and that were there any of that name in rerum natura they would intend that he was the Plaintiff Cur̄ We take notice judicially that the Lessor of the Plaintiff is the person interested and therefore we punish the Plaintiff if he release the Action or release the damages Accordingly Iudgment was given Anonymus DEbt upon an Obligation was brought against the Heir of the Obligor hanging which Action another Action was brought against the same Heir upon another Obligation of his Ancestor Iudgment is given for the Plaintiffs in both Actions but the Plaintiff in the second Action obtains Iudgment first And which should be first satisfied was the question Barrel He shall be first satisfied that brought the first Action North. It is very clear That he for whom the first Iudgment was given shall be first satisfied For the Land is not bound till Iudgment be given But if the Heir after the first Action brought had aliened the Land which he had by descent and the Plaintiff in the second Action commenced after such alienation had obtained Iudgment and afterward the Plaintiff in the first Action had Iudgment likewise in that case the Plaintiff in the first Action should be satisfied and he in the second Action not at all What if the Sheriff return in such a case that the Defendant has Lands by descent which indeed are of his own purchase North. If the Sheriffs return cannot be traversed at least the party shall be relieved in an Ejectione firmae Dominus Rex versus Thorneborough Studly THe King brought a Quare Impedit against the Bishop of _____ and Thorneborough and Studly and declares That Queen Elizabeth was seised in see of the Advowson of Redriff in the County of Surrey and presented J. S. that the Quéen died and the Advowson descended to King James who died seized c. and so brings down the Advowson by descent to the King that now is Thorneborough the Patron pleads a Plea in Bar upon which the King demurs Studly the Incumbent pleads confessing Queen Elizabeths seisin in feé in right of her Crown but says that she in the second year of her Reign granted the Advowson to one Bosbill who granted to Ludwell who granted to Danson who granted to Hurlestone who granted to Thorneborough who presented the Defendant Studly and traverseth absque hoc that Queen Elizabeth died seized The Defendants Council produced the Letters Patents of secundo Reginae to Bosbill and his Heirs The King's Council give in evidence a Presentation made by Queen Elizabeth by usurpation anno 34 Regni sui of one Rider by which Presentation the Advowson was vested again in the Crown The Presentation was read in Court wherein the Queen recited that the Church was void and that it appertained to her to present North Chief Justice Is not the Queen deceived in this Presentation for she recites that it belongs to her to present which is not true If the Queen had intended to make an usurpation and her Clerk had been instituted she had gained the Fee-simple but here she recites that she had right Maynard When the King recites a particular Title and has no such Title his Presentation is void but not when his recital is general as it is here And this difference was agreed to in the Kings Bench in the Case of one Erasmus Dryden The Defendants Council shewed a Iudgment in a Quare Impedit against the same Rider at the suit of one Wingate in Queen Elizabeths time whereupon the Plaintiff had a writ to the Bishop and Rider was ousted Wingate claimed under the Letters Patents of the Second of the Queen viz. by a Grant of one Adie to himself to which Adie one Ludwell granted it anno 33 Eliz. Baldwin It appears by the Record of this Iudgment that a writ to the Bishop was awarded but no final Iudgment is given which ought to be after the three points of the writ enquired North. What is it that you call the final Iudgment there are two Iudgments in a Quare Impedit one that the Plaintiff shall have a writ to the Bishop and that is the final Iudgment that goes to the right betwixt the parties And the Iudgment at the Common Law There in another Iudgment to be given for Damages since the Stat. of West 2. cap. 5. after the points of the writ are enquired of Which Iudgment is not to be given but at the instance of the party Pemberton This Wingate that recovered was a stranger and had no title to have a Quare Impedit Now I take this difference where the King has a good Title no recovery against his Clerk shall affect the King's Title he shall not be prejudiced by a Recovery to which he is no party If the King have a defeasible Title as in our case by Vsurpation there if the rightful Patron recover against the King's Incumbent the King's Title shall be bound though he be not a party for his Title having no other Foundation than a Presentation when that is once avoided the Kings Title falls together with it But though the Kings Title be only by Vsurpation yet a Recovery against his Clerk by a stranger that has nothing to do with it shall not predudice the King covin may be betwixt them and the King be tried Now Wingate had no Right for he claimed by Grant from one Adie to whom Ludwell granted ann 33 Eliz. But we can prove this Grant by Ludwell to have been void for in the 29th of the
Queen he had made a Prior Grant to one Danson of which Grant we here produce the Inrolment This Grant to Danson was an effectual Grant for anno 11 Jacobi a Presentation was made by J. R. Th. Danson which proves that this Grant took effect and the Defendant himself deduceth the Title of his own Patron under that Grant Barrel Wingate is not to be accounted a stranger for he makes Title by the Letters Letters Patents of 2 Eliz. so that he encounters the Queen with her own Grant and his Title under that Grant was allowed by the Court who gave Iudgment accordingly There was no faint Pleader in the Case as appears by the Record that has been read And covin shall not be presumed if it be not alledged We deduce our Title under the Grant made to Danson 29 Eliz. in our plea but that is only by way of inducement to our traverse Cur. By that Iudgment temp Regin Eliz. the Quéens Title was avoided We must not presume that Wingate had a Title Ex diuturnitate temporis omnia presumuntur solemniter esse acta That Quare Impedit was brought when the matter was fresh Without doubt Danson would have asserted his Title against Wingate if he had had any The Defendant did not do prudently in conveying a Title to his Patron under the Grant made to Danson but issue being taken upon the Quéens dying seized he shall not be concluded to give in Evidence any other Title to maintain the Issue Vpon which Evidence the Iury found for the Defendant that Queen Elizabeth did not die seized North said He was clearly of Opinion That the Kings Title by Vsurpation should be avoided by a Recovery against his Clerk though the Recoverer were a meer stranger The Company of Stationers against Seymour THe Company brought an Action of Debt against Seymour for printing Gadbury's Almanacks without their leave Vpon a special Verdict found the question was Whether the Letters Patents whereby the Company of Stationers had granted to them the sole printing of Almanacks were good or not The Iury found the Stat. of 13 14 Car. 2. concerning Printing They found a Patent made by King James of the same Priviledge to the Company in which a former Patent of Queen Elizabeths was recited and they found the Letters Patents of the King that now is Then they found that the Defendant had printed an Almanack which they found in his verbis figuris and that the said Almanack had all the essential parts of the Almanack that is printed before the Book of Common Prayer but that it has some other additions such as are usual in common Almanacks c. Pemberton The King may by Law grant the sole-printing of Almanacks The Art of Printing is altogether of another consideration in the eye of the Law than other Trades and Mysteries are the Press is a late Invention But the Exorbitancies and Licentiousness thereof has ever since it was first found out been under the care and restraint of the Magistrate For great Mischiefs and Disorder would ensue to the Common-wealth if it were under no Regulation and it has therefore always been thought fit to be under the Inspection and Controul of the Government And the Stat. 14. Car. 2. recites that it is a matter of publique Care In England it has from time to time been under the Kings own Regulation so that no Book could lawfully be printed without an Imprimatur granted by some that derive authority from him to Licence Books But the question here is not Whether the King may by Law grant the sole-Printing of all Books but of any and of what sort of Books the sole-printing of Law-Books is not now in question that seémed to be a point of some difficulty because of the large extent of such a Patent and the uncertainty of determining what should be accounted a Law-Book and what not And yet such a Patent has been allowed to be good by a Iudgment in the House of Péers When Sir Orlando Bridgeman was Chief Justice in this Court there was a question raised concerning the validity of a Grant of the sole-printing of any particular Book with a Prohibition to all others to print the same how far it should stand good against them that claim a Property in the Copy paramount to the Kings Grant and Opinions were divided upon the Point But the Defendant in our Case makes no Title to the Copy only he pretends a nullity in our Patent The Book which this Defendant has printed has no certain Author and then according to the Rule of our Law the King has the property and by consequence may grant his Property to the Company Cur. There is no difference in any material part betwixt this Almanack and that that is put in the Rubrick of the Common-Prayer Now the Almanack that is before the Common-Prayer proceeds from a publick Constitution it was first setled by the Nicene Council is established by the Canons of the Church and is under the Government of the Archbishop of Canterbury So that Almanacks may be accounted Prerogative Copies Those particular Almanacks that are made yearly are but applications of the general Rules there laid down for the moveable Feasts for ever to every particular year And without doubt this may be granted by the King This is a stronger Case than that of Law-Books which has been mentioned The Lords in in the Resolution of that Case relyed upon this That Printing was a new Invention and therefore every man could not by the Common Law have a liberty of printing Law-Books And since Printing has been invented and is become a common Trade so much of it as has been kept inclosed never was made common but matters of State and things that concern the Government were never left to any mans liberty to print that would And particularly the sole Printing of Law-Books has been formerly granted in other Reigns Though Printing be a new Invention yet the use and benefit of it is only for men to publish their Works with more ease than they could before Men had some other way to publish their Thoughts before Printing came in and forasmuch as Printing has always been under the Care of the Government since it was first set on foot we may well presume that the former way was so too Queen Elizabeth King James and King Charles the First granted such Patents as these and the Law has a great respect to common usage We ought to be guided in our Opinions by the Iudgment of the House Peérs which is express in the point the ultimate resort of Law and Iustice being to them There is no particular Author of an Almanack and then by the Rule of our Law the King has the Property in the Copy Those additions of Prognostications and other things that are common in Almanacks do not alter the Case no more than if a man should claim a property in another mans Copy by reason of some inconsiderable
300 l. is as a penalty imposed upon him if he refuse to make such a Grant And if he shall not c. instead of the word not put the words refuse to c. and the case will be out of doubt Besides the annuity to be granted is but 20 l. per annum for a life and 300 l. in money is more then the value of it so that it cannot be intended a sum to be paid in lieu or recompence of it but must be taken for a penalty But suppose it to be a dis-junctive Condition then we ought to have an Election whether we would do but as this case is the Plaintiff by his negligence has deprived us of our Election For Authorities he cited Gerningham Ewer's case Cr. Eliz. 396. 539. 4 H. 7. fol. 4. 5 Co. 21. b. Laughter's case Warner Whyte's case resolved the day before in the Kings Bench. There is a rule laid down in Morecomb's case in Moors Reports 645. which makes against me but the resolution of that case is Law and there needed no such rule That case goes upon the reason of Lambs case 5 Rep. when a man is obliged to pay such a sum as J. S. shall assess J. S. being a meer stranger the Obligor takes upon him that J. S. shall assess a sum in certain and he must procure him to do it or he forfeits his Obligation But in our case nothing is to be done but by the Obligee himself Pemberton contra He argued that the Obligors Election is not taken away for though no Deed were tendred him he might have got one made and the tender of that would have discharged the Condition of his Bond. Indeed this will put him to charge but he may have an Action of Debt for what he lays out He cited the cases cited by Walmesley in Moor 645. betwixt Milles Wood 41 Eliz. Gowers case 38 39 Eliz. c. North. The case of Warner White adjudged yesterday in the Court of Kings Bench is according to Law the condition there was that J. S. should pay such a sum upon the 25th of December or should appear in Hillary Term after in the Court of Kings Bench. J. S. died after the 25th day of Dec ' and before Hill Term and had paid nothing upon the 25th of December In that case the Condition was not broken by the non-payment and the other part is become impossible by the act of God But I think that if the first part of a Condition be rendred impossible by the act of God that the Obligor is bound to perform the other part But in the case at the bar the Obligors Election is taken away by the act of the Obligee himself And I see no difference betwixt this case and that of Gerningham Ewer in Cr. Eliz. if the Condition of an Obligation be single to make such assurance as shall be advised by the Council of the Obligee there concilium non dedit advisamentum is a good plea and the Obligor is not bound to make an assurance of his own head no more shall he be bound to do it when the Condition is in the dis-junctive to save his Bond. In both cases the Condition refers to the manner of the assurance and it must be made in such manner as the words of the Condition import So he said he was of Opinion against the Plaintiff Wyndham Where the Condition of an Obligation is in the disjunctive the Obligor must have his Election But in this case there is no such thing as a disjunctive till such time as there be a request made to seal a Deed of Annuity and then the Obligor will have an Election either to execute the assurance or to pay the 300 l. but no such request being made it should seem that the Obligor must pay the 300 l. at his peril Atkyns agreed with the Chief Iustice and so did Scroggs wherefore Iudgment was ordered to be entred against the Plaintiff Nisi causa c. within a week Quare impedit The Plaintiff declared upon a grant of the Advowson to his Ancestor and in his Declaration says hic in Cur̄ prolat ' but indéed had not the Deed to shew Serjeant Baldwin brought an Affidavit into Court that the Defendant had gotten the Deéd into his hands and prayed that the Plaintiff may take advantage of a Copy thereof which appear'd in an Inquisition found temp Edw. 6. Cur̄ When an Action of Debt is brought upon a Bond to perform Covenants in a Deed and the Defendant cannot plead Covenants perform'd without the Deed because the Plaintiff has the original deed and perhaps the Defendant took not a Counterpart of it we use to grant imparlances till the Plaintiff bring in the deed And upon Evidence if it be proved that the other party has the deed we admit Copies to be given in Evidence But here the Law requires that the deed be produced you have your remedy for the deed at Law We cannot alter the Law nor ought to grant an emparlance Stead Perryer EJectione firmae A man has a Son called Robert Robert has likewise a Son called Robert The Grandfather deviseth the Land in question to his Son Robert and his heirs Robert the deviseé dies in the devisors life time Afterwards the devisor makes a new publication of the same Will and declares it to be his intention that Robert the Grand-child should take the Land in question per eandem voluntatem instead of his Father and dyed And all this was found by special Verdict upon a Trial betwixt Robert the Grand-child and a Daughter of the elder Brother of Robert the first devisee Pemberton The Land does not pass by this Will the devise to Robert became void by his death and cannot be made good by a republication A publication cannot alter the words of a Will so as to put a new sense upon them Land must pass by Will in writing Robert the Grand-son is not within this Will in writing The Grandfathers intention is not considerable in the case Skipwith contra I agree the case between Brett Rygden in the Commentaries to be Law but there are two great diversities between this case and that 1. There was no new publication 2. In this case Robert the Father and Robert the Son are cognominous He cited Dyer 142 143. Trevilians case Fuller Fuller Cr. Eliz. 422. Moor 353. Cr Eliz. 493. North Atkyns Without question Robert the Grand-child shall take by this Will If he never had had a Son called Robert or if Robert the Son had been dead at the time of making the Will the Grand-child would then without dispute have taken by these words Now a new publication is equivolent to a new writing The Grand-child is not directly within the words of the Will but they are applicable to him He is a Son though he be not begotten by the body of the devisor himself He is a Son with
Obligation I agreed with Copping versus Hornar and Bernard versus King That where an Vmpire is at first certainly named and appointed he cannot exercise his authority within the time appointed to the Arbitrators because the same authority cannot be given to and continue both in the Arbitrators and Vmpire at the same time But when the Vmpire is named and chosen by the Arbitrators as in our Case he may make his award within the time allowed to the Arbitrators because cause there the Arbitrators by their own action viz. the election of the Vmpire determine their authority And the authority vests and remains in the Vmpire only and so it was admitted in Bernard versus King Twisden assentibus Rainsford Morton This is a good part of the Condition There was a Condition That if the Obligor should c. then the Bond should be void and further that the Obligor should release And it was adjudged here That the last was a part of the Condition I was at the Bar when the Case betwixt Barnard and King was spoken to and I know Roll did hold and deliver then That if it had been alledged that the Arbitrators had wholly denied and deserted their power it had let in the Vmpire so as that he might account within the time allowed to the Arbitrators and he stood upon this then that it was implicitely alledged viz. Postquam denegassent c. But this was a hard Opinion of his and he himself reports his own judgment otherwise 1 Ro. 262. It may be he altered his Opinion we inclin'd that the award in the Case at the Bar is naught For the authority of the Arbitrators was not determined till after the 19th of February For Iustice Croke goes so far 1 Cr. 263. as to agree That Arbitrators may nominate an Vmpire within the time for their making their award So that the chusing the Vmpire doth not extinguish their authority and therefore the Vmpire could not make an award upon this 19th of February It is true the Arbitrators might chuse him upon that day or before But yet still they might have made an award and therefore he could not Adjournatur Rex versus Episcopum Worcest ' Jervason Hinkley in Communi Banco See the Case put at large in Vaughan's Reports The Arguments of Justice Wild Archer and Tyrrel were as follow The Chief Justices Argument is here omitted because published at large in his own Reports JUstice Wild. I think the King cannot take the traverse in this Case and this will appear by looking upon the old Books which were not well considered by those who did reply 13 H. 7. 13. 14. Pl. 18. It is said the King may chuse either to maintain his own Title or traverse the Title of the party who sues him by Petition So 13 E. 4. 8. pl. 1. It is said when one traverses an Office the King may either maintain the Office or traverse the Title shewn for the party because no man shall recover Lands against the King without having a Title But there it is Resolved That if the King joyn issue upon his own Title he cannot change issue and traverse the Title shewed for the party Now here is the allegation of the King that the Advowson was in gross and the Defendants denying it is in nature of joyning an issue which cannot be receded from But the reason why in that Case the King might wave the traverse tendered to his Title and traverse the Title shewn for the party is because the Office puts the King in actual possession for where the King is in by Record or possession for possession is enough the party must make a Title if he will recover against the King Keil 192. pl. 3. Savages Case It was found by Inquisition that whereas the Turn time out of mind used to be held at Worcester he being Sheriff for life held it at Pedyl and Streight Contra formam Statuti de magna Charta upon a Scire fac upon an Information hereupon for forfeiting the Office He pleads that time out mind c. it used to be held at Pedyl c. absque hoc that it used to be held at Wâ—â—â—ester Resolved That the King might maintain the Inquisition that it used to be held at Worcester absque hoc that it used to be held at Pedyl c. and the reason is because the King was intituled to the Forfeiture by a Record The difference is where the King is Actor as here he is being out of possession he must make a Title and prove it But where the party is Actor he cannot fix upon his own Title and force the King to make good his own Title 34 H. 8. Br. Prerog 116. Whorewood's Case is full in point In an Information tam quam if the Defendant traverse the King cannot wave the issue so tendered One Reason indeed given is because the King is not sole party But the chief reason is because the King is not intituled by matter of Record For saith the Book There is no Office found before the Information But upon a traverse of an Office hujusmodi saith the Book the King may do it because he is intituled by matter of Record therefore in our Case the King shall not wave the issue tendered c. and fly upon the matter of the Defendants Title Archer accordant It must be admitted that in this Case the King must make a Title because by presenting of Tim. White and also of Hinkley the Defendant the which was nine years since he is put to his Quare Impedit and is out of possession I do not say of the Inheritance though that hath been a question in the old Books V. 2. Cr. 53. But it has been adjudged That the Inheritance cannot be gained or devested out of the King by any Vsurpations 2 Cr. 123. 3 Cr. 241. 519. and Green's 6 Co. 30. a. But that he may grant away the Inheritance of the Advowsons still c. But it is as clear and agreéd by all those Books and Boswell's Case 6 Co. 49 50. that in such case he must bring a Quare Impedit to recover the Presentation for he is put out of possession of that For as my Lord Hob. 322. observes it is one of the things whereupon Vsurpation works more violently than upon other possessions Now he that is thus out of possession and put to his Quare Impedit must always make a Title to himself in the Declaration Hob. 102. and this the Defendant cannot counterplead but by conveighing a Title to himself and so avoiding the Plaintiffs alledged Title by traverse or confessing and avoiding Hob 163. Now here the Defendant hath done what he could do he hath traversed the Kings Title why then shall 〈◊〉 King depart from his own Title and fly upon the defectâ—â—â— Title of the Defendant No. Actori incumbit onus he must recover by his own strength not by the Defendants weakness The Defendant by traversing the Kings
Legacies and that the Devisee has paid almost all and fails in one or so there may be good cause of relief because he has paid much and is somewhat in the nature of a purchasor This is not like a Legacy This is upon the Statute Where it is said a man may Devise at his Will and pleasure i.e. absolutely upon Condition upon Limitation or any way that the Law warrants Suppose there had been a special Act of Parliament disposing as the Earl has done in this case could there be any colour in Equity to alter or vary this Law And here 't is equally as concluding as that since the Statute gives a man power to dispose as expresly and otherwise Equity would alter and dispose of all property and all things that came in question But let Notice or Consent c. be requisite or not 't is Triable at Law But I stand upon this that there ought to be no relief in Equity It was insisted that her Grandmother gave a kind of consent but I take that for nothing For though the Grandmother would not have offered or proposed a Marriage yet she ought not to marry without her consent Nor is the Lords Post-Consent any thing for consent cannot be had for things which cannot be otherwise as a man cannot be said to consent to his Stature or the colour of his hair c. A man may know of what Opinion he is or was but 't is impossible for a man to know of what Opinion he would have been in the circumstances of Action which he never tryed I conclude the Plaintiff ought not to have relief in Equity But if any matter in Law will help them they are not excluded from it Keling Cheif Justice I think there ought to be no relief in this Case I have considered it as well as I can and I think nothing is more fit to be observed then thief Customary Rules for Children they are very good restraints for Children and ought to be made good here to encourage obedience and discourage those who would make a Prey of them and if there were not hope for men to hasten their fortunes by this means there would be few adventures of this nature I have lookt upon the Presidents c. and I find they come not to this Case except only one and that is but seven years old and the other are for money for which there is reason because the party may be substantially relieved and satisfied otherways If there had been no limitation over there may be some reason why it may be intented that it was only in terrorem I do not think all Cases upon Wills are irremediable here because of the Statute If the breach of the Condition be in a circumstance only as in the Case where the consent was given but not in writing as it ought it may be relieved for that was a caution to the Consentor that he should not give consent before strangers and trust to the swearing of a parol-consent I never yet saw any devise obliging to have any such consent after the parties age of 21 years so that there is no great hardship in it And if there should be any ill design in those who have the trust and power to consent in with-holding their consent it might be relieved here I think none would make a decree that if she died without issue the Defendant should have it and this is the same But equity can never go against the substantial part of a Conveyance or Will but that must be governed by the parties agreement or appointment Equity ought to arise upon some collateral or accidental emergent 'T is not in Terrorem indeed without a penalty There can be no collateral Averment Being an Infant is nothing for this is only a provision while she is an Infant Besides the case of the Forfeiture of the double value is a very good instance for the Notice If she had notice of this Will yet they that came to steal her knew it not for they did not come to take a shorn sheep and therefore no relief is deserved by the Plaintiff In Honesty and Conscience those Bonds ought to be kept strict I confess I would not have the Plaintiff tempted to a further Suit but indeed in saying that I go further then I need Bridgeman Lord Keeper If I were of another Opinion yet I would be bound by my Lords for I did not send for them not to be bound by them But I was of their Opinion from the beginning And I am glad now that we are delivered from a common Error and that men may make such provisions as may bind their Children But to justifie the Decree a little 1 Here is 5000 l. appointed to George Porter so that the ample provision was made for him and it may the rather be intended that this Estate was wholly designed for the Plaintiff 2 Here was a Post-consent and those persons were in loco parentum Now if the Earl had as possibly he might have thus pardoned and been reconciled to the Marriage he would probably have given the Plaintiff the Estate and that is a reason to induce us to the same For I think it clear that an Estate by Act of Parliament is liable to the same Relief Regulation c. as any other Estate An Estate Tail though that be by Statute yet is liable to be cut off c. If there had beén a time limited then there had been more reason to bind her up to have consent But there ought to be a restraint put in these Cases That of the double forfeiture was truly and well observed Where no body is bound to give Notice it is to be taken but besides she is not heir for that might have made a great difference This I thought not to say Vpon the whole I am of my Opinion with my Lords and I am glad I have their assistance Let the Bill be dismissed FINIS A TABLE of the Principal Matters contained in the foregoing REPORTS A. Abatement A Plea may be good in abatement though it contain also matter that goes in barr 214 Accord Accord with satisfaction 69 Account Pray'd that the Court would give further day for giving in the Account 42 Plea in barr and Plea before Auditors 65 Action for words Words spoken of a Watchmaker 19 Of a Justice of Peace 22 23 You are a Pimp and a Bawd and fetch young Gentlewomen to young Gentlemen 31 32 Action for words spoken of an Attorney 172 Action upon the Case For suing the Plaintiff in placito debiti for 600 li. and affirming that he owed him 600 li. whereby he was held to extraordinary Bail 4 Action upon a Promise in consideration that the Plaintiff mitteret prosequi such a Suit c. held good 43 For a false Return V. Tit. Return For a Libel V. Libel V. Market Against a Master of a Ship for keeping Goods so negligently that they were stollen away whilst the Ship