Tales might be of the other County only Davies versus Gardiner 3. AN Action upon the case for a Slander was brought by Anne Davies against Iohn Gardiner That wheras there was a Communication of a Marriage to be had between the Plaintiff and one Anthony Elcock the Defendant to the intent to hinder the said Marriage said and published that there was a Grocer in London that did get her with Child and that she had Vide this case reported Cook lib. 4. 16. b the Child by the said Grocer wherby she lost her Marriage To which the Defendant pleaded not guilty and was found guilty at the Assises at Aylesbury to the Damages of 200. marks And now it was alledged in Arrest of Iudgment that this matter appeareth to be meerly spirituall and therfore not determinable at common Law but to be prosecuted in the spirituall Court. But per Curiam the Action lies here for a woman not maried candot by intendment have so great advancement as by her Marriage wherby she is sure of maintenance for her life or during her Marriage and Dower and other benefits which the temporall Laws gives by reason of her Marriage and therfore by this slander she is greatly prejudiced in that which is to be her temporall advancement for which it is reason to give her remedy by way of Action at common Law As if a woman keep a Victualling house to which divers of great credit repair wherby she hath her livelyhood and one will say to her Guests that as they respect their credits they take care how they they use such a house for there the woman is known to be a Bawd wherby the Guests avoid her house to the losse of her husband shall not she in this case have an Action at common Law for such a slander It is cleer that shee will So if one saith that a woman is a common Strumpet and that it is a slander to them to come to her house wherby she looseth the adâ—antage which she was wont to have by her Guests she shall have her Action â—or this at common Law So here upon these collaterall circumstances wherby it may appear that she hath more prejudice then can be by calling of one Harlot and the like And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Hillary Term 36 Eliz. in the Kings Bench. IN Michaelmas Term 33 34 Eliz. Rot. 181. William and Joane his wife Administratrir of Andrew Stock brought an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit made to the Intestate for the payment of 5 l. to William Stock who imparled untill Tuesday next after Octa. Hillary next which was the 24th day of January and then the Defendâ—nt demanded Oyer of the Letters of Administration which were entred in haec verba Wherby it appeareth that the Letters of Administration were committed to the said Joane by Thomas Taylor Batchelor of Law Commissary to the Bishop of London c. wherby the Defendant pleaded that after the last continuance â—he said Letters Patents of Administâ—ation sealed with the Seal of the Vicar Generall of the said Bishop which he useth in this behalf and brought here into Court bearing date the 27th day of January 1591. which was three daies after the continuance committed the Administration to the said Defendant And pleaded further the Act of 37 H. 8. which sayes that it shall be lawfull hereafter for any person being a Doctor of the Law to be Chancellor Commissary or to exercise Ecclesiasticall Iurisdiction albeit he were a meer Lay person so that such a person be a Doctor as aforesaid and avers that at the time of the committing of the Administration to the said Joane the said Thomas Taylor was a meer Lay person and not Doctor Legis civilis nec minister allocatus according to the Laws of the Church of England wherby he had no lawfull power to commit the Administration Vpon which it was demurred generally and by all the Court the Plaintiff had Iudgment to recover for we are to consider what our Law was in this case before this Statute of 37 H. 8. And albeit a Doctor then affirmed that the Canon Law was that there was a meer nullity in such Administration so although the party that did it not being a Clark nor Doctor according to the Stat. of 37 H. 8. yet all the Iustices agreed that the Administration so committed will be adjudged in our Law to be of force and effect being shewn under the Seal of the Officer and committed by him who is reputed the Officer who ought to do it and is invested in the Office untill it be avoided by sentence and yet such an avoidance shall not make a mans act to be made void no more then if a meer Lay-man be presented to a benefice albeit this be a meer nullity in our Law and void yet we adjudge the Church full according to the publike admission constitution and induction and not according to the capacity of the person which is a thing secret untill such a one be deprived for it by sentence in the spirituall Court and yet the Church shall be in our Law void but from the time of deprivation of which notice ought to be given to the Patron So here he remains as to our Law an Officer untill his authority be defeated by sentence of the spirituall Court otherwise great mischief will happen for an infinite number of Administrations may be drawn in question by Averment that he who granted them was a meer lay person and so make such Garboils in the Common-wealth which is not to be suffered for the inconveniency which will happen by it and therfore our Law which is founded upon reason shall judge of it according to the open appearance of the Officer to wit that he hath a grant made to him and not according to the private capacity of the person and this is not altered by the said Statuts which is made in affirmation of it and makes the authority of a Doctor of Law absolute not to be defeated by the Civill or Canon Law which is not in the other case But yet it doth not make this case of worse condition then it was at Common Law And by all the pleading of the Administration committed to the Defendant is not good because it appeareth by the date of it that it was made after the day of the last continuance and therfore could not have been pleaded untill a new continuance after And by the Doctor the last Administration does not avoid the first but in case where there is an especial revecation of the first But they did not speak of the doublenesse because the Demurrer was generall and not speciall and also because the other matters were so cleer 2. IN Trespasse for carrying away certain Loads of Hay the case hapned to be this The Plaintiff pretending Title to certain Hay which the defend had standing in certain Land to be more sure to have the Action passe for Property him
but as referring to the provision subsequent in the Statute in which case this matter shall be used but as the Proviso it self shall be and according to this it hath been commonly put in practise by all the Iustices in all places after the Statute untill now And they agreed also that it need not be shewn whether he were made a Iesuit or Priest c. either beyond Sea or within the Realm because whersoever it was it is within the Law if he were made by the pretended authority of the See of Rome But they agreed that it ought to be comprised in the Indictment that he was born within this Realm or other Dominions of the Queen but need not to shew where but generally Et quod I. S. natus infra hoc Regnum Angliae c. And the Indictment ought to comprise that he was a Iesuite or Priest c. by authority challenged or pretended from to the See of Rome because that this is in the body of the Act without such reference as in the other point and according to this resolution the proceeding was against the said Southwell Easter Term 37 Eliz. Pigots Case 1. AFter the death of Valentine Pigot Esquire a Commission was awarded in nature of a Mandamus and after the death of Thomas Pigot Father of the said Valentine a Commission was awarded in nature of a Diem clausit extremum and the said Commissions were awarded to one and the same Commissioners who by one Inquest took but one Inquisition upon these severall Commissions in this form Inquisitio indentata captâ— apud c. virtute Commiss in natura brevis de diem clausit extremum eisdem Commiss direct c. ad inquirendum post mortem Thomae Pigot Ar. nuper defuncti patris predict Valentin per sacramentum c. Qui dâ—cunt c. After which all the points of the Câ—mmission after the death of the sâ—id Valentine are enquired of but for the Commissions after the death of the said Thomas Pigot it is imperfect in some points as who is his Heir c. is not found And by Popham and Anderson this Inquisition is void as to Valentine as well as for Thomas for their authorities which are the Commissions are by severall Warrants which cannot be simul semel by one and the same Inquisition executed and satisfied but ought to be divided and severall as the Warrant is severall and yet the same Inquest which found one Inquisition by one Warrant may also find another Inquisition by the other Warrant but divided and severall and not as one for as it is made it does not appear upon which of the Commissions the Inquisition as to Valentine is taken for as it is made it may be as well upon the one as upon the other for it is said to be by vertue of both the Commissions which cannot be and therfore is not good in any part and severall Warrants ought to be severally execused and therfore although the Escheator as appeareth by 9 H. 7. 8. may take â—â— Inquisition Virtue officii and at the same day another Inquisition Virtue brevis by one and the same Inquest yet this cannot be drawn into one Inquisition And that which is found Virtue officii contrary to that which before the same day Virtute libris as that it found more Land is good for the King And this their opinion was certified to the Court of Wards Sir Rowland Haywards Case 2. THis Case was also sent to the same chief Iustices out of the Court of See this case in Coke â— Report 35. Wards Sir Rowland Hayward being seised in his Demesne as of Fee of the Mannors of D. and A. in the County of Salop and of other Lands in the same County part wherof were in Lease for years by severall Indentures rendring certain rent part in the possessions of severall Copyholders and part in Demesne in possession out of Lease by Indenture dated 2. September 34. Eliz. made mention that this was for and in consideration of a certain sum of money to him paid by Richard Warren Esquire and others demised granted bargained and sold to the said Richard Warren and the others the said Mannors Lands and Tenements and the Reversion and Remainder of them and of every part of them and the Rents and Profits reserved upon any Demise therupon for 17. years next ensuing the death of the said Sir Rowland rendring a Rose at the Feast of S. John Baptist yearly if it be demanded which Deed was acknowledged to be enrolled and afterwards by another Indenture covenanted and granted for him and his Heirs hereafter to stand seised of the said Mannors Lands and Tenements to the use of the said Sir Rowland and of the Heirs Males of his body and afterwards and before any Attornment to the said Richard Warren and his Co-lessees or any of them the said Sir Rowland died seised of the said Mannors Lands and Tenements leaving a full third part of other Lands to descend to his Heir And it was moved on the Queens part that for part to wit for that which was in possession it past to the said Richard Warren and the other by way of Demise at Common Law and therfore it doth not passe afterwards by way of Bargain and Sale as to the Remainder and that therfore for the Services of the Mannors and for the Rents reserved upon the Demise these remain to the Heir who was in Ward to the Queen and within age and therfore to the Queen by reason of the Tenure which was in Capite by Knights-service But by Popham and Anderson it is at the Election of the said Richard Warren and his Co-lessees to take it by way of Demise or by way of Bargain and Sale untill that by some act done or other matter it may appear that their intent is to take it another way for the Vse in this case may well passe without the Inrolement of the Deed because the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Inrolements extends but to where a Free-hold is to passe and the Vse so passing this shall be executed by the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Vses and therfore if the said Richard Warren and his Co-lessees after the death of the said Sir Rowland Hayward would elect to take it by way of Bargain and Sale they shall have all the Reversions Remainders Rents and Services as well as the Land in possession executed to them by the Statute of Vses And of the same opinion were all the Iustices in Trinity Term following upon their meeting at Serjeants-Inne for another great cause Trinity Term 37 Eliz. 1. VPon an Assembly of all the Iustices and Barons of the Exchecquer at Where a Justâ—ce of Peace bails one who is not bailable he shall be sined and albeit he be committed but for sufficiâ—â—â— of Felony and haâ—h no notice of his offence Serjeants-Inne in Fleetstreet this Term it was resolved by them and so agreed to be hereafter put
Co. lib. 8. Baspoles case and 7 H. 6. 40. accordingly The same Term in the same Court Vaughans Case THomas Dedham had to Apprentice one Holland who got his Main with Child and afterwards departed from his Masters Service and staid a whole night with Vaughan his Kinsman and Dedham procured a Warrant from S. Stephen Soame a Iustice of Peace that the Constable should bring the said Apprentice to order according to Law and because that Vaughan perswaded him to withdraw himself so that he should not be taken by virtue of the Warrant he was indited And it was agreed that it was lawfull for Vaughan to lodge and relieve him albeit he knew his misdeeds they being no Treason or Felony But Haughton Iustice took exception to the Inditement because no place appeared where he perswaded him to withdraw himself from the Warrant or in truth that he did hide himself from the Warrant for if he did not so the perswasion was nothing And Doderidge took another exception to the Warrant because the Statute saith that two Iustices of which one of them shall be of the Quorum shall proceed in such cases against the Malefactor and that they shall compell the party to allow means for the education of the Infant or otherwise the Offendor shall suffer corporall punishment and so this Warrant not being speciall according Pasch 16. Jac. In the Star Chamber Wrennums Case SIr Henry Yelverton Attorney-generall exhibited an Information in the Star Chamber against one Wrennum Ore tenus because he had divers times petitioned the King against Sir Francis Bacon Lord Chancellor pretending that the said Lord Bacon had done great Injustice to him in granting an Injunction and awarding Possession of Land against him for which he had two decrees in the time of the former Chancellor And also he made a Book of all the proceedings in the said cause between him and one Fisher and dedicated and delivered it to the King in which he notoriously traduced and scandalised the said Chancellor saying that for this unjust decree he his Wife and Children were murthered and by the worst kind of death by starving And that now he having done unjustly he must maintain it by speaking untruths and that he must use his authority Wit Art and Eloquence for the better maintenance therof with other such like scandalous words And the Attorney cited a president 2 Jac. Where one Ford for an offence in the like manner against the late Chancellor was censured in this Court that he should be perpetnally imprisoned and pay the fine of 1000 l. and that he should ride upon a Horse with his face to the tail from the Fleet to Westminster with his fault written upon his head and that he should acknowledge his offence in all the Courts at Westminster and that he should stand there a reasonable time upon the Pillory and that one of his ears shall be cut off and from thence shall be carried to Prison again and in the like manner should go to Cheapside and should have his other ear cut off c. And because they conceived that the said Wrennum had wronged the said Lord Chancellor in the said suggestion they all agreed in his censure according to the said President See for such matter 19. Ass 5. 9 H. 8. Sir Rowland Heywards case and 21 H. 8. Cardinall Wolseys case The same Term in the Kings Bench. Mingies Case AWrit of Annuity was brought by Mingy which was granted Pro Consilio impenso impendendo the Defendant pleaded in Bar that he carried a Bill to the Plaintiff to have him set his hand to it and because he refused Annuity pro Consil impenso c. he detained the said Annuity And per Curiam this is no plea for he is bound to give advice but not to set his hand to every Bill for this may be inconventent to him The same Term in the same Court THe Case was this A Lessee for years was bound in a Bond to give up the possession of the Land demised to the Lessor or his Assigns at the end of the Term the Lessor assigns over his Interest and the Assignee requires the Lessee to perform the Condition who answers that he knew not Notice where requisite whether he were the Assignee and therupon refuseth And the question was whether he had broken the Condition and it was adjudged that he had for he hath taken upon him so to do and it is not like a Condition annexed to an Estate as Co. lib. 5. Mallories case or Co. lib. 6. Greens case where the Patron presented his Clark to a deprivation yet the Ordinary ought to give the Patron notice of the deprivation for it is a thing Spirituall of which a Lay-man shall not be bound to take notice It was moved that a man riding upon a Horse through the water was Dead and. drowned and by the Coroners Inquest it was found that his death was caused Per cursum aquae and the Horse was not found a Deodand and per Curiam they did well for the water and not the Horse was the cause of his death The same Terme in the same Court. Wooton versus Bye THe case was this A man made a Lease for years rendring Rent and upon payment of the Rent the Lessor made an Acquittance by a release of all Actions Duties and Demands from the beginning of the World to Release of all Demands bars a future Rent the day of the date And whether the Rent to come were released by it was the question And it was moved by Crook at the Bar that it was not for a Covenant in future shall not be released by such words yet a release of all Covenants will be good in such a case as the Book is in Dyer 57. so Hoes case Co. lib. 5. 70. b. such a release will not discharge a Bail before Iudgment But it was answered and resolved by the Court that such a Release will discharge the Rent to come for this word Demand is the most large and ample word in a Release that may be as Littleton saith and in Co. lib. 8. Althams case and in Hoes case Co. lib. 5. one was Bail for the Defendant the words wherof are conditionable Scil. Si contigerit predict defendent debit damna illa prefat Quer. minime solvere c. So that before Iudment it is altogether incertain and therfore cannot be released but in the case at the Bar he hath Jus ad rem though not in re as Crook Iustice said The same Term in the same Court. Bret versus Cumberland IN a Writ of Covenant the case was thus Queen Elizabeth by her Letters Patents made a Lease of certain Mills rendring Rent in which Lease were these words to wit That the said Lessee his Executors Administrators and Assigns should from time to time repair the Mills and so leave them at the end of the Term the Lessee assigns over his Term the Queen also
will is wrong to him and the performance of Wills is much favoured because it is the last desire of the Partie who is dead and it is for the publick-weale because by this means debts shall be payd And many cases are within the equity of the Statute that are not within the letter as those Cases which have been put all which he agreed Jones Iustice on the sudden was against it and that this Case is not within the equity of the Statute of 4. E. 3. There are divers Actions which are not helped by this Statute as Trespasse for cutting of Trees Battery and the like for the Statute is de bonis Catallis asportat in vita testator An Executor shall have a Replevin of Goods taken in vita testator for by this he recovers the thing it selfe and shall have Detinue but shall not have treâ—passe for he cannot punish the wrong done in the life of the Testator The Statute of 4. E. 3. is much inlarged by equity as the cases which have been put and extend also to usurpation in the life time of the Testator as appears in Russels Case Co. lib 5. 32. 33. Eliz. in C. B. in the Bishop of Chichesters case that if the Testator dyes within 6 months after the usurpation the Executor shall have a Quare impedit And the Case of Trover and Conversion in vita Testator was maintained by Executors and it was so resolved 41. and 42. Eliz. in the Countesse of Rutlands Case in both the Benches because this is in nature of a Writ of Detinue Now for the Case in question I conceive that it is not within the Statute of 4. E. 3. because it is neither bona nor catalla Whitlock Iustice contra and that this Statute is very much taken by equity praeter literam though not contra literam But Nota that all agreed if it were upon an escape after Iudgement that the Action would lie by the Executors according to the Case of F. N. B. 121. a. But the principall Case was adjourned And afterwards Trin. 3. Car. It was argued again by Jermy for the Plaintiff and the sole point was A man taken by latitat and being in the custody of the Sheriff escape the Party at whose suit he was arrested dies whether his Executor shall have an Action upon the Case upon the Escape and he conceived that he might It hath been objected that it is a personall wrong and as an Action doth not lye against Executors upon an Escape in vita Testator so not by Execucutors To which I answer that it is not meerly personall but mixed with an interest At the Common-Law an Executor could not have trespas for Goods taken in vita Testator but yet he should have a Replevin 34. E. 3. Fitz. Avoury 257. and Executors 106. So at Common-Law a Successor should not have Trespas for Goods carried away in the life time of his Predecessor but he shall have a Replevin 9. H. 6. 25 but this was remedied by the Statute of Marlebridge cap. 28. and so upon the Statute of 4. E. 3. de bonis asportat c. Trover and Conversion hath beene adjudged within the said Statute for the Statute hath alwayes been liberally expounded 7. H. 4. 2. Fitz Executor 52. An Executor shall have ravishment of Gard taken away in vita Testator and also other Statutes which do not name Executors have beene eâ—pounded to extend to them as the Statute of 23. H. 8. which gives attaint 3. Eliz. Dyer 201. Co. lib. 6. 8. Executors shall take benefit of the pardon of Trin. 14 Jac. Pâ—obe and Maynes Case if the party escape being a rested upon mean Proces the Sheriffe is not liable for the Escape otherwise if upâ—n an Execution 43. Eliz. and 6. E. 6. Bendloes Reports which is cited there Executors shall have restitution upon the Statute of 21. H. 8. and Co. lib. 5. 31. and 27. Russels Case an Executor shall have Trover upon Goods lost in vita Testator and this is in manner and nature of a promise to have the party in Court at the day and it is cleer that upon an expresse Assumpsit to the Testator an Executor shal have an action upon the Case and it hath been in manner agreed by the Court that if it had been an escape of one in execution that the action would have lyen by the Executor and I see no difference between that and our case And it was adjourned The same Term in the same Court UPon an Information by Heath the Kings Attorney against two men of the County of Huntington in the name of all the County that they ought and used to repaire the Bridge of S. Eedes in the County of Huntington Issue was joyned by the County whether they ought and used to repaire this Bridge and the Attorney gave no evidence but put it upon the other side for he said by the Statute of 22. H. 8. cap. if it doth not appeare that any particular person or Towne ought to repaire a Bridge by reason of Tenure or otherwise that then the County where this is ought to repaire it But Nota that the issue was whether they ought to repaire the whole Bridge and yet upon the evidence it appeared that onely two Arches and a halfe of the Bridge was in the County of Huntington and two Aâ—â—hes and a halfe in the County of Bedford and the Iury found generally that onely two Arches and a halfe of the Bridge were in the County of Huntington and say nothing where the rest was for they could not find a thing in another County And also they found that the County of Huntington ought to repaire all but not that they used to repaire it And at another day Hedley Serjeant moved for the County that the Verdict was not good because the issue was whether they ought to repaire and a tempore cujus contrarium c. had repaired c. And the Iury hath found that they ought to repaire which is but the halfe of the issue and also they find that they ought to do it which is a Question in Law and therefore voyd 8. H. 6. 3. 4. Secondly the issue is whether they ought to repair the Bridge and the Iury hath found that they ought to repair two Arches and a halfe onely c. and the Bridge is an entire thing The Attorney answered that for the first exception the case of 27. Ass Pl. 8. is against it And for the last the very case of 43 Ass Pl. 37. is against it and therfore the Court conceived the Verdict good notwithstanding these exceptions Doderidge Iustice By the common Law before the Statute of 22. H. 8. if no man by reason of tenure or otherwise ought to repaire a Bridge the County ought to do it like to the case of 8. E. 4. Fishers by the Law of Nations may dry their Nets upon the Land of any man The same Term in the same Court DOctor
but if there were no such clause of reserving rent then I conceive it were otherwise But admitting all this were against me yet the justification of the Defendant is not good for by the exception out of the exception the Lessor cannot take the benefit of the bodies of the trées because he will thereby deprive the Lessée of the croppings and loppings c. as in 28. H 8. Dyer Maleverell and Spynkes case Mylward of Lincolnes Inne for the Defendant And first he conceived that the Lessée for life without impeachment of waste might dispose of the trées in the same manner as Tenant in fée might doe with this difference that the disposall thereof ought to be in his life time and so it is resolved in Lewys Bowles case Co. lib. 11. 46. 2. The second matter in the case is whether the Lessée for life without impeachment of waste c. hath only an authority or an interest in the trées and I conceive that he hath an interest for his power is to make Leases of it or of any part for 21. years or 3. lives and that the Conuzors shall be seized to the use of such Lessées now when he makes a Lease excepting the trées the trées are not demised so that he remains still tenant for life without impeachment of waste for the trees 3. Excepting all Timber-trées but for fencing cropping and lopping it hath béene objected that this exception hath no forme It is a generall rule that if a man makes a Grant and in the close thereof except all that which was granted before the exception is voyd and this appears by 34. Ass Pl. 11. A Will was granted salvo stagno molendini so here the last exception takes away all that which was granted before 38. H. 6. 38. in a Quare impedit 28. H. 8. Dyer 19. by Mountague the cropping and lopping of trées belong to the Lessee like to the Duke of Norfolks case in 12. H. 7. 25. and 13. H. 7. 13. and 18. E. 4. 14. and albeit every grant shall be taken most strongly against the Grantor yet it shall have a reasonable intendment for the benefit of the Grantor and this appeares by 7. E. 4. 22. 17. E. 3. 7. 9. E. 4. 2. 21. E. 3. 43. so here the Exception shall have a reasonable intendment that he shall onely have such loppings and croppings as shall be bestowed upon the Park and no other Doderidge Iustice I conceive that by the words without impeachment of waste he hath interest in the trees as long as the estate continues 2. That when he makes a lease by the second power given to him this is derived out of the Fine and shall be good against him in the remainder 3. Because he hath power to dispose of the trées I conceive that when he makes a Lease excepting the trees this is a good exception 24. Eliz. C. B. A man made a Lease for years now he hath the wast of the trees if he assign over his estate excepting the trées the exception is voyd but in our case the Lessée hath not parted with his whole estate 4. So the sole question is whether he in remainder may cut the trées during the estate of thrée lives made by Henry Secheverell and he conceived that he might and so concluded for the Defendant Jones Iustice agréed that the Lessee for life without impeachment of wast hath interest in the trées but this interest is concomitant with his estate and determinable with it 2. I conceive that the exception is good Such things which a man hath by the Law he cannot resign to himselfe upon his assignment as the cropping and lopping of trées as if tenant in taile after possibility c. who is dispunishable of wast by fréedome of the Law assign over his estate reserving the trees he cannot cut the trees but here the Lessee hath a larger liberty then the Law gives to him and he by vertue of this may give away the trees but I conceive that if he had assigned over all his estate then he could not have excepted the trees but here he hath not granted over all his estate for he hath a remainder and may have an estate in possession afterwards and upon this Lease for three lives hee may reserve a rent to himselfe 3. I conceive that this Lease is derived partly out of his owne estate and hee hath not the meere nomination and partly out of the first Fine and therefore such Lessees shall be subject to all charges made by the Tenant for life who made the Lease as Statutes Recognizances c. to wit during the life of the first tenant for life 4. When he dyes who made the said Lease for three lifes whether he in remainder may cut the Trees during the said Lease and he conceived yet not without some doubt that he had no power during the lives of the sayd Lessees Whitlock Iustice agreed with the rest so that it was agreed by all 1. That it is a good exception 2. That the second lease is drawn out of the Fine And the question now is whether he in remainder without impeachment of waste with power to cut the trees hath power to cut them during the lives of the said three Lessees and the Councell was commanded to speake to this point only upon another day The same Term in the same Court. Foster and Taylers Case ERror was brought upon a Iudgement given in C. B. and after the Record was certified into this Court the Common-pleas amended a rasure of the Record which was there and now Bramston Sergeant movâ—â— for the Def. that the Record might be amended here Jones Iustice I doubt whether an inferior Court can amend after the Record is certified here for then it is but a piece of Parchment with them Bramston It is resolved that it may in Blackamores case Co. lib. 8. Doderidge the doubt is whether it may be amended after error assigned in the same Court for this takes away the benefit of the Law from the Plaintiff in the Writ of error Jones at another day said that if in nullo est erratum had been pleaded it could not have beene amended And as it is it cannot be amended because now it is assigned for error and the Plaintiffe was once intitled to his Writ of error which shall not be taken away from him afterwards and in 11. Jac. there was such a case moved by Yelverton the Kings Solicitor and agreed that it could not be amended And Pasch 17. Jac. one Abbingtons case upon a rasure as our case is it was doubted whether it could be amended and by Broom Secondary in the said case it was amended Doderidge in this case it may be amended albeit it be after error brought because it is only the error of the Clerk and it is amendable although the error be assigned in the same point and so was the opinion of the whole Court and therefore it was amended The same
will remember but one book upon which I will rely 27. H. 8. 24. Jordons Case in an Action upon the Case the Defendant assumed to the Plaintiffe that if the Plaintiffe would discharge I. T. of such an Execution in which he is bound at the suit of the Plaintiffe then if I. T. did not satisfie the Plaintiffe by such a day the Defendant would do it and they were at Issue upon an Assumpsit and there the Count is admitted good and he need not plead it was by writing because the Discharge is good without writing but it hath been resolved that if a man be in execution at my suit and I go to the Sheriffe and command him to discharge the Party this is a good Discharge although it be by Peroll Jones If I say to the Sheriff suffer the party to go at large this is a good release both to the party and to the Sheriffe and by him relaxavit implies a sufficient release and therefore the Plaintiffe in the Writ of Errour shall be barred And if a man be bound to save one harmlesse in an Action brought upon this obligation he pleads that he hath saved him harmlesse and shews not how the Plaintiffe demurres generally he shall not now take advantage of it Doderidge The Cases put by Bolstred are not to this purpose for all those cases are of things in certaine and he agreed that a release by perol was sufficient and the case of 22. H. 8. is a stronger case then this is Whitlock agreed also and therefore Doderidge advised the Plaintiff to be satisfied or otherwise they would affirm the first Judgement Trin 2. Car. in the Kings Bench. Caryes Case IN Caryes case of Grayes Inne where these words were adjudged actionable You a Councellor a Foole an Asse a Hangman a Councellor of Law a Foole in the Profession it was said by Jones Instice it was not sufficient to say that he was eruditus in Lege but he ought to say that he was Homo Conciliarius and he said that in maintainance against Boughton it came in question upon evidence to a Iury whether one who is a Barrister may give advice and it was ruled that he could not albeit he had Letters Patents to inable him as fully as if he had been called to the Bar and in Fleetwoods case adjudged that these words You the Kings Receiver you are his Deceiver are you not were actionable The same Term in the same Court SIr Tho. Savill was indited for breach of the peace within the Pallace to wit for assaulting Sir Fran Wortley and he pleaded his pardon and Doderidge said that to strike in the place was the losse of the right hand by the Law and in this poynt our Law agrees with the Lawes of France and Spain and all other Nations for as the person of the King so his Palace and courts of Iustice are so sacred that such contempts and affronts are judged worthy of such punishments and said that the Book of 24. E. 3. 33. Fitzherbert Forfeiture 22. of which he would have Students to take notice is that where one came into the Palace armed and being brought to the Barre in his compleat armor the cause was demanded and he said that it was in his own defence being in fear of a great man then in Court and he was committed to Prison by the Court during the Kings pleasure and his Lands forfeited during his life Vide for the like matter 41. E. 3. Fitzh Coron 280. Dyer 188. 22. E. 3. 13. Hillar 2. Car. in the Kings Bench. ONe Mathias Wheelhorse was indited at the Sessions of the Peace holden in the Town of Northampton quia Noctivagus and because he divers dayes and nights did frequent the house of c. which was within the liberties of Southampton and was a suspected Bawdy-house and Crawley Sergeant moved that this Inditement was insufficient for three reasons 1. Because it does not appeare in the Inditement that the party knew this to be a Bawdy-house 2. Because it is not said that it was a Bawdy-house but that it was susspected to be a Bawdy-house 3. Because the Inditement is before Iustices of Peace Villae de Northampt and the house is infra libertates Villae de Northampt. and it shall not be intended that the power of the Iustices of Peace extend thither and for it see Co. lib 5. 120. Longs case 13. H. 7. 33. 34. 22. H. 7. Kelleway 89. Co. lib. 9. Mackaleys case And the Court gave no opinion concerning the exceptions But another thing was moved to wit that one could not be indited before Iustices of peace for being Noctivagus but this is to be inquired of in the Leet and in this the whole Court was against him for it is a misdemeanor and it is contrary to the Statute of Winchester and every one may arrest him And at another day he moved this last exception again and sayd that the Iustices of Peace have no power to fine men that are noctivagant yet true it is that a Court-Leet hath such a power Rastol Leet 2. and true it is also as it is in 4. H. 7. 1. 2. that every one may arrest a Night-walker but there it is said that if he appeareth to be a man of good fame the party who arrests him ought to let him go at large and the Inditement here is only that he was Noctivagus it appears not that he is a suspicious Night-walker by Doderidge Whitlock Iustices only present by the Common Law every man may arrest him who is Noctivagus and the word Noctivagus implies that he was a common Night-walker and they sayd that Iustices of peace by their Commission have power to take such Inditements for it is of ill behaviour and albeit the Inditement were nought for the other exceptions yet being good in this it shall not be quasht and therefore Iudgement was given upon it and the party fined 40 s. The same Term in the same Court. Sparrow versus Sherwood IN Trover and Conversion of two loads of Fitches of certain Land c. The Defendant justifie by the command of Hare to whom part of the Land belongs and to one Pots to whom another part in right of the Lady his Wife belongs and shews that part of the Fitches did grow upon the Land of one and part upon the Land of the other and upon this the Plaintiff demurs 1. Because he justifies by the command of two generally and he cannot justifie upon the Land of the one by the command of the other and therefore he ought to have alledged severall commands 2. Because he does not shew particularly upon whose Land the Fitches grew but that part grew upon the Land of one and part upon the Land of the other which is incertain 3. Because the Wife of Pots is called by the name of Lady and the Wife of an Esquire cannot be a Lady Doderidge and Whitlock onely present for the first were of opinion
where the Plaintiff shews a speciall Title under the Possession of the Defendant As for example In trespasse for breaking of his Close the Defendant pleads that J. G. was seised of it in his Demesne as of fee and enfeoffed J. K. by virtue of which he was seised accordingly and so being seised enfeoffed the Defendant of it by which he was seised untill the Plaintiff claiming by calour of a Deed of Feoffment made by the sayd J. G. long before that he enfeoffed J. K. where nothing passed by the sayd Feoffment entred upon which the Defendant did re-enter here the Plaintiff may well traverse the Feoffment supposed to be made by the sayd J. G. to the sayd I. K. without making Title because that this Feoffment only destroies the Estate at will made by the sayd I. G. to the Plaintiff which being destroyed he cannot enter upon the Defendant albeit the Defendant cometh to the Land by Disseisin and not by the Feoffment of the sayd I. K. for the first Possession of the Defendant is a good Title in Trespasse against the Plaintiff if he cannot shew or maintain a Title Paramounâ— But the Feoffment of the sayd I. G. being traversed and found for him he hath by the acknowledgment of the Defendant himself a good Title against him by reason of the first Estate at will acknowledged by the Defendant to be to the Plaintiff and now not defeated But in the same case he cannot traverse the Feoffment supposed to be made to the sayd I. K. to the Defendant without an especiall Title made to himself for albeit that I. K. did not enfeoff the Defendant but that the Defendant disseised him or that he cometh to the Land by another means yet he hath a good Title against the Plaintiff by his first Possession not destroyed by any Title Paramount by any matter which appeareth by the Record upon which the Court is to adjudge and with this accord the opinion of 31 4. 1. That the materiall matter of the Bar ought alwaies to be traversed or other wise that which upon the pleading is become to be materiall and that which the Plaintiff traversed here to wit the Lease made by Wright to the Defendant is the materiall point of the Bar which destroyeth the Title Paramount acknowledged to the Plaintiff by the colour given in the Bar which is good without another Title made So note well the diversity where in pleading in Trespasse the first Possession is acknowledged in the Plaintiff by the Bar and where it appeareth by the pleading to be in the Defendant and where and by what matter the first Possession acknowledged in the Plaintiff by the Bar is avoided by the same Bar And upon this Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff as appeareth in 34. and 35. Eliz. Rol. Earl of Bedford versus Eliz. Anne Russell Mich. 34. and 35. Eliz. 2. IN tho Court of Wards the Case was thus between the now Earl of Bedford In the Court of Wards and Elizabeth and Anne the Daughters and Heirs of John late Lord Russell which was put ten times to all the Iustices to be resolved Francis late Earl of Bedford was seised of the Mannor of Baruake Chaldon c. in Commitatu Dorset in his Demesne as of see and so seised the fourth year of Queen Eliz. of it enfeoffed the Lord S. John of Bletsoe and others in see to the use of himself for forty years from the date of the sayd Deed and after to the use of the sayd John then his second Son and the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue then to the use of the right Heirs of the sayd Earl the Feoffor for ever Afterwards Edward Lord Russell Son and Heir apparant to the sayd Earl dyed without Issue and after the sayd John Lord Russell dyed without Issue Male having Issue the sayd two Daughters afterwards to wit 27 Eliz. the sayd Francis Earl of Bedford by Indenture made between him and the Earl of Cumberland and others in consideration of the advancement of the Heirs Males of the body of the sayd Earl which by course of descent should or might succeed the sayd Earl in the name and dignity of the Earldome of Bedford and for the better establishment of his Lordships Mannors and Hereditaments in the name and blood of the sayd Earl covenanted and grantes with the sayd Covenantees that he and his Heirs hereafter shall stand seised of the sayd Mannors amongst others to the use of himself for life without impeachment of Waste and after his decease to the use of Francis the Lord Russell and the Heirs Males of his body for default of such Issue to the use of Sir William Russell Knight his youngest Son and the Heirs Males of his body with diverse Remainders over after which the sayd Francis Lord Russell tyed having Issue Edward the now Earl of Bedford and after this the sayd Francâ—s late Earl of Bedford dyed also and after the Daughters of the sayd John Lord Russell or the now Earl of Bedford shall have these Mannors of Barunke c. was the question and upon this it was argued by Cook Sollinton and others for the Daughters that an use at Common-law was but a confidence put in some to the benefit and behoof of others and that Conscience was to give remedy but for those for whose availe the confidence was and that was in this Case for the sayd Daughters which were the right Heirs to the sayd Francis late Earl of Bedford upon the first conveyance made 41 Eliz. for the confidence that he put in the Feoffees as to the profits that he himself was to have was but for the forty years and how can any other say that he shall have any other Estate when he himself saith that he will have it but for forty years and therefore in this case his right Heir shall take as a Purchasor by the intent of the Feoffor which hath power to make a disposition of the use at his pleasure and his pleasure as appeareth was to have it so and it is not as if the use had been limitted to be to himself for life with such a Remainder over in which Case the use of the Fee by the operation of Law ought to execuse in himself for the Free-hold which was in him before As where Land is given to one for life the Remainder to his right Heirs he hath a Fee-simple executed but here he shall have but an Estate for forty years precedent and that the Fee-simple cannot be executed by such a limitation made to the right Heirs but in case of an Estate for years only precedent such a limitation to his right Heirs afterwards is not good but in case of an use it is otherwise for it may remain to be executed to be an use in Esse where the right Heir shall be and therefore not to be resembled to an Estate made in Possession And an Vse is alwaies to be
l. at such a day without saying how or in what manner these Debts accrued or when because the Action is nor meerly founded upon the Debt but upon the promise and the Debts are but inducements to it But if it were to recover the Debts themselves in an Action of Debt there ought to be made a certainty therof to wit when and how it comes And further here in as much as the Assumpsit is found for the Plaintiff it shall be implyed that the consideration was duly performed for without due proof of the consideration the Plaintiff hath failed of his assumption and therfore also it shall be now taken that the Testator hath such a term of years in reversion to which the term for years in possession may be surrendred for he said that he who hath ten years in possession may well surrender to him who hath more years as twenty in reversion for the lesser may surrender to the greater term To all which Popham and Fennor agreed And Popham said further although it shall be taken most strongly against Hughes to wit that Robotham had a lesser term in the reversion then Hughes had in the possession yet the surrender shall be good for in Law it is greater and more beneficiall for him to have a lesser term to be a term in possession then to have it to be in reversion â—â—nd by him if a Lessee for twenty years make a Lease for ten years then he wâ—ich makes the Lease for ten years hath a reversion upon these ten years so that if Rent be reserved upon it he may distrain for it and have Fealty of the Termor And if he grant the Reversion over for ten years with attornment of the Termor in possession the Grantee hath the Reversion and shall have the Rent for the time and yet the Remainder for years remains alwaies to the Grantor and therfore before the Reversion granted ever the Termor for ten years in possession might have surrendred to his Lessor and therby the said Lessor shall have so many of the said years which were then to come of his former term of twenty years And after the Reversion granted he which hath the ten years may surrender to the Grantee of ten years in Reversion and there he shall have so many years in possession which were to come of his Reversion Quod nota bene And if he had had a lesser term in the Reversiâ—n then the Lessâ—r himself had in the Possession it shall go to the benefit of the first Termor for twenty years who was his Grantor for the Term in possession is quite gone and drowned in the Reversion to the benefit of those who have the Râ—version therupon having regard to their Estate in the Reversion and not otherwise to all which Fennor agreed wherupon Gawdy gave the rule that Iudgment shall be entred for the Plaintiff But Popham said that if the consideration for the surrender had not been sufficiently alledged that the Plaintiff shâ—uld not be helped by the other consideration of 100. marks given by Thornel for if such an Assumption as this is be founded upon two more considerations and such which by possibility may be performed then the party hath failed of his Suit As if a man in consideration of 5 s. paid and of other 5 s. to be paid at a day to come assume to do a thing or to pay money if the one 5 s. be not paid or if it be not averred that the other 5 s. was paid at the day limited for the payment of it the party hath failed in his assumption in the one case and the declaration is insufficient in the other case for he hath made a departure from his consideration But if one of the considerations be impossible or against Law there the other considerations which are possible or stand with the Law suffice if they he well alledged And he said that the Executor shall be charged with the contract of the Testator by common course of the Court which stands upon reason for if an Action of Debt upon a bare contract be brought against an Executor if he do not demur upon it but plead to the Paâ—s that he owes him nothing and it is found against him he shall be theâ— by charged of the Goods of the dead and the cause why he may be helped by demurring upon the declaration in that case is becâ—use the Testator might have waged his Law in that case of debt which the Executor could not do of other contracts and therfore shall not be charged with it by such an act if he will help himself by demurrer but in â—he assumption of his Testator he could not have waged his Law and it is founded upon the death of the Testator to wit his debt with which the Executor by a mean may be charged as before and therfore the assumption in such a câ—se maintâ—inable against the Executor But if the Testator upon good consideration assume to make assurance of Land or to do any other such collaterall thing which doth not sound in a duty of a thing payable there the Executor shâ—ll never be charged with such an assumption to render recompence for it And to this agreed all the Iustices â—â— the common Bench and Barons of the Exchequer And such an assuâ—â—â—ion hath not been allowed in the Kings Bench but of late time and thâ—â— but 〈…〉 or two cases But in the other case it hath been common and of 〈…〉 and therfore now too late to be drawn in question and if it should â—â— it may be maintained with good reason in this case of a duty of â—â—ing payable in as much as the Testator cannot wage his Law in the Action but in the other case there is no reason nor course of the Court to maintaiâ— it But the Iudges in the Exchequer Chamber reversed all these Iudments in both cases 2. Nota that this Term was adjourned to Octob. Trin. and because the Writ was that Adjournment shall be made in Octob. Trin. of all cases untill Tres Trinitat the Adjournment was made in every of the Courts of Kings Bench Common Bench and the Exchequer the very first day of Octob. Trin. then it was holden by the Iustices that the Adjournment ought not to have been made untill the sitting of the Court the fourth day from Octabis And because that the Writs were that at the said Tres Tr. the Term shall be holden therafter as if no Adjournment had been the Iustices held that they ought to sit the first day of the said Tres Trin. and so from thence every day untill the end of the Term and for all causes as if no adjournment had been and so they did accordingly saving by assent some of the Iustices did not come thither by reason of their far distance from London at the end of the Term upon the last Adjournment But they held that if it had not been for the especiall words in the Writ which were
in making pursuit And it is not the form of the pleading to alledge that he pursued him freshly and had him alwaies in his view untill he re-took him but only that he pursued him freshly and took him in this fresh pursuit without saying any thing that he was in his view and therfore his being out of the view of the Sheriff is not materiall in the case but the fresh pursuit and the taking of him in this pursuit Then Coke moved that the Bar was not good because he doth not shew where he made the pursuit so that he might agres to answer that which is alledged by the Plaintiff to wit his being at large at London and therfore the Bar not being good Iudgment shall be given against the Defendant for the insufficiency of his Bar for a Repleader shall not be in case of Demurs as it hath been adjudged here very lately and also in the Common Bench. To which it was answered by the said Iustices That if the Bar be insufficient in matter so that it may appear by it that the Plaintiff hath sufficient cause of Action which in matter is not sufficiently avoided by the Bar Judgment shall be given for the Plaintiff upon the Bar if the Replication be sufficient and no Repleader but if the Bar be sufficient for the matter and insufficient for the form only as it is here there before the Statute of Eliz. for pleading there shall be a Repleader but now because no Demurrer was upon the Bar but a Replication made to it therfore by Popham no advantage shall be taken of the Bar for matter of form which is admitted by the party and no advantage taken therof according to the Statute And they all agreed that the Sheriff albeit he did not make fresh pursuit upon the escape may yet take re-take the Prisoner who escaped from him out of Execution for the Prisoner shall not take advantage to avoid the Execution and therfore in respect of the Plaintiff who yet may accept the Prisoner to be in execution the Sheriff may re-take the Prisoner But if the Plai had recovered against the Sheriff before for the escape then the Sheriff for his Indempnity cannot re-take him but is put to his Action upon the Case against the Prisoner for the Sheriff hath no colour in such a case of escape to retake him but in respect and for the advantage of the Plaintiff who had Iudgment against the Prisoner and not in respect of the private wrong done to himself of which he hath no Iudgment and as it is now the Replication not being good by Popham Iudgment ought to be given against the Plaintiff But by assent it was ordered that the Defendant shall put in new Bail and that upon it he shall plead anew But how shall it be if the Sheriff do notmake fresh Suit and re-take him And afterwards he at whose Suit he was in Execution recovered against the Sheriff may the Prisoner have an Audita querela upon the matter Vpon an Assembly of all the Iustices at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet with the Barens of the Exchequer it was cleerly agreed by them all but two who at the beginning made some doubt of it but at the end assented also If in the night the house of any be broken with an intent to steal any thing being in the house although no person be in the house at this time yet this is Burglary for the Law is that every one shall be in security in the night as well for their Goods as their persons which be in the house And if a Church be broken in the night for the stealing of any thing in it this is Burglary though no person be in it at this time And so hath the Law alwaies been put in execution and in all the Books which speak of Burglary it is not mentioned that any person ought to be in the house but that it is Burglary the Messuage being â—eckâ—n in the night to the intent to kill any person thâ—â—e or to the intent to steal any thing out of it And the case that of late time it hath been put in the Inditements of Burglary that some person was then there c hath been because that in such cases of Burglary Clergy was taken away but now by the Statute of 18 Eliz. Clergy is taken away in every case of Burglary And the ancient Presidents are Quod domum of such a one Nectanter Felonice burglariter fregit without making mention that any person was then in it or making mention that it was Domus mansionalis of any And it may be a Mansion House albeit no person then inhabit in it And agreed that hereafter it shall be so put in execution by all the Iustices See this more fully hereafter Trin. 36 Eliz. Pl. 1. in this Book AT Tres Paschae this Term there were made for Serjeants at Law viz. Lewkenor Savage and Williams of the Middle-Temple Heale only of the Inner-Temple Kingsmill Warburton Branthwaite and Flemming of Lincolns-Inn and Daniel and Spurling of Grayes-Inn And all the Iustices were assembled in the Middle-Temple Hall the Wednesday past Mâ—nsem Paschae being the second day of May where the two chief Iustices and chief Baron sate upon the Vpper-Bench of the same Hall in their Scarlet Robes with their Collers of S. S. and every one of the other Iustices and Barens in their Ancienty one on the one side and the other on the other side in their Scarlet Robes also and then came the new Serjeants in their black Gowns before the Iustices there the two eldest being put in the midst before the chief Iustice of England and so every one of them one on the one side and the other on the other side according to their Ancienty and every one of the said Serjeants having one of his Servants behind him at his back with his Masters Scarlet Hood and Coife upon his arms And therupon the said chief Iustice made his Speech in this manner IF men will enter into a due consideration upon what grounds the Laws of this Realm have their Original Foundation and what good effects are wrought through the due execution of the same they might say and that justly that the profession therof is both an honest and honourable Profession The Laws are derived partly from the law of God and partly from the Law of Nature From the Law of God in that it ordaineth means how the people may be truly instructed in the knowledge and fear of God How they should demean themselves towards their Soveraign and Prince How they ought to live one with the other and how to be defended from oppressions and injuries From the Law of Nature in that it provideth how each man may defend himself that he may live by his own labours or otherwise according to his profession or calling That he may secure his Posterity of that which he hath gathered together by his industry and that man with man
resolved by all the Iustices as he said that it shall passe and he said that himself was of this opinion also And to say that by grant of Land at Common Law the use had been raised out of the possessions of the Land which the Grantor then had and by it passe to the Bargainee and that it shall not be raised and passed to another by grant of Land in consideration of marriage which is a more valuable consideration then money is absurd and against all reason And for the solemnity Vses in such cases in respect of marriage were the cause that they alwaies were left as they were at Common Law and not restrained as the case of bargain and sale is which by Common intendment may be made more easily and secretly then that which is done in consideration of marriage which is alwaies a thing publike and notorious but it is not reasonable that every slight or accidentall speech shall make an alteration of any Vse As if a man ask of any one what he will give or leave to any of his Sons or Daughters for their advancement in marriage or otherwise for their advancement this shall be but as a bare speech or communication which shall not alter or change any Vse But where there is upon the Speech a conclusion of a Marriage between the friends of the parties themselves and that in consideration therof they shall have such Lands and for such an Estate there the Vse shall be raised by it and shall passe accordingly to the parties according to the conclusion which Fennor granted But by Popham If it may be taken upon the words spoken that the purpose was to have the Estate passe by way of making of an Estate as by way of Feoffment c. then notwithstanding the consideration expressed the use shall not change nor no Estate by it but at will untill the Livery made therupon And therfore if a man make a Deed of Feoffment with expresse consideration of marriage although the Deed hath words in it of Dedi Concessi with a Letter of Attorney to make Livery therupon there untill Livery made nothing passe but at will because that by the Warrant of Attorney it appeareth the full intent of the parties was that it shall passe by way of Feoffment and not otherwise if it be of Land in possession And if it be of Land in Lease not untill Attornment of Tenants which was granted by all the Iustices But if a man in consideration of money makes a Deed of Gift Grant Bargain and Sale of his Lands to another and his Heirs by Deed indented with a Letter of Attorny to make Livery if Livery be therupon made before Inrolement there it hath been adjudged to passe by the Livery and not by the Inrolement But by Popham where Land is to passe in possession by Estate executed two things are requisite The one the grant of the said Land the other the Livery to be made therupon for by the bare Grant without Livery it doth not passe as by way of making of an Estate And this is the cause that such solemnity hath been used in Liveries to wit if it were of a Messuage to have the people out of it and then to give Seisin to the party by the Ring of the door of the House and of Land by a Turff and a Twig and the like which may be notorious Yet I agree it shall be a good Livery to say to the party Here is the Land enter into it and take it to you and your Heirs for ever or for life or in tail as the case is And albeit Livery by the View may be made in such manner yet by the sealing of the Deed of Grant upon the Land or by grant of it upon the Land without Livery nothing passe but at will But if therupon one party saith to the other after the Grant or upon it Here is the Land enter upon it and take it according to the Grant this is a good Livery But he ought to say this or somthing which amounts to so much or otherwise it shall not passe by the bare Grant of the Land although it be made upon the Land Clench said That when Thomas said to Eustace Stand forth here I do give to thee and thine Heirs these Lands this amounts to a Grant and a Livery also and by the words of the Reservation of the Estate to himself and his wife for their lives in this the Law shall make an use in the said Thomas and his wife for their lives so that by such means it shal enure as if he had reserved the use therof to him and his wife and so it shall enure to them as it may by the Law according to his intent without doing prejudice to the Estate passed to the said Eustace And afterwards Term Mich. 36 37 Eliz. the Case was again disputed amongst the Iustices and then Popham said That the Case of Baâ—gains and Sales of Lands in Cities as London c. as appeareth in Dyer 6. Eliz. are as they were at Common Law To which all the Iustices agreed and therfore shall passe by Bargain by parole without writing And by Bayntons Case in 6 7 Eliz. it is admitted of every side that an Vse was raised out of a Possession at Common Law by Bargain and Sale by parole and otherwise to what purpose was the Statute of Inrolements and by the same case it is also admitted now to passe by parole upon a full agreement by words in consideration of Marriage or the continuance of Name or Blood For it is agreed there that the consideration of nature is the most forceable consideration which can be and agreed also that a bare Covenant by writing without consideration will not change an Vse therfore the force therof is in the consideration of which the Law hath great respect And therfore the Son and Heir apparant ex assensu patris onely may at the door of the Church endow his wife of his Fathers Land which he hath in Fee and this is good by Littleton although the Son hath nothing in it wherby an Estate passe to the wife which is more then an Vse Nature is of so strong consideration in the Law And therupon after advice Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff the Roll of this appeareth in Banco Regis 1 Hill 35. Eliz. Rot. 355. And upon this Iudgment a Writ of Error was brought and the Iudgment aforesaid reversed in the point of Iudgment in the Exchequer by the Statute of 27 Eliz. Kettle versus Mason and Esterby 6. IN a second deliverance between Joh. Kettle Plaintiff and George Mason Vide this case Coke lib. 1. 146 c. and Francis Esterby Avowants the case appeared to be this Thomas May was seised of the Mannor of Sawters and Hawlin in the County of Kent in his Demesne as of Fee and being so therof seised enfeoffed Thomas Scot and John Fremling and their Heirs
dies and afterwards John his Son and Heir dies without Issue the reversion by this descends to the said Christopher who dies leaving Issue And upon this Case made in the Court of Wards the two chief Iustices Popham and Anderson agreed first That upon the devise and death of the Father the said Christopher and William were Joynt-tenants of the Land and not Tenants in Common notwithstanding the word severally because it is coupled with the said word joyntly But yet they agreed also that by the descent from John to Christopher the Fee-simple was executed in the said Christopher for the Moyety in the same Mannor as if he had purchased the Reversion of the whole or of this Moyety and that it is not like to the Case where Land is given and to the Heirs of one of them in which case for the benefit of the Survivorship it is not executed to divide the Ioynture because the Estates are made at one and the same time together and therfore not like to the case where the Inheritance cometh to the particular Estate by severall and divided means And a Decree was made accordingly Trin. 36. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 1. IT was agreed by all the Iustices and Barons of the Exchequer upon an Assembly made at Serjeants-Inn after search made for the ancient Presidents and upon good deliberation taken If a man have two houses and inhabit somtimes in one and somtimes in the other if that House in which he doth not then inhabity be broken in the night to the intent to steal the Goods then being in his house that this is Burglary although no person bee then in the House and that now by the new Statute made such an Offender shall not have his Clergy for before the Statutes were made which take away Clergy in case of Burglary where any person was put in fear no mention was made in the Inditements of Burglary that any person was in the House But it was generall that the house of such a one Noctanter fregit and such Goods then there Felonice cepit And the breaking of a Church in the night to steal the Goods there is Burglary although no person be in it because this is the place to keep the Goods of the Parish And in the same manner the house of every one is the proper place to preserve his Goods although no person be there And that the Law was alwaies so it is to be collected by the course of the Statutes therof made for first the Statute of 23 H. 8. doth not take Clergy from any in case of Burglary unlesse some of the same Family be in the house and put in fear And in 5 Eliz. 6. The Offendor shall be ousted of his Clergy if any of the Family be in the house be they sleeping or waking And these Statutes were the cause that it was used of late time to put in the Inditements of Burglary that some person of the Family was then in the house to put them from their Clergy But this doth not prove that it shall not be Burglary but where some person was in the house and by 18 Eliz. Clergy is taken away in all cases of Burglary generally without making mention of any person to be there which enforce the resolution aforesaid and according to it they all agreed hereafter to put it in Execution Finch versus Riseley 2. IN this Term the case betweeen Finch and Riseley was in question before all the Iustices and Barons for this assembled at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet where after Arguments heard by the Councell of the parties upon this point only If the Queen make a Lease for years rendring Rent with a Proviso that the Rent be not paid at the day limited that the Lease shall cease without making mention that it was to be paid at the receit whether the Lease shall cease upon the default of payment before Office found therof And by Periam and some of the Iustices the Lease stall not cease untill an Office be found of the default because it is a matter in Fait which determines it to wit the not-payment And by Gawdy it shall be taken as if it had been for the not-payment that the Proviso had been that the Lease shall be forfeited In which case it is not detennined untill Re-entry made for the forfeiture which in the Queens case ought alwaies to be by Office which countervails the re-entry of a common person As where the Queen makes a Lease rendring Rent and for default of payment a Re-entry albeit the Rent be not paid yet untill Office found therof the Rent continues Popham Anderson and the greater part of the Iustices and Barons resolved that it was cleer in this case that Ipso facto upon the default of payment the Lease was determined according to the very purport of the contract beyond which it cannot have any beeing and therfore there needs no Office in the case But where it is that it shall be forfeited or that he shall re-enter there untill advantage taken of the forfeiture in the one case or untill re-entry made in the other case the Term alwaies continues by the contract And where in the case of a common person there is need of a re-entry to undo the Estate there in the case of the King there needs an Office to determine the Estate for an Office in the Kings case countervails an entry for the King in person cannot make the entry And upon this resolution of the greater part of the Iustices in Mich. Term 31 32 Eliz. the same case was in question in the Office of Pleas in the Exchequer between the said Moil Finch Plaintiff and Thomas Throgmorton and others Defendants and there adjudged by Manwood late chief Baron and all the other Barons unanimously after long argument at the Bar and Bench that the Lease was void upon default of payment of the Rent according to the Proviso of the Lease and this immediatly without Office for the reasens before remembred upon which Iudgment was given a Writ of Error was brought before the Lord Keeper of the great Seal and the Lord Treasurer of England where it long depended and after many arguments the Iudgment given in the Exchequer by the advice of Popham and Anderson was affirmed and that upon this reason for the Proviso shall be taken to be a limitation to determine the Estate and not a Condition to undo the Estate which cannot be defeated in case of a Condition but by entry in case of a common person and but by Office which countervails an entry in the case of the Queen And this Iudgment was so affirmed in Mich. Term 36 37 Eliz. Smiths Case 3 IT was found by Diem clausit extremum after the death of Richard Smith that in consideration of a marriage to be had between Margaret Smith and William Littleton a younger Son to Sir John Littleton Knight and of 1300. marks paid by the said Sir John to the said
35 E. Rot. 258. And Popham said further in this case that to erect an Hospitall by the name of an Hospitall in the County of S. or in the Bishopprick of B. and the like is not good because he is bound to a place too large and incertain But a Colledge erected in Accademia Cantabrig or Oxon. is good and sâ—me are so founded because it tends but to a particular place as a City Town c. King versus Bery and Palmer 2. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by William King against John Bery and William Palmer Defendants for two Messuages and certain Lands in Halstead in the County of Leicester upon a Demise alledged to be made by Dorothy Pool and Robert Smith the case upon a speciall Verdict was this The said Dorothy was Tenant for life of the said Tenants the Remainder over to the said Robert Smith and his Heirs and they being so seised made the Lease in the Declaration upon which the Action was brought And per curiam the Lease found by the Verdict doth not warrant the Lease alledged in the Declaration for although they joyned in the Demise yet during the life of the said Dorothy it is her Demise and not the Demise of the said Robert Smith but as his confirmation for that time for he hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land during the life of the said Dorothy but after the death of the said Dorothy then it shall be said to be the Domise of the said Robert Smith and not before because untill this time Smith hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land And in a more strong case If Tenant for life and he in the Reversion in Fee make a Gift in tail for the life of Tenant for life it shall be said to be his Gift but after his death it shall be said the Gift of him in the Reversion and if the Estate tail had expired during the life of the said Tenant for life he shall have the Land again in his former Estate and there shal be no forfeiture in the case because he in the Reversion of the immediate Estate of Inheritance had joyned in it and therfore hath dispensed with that which otherwise had been a meer forfeiture of the Estate for life wherby it was awarded by the Court that the Plaintif take nothing by his Bill in 33 34 Eliz. Rot. And the Judgment is entred Hill 34. Eliz. Ret. 72. 3. In this Term I hapned to see a Case agreed by the Iustices in 3. 4. Eliz. which was this If a man make a Lease of two Barns rendring Rent and for default of payment a Re-entry if the Tenant be at one of the Barns to pay the Rent and the Lessor at the other to demand the Rent and none be there to pay it that yet the Lessor cannot enter for the Condition broken because there was no default in the Tenant he being at one for it was not possible for him to be at both places together And upon this Case now remembred to the Iustices Popham Walmesley and Fennor said That perhaps also the Tenant had not money sufficient to have been ready to have paid it at either of the said places but it is sufficient for him to have and provide one Rent which cannot be at two places together And by the Case reported here also If Lands and Woods are demised together the Rent ought to be demanded at the Land and not the Woood because the Land is the more worthy thing and also more open then the Wood And therfore by the three Iustices aforesaid Rent ought not to be demanded in any private place of a Close as amongst Bushes in a Pit or the like nor in the open and most usuall passage therof as at a Stile Gate and the like 4. Vpon a Prohibition sued out of the Kings Bench the Case appeared to be this The late Lord Rich Father to the now Lord Rich devised to his Daughter for her advancement in marriage 1500. upon condition that she marry with the consent of certain friends and deviseth further that if his Goods and Chattels are not sufficient to pay his Debts and Legacies that then there shall be 200 l. a year of his Lands sold to supply it and dies making the now Lord Rich his Executor his Goods and Chattels not being sufficient to pay the Debts of the Testator as was averred the said Daughter married with a Husband against the will of those who were put in trust to give their assents and the Husband and the Wife sued in the Spirituall Court for the Legacy And it was surmised that they would not allow the proofs of the said now Lord Rich exhihited to prove the payment of the Debts of his Testator and further that they would charge him for the sale of the Land upon which matter the Prohibition was granted to the Delegates before whom the matter depended and now consultation was prayed in the case Vpon which it was affirmed by a Doctor of the Civill Law that they will allow the proofs for the payment of the Debts according to our Law and that the Legacy shall not be paid untill the Debs are satisfied But he said that by the Law if the Executor do not exhibit his Inventory but neglect it for a year or more that then if any omission or default be in the true value of the Inventory exhibited that then such on Executor for this default shall pay all the Legacies of his Testator of what value soever they are not respecting the Debts or the value of the Goods or Chattels how small soever the omission or default be in the Inventory And so he said was the case of the now Sir Richard S. who did not bring in the Inventory for four years after the death of the Testator and that in the Inventory exhibited the values of every thing were found to be too small and therfore to be charged by their Law albeit he hath not Goods and Chattels sufficient of the Testators To which it was answered that this was quite without reason for by such means every Subject of the Realm may be utterly defeated if he take upon him the charge of an Executorship And if this shall be admitted no man will take upon him the Execution of the Will of any and by such a means none will have their Wills performed which shall be too inconvenient And they said further that in as much as Debts are to be proved by the Common Law of the Realm those of the Ecclesiasticall Courts ought to admit in the proof therof such proofs as our Law allows and not according to the precisenesse of their Law And although by their Law such a Condition as before being annexed to a Legacy is void because that marriage oughr to be free without Coercion yet where we are to judge upon the point as we are here if the Execution happen to be charged because of the sale of Land and for
in his custody and offered to the said Sheriff to put him in the Indenture amongst his other Prisoners delivered to the new Sheriff but would hâ—ve had the said old Sheriff to have sent for the said new Sheriff to have taken him into his custody but the new Sheriff refused to receive him unlesse Dabridgecourt would deliver him into the common Gaol of the County which was in the Town of Warwick wherupon afterwards the Prisoner escaped And Dabridgecourt was charged with this Escape and not the new Sheriff for he is not compellable to take the Prisoners of the delivery of the old Sheriff but in the common Goal of the County and the old Sheriff remains chargeable with the Prisoner untill he be lawfully discharged of him and if the Sheriff dies the party shall be rather at a prejudice then the new Sheriff without cause charged with him And in such a case the party who sued the execution may help himself to wit by the remaining of the body by a Corpus cum causa wherby he may be brought to be duly in execution and this under a due Officer And Anderson Periam and other Iustices were also of opinion that the said Skinner and Catcher are to be charged with the escape in the principall case wherupon Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff which was entred Hillar 34 Eliz. Rot. 169. in the B. R. Fulwood versus Ward 2. IN a Writ of Annuity brought in the Common Pleas by George Fulwood Plaintiff against William Ward Defendant the Case was thus The Queen was seised of a Barn and Tithes of Stretton in the County of Stafford for the life of the Lord Paget and being so seised demised it by Letters Patents dated 21. June 29 Eliz. to the said William Ward for 21. years wherupon the said Ward by Writing dated 30. Iune 29 Eliz. granted to the said Plaintiff an Annuity or yearly Rent of 10 l. out of the said Barn and Tithes for 15. years then next ensuing payable yearly upon the 8. day of November with clause of Distresse The Lord Paget died the first day of March 32 Eliz. and for the Arrearages after his death the Plaintiff brought this Writ of Annuity and for the difficulty therof in the Common Pleas the Case came this Term to be argued before all the Iustices and Barons at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet where it was agreed by Walmsley Fennor and Owen that the Annuity was gone by the determination â—â— his Estate in the Land who made the Grant for they said that presently upon the Grant made as before it was a Rent-charge for by such a Rent granted in Fee the Fee shall be in his Heirs albeit the Grantee dies before any Election made and such a Rent is payable from the beginning at the Land as appeareth by 12 E. 4. And by grant of Omnia terras tenementa hereditamenta such â— Rent will passe ergo it is a Rent-charge and not an Annuity untill the Election made and by the determination therof in the nature of a Rent the Election is gone as by Babington and Martin 9 H. 6. by the recovery of Lâ—nd charged with such a Rent by elder Title the Annuity is gone as it seeâ—s by their opinion and by them and by Littleton upon a Rent-charg◠〈◊〉 with Proviso that he shall not charge the person of the Grantor 〈…〉 exclude the charge of the person which proves that the Land is charâ—â—â— Originally and not the person for otherwise the Proviso would be void for the repugnancy And if so whensoever the Land is discharged as by 〈…〉 â—â—â—cent or the like the person therby is also discharged and therfore â—he Iuâ—gment here shall be that the Plaintiff shall be barred But by the chief Iustices chief Baron and all the other Iustices and Barons the Plaintiff ought to have Iudgment in this case to recover the Annuity for the Law gives him at the beginning an Election to have it as a Rent or an Annuity which matter of election shall not be taken from him but by his own Deed and folly as in case where he purchase part of the land charged in which case by his own Act he hath excluded himself of his Election But if a Feoffee upon condition grant a Rent-charge and presently break the Condition wherupon the Feoffor re-enter shall not the Feoffee be charged by Writ of Annuity surely it shall be against all reason that he by his own act without any folly of the Grantee shall exclude the Grantee of his Election which the Law gives at the beginning And they denied the opinion of 9 H. 6. to be Law But if the Disseisor grant a Rent-charge to the Disseisee out of the Land which he had by the Disseisen by his re-entry before the Annuity brought the Annuity is gone for this was his own act yet in effect all of them agreed that Prima facie it shall be taken as a Rent-charge of which the Wife shall be endowed as hath been said which passe by grant of Omnia hereditamenta and which is payable at the Land but the reason is because it is expresly granted out of the Land and also for the presumption of Law that it is more beneficiall for the Grantee to have it in such a degree then in the other But neither the presumption of Law nor the expresse Grant therof as a Rent shall not take away from the Grantee the benefit of his Election where no default was in him but that upon his Election he may make it to be otherwise as ab initio And therfore by Popham If a Rent-charge be granted in tail the Grantee may bring a Writ of Annuity and therby prejudice his Issue because that then it shall not be taken to be an Intail but as a Fee-simple conditionall ab initio And if a Termer for two years grant a Rent-charge in fee this as to the Land is but a Rent charge for two years and if he avow for it upon the determination of the Term the Rent is gone but by way of Annuity it remains for ever if it be granted for him and his Heirs and assets descend from him who granted it And if a Rent-charge be granted in fee and doth not say for him and his Heirs if the Grantee brings his Writ of Annuity the Heir shall never be charged therwith yet if he had taken it as a Rent-charge the Land had been charged with it in perpetuity And by him the cause why the Proviso that he shall not charge the person of the Grantor upon the grant of a Rent-charge is good is because the person is not expresly charged by such a Grant but by operation of Law But in such a case a Proviso that he shall not charge his Land is meerly void for the repugnancy because there the Land is expresly charged by precised words and therfore if it be expresly comprised in such a Grant that the Grantee may charge the Land or the person of the
Vse may be averred without Deed upon a Fine sur Render And all agreed that if there had been a Deed to have declared the purport of the Fine that the Fine shall not be taken to extend further then is comprised in the Deed. And what is the cause therof the Deed or the intent of the parties and none can say but that it is the intent of the parties and not the Deed and the intent may as well appear without the Deed as with it albeit it be not so conclusive by Parole as by Deed. And therfore suppose I have 100. acres of Land in a Close in D. and I. S. hath another 100. acres in the same Close and Town and I. S. hath a 100. acres of Land in the same Town out of this Close and my intent is to levy a Fine to I. S. of the whole Close by the name of 200. acres of Land with a Render as before and I levy it accordingly shall the Render enure to the Land which I. S. had in the same Town It is cleer that it shall not although it be without Deed why then shall the Fine here be taken to work rather to the Land called Karkian then to any other Lands which any other had in the same Towns when it appeareth plainly that it never was the intent of the parties that the Fine should extend to these Lands called Karkian and it was decreed in Chancery accordingly Hall versus Arrowsmith 4. IN the case between Hall and Arrowsmith it was agreed by the whole Court in the Kings Bench That if a Copyholder for life hath licence to make a Lease for three years if he shall live so long and he makes a Lease for three years without such a Limitation that yet this is no forfeiture of his Estate because the operation of Law makes such a Limitation to the Estate which he made to wit that it shall not continue but for his life and then such an express Limitation in the case where the Law it self makes it is but a meer trifle and yet if a Lessee for life makes a Lease for years and he in the Reversion confirm it it remains good after the death of the Tenant for life but this then shall be as if it had been made by him in the Reversion himself and shall be his Lease But if the Lease there had been made determinâ—ble upon the life of Tenant for life the confirmation therof by him in the Reversion will not help him after the death of him who was Tenant for life Causa patet But in the principall case if the Copyholder had had an Estate in Fee by Copy it had been a forfeiture of his Estate to make an absolute Lease because in that case he does more then he was licensed to do And they agreed that such a licence cannot be made to be void by a Condition subsequent to the execution therof to undo that which was once well executed But there may be a Condition precedent united to it because in such a case it is no licence untill the Condition performed but the licence before mentioned is not a condition all Licence but a Licence with a Limitation and therfore hath not been of force if the Limitation which the Law makes in this case had not been and the Limitation in Law shall be preferred before the Limitation in Deed where they work to one and the same effect and not different Arthur Johnsons Case 5. ARthur Johnson was possessed of a Term for years and so possessed assigned this over to Robert Waterhouse and John Waterhouse being Brothers to the Wife of the said Johnson to the use of the said Wife the said Johnson dies and makes his Wife his Executrix after which the said Wife takes Robert Witham to Husband who takes the Profits of the Land during the life of his said Wife the Wife dies Intestate her said Brothers being next of kin to the said Wife took administration as well of the Goods of the said Wife as of her first Husband And whether the said Waterhouses or the said Witham shall have this Lease or the use therof was the question in the Chancery and therupon put to the two chief Iustices upon which they and the chief Baron and all the other Iustices of Serjeants-Inne in Fleetstreet and Beamont also were cleer in opinion that the said Administrators had now as well the Interest as the Vse also of the said Term as well in Conscience as in Law and that they had the use as Administrators to the said Wife and that the said Witham shall not have it because it is as a thing in Action which the Administrators of the Wife alwaies shall have and not the Husband As if an Obligation had been made to the use of the Wife And this opinion was certified accordingly to the Lord Keeper of the great Seal of England and it was so decreed Taunton versus Barrey 6. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Giles Taunton Plaintiff in the King Bench against Giles Barrey Defendant the Case was thus Iohn Coles Esquire made a Lease of the Lands in question to the Father of the said Barrey for divers years depending upon the life of the Lessee and of the said Defendant and of the Survivor of them upon condition that the said Father should not alien without the consent of the said Coles his heirs after which the said Father devised the Term to the said Defendant and died making his Executor who assented And the question upon this point found upon a speciall Verdict was whether upon the matter the Condition were broken and by the opinion of the whole Court adjudged that it was for in such a case he ought to have left it to his Executor without making any Devise of it for the Devise is an Alienation against him and therfore it was agreed that the Plaintiff shall recover Term 37 Eliz. Rot. between Roper and Roper Michaelmas Term 38 39. Eliz. Everets Case 1. THis Case was moved by the chief Iustice to the other chief Iustices at Serjeants-Inne in Fleetstreet concerning one Everet who before was attaint for stealing of a Horse reprieved after Iudgment and Indited again for stealing another Horse before this Attainder And the Vicar of Pelton in the County of Somerset was Indited as accessary before this Felony for the procurement of it And Everet being again Indited upon this last Inditement did not plead that he was formerly Indited of another Felony c. but acknowledged the Inditement wherby the Accessary was Arrained tried and found guilty and had his Iudgment also as the principall but the Execution of the Accessary was respited And now moved whether upon this matter it shall be fit to execute the Accessary the principall being executed And it seemed convenient to all the Iustices and Barons that he shall be executed and that the matter was cleer in this case because the principall did not take advantage of his
same Deed granted and confirmed to the said Sir Maurice and to the Heirs Males of his body the said Lievtenant-ship and Deputy-ship of the said West part of the said Forest and also the Keeper-ship of the said Walk called Staverdale Walk together with the Lodges c. Provided alwaies and the said Sir Maurice covenanted and granted for him and the Heirs Males of his body with the said now Earl his Heirs and Assigns that it shall be lawfull for the said Earl his Heirs and Assigns to have all the Preheminence or commandment of the said Game and Hunting and pleasure there as if this Grant had not been made Provided also and the said Sir Maurice covenanted granted and promised for him and the Heirs Males of his body to and with the said Earl his Heirs and Assigns that the said Sir Maurice and the Heirs Males of his body and their Assignee and Assignees will preserve the Games as fair as it commonly hath been used and that neither the said Maurice nor any of the Heirs Males of his body nor any of their Assignees will cut any manner of Wood growing upon any part of the Premisses unlesse for necessary Brouse and such as they may lawfully cut of their own and as was accustomed c. after which Sir Maurice died and Sir Henry Barkley his Son and Heir Male cut four Okes within the said Walk called Brewicks growing upon the soile of the Queen there every one of them being Timber and of the value of 13 s. 4 d. and converted them to his own use And whether by this act done by the said Sir Henry the now Earl of Pembrook may re-enter into the things granted by him was the question which stands upon two points the first Whether the last Proviso makes a Condition or be but a meer Covenant 2. Whether this Act makes a Forfeiture of the said Offices granted as before by the course of the Common Law Gaudey Clench Walmsley and Beamont that the first Proviso is not a Condition either because he is not by this to do more then he may do by his superior custody in which case he ought to do it by his own authority as to take his fee Deer or to chase and kill Deer by Warrant and the like or otherwise if it shall be taken that he may by this Proviso kill or chase the Game at his pleasure it is void because as to it he is to do that which he ought not to do by his Office to wit to destroy the Game which by his Office he is to preserve and therfore for the first it stands meerly upon the Covenant Then when he saith further in the second clause Provided also and the said Sir Henry Barkley covenants this is to be intended that it shall be as the other for the word also and this is but a bare Covenant as the first was And they said further that this last Proviso shall be said entirely the words of the Grantee himself as the Covenant is and without words of the Grantor a Condition cannot be for it is for him to condition with the Estate given and not for him to whom the Grant is made And therfore suppose that it had been on the other part to wit Provided alwaies and the Grantor covenant that the Grantee shall have the refuse of the brouse and the like this shall not be said to be any Condition but a meer Covenant In like manner shall it be on the other part And further it is common for Scriveners and ignorant persons to make in effect every Covenant to begin with a Proviso in this manner and therfore to expound such a manner of Proviso as a Condition it shall be too perilous to the Estates of men And for the case upon the Lease made by Serjeant Bâ—â—dloes which was thus Provided alwaies and it was covenanted granted and agreed between the parties if the Lessee sell or alien the term that the Lessor shall have the preferment This they agreed to be a good Condition as was adjudged in the Common Bench 32 Eliz. but the case there is because they are the words as well of the Lessor who may add a Condition to the Estate as of the Lessee who made the Covenant which is not here But they said that the case between Hamington and Pepull which was 17 Eliz. in the Kings Bench was more nigh in resemblance to the case in question which was that the said Pepull made a Lease for years to Hamington of a Farm except the wood and covenanted with the Lessee that he shall take all manner of under-wood provided alwaies and the Lessee covenant that he will not cut any manner of Timber-tree this was adjudged no Condition And as to the other point they said that the cutting of Trees by him who had the custody of the Forest is not a forfeiture of his Office by the Common Law as it is of him who hath the custody of a Park for there is another speciall Officer who hath the charge of wood in a Forest to wit the Verderer and the Woodward and therfore it is no forfeiture of him who hath the custody of the Forest to cut Trees for he hath another charge to wit the custody of the Game only and not of the Wood. And further the cutting of one or two Trees is no cause of forfeiture for it may be that there is Covert-shade and brouse sufficient of that which yet remains in which case it is no forfeiture if it be not averred that these things are impaired by it But the chief Iustices chief Baron and all the other Iustices and Barons were of a contrary opinion And for the matter of forfeiture at Common Law they said that it was a cause of forfeiture of an Office at common Law to cut the Trees as well in the case of a Forester as in case of a Park-keeper for the Forester hath not only the charge of the Game but of all that is within the Forest by which the Game is fed preserved or succoured and they are fed by the brouse and succoured by the shade and have the calmer and better lodging by reason of the Trees and therfore by their Office they are to have a care of these things as well as of the Game for without these the Game cannot stand as to say that there are others who have speciall charge of the Wood and Pasture as the Woodward or Agister c. this is no proof that the Foresters or Keepers are discharged therby And the Foresters and Keepers are by their Offices to present the Misdoers in the Woods within the Forests of the Wood-wards and therfore they have to do with it And by Carta de foresta none may cut his wood within his Forest Nisi per visum Forestraii ergo the Foresters have charge therof And every voluntary act done by an Officer contrary to that which belongs to his Office is a forfeiture of his Office as by
to attend and be assistant to the Iustices Sheriffs or other Ministers of the King in the doing of it 3. AT the same time it was also resolved by them all except Walmsley Fennor and Owen in the Case of one Richard Bradshaw and Robert Burton who with others lately by word entred themselves into an agreement one with another to rise and put themselves into Armes and so to go from one Gentlemans house to another and so from house to house to pull down Inclosures generally that this so appearing by their own confession or by two Witnesses according to the Statute is high Treason by the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 1. The words of which Statute are That if any intend to levy War against the Queen and this maliciously advisedly and expresly declare or utter by any words or sayings that this shall be high Treason For all agreed that Rebellion of Subjects against the Queen hath Rebellion of Subjects high Treason been alwaies high Treason at the Common Law for the Statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 1. is that levying of War within the Realm against the King is Treason and Rebellion is all the War which a Subject can make against the King But Walmsley and the others with him said that the Statute of 1 Mar cap. 12. 10. That if any to the number of twelve or more assemble themselves to the intent to pull down Inclosures Pales and the like with force and continuing together after proclamation according to the Statute to go away by the space of an hour or do any of the Offences mentioned in the Statute that this is Felony So that if these Actions had been Treason at the Common Law it had been to no purpose to have made it Felony And it seemed to them that the resistance ought to be with force to the Queen before that such Acts shall be said Treason But all the other Iustices agreed and so it was put in ure lately in the case of the Prentices of London that if any assemble themselves with force to alter the Laws or to set a price upon Victualls or to lay violent hands upon the Magistrate as upon the Major of London and the like and with force attempt to put it in action that this is Rebellion and Treason at Common Law and yet this Statute of 1 Mariae makes it in such a case but Felony And they put a diversity between the cases of pulling down Inclosures Pales c. comprised in the Statute of 1 Mar. for those are to be understood where diverse to the number of twelve or more pretending any or all of them to be injured in particular as by reason of their common or other Interest in the Land inclosed and the like and assembling to pull it down forcibly and not to the cases where they have a generall dislike to all manner of Inclosures and therfore the assembling in a forcible manner and with Armes to pull them down where they have any Interest wherby they were in any particular to be annoyed or grieved is not Treason but the case here tending to a generality makes the act if it had been executed to be high Treason by the câ—uâ—se of the Common Law And therfore the intention appearing as the case is here it is Treason by the Stâ—tute of 13. aforesaid Periam in some manner doubted of the principall case but to intend to rise with force to alter the Laws to set price upon any Victuals or to use force against a Magistrate for executing his Office of Iustice and the like he said that they were cleerly Treason by the Statute of 13. aforesaid if it may appear by expresse words or otherwise as the said Statute mentions for all these tend against the Queen her Crown and Dignity and therfore shall be as against the Queen her self And if it had been put in practice it had been Treason at the Common Law Here ends the LORD POPHAM'S REPORTS An addition of certain Select CASES in the time of KING JAMES and KING CHARLES Trin. 15. Jac. In the Kings Bench entred Hill Jac. Rot. 194. Brooks Case IN an Ejectione firmae brough by one Brook against Brook the Case was thus Iohn Wright a Copyholder in Fee 10 Eliz. surrendred his Land into the hands of the Lord by the hands of Tenants according to the Custom c. without saying to whose use the Surrender should be And at the next Court the said Iohn Wright was admitted Habendum to him and his Wife in Tail the remainder to the right Heirs of Iohn Wright and the Wife of Iohn Wright now Defendant was seised from the time of Where upon surrender of Copyhold land no use is limited to whole use iâ— shall be the admittance untill this day And it was objected by the Counsell of the Plaintiff that the surrender was void because no use was limitted and therfore by constitution of Law ought to be to the use of the Surrender as if a Feoffment be made and no Use limited it shall be to the Use of the Feoffor or as it is in Sir Edward Cleers Case Coke lib. 6. 18. If a Feoffment be made by one to the use of his last Will he hath the use in the mean time 2. That the admittance was not available to passe an Estate to the Wife for she was not named in the Premisses but only in the Habendum and the Office of an Habendum is to limit the Estate and not the person and therfore it is said in Throgmorten and Tracies Case in Plowd com That if one be named to take an Estate in the Habendum where he was not named at all in the Premisses this is not good But it was resolved by the whole Court for the first point that the subsequent Act shâ—ll explain the Surrender for Quando abest Provisio partis adest provisio legis And when the Copyholder accepts a new admittance the Law intends that the Surrender generally made was to such an Vse as is specified in the admittance and the Lord is only as an Instrument to convey the Estate and as it were put in trust to make such an admittance â—s he who surrenders would hâ—ve him to make And Crook Iustice said Fides adhibita fidem obligat For the second point it was also agreed by the Court that the Wife shall take by this admittance albeit she were not named in the Premisses but only in the Habendum and they agreed that in Feoffments and Grants the party that is not named in the Premisses shall not take by the Habendum and therfore Throgmorton and Tracies Case as to this point is good Law But this case of a Copyhold is like to the case of a Will or to the case of Frank-marriage in which it is sufficient to passe an Estate albeit the party be only named in the Habendum and if it should be otherwise the Estates of many Copyholders would be subverted And so they resolved that Iudg-should be
Doctor and Student 137. in what case the Master shall answer for his Servant Coventry Solicitor to the contrary for it was lawful for the Plaintiff to command his Servant to sell them for it was found by the Verdict that the Iewels were of some worth and value and he did not command him to sell them for more then they were worth and 9 H. 6. 53. b. If the Master send his Servant into a Fair or Market to Merchandize for him the Master shall not be punished for his fault And in this case the command was not to deal with the Plaintiff or to sell to any one in particular and for it see 9 H. 6. aforesaid And if the Servant will exceed the lawfull command of his Master the Master shall not be punished therfore but if the command be unlawfull it is otherwise 11 E. 4. 6. A man sells cloath of such a length which proves to be short of the length an action lies not without a Warranty so Fitz. N. B. 64. c. For Wine if it be warranted to be good an action lies if it be corrupt If my Beasts go into another mans Soil an action lies against me but if my Servant drive my Beast into another mans Soil I shall not be punished for he doth this of his own wrong without any such warrant from me 13 H. 7. b. And if when a man sell a thing for more then it is worth an action would lye for it we should never have an end of actions And the action doth not lye for another reason because it doth not appear that the King of Barbary did lawfully imprison the Plaintiff 26 H. 8. 3. If a man makes a Lease and covenants that he shall not be disturbed if a stranger disturb him an action lieth not against the Covenantor so here c. for it seems it was Ex regali potestate and not in a lawfull manner and so he concluded that the action will not lye and so it was resolved by the whole Court Mountague chief Iustice the Plaintiff is no party who shall have the action but the King of Barbary 2. The Verdictis contrary to the Declaration and Iewels are in value according to the estimation and therfore 38 Eliz. between Simson and Sanders in the Star Chamber it was resolved that a man shall not be punished for Perjury upon the valuation of Iewels Doderidge said that 22 Eliz. an action upon the case was brought in the Common Pleas by a Clothier that wheras he had gained great reputation for his making of his Cloath by reason wherof he had great utterance to his great benefit and profit and that he used to set his mark to his Cloath wherby it should be known to be his Cloath And another Clothier perceiving it used the same mark to his ill-made Cloath on purpose to deceive him and it was resolved that the Action did well lye The same Term in the same Court VPon an Indictment of Barretry before the Iustices of Wales a Certiorari was moved for to remove it into this Court And it was said at the Bar that it had not been seen from the time of E. I. that such a Writ A Certiorarâ— granted into Wales had been granted in the like case and therfore he collected that it ought not to be granted But it was resolved by the Court that a Certiorari should be granted in regard it is in the Kings case and by Haughton Iustice notwithstanding the Statute Quod communia placita non sequantur Curiam meam yet it is plain that the King may sue in what Court he will And albeit this Writ in such a case ought not to be granted in case of a common person yet that is no reason but that it may be granted in the case of the King The same Term in the same Court Sir Henry Glemhams Case IN a Quo warranto against Sir Henry Glemham for using certain Liberties to which Sir Henry pleaded in Bar and the Kings Attorney replyed and so this matter rested three years and then the Kings Attorney put in a new Replication and joyned Issue upon other points And it was moved for the Defendant that he might put in a new Bar in regard the Replication A Plea not to be amended in another Term without assent of parties is altered and nothing was entred but all remained in paper And it was agreed by the Court that the King shall not be concluded but that he might put in his Replication at any time And that the King cannot make a double Plea for the other party shall answer first to one and then to the other And the Court would not allow Sir Henry to make a new Bar in this case without the assent of the Attorney who would by no means agree to it And in case of a common person this shall not be allowed without the assent of parties The same Term in the same Court IN an Action of Trover and Conversion between one Nicholas and William Ward it was agreed that tithe Lamb and Wooll was included within small Tithes And Mountague said that a Vicaridge endowed Lamb aâ—d Wooll included in small Tithes might be appropriated but not to the parson to which Haughton and Doderidge agreed 31 H. 6. Fitz. tit Indicavit is that such a Vicaridge may be dissolved An appropriation may be by the King sole where he is Patron but there is no Book that it might be by the Patron sole Grindons case in Plowden and 17 E. 3. 39. An Appropriation cannot be without the Kings licence The same Term in the same Court. Blaxton versus Heath IN an Action of Debt by Blaxton against Heath the case was this A man possessed of a term for twenty years in right of his Wife made a Lease for ten years rendring rent to him his Executors and Assigns and died And the question was whether the Wife shall have the rent after his death or his Executors and it was argued that the wife should nâ—t have it because she was in by a Title Paramount as if there be two Joynt-tenants for life the one makes a Lease for years rendring rent and dies the other shall not have the Rent Dyer 167. and so of Joynt-tenants in fee Co. lib. 1. 96. and Perkins accordingly To which Mountague chief Iustice agreed for he said it was but an extract of ten out of twenty the remainder continuing as before And Redditus is Reventus a turning again but it is otherwise of a Condition which is a new Creature of which the wife shall take no advantage Crook Iustice This is a speciall reservation and therfore the Executor shall have it and not the wife for she comes in Paramount as in the case of Ioyn-tenants Haughton agreed therunto and said that the Rent shall be incident to him who hath the Reversion under the Lessor who is the Executor And Mountague demanded of Hobert chief Iustice of the Common Pleas his opinion in this
Prohibition and had it and Noy moved for a Consultation 1. Because that a Prohibition and an Attachment upon it are but one Suit for the contempt of the party in bringing his Suit in another Court and translating this from the Kings Court and when it is once tried for the Defendant the same thing shall not be tried again And as to the Statute of 50 E 3. 4. upon the mistake wherof the mistake is raised he confessed that the Printed Books and also in the Extract of the Parliament one Roll remaining in the Tower is the same Iudge but the Parliament Roll it self and the Petition is Liceatque Iudici Ecclesiastico sive diocess eidem an hujusmodi and the answer to the Petition is one Consultation granted sufficeth in this case And the Parliament Roll it self was brought into the Court and viewed but he said that if it were as it is in the printed Book and Extract the same Iudge shall not be intended the same personall Iudge but the same Iudge of Conusance of the same Iurisdiction or cause for otherwise if another Commissary be made as the Bishop may when he will his Successor may be newly prohibited and also one thing may be infinitely tried for in many places the Suit begins in the Arch-deacons Court and from him an Appeal may be brought to the Bishop The same Term in the Kings Bench. Pack versus Methold in a Writ of Error IN Mich. Term 22 Jac. Methold brought an action upon the case in the Common Pleas against Pack and declared that in consideration that the Plaintiff would pay to Playford 52 l. 14 s. to the use of the said Pack such a day c. Pack promised to deliver to him his Bond in which he was bound to him in the said summ when he should be therunto requested And shews that he had paid c. and the Defendant did not deliver to him the Bond albeit the same to do he was afterwards often times requested and upon non assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plaintiff and now it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment because the request is not laid specially nor the day nor place therof expressed But the Court to wit Hobart chief Iustice Hutton and Harvey gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff and yet they agreed that if he had demurred upon the Declaration it had not been good and also that if it had been generall Licet saepius requisit it had not been good in as much as it is parcell of the promise and therfore ought to be said substantially viz. That it was after the promise and payment of the 52 l. but the time is supplied by these words Postea and there is no defect but in the place and Postea implies that it was after the promise and payment And Hobart said that all the points of the Declaration which have matter and substance are good only there wants the place where the request was made which by the Issue is moved and the request is here well notified to the Court and the defect of the place is now helped by the Statute Hutton said that if the promise had been to pay so much upon request at Easter there the day ought to have been shewn and Postea had not been sufficient but here the Postea refers only to a thing wherby it is certain and he said that upon this Issue such a request shall be given in evidence Harvey said that the request being here laid as it is the Court may well give Iudgment And it seemed to Hobart that such a request cannot be given in evidence where the Issue is upon an Assumpsit And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff and afterwards a Writ of Error Hill 1. Car. Where in an action upon the case there ought to be a speciall request and where not was brought in the Kings Bench and the opinion of the Court was strongly that the Plaintiff ought to have alledged the request specially and ceriainly in time and place because it is traversable and parcell of the Assumpsit and not to be done but upon request Jones Iustice remembred divers Presidents in the point and further day was given to bring in Presidents of either side and two Presidents were produced according to the opinion of this Court Scil. Pasch 30 Eliz. Rot. 464. in 1. Court Old and Estgreens case Trin 16 Jac. Rot. 268. Wales case But in Debt Licet saepius requisit is sufficient for it is not materiall nor traversable for the bringing of the action of Debt which is a Precipe is a sufficient demand in it self and afterwards at another day the Court continued of the same opinion and therfore the Plaintiff in the first action brought a new action Quod nota for albeit the Defendant had pleaded non assumpsit and Issue was joyned upon it yet this did not amend the evill laying of the request according to the Presidents abovesaid Pasch 2 Car. In the Kings Bench in t Hill 1 Car. Rot. 135. Constable versus Clobery IN an action of Covenant the question was upon the Traverse the Plaintiff declared upon the Indenture of Covenant and the Covenant was that a Ship shall go with the next fair wind and that the Merchant shall pay so much for fraught the Defendant saith by way of traverse that he did not go with the next wind and it was obiected by Stone of the Temple of Counsell with the Plaintiff that the Traverse was not good but he ought to have traversed that the Ship did not go at all for that which is materiall shall be traversed and that the Ship did not go is the most materiall thing here and this appeareth by 15 E. 4. 2. where a Gift in tail is traversed and not the death of the Tenant in tail 19 H. 8. 7. 36 H. 6. 16. 2 H. 5. 2. 2 H. 7. 12. and there are cases to this purpose Co. lib. 7. 9. Ughtreds case If a man intitles himself to Land by an Estate which cometh by Condition he ought to shew that the Condition is performed A Covenant against a Covenant will not make an Estoppell but he shall bring his action 3 H. 6. 33. Where he ought to shew that he went to Rome because it is a precedent Condition The principall case in Ughtreds case prove other to wit that which is materiall is alledgable And the difference upon the case of 48 E. 3. 3. 4. Where A. Covenant with B. to serve him with three Esquires in France and B. covenant for it to pay him 42. marks he may chuse to covenant in generall or speciall as he will for there was Covenant against Covenant and here there is a Covenant of one part to go with the Ship and on the other part to pay so much for the Fraught and so Covenant against Covenant And it seemed to Doderidge Iustice that the Traverse is not good for the Traverse here is by permission of God And for another thing where Merchants
put in Bracton lib 4. 221. These are called Servitutes as jus eundi fodendi hauriendi c. sunt servitutes quas praedia ex quibus exunt aliis praediis debent and are called Servitutes praediales and this began by private right to wit by grant or prescription A way or common shall be extinguished because they are part of the profits of the Land and the same Law is of Fishings also but in our case the water-course doth not begin by the consent of parties nor by prescription but Ex jure naturae and therfore shall not be extinguished by unity A Warren is not extinguished by unity because a man may have a Warren in his own Land and in the case of 11 H. 7. the Gutter was not extinguished only by the unity of possession but there also appeareth in the case that the Pipes were destroyed wherby it could not be revived and although the Book of 13 Eliz. Dyer 295. Two Closes adjoyn together the one being by prescription bound to a Fence the owner of the one purchase the other dies having issue two Daughters who make partition it is a quaere whether the inclosure be revived yet I conceive cleerly that by unity of the possession the Inclosure is destroyed for fencing is not naturall but comes by industry of men and therfore by the unity it shall be gone and so briefly with this diversity he concluded that where the thing hath its being by prescription unity will extinguish it but where the thing hath its being Ex jure naturae it shall not be extinguished and therfore the Plaintiff ought to have Iudgment Jones Iustice agreed that the Declaration is good and that the Bar also is good in manner but for the matter in Law it is not good As to the first exception to the Declaration I conceive it is good albeit there wants a prescription and this is the ordinary of pleading as appears in Co. lib. 4 Luttrels case and in all the presidents before cited 2. For the exception Vi armis he conceived this difference where the act is a Trespasse and a Nusance there it may be laid to be Vi armis but if it be a Nusance only and not a Trespasse it is otherwise as if I have a way over another mans Land if a stranger dig in the Land so aâ— I cannot have the way now because it is a Trespasse to the Owner of the Soil in my action upon the case against a stranger I may have Vi armis but if the owner stop the way there Vi armis shall not be in my action upon the case For the third exception because he both not say Ad Rectoriam spectandum but I conceive that it shall be intended ad Rectoriam impropriat and so it appeareth 4. Where it is said Watering-course for his Tenants I conceive it is good enough being in an action upon the case where damages only are to be recovered That the Bar also is good in form for although the Tenant here be a Disseisor yet it is a good Bar for it matters not whether he hath a Title or no if the Water-course be extinct by the unity for the matter in Law he conceived that the unity of possession had not extinguished the Water-course A man hath things out of another mans Land either by grant as a Seigniory Rent Common c. and these are distinguished by unity c. and the reason is because one who hath interest as Owner of the Land cannot have a particular interest in the same Land also Or by prescription and those things are extinguished by unity of possession also and not only for the first reason because he is Owner of the Land and so cannot have a particular interest in the same Land also but also because that by the unity the prescription fail And for the case in Dyer 13 Eliz. I conceive that by the unity the inclosure is gone and so it was resolved in 37 Eliz. for every one is not bound to inclose For the case of the way I will suspend my opinion concerning it because Clark and Lambs case is now depending touching it in the same point But now for our case it differs from the other cases for the prescription here is in another manner then is made for Common for it shall be pleaded either as appendant or appurtenant but Currere solebat is only in this pleading for here no interest is claimed but in the other cases an interest is claimed In this case the Land remains as it was before and therfore the unity will not extinguish it and if such a unity by construction of Law should extinguish Water-courses it would be too dangerous for suppose that a man hath a Water-course from Thames to his house in Lambeth if he purchase a parcell of Land in Hendley now because that the Thames come by the same Land his Water-course shall be extinguished Also suppose that the Water-course after it hath been in the Curtilage of the Plaintiff goes into another Curtilage is it reason that by this unity the second man shall lose his Water-course without doubt it is unreasonable And the case of 11 H. 7. of the Gutter warrants this opinion and therfore the Plaintiff ought to have Iudgment Doderidge Iustice I conceive no great difficulty in the case for the exceptions to the Declarations they are not materiall 1. That there wants Prescription or Custom I conceive that it is good enough for here are the words of Currere solebat consuevit and Consuevit is a good word for a Custom 2. That a Lay-man cannot have a Parsonage true it is that a Lay-man cannot be a Parson but he may have a Parsonage for he may be Lessee of it which appeareth many times in our Books 3. That it is not alledged to be Vi armis this is the most colourable exception and the case and rule cited out of Co. lib. 9. the Earl of Shrewsburies case is good Law but it is impossible to plead Vi armis in this case for the unity was in H. 8. and the wrong is supposed after the severance and it is supposed to be done by the Owner of the Land and a man cannot do a thing upon his own Land Vi armis 4. Because it is not alledged to be an ancient Rectory I conceive it need not because the Law presumes all Rectories to be ancient the Patronages wherof are gained Ratione fundi fundationis vel dotationis 5. Because he doth not say that Pertinet ad Rectoriam But he hath said a thing which amounts to as much for it is said that in the Rectory was a certain Curtilage in which there is a Watering-pond and the Curtilage is part of the house and therfore he need not say that it belongs to the house For the Bar I conceive that it is good for the Mannor A man makes a Feoffment of Land the Owner of the Land being present at the
same time nothing works by the Livery for the reason before given by Jones For the matter of Law he conceived that the unity of possession doth not extinguish the Water-course and that for two reasons 1. For the necessity of the thing 2. From the nature of the thing being a Water-course which is a thing running 1 For the necessity and this is the reason that common appendant by the unity of possession shall not be extinguished for it is appendant to ancient Land-hide and gain arable Land which is necessary for the preservation of the Common-wealth and as in this case there is a necessity of bread so in our case there is a necessity of water And for the case of a way Distinguendum est for if it be a way which is only for easement it is extinguished by unity of possession but if it be a way of necessity as a way to Market or Church there it is not extinguished by unity of possession and accordingly was the opinion of Popham chief Iustice which I take for good Law and the case of 11 H. 7. 25. is a notable case and there a reason is given why a Gutter is not extinguished by unity of possession because it is matter of necessity 2. From the nature of water which naturally descends it is alwais current Et aut invenit aut facit viam and shall such a thing be extinguished which hath its being from the Creation Co. lib. 4. Luttrels case a Mill is a necessary thing and if I purchase the Land upon which the streams goes which runs to this Mill and afterwards I alien the Mill the Water-course remains So if a man hath a Dye-house and there is a water running to it and afterwards he purchase the Land upon which the water is current and sell it yet he shall have the Water-course Dyer Dame Browns case and the principall case in Luttrels case a Fulling-mill made a Water-mill this shall not alter the nature of the Mill but yet it remains a Mill so the water hath its course notwithstanding the unity and he concluded for the Plaintiff Crew chief Iustice I agree that the Declaration is good and also that the Bar is good for the manner but for the matter in Law I conceive that it is not good In our Law every case hath its stand or fall from a particular reason or circumstance For a Warren and Tithes they are not extinguished by unity because they are things collaterall to the Land And for the case of 13 Eliz. in Dyer of an Inclosure I conceive that by the unity the Inclosure is destroyed for the Prescription was interrupted and in Day and Drakes case 3 Jac. in this Court it was adjudged that in the same case the Prescription was gone It may be resembled to the case of Homage Ancestrell 57 E. 3. Fitzherbert Nusans And for our case it is not like to the cases of Common or a Way because the Water-course is a thing naturall and therfore by unity it shal not be discharged also there is a linement out of which every man shall have a benefit and therfore he concluded that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff And Iudgment was commanded to be entred for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court. Welden versus Vesey AN action of Debt was brought by Welden Sheriff of the City of Coventry against Vesey upon the Statute of 29 Eliz. cap. 4. and declares that it is provided by this Statute that no Sheriff or Minister c. shall take for an execution if the summ doth not exceed 100 l. but 12 d. for every 20 s. and being above the summ of 100 l. 6 d. for every 20 s. and shews that wheras the said Vesey had judgment against one in an action of Debt that the Plaintiff by virtue of a Capias directed to him took the body of the said person condemned and that it was delivered to the Plaintiff and that he for levying of the money had brought this action The Defendant by way of Bar saith that it is provided by this act that it shall not extend to Executions in Towns Corporate and that this was within Coventry and so demurred upon the Declaration And Whitwick argued for the Plaintiff two things are considerable in this case 1. Whether where the summ exceeds 100 l. the Sheriff shall have 12 d. for every 20 s. of the 100 l. and 6 d. for that which is over or 6 d. only for every 20 s. for all the summ 2. Whether this Statute extend to Iudgments in Towns Corporate For the first the letter of the Statute is cleer that he shall have 12 d. for the first 100 l. and 6 d. for the residue for the Statute is that if it be above 100 l. Whether a Sheriff or c. shall have 12 d. in the pound for the first 100 l. and 6 d. for the rest upon an Execution that he shall have but 6 d. therfore if it be under a 100 l. he shall have 12 d. for every 20 s. And the meaning of the Statute is plain also for otherwise the Sheriff shall have a lesser Fee where it is above a 100 l. as where it is a 199 l. then he shall have for 100 l. but this was not the intent of the Statute but the greater the Execution the greater the Fee It was adjudged in one Gores case 10 Jac. that an action of Debt lies upon this Law Pasch 14 Jac. Rot. 351. Brole and Tumblerson Sheriffs of the City of London brought Dabt against Nathanael Michell for execution of 400 l. for 12 l. 10 s. scil 5 l. for the first 100 l. and 6 d. for every 20 1. after But I confesse that the principall question there was whether an action of Debt lies for the money and it was resolved that it did and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff 2. To the Proviso that this doth not extend to Fees in a Town Corporate whether this extend to executions which go out of Iudgments in this Court or in the Common Pleas into Towns Corporate The Statute shews that before that time the Sheriff had taken great Fees which the Parliament considering restrained them to a certainty The words of the Proviso are generall Provided that this Act shall not extend to any Fees to be taken for any Execution within any City or Town Corporate and although the words be generall yet the exposition shall be according to reason as it is said in Fulmerston and Stewards case in Plow Expesition shal be made against the words if the words be against reason 5 H. 7. 7 38 H. 3. Broo. Livery 6. The King shall have primer Seisen of all Lands of his Tenant which he holds of him in Capite but if one holds of the King in Capite in Socage he shall pay no primer Seisen to the King and this Statute shall have this intendment that this Proviso shall extend only to Executions upon Iudgments
Proviso extends only to Iudgments originally commenced in Towns corporate and not to executions upon Iudgments given in superior Courts for then the Sheriff does execution as an Officer to these Courts And the Sheriff of the County is at as great pains as if he were Sheriff of another County and shall not be bound by the Proviso Whitlock Iustice was for the Plaintiff in both the points to wit that the Sheriff shall have 1 s. for every 20 s. of the first 100 l. and 6 d. for every 20 s. of the residue And by him the Sheriff may refuse to do execution untill the levying money be paid to him And for the second point the Sheriff of the County of the City is not within the Proviso but shall have the Fees by the Statute provided as well as the Sheriff of the County shall have for the words are generall and the exception goes to all Towns corporate and Cities but doth not say Cities which are Counties and therfore this Sheriff is within the benefit of this Law And in Michaelmas Term next following the case was moved again by Whitlock for the Plaintiff and he said that he would not speak to the second point because the Court had delivered their opinion that the Proviso in the Statute that this shall not extend to executions in Towns corporate it is to be intended of executions in Towns corporate upon Iudgments there given But for executions there upon Iudgments given in this Court or any other superior Court the Sheriff shall have such Fees as are limited by this Statute And the Court said to him that were agreed of it And as for the first point he conceived that the Sheriff shall have 12 d. for levying of every 20 s. of the first 100 l. and 6 d. of every pound more and this appears cleerly by the Letter of the Statute And the case in Mich. 19 Jac. in C. B. between Empson and Bathirst doth not make against it for the resolution of the said case was upon other matters The case being a man was bound in a Statute of 120 l. the Sheriff extends and before the Liberate takes double Bond of the party for payment of his Fees and afterwards brought Debt against the party who pleads the said matter in Bar and the Statute of 23 H. 6. cap. 10. And in the case were three points 1. Whether the Sheriff may take a double Bond for the payment of his Fees and it was resolved that the Bond was void for the Sheriff might have Debt upon the Statute for his Fees 2. Whether the Sheriff shall have his Fees before the Liberate and resolved that he shall not 3. Was this very question and two Iustices were against one that where the summ exceed 100 l. he shall have but 6 d. for levying of every 20 s of the first 100 l. But the Iudgment was given upon the other points All the Court seemed to be of opinion that he shall have 12 d. for every 20 s. of the first 100 l. and 6 d. for every 20 s. of the residue The same Term in the same Court. Awdeley versus Joye AWdeley being put out of the Town-Clarkship of Bedford moved for a Writ of Restitution to the place and it seemed to Doderidge Iustice that the Iustices of this Court have power to grant restitution in this case and he cited a case in 16 Eliz. in this Court where restitution was granted in such a case and 43 Eliz. by warrant of Fennor Iustice a Writ of Restitution was granted One who was Town Clark of Boston for life was made Alder-man and put out of his Clarkship and was restored This Court hath power not only in judiciall things but also in some things which are extrajudicial The A Writ of Restitution to a Town-Clark being ousted of his Office Major and Commonalty of Coventry displaced one of the Alder-men and he was restored And this thing is peculiar to this Court and is one of the flowers of it Crew chief Iustice doubted whether restitution could be made to Awdeley or no because the Office was granted to him in Reversion when it was expectant upon an Estate for life and when the Officer for life died Joye was elected and he said that all the said Writs remembred are where he had once possession Whitlock Iustice in the case of one Constable 10 Eliz. It was resolved that this Court hath power to grant restitution in such a case where he was put out of his Office And by Jones Iustice this Court hath power to grant Restitution and he remembred one Mittlecots case And Noy being of Counsell with Awdeley said that there are Presidents to prove this in the times of E. 2. E. 3. and H. 6. And it was said by the Iustices that they are the chief Conservators of the Peace within the Realm and therfore have power for the preservation of the Peace in such factious Towns to grant restitution The same Term in the same Court Dabborne versus Martin THomas Dabborne brought an action upon the case against Martin for Words Thou art a Knave of Record these words Thou art a Knave of Record and a forgering Knave And it was argued by Jermy for the Defendant that the words were not actionable for a Knave signifies a Male-child so that it is no more then to say Thou art a Male-child of Record And for forgering Knave the action will not lye for Forger is a generall word and may be applied to divers Trades as forgering Smith forgering Goldsmith and when he called him forgering Knave there was no communication of his Office 18 Jac. Sir William Brunskill brought an action upon the case and declared that he was well discended and was a Gentleman of the Chamber to Prince Henry and he brought an action for these words Thou art a Cosener and livest by cosenage and adjudged not actionable Co. lib. 4. 16. Action upon the case doth not lye for these words Thou art a corrupt man if there were no communication touching his Profession And it was argued for the Plaintiff that the words were actionable for it lyeth for these words Thou art an Out-putterer if they were spoken in Northumberland where they are understood but not here because they have no signification And the words here are speciall and shall have reference to his Office and shall have such an interpretation as is now used and now Knave hath no signification of Male-child Jones Iustice said that if one saith that such a one is a corrupt Iudge action lies or if one saith of a Clark that he is a forging Clark action lies And in 28 Eliz. the opinion of Iustice Fennor was that for these words Thou hast forged my Fathers Will action lies Crew said that he did not understand the word Forgering but for calling one Knave of Record action lies And Doderidge Iustice said that he never gave way to these actions upon the case for words And no opinion
shall it be in the case Doderidge Justice the Servant may have the Action also If the Servant be robbed of wares the Master or Servant may have an appeale 8. E. 2. Tit. Robbery two joynt Merchants one is Robbed both shall joyne in the Action and may also joyn in the appeal But it may be objected as Whitlock Iustice did that the Master is not Hospitans I say this is to no purpose A man put his Horse in the Stable and before he goes to bed or lodging the Horse is gone he shall have an action although he did not lodge there For the word transeuntes although he be at the end of his Iourney yet it is within the custom and he shall have action And by Crew if I send cloath to a Taylor and it is stoln from him the Taylor shall have an action of trespasse or the Owner Jones the case of Hue and Cry is a more stronger case then this is for there the Servant ought to swear that he is robbed and yet the Master shall have an action And for the word transeuntes all agreed that although he be at the end of his journey or at an Inne in London yet he is within the remedy of this Law And if a man stay in an Inne a moneth or a quarter of a year shall not he have an action if he lose his Goods Doderidge agreed that if a man be boarded in an Inne and his Goods are stoln he shall not have an action upon this Law And notwithstanding this objection judgment was given for the Plaintiff upon the Verdict Trin. Term 2 Car. In the Kings Bench. Sir William Buttons Case SIr William Button a Iustice of Peace brought an action for these words Sir William Buttons men have stoln Sheep and he spake to me that I should not prosecute them and it seems that the action did not lye because Words Sir William Buttons men have stoln Sheep and be spake to me that I should not prosecute them Sir William did not aver that he is a Iustice of Peace and it doth not appear in what County the said Felony was done 36 Eliz. One brought an action for these words A. is a cosening fellow and the greatest Pickpurse in Northamptonshire and there is not a Purse picked within 40. miles of Northampton but he hath a hand in it And the action did not lye because he did not aver that there were Purses cut Jones Iustice put this case One saith that A. is as strong a Thief as any is in Warwick Gaol he ought to aver that there is a Theef in Warwick Gaol or otherwise they are not actionable Doderidge put this case There is a nest of Theeves at Dale and Sir Iohn Bridges is the maintainer of them these are actionable because it implies maintenance Note that it appeared upon a motion which the Attorney-generall made against one Lane who is a Recusant in Northamptonshire that a Lease for years made by a Recusant of his own Lands after conviction if it be Bona fide will bind the King but if it be upon fraud and covin then it will not and Whitlock said that it is a common course for Recusants to make Leases after their Indictment and before conviction The same Term in the same Court The Case of the Major Bayliffs and Jurates of Maidstone IN a Quo warranto depending against the Mayor Bayliffs and Iurates of Maidstone in Kent Serjeant Finch of Counsell with them of Maidstone put the case briefly in effect thus In the Quo warranto against them it was ordered by the Court that they should have day to plead untill afornight after Trinity Term and the truth was that they had not pleaded accordingly wherupon Iudgment was entred in the Roll and the Writ of Seisin awarded and execution therupon and afterwards by a private order in the Vacation by the chief Iustice and Iustice Jones it was ordered that the Iudgment should be staid and the truth was that it was never entred amongst the Rules of the Court and therfore he prayed that the Iudgment might not be filed but that the last order might be observed and that they might amend their Plea Hendon Serjeant on the other side said that it could not be for by the Iudgment given the King was intitled to have the profits of Franchises which he shal not lose he cited the case which is in F. N. B. 21. Error in B. R. cannot be reversed the same Term before the same Iustices without a Writ of Error but otherwise it is in C. B. and he said that the same course was observed in Eyre there can be no pleading in Eyre after the Eyre determined and upon this he cited the case of 15 E. 4. 7. before the Iustices in Eyre if the Defendant does not come the Franchises shall be seised into the Kings hands nomine destinctionis and if the party who ought the Franchise doth not come during the Eyre in the same County he shall forfeit his Franchise for ever so here after Iudgement entred there can be no plea per que c. Finch we have order from the Court for stay of Iudgement here no perfect Iudgement was given and this is not without president and he cited one Chamberlains Case where the Iudgement was nigh to perfection c. but he did not put the Case Creve ch Justice in this case there was the assent of the Attorney generall who prosecuted the Quo Warranto and so the cases put by Hendon to no purpose Jones upon F. N. B. 21. J. took this difference true it is that the Kings Bench cannot reverse a Iudgement although it be in the same term without a Writ of Error but this is where error lies in Where the Kings Bench may reverse its owne judgmeÌ„t without Writ of Error and where not the same cause in the same Court as upon outlawry but if no error lies in this Court for the same cause but in Parliament then the Kings Bench may reverse the Iudgement without Writ of Error being the same term And the Iudgement here was ever of Record for the Roll untill it be fixed amongst other Rolls is no Record And for the Case of 15. E. 4. 7. it is not like our case in reason for when When a Roll â—s become a Record the Eyre is determined the power of the Iustices in Eyre is also determined but it is not so here for the Iustices have power from Term to Term But Noy argued further for the King that it is a Iudgement of another Term and Execution awarded upon it and said that it is without president that now it should be avoyded and upon the awarding of execution the King under his seal hath averred that judgement is given which cannot be falsified and for Chamberlains Case he said that there was an assent in it Doderidge the Question which now is moved is but this whether a Iudgement entered in a private Roll
As to the first words Base Gentleman they are but words of choller 2. The next words He hath four Children by his servant Agnes cannot be actionable for although she were once his servant yet she might be afterwards his Wife 3. The Plaintiff hath averred in his Declaration that he hath lived continently and then he cannot have children by his servant Agnes and then the words are not actionable And 4. For saying he hath killed them is not actionable and upon this he cited one Snags Case Co. lib. 4. who brought an Action for these words Thou hast killed thy Wife and it appeared by the Declaration that his Wife was alive and therefore it was resolved that the words were not actionable And as to the last exception it was said by Ashley Serjeant on the other side that albeit the Plaintiff hath averred in his Declaration that he lived continently and so in a manner confessed that he had no children this is but for the aggravation of the offence of the Defendant as when an Action is brought for calling one Thiefe he avers that he lived honestly and yet the Action will lye But I confesse if the Plaintiff had averred that he never had any child then it would be like to Snags Case Co. lib. 4. 16. a. and that the Action would not lye But in Anne Davyes Case there she averred that she was a Virgin of good fame and frée from all suspition of incontinency and the Defendant sayd that a Grocer had got her with child Owen Wards Case in Cook Book of Entries hath the same Declaration as this and it was the President thereof But Jermy moved another exception upon these words he hath killed them and doth not say Felony which is not good for he migt kill them in execution of Iustice which is justifiable Trin. 2. Jac. Willers Case in the Court it was adjudged that for these words Thou hast stollen a peece and I will charge thee with Felony an Action lies not because a péece is a word of doubtfull signification And Trin. 20. Jac. It was resolved that these words Agnes Knight is a Witch were not Actinable but it was answered of the other side that upon the whole frame of these words they cannot be intended but to be spoken malitiously and there can be no pretencâ— of lawfull killing of children Doderidge all the words joyned together are actionable but these words only considered he hath four children by his servant Agnes are not Actionable and albeit he doth not alledge it felony yet this is a scandall and good cause of Action Jones agreed and yet he conceived that for saying singly that one hath a Bastard an Action lies not albeit the having of a Bastard be punishable by the Statute of 18. Eliz. cap. 1. But by him he hath killed the King shall be taken in pejori sensu otherwise it is if the words of themselves be indifferent as Pope and this word shall not be the rather taken in pejori sensu having relation to all the sentence for the contrariety of the Declaration it seems to me that the Declaration is good enough but if one saith Thou hast killed J. S. where in truth there never was such a man it is not actionable But here the Averment of the Plaintiff is more generall Ubi re vera he is not guilâ—y or incontinent which is a general allegation but if he had averred ubi re vera he never had any child there peradventure the Action would not lye but here it will Whitlock Justice agreed and he sayd that the first words hath had four children by his Maid Agnes are actionable and for the other matters they agreed whereby Iudgement was given for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court THis Term in the Common-place Sargeant Hendon cited this Case to be adjudged 4. Jac. A Copy-holder made a Lease for yeares by License and the Lessee dyed that this Lease shall not be accounted assets in the hands of the Excecutors neither shall it be extended But the Case was denyed by Iustice Hutton and others and that an Ejectione firmae lies of such a Lease But he said that if a Copy-holder makes a Lease for yeares by License of the Lord and dyes without Heire the years not expired the Lord notwithstanding this may enter for the Estate out of which this Lease was derived is determined But Yelverton Iustice was contra because this License shall be taken as a confirmation of the Lord and therefore the Lease shall be good against him and there as I heard it was argued by all that if a Copy-holder makes a Lease for a yeare this is a Lease by the common-Common-Law and not customary and shall be counted assets in the hands of the Executors of the Lessée The same Term in the Kings Bench. NOta upon evidence to a Iury between Buffield and Byburo the Case appeared to be this upon a Devise with these words I will and devise that A. and B. my Feoffees shall stand seised and be seised to and of Iohn Callis for life the remainder c. And the truth was that he had no Feoffees and the opinion of the whole Court nullo contradicente was that this is a good Devise to John Callis by reason of the intention 38. H. 8. Bro. Devis 48. 15. Eliz. Dyer 323. were urged for the proofe of it and by Doderidge the Case of 15. Eliz. is more strong then our Case is Linyen made a Feoffment to his own use and afterwards devised that his Feoffees should be seised to the use of his Daughter A. who in truth was a Bastard and yet this is a good Devise of the Land by intention for by no possibility they can be seised to his use Mich. 2. Car. Lemasons and Dicksons Case in the Kings Bench. Trin. 2. Car. Roll. 1365. THe Case was this One Parcevall Sherwood was indebted to Susan Clarke who brought an Action of debt by a Bill of Middlesex which is in nature of a Writ of Trespas against him and Sherwood upon a mean Proces was arrested by the Defendant being Bayliff of the Liberty of White-Chappel and being in his custody he suffered him to escape Afterwards Susan Clarke made the Plaintiff her Executor and dyed and then the Plaintiff brought an Action upon the Case against the Defendant upon the said escape and upon issue joyned it was found for the Plaintiff And Calthrop of Councel with the Plaintiff moved that the Action will well lye for the Testator himselfe might have had either an Action of Debt or upon the case upon the sayd Escape and therefore the Executor may have the same remedy and that by the equity of the Statute of 4. E. 3. cap. 7. which gives an Action to Executors pro bonis asportatis in vita Testatoris And by 14. H. 7. 17. this Statute shall be taken by equity and Administrators who are in the same mischiefe shall have the same remedy albeit they
be not named in the Statute old Nat. Brevium 103. An Executor shall have a Quare impedit for a disturbance made in vita Testator and 7. H. 4. 6. and old Nat. Brev. 123. b. An Executor shall have an Ejectione firmae of an ouster made to the Testator 17. E. 3. Executors 106. An Executor shall have a Replevin of Goods taken in vita Testatoris and it hath been oftentimes resolved that an Executor shal have a Trover and Conversion of Goods taken and converted in vita Testator Doderidge demanded of him the reason why an Action upon the Case upon an Escape in the life of the Testator should not lye against an Executor to which he answered because it was a meer personall wrong Doderidge so is the wrong here and he said that an Executor cannot have an action Vi armis for a trespas done in vita Testator and in this case because the escape was in vita Testator it is a personall wrong to him for which the Executor shall not have an action upon the case But it had been otherwise if the escape had been after the death of the Testator and the Statute of 7. E. 3. doth not extend to it because this Statute is only for Goods but I agree to the case of Trover and Conversion Jones Justice If this action upon the case will not lye by the Executor it would be a mischievous case for as soon as the Creditor dies the Goalor will and may suffer the Prisoner to escape because none can have an action against him but as it appeareth by the Case of 15. Eliz. Dyer The case is as mischievous for the Creditor if the Goalor suffers an escape and dyes for there no action lyes against the Executors And for the case of Quare impedit I agree to it and so it was resolved in Brokesbyes Case 31. Eliz. that an Executor shall have a Quare impedit for a disturbance made in vita Testator if the avoydance be a Chattel vested and therefore within the equity of the Statute which gives an action de bonis Testator and he was commanded to move it another time And at another day in Hillary Term next after Grigs said for the Defendant that the Executor cannot have this action for an escape in vita Testator because it is a meer personall action given to the Testator moritur cum persona and cited 15. Eliz. Dyer Whitakers Case and that it is meerly personall appeareth by 10. Eliz. Dyer 271. Where an Executor shall not be charged with an ascape in vita testator generally where not guilty is a good Plea there an Action doth not lye for it against Executors And this Case is not within the equity of the Statute of 4. E. 7. But it hath been objected that an Ejectione firmae is within the equity of this Statute for the Executors to have it 7. H. 4. 6. but the reason there is because it is to recover the Term it selfe and not dâ—mages only and upon the same reason an Action of Covenant upon a Covenant broken in the life of the Testator is maintainable by an Executor and that also is the reason of the Case of the Qua impedit because there the presentation is to be recorded but in our Case damages only are to be recorded upon the escape and so they are not alike 2. The Arrest here is upon mean Proces and upon a Bill of Middlesex which is but in nature of a Trespasse before Declaration and I conceive that if one be taken by a Cap ad satisfaciendum at the sute of one albeit the party at whose Suit he is taken dyes yet he shall be detained in execution but I conceive the Law to be otherwise upon a Cap ad respondend and albeit the Plaintiff saith that the Arrest was ea intentione to declare against him in an Action of Debt yet an intent is a secret thing and albeit the Executor represent the person of the Testator yet he cannot follow it and it is impossible to prove the intent Jermy for the Plaintiff said that there is a difference where an Action is brought by and where against Executors and this appeareth by Littletons Case that an Action of account doth not lye against Executors for want of privity as to that purpose but it is cleer that account lies by Executors because this is a point of interest And here in this Case the Testator had interest in the body by the arrest and this appeareth in Hichcocks Case cited in Hargraves Case in the Lord Cooks 5. Report and by the Arrest the body of the party is as a Chattel in the Testator and he compared this to the case of 7. H. 4. 2. 3. Fitzherberts Executors 52. An Executor shall have a ravishment of ward for a taking in the time of the Testator And 7 H. 4. 6. and a Case cited by Hankford that if one enter upon a Statute Merchant who dyes his Executor shall have an assize and therefore I conceive that if a Tenant by Elegit be ousted and bring an Assize if the Executors be custed again he shall have a redisseisen upon the first â—uster because the Interest continues in him which was in the first Testator and it is to be observed in our law that the Law inlargeth it selfe to give to Executors the same remedy which the Testator had and thereupon he cited Co. lib. 6. 80. a. 3. Eliz. Dyer 301. And in our Case the body of the party was in the Testator as a gage till appearance so that it was not only a personall tort for he had an interest and this appeareth by Co. lib. 5. 27. by a Case put in Russels Case there and if the Executors shall not in this Case have an Action it would be very mischievous for so the Goalor shall suffer escapes dispunishable 20. E. 3. Fitz. Executors 74. But as to this reason it was answered by Jones Justice that the same mischiefe is of the other side if the Goaler suffer an escape and dies and Action lies not against his executors Calthrop on the same side cited F. N. B. 121. a. that a man condemned in debt and imprisoned if the Goalor suffer him to escape the Party or his Executor may have debt against the Goalor And he said that at Common Law Debt lay against a Goalor upon an escape as appeares in Fitz. Debt 127. 38. H. C. placit 36. And if it were a debt in the Testator then Executors may have an Action upon it But by Doderidge Iustice in the said case debt lies not at common-Common-Law for to what purpose was the Statute made But for the point in Question his sudden opinion was the Executor shall have this Action and that it is within the equity of the Statute of 4. E. 3. for it is a wrong although it were upon meane Proces and the tort continues as to the Executor for every thing which makes to the hinderance of the Execution of the
Cleland brought a Writ of error against Baldock upon a Iudgement given in where the Plaintiff declared that the Intr. Hill 22. Iac Rot. 59â— Defendant in consideration that he would do all his commands honestly and truly for the space of a yeare assumed to pay him 10 l. and further declared that he had done all his honest and lawfull commands and this promise being found by verdict Iudgement was given against Doctor Cleland and thereupon he brought this Writ of error and Greene assigned two errors 1. The Assumpsit is that he shall doe all his commands honestly and truly and he hath declared that he hath done all his lawfull and honest commands and he may honest commands and yet not honestly 2. It is said that Jurator Assident dampna and it is not said occasione transgression predict and it is against all Presidents But Nota that there were these words ex hac parte opposita and therefore the exceptions were disallowed by the Court and the first Iudgement affirmed The same Term in the same Court. Secheverel versus Dale THis Case was sent out of Chancery to this Court â—o know the Law therein and in Trespas the case was this Henry Secheverell the Father seised in Fée levied a Fine to A. and B. in Fee to the use of himselfe for life absque impetitione vasti with power to cut and carry away the trees and to make Leases for 21 yeares or three lives the remainder to the use of John Secheverell his eldest Son for life without impeachment of waste with the same powers Henry the Father made a Lease to one under whom the Plaintiff claims for three lives rendring the ancient Rent excepting all the trees unlesse those which shall be for cropping lopping and fewell Henry the Father dyes John the Son in the next remainder cut certain trees Victorin Secheverell who clayms by the lease made by the Father brings trespas and two Questions were moved 1. Whether Lessee for life without impeachment of waste may make a Lease excepting the trees and it was objected by the Councel of the Plaintiff that he could not because this second Lease ariseth out of the first fine and out of the estate of the Conusor But the Court prima facie was of opinion that he might well make such a Lease with such an exception See Co. lib. 11. Lewys Bowls his Case and Doctor and Student lib. 1. cap. 1. and by Doderidge Iustice the Lease ariseth out of both the estates Jones Iustice suppose the Lessee absque impetitione vasti assigne over all his estate might he cut the trees and it was conceived that he might for by Doderidge he hath power to dispose of the trees as it was resolved in Lewys Bowls his case Jones he hath no propriety in the Trees untill they be cut Crew ch Justice Admit a Stranger cut the trees who shall have them By all the Court the Lessee without impeachment of waste shall have them 2. Point Tenant for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut and carry away the trees and make Leases for 21. years or three lives the remainder for life to J. S. without impeachment of waste c. Tenant for life makes a Lease for thrée lives and dyes whether he in remainder for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut the trées may cut the trées and take them during the Lease for thrée lives and the Court séemed to be of opinion that he might And Leving of Councell with the Plaintiff argued that when tenant for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut the trees and to make Leases for 21. years or three lives makes a Lease for thrée lives excepting the trées that this is a voyd exception because he hath no interest but a bare Authority 27. H. 6. Fitz. Wast 8. Statham tit Wast 1. makes this a Quaere which Statham was once the owner of the Land in question A man makes a Lease for life without impeachment of waste a Stranger cuts trées the Lessée brings trespas he shall recover no Damages for the value of the trees because the propriety belongs to him in the reversion he may dispose of them Quaere Dyer 284. Daunsley and Southwels Case Co. lib. 11. Lewys Bowles case that such a Lessee may take trées which are blown down and 3. H. 6. 45. Mich 41. and 42. Eliz. C. B. Leechford against Sanders in an Action of waste upon a Lease made to Sanders for life with a proviso that the Plaintiff might dispose of the trées during the estate and resolved that the Action lies not for notwithstanding this power the trées are demised to the Lessée also so here when the trées are excepted he hath no interest but only an authority 2. The exception is voyd for another reason because when such a Lessée makes such a Lease this is not his Lease but it hath its operation out of the originall fine and he who makes this hath but the nomination and therefore cannot adde a condition or exception to it And if the second Lease shall have its being out of the estate of the Lessee for life then there shall be an use upon an use as appears Co. lib. 1. 134. and that the Law will not allow 15. H. 7. and Co. Lib. 1. Albanyes Case If a man devise that his Executors shall fell his Land they cannot adde a condition or exception to this sale as an attornment upon a condition subsequent is voyd Co. lib. 2. Tookers case 3. This case may be resembled to the case of Copy-holds which is in Co. lib. 8. 63. b. in Swaynes Case If a Lord takes a Wife and afterwards grants Lands by Copy according to the custome and dyes his Wife shall not be endowed of this Land for albeit her title of Dower was before the Grant yet the title of Copi-hold which is the custome is elder then the title of Dower so in our case the title of the second Lessee is derived out of the estate of the Conuzées and therefore shall not be clogg'd with the Exceptions of Lessee for life without impeachment of waste 4. This priviledge to cut the trées is annexed to the estates and goes along with the estate and therefore shall not begin before the Stranger be in possession 3. E. 3. 44. 45. Idles case 28. H. 8. Dyer 10. And it may be resembled to the cases of 16. E. 4. and 27. H. 8. Tenant in taile sold the trées if he dyes before the Party takes them he shall never have them because he hath stayd out his time But it may be objected that upon such a Lease he may reserve a rent as it is in Whitlocks case Co. lib. 8. to which I will offer this difference Lessée for life with power to make Leases for thrée lives reserving rent makes a Lease for thrée lives reserving rent this reservation is good because it is but a Declaration of the Lease and of the rent
Terme in the same Court WEld of the Inner Temple moved for a Prohibition to the Ecclesiasticall Court at Worcester and shewed for cause 1. That the suit there was for money which by the assent of the greater part of the Parishioners of D. was assessed upon the Plaintiffe for the reparations of the Church to wit for the recasting of their Bels the truth is that the charge was for the making of new Bels where there were four before whereby it appears that it is meerly matter of curiosity and not of necessity for which Parishioners shall not he liable to such taxations and he relied upon 44. E. 3. 19. by Finchden 2 The party there is overcharged of which the Common Law shall Judge 3 The Party hath alledged a Custome that he and all those who hath an estate in such a Tenement have used to pay but 11 s. for any reparation of the Church But the Prohibition was denied and by Doderidge in the Book of 44 E. 3. there was a By-law in the case to distrain which is a thing meerly temporal for which the Prohibition was granted per Curiam in this case the assessment by the major part of the Parishioners binds the party albeit he assented not to it and the Court seemed to be of Opinion that the Custome was not reasonable because iâ—â—aid a burthen upon the rest of the Parish Littleton of Counsell of the other side suppose the Church falls shall he pay but 11 s. Whitlock If the Church falls the Parishioners are not bound to build it up again which was not denied by Justice Jones The same Term in the same Court A Prohibition was prayed because a person had libelled in the Ecclesiasticall Court for the tenth part of a bargain of Sheep which had depastured in the Parish from Michaelmas to Lady day and the party surmised that he would pay the tenth of the Wooll of them according to the custome of the Parish But the Prohibition was denyed for as Doderidge Iustice sayd by this way the person shall bee defrauded of all if he shall not have his recompence for now the Sheepe are gone to another Parish and he cannot have any Wooll at this time because it was not the time of sheering Nota per Whitlock de animalibus inutilibus the Person shall have the tenth part of the bargain for depasturing as Horses Oxen c. but de Animalibus Utilibus he shall have the Tith in specie as Cowes Sheep c. The same Term in the same Court UPon an Issue joyned in an Ejectione firmae it was found for the Plaintiff and Lewkoor moved in arrest c. because the Ejectione firmae was de Messuagio â—ive Tenemento which is not good for the incertainty and so it was resolved 12. Jac. in this Court and Ejectione firmae lies not De Tenemento Co. lib. 11. 54. Savils case And it was resolved in the Exchequor-chamber that it lies not de pecia terrae and in this Court in Rhetorick and Chappels Case it was resolved that it lyes not De Mess Tenemento The same Term in the same Court Sir Robert Browne against Sir Robert Stroud IN debt upon an Obligation for performance of certain Covenants contained in certain Indentures made between the Parties aforesaid and the Covenant upon which the question did arise was this R. B. being seised of the Mannor of Dale S. R. S. of the Mannor of Sale they exchanged the one for the other and the Mannor of R. B. being more worth then the Mannor of R. S. R. S. covenanted to pay for the said Mannor 1200 l. and no time was limited when the money should be payd and the money not being payd within a year after R. B. bargained and sold the said Mannor by Deed indented and inrolled to J. S. and his Heirs and afterwards brought an Action of Debt against the said R. S. for the said 1200 l. who pleaded this mater in Bar and Jermy argued for the Plaintiff that this Plea shall not discharge the Defendant of the said Covenant for it is a reciprocall covenant and he ought to sue the other Party for the breach of the covenant and it is a perfect bargain Dyer 30. 14. H. 8. 9. and here the Agreement is in writing and it is good albeit there be no limitation when the money shall be payd 37. H. 6. 9. Calthrop for the Defendant that the Action could not lyâ— for the contract is Executory and therefore is not to pay the money till he hath the Mannor for the Covenant is that pro Maner c. he should pay him 1200 l. and the word pro implies a condition and consideration and being excecutory on the one part shall be also executory on the other part 9. E. 4. 20. 21. Abridg. in Plowden 134. in Browning and Bestons case 15. E. 4. 4. If A. grant to B. all the ancient Pale and for them B. grants that he will make new Pale for A. if B. cannot have the old Pale he shall be excused from making the new Pale for he cannot have the one without doing the other 6. E. 6. Dyer 75. The contract was pro 20. which makes a condition 15. H. 7. 10. by Fineaux If a man covenant with me to serve me for a yeare and I covenant to give him 10 l. he shall have an Action for the 10 l. although hee do not serve me otherwise if I covenant to give him 10 l. for his service Also there is no time limited when the payment shall be made true it is that in Co. lib. 6. 30. when the act to be done is a transitory act and no time is limited there it ought to be done in convenient time but the Law shall judge of the conveniency of this time and the Law will never judge the time of payment to be before he hath the Mannor pro quo c. In many cases when no time is limited the Law will appoint a time as appeareth in 33. H. 6. 48. and Perkins 799. But now in our case the Law will never appoint that this money shall be payd because the other party hath disabled himselfe to perform his part like to Sir Anthony Maines case Co. lib. 5. 21. Doderidge The bargain is not perfect because no day of payment is limited and the other shall have no Action of Debt for the money before he hath the Mannor Jones If I covenant to make a Feoffment to J. S. and he covenant in consideration of that Covenant to pay me 10 l. he shall have an Action of Debt against me before he hath made the Feoffment And at another day in Trinity Term. 3. Car. Noy argued for the Plaintiff and opened the case thus Amongst other Covenants in certain Indentures between them it was agreed that wheras Sir R. Brown the Father was sâ—ized of the MaÌ„nor of Gadmaston with the Advowson appendent Sir R. Stroud of the MaÌ„nor of D. within the same CouÌ„ty that there
a Lease made de Burg. sine Tent. which is not good no more then in Ejectione firmae de Mess sive Tent. 2. Because the Judgement is not quod capitur as it ought to be because it is vi armis 3. The judgement is Ideo concessum est where it ought to be consideratus est and for these Errors the Judgement was reversed And the same day another Judgement between Bell and Margery Strongury was reversed for the same causes The same Term in the same Court. Petit versus Robinson IN Error to reverse a Iudgment given in C. B. in a Replevin there Jermy for the Plaintiff assigned two Errors 1. It appears that after the Writ and before the triall it was coram Justiciar Dic. Domini Regis and there was not any speech of any King but of King James before and there is no speech of his demise and therefore this shall be intended before the Iustices of King James which cannot be 2. Because the Nisi prius is certified to be tried before Francisco Harvey Mill. uno Justiciar c. the Postea returned is before Francisco Harvey Arm. argued so there was no such Iudge of Nisi prius as Francis Harvey Banks for the Defendant I conceive the first errors to be because the adjournment was per br Dom. Reg. and King James was named before so that the objection may be that it shall be intended the Writ of Adjournment of King James which cannot be but I conceive the Writ is generall and shall not be intended â—hat it can be adjourned by the Kings Writ who was dead before and the Clerk of the Assises who certified it is bound to take notice of the Kings death 37. H. 6. 28. and also the Record is not per br Dic. Dom. Regis but per br Domini Regis generally And for the second I conceive it is no error and if it be error then if the Certificate be not according to the Copy out of which the Clerke certifies it shall be amended 22. E. 4 22. 35. H. 6. 23. b. Co. lib. 8. 136. Blackmores case which is a stronger case then this But it hath been objected that the Record is certified by the Iustices and now there can be no averment to the contrary but I conceive that this Court may send to the Clark of the Assizes to amend it and those objections were over-ruled in C. B. in the same case Doderidge Iustice I conceive that notwithstanding these exceptions the Iudgement ought to be affirmed for as to the first the Court is bound to take notice of the demise of the King and therefore it shall be intended the King that now is and so the Writ of adâ—ournment good enough in Dyer King Henry 8. made a Patent and it was Eâ—ricus Dei gratia c. where it should be Henricus and yet the Patent good so in a Writ to the Bishop the subscription is Episcop Norw this is good enough for the Bishop of Norwich is very well known And for the other I conceive it is not well alledged because it is not showne whether he were a Knight at the time of the Certificate or not and so it may well stand together that he was a Knight for he might be an Esquire at the time of the triall and before the Record certified might be made Knight Jones Iustice to the same intent and that we ought to take notice of the demise of the King therefore it shall be intended of the Writ of adjournment of the King which now is and therefore it is no error and yet if it were it were amendable Whitlock Iustice agreed and therefore the Iudgement was affirmed by the whole Court The same Term in the same Court. Crabbe and his Wife versus Tooker IN Covenant betweene Walter Crabbe and Anne his Wife against Tooker the covenant upon which the breach was layd was this Tooker the Defendant covenanted with Tooker his Son and Anne Slade one of the Plaintiffs whom he intended to marry to give them their meat and drink in his house and if any discontent should happen between the Father and Son so that he and his Wife Anne should disagree to dwell with Tooker the Father then they should have 6. Beasts gates c. Tooker the Son died Anne disagree to dwell with Tooker the Father and marries with Crabbe who with hâ—s Wife Anne brings this Action and Taylor argued for the Planitiff that the Action lies for albeit the Covenant be in the conjunctive if they disagree yet it shall have a disjunctive interpretation as where a man covenant to levy a fine to one and his heirs if he dies the Covenantor may levy a fine to his Heirs and Hill and Granges case in Plow Two Tenants in common grant a rent this shall be taken for severall Rents and Co. lib. 5. Slingesbyes case also the Wife is party to this covenant and she must either have remedy upon this covenant after the death of her Husband or not at all for she cannot disagree in the life time of her Husband per que c. And it was agreed on the other side that there ought to be a dislike between all joyntly the Father the Son and the Wife and now one of them being dead the covenant is discharged like to the case put in Brudenels case Co. lib. 5. If Administration be grant during the minority of 3 if one of them dies the administration ceaseth and 31. Eliz. in C. B. A Lease was made to three and the Lessor grants to them to be dispunishable of Wast quamdiu cohabitarent one of them dies and it was resolved that now they shall be liable to wast Also the Bar is not bone for it is pleaded that Discordia orta fuit and doth not shew what manner of discord this was and therefore not good as 3 H 6. In Annuity brought Pro concilio c. he ought to shew for what manner of Councel it was Whitlock Justice was of opinion for the Plaintiff and that this Covenant extends to the Wife and that upon equall construction because it comes in place of the first Covenant and this was intended for the benefit of the Wife as well after the death of the Husband as before Jones Justice was of the contrary opinion and that the second covenant was a severall covenant from the first and that the disagreement is to be made by all three joyntly and that when one dies the Covenant is gone 2. Eliz. Dyer A man will that A. B. and C. his Feoffees shall sell his Land B. dies now the Authority is determined The Lord Gray committed the custody of his Son to four one of them dies the authority is gone and in this case there is no matter of interest but an agreement and in such a case as this is a Feme covert hath a will albeit she hath no legall will but in this case there ought to be a disagreement of both and
there ought to be a dislike of the Father also and in the Declaration it is also said that she dis-agreed Doderidge agreed with Jones that â—he Declaration is not good and that it is not warranted by the Covenant and that the breach is not well assigned The case is grounded upon the second covenant which consists upon a contingency which contingency is if there happen any discord between the Father and the Son c. the words are joynt and all ought to disagree True it is that in some cases a conjunctive shall be taken for a disjunctive but this is according to the matter and circumstances of the fact but in our case it shall not be taken disjunctively If the Father the Son and the Wife had disagreed then it is cleer that an Action of covenant lies but this is casus omissus and no provision for it Also it is only alledged in the Declaration that she disagreed whereas a mutuall disagreement between all ought to be alledged and therefore Judgement was given Quod quaerens mil. capiat per bellam But all agreed that the Wife might have boarded with Tooker the Father if she would but her new Husband could not AT thowe Sergeant took divers exceptions to an Inditement of forcible entry upon the Stat. of 8. H. 6. against Ployden and others for expelling one Syms from his Copi-hold and the principall exception was because disseisivit was not in the Inditement and in truth it cannot for albeit the Stat. of 21. Jac. cap. 15. gives power to Iudges and Iustices of Peace to give restitution of possession to Tenants for yeares and Copy-holders in which there shal be an entry or detainer by force yet the Stat. does not give an Inditement of forcible entry of copy-hold Noy a Copy-holder shal now have an Iditement of forcible entry but disseisivit shal not be in it for no Iury will find that because it is not possible because a Copy-holder hath no Frée-hold and yet a Copy-holder shall have a Plaint in nature of an Assize against a stranger but not against the Lord And at last the opinion of the Court was that the Inditement was good UPon a Capias directed to the Sheriff of London to take the body of J. S. the Capias was returnable die Jovis which was the day of All-souls and thereupon the Sheriff took the party but he returned that because the return of the Writ was upon a day that was not Dies Juridicus he suffered the party to go at large And the return was holden insufficient for by Doderidge the Writ was good and the taking and detaining of the party by vertue thereof was lawfull but yet he could not have the party there at the sayd day and therefore the Sheriff was compelled to bring the party into Court which the same day he did accordingly The same Term in the same Court A Man granted a Rent charge of 12 l. to one of his Sons out of the Mannor of D. by Déed and died the Grantée lost his Deed the Land is extended to I. D. by vertue of a Recognizance acknowledged by the eldest Son of the Grantor the Grantée sue for his Annuity before the Councell of York to be relieved in equity for that in respect of the losse of the Déed he could not have remedy at the common-Law and J. D. the Conuzée obtained a prohibition out of this Court upon this surmize that although the Councel of York should make a Decree that he should pay the said Annuity yet it should be no discharge for so much against the Conuzor because their Decrée was no legall eviction Now came Smith of the Temple and prayed a Precedendo for the Grantée to the Councel of York and the opinion of the whole Court was that a Decrée there being no legall eviction shall not be a discharge for so much against the Conuzor Doderidge the Grantée of the Rent-charge having now lost his Déed can have no remedy in equity for in this case Equitas sequitur legem and of the same opinion were Jones and Whitlock but by Doderidge which was not denied if the Grantee had lost the Deed by a casuall losse as by firâ— c. in such a case he shall have remedy in equity and he sayd that in the beginning of King James when Egerton was Lord Chancellor there was such a Case in Chancery A Grantee of a rent-seck had seisen of it so that he might have an assize and he devised it to J. S. the Devisée sued in Chancery to have his Rent and seizen of it and he could have no remedy for it in Chancery And this was one Malleryes case The same Term in the same Court ONe Hebborne was indited for stopping a way c. and it was mooved that the inditement was insufficient because it is not layd that it was communis via but only that it was a way to the Church and per Curiam it was good enough and by Jones Iustice the Inditement is good enough although there wants vi armis because he who is supposed to stop the way is owner of the Land The same Term in the same Court AN Action upon the Case upon a promise was brought in the Town of Northampton and the Consideration alledged was that if the Defendant here in the Writ of Errour would discharge Bagnot of Execution c. that then the Plaintiff here in this Writ of Errour promised to pay him eleven pounds and there the Defendant pleaded quod exoneravit illum de Executione relaxavit And Bolstred for the Plaintiffe moved this for Errours that the Plaintiffe in the inferiour Court did not shew by what manner of release it was nor that it was by writing for this being the Consideration upon which the Action is grounded ought to be put in certain Mich. 15. Iac. Staple and King Execution of a consideration ought to be shown 35 H. 6. 19. a discharge ought to be shown in certain 22 E. 4. 43. the Lord Lisles Case and Mich. 16. Iac. in this Court Liverel and Rivets Case which was entred Trin. 16. Iac. Rot. 32â— in an Action upon the Case upon a promise upon issue joyned it was found for the Plaintiffe and it was moved in arrest of Judgement because the Consideration was that the Plaintiffe should discharge one Ogle and he declares that he did discharge him and thereupon he brought this Action and because he declared but generally quod exoneravit the Judgement for that very cause was stayed and 36 Eliz. one covenanted to make an assurance and pleaded generally that he had assured and resolved that it was not good and in Rosse and Harvies Case this Term which was entred Trin. 2 Car. Rot. 1408. In Covenant the Defendant covenanted to give security the Defendant pleaded that he offered security and resolved that it was not good per que c. Jermy for the Defendant that the plea is good enough for a Release by Peroll is sufficient I
that it was good enough for although it were a joynt command yet the parties commanding having severall titles it shall be taken as severall commands reddendo singula singulis and for the third it is good enough being in a Plea otherwise if it had been in a Writ But for the second Exception the bar is not good enough because incertain so that although upon other Exceptions moved by the Defendant the Replication of the Plaintiff was not good yet the Defendants Bar being ill the Plaintiff shall have Iudgement upon tâ—e Declaration And the Plaintiff had Iudgement accordingly The same Term in the same Court Risley versus Hains IN an Action upon the Case upon an assumpsit the Plaintiffe declared upon the Sale of several parcells of Tobacco to wit for one parcell so much for another parcell so much and so forward and in the Conclusion he saith quae quidem separales summae in toto se attingunt to 55. l. which being computed is lesse then the pariculars and upon non assumpsit it was found for the Plaintiffe and now Andrewes moved in arrest of Judgement for that the particulars and the summing up of them differs and this being in a Declaration which ought to contain truth it is not good and so there appears to be no cause of action 35. H. 8. Dyer 55. And Grices Case in the very point Mich. 17. Jac. in this Court but by Jones and Whitlock Iustices onely present the Declaration is good enough for there is a particular promise for every parcell and the summing up of particulars is only surplusage and officiousness of the Clark therefore the Iudgement was affirmed And nota that Jones said obiter in this Case that upon a contract the Party to whom payment is to be made need not make request and afterwards it was agreed by the whole Court that it should be amended otherwise it had been more The same Term in the same Court A Great multitude of Welsh-men were Indited for the death of a man by an Inquisition taken before the Coroner in the County of Mountgomery in Wales and Littleton of Councel with the Welsh-men took some Exceptions to the Inquisition as 1. That the Coroner cannot take any Inquest unlesse it be super visum corporis and to this purpose he cited Britton 6. Ric. 2. Coron 107. 21. E. 4. 70. 2. Ric. 3. 2. This also is the reason that if a man drown himselfe and cannot be found the Coroner cannot enquire of the death of this man but for the King to have a forfeiture of his Goods an Inquisition ought to be taken before the Iustices of Peace as it was resolved in this Court Trin. 13. Jac. upon which the first exception was that the Inquisition was taken at D. in the time of King James super visum corporis in D. in the time of this King and for this he cited two presidents out of Cookes Booke of Eâ—tryes Another Exception was because the Inquisition was per Sacramentum probor legal hominum Com. predict whereas by the Stat. of 4. E. 1. this inquest ought to be by men of the four Towns next adjoyning and this ought to appear in the Inditement also Hill 10. Jac. Rot. 3. Co. lib. Intr. 354. And day was given to the Attorney General to maintain this Inquisition But afterwards Pasch 3. Car. the Inditement was quashed especially for the first exception The same Term in the same Court King versus Merrick In an Action upon the Case for these words I charge you King with Felony and you Constable inuendo Thomas Legat to apprehend him And a verdict for the Plaintiff It was moved in arrest of Iudgement by Bacon that the words are not actionable The first words are not because they are not an expresse affirmation and for this he cited Mich. 11. Jac. in this Court Powel and Bauds case where an action was brought for these words I have arrested Powel of Felony for stealing sheep of mine and adjudged not actionable Also the Plaintiff did not shew in his Declaration what kinde of felony this was and it may be such a felony for which an Action will not lie for there are divers kinds of felony and a Mayhem is one kind as appears in 40. Ass Pl. 4. 6. H. 7. 1 and in this case it shall be taken in mitiori sensu and it shall not be intended such a felony for which he may be hanged If one charge another with felony because he hath committed a Mayhem it is cleer that an action will not lye And the other words I charge you Constable to apprehend him are not actionable and the words are onely spoken to the Plaintiff Also the words are layd to be spoken in London and it appears that the Constable was of a Town in Norfolk who cannot apprehend any one in London Earle for the Plaintiff It hath been argued that the words are not actionable because felony is a generall word and contains in it selfe a mayhem also But I conceive that in this case felony shall be taken according to the general and common acceptation which is such a Felony for which a man may loose his life and for this he cited Co. lib. 4. 15. b. Yeomans charged Hext for my ground in Allerton Hext seeks my life and if I could find Iohn Silver I do not doubt but within two dayes to arrest him upon suspition of Felony and it was adjudged that for the last words the Action lies because he shall be imprisoned for suspition of felony and felony is there taken according to the common acceptation of the word It hath been objected that there is no expresse affirmation of the Felony but I conceive that there is 39. Eliz. Action was brought for these words I will call him in question for poysoning my Aunt and adjudged that it lyes and Mich. 37. and 38. Eliz. Woodrofe and Vaughans case for these words I did not know Mr. Woodrofe was your Brother I will prove him perjured or else I will bear his charges and adjudged actionable And Hill 44. Eliz. Rot. 351. This man inuendo Iohn Latham hath cut my Wives purse and his Father knowing of it received it of him and the Money and Rings theein and therefore I charge him of flat Felony and resolved that for these words did cut my Wife's purse no action lies for the cutting of ones purse only is not felony unlesse it be taken from the person and to receive one is not Felony but resolved that the last words were actionoble and then it was agreed that if one say that I. S. did see such a one that had committed felony and did suffer him to slip away I charge him of Felony these words are not actionable and Mich. 20. Jac. in this Court that these words beare witnesse I arrest him of felony are actionable and therefore he prayeâ— judgement for the Plaintiff Doderidge Iustice the words are not actionable And Hexts case comes not to this
case for there by the word Felony it was manifest what Felony he intended by the circumstances of the speech to wit that he ment such felony for which he might lose his life But the words here being generall of Felony it may be intended as well of a Mayhem aâ— of any other Felony for in an appeal of Mayhem he is arraigned as Felo Domici Regis 40. Ass and the other case of 44. Eliz. I do arrest him of flat Felony is not consonant with the reason of this case for there by the arrest his liberty is taken away but in this case there is no restraint and it is very hard to make these cases agree together for words are as variable as the faces of men c. Jones Justice agreed and he took it for a generall rule that where words carry a double sense and there is nothing to guide the sense more one way then another there the words are not actionable for finis est legis dirimire lites And therefore if one faith of another that he hath the Pox because the sense is ambiguous it shâ—ll be interpreted in mitiori sensu and therefore the words are not actionable to if one sayes of another that he hath stolen his Apples or his Corn because they may be Apples from the tree or Corn in the field the taking whereof is no felony but it was adjudged in the Common-Pleas when I was there that these words viz. Thou art a Thief and hast stolen my Corn are actionable by reason of the addition of the word Thiefe So that the speaking of words of a double sense are not actionable unlesse ex antecedentibus or consequentibus it can be collected that the words were spoken in pejori sensu Then the words in this case I charge you with Felony peradventure intend such a Felony for which he shall recover damages only which is Mayhem and therefore no action will lie These words Thou art forsworn are not actionable because forswearing may be in ordinary communication or in a Court of Justice and it shall be taken in mitiori sensu but if he sayes Thou art forsworn in a Court of Record it is actionable and if in this case he had charged him with Felony and sayd further that he had stolen c. they would have been actionable but here he only charges him with Felony which is an ambiguous word and also it is no direct affirmation and therefore not actionable and Iudgement was given Quod quaerens nil capiat per Billam The same Term in the same Court Goods Case GOod and his Wife brought a Writ of Error upon a Judgement given in the Court of the Castle of Windsor in an Action of Debt there which was entered Trin. Mich. 2 Car. Rot. 119. 120. and two Errors were assigned 1. Because the Judgement there is given in these words ideo consideratum ad judicatum assessum est whereas it ought to be onely by the word consideratum and the Judgement being the act of the Court the Law is precise in it and therefore it hath been resolved that a Judgement given by the word concessum is not good but it ought to be by the word consideratum 2. The costs ex incremento are not said to be given ad petitionem quaerentis aâ— it ought to be for beneficium nemini obt ruditur and therefore it hath been resolved in this Court that an alien born shall not have medietatem linguae if he does not request it and as to this it was answered of the other side that costs ought alwayes to be assâ—ssed ex petitione quaerentis and albeit here the request of the Plaintiff was not precisely put to increase of the costs yet at the beginning of the Judgement it is said Ideo ad petitionem quaerentis consâ—â—eratum c. And that costs shall be given ex in cremento so that this request goes to all the Sentence and by the unanimous opinion of all the Court the Judgement was reversed for both the Errourrs for 1. Ideo considerat adjudicat c. is not good the Judgement being the Act of the Court and the Law hath appointed in what words it shall be given and if other words should be suffered great incertainty and confusion would ensue and needâ—esse verbosity is the mother of difficulty 2. The increase of costs ought to be given ad petitionem quaerentis and the words ad petitionem quaerentis being misplaced will not supply this defect and Dammages ex incremento is alwayes given ad petitionem quaerent for as Bracton saith Omne judicium est trinus actus trium personarum judicis actoris rei and if in this case the usuall form should not be observed all would be in a confusion and in as much as the words are misplaced it is as if they had not been put in at all and therefore void like to a case put in Walsinghams case in Plowden where an averrement misplaced is as if there were none In this case the Judgement was reversed and Trin. 3 Car. in B. B. intr Hill 2 Car. Rot 849. a judgement was reversed because it was Ideo concessum consideratum est FINIS THE TABLE OF THE PRINCIPALL MATERS Contained in this BOOK A. ACceptance 113 Of a second Lease determines the first 9 Action 179 Where the Master shall be charged in an Action for the act of the Servant e contr 143 Action upon the case for words 35 36. 139. 140. 128 129. 148. 150. 177. 180. 184. 187. 207. 210. Action upon the case 116. 144. for pulling down a house 15 Against an Officer for his neglect 27 For laying too much waight wherby goods in another mans possession are lost 46 For stopping of a Water-course 166 Accessaries 107 Adjournment 33 Administration  not avoided by Averment 37. granted by a Lay-man 160 Administrators  Of the Wise shall have a Lease setled on the Wife not the Husband 106 Admittance 125 What the Heir may do before admittance 39 upon a surrender by a Disseisor 71 Addition  Of matter of Ornament shall not avoid a grant 57 Advowson 23 Agreement 134 construed according to the intention of the parties 182 Where to be joynt where severall 204 Alien  Where he may purchase where not 36 Amendment 21. 128. 203 204. Of the Postea and made according to the Pannel and the Record 102 Of a Record after the Record removed and Errour assigned 196 Annuity 87. 86 Pro consilio 135 Appropriation 144 145 Appeal  Of Mayhme 115 Plea in it 115 Assesment  by the major part of Parishoners shall bind the rest 197 Assumpsit 148. 182 183. 193. 206 against an Executor of an Assumpsit in the life of the Testator 30 31 32. generall indebitat Assumpsit 31 without consideration is nudum pactum 178 What shal be a good consideration to ground Assumpsit 183 184. Assise 111. Assets where a Lease for years to a Copyholder in the hand of
REPORTS AND CASES COLLECTED BY THE LEARNED SIR JOHN POPHAM KNIGHT Late LORD chief-CHIEF-JUSTICE OF ENGLAND Written with his own hand in French and novv faithfully Translated into English To which are added some Remarkable CASES Reported by other Learned Pens since his death With an Alphabeticall Table wherein may be found the Principall Matters contained in this Booke LONDON Printed by Tho Roycroft for John Place and are to be sold at his Shop at Furnivals Inne Gate in Holborn 1656. TO THE READER Courteous Reader ALbeit the name of the Compiler of the greatest part of the ensuing REPORTS for Denominatio fit a parte majori meliori would be a sufficient invitation to any understanding Reader not only to cast his Eye upon but seriously to peruse them yet because these two Questions may and no doubt will and that upon good ground be made as 1. Why they should lye so long in private hands vvithout being exposed to the publique vievv 2. Why they should be now Printed To the first I answer That by the handsome composure and connexion of them it may and that very probably be conjectured that the honourable Compiler at first intended them for the publique but they after his death comming into private hands they who became possessors of them did rather intend their owne and their friends private knowledge and advantage by them then to let others communicate therein for it hath not formerly been neither yet is a thing unusuall for the great and learned Professors of the Law to ingrosse into their owne hands the best and most authentick REPORTS for their better help credit and advantage in the course of their practise which being unknown to other men they cannot upon sudden occasions be ready to make answer thereunto and that might be the reason why they have not been as yet published To the second I answer that the Copy out of which this Translation was made comming out of the Library of a reverend and Learned Sergeant at Law now deceased and said therin to be written with the proper hand-writing of the Lord POPHAM a good ground to conceive that it was Authentick the Gentleman in whose hands it was was earnestly importuned for the Copy that so it might be made publique to whose importunity there was at last a condâ—ssention so as such due care might be taken both in the Translation and Printing as not to prejudice the Author or the matter therein contained And whether that condition be fully performed shall be now left to the candid interpretation of the judicious Reader who cannot but know that some Errata's let the Printer or Correcter be never so carefull will follow the Presse but it is hoped that nothing materiall or substantiall is committed or omitted to the prejudice of the Work or of the Compiler thereof There is an addition of some later Cases in the time of King JAMES and the late King CHARLES which were taken by judicious Pens as will evidently appear by the Cases themselves and I dare say that whoever reads them will neither think his Time or Money mispent they being such as are well digested and very practicall I shall adde this one thing more that the principall end of this Edition is the advancement of knovvledge and to impart the good thereof to those who heretofore vvanted vvhat is hereby made publick vvhich may peradventure be a means to invite others more learned to publish other things of the like nature for the benefit of Students and Professors of the Lavv. THE NAMES OF THE PRINCIPALL CASES and other CASES vouched in this BOOKE P. Stands for Principall Case B. Stands for Avouched Case A Â fol. ARton and Hares case 97p Arthur Johnsons case 106p Austins case 183b Arnold and Dichtons case 183p Austen and Monks case 186p Audâ—ey and Joices case 176b Abbingtons case 196b Arrunstels case 201b B LOrd Burleighs case 26b Bullock and Diblers case 38p Burtons and Wrightmans case 56p Baynes case 84p Butler and Bakers case 87p Burtons case 100p Baskervill and Brooks case 132p Brett and Cumberlands case 136p Bennet and Westbechs case 137p Sir Baptist Hixe case 130p Bernard and Beales case 146p Brabin and Tradurus case 140p Blaxton and Heaths case 145p Sir John Bingleys case 147p Bowyer and Rivets case 153p Bowry and Wallingtons case 159p Block and Harris case 168b Brole and Michels case 173b Bidles case 179b Sir William Burtons case 180p Beven and Cowlings case 183p Barker and Ringroses case 184p Buffeild and Byburos case 188p Brokesbyes case 189b Brookes case 125p Sir Robert Browne and Sir Robert Strowds case 198p Bell and Stranguryes case 203b Bagnols case 206p C CRocker and Dormars case 22p Caesar and Curtines case 35p Callard and Callards case 47p Cawdry and Attons case 59p Case of Armes 1â—1p Cowper and Smiths case 128p Lord Chandos and Scullers case 145b Constable and Cloberys case 161p Challoner and Mores case 167b Chamberlains case 185b Calf and Neiols case 185p Cadmor and Hildersons case 186b Chambers case 202p Crab and Tookers case 204p Caryes case 207p D DAcres and Culpeppers case 19b Davies and Gardiners case 36p Dillon and Fraines case 70p Dabridgcourts case 85b Dickenson and Greenhows case 156p Day and Drakes case 170b Dabborn and Martins case 177p Drope and Theyars case 178p Dickar and Molands case 200p Desmond and Johnsons case 201b E EArl of Bedfords case against Russell 3p Sir Francis Englesfields case 18p Edwards and Halinders case 46p Earl of Shrewsbury and Sir Tho. Stanhops case 66p Eton and Monnys case 98p Everets case 107p Earl of Pembroke against Sir Henry Barkley 116p Earl of Shrewsburys case 132p Earl of Northumberland and Dewels case 141p Empson and Bathirsts case 176b F FEnner and Fishers case 1p Sir Moile Finches case 2â—p Forth and Halboroughs case 39p Finch and Riseleys case 53p Sir Moile Finch and Frogmortons case 53b Fulwood and Wards case 86p Fennors case 109p Fulcher and Griffins case 140p Foster and Taylors case 196p G GIbbons and Maltyards case 6p Gravener and Brookes case 32p Geilles and Rigewayes case 41p Greenhingham Heydons case 98p Goodale and Wyats case 99p Glover and Humbles case 120b Gouldwels case 131p Godfrey and Owens case 148p Gilbert and Hoptons case 152p Gores case 173b Goodwin and Willoughbys case 177p Giffords case 186b Goldsmith and Goodwyns case 186b Sir Henry Gemhams case 144p Goods case 211p H HUnt Gotelers case 5p Hayes Allens case 13p Haycock Warnfords case 24p Hughes Robothams case 30p Humble and Olivers case 55p Halâ— Pearts case 60p Harry and Farceys case 61p Sir Rowland Heywards case 95p Herbin Chards case 96p Hall Arrowsmiths case 105p Holme Gees case 112p Havengate Hares case 126. 147p Harlo Wards case 127b Hare Brickleys case 128b Hide and Whistlers case 146p Hodges and Mores case 164p Hemdon and Crowches case 167b Holcome and Evans case 169b Hobs and Tadcasters case 186b Hord Paramours case 201b Higgs case 201b
Harrison Erringtons case 202p Hebborns case 206p I JEne and Chesters case 151p Jenningâ— Maystâ—â—â— case 102b Jorden Ayliffs case 168b Jenkin and Vivians case 201p K. Kettle and Masons Case 50p King and Berys Case 57p Kellies Case 104p Kirton and Hoxtons case 115p The King and Brigs case 150p Kebles case 18â—b Knights case 187b King Merricks case 2o L Lee and Browns case 128p Lewes and Jeofferies case 153p Lemasons and Dicksons case 189p Laurking and Wylds case 126p Leechford and Saunders case 194b Liverel and Rivets case 206b Lathams case 210b M MIchels case 8b Morgans case 52p Morgan and Tadcastles case 55p Montague and Jeofferies case 108p Mounson and Wests case 110p May and Kets case 129p Middletons case 131p May and Samuels case 134p Mingies case 135p Sir Arthur Mannarings case 145p Morley and Sir Richard Molineuxs case 1â—5p Millen and Fandries case 161p March and Fandries case 161p March and Newmans case 163p Mayor of Maidstons case 180p Mills and Parsons case 199b O OAks and the Lord Sturtonrs case 65b Overton and Sydalls case 120p Old and Estgreens case 160b Owen Wards case 187b P PIgots case 94p Porramor and Veralds case 101p Pollard and Lutterells case 108p Sir John Pools case 128p Powels case 139p Pack and Metholds case 160p Probe and Maynes case 192b Petit and Robinsons case 203p Ployden and Symes case 205p R ROper and Ropers case 106b Robinson Walkers case 127p Rawlinson and Greens case 127p Rones case 133p Richardson and Cabells case 142p Sir George Reynalds case 165p Ryman and Bickleys case 129p Reynor and Hallets case 187p Rochester and Rickhouse case 203p Rosse and Harvies case 206b Risley and Hains case 209p S STocks case 37p Smiths case 53p Southwell and Wards case 91p Sawyer and Hardies case 99p Stainings case 102p Scot and Mainys case 109p Strowd and Wyllis case 114p Southern and Howes case 143p Silvesters case 148p Stone and Withipoles case 152p Sary and Pigots case 166p Sharp and Rasts case 181p Snaggs case 187b Sherry and Richardsons case 15p Smithers case 169b Scheverel Dales case 193p Sanders Meritors case 200p Staple Kings case 206b Savile Wortleys case 207p Sparman Sherwoods case 222p T THompson Traffords case 8p Taunton Raries case 106p Tailours case 133p Thurman Coopers case 188p Talbot and Sir Walters Lacens case 146p Turner and Dennis case 169 V VAughans case 134p W WOod and Downings case 10p Webly and Skinners case 85p Wood and Matthews case 102p Westcot and Cottons case 130p Wrenhams case 135p Wootton and Byes case 136p Wards case 144p Webb and Paternosters case 151p Westermans case 151p Wales case 160p Welden and Bâ—sies case  Wicks case 186b Williams and Vaughans case 186b Willers case 197b Whelhorseys case 208p Woodroof and Vaughans case 210q CASES Reported by S R. JOHN POPHAM Knight Lord chief Justice of ENGLAND In the time of Queen ELIZABETH and written with his own hand in French and now faithfully done into English to which are added some remarkable CASES Reported by other Learned and Judicious Pens since his death Fenner versus Fisher Mich. 34. and 35. Eliz. Reginae in the Kings Bench IN Trespasse brought by Iustice Fenner against Andrew Fisher for a Trespasse done in the Parsonage house of Cravfords in the County of Kent 30. Maij 34. of the Queen the Defendant pleaded that one 〈…〉 was seised of the same Messuage in his Demesne as of see and being so seised the 〈…〉 day of in the same year did demise it to the Defendant for two years from such a Feast then last past by virtue of which he entred and was possessed untill the Plaintiff claiming by colour of a Deed made of the sayd Wrighâ— where nothing passed by the Deed upon which the Defendant entred c. The Plaintiff replies by protestation that the sayd Wrighâ— was not seised as the Defendant hath alledged And for Plea saith that the sayd Wright did not let it to the Defendant as the Defendant hath alledged upon which being at Issue and found for the Plaintif Ackinson moved that Iudgment ought not to be given for the plaintiff because that he hath not made any Title by his Replication for by 9 E. 4. 49. In Trespasse the Defendant pleads in Bar and gives colour to the Plaintiff it is taken for a Rule that the Plaintiff ought to make Title Cook answered that he needs not to make Title in this case but that it sufficeth to traverse the Bar without making a Title and sayd that in 22 E. 4. Fitzh Trespass It is adjudged that in Trespasse the Plaintiff may traverse the Bar without making Title in his Replication and here in as much as it is acknowledged by the Defendant that Wright did demise it to the Plaintiff and that this is a Lease ta will at the least not defeated by his own shewing but by the Lease made to Defendant this being traversed and found against the Defendant The Plaintiff by the acknowledgment of the Defendant himself hath a good Title against him to enter into the Land and by it the Defendant by his Re-entry is become Trespassâ—â— to the Plaintiff and he sayd that in 2 E. 4. fol. In Trespasse where the Defendant pleads that he let the Land to the Plaintiff for another mans life and that he for whose life it was was dead upon which he entred and it is adjudged that it sufficeth for the Plaintiff to maintain that Cestuy vie was yet living without making any other Title And yet these reasons Cleoch and Gawdy held the Replication good to which Popham sayd that we as Iustices ought not to adjudge for the Plaintif where a good formall bar is pleaded as here it is But wherby the Record it self which is before us we cannot see that the Plaintiff hath good cause of Action And therefore I agree that in Trespasse in some cases the Plaintiff may traverse the Bar or part of it without making any other Title then that which is acknowledged to the Plaintiff by the Bar but this alwaies ought to be where a Title is acknowledged to the Plaintiff by the Bar and by another means destroy by the same Bar for there it sufficeth the Plaintiff to traverse that part of the Bar which goeth to the destruction of the Title of the Plaintiff comprised in the Bar without making any other Title but if hee will traverse any other part of the Bar he cannot do it without making an especiall Title to himself in his Replication where by the Bar the first possession appeareth to be in the Defendant because that although the Traverse there be found for the Plaintiff yet notwithstanding by the Record in such a Case the first Possessions will yet appear to be in the Defendant which sufficeth to maintain his Regresse upon the Plaintiff and therefore the Court hath no matter before them in such a Case to adjudge for the Plaintiff unlesse in cases
and also in pleading he ought to aver the life of the Lessee or otherwise the contents of the thing according to the limitation But where that which was the Limitation cometh by a Proviso after the Habendum which distinguisheth the sentence as here there because it it is a matter distinct and subsequent from the Habendum and not annered to it he need not to speak of it but there it shall alwaies come in to be shewn of the other part and this is the usuall and common case of difference for pleading but this makes no difference of the Estate And therfore if an Obligation be made with a Condition endorsed the Plaintiff in debt upon it doth not speak of the Condition in his Count but if the Condition be precedent or stands comprised within the body of the Obligation then he ought to speak of it in his Count as appeareth by 28 H. 8. where a man was bound in twenty quarters of Malt to be paid at such a day and if he fail that he shall pay forty quarters at such a day if he demand the forty quarters in his count he ought to shew the default of payment of the twenty quarters at the day limited for it and yet the Condition that is out of and that which is comprehended within the Obligation are but as one for the substance but for the form it differs as to the pleading which form ought to be observed Another reason is in this case because that the payment of the Rent is limited to â—â— made at the receit of the Exchequer in which case if it had been 〈…〉 had been entred of Record and not being so the default appeareth oâ— Record and where the default appeareth of Record there needs no Office for â—â— shall be in vain to make that to appear upon Record by Office which 〈◊〉 appeareth of it self by Record and therfore in 4. and 5. 〈…〉 Mary it appeareth where Sir John Savage was Sheriff of the 〈…〉 Fee and that he was indited of two severall voluntary 〈…〉 and for not keeping of his Turn in loco consueto upon two 〈…〉 removed into the Kings Bench in 8 H. 8. upon the motion of the 〈…〉 generall the Office was seised into the Kings hand without Scire facias or any Inquisition found therof and as appeareth 3 Eliz. One Bâ—ake who by Patent was the Kings Remembrancer in the Exchequer being made one of the Bâ—rons of the same Exchequer the other Office was ipso facto â—one and determined there need no inquisition to be made of it nor Scire facias to avoid it because the taking of the Office of a Baron is of Record And a man cannot be a Iudge and a Minister in one and the same Court and therfore the first Office is determined by taking of the second and there need no Office to be found of it the matter it self being apparant upon Record and therfore as it appeareth it was adjudged in 13 H. 8. that a new Patent of the same Office of Remembrancer making recitall of the former Patent which appeared as before upon Record to be void with a clause Quod post mortem sive determinationem c. therof the new Grant shall take effect was void And Englefields case was lately adjudged in the Exchequer and at the Parliament 35 Eliz. allowed to be good Law by all the Iustices there being where the Queen had a Condition given to her by forfeiture upon an Attainder of Treason to be performed by the payment of a summ of money or the like If the Queen makes a Warrant by Patent to one to perform the Condition and to return his proceedings therupon into the Exchequer who performs it accordingly and therupon returns all that he hath done with his Warrant into the Exchequer no Office need to be found of the performance of the Condition because that by the return which is warranted by the Patent the Condition appeareth sufficiently upon Record to be performed and therfore no Office need to be found no more of the not-payment in this case It hath been said by some that it may be that the Patentee hath tendred the Rent at the receit and that they would not receive or record the receit of it and that then it should be hard that he should loose his Lease no default being in him to which I say suppose a man be bound to make his appearance in any of the Kings Courts may he say that he appeared there according to the Obligation excuse himself by such bare averment therof unlesse his appearance be entred of Record It is cleer that he cannot as appeareth by 18 E. 4. for appearance in a Court of Record is not unlesse it be of Record yet it may be said that then the case may be had to the party as if the Officer will not record his appearance which is the same mischief as in this case but this will not help him for first the Law presumes that every Officer wil be indifferent betwixt party and party and upon this opinion had of him he is admitted to his Office wherupon the Law presumes that if the party would have appeared that the Officer would have recorded it and in as much as he did not do it it shall be taken that he did not appear But the strongest reason in the case is this to wit if default be not in the party to do that which he ought to do but in the Officer to do that which belongeth to his Office as to record that which he ought to record there the Officer shall be chargable to the party in an Action upon the case to answer him so much in Damages as he hath sustained by such default of the Officer and the Law will put the party rather to such a recovery then to answer it by a bare matter of averment which ought to be of Record And further such a voluntary default may be a forfeiture of his Office and so a sufficient penalty in case of an Officer And to say that the Office of Receit is not an Office of Record is too absurd for it is a principall member and part of the Court of Exchequer and as wel of Record for the matters belonging to it as the Offices of the Pipe and Remembrancers are for those things which belong to them and the Records of Receit as well inrolled in Rolls of Parchment as any other Records of the Queen in this or any other Court it is commonly used now to convey Reversions Remainders to the Queen with a Proviso to be void upon payment of a certain sum of mony to the Queen at the receit of the Exchequer it is as usual upon payment made there to have it back again without office found of this paym and what is the reason of it now but because the paym there is alwaies entred upon Record therfore no Office needs make this paym to appear upon Record And
such Estates that the Law allows them to be good against the Lords themselves they performing their Customs and Services and therfore are more commonly guided by the guides and rules of the common Law and therfore as appeareth in Dyer Tr. 12. Eliz. Possessio fratris of such an Estate facit sororem esse haeredem And to say that Estates of Copyhold Land are not warranted but by custom and every Custom lies in Vsage and without Vsage a Custom cannot be is true but in the Vsage of the greater the lesser is alwaies implyed As by Vsage three lives have been alwaies granted by Copy of Court Roll but never within memory two or one alone yet the grant of one or two lives only is warranted by this Custom for the use of the greater number warrants the lesser number of lives but not è converso And so Fee-simples upon a Limitation or Estates in tail are warranted by the equity of the Statute because they are lesser Estates then are warranted by the Custom and these lesser are implyed as before in the greater and none will doubt but that in this case the Lord may make a Demise for life the Remainder over in Fee and it is well warranted by the Custom and therfore it seems to them that it is a good Estate tail to John Gravenor and a good Remainder over to Henry his Brother and if so it follows that the Plaintiff hath a good Title to the Land and that Iudgment ought to be given for him And for the dying seised of Elizabeth they did not regard it for she cannot dye seised of it as a Copyholder for she had no right to be Copyholder of it And by the dying seised of a Copyholder at common Law it shall be no prejudice to him who hath right for he may enter But here in as much as she cometh in by admittance of the Lord at the Court her Occupation cannot be fortious to him and therfore no descent at common Law by her dying seised for it was but as an Occupation at Will But if it shall not be an Estate tail in John Gravenor as they conceive strongly it is yet for the other causes alledged by Gawdy and Clench Iudgment ought to be given for the Plaintiff and the Remainder which is not good shall not prejudice the Fee-simple conditionall granted to John which is no more then if the Surrender had been to the use of Iohn Gravenor and his Heirs the Remainder over because that we as Iudges see that this cannot be good by Law and therfore not to be compared to the case where the Custom warrants but one life and the Lord grants two joyntly or successively there both the one and the other is void And this is true because the custom is the cause that it was void and not the Law and also it is a larger Estate then the Custom warrants which is not here and upon this Iudgment was given that the Plaintiff shall recover And by Popham it hath been used and that upon good advice in some Maâ—nors to bar such Estates tails by a common Recovery prosecuted in the Lords Court upon a Plaint in nature of a Writ of Entry in the Post 2. JUlius Cesar Iudge of the Admiralty Court brought an Action upon the Case for a Slander against Philip Curtine a Merchant-stranger for saying that the said Cesar had given a corrupt Sentence And upon not guilty pleaded and 200. marks Damages given it was alledged in arrest of Iudgment where it was tryed by Nisi prius at the Guildhall by a partiall Inquest because that upon the default of strangers one being challenged and tryed out a Tales was awarded De circumstantibus by the Iustice of Nisi prius wheras as was alledged a Tale could not have been granted in this case for the Statute of 35 H. 8 cap. 6. which give the Tales is to be intended but of commontryals of English for the Statute speaks at the beginning but of such Iuries which by the Law eught to have 40 s. of Free-hold and wills that in such cases the Venire facias ought to have this clause Quorum quilibet habeat 40 s. in terris c. which cannot be intended of Aliens which cannot have Free-hold And it goes further that upon default of Iurors the Iustices have authority at the Prayer of the Plaintiff or Defendant to command the Sheriff or other Minister to whom it appertaineth to make a return of such other able persons of the said County then present at the same Assises or Nisi prius which shall make a full Iury c. which cannot be intended of Aliens but of Subjects and therfore shall be of tryals which are onely of English and not of this Inquest which was part of Aliens And further the Tales was awarded only of Aliens as was alledged on the Defendants part but in this point it was a mistake for the Tales was awarded generally de circumstantibus which ought alwaies to be of such as the principall Pannell was But Per Curiam the exceptions were disallowed for albeit the Statute is as hath been said yet when the Statute comes to this clause which gives that a Tales may be granted by the Iustices of Nisi prius and is generally referred to the former part of the Act for it is added Furthermore be it enacted that upon every first Writ of Habeas Corpora or Distringas with a Nisi prius c. the Sheriff c. shall return upon every Juror 5 s. Issues at the least c which is generall of all And then it goes further And wills that in every such Writ oâ— Habeas Corpora or Distringas with a Nisi prius where a full Jury doth not appear before the Justices of Assise or Nisi prius that they have power to command the Sheriff or other Minister to whom it appertains to nominate such other persons as before which is generall in all places where a Nisi prius is granted and therfore this is not excepted neither by the Letter nor intent of the Law And where it is said such persons by it is to be intended such as the first which shall be of Aliens as well as English where the case requires it for expedition was as requisite in cases for or against them as if it were between other persons And Aliens may well be of the County or place where the Nisi prius is to be taken and may be there for although an Alien cannot purchâ—se Land of an Estate of Free-hold within the Realm yet he may have a house for habitation within it for the time that he is there albeit he be no Denison but be to remain there for Merchandise or the like And by Gawdy where the default was only of strangers the Tales might have been awarded only of Aliens as where a thing is to be tryed by Inquest within two Counties and those of the one County appear but not those of the other the
Defendant had nothing to do there the Defendant shall be excused But here it is expresly alledged that it fell by the weight put upon it which ought to be answered As if a man take an Estate for life or years in a ruinous house if he pull it down he shall be charged in Wast but if it fall of it self he shall be excused in Wast so there is a diversity where default is in the party and where not so here the Defendant ought to have taken good care that he did not put upon such a ruinous floor more then it might well bear if it would not bear any thing he ought not to put any thing into it to the prejudice of a third person and if he does he shall answer to the party his damages Collard versus Collard 5. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Constantine Collard against Richard Collard the case appeared to be this Thomas Collard was seised in his Demesne as of Fee of Lands in Winkle in the County of Devon called the Barton of Southcote And having two Sons to wit Eustace the eldest and Richard the now Defendant the youngest and the eldest being to be married the said Thomas in consideration of this marriage being upon the said Barton said these words Eustace stand forth I do here reserving an Estate for my own life and my wives life give unto thee and thy Heirs for ever these my Lands and Barton of Southcote after which the said Thomas enfeoffed his youngest Son of Barton with warranty from him and his Heirs the eldest Son enter and let it to the Plaintiff upon whom the Defendant re-enter upon which re-entry the Action was brought and upon a speciall Verdict all this matter appeared But it was not found by the Verdict that the said Thomas Collard the Father was dead and therfore the Warranty was not any thing in the Case And it was moved by Heale that the Plaintiff ought to be barred because it did not passe by way of Estate in as much as a man cannot passe a Freehold of a Land from himself to begin at a time to come and by it to create a particular Estate to himself and in use it cannot passe because that by a bare parole and Vse cannot be raised and by giving my Land to my Son Cosin and the like nothing will passe without Livery for there is not consideration to raise an Vse Fennor The words shall be taken as if he had said here I give you this Barton reserving an Estate for my life although the words of reservation have priority in their time from the speaking of them because a reservation cannot be but out of a thing granted and therfore the reservation shall be utterly void or otherwise ought to be taken according to their proper nature to wit to be in their operation subsequent and so shall not hurt the Grant and therfore are not to be compared to the case where a man grant that after the death of I. S. or after his own death a stranger shall have his Land which Popham granted And Fennor said further that these words being spoken upon the Land as before amount to a Livery Gawdy said That the words as they are spoken amount to a Livery if the words are sufficient to passe the Estate but he conceived that the words are not sufficient to make the Estate to passe to the said Eustace because his intent appeareth that Eustace was not to have the Land untill after the death of him and his wife and therfore of the same effect as if he had granted the Land to the said Eustace after his death and as an Vse it cannot passe because by a bare word an Vse cannot be raised as appeareth in divers Reports Mich. 12 13 Eliz. which is a good case to this purpose But to say generally that an Vse cannot be raised or charged upon a perfect Contract by words upon good consideration cannot be Law and therfore it is to be considered what the Law was before the Statute of 27 H. 8. And I thinke that none will deny but that by grant of Land for money before this Statute an Vse was raised out of the same Land for a bargain and sale of Land for money and a grant of Land for money is all one and no difference between them And is not a grant of Land made in consideration of marriage of my Son and Daughter as valuable as a grant of it for money It is cleer that it is and much more valuable as my blood is more valuable to me then my money and therfore it is absurd to say that the consideration of money raise or change an Vse at Common Law and not such a consideration of marriage And in such a case at Common Law there was not any diversity that the party who so grant or hargain for the one or the other considerations was fâ—ised of the Land granted or bargained in use or possession but that the Vse by the Contract was transferred according to the bargain in both cases where there is a consideration And where through all the Law shall it be seen that of any thing which might passe by contract there need any other thing then the words which make the contract as writing or the like testifying it And that the Law was so it appeareth by the Statute of Inrolements of bargains and sales of Land made 27 H. 8. which enacts that no Freehold nor Vse therof shall passe by bargain and sale only unlesse it be by deed indented and enrolled according to the Statute Ergo if this Statute had not been it had passed by the bargain and sale by bare words and in as much as the Statute enacts this in case of bargain and sale only the other cases as this case here are as it was before at Common Law And by an exception at the end of the same Statute London is as it was at Common Law and therfore now Lands may passe there at this day by bargain and sale by word without deed for it is out of the Statute And how can we say that the Statute of Vses does any thing to alter the Common Law in this point by any intent of the makers therof wheras at the same Parliament they made an especiall Law in the case of bargain and sale of Lands And at this day for the Lands in London notwithstanding the Statute of Vses the Law hath been put in practice and alwaies holden as to the Lands there to be good if sold by bare Parole as it were at Common Law And I have heard it reported by Manwood late chief Baron of the Exchequer that it was in question in the time of King Edw. the 6th whether the use of a Freehold of Land will passe upon a Contract by Parole without Deed in consideration of marriage upon which all the then Iustices were assembled upon a doubt rising in a case hapning in the Star-chamber and then
Richard he made assurance by Fine of his Lands being 174 l. a year viz. Of part therof of the value of 123 l. a year of which part was holden of the Queen by Knights Service in Capite to the use of himself for his life and after his decease to the use of the said William and Margaret and the Heirs of the body of the said William begotten on the body of the said Margaret and for default of such Issue to the use of the right Heirs of the said William And of the residue therof being also holden in Capite of the Queen to the use of himself for his life and after his decease to the use of the first Issue Male of the said Richard and to the Heirs Males of his body and then to other Issues of his body and for default of such Issue to the said William and Margaret and the Heirs of the body of the said William on the body of the said Margaret lawfully begotten and for default of such Issue to the right Heirs of the said William with this Prouiso That it shall be lawfull for the said Richard to make a Joynture to his wife of the Lands limited to his Issue Males and for making of Leases for 21. years or three lives for any part of the said Land rendring the ancient Rent except of certain parcels and that William died without Issue and that Gilbert Littleton was his Brother and Heir and that the said Margaret married the said George Littleton youngest brother to the said William which are yet living And that the said Richard married Dorothy and made her a Joynture according to the Proviso And that the said Richard had Issue Iohn Smith and died the said Iohn being his Son and Heir and within age After which a Melius inquirendum issued by which it was found that the said Margaret was the Daughter of the said Richard and that the said Land was of the value of 12000 l. at the time of the assurance And how much of the Land shall be in ward and what Land and what the Melius inquirendum makes in the case was the question put to the two chief Iustices Popham and Anderson who agreed that the Queen now shall have the third part as well of that which was assured to William and Margaret immediatly after the death of the said Richard as of that which was limited to Dorothy for the life of the said Margaret for although money were paid yet this was not the only consideration why the Lands were assured but the advancement of the Daughter and now by the surviving of the said Margaret shee shall be said to be in the whole which was assured to her by her Father and for her advancement and the Land as it appears was of greater value then the money given and may as well be thought to be given for the Remainder of the Fee And agreeable to this was the case of Coffin of Devonshire about the beginning of the Raign of the now Queen which was that the said Coffin for moneys paid by one Coffin his Cosin having but Dâ—ughters himself conveyed his Land to the use of himself and his wife and to the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue to the use of his said Cosin and his Heirs for which his said Cosin was to give a certain sum of money to the Daughters for their marriage Coffin dies his said Daughters being his Heirs and within age and were in ward to the Queen the Lands being holden by Knights Service in Capite And the third part of the Land was taken from the wife of Coffin for the life of the said wife if the Heirs continue so long in Ward And it was also agreed by them and the Councell of the Court that the Melius inquirendum was well awarded to certifie that the said Margaret was the Daughter of the said Richard of which the Court could not otherwise well take Conusance for they thought that it was not matter to come in by the averment of the Attorney-generall as Dyer hath reported it But now by the Statute it ought to be found by Inquisition and being a thing which stands with the former Inquisition it ought to be supplied by the Melius inquirendum for the same Statute which gives the Wardship in case where Land is conveyed for the advancement of the Wife or Infants or for the satisfaction of Debts and Legacies of the party by the implication of the same Statute this may be found by Inquisitton and if it be omitted in the Inquisition it ought to be found by a Melius inquirendum but not to come in by a bare surmise And therfore if in the Inquisition it be found that the Ancestor had conveyed his Land by the Melius inquirendum it may be found that it was for the payment of his Debts or Legacies or that the party to whom or to whose use it was made was the Son or Wife of the party that made it and that by the very purport of the Statutes 32. 34 H. 8. as by Fitzherbert if it be surmised that the Land is of greater value then it is found a Melius inquirendum shall issue and so shall it be if it be found that one is Heir of the part of the Mother but they know not who is Heir of the part of the Father so if it be not found what Estate the Tenant had or of whom the Land was holden so upon surmise made that he is seised of some other Estate or that he held it by other Services by Fitzherbert a Melius inquirendum shall Issue and upon this order given it was decreed accordingly this Term. Morgan versus Tedcastle 4. IN the same Term upon matter of Arbitrement between Morgan and Tedcastle touching certain Lands at Welburn in the County of Lâ—ncoln put to Popham Walmesley and Ewens Baron of the Exchequer Wheras Morgan had granted to Tedcastle a 100. acres of Land in such a field and 60 in such a field and 20. acres of Meadow in such a Meadow in Welburn and Hanstead in which the acres are known by estimations or limits there be shall take the acres as they are known in the same places be they more or lesse then the Statute for they passe as they are there known and not according to the measure by the Statute But if I have a great Close containing 20. acres of Land by estimation which is not 18. And I grant 10. acres of the same Close to another there he shall have them according to the measure by the Statute because the acres of such a Close are not known by parcels or by meets and bounds and so it differeth from the first case And upon the case then put to Anderson Brian and Fennor they were of the same opinion Quod nota Humble versus Oliver 5. IN Debt by Richard Humble against William Oliver for a Rent reserved upon a Lease for years the case was
said Queen her Heirs and Successors for ever which Deed was acknowledged the 25th day of March 32 Eliz. and enrolled in the Chancery the 12th day of May in thâ— same year And there was a Proviso in the same Deed that if the said Robert Bret shall pay to the Queen at the receipt of the Exchequer 5 s. of lawfull money that then the said Gift Grant Bargain and Sale shall be void and that from thence-forward it shall be lawfull for the said Robert Bret and his Heirs to re-enter into the said Tenements and in the mean time between the Inrolement of this Deed And the said 14th day of Octob. to wit the 15th day of September 32 Eliz. the said Arthur upon the said Tenements in North-petherton entred and claimed the Reversion therof in the right of the said Elianor his wife by reason of the death of the said Christian And that afterwards to wit the 30th day of February 33 Eliz. the said Robert Bret to redeem the said Tenements out of the Queen paid the said 5 s. at the receipt of the Exchequer which payment is there recorded and enrolled accordingly after which in September 34 Eliz. the said Arthur and Elianor sued out a speciall Livery of the said Elianor out of the hands of the Queen of all the Lands seised into the hands of the Queen by reason of the Nonage of the said John Mallet And afterwards in the same meneth of September 34 Eliz. the said Arthur and Elianor sued out another speciall Livery as Heir to the said Christian of all the Lands which were in the Queens hands by the death of the said Christian And it was further found that the said John Clark and Elianor Middleton died after the 5 s. paid as before and that the said Robert Bret entred the 8th day of October 34 Eliz. and then made the Lease to the Plaintiff upon which the Defendant by commandment of the said Arthur and with him entred upon the Plaintiff and the generall question was Whether the entry of the Defendant were lawfull But no ouster of the Plaintiff was found And by Clench and Fennor a Fee-simple passe at Common Law by a Fine levied by him in Reversion or Remainder in Tail because a Fine is said to be a Feoffment of Record and by their entry and Feoffment a Fee-simple passe in such a case at Common Law But by Popham and Gaudy a Fee-simple doth not passe nor nothing but that which Tenant in Tail may lawfully grant over which is for his life in which he said that Littleton was plain in all cases of Grant although it be by Fine and a Fee-simple does not passe at Common Law but where the Fee may be drawn out of him who had the Reversion or Remainder in Fee therupon if such a Reversion or Remainder had been in a stranger which had not been in this case if the Reversion or Remainder had been in a stranger and therfore a Discontinuance cannot be of an Intail where the Reversion or Remainder is in the King But by them all however it was at Common Law it is cleer upon the Statute of Fines that a Fee-simple determinable passe by such a Fine as soon as the Fine is levied because every Fine by presumption of Law shall be taken to be such wherupon proclamation is made untill the contrary therof appeareth to the Court. And this is the reason why a Quid juris clamat is at this day maintained upon such a Fine which was not at Common Law before this Statute or otherwise it will never lye And so it was holden lately in the Common Bench in the case of Iustice Wimondham and yet we may see that the Quid juris clamat ought to be brought before that the Fine be engrossed wherby it is manifest that now a Fee-simple shall passe by the Fine levied for the possibility of the Proclamations to wit that the Proclamations shall not be made and to this Fee-simple the Proclamations shall enure to make a bar to the Estate-tail But such a Fine by Popham and Gawdy was not any wrong to him who had the Reversion or Remainder in Fee being levied by him who had a mean Reversion or Remainder in Tail depending upon an Estate for life or in Tail precedent And it is cleer that the Proclamations do not make the Estate but enure to the Estate made by the Fine for if an Estate be granted in Reversion for life or in Tail by Fine with Proclamations by such a Tenant in Tail in Reversion or Remainder the Proclamations work to this Estate and no further for alwaies the Estate passe by the Fine and the Proclamations make the Bar according to the Estate which passe by the Fine before But by Clench Gawdy and Fennor the Fee-simple which was in the Queen after the Fine levied as before was divested by means of this claim made upon the possession of the Queen lo that the Proclamations following are of no force to hurt the Estate tail for they said in divers cases a possession may be invested out of the Queen without Office Petition or Monstrans de droit as the case is where a man devise that his Land shall be sold and in the mean time before the sale the possession of the Land cometh to the Queen and afterwards the Land is sold according to the Will the Vendee enter there the Land passe from the Queen therby and is divested and so in many other cases And in all cases where the Queens Estate is determined the Subject may enter into the Land without Office or Ouster le main c. And they said if it had been in the possession of a common person that by such a claim the force of the Fine had been defeated and this appeareth by the case between Smith and Stapleton in the Commentaries where it is holden that where a Fine is levied with Proclamations by Tenant in Tail of an Advowson Rent or Tithes by claim made by the Issue in Tail before the Proclamations are passed where the Tenant in Tail is dead the same is defeated and that the Proclamations passing afterwards shall not be of force to bar the Intail And they said that the conveyance therof to the Queen after the Fine levied doth not make it to be in worse case And admit it will not serve against the Queen yet the claim will serve against Bret when he had entred by the performance of the Condition And Clench and Gawdy said that Bret shall not take advantage of this covenous Deed made by himself of very purpose to bar the party who had right and to put him without remedy no more then where the Disseisor enfeoff his Father who dies seised he shall not take advantage of this descent or if he who hath cause of Action to recover Lands by Covin causeth another to enter into the Lands to the intent to recover against him and does it accordingly for the Covin the Recovery shall
wit the 6th day of July in the same 6th year by his Deed of the same date the said Christopher enfeoffed the said Sir John Chichester and his Heirs of the said Mannor and by the same Deed warranted it for him and his Heirs to the said Sir John Chichester and his Heirs wherupon the said Sir John Chichester entred into the said Mannor after which to wit the first day of October 12 Eliz. the said Christopher died after which the 7th day of November 13 Eliz. the said Stretchley Chudleigh died without Issue of his body And after the death of the said Sir Richard Chudleigh to wit the 6th day of September 7 Eliz. the said Sir John Chichester enfeoffed one Philip Chichester and his Heirs of the said Mannor to the use of the said Philip and his Heirs And the said Close being Copyhold and Customary Land of the said Mannor demisable by the Lord of the same Mannor or his Steward for the time being for life or lives by Copy of Court-roll according to the custom of the said Mannor The said Philip at a Court holden at the said Mannor for the said Mannor the 8th day of December 15 Eliz. by Copy of Court-roll granted the said Close to the said John Frain for Term of his life according to the custom of the said Mannor after which to wit the 11th day of March 28 Eliz. the said John Chudleigh being now Heir to the said Christopher enfeoffed the said William Dillon of the said Mannor to have and to hold to him and his Heirs to the use of the said William and his Heirs for ever wherby he entred and was seised untill the said John Fraine entred into the said Close upon him the 8th day of February 30 Eliz. upon which entry of the said Fraine this Action is brought And for difficulty of the case it was adjourned into the Exchequer Chamber before all the Iustices and Barons of the Exchequer And there it was agreed by all that a Warranty descending upon an Infant shall not bind him in case that the entry of the Infant be lawfull into the Land to which the Warranty is united But the Infant ought in such a case to look well that he do not suffer a descent of the Land after his full age before he hath made his re-entry for then the Warranty when he is to have an Action for the Land shall bind him And they agreed also that a Copyhold granted by a Disseisor or any other who hath the Mannor of which it is parcel by wrong shall be avoided by the Disseisee or any other who hath right to the Mannor by his entry or recovery of the Mannor And so by Popham it was agreed by the Iustices in the case of the Manner of Hasselbury Brian in the County of Dorset between Henry late Earl of Arundell and Henry late Earl of Northumberland but then he said that it was agreed that admittance upon surrenders of Copyholders in Fee to the use of another or if an Heir in case of a Descent of a Copyhold were good being made by a Disseisor of a Mannor or any other who hath it by Tort because these are acts of necessity and for the benefit of a stranger to wit of him who is to have the Land by the surrender or of the Heir And also Grants made by Copy by the Feoffee upon condition of a Mannor before the Condition broken are good because he was lawfull Dominus pro tempore And for the matter upon the Statute of 27 H. 8. what shall become of this future use â—imited to the first second and other Issues Males not in Esse at the time of the Feoffment Ewens Owen Bateman and Fennor said That an Use at Common Law is Use what it is no other then a confidence which one person puts in another for a confidence cannot be in Land or other dead thing but ought alwaies to be in such a thing which hath understanding of the trust put in him which cannot be no other then such a one who hâ—th reason and understanding to perform what the other hath committed to him which confidence shall bind but in privity and yet the confidence is in respect of the Land but every one who hath the Land is not bound to the confidence but in privity shall be said to be in the Heir and the Feoffee who hath knowledge of the confidence and in him who cometh to the Land by Feoffâ—ent without consideration albeit he hath no knowledge therof and yet every Feoffee is not bound although he hath knowledge of the confidence as an Alien Person Attaint and the like not the King he shall not be seised to anothers use because he is not compellable to perform the confidence nor a Corporation because it is a dead body although it consist of naturall persons and in this dead body a confidence cannot be put but in bodies naturall And this was the Common Law before the Statute of 27 H. 8. Then the Letter of the Statute is not to execute any Vse before that it hapneth to be an Vse in Esse for the words are Where any person is seised to the use of any other person that in such a case he who hath the Vse shall have the same Estate in the Land which he had before in the Vse Ergo by the very letter of the Law he ought to have an Estate in the Vse and there ought to be a person to have the Vse before the Statute intends to execute any possession to the Vse for the words are expresse that in every such case he shall have it therfore not another And therfore the Statute had purpose to execute the Vses in possession Reversion or Remainder presently upon the conveyance made to the Vses But for the future Vses which were to be raised at a time to come upon any contingent as to the Infants here not being then born the Statute never intended to execute such Vses untill they happen to have their beeing and in the mean time to leave them as they were at Common Law without medling with or altering of them in any manner untill this time and if before this time the root out of which these contingent Vses ought to spring be defeated the Vse for this is utterly destroyed and shall never afterwards have his being as here by the Feoffment made by the said Sir John Saintleger and his Co-feoffees who then were but as Tenements pur auter vie to wit for the life of Christopher and which was a forfeiture of their Estate and for which Oliver Chudleigh might have entred it being before that the said Strechley or John Chudleigh were born the privity of them from Estate being the root out of which this future use ought to have risen is gone and destroyed and therfore the Contingent Vses utterly therby overthrown As if before the Statute of 27 H. 8. Tenant for life had been the remainder over in Fee to an Vse
time to come and therfore by this exposition much more to the disinherison of the Heir then it was before the making of this Statute And which is more mischievous if a Feme putein happen to be in such a house who happen to have Children in Adultery these Bastards shall have the Land against the will of the Father to the utter disinherison of the true Heirs and against the intent of him who made the limitation by which we may see the just Judgment of of God upon these who attempt by humane pollicy to circumvent the divine providence of God for the time to come and of this also I have seen an example And now to the mischief that men do not know against whom to bring their Actions to sue for their Rights and it is cleer that now by such an exposition they shall be now in much worse condition then they were before for before the Action was given against him who received the Profits which is now gone by this Statute in the cases of Free-hold and therfore if the other exposition shall hold place it is cleer that untill the Statute of 13 Eliz. men might have been by means of this Statute put out of all remedy to recover their rights by any manner of Action as some put it in practice as to make Feoffments to the use of the Feoffor and his Heirs untill any intend to bring an Action against him for this Land and then over to others upon the like limâ—tation with a Proviso to make it void at his pleasure and the like and what mischief shall then be for the time upon such an exposition such that Justice therby cannot be done to the Subject and what an absurdity shall it be to say that such an Exposition can stand with the intent of the Makers of the Law And to that which hath been argued on the other side and first to that which was said by Walmsley That the Right Estate and Possession is wholly out of the Feoffee and vested to the Vses which have their beeing by the Statute and that upon the Contingents hapning their Estates uncouple and give place to the contingent Vse then executed and that the execution therof shall be by a Possession dâ—awn to it out of the Possession which was before executed by the Statute in another I say that this Statute can by no means have such an exposition for this is as much as to say that an Vse may arise upon an Vse contrary to what is adjudged 36 H. 8. That a Bargain and Sale by a Deed indented and enrolled cannot be at this day of Land to one to the Vse of another And if a man enfeoff another to the use of I. S. and his Heirs and if I. N. pay such a summ that then the said I. S. and his Heirs shall be seised of the same Land to the use of the said I. N. and the Heirs of his body I. â— paies the money yet the Vse doth not rise out of the Possession of the said I. S. But if it had been that upon the payment the first Feoffee and his Heirs shall stand seised to the use of the said I. N. and the Heirs of his body it shall be otherwise therfore somthing remains to the first Feoffee in the Judgment of the Law And I remember that when I was a Counsellor at Law in the time of the Lord Dyer where a Feoffment was made to the Vse of one for life with Remainders over with restraint to alien and with power given to Tenant for life to make Leases for one and twenty years or three lives it was much doubted whether this power so limited to him without words in the Assurance that the Feoffee and his Heirs shall stand seised to these Vses shall be good to make such Leases or not And therfore suppose that a man bargains and sells Land to one for his life by Deed indented and inrolled and make therin a Proviso that the Tenant for life may make such Leases this is to no purpose as to power to make a Lease but the strongest case which he put was that of 30 H. 8. which I agreed to be Law as it is there put whether it were before or after the Statute of 27 H 8. for it is not there put that the Feoffment was made upon any consideration to the stranger in which case although he had no notice of the first Covenant yet in such a case he shall take the Possession subject to the Vse to which it was bound by the present Covenant But if you consider the case well you shall see that it was a case before the Statute for it followeth presently in the same case that it is there said that it is not like the case where the Feoffees in Vse fell the Land to one who hath no notice of the first Vse wherby it appeareth that it was a case before the Statute for otherwise there had been no cause to have spoken then of the Feoffees to an Vse and by the same it appeareth if the Covenantor had bargained and sold the Land to another the same Vse had never risen upon the Covenant and therfore it is cleer against the Law that the Possession shall be bound wâ—th such an Vse in whosoevers hand it comes And to that which Peâ—â—am said in the case of these Contingent Vses they shall now by the Statute be in the same degree as if Land it self had been so conveyed and that now the Land shall be in Contingency in stead of the Vse and that by such manner it shall be executed and that by such means all is utterly out of the Feoffees because the Statute was made to determine all â—â—â—ter of trust to be hereafter reposed in any Feoffee this is well spoken but not well proved for as I have said before it is an exposition quite contrary to the letter and intention of the Law And I agree as hath been said if there be none to take the Use at the time that it falleth to be in possession according to the limitation that he shall never take it afterwards no more of an Use upon the Statute then of â—n Use at Common Law As if an Use be limitted for life the remainder to the right Heirs of I. S. if the Estate for life be determined in the life of I S. the remainder shall never vest afterwards in the right Heirs of I. S. no more then if an Estate had been so made But this makes for me to wit that the Estate upon the Uses executed by the Statute shall be of the same condition as Estates in possession were at Common Law and that they being executed ought also to be such of which the Common Law makes allowance And by way of argument I agree for the time that it is as hath been said by them who maintain that an Use may be in suspence as to that which is an Use in its proper nature for it is
not properly said an Use untill that it be said in Esse to take the Profits themselves But I am to turn this Argument against him who made it for if it be so the Use can never be in suspence and iâ— so it follows that no Possession by means of any such Use can be in suspence but staies where it was before to be executed when the Use happens to be in beeing But as to that that a Reversion or Remainder may be of that which we call an Use so also may such a Use be in suspence in the same manner as the Possession it self but not otherwise And as to Cramners Case formerly put the Law is so because nothing appeareth in the case to be done to the disturbance of this contingent Vse in the interim before it happen But upon the Case put of the Lady Bray upon which it hath been so strongly relied it was thus The Lord Bray made an assurance of certain Lands to the use of certain of his Councell untill the Son of the said Lord Bray should come to the age of 21. years for the livelyhood of the said Son and of such a Wife as he shall marry with the assent of the said Councell and then to the use of the said Son and of the said Wife and of the Heirs of the body of the said Son The Father dies the Son was become in Ward to the King after which one of the said Councellors dies the King grants over the Wardship of the said Son after which the said Lord Bray by the assent of his Guardian and of the surviving Councellors marries the Daughter of the then Earl of Shrewsbury after which the Husband aliens the same Land to one Butler and dies and upon Action brought by the said Lady against the said Butler for the same land she was barred by Judgment and upon what reason because she was not a person known when the Statute was made which must be in every case of a Freehold in Demesne as well in case of an Use as in case of a Possession And therfore a Lease for years the Remainder to the Heirs of I. S. then living is not good and the same Law of an Vse And so it was agreed by all the Iustices very lately in the case of the Earl of Bedford but in these Cases it remaineth to the Feoffor and because it doth not appear at the time of the assurance who shall be the Wife of the said Son so that there was not any to take the present Free-hold by name of the Wife of the Son she takes nothing by the assurance but this reason makes for our side to wit That if there were none to take the Free-hold in Demesne from the Use when it falleth he shall never take it The other reason in this Case was because she was not married by the consent of all the Counsellors for that one was dead nor according to the power given by the agreement but by the authority of the Guardian that the power which the Father had upon his Son was ceased And Nota That by a Disseisin the contingent Use may be disturbed of his Execution but there by the regresse of the Feoffee oâ— his Heirs when the Contingent happen it may be revived to be executed But by the release of the Feoffee or his Heirs the Contingent in such a case by Popham iâ—â—â—â—red oâ— all possibility at any time to be executed And to that which hath been said that the generall and universall Assurances of men throughout all the Realm at this â—ay arâ— by means of Vses and that it shall be a great deal of danger and inconvenience to draw them now in question or doubt and that it now trembleth upon all the Possessions of the Realm and therfore it shall be too dangerous to pull up such Trees by the roots the Branches wherof are such and so long spread that they overshadow the whole Realm Popham said That they were not utterly against Uses but only against those and this part of them which will not stand with the publike Weal of of the Realm and which being executed shall make such an Estate which cannot stand with Common Law of the Realm or the true purport of the Statute and therfore he said that it was but to prune and cut off the rotten and corrupt branches of this Tree to wit that those which had not their substance from the true Sap nor from the ancient Law of the Realm nor from the meaning of the Statute and so to reduce the Tree to its beauty and perfection The same reason he said might have been made in the time of Edw. 4. against those Arguments which were made to maintain the common Recoveries to bar Estates-tail But if such a reason had been then made it would have been taken for a bare conceit and meer trifle and yet Vses were never more common then Estates-tail were between the Statute of Donis conditionalibus and the said time of Edw 4. But the grave Iudges then saw what great trouble hapned amongst the people by means of Intails and what insecurity happened by means therof to true Purchasors for whose security nothing was before found as we may see by our Books but collaterall Warranty or infinite delay by Voucher and thus did the Iudges of this time look most deeply into it wherupon upon the very rules of Law it was found that by common Recovery with Vouchers these Estates-tail might be barred which hath been great cause of much quiet in the Land untill this day that now it begins to be so much troubled with the cases of Vses for which it is also necessary to provide a lawfull remedy But he said plainly That if the Exposition made on the other side shall take place it will bring in with it so many mischiefs and inconveniencies to the universall disquiet of the Realm that it will cast the whole Common-wealth into a Sea of troubles and endanger it with utter confusion and drowning And to that which was said That a Remainder to the right Heirs of I. S. or to the Heirs of the body of I S. or to the first Son as here are so in the custody of the Law that they cannot be drawn out that therfore no forfeiture can be made by the Feoffment made by him who hath the particular Estate To that he said That a Disseisin made to the particular Estate for life draws out such Remainders to the right Heirs as is proved expresly by 3 H. 6 where it is holden that a collaterall Warranty bars such a Remainder in obeyance after a disseisin And by Gascoigne 7 H. 4. If such a Tenant for life makes a Feoffment in Fee it is a Forfeiture but he conceived that in the life time of I. S. none can enter for it but this is not Law and when by the Feoffment the particular Estate is quite gone in possession and in right also the remainder shall never take
made their Election to have the one or the other it is not to be granted over by generall words But by the dissolution of the Hospitall the grant for want of Election before is gone and determined And further wheras the King made his Grant of the Hospitall and of all the said rent of Fagots and Focals without making mention of 20 s. for the same it was moved that if it doth passe to the King yet it doth not passe from him to the Major c. in as much as he granted it precisely as a Fuell wheras it was in him as a Rent of Fuell or of money at his Election and therfore the King deceived in his Grant And further here he hath made Conusance for the Fuell without making mention of their Election to have it one way or another before the taking but all the Court agreed that the Conusance was good and that the return shall be awarded to him who made the Conusance first because that this case is quite out of the case of Election because the rent which is granted is only out of the Fagots and Astlewood and the 20 s. granted is not as a distinct thing but granted as a recompence or satisfaction of that because the Grant is of the Fagots c. or of 20 s. for the same so that in such a case the Seisin of the 20 s. is a good Seisin of the Fagots and Focals and sufficeth to maintain an Assise upon this Seisin for the Fuell but not for the 20 s. as money paid for Suit of Court is good Seisin of the Suit And the 20 s. here is not granted in nature of a Rent of so much but as an allowance in satisfaction for the Fuell And Popham conceived that he shall have an Action of debt for this 20 s. for the fuell after the Election made if he will as for a Nomine poene because it is not the principall thing granted of which the Inheritance is but a casuall Accident in recompence therof if he will have it or otherwise he may distrain for it because it is so limited to be done by the Grant it self But they shall never have assurance of the 20 s. as a thing of Inheritance because it is not the thing of which the Inheritance is granted but only granted in allowance and satisfaction of it and therfore not to be resembled to the cases where 20. quarters of Corn or 20 s. Rent is granted to one and his Heirs or other such thing which stands meerly in the disjunctive to wit to have or take the one or the other And therfore suppose the Prior was to carry the Fuell yearly to the Hospitall at the Feast of S. Michael and yet then the Master and Brethren might have refused the Fuell and held themselves to have the 20 s. by force of the Grant for then originally the Election ought to have been made there But upon the Covenant which cometh afterwards on the other part the notice ought to have been given in April yearly before but if it be not done there lies but an Action of Covenant for the not doing of it for this will not alter the nature of the Grant which was full and perfect in Law before And here he needs not make this appearance in the Conusance that any Election was made before the taking of the Cattel because the Grant is of the Fuell it self and if the other had made Election before to have the 20 s. for the Fuell this ought to have been shewn on the other side in Bar of the Avowry to wit that he brought to them the Fuell yearly according to the Grant and that they refused it and required the 20 s. every time for it in which case for every such refusall and Election to have the 20 s. for it it had excluded him to have any Fuell for this year so refused And by Popham also you may see a great diversity between this case where a man is to deliver to another 20. Loads of Wood or 20. Loads of Hay yearly out of such Land and he does not tender them for divers years and where a man is to take so much Fuell or Hay out of the Land of another and he takes it not for divers years for in the former case the party who is not satisfied shâ—ll have all the arrears be it never so prejudiciall to the Grantor because it was through his own default that it was not paid but in the other case as appeareth 27 H. 6. 10. he shall not have any remedy for the arrears for the years past because he took them not yearly as they were due which shâ—ll not turn the other party to prejudice that he shall want Fuell or Hay himself by reason of the arrears which hapned through the default of him who ought to take it and the Iudgment was given for him who made the Conusance and it is entred in the Kings Bench Mich. 33. 34. Eliz. Rot. 229. Southwells Case 5. AT the end of this Term upon the proceeding against Southwell the Iesuite it was moved by the Attorney-general to Popham chief Iustice the Master of the Rolls Periam chief Baron Walmsley and Owen Iustices and Ewens one of the Barons of the Exchecquer upon the form of Indictments upon the Statute of 27 Eliz. for Iesuits c If it need be comprehended in the Indictment of a Iesuite who cometh into the Realm of England or any Dominions of the Queen or shall be taken therin 40. daies after the end of this Session of Parliament that if he doth not submit himself within three daies of his landing if he cometh in after the 40. daies according to the Proviso of the Statute or that he was not so infirm of his body where he came in before the 40. daies that he was not able to passe out of the Realm by the time prescribed at first because that it is comprised in the body of the Act that it shall not be lawfull for any Iesuite c. being born within this Realm or any other the Queens Dominions made after the Feast of S. John Baptist in the first year of her Raign or after this to be made by any authority derived c. from the See of Rome to come be or remain in any part of this Realm c. otherwise then in such speciall cases and upon such speciall occasions and for such time only which is expressed in this Act and if he does that this offence shall be adjudged high Treason c. And after deliberation taken and consideration and conference amongst themselves had they all resolved that the better course was to omit this in the Indictment notwithstanding it be comprised in the body of the Act in the same manner as if it had been only in a Proviso in which case it is to the Prisoner to help him by means of such a Proviso if he can do it for the words other then c. are
in execution in all Circuits That if a man taken for Felony be examined by a Justice of Peace it appeareth that the Felon is not bailable by the Law and yet the Justices commit him to Goal but as upon suspition of Felony not making mention for any cause for which he is not bailable wherby he is brought before another Justice of Peace not knowing of any matter why he ought not to be bailed wherupon they bail him these Justices ought to be fined by the Statute of 1 2. Phil. Mar. for they offend if they bail him who by the Statute of Westm 1. is not bailable and therfore they at their peril ought so to inform themselves before the bail taken of the matter that they may be well satisfied that such a one is bailable by Law and therfore observe well the Statute of Westm 1. cap. 18. who is bailable and who not by the Law And it seems that no Justice of Peace could have bailed any one for Felony before the Statute of 1 Rich. 3. cap. 3. which is made void by 3 H. 7. cap. 3. for before this he ought to have been bailed by the Sheriff or other Keeper of the Prison where he was in Ward or by the Constable and by no other Officer unlesse Justices of the Kings Bench Justices in Eyre or Justices of Goal-delivery Herbin versus Chard and others 2. IN Trespasse by William Herbin Plaintiff against Chard and others Defendants for a Trespasse made at Pynon Farm in Netherbury and Loder in the County of Dorset the Case upon the Demurrer appeared to be this The Lord Mordant was seised of the Farm in his Demesne as of Fee and so seised demised it to Philip Fernam Elizabeth his wife and Iohn Fernam the eldest Son of the said Philip for term of their lives and of the Survivor of them and the said Eliz. died after which the said Philip his Father demised his part of the Farm by his Deed indented dated 13. Mart. 32. Eliz. to Philip his Son and Toby Fernam his Son for eighty years immediatly after the death of the said Philip the Father if the said Iohn Fernam shal so long live with divers remainders over for years depending upon the life of the said Iohn after which the said Philip the Father died and Iohn survived him and demised the said Farm to the Plaintiff upon whom the Defendants entred in right of the said Philip and Toby and whether their entry were congeable was the question And it was moued by Goodridge of the Middle-Temple that the entry of the Defendant was not lawfull because the said John was now in by the Lessor and not by his joynt Companion And further he had no power to dispose therof beyond his own life for suppose that he makes a Lease therof for years and afterwards grant over his Estate to a stranger and dies the Lease for years is therby determined albeit his joynt Companion be yet living and that his Estate continues And yet he agreed that if had made a Lease for years to begin at a day to come as at Michaelmas following or the like that this had been good for it is an Interest in the Grantee to be granted over for the presumption that it might be executed in his life but in the other case there is not any possibility that he who hath not but for his life can demise it to begin after the Estate made to him is determined But on the other part it was moved that the Demise remains in force for the life of the said John for at the first every one had an interest for the life of the other also and therfore if one Ioynt-tenant for life make a Lease for years in possession and dies the Lease yet continues And Crook the younger alledged that it was adjudged at last Hartf Term If a man possessed of a Term for years in right of his Wife makes a Lease for years of the same Lands to begin after his death dies during the Term without other alteration of it and the Wife survives him that now the Lease made by the Husband is good and that the like case as this by the opinion of Clench and Walmsley was decreed to be good in the Chancery Arton versus Hare 3. IN a second deliverance between Francis Arton Plaintiff and Henry Hare Avowant the case appeared to be this William Cocksey Esquire was seised in his Demesne as of Fee of the Mannor of Wolverton in the County of Worcester and so seised in Octab. Mich. 7 Eliz. levied a Fine of the said Mannor to certain persons to the use of the said William and Alice his Wife and the Heirs of William untill a marriage had between Martin Croft and Anne Wigstone and after this marriage to the use of the said William and Alice his Wife and the Heirs of the body of the said William and for defualt of such Issue to the use of the said Martin Crofts and Anne and the Heirs Males of the body of the said Martin upon the body of the said Anne begotten untill the said Martin should go about to alien sell grant or give the said Mannor or any parcell therof or to suffer any Recovery or levy any Fine therof or make any discontinuance c. And after the Estate of the said Martin and Anne and of the Heirs Males of their bodies to the Premisses by any such attempts determined and finished then to the use of the said Anne for her life and after to the use of the Heirs Males of the body of the said Martin upon the body of the said Anne lawfully begotten and for default of such Issue to the use of the Heirs of the body of the said Martin and for default of such Issue to the use of Giles Croft brother of the said Martin and the Heirs Males of his body untill c. as before and after to the use of the Heirs of the body of the said Giles and for default of such Issue to the use of Edmund Crofts the third brother of the said Martin and of the Heirs Males of his body as is before limited to the said Giles with remainders over afterwards the marriage was had between the said Martin and Alice after which the said Martin and Giles died without Issue without any thing done by the said Martin to determine his Estate or by the said Giles to determine his Estate if any had been And it was agreed by all the Court that as this case is no remainder can enure over to the said Giles without an attempt precedent by the said Martin to determine his Estate because the Estate of Giles is not limited to begin but upon such an attempt precedent And in the same manner Edmund shall have nothing untill the Estate of Giles determine by some attempt made by him if the said Giles had an Estate because the Estate of Edmund depends upon the attempt made by Giles
and not otherwise to wit 100 l. therof in thâ—se words On that day twelvemonth next after the day of his death and the other 100 l. that day twelvemonth next after c. and made the said John Slaning his Executor and afterwards to wit the 8. day of April 25 Eliz died without Issue Male of his body the said Agnes took to Husband one Edmund Marley and upon the 8. day of April 26 Eliz. the said John Slaning paid the first 100 l. to Agnes then being living and upon the 8. and 9. daies of April 27 Eliz. Nicholas Slaning of Plumpton Son and Heir of the said John Slaning who died in the mean time an hour before the Sun set and untill the Sâ—n was set came to the House where the said Edmund and his Wife inhabited in London and tendred the last 100 l. and that neither the said Edmund nor Agnes his Wife were there to receive it but that the said Edmund voluntarily absented himself because he would not receivâ— the 100 l. and that therupon the Wife of the said Edmund died having Issuâ— two Daughters the Lands being holden by Knights-service in Capite and the said Daughters being yet within age and all this being found by Office by the opinions and resolutions of Popham and Anderson and the rest of thâ— Councel of the Court of Wards the said Heirs now in Ward shall have nothing but that which doth not passe by the conveyance to John Fits and his joynt Feoffees which was only that which was in the possessions of Peterfield and Atwill and that the Livery was good of the rest albeit the Attorny did nothing of that which was in Lease notwithstanding the words of the Warrant that they should enter into all and then shall make the Livery And they agreed that the Condition doth not â—ind neither the said John Slaning nor Nicholas his Son because they had not all the Land according to the purport of the Condition which was that he who had all therof should pay the 200 l. wheras here that which was in the possession of Peterfeild and Atwill did not passe to them for want of Attornment for a Condition ought to be taken strictly And further the payment was referred by the Indenture to be according to the Will or by the Will and the 200 l. was devised as a Legacy which ought to be paid but upon demand and not at the peril of the Executor and therfore the nature of the payment of it is altered by the intent of the Will and being not demanded there is no default in the said Nicholas Slaning of Plumpton to prejudice him of his Land if it had been a Condition for then it shall be but a Condition to be paid according to the nature of a Legacy upon demand and not at the peril of the party And whether the word twelve-month shall be taken for a year or twelve months according to 28. daies to the month as it shall be of eight or twelve months or the like And they agreed that in this case it shall be taken for the whole year according to the common and usuall speech amongst men in such a case and according to this opinion Wray who is dead Anderson and Gawdy made their Certificate to the late Chancellor Sir Christopher Hatton in the same case then being in the Chancery and a Decree was made accordingly And many were of opinion that by his absence by such fraud he shall not take advantage of the Condition being a thing done on purpose if it had been to be performed at his peril Kellies Case WIlliam Kelly and Thomasine his Wife were seised of certain Lands in S. Eth in the County of Cornwall called Karkian to them and to the Heirs of their two bodies between them lawfully begotten by the Gift of one William Dowmand Father of the said Thomasine 11 H. 8. a long time after which Gift to wit 25 H. 8. A Fine Sur conusance de droit come ceo que il ad per was levied by Peter Dowmand Son and Heir of the said William Dowmand to William Kelley of the Mannor of Dowmand and of a 100. acres of Land 300 acres of Meadow 300. acres of Pasture and a 1000. acres of Furzse and Heath in Dowmand S. Eth. Trevile and divers other Towns named in the Fine who rendred the same back again to the said Peter in tail with diverse Remainders over and this Fine was with proclamations according to the Statute after which the possession of Karkian continued with Kelly and his Heirs according to the first Intail and the Mannor of Dowmand and the Remainder of the Lands in these Towns which were to the said Peter Dowmand to him and his Heirs according to the render untill nine years past that by Nisi prius in the Country upon the opinion of Manwood late chief Baron the Land called Karkian was recovered against the Heir of the said William Kelly by virtue of the said Fine and Render because all the Land which the said Peter Dowmand and the said William Kelly also had in all these Towns named in the Fine were not sufficient to supply the Contents of acres comprised in the said Fine And what the Law was in this case was referred to the chief Iustices the Master of the Rolls Egerton and the now chief Baron â—ut of the Chancery who all agreed upon all this matter appearing that nothing shall be said to be rendred but that which indeed was given by the Fine and Karkian does not passe to the said William Kelly by the Fine for as to it the Fine is but as a release of Peter to him and therfore shall not be said to be rendred to the said Peter by the Fine where no matter appeareth wherby it may appear that it was the intent of the parties that this shall be rendred And therfore Popham said that by so many Fines which have been levied in such a manner and to such who have Land in the same Towns where the Conusance hath been considering that alwaies more Land is comprised in Fines by number of acres then men have or is intended to passe by them at some time or in some age it would have come in question if the Law had been taken as Manwood took it but in all such cases the Possession hath alwaies gone otherwise which shews how the Law hath been alwaies taken in such cases And therfore if a man be to passe his Mannor of D. to another by Fine Executory and he levy the Fine to him by the name of the Mannor of D. and of so many acres of Land in D. and S. being the Towns in which the Mannor lies after which the Conuzor purchaseth other Lands in these Towns the Fine before the Statute of Vses shall not be executed of these Lands purchased after the Conusance and the Fine shall work to these which he had power and intent to passe and no further And it seemed to them that an
first Attainder by way of Plea but acknowledged the Deed in which case the Accessary may well be Arraigned But if the principall had pleaded his former Attainder whether now he shall be put to answer for the benefit of the Queen having regard to this Accessary who otherwise shall go quit because there was not any principall but he who was formerly attainted And it seemed to Popham and some others that it shall be in the same manner as if the same person so formerly attainted should be tried now for Treason made before his Attainder as appeareth by 1 H. 6. 5. because it is for the advantage of the King in his Escheat of the Land and notwithstanding that it is moved by Stamford in his Pleas of the Crown it seemed to Popham that there was no diversity where the Treason was made before the Felony of which he is attainted and where after and before the Attainder And by the same reason that he shall be again tried for the benefit of the King in this case because of the Escheat by the same reason in this case here because of the forfeiture which accrueth to the Queen by the Attainder of the accessary and for the Iustice which is to be done to a third person who otherwise by this means shall escape unpunished But he agreed that the party Attaint shall not be again Arraigned for any other Felony done before the Attainder in case where no Accessary was touched before the Statute of 8 Eliz. cap. 4. he who is convict of Felony and hath his Clergy after his purgation made shall be Arraigned for another Felony done before the conviction if it be such for which he cannot have his Clergy and was not convicted or acquitted of the same Felony before the Attainder But upon this Statute it appeareth that he who shall have his Clergy in such manner shall not be drawn in question for any other Felony done before his Attainder for which he might have his Clergy And of this opinion as Clark and others of the Iustices said were all the Iustices in the time of Wray And as to the Statute of 18 Eliz. cap 7. It is not to be understood but that he who hath his Clergy and delivered according to this Statute shall be yet arraigned for any other Felony done before his former Conviction or Attainder if it be such for which he cannot have his Clergy for the words are That he shall be put now to answer c. in the same manner as if he had been delivered to the Ordinary and had made his Purgation any thing in this act to the contrary notwithstanding Pollard versus Luttrell 2. IN an Ejectione firmae between Pollard and Luttrell for Lands in Hubury and Listock upon the Title between the Lord Audeley and Richard Audeley it was agreed by the chief Iustices that if the Disseisor levy a Fine with Proclamations according to the Statute of 4 H. 7. and a stranger within five years after the Proclamations enter in the right of the Disseisee without the privity or consent of the Disseisee that this shall not avoid the Bar of the Fine unlesse that he assent to it within the five years for the words of the Statute are so that they pursue their Title Claim or Interest by way of Action or lawfull Entry within five years c. and that which is done by another without their assent is not a pursuing by them according to the intent of the Statute for otherwise by such means against the will of the Disseisee every stranger may avoid such a Fine which was not the intent of the Statute Mountague versus Jeoffreys and others 3. IN Trespasse by Edward Mountague Plaintiff against Richard Jeoffreys and others Defendants for a Trespasse done in certain Lands called Graveland in Hailsham in the County of Sussex the Case upon a special Verdict was thus Sir John Jeoffreys late chief Baron bing seised in his Demesn as of Fee amongst others of the said Land called Graveland having Issue but one only Daughter by his Will in writing devised all his Land of which he was seised in fee except the said Graveland to his said Daughter for 21. years c. and the said Land called Graveland which was then in Lease for divers years to one Nicholas Cobb which years at the time of the death of the said Sir John Geoffreys continued he devised to the said Richard Jeoffreys his Brother and his Heirs and by the same Will he disposed divers Legacies of his Chattels and the Remainder he gave to his said Daughter and made her Executrix of his said Will after which the first Wife of the said Sir John Jeoffreys being dead he covenanted with Mr. George Goring to take the Daughter of the said George to Wife and covenanted with the said George amongst other Lands to assure the said Land called Graveland to the said George Goring and Richard Jeoffreys and their Heirs to the use of the said Sir John Jeoffreys and Mary Goring Daughter of the said George and the Heirs of the said Sir John Jeoffreys by a certain day before which day the marriage being had the said Sir Io Ieoffreys made a Deed and sealed it and delivered it containing a Feoffment of the said Land called Graveland amongst others to the said George Goring and Richard Ieoffreys and their Heirs to the Uses aforesaid in performance of the said Covenants with a Warrant of Attorney to make Livery accordingly and the Attorney made Livery in other parts of the Land and not in Graveland and this was in the name of all the Lands compriâ—â—d in the Deed and the said Nicholas Cobb never attorned to this Deed After which Sir Iohn Ieoffreys interlined in the said Will that the said Mary then his Wife should be joynt Executrix with his Daughter And in the Legacy of the rest of his Goods c. he interlin'd the said Mary his Wife to be Joynt-tenant with his said Daughter without other publication therof and afterward the saâ—d Sir Iohn died the said Daughter being his Heir who took to Husband the said Edward Mountague 4. IN Trespasse the Plaintiff supposeth the Trespasse to be done in the breaking of his House and Close in such a Town the Defendant justifies in a House and Close in the same Town and shews which to put the Plaintiff to his new Assignment to which the Plaintiff replied that the House and Close of which he complains is such a House and gives it a speciall name upon which the Defendant demurs and adjudged that the Plaintiff take nothing by his Writ for albeit a House may have a Curtilage which passeth by the name of a Messuage with the Appurtenances yet this shall not be in this case for by the Bar the Plaintiff is bound to make a speciall demonstration in what Messuage and what Close he supposeth the Trespasse to be done as to say that the House hath a Curtilage the which he broke and
E. 6. with the assent of the Dean and Chapter and by Writing indented demised the said Prebend to the said William Sydall for 43. years from the Feast of the Annunciation of our Lady in the year of our Lord 555. at the yearly rent of 361. William Sydall assigned over his term and died making the said Thomas his Executor Henry Sydall also died and afterwards the Plaintiff was made Prebend and for the rent arrear in his time and after the assignment this Action is brought against the Executors in the Debet and Detinet And it was alledged that in Hillary Term 36 Eliz. Rot. 420. in the case between Glover and Humble it was adjudged in the Kings Bench that the Grantee of the Reversion shall not maintain an Action of Debt upon a Lease for years against the Lessee himself for any arrears of Rent incurred after that he had made an assignment of his Term over to another and alledged also that in Hillary 29 Eliz. in a case between it was adjudged that an Action of Debt lyeth for the Lessor himself against the Lessee for arrearages of Rent reserved upon the Lease and accrued after the Lessee had assigned his Term over and both these cases were adjudged accordingly in the Kings Bench and the reason in the first case was because that by the Grant of the Reversion over the privity of contract which was between the Lessor and the Lessee is dissolved and the Grantee of the Reversion as to it but a stranger But in the last case the privity of contract is not dissolved between the Lessor and the Lessee notwithstanding the Lessee hath passed over his Term neither is the contract therby determined between the parties But Fennor said that in this case the privity in Deed is gone by the death of the Lessee and therfore the Executor who is but privy in Law is not subject to this Action unlesse in case where he hath the Term in which case he shall be charged as he who hath Quid pro quo which is not in the case here And he said further that a Lease made by a Prebend is good no longer then his own life but is meerly void by his death and therfore shall not be said to be a contract to bind further then his life and therfore also he said that the Action will not lye in the said case for the Successor But Gawdy said that here the Lease is confirmed and therfore good during the Term but it seemed to him that the Executor who is but in privy in Law shall not be chargable with this action for the arrearages due after the assignment over and yet he agreed that the Heir the Successor and the Executor of the Lessor shall have debt against the Lessee himself for the arrearages which accrues to be due after the assignment over of the Lease But he said that the Action of Debt against the Executor upon a Lease made to the Testator and for the arrearages due in the time of the Executor ought to be in the Debet and Detinet and that for the occupation of the Term wherby he hath Quid pro quo which is not in this case Popham said that for the time that the contract shall bind in nature of a Contract there is not any difference between thâ— Heir the Successor and the Executor of the Lessor and the Executor or Administrator of the Lessee for the one and the other are equally privy to the Contract and a Contract or Covenant especially being by writing binds as strongly the Executor or Administrator as the Testator or the Iâ—testate himself who made it For these are privies indeed to the Contract and as to it represent the person of the Testator or Intestate himself And he agreed that the Action of Debt against the Executors for the arrearages of Rent of a Lease which he occupies as Executor and accrued in their own time shall be in the Debet and Detinet The reason is although they have the Land as Executor yet nothinâ— ther of shall be â—mpâ—â—yed to the Execution of the Will but such Prâ—fits as are above that which wâ—s to make the Rent and therfore so much of the Profits as is to make or answer the Rent they shall take to their own use to answer the Rent and therfore they having Quid pro quo to wit so much of the Profits for the Rent the action ought to be brought against them in such cases where they are to be charged in Debt for Rent upon a Lease made to the Testator and have not the Profits of the Lease it self nor means nor default in them to come to it the action of Debt ought to be against them in the Detinet only and this is the case here and therfore the action being in the Debet and Detmet doth not lye And further he agreed in this case to the opinion of Fennor that the action here doth not lye for the Successor of the Prevend who made the Lease for no more then the Successor in this case shâ—ll be bound by the Contract of his Predecessor no more shall he take advantage by this Contract for it is the consideration which makes him to be bound and not only the Câ—ntract and so the Successor in such cases is but privy in Law and not in Dâ—ed tâ— the Contract of his Predecessor But otherwise it is â—f the Successor of a Bishop and the like which Leases are not void against the Successor but voidable Case of Armes 2. VPon an assembly of all the Iustices and Barons at Sergeants-Inne this Term on Munday the 15. day of April upon this question mâ—ved by Anderson chief Iustice of the Common Bench Whether men may arme themselves to suppresse Riots Rebellions or to resist Enemies and to endeavour themselves to suppresse or resist such Disturbers of the Peace or quiet of the Realm and upon good deliberation it was resolved by them all that every Iustice of Peace Sheriff and other Minister or other Subject of the King where such accident happen may do it And to fortifie this their resolution they perused the Statute of 2 E 3. cap. 3. which enacts that none be so hardy as to come with force or bring forcâ— to any place in affray of the Peace nor to go or ride armed night nor day unlesse hâ— be Servant to the King in his presence and the Ministers of the King in the execution of his Precepts or of their Office and these who are in their company assisting them or upon cry made for Weapons to keep the Peace and this in such places where accident happen upon the penalty in the same Statute contained wherby it appeareth that upon cry made for Weapons to keep the Peace every man where such accidents happen for breaking the Peace may by the Law arme himself against such evill Doers to keep the Peace But they take it to be the more discreet way for every one in such a case
given for the Defendant The same Term in the same Court. Laurking and Wildes Case THe Rector of the Church of livelled in the spirituall Court for the Tithes of a riding Nag where the case was That a man let his Land reserving the running of a Horse at some time when he had occasion Tithes for a riding Nag to use him there The Defendant shewed this matter in the Court by his Counsell and prayed a Prohibition and avers that for the same Land in which the Horse went he paid Tithes And by the Court nigh London a man will take a 100. or 200. Horses to Grasse now he shall pay Tithes for them or otherwise the parson shall be defeated But in this case if the Defendant alledge and prove that it was a Nag for labour and not for profit a Prohibition lies The same Term in the same Court. Havergall versus Hare IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Havergal against Hare the Case was thus Afterwards fol 55. A Rent of 20 l. per annum was granted out of Green acre to one and his Heirs to be paid at Michaelmas and the Annunciation of our Lady by equall portions and the Grantor covenants that if the Rent of 20 l. be arrear by the space of twenty daies that the Grantee may distâ—ain and that if there be not sufficient distresse upon the Land or iâ— there be a Rescous Replevin or Pound-breach that then it shall be lawfull for the Grantee and his Heirs to enter and retain the Land to them and their Heirs untill the 20 l. be paid 10 l. for one half years Rent was in arrear and for it an entry was made Mountague chief Iustice and Doderidge Iustice there can be no entry made when 10 l. only is behind for the words of the Deed are that if the Rent of 20 l. be behind that the Grantee and his Heirs may enter and if he shall enter now he shall retain the Land for ever for the 20 l. shall never be paid Crook and Haughton Iustices contrary for if 10 l. be arrear the Rent of 20 l. is arrear for Haughton said In an Assise of Rent of 40 l. where part is arrear yet he ought to bring his Assise for the whole Rent of 40 l. for the Writ ought to agree with the Deed. Doderidge agreed with him in the case of an Assise but not in the principall point And for the second point it was agreed by them all that upon the entry of the Grantee he shall have a Fee-simple determinable admitting the entry for the 10 l. to be good The same Term in the same Court and it is entred 14 Jac. Rot. 1484. Robinson versus Walter RObinson brought an Action of Trover and Conversion against Walter and upon the whole matter the case appeared to be this A Stranger took the horse of the Plaintiff and sent him to a common Inn and there he remained for the space of half a year at which time the Plaintiff had notice where his Horse was and therupon he demanded him of the Inn-keeper who answered that a person unknown left the Horse with him and said that he would not deliver the Hoâ—se to the Plaintiff unlesse he would pay for his meat which came to 3 l. 10 s. for all the time and also would prove that it was his Horse upon which the Plaintiff demurred in An Inn-keeper may detain a Horse untill he be satisfied for meat albeit he be left by a stranger Law And it was resolved by Mountague chief Iustice Crook and Doderidge Iustices Haughton Iustice dissenting that the Defendants plea was good for the Inn-keeper was compellable to keep the Horse and not bound at his peril to take notice of the Ownder of the Horse And by the custom of Lond. if a horse be brought to a common Inn wher he hath as it is commonly said eaten out his head it is lawfull for the Inn-keeper to sell him which case of the custom implies this case And there is a difference where the Law compels a man to do a thing and where not As if the Lievtenant of the Tower brings an Action of debt for Dyet against one who was his Prisoner in this case the Defendant cannot wage his Law because the Law compels the Lievtenant to give Victuals to his Prisoner otherwise if another man brings an Action of debt for Dyet and in the case at the Bar the Inn-keeper was compellable And Doderidge said that if the Law were as the Plaintiff would have it it were a pretty trick for one who wants a keeping for his Horse And Mich. 6 â—ac in the Kings Bench between Harlo and Ward the like was resolved as was cited by Barkesdels of Counsell with the Defendant Mich. 14. Jac. In the Kings Bench. Rawlinson versus Green A Copyholder surrendred out of Court according to the custom of the Mannor which at the next Court was presented and entry therof made by the Steward Scilicet Compertum est per homagium c. but no admittance Afterwards Cestuy que use surrenders before admittance and the first Copyholder surrenders to the Plaintiff And in this case there were two questions 1. Whether he may surrender before admittance 2. Who shall have the Land whether the first Copyholder or the Lord Haughton Iustice held that he could not surrender before admittance and the entry of the surrender doth not make an admittance for this being the A â—urâ—ender of Copyhold cannot surrender before admittance sole act of the Steward shall not bind the Lord and it is not like to the usuall foâ—m of an admittance for that is Dat Domino de fine fecit fiâ—elitatem admissus est inde tenens Doderidge Iustice agreed and said that in Hare and Brickleys case the admittance of a Copyholder was compared to the induction to a Benefice which gives the possession Hillary 14. Jac. In the Kings Bench. Sir John Pools Case Three Executors brought an Action of Debt and one only declared and they were ready for a triall in the Country and now it was moved that the Declaration might be amended and the names of the other Executors incerted but per Curiam this cannot be without the assent of the parties Pasch 15. Iac. In the Kings Bench. Cooper versus Smiths AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words viz Waterman Action for these words Thou hast killed thy Masteâ—s Cook and thou Innuende the Plaintiff hast killed thy Masters Cook Innuende c. and I will bring thee in question for thy life And after Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment by the Counsell of the Defendant that the words were not actionable for the incertainty inasmuch as it doth not appear who was his Master nor that his Master had a Cook Mountague chief Iustice said that the words were actionable and albeit Inâ—uendo cannot maâ—e a thing that is uncertain certain an Innuendo cannot make a
of the Bailment But Haughton being contra therfore Curia advisare vult The same Term in the same Court The Earl of Shrewsburies Case VPon a Verdict a rule was given to have Iudgment and this was upon the Thursday and upon Sâ—â—uâ—day after thâ— party that was Plaintiff died and it was moved to have a Writ of Error because it was said that the party died before Iudgment in as much as of course aâ—ter the Verdict and the â—ule given for Iudgment there are four daies given to speak in Arrest In the diâ—cretion of the chief â—ustice to allow a Writ of Error The entry of a Iudgment how it shall relate of Iudgment â—â—o so as Yelverton Attorney-generall said he died before Iudgment absolutely given and he moved the Court to have a Supersedeas And it was agreed that it wâ—s in the discretion of the chief Iustice Ex officio to allow a Writ of Error but because it was a cause of great consequence he took the advice of the Court and it was agreed that a Writ of Error was a Supersedeas in it self yet it is good to have a Supersedeas also and if the Writ of Error had been allowed the Court could not deny the party a Supersedeas But because the Writ of Error was not allowed and also because no Error appeared to the Court for where Iudgment is entred this shall relate to the time of the rule given It was resolved that no Writ of Error should be allowed nor any Supersedeas granted The same Term in the same Court. Rones Case IN an Ejectione firmae brought by the Lessee of Rone Incumbent of the Church of Dallinghoe in Com. Suff. It was found by speciall Verdict that the King was the true Patron and that Wingfeild entred a Caveat in vita Incumbentis he then lying in Extremis scilicet Caveat Episcopus ne quis admittatur c. Nisi Convocatus the said Wingfeild the Incumbent dies Naunton a stranger presents one Morgan who is admitted and instituted afterwards the said Wingfeild presents one Glover who is instituted and inducted and afterwards the said Rone procure a presentation from the King who was instituted and inducted and then it came in question in the Spirituall Court who had the best right and there sentence was given that the first institution was Irrita vacua inanis by reason of the Caveat then the Church being full of the second Incumbent the King was put out of possession and so his presentment void But it was adjudged and resolved by all the Court for Rone for 1. It was resolved that this Caveat was void because it was in the life of the Incumbent 2. The Church upon the Institution of Morgan was full against all but the King and so agreed many times in the Books and then the presentation of Glover was void by reason of the super-institution and therfore no obstacle in the way to hinder the presentation of Rone and therfore Rone had good right And if the second institution be void the sentence cannot make it good for the Spirituall Court ought to take notice of the Common Law which saith that Ecclesia est plena consulta upon the institution and the person hath therby Curam animarum And as Doderidge Iustice said he hath by it Officium but Beneficium comes by the Induction And although by the Spirituall Law the institution may be disannulled by sentence yet as Linwood saith Aliter est in Anglia who is an Author very well approved of amongst the Civilians And Doderidge put a case out of Doctor and Studient the second Book If a man devise a summ of money to be paid to I. S. when he cometh to full age and afterwards he sues for it in the Spirituall Court they ought to take notice of the time of full age as it is used by the Common Law to wit 21. and not of the time of full age as it is used amongst them to wit 25. So in this case at the Bar for when these two Laws met together the Common Law ought to be preferred And when the Parson hath institution the Arch-deacon ought to give him Induction And see Dyer 293. Bedingfeilds case cited by Haughton to accord with this case The same Term in the same Court Taylors Case JOhn Taylor a Citizen and Alderman of Glocester was put out of his place by the Common Counsel of the City for some misdemeanor and he sued out a Writ of Restitution and for that the cause of his displacing was not sufficient Writ of Restitution for an Aldermans place his Writ was allowed by reason wherof the other Alderman who was elected in his place was to be removed for the number of Aldermen was full But Hazard another Alderman to the end that the new elect who now was Major should not be displaced was contented to surrender his place in consideration of 10 l. a year granted to him by the Corporation for term of his life with which the Wife of Hazard was not content and therfore he would have left his agreement And therupon the question was whether he might surrender or not And it was said by Coventree Sollicitor that he cannot and he cited Middlecots case an Alderman of B. where the opinion of the Court was 13 Eliz. that he cannot surrender Doderidge perhaps they would not except his surrender Mountague said that Alderman Martin of London gave up his Aldermans place and without question any man in such a case may surrender or leave his place to which the Court agreed and therfore it was ordered that Hazard shall have his 10 l. a year and that he shall stand to his first agreement The same Term in the same Court. May and Samuels Case AN action of Debt was brought upon an Obligation the Condition wherof was to stand to the Arbitrement of John S. concerning all matters between them to the time of the submission who arbitrates that the one shall pay 20 s. and that the other shall make a generall release to him of all matters from the beginning of the world to the time of the arbitrement Arbitrement Haughton Iustice this is an arbitrement but of one part and therfore void but if it had been only that the one shall pay 20 s. it may be good for it shall be intended that the other by reasonable construction shall be discharged or acquitted to which Crook and Doderidge Iustices agreed But by Mountague chief Iustice it ought to be specified yet they all agreed and so it was adjudged that this was a void arbitrement for it was of the one part only to wit that he shall pay 20 s. for the other part for the release to the time of the arbitrement was not within the submission so if the arbitrement had been that the one shall make a release or shall be discharged or acquitted without speaking of the other this being on the one part only is a void arbitrement vide
grants over the Reversion the first Lessee dies and the Grantee of the Reversion brings a Writ of Covenant against his Executors In which case there were two points 1. Whether these words And the said Lessee his Executors Administrators and Assigns shall from time to time c. make a Covenant or Whether Covenant lies against the Executor of a Lessee after assignment no. 2. Whether as this case is it will lye against the Executors of the Lessee As to the first point it was agreed that it is a Covenant for being by Indenture it is the words of both parties and it is more strong being in the case of the Queen Haughton laid that 25 H. 8. Tit. Covenant Covenant will lye against a Lessee after assignment but Debt lyeth not for Rent after the Lessee hath accepted the Assignee for his Tenant and therfore it seems that by the expresse words of the Covenant that the Action lies Doderidge Iustice contra for between the Queen and the Lessee there is privity of Contract and also of Estate so that the Queen her Heirs and Successors might have had an action against the Lessee or his Executors upon the privity of Contract and where the Lessee â—ssigns over the privity of Contract remains but the privity of Estate is gone to the Assignee and now when the Queen grants over the Reversion the privity of Contract is utterly determined wherby the Action of Covenant cannot be maintained against the first Lessee or his Executors who are more remote to which Mountague chief Iustice agreed see 2 H. 4. 6. 6. H. 4. 1. and Co. lib. 3. Walkers case and the Iudgments there cited Et adjournator The same Term in the same Court. Bennet versus Westbeck THe Case was thus Tenant for life Remainder for life Reversion in Fee he in Remainder for life gives his Deed of Demise with the assent of the first Tenant for life upon the Land to a stranger in the absence of the Lessor and said that he surrendred to him in Reversion And it was said that this Surrender being without Deed was not good to him who was absent and to confirm it the case was put out of 27 H. 8. Where Mountague chief Iustice said that if a Feoffment be made to four and Livery is made to one in the absence of the other but in name of all if it be by Deed this shall enure to all but if it be without Deed then only to him to whom the Livery was made So here this Surrender doth not enure to him in the Reversion being absent Whether Tenant for life in Remainder may surrender without Deed. But Non aliocatur for the sole point now in question was whether he in Remainder for life can surrender without Deed and as to it this Rule was taken viz. That that which cannot commence without Deed cannot be granted without Deed as a Rent Reversion common Advowson c. as 19 H. 6. 33. 14 H 7. 3. 1 2. Ph. Mar. 110. 22. Ass Pl. 16. But in this case this took effect by Livery and not by Deed and therfore might be determined without Deed. Mountague and Haughton agreed that it might be surrendred without Deed because it had its beginning without Deed but it could not be granted over without Deed. Doderidge Iustice said that it could not be surrendred without Deed but he said that Tenant in possession may or Tenant for life and he in Remainder together may surrender to him in the Reversion but this shall innure as two severall Surrenders first of him in Remainder to the Tenant for life and then by the Tenant for life to him in the Reversion Crook Iustice agreed with Doderidge for the Estate of him in Possession is an Estoppell to the Surrender so that it could not be surrendred without Deed. The same Term in the same Court. Thurman versus Cooper IN an Ejectione firmae brought by John Thurman against William Cooper upon the whole matter the case was thus Lands were given to a man and woman who afterwards inter-marry and to their Heirs and Assigns Habendum to them and to the Heirs of their two bodies engendered the remainder to them and the Survivor of them with warranty to them and their Heirs and Assigns for ever And the question was what Estate this shall be whether an Estate-tail or Fee-simple or a Fee-tail with a simple Expectant And it was said that this shall be an Estate-tail only for the Habendum qualifies the generall words precedent and with this agrees Perkins 35. b. and Co. lib. 8. 154. b. Althams case But it was answered and resolved by the whole Court that this is a Fee-tail with a Fee-simple expectant and they observed these Rules 1. That every Deed shall be taken most strong against him that made it 2. That every Deed shall be construed according to the intent of the maker so that all the parts may be effectuall if they can stand together with the Rules of Law 40 E. 3. 5 Percy saith that it is a Fee-simple 21 H. 6. 7. that it is an Estate-tail with a Fee-simple expectant Dyer 160. and Plow Paramore and Yardleys case the Law shall make an order of words where there is no order put by the parties and the words after the Remainder limited are Tenendum de Capitalibus Dominis feodi c. and therfore it ought to be a Fee-simple for if it were a Fee-tail he should hold of the Donor as it is in Co. lib. 6. Sir John Molins case and other Books And although the Warranty cannot inlarge an Estate yet this expresses his intent to passe a Fee-simple and the Law shall make a construction that the Fee-tail shall precede upon which the Fee-simple shall be expectant according to that which is before said in Paramore and Yardleys case Doderidge If the Habendum had been to a stranger the Premisses had been but a Tail as 7 H. 4. for otherwise the Habendum shall be void But if Land be given to one and his Heirs viz. In Tail or if the said Donce dye without Issue of his body this had been but an Estate-tail only because it immediatly checks and confirms the Premisses to which Haughton agreed Et adjournator The same Term in the same Court. Powels Case POwel an Vtter-Barister of the Temple and also Town-Clark of Plimoth brought an Action upon the Case against for these Words That he was a Puritan Knave a precise Knave a bribing Knave a corrupted Knave c. words The Defendant supposing that the Plaintiff had wronged him in the Court of Plimoth said that he was a Puritan Knave a precise Knave a bribing Knave a corrupted Knave and that he would make him answer for that which he had done in another place And after Verdict for the Plaintiff it was now moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the words were not actionable because he doth not scandalize him in his Profession by which he acquires his
Living And Mountague chief Iustice said that this word Bribing doth not import that he took a Bribe and therfore this word and all the other words but corrupted Knave are idle but these words impeacheth him in his Office for it hath reference to that and therfore is actionable And Iudgment was given accordingly The same Term in the same Court Sir Baptist Hickes Case in the Star Chamber SIr Baptist Hickes having done divers Pions and Charitable Acts to wit had founded at Camden in Glocestershire an Hospitall for twelve poor and impotent men and women and had made in the same Town a new Bell tunable to others a new Pulpit and adorned it with a Cushion and Cloath and had bestowed cost on the Sessions House in Middlesex c. one Austin Garret a Copyholder of his Mannor of Camden out of private malice had framed and writ a malicious and invective Letter to him in which in an ironicall and deriding manner he said that the said Sir Baptist had done these charitable works as the proud Pharisee for vain-glory and oftentation and to have popular applause and further in approâ—rtous manner taxed him with divers other unlawfull Acts And it was resolved by the Court that for such private Letters an Action upon the case doth not lye at Common Law for he cannot prove his case to wit the publishing of it but because Where a private Letter is punishable as a Libell it tends to the breach of the Peace it is punishable in this Court and the rather in this case because it tends to a publike wrong for if it should be unpunished it would not only deter and discourage Sir Baptist from doing such good Acts but other men also who are well disposed in such cases and therfore as the Arch-bishop observed this was a wrong 1. To Piety in respect of the cost bestowed on the Church 2. To charity in regard of the Hospitall 3. To Iustice in consideration of the Session House and these things were the more commendable in Sir Baptist because he did them in his life time For as Mountague chief Iustice observed they who do such acts by their Will do shew that they have no will to do them for they cannot keep their Goods any longer And he only took a diversity where such a Letter concerns publike matter as they did or private in which case it is not punishable But the Lord Coke said that it was the opinion of the Iudges in the Lord Treasurers case when he was Attorney that such a private Letter was punishable in this Court and therupon he had instructions to exhibit an Information but the Lord Treasurer Jacens in extremis was content to pardon him and so it was resolved between Wooton and Edwards And Sir Francis Bacon Lord Chancellor said that the reason why such a private Letter shall be punished is because that it in a manner enforceth the party to whom the Letter is directed to publish it to his friends to have their advice and for fear that the other party would publish it so that this compulsary publication shall be deemed a publication in the Delinquent and in this case the party was fined at 500 l. The same Term in the same Court. Bernard versus Beale AN Action upon the case was brought for these words viz. That the Words That the Plaintiff had two Bastards 36. yeaâ—s since Plaintiff had two Bastards 36. years ago upon the report wherof he was in danger to have been divorced And it was resolved that for Defamation there was no remedy but in the Spirituall Court if he had no temporall lesse therby and therfore it is not sufficient to ground an Action to say that he was in danger to be diverced but thâ—t he was De facto divorced or that he wâ—s to have a presentment in marriage as it is in Anne Devies case Co. lib. 4. The same Term in the same Court. Brabin and Tradums Case THe Case was That the Church-wardens of D. had used time out of mind to dispose and order all the Seats of the Church wherupon they disposed of a Seat to one and the Ordinary granted the same Seat to another and his A Prohibition for a Seat in the Church Heirs and excommunicated all others who afterwards should sit in the Seat and a Prohibition was prayed and granted for this grant of a Seat to one and his Heirs is not good for the Seat doth not belong to the person but to the house for otherwise when the person goes out of the Town to dwell in another place yet he shall retain the Seat which is no reason and also it is no reason to excommunicate all others that should sit there for such great punishments should not be imposed upon such small Offenders an Excommunication being Traditio diabola In the same Term in the same Court. Fulcher versus Griffin THe Parson of D. covenanted with one of his Parishoners that he should A Parson covenant that his Parishoners shall pay no Tithes pay no Tithes for which the Parishoner covenanted to pay to the Parson an annuall summ of money and afterwards the Tithes not being paid the Parson sued him in the Court Christian and the other prayed a Prohibition And it was agreed that if no interest of Tithes passe but a bare Covenant then the party who is sued for the Tithes hath no remedy but a Writ of Covenant And the better opinion of the Court in this case was that this was a bare Covenant and that no interest in the Tithes passe The custody of a Copyholder that was a Lunatick was committed to Darcies case in the Common Pleas. I. S. and for Trespasse done upon his Land it was demanded of the Court in whose name J. S. should bring the action and their opinion was that it should be in the name of the Lunatick Trinity 16. Jac. In the Kings Bench. The Earl of Northumberlands Case THe Earl of Northumberland being seised of the Mannor of Thistleworth in which he had a Leet to be holden twice a year to wit within a moneth after Easter and a moneth after Michaelmas and Henry Devell being a Free-holder of the said Mannor erected a new Dove-coat at Heston within the Precinct of the said Leet which was presented at the Leet for a common Nusance for which Devell was amerced 40 s. and was commanded to remove it upon pain of 10 l. for the which a Distresse was taken by Henry Sanders and others as Bailiffs to the said Earl wherupon Devell brought a Replevin and they made Avowry and justified as Bayliffs and prescribed that they used to make by-laws to redresse common Nusances and also prescribed in the Distresse And the point in question was whether the new erecting of a Dove-coat by a Free-holder were a common Nusance punishable Whether the erecting of a Dove-coat be a common Nusance in the Leet And it was resolved by the whole Court upon
great deliberation viz. Mountague chief Iustice Crook Doderidge and Haughton Iustices that it was not a common Nusance either punishable or inquirable in a Leet and by Haughton a man hath Jus proprietatis privilegii in the Doves 1. Propriety in respect of the place as 22 H. 6. 39. Trespasse lies for taking a Goshawk in respect of the place as 3 H. 6. 55. For Hares and Spencers case in Dyer and so of other things which are Ferae naturae And if a Deer goes out of a Park albeit it be in the Kings case yet it is lawfull for the Owner of the Sail to take it if it be in the place where the Deer bath chase and re-chase And by the Register and Fitzherbert it appears that Trespasse lies Quaere columbare fregit Columbas cepit But 16 E. 4. 7. Trespasse doth not lye for killing of Doves but there is a Quaere of an action upon the case and because the Doves do no Trespasse neither is there any remedy for the killing of them therfore they are no common Nusance for by Brook 34 H. 6. Brooks action upon the case the common custom is the common Law and there is no authority against it but Co. lib. 5. 104. Boulstons case which is only on the byâ— and is not agreeing with the reason of the principall and this confirms my opinion Quod fiat concessum per totam Curiam for there the principall case was that a man made Cony-burrows and the Conies strayed into his Neighbors grounds and adjudged that it was not actionable but it was lawfull for any man to kill them upon his own ground so here c. Doderidge It may be a hurt to the Common-wealth but not a publike Nusance for that ought to be immediate or generall 1. Immediate it cannot be for the erecting of a Dove-coat cannot in it self be a Nusance 2. It is not generall but particular to the Neighbouring Inhabitants And it hath been allowed of all sides that a man may have a Dove-coat by prescription which could not be if it were a Nusance to which Mountague agreed And it is lawfull for any man to kill the Doves upon his own Land but they must be ware that they do it not against any Statute for Doves are preserved by many Statutes as by the Statute of Wales made in the time of E. 1. and the Statute of 18 E. 2. gives directions that the killing of Doves shall be presented at the Leet And the Statute of 18 Eliz. ordains that Doves shall not be shot 3. However the Replevin lies for a fault in the pleading for the harm and nusance which the Doves do is laid to be Per totam patriam wheras it ought to be within the Precinct of the Leet to which Mountague agreed Crook A man hath property in the Doves only by the Possession for being at large they are Nullius in bonis and when they are in his possession to wit in the Dove-coat they do no harm to any and it was lately ruled in this Câ—uâ—t that a man cannot lay Loggs in the Kings high way although there be sufficient room for Passengers because it is a wrong to have the high way strained so here a Prescription should not be good if it were a Nusance for it is all one to erect a great Dove-coat or a little one for a Nusance Non recipit magis aut minus And Bolstons case rather confirms then encreaseth my doubt and so I agree with my Brethren Mountague A man hath Jus duplex in Doves 1. Jus proprietatis 2. Jus privilegii for they fly to and again and as Bracton saith have Animum revertendi and so have not other things which are Ferox naturae And it is a good Argument that this matter was never questioned for it is without question Littleton saith in the case of Disparagement 21 E. 3. 4. They of the Leet ought to enquire of such things as have been enquirable yet the excesse therof is restrainable by the Iustices of Assise A Precipe lies of a Dove-coat as appears by the Verse Mich. Col. and Dower and Partition lies therof which shews it to be lawfull and by the Excesse of Dove-coats restrainable by the Iustices of Assise Book of 17 E. 4. 7. It seems that it is not lawfull to take Doves And as a man cannot prescribe to do a Nusance so the King cannot licence one to do it And therfore I agree that Iudgment shall be given for the Dove-coat The same Term in the same Court. Richardson versus Cabell RIchardson being a Parson libelled against Cabell in the Spirituall Court for Tithes because the said Cabell being an Inn-keeper took all the benefit of his Pasture by putting in Guest Horses into his Pasture wherupon Cabell prayed a Prohibition and it was not granted for it is Tithable in this case But if Cabell had taken a crop of Hay and afterwards he had put Guest Horses into the Pasture in that case it had not been Where tithes shall be paid for grasse of guest Horses Tithable for he had his Tithe before and therby it should seem that some Crop is not Tithable The same Term in the same Court. Southern versus How RAlph Southern Plaintiff in an Action upon the Case against Robert How shews for his case That the Defendant being a Goldsmith in London and having Counterfeit Iewels knowing them to be counterfeit sent William Saldock his Servant with them to the Plaintiff being a Merchant in Barbary to use him for the sale of the Iewels to the King of Barbary and the Plaintiff therupon sold them to the King of Barbary for 800 l. and Saldock having received the said money went from thence And the Iewels being afterwards discovered to be counterfeit the Plaintiff was taken and enforced by Imprisonment to make restitution of the money to the said King But it was said by the Court that the Verdict did not prove the case for it was found that the Defendant did not command his Servant to make use of the Plaintiff nor to sell to the King but generally to any And that the Iewels were of some worth Scil. 80 l. And it was agreed at the Bar by Davenport that in this case the action well lies for the Master shall answer for Where a Master shall be answerable for his Servant and where not his Servant Dyer 151. the Lord Norths case 5 E. 4. 1. the Sheriff shall be amerced for the ill return of his Bailiff And if I command my Servant to kill one who commands another in this case the Master shall not be punished but in Trespasse all are principals and 2 H. 4. 18. If a Servant burns his Masters house wherby another house is burnt there the Master shall answer for it for 14 H. 8. 31. b. an Action upon the case lies where there is no other action provided for such a thing so that an action well lies in this case and see
levied yet the Vse shall be directed by the originall Indenture and therfore 6 Rich. 2. A Feoffment is made to two and their Heirs and afterwards a Fine is levied upon it for further assurance to the use of them and the Heirs of one of them yet it shall go to the use of both for it shall be respected according to the original agreement where there are divers assurances for the perfecting of one and the same thing 16 E. 3. tit Age. A Daughter had a Seigniory by descent a Tenancy Escheats a Son is born he shall have the Land see Sharoes case in 4 Mar. Dyer and in Chadleighs case all looks to the originall agreement and therfore variance of time shall not hinder the originall agreement as 33. Ass the Servant inâ—ends to kill his Master and afterwards the Master puts him out of his Service and then he kills him this shall be petty Treason in the Servant 28 H. 6. Two are bound in a Bond at severall times and yet he shall declare against both as upon the first delivery 11 H. 7. it is adjudged that if a Deed be delivered by an Infant and afterwards it is again delivered when he comes of full age And see Mallories case Finches case and Borastons case Nunc tunc quando are a demonstration of the time and not of the matter and so they concluded that the Vse shall rise upon the first Indenture and not upon the Fine or Replevin brought but Doderidge and Haughton Iustices contra Trin. 17. Jac. In the Kings Bench. Silvesters Case JOhn Silvester promised to John B. that if he would marry his Daughter that he would give with her a Childs part and that at the time of his death he would give to her as much as to any of his Children excepting his eldest Son and afterwards he made his Executors and died I. B. brought an action upon the case against the Executors upon this Promise and shewed that the Executor had not given him a Childs part and that such a younger Son of the Testators had a 100 l. given him And it was resolved by the Court that the promise of a Childs part is altogether incertain but being so much as any of his Children had and then shewing that the younger Son had a 100 l. this was certain enough and therupon Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court. Godfrey and Owen COrnelius Godfrey was Plaintiff in an action upon the case for Words He is a very Varlet and seeks to supâ—res his brothers Will c. words against Owen Defendant and the words were these to wit He is a very Varlet and seeks to suppresse his Broâ—hers Will he makes shew of Religion but he is a very Hypocrite And the words were spâ—ken of a Merchant to one who gave him much credite in his Trade Mountague chief Iustice said that the words which are actionable in such a case ought to touch the Plaintiff in his Profession which these do not do Et relata ad personam intelligi debent secundum conditionem personae for in the suppressing of his Brothers Will the case might be such that he might well do it for perhaps there may be an after Will made And for calling him Hypocrite lies not in the conusance of the Common Law for GOD only can judge of the heart of man and therfore these words do not touch the Plaintiff as he is a Merchant Doderidge Iustice Words ought to tend some way to the ruine of the party or otherwise they are not actionable and Iudgment was given Quod quere nil capiat per billam Mich. 17. Jac. In the Star Chamber Sis John Bingleys Case IN Sir John Bingleys case in the Star Chamber it was resolved by the two chief Iustices Mountague and Hobart and agreed by the Lord Verulam Lord Chancellor and Sir Edward Coke that if an Information be exhibited there which begins with divers particular misdemeanours and conclude in the generall that 1. The matter included in the generall charge ought to be Ejusdem generis 2. They ought to exceed the particulars expressed in number 3. They ought not to be greater or more capitall wherupon Mountague cited the Statute which speaks of Deans and other Spirituall persons upon which it hath been resolved that Bishops are not within it for they are of a higher degree and the principall reason of these rules was because that a man cannot possibly make a defence because he knews not what will be objected against him and upon this Sir John Bingley was discharged at this time for the most transcendent Offence that was objected against him to wit concerning Captain Baugh and other Pirates to whom the King of his grace and bounty had given 200 l. to make them Loyall Subjects But Sir John Bingley Colore officii had defrauded them of almost An Officer â— his own wrong all of it for the want wherof some of them died miserably and the rest became Pirates again But Sir John Bingley made many protestations of his innocence in this mâ—tter And it was holden also that one might be an Officer of his own wrong as their might be an Executor of his own wrong And this was Sir John Bingleys case for somthing in the information for he committed Extortion Colore officii The same Term in the Star Chamber THe Attorney-generall put in an Information against divers Dutch Merchants for buying and transporting of many great summs of Gold and Silver Bullion And it was said by the Court that divers Statutes had been made for redresse of this mischief as the Statute of 5 R. 2. the Offenders wherof ought to forfeit all they may and by another Statute in 17 E. 4. this Offence was made Felony to continue for seven years But the Court would not now punish them upon any Statute for it was an offence at common To carry Gold and Silver out of the Realm punishable at Common Law Law and therfore punishable in this Court And Sir Edward Coke said that if any be to be punisht upon a penal Statute it ought to be within two or three years at least after the offence committed for the Informer hath but a year to sue and the King two years for the most part The Statutes of 37 E. 3. and 5 E. 6. Prohibite the buying of Coin and that it is so at the Common Law see 21 E. 3. 60. and Plow 215. and not only he that buyes but he that sels also offends in it for it is a Prerogative only belonging to the King and it is his Coin and none can put a value upon it but himself which is a Flower of his Crown Hobart chief Iustice of the Common Pleas as one shall be punished for ingrossing any Commodity a Fortiori one shall be punished for ingrossing and buying of a great quantity of money all other Commodities being thereby ingrossed for money is the Mistresse of commerce Pecunia
my Furze And after Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment thâ—t these words were not actionable But it wâ—s said on the other side that to say thou art a Theef is actionable and the subsequent words are in the Copulative and enure as a confirmation of the precedent words But if it had been for Thou hast stoln my Furze this had been â—n explanation of the precedent words and therfore in that case the action would not have been And it was answered and resolved by the Court that the word and in some cases shall be taken as the word for and so it shall be in this case and therfore adjudged that the action lies Mich. 22. Jac. In the Star Chamber TWo men came Ore tenus into the Star Chamber for stealing of the Kings Deer and were fined a 100 l. a peece and three years Imprisonment unlesse it would please he King to release them sooner and before Fines in the Star Chamber for killing the Kings Deer they should be released of their Imprisonment to be bound to their good behaviour And it was observed by the Attorney-generall that the offence was the greater in regard that the King had but one darling pleasure and yet they would offend him in that And it was said by some of the Court that it was a great folly and madnesse in the Defendants to hazard themselves in such a manner for a thing of so small value as a Deer was The Lord President said that Mr. Attorney was the best Keeper the King had of his Parks in regard he brings the Offenders into this Court to be punished The Lord Keeper said that the Defendants in such a case being brought Ore tenus â—re not allowed to speak by their Counsell and yet these men have had their Counsell but it was Peters Counsellors meaning their sorrow and contrition at the Bar which much moved him so that if his vete might prevail he would set but 20 l. fine upon them In the same Term in the same Court THe Lord Morley and Sir Richard Mollineax being beyond Sea their Sollicitor in their names exhibited a scandalous Bill in the Star Chamber against the Bishop of Chichister and after their return this continued so for three years without any disclaiming therof by them and now the matter being questioned they said that it was not done with their privity But because they had not disclaimed the Fact before they were fined a 100 l. to the King and a 100 l. to the Bishop for Damages and the Bill was to be taken of the File The same Term in the same Court. Lewes Plaintiff versus Jeoffreys and others Defendants THe Plaintiffs Brother had been a Suitor to a woman which matter proceeded to a Contract and afterwards the Defendant Jeoffreys hapned to be a Suitor to her also wherupon being Rivalls they fell out and the Plaintiffs Brother called the Defendant Jackanapes which was taken very ill by the Defendant being a Iustice of Peace in the County of Worcester and the other being but a mean man in respect of him so that he told him that if he would meet him on Horse-back he would fight with him afterwards one of the Sons of the Defendant went to the said Brother being upon his own Land and gave him a mortall wound wherupon a friend on the behalf of the party wounded came to the Defendant being a Iustice of Peace and brought him a peece of his Skull to the end that his Son should be forth coming at the next Assises declaring to him the danger of death the man was in wherupon the Defendant took a Recognisance of 10 l. of his Son and of his sureties of 5 l. a peece to answer this at the next Assise And in the mean time the party died of the said wound and the Son did not appear at the Assises and the Iudges of Assise fined the Defendant 100 l. for taking such slender security for the appearance of his Son which was paid and yet notwithstanding the Defendant was fined 200 l. more for this offence and also 200 l. for his misdemeanor in his challenge albeit the Defendant A Challenge fined in the Star Chamber was of the age of 63 years and so it seems that he intended to fight with him But he being a Iustice of Peace who is Conservator pacis he did against his oath to do any thing which may tend to the breach of the Peace And for the other matter it was said by the Court that the Defendant being Father to the offendor it had been better for him to have referred this matter to another Iustice of Peace or at least to have had the assistance of another And the party being in such great danger of death his son was not bailable Hillary 1. Car. In the Kings Bench. Bowyer versus Rivet THe case was thus Sir William Bowyer 12. Jac. recovered against Sir Thomas Rivet in an Action of debt Sir William made his wife his Exceutrix and died the wife made Bowyer her Executor and died then Sir Thomas Rivet died Bowyer brought a Scire facias to have execution upon the Iugment against Sir Thomas Rivet the younger as Heir apparant to the Land to him descended from Sir Thomas Rivet who pleaded Riens per descent from Sir Thomas Rivet and it was found that he had two acres and a half of Land by discent and it was prayed by Goldsmith that Iudgment might be given against Sir Thomas Rivet generally for he said that this false Plea shall charge him and his own Lands and cited Plowden 440. where in debt against an Heir upon his false Plea his own Lands shall become liable to the debt and Co. lib. 3. 11. b. Sir William Herberts case where the case was upon a Scire facias against the Heir as it is in this case But on the other part it was argued by Richardson the Kings Serjeant Banks and all the Iustices that Execution shall be awarded in no other manner against the Heir then it should be against his Ancestor or other Purchasor to wit of a Moyety of that which he had by discent for as much as in this case he cannot be to this purpose charged as Heir but he ought to be charged as Ter-tenant and as a Purchasor and a Purchasor shall never hurt himself but his false Plea And Banks argued that the Heir in this case is charged as a Purchasor and the false Plea of a Purchasor shall never charge himself 33 E. 3. Fitz. Execution 162. and 6 E 3. 15. and that in this case he is charged as Ter-tenant appears by three reasons 1. Debt will not lye against an Heir but where he is bound as Heir but in this case Execution is to be sued against him as another Ter-tenant Dyer 271. 11 E. 3. 15. and in 27 H. 6. Execution 135. and Co. lib. 3. 12. b. That in Iudgment upon Debt or Recognisance the Heir is charged and
very plain case Crew chief Iustice agreed and in his argument he affirmed what Jones said that a generall Iudgment shall not be given against the Heir if he do not plead falsly that he hath no Assets and not upon Nihil dicit And so Iudgment was given that the Plaintiff shall have Execution of the Moyety of the Lands discended to the Defendant and so note the diversity of debt against the Heir and Scire facias against the Heir Dickenson versus Greenhow Hill 1. Car. In the Kings Bench Intr. Hill 18. Jac. Rot. 189. IN an Attachment upon a Prohibition the Plaintiff declared that where Robert the last Abbot of Cokersham in Lancashire was seised in Fee of three acres of Land parcel of his Monastery and that the Abbot and his Com-monks and all the Predecessors of the Abbot were time out of mind of the order and rule of Praemonstratenses and that the order of Praemonstratenses and all Monks therof were time out of mind discharged of payment of tithes for their Lands and Tenements Quamdiu manibus propriis aut sumptubus excolâ—bant And that the said Abbot and all his Predecessors time out of mind had holden the said three acres discharged of payment of Tithes Quamdiu c. and so held them untill the dissolution of the Monastery and shew the surrender to H. 8. and the Statute of 31 H. 8 by force wherof H. 8. was seised and held them discharged and from him derive them to E. 6. and from E. 6. to Queen Mary and from her to Queen Elizabeth and from her in the 42. year of her Raign to Wagstaff and from him by mean conveyances to Dickenson the Plaintiff Quorum pretextu he was seised and enjoyed them in Propria manurantia and shew the Statute of 2 E. 6. cap. 15. wherby it is enacted that Tithes shall be paid as usually they were c. Quorum pretextu the Plaintiff held the three acres discharged of Tithes and that notwithstanding and against the Prohibition the Defendant did draw him into Plea for them in Court Christian and the Iudge therof held plea and the Defendant did there prosecute him to the disinherison of the Crown And upon this the Defendant demurred and prayed a consultation And Sir John Davies the Kings Serjeant argued for the Defendant that a Consultation should be granted because that his matter of discharge is double 1. His Priviledge 2. The prescription and if either of them will not help him then he ought to be charged For the Priviledge he took it that the Praemonstratenses never had such a priviledge It is a Maxime in Law All Lands chargable with Tithes that all persons ought to pay Tithes and all Lands shall be charged with them of common right but also there are divers discharges of them and allowed by our Law as is manifest by the orders of Templers Hospitalers and Cistertians which discharges our Law allows and these are 1. By prescription 2. By reall composition 3. By priviledge obtained and that by two wais 1. Either by the Bull of the Pope for he taking upon himself to be the great Dispensâ—r and Steward of the Church took upon him to discharge them but this as it is holden by the Canon he could not absolutely do but might divert them to a Clergy-man or grant to another to hold them by way of retainer and this ought to be to a Clergy-man also Or 2. By a generall Counsell for some orders were discharged by generall Counsels So some obtained Priviledges by the Popes Bulls which are his Patents some by Counsels which are as his Statutes and Decrees were as Iudgments but yet none of them had ever any force in our Law nor did bind us in England more then voluntarily retained and approved by usage and custom for as it is said in 11 H 4. the Pope cannot alter the Law of England and this is evident for in all cases where the Bulls or Constitutions of the Pope crosse the Law of the Land they have alwaies been rejected The Popes Bulls of four sorts as for instance 1 In the Bulls which are of four sorts 1. Of Provision 2. Of Citation 3. Of Exemption And 4. Of Excommunication And as for those of Excommunication it appeareth that it was Treason at Common Law and that the Treasurer did kneel to E. 2. for one who brought them in and in the perpetuall course of the Books afterwards they have alwaies been disallowed in Pleas. So his Bulls of Citation before the Statute of Provision was a hainous offence and so are Bulls of Provision and Exemption For his Canons where they were against the Law they were neglected It appeareth by the Canon Quod nullus capiat beneficium a Laico and yet notwithstanding continued long after for Benefices and does yet for Bishopricks that the Clergy shall take them from the King and a lay-hand And also there is a Canon for exemption of Clarks out of temporall Iurisdiction but yet as Brain saith 10 H. 7. 18. it was never observed here So the Canon saith that the time of the Laps shall be accounted Per septimanas but our Law not regarding this saith that it shall be accounted Per menses in the Calender as it is expresly adjudged in 5 E. 3. Rot. 100. Rot. claus in turri And there is a great reason for it as it is in 29 H. 3. memb 5. in turri It is not necessary for Bishops of England to go to generall Councells so as in Parliament those that do not â—end Knights or Burgesses shall not be bound by Statutes And the Counsels of Lyons of Bigamis c. are expounded by Statutes how they shal be taken so that it they have a Priviledge as in truth they have by the Popes Bulls if it were not allowed in England they are not of force to priviledge them against the Common Law of the Land for payment of Tithes but this was never here allowed And now for the Prescription this cannot help them for Monks are not of Evangelicall Priesthood to wit capable of Tithes in the Pernamy but meerly Lay-men and then as the Bishop of Winchesters case is they cannot prescribe in non decimando And Bede saith of them that they are Merè laici so that if their Priviledge were allowed their Prescription will not help them The priviledge of Praemonstratenses was by the Counsell generall of for their discharge which denies that all religious persons should be discharged of Tithes of Lands in their own hands Quamdiu c. But afterwards Adrian restrained it to Templars Hospitalars and Cistertians omitting the Praemonstratenses and the decree of Adrian was received also wherby the Law took notice of the discharge of the said three Orders True it is that the Praemonstratenses have a Bull of Pope Innocent the third of discharge and as large liberties as the Cistertians but they never put this in ure And it seems 1. That there were of them 29. Abbots
covenant to pay joyntly and severally according to the quantity of the Wares there an action of Covenant may be brought against one alone for the Deed is severall And by Crew chief Iustice it cannot be a good Traverse for a circumstance cannot be traversed for wind is alterable and a thing materiall is only traversable and here the Covenant is severall for their severall Fraughts and it may be that others have paid him Jones Iustice the traverse is not good and for the other matter he cited Mattheusens case Co. lib. 5. 22. Where upon a Charter party if one seal be broken all is gone If three are bound ioyntly and an action is brought against one and it appeareth that others have sealed the Writ shall abate But in this case an action lies against him alone although the other be named in the Indenture The same Term in the same Court intr Hill 22. Jac. Rot. 1019. Millen versus Fandrye AN action of trespasse was brought for chasing of Sheep the Defendant pleaded that they were trespassing upon certain land and he with a little Dog chased them out and as soon as the Sheep were cut of the land he called in his Dog and upon this the Plaintiff demurred The point singly was but thus J chase the Sheep of another out of my ground and the Dog pursues them into another mans land next adjoyning and J chide my Dog Iustification in trâ—spase and the Owner of the Sheep brings trespasse for chasing of them And it was argued by Whistler of Grays-Inne that the justification was not good and he cited Co. lib. 4. 38. b. that a man may hunt Cattell out of his ground with a Dog but cannot exceed his authority and by him an authority in Law which is abused is void in all and to hunt them into the next ground is not justifiable The Books differ if Cattell stray out of the high way involuntarily whether Trespasse lies 7 H. 7. 2. and H. 7. 20. but all agree that they ought to be chased out as hastily as may be Littleton argued for the Defendant that Cattell may be chased out into another mans ground and he said that a man cannot have such a power upon his Dog as to recall him when he pleaseth and a Dog is ignorant of the bounds of Land and he resembled this case to other cases of the Law first to 21 E. 4. 64. In Trespasse of Cattell taken in A. in D. the Defendant saith that he was seised of four acres called C. in D. and found the Cattell there Damage feasant and chased them towards the Pound and they escaped from him and went into A. and he presently retook them which is the same Trespasse and admitted for a good plea and 22 E. 4. 8. In trespasse the Defendant justifies by reason of a custom that they which plow may turn their Plow upon the Land of another and that for necessity and it was allowed for a good justification and he hath more government of his Oxen then in our case he can have of his Dog If a man be making of a lawfull Chase and cannot do it without damage to another this is Damnum absque injuria 21 H. 7. 28. And he cited a case which was in Mich. 18 Jac. between Jenning and Maystore where a man of necessity chased Sheep for taking one of his own in trespasse he may justifie it And also if a Dog goes into the Land of another as in this case trespasse does not lye but otherwise it is of Cattell Crew chief Iustice it seems to me that he might drive the Sheep out with the Dog and he cold not withdraw his Dog when he would in an instant and therfore it is not like to the case of 38 E. 3. Where trespasse was brought for entring into a Warren and there it was pleaded that there was a Pheasant in his Land and his Hawk flew and followed it into the Plaintiffs ground and there it seems that it is not a good justification for he may pursue the Hawk but cannot take the Pheasant 6 E. 4. a man cuts Thorns and they fell into another mans Land and in tresgasse he justified for it and the opinion was that notwithstanding this justification trespasse lies because he did not plead that he did his best endeavour to hinder their falling there yet this was a hard case But this case is not like to these cases for here it was lawfull to chase them out of his own Land and he did his best endeavour to recall the Dog and therfore trespasse does not lye Doderidge Iustice agreed for here was no hedge and when he saw them out of his own ground he rated the Dog 12 H. 8. this difference is taken if I see Sheep in my Land I may chase them out but if another sees them and chase them out I may have trespasse against him because he hath taken away For an involuntary trespasse action doth not lye my advantage and the nature of a Dog is such that he cannot be ruled suddenly and here it appeareth to be an involuntary Trespasse 8 E. 4. A man is driving Goods through a Town and one of them goes into another mans house and he follows him trespasse doth not lye for this because it was involuntary and a trespasse ought to be done voluntarily and so it is Injuria and a hurt to another and so it is Damnum If Deer be out of a Forest the Owner of the Land where they are may hunt them and if the Deer flye to the Forest and the Hounds pursue him then he ought to call in the Dogs and so I may justifie and trespasse lies not In the time of chief Iustice Popham this case was adjudged in this Court Trespasse was brought for hunting and breaking of hedges and the case was that a man started a Fox in his own land and his Hounds pursued him into another mans Lands and it was holden that he may hunt and pursue him into any mans land because a Fox is a noysom creature to the Common-wealth Bracton saith that when a man is outlawed he hath Caput lupinum and he may be hunted through all the County And he agreed the case of 8 E. 4. If a Tree grow in a hedge and the Fruit fall into another mans land the Owner may fetch it in the other mans land and he also agreed the case of 22 E. 48. of the Plew and so concluded that the trespasse doth not lye Jones Iustice that the trespasse doth not lye vide Co. lib. 8. 67. Crogates case and lib. 4. Terringhams case and he cannot recall his Dog in an instant And the same day Iudgment was given for the Defendant Quod quaerens nil capiat per billam The same Term in the same Court. Marsh versus Newman IN a Replevin the Defendant pleaded that was seised In jure Collegii and doth not say that he was in Dominico suo ut de foedo and the Plaintiff
demurred upon the Avowry And Andrews argued for the Plaintiff 1. The Defendant ought to have alleadged certainly that they were seised in Fee for Littleton saith that in Counts and pleadings a man ought to shew how he is seised 8 E. 3. 55. 13 Eliz. Dyer 299. Pl. 31. An Inquisition was found upon an extent of a Statute-merchant and doth not shew how the Conusor was seised but only that he was seised and the Inquisition holden void But it may be objected that if Land be given to a Dean and Chapiter that they have fee 11 H. 7. 12. I confesse it But the constant use of pleading hath alwais been in case of a Bishop Colledge c. to say that they were seised in Fee as appears in Hill and Granges case and Co. lib. 6. the Dean and Chapiter of Worcesters case and Co. lib. 11. 66. Magdalen Colledge case and it appeareth by 20 H. 7. in the Abbey of S. Austins case that an Abbey may have a Lease Prae auter vie and so perhaps here the Dean had a Lease but Prae auter vie and therfore ought to have alledged that he was seised in Fee if the truth were so And he moved other exceptions as 1. That the Defendant intitled himself to a Lease as Executor and doth not plead Literas testamentarias 2. That the Defendant entitles himself to a Rent part of which was due in the time of the Testator and part in his own time and doth not shew when the Testator died and therfore the Avowry not good Jermy for the Defendant that the Avowry is good and it cannot be otherwise intended but that they are seised in Fee 11 H. 7. Lands given to a Major and Comminalty is Fee-simple but otherwise of an Abbot and Parson Plow 103. and Dyer 103. A Seisin in Fee is implied by Seisin In jure Collegii and because it hath been objected that he may be seised Prae auter vie this is but a forraign intendment for a Fee is alwaies intended Seisin in Fee-simple For the second objection because Non profert literas testament true it is if he entitle himself meerly as Executor he ought to bring in Literas testamentar but our case is not so for here we are Defendants and we endeavour only to excuse a Tort 36 H. 6. 36. Where a man is Plaintiff he ought to show Literas testamentar that so the Court may see that he hath cause of action but here it is only by way of excuse For the third that the death of the Testator doth not appear is not materiall for if any part be due to him it is due as Executor Doderidge they ought to have pleaded that they were seised in Fee true it is that Land given to a Major and Comminalty is Fee-simple and the reason is because they are perpetuall and if the Estate be not limitted they shall take according to their continuance 11 H. 4. 11 H. 7. and 27 H. 8 Dockrayes case they may be seised Prae terme dauter vie but if they had pleaded that they were seised to them and their Successors this pleading is good Prima facie 17 E. 3. 1. Crew chief Iustice all the authorities are that ther were seised in Fee Injure Collegii and it is good to admit a new way of pleading Jones Iustice Tenant Prae auter vie makes a Lease for years and cestui que use dies he cannot have an action of Debt against Lessee for years for years for he is now Tenant at sufferance But for the first point it seems to him that the pleading is not good for although in point of Creation they take a Fee by a Gift to Dean and Chapiter yet in pleading they ought to alledge their Estate specially for they may have an Estate Prae auter vie And this is in an Avowry which shall be taken strickly And by Crew chief Iustice the Defendant here ought to shew Literas testamentar for he is an especiall Actor in the Avowry And by Doderidge Longissimum vitae tempus est 100. years Co. lib. 10 50. Lampets case and therfore in pleading if the Defendant had said that a Dean and Chapiter were seised and made a Lease for 200. years this implies a Seisin in Fee because a man cannot have so long a life but here the Lease is but for 89. years and it is common to let for 89. years if A. shall so long live yet this is but a slip and the Title is apparant The same Term in the same Court. Hodges versus Moore IN Debt for marriage money the case was this A man was bound to Hedges to pay him a 1000 l. after that he had married his Daughter and afterwards he married her and brought Debt upon this Obligation and it was not averred that he had given notice to him of the marriage but demanded the money And this was moved by Noy in Arrest of Iudgment but quaere if request afterwards doth not implynetice And Doderidge Iustice put this case A man is bound to pay a 100 l. two Where notice is requisite before action and where not moneths after A. return from Rome he ought to give notice of his return before that he can have an action upon this Obligation for he may land at Newcastle or Plymoth where by common intendment the Obligor cannot know whether he be returned or not and this was agreed by the chief Iustice and Jones And Serjeant Davies argued for the Plaintiff that there need not precise notice to be given and he cited 1 H. 7. 18 E. 4. and Co. lib. 8. Where the Obligor shall take notice at his perill and so here because he takes upon him â—or to pay it And it was said that one Blackamores case was adjudged in the point and he conceived also that this request afterwards is a sufficient notice But Noy for the Defendant said that he ought to give notice or otherwise this mischief would ensue that if he had not married her and yet had demanded the money he ought to pay it and he said that where an act is to be done by a stranger the Plaintiff or Defendant ought to take notice therof at his perill as the case E. 4. where a man was bound to stand to the Award of I. C. he ought to take notice of the Award at his perill but where it lies properly in the Conusance and notice of the Plaintiff there he ought to give notice therof to the Defendant Co. lib. 5. Mallories case If a Reversion be bargained and sold to J. S. the Bargainee shall have the Rent without Attornment but if a penalty be to be forfeited he ought to give notice to the particular Tenant of the Grant or otherwise he shall not take advantage therof and he cited a case which was in 17 Eliz. Stephen Gurneys case Lessee for years the Reversion is granted over for years by way of future Interest to begin upon the death forfeiture or determination of the first Lease
provided that if the Rent upon the second Lease be arrear that the Lessor may enter the first Lessee surrender a Rent-day incur the second Lessee doth not pay the Rent the Lessor shall not enter for a Forfeiture because the first Lease determined by an act which lies properly in the Conusance of the Lessor and because he was to take advantage by it he ought to have given notice therof to the Lessee and here he might have well given notice to the Defendant for it lies properly in the Conusance of the Plaintiff The second Objection was that here was an implied notice because the Marriage was at the instance of the Defendant which implies a notice Vnder favour this is no notice for this is before the marriage but if no notice be given after the marriage then there is no notice But by Serjeant Davies there is a sufficient implication and there is no need of notice in our case and see Co. lib. 8. Francis his case where they ought to take notice at their perill and a marriage is an Ecclesiasticall Iudgment of which he ought to take notice and he was interrupted for all the Iustices went to the Parliament And divers Presidents were cited that there need no notice to be given in this case And it was agreed that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff And in Trinity Term next following Iudgment was accordingly given for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court Sir George Reynolls Case SIr George Reynoll Marshall of the Marshalsey of the Kings Bench What Bonds a Sheriff or Marshall maâ— take â—rought Debt upon a Bond the Condition wherof was that the Defendant shall be a true Prisoner and it was doubted whether the Bond were within the Statute of 23 H. 6 cap. 10. Doderidge It is not to be understood by this Statute that a Sheriff Gaâ—ler or Marshall shall take no Bond for if the Marshall hath a man in execucution and fear that he will escape and he takes Bond of him this Bond is good Jones The intent of the Statute that the Sheriff or Marshall shall not suffer Prisoners to go at large for that is within the Statute And it was ruled in the Kings Bench that the Marshalsey should be enlarged Within the Rules of Bâ— what it is and this shall be called within the Rule and if the Marshall take a Band to tarry there it is good but if he suffer him to go at large it is not good The same Term in the same Court Sury versus Albon Pigot and three other Defendants Intr. Hill 1. Car. Rot. 1. 24. IN an action upon the case for stopping his Water-course the Plaintiff declares that 14. Octob. 22. Jac. he was possessed of the Rectory of M. in Barkshire of which a Curtilage was parcell and that in this Curtilage is and hath been time out of mind a watering place for the watering of the Cattell of the Plaintiff and others and for other necessary uses and that a certain Watercourse had time out of mind flowed from Mildford stream to this Curtilage and that this water filled the said Pond and further that the Defendant well knowing this and intending to dam up the said Watering-course built a stone Wall therupon wherby the Water-course was stopt up to the Plaintiffs damage of 20 l. and this was laid with a Continuando The Defendant plead that 3 H. 8. the said H. 8. was seised of the Mannor of c. and of the said Rectory in his Demesne as of Fee and of a certain peece of Land called the Hopyard lying between the said watering-place and the said stream and by his Letters Patents granted this to Wiliam Box and his Heirs by virtue wherof he was seised Francis Searles entred upon him and was seised and enfeoffed Pigot 20 Jac. by virtue wherof of he was seised c. and the three others justifie as Servants to Pigot that they the said day and year filled up the said Water-course as it was lawfull for them to do and Whether unity of possession in severall lands shal destroy a Water course that this is the same Trespasse c. The Plaintiff demurs And the question is whether the unity of possession of all in H. 8. hath extinguished the Water-course And by Dorrell for the Plaintiff if it were of a Common it is cleer that it is destroyed because Common ought to be in another mans Land but not in our case for if one prescribe to have Warren if he purchase the Land yet he shall have Warren 11 H. 7. 25. there are two houses and the one prescribe that the other shall mend the Gutter and afterwards they come to the hands of one man and then he alien one of them this unity shall destroy the mending of the Gutter Berd for the Defendant that the unity hath destroyed the custom 21 E. 3. 2. A way is but an easement yet by the purchase of the Land the way is extinguished and also the watering-course is not only an casement but a profit or Prender and he cited Dyer 295. in case of an Inclosure that the Inclosure is extinguished but there is made a quaere and he cited 38 Eliz. in C. B. an opinion that by purchase of a Close the Inclosure is extinguished a fortiori here because it is a profit And for the case of 11 H. 7. it is by the custom of London but there is no custom in our case and the case of a Warren is not like to our case because a man may have Warren in his own Soil And in Michaelmas Term next the case was argued again by Barkesdale for the Plaintiff that the unity of possession in H. 8. had not extinguished the Water-course and that the Terminus ad quem and the Medium also being in one had not distinguished nor destroyed it And 1 Col lib. 4. 26. Benedicta est expositio quando res redimitur a distructione The Law will not destroy things but the Law will somtimes suffer a fiction which is nothing in rerum natura ut res magis valeat I confesse that profit apprender as Common or Rent is extinguished by unity of possession for Common it appeareth in 4 E. 3. and Co. lib. 4. Terringhams case And for Rent it appeareth in 4 H. 4. 7. and in 21 E. 3. 2. it appeareth that a way is extinguished by unity of possession 3 H. 6. 31. Brook Nusance 11. for it is repugnant for a man to have a way upon his own Land But I conceive that our case differs from the case of a way and that for this reason where the thing hath a being and existence notwithstanding the unity there it is not destroyed by the unity but the Water-course hath a being notwithstanding the unity ergo c. I will prove the major proposition by these cases 35 H. 6. 55 56. Where a Warren is not extinct by a Feoffment of the Land for I may hawk and hunt in my
own land as in another mans so the Warren hath existence notwithstanding the unity Dyer 326. Where the Queen was seised of Whaddon Chase and the Lord Gray was Lievtenant there in Fee and he and his Ancestors and their Keepers had by prescription used to hunt wandring Deer in the Demesns of the Mannor of S. adjoyning as in Purlieues the Mannor of S. comes into the Queens hands who grants this to Fortescue in Fee with free Warren within the Demesns c. it was holden that the unity doth not extinguish the Purlieu Dyer 295. Two Closes adjoyn the one by prescription is bound to a Fence the Owner of one purchase the other and suffer the Hedges to decay and dies leaving two Daughters his Heirs who make partition Quaere whether the prescription for the Inclosure be revived true it is that it is made a quaere but he saith see the like case 11 H. 7. 27. of a Gutter which proves our case as I will shew afterwards For the Minor proposition that the watering hath being notwithstanding the said unity I will prove it by 12 H. 7. 4. A Precipe quod reddat of Land Aqua Co-opert Mich. 6. Jac. Challenor and Moores case An Ejectione firmae was brought of a Watering-course and there resolved that it does not lye of it because it is not firma sed currit but of Terra aqua co-operta it doth lye Also I will take some exceptions to the Bar there is no Title in the Bar for the Defendant Pigot and so we being in possession albeit in truth we have no Title yet he who hath no Title cannot oust us neither can stop the said Water-course and it is only shewn in the Bar that Searles entred and enfeoffed Pigot but for any thing as yet appears the true Owner continued in possession 21 Jac. C. B. Cook against Cook in a Writ of Dower the Defendant pleads an Entry after the Darrein continuance and doth not plead that he ousted him and upon this the Plaintiff Demurs and there adjudged that it is no plea in Bar because he doth not say that the Defendant entred and ousted the Tenant 2. Exception the action is brought against four Scil. Pigot Cole Branch and Elyman and Pigot hath conveyed a Title from Searles the three other Defendants justifie but Pigot doth not say any thing but that Searles enfeoffed him 7 H. 6. an action of Wast is brought against many one answers and the other not this is a discontinuance And for the principall matter I will conclude with 11 H. 7. 25. Broo. Extinguishment 60. Two have Tenements adjoyning and the one hath a Gutter in the others Land and afterwards one purchase both and then he alien one to one and another to another the Gutter is revived notwithstanding the unity because it is very necessary and so he prayed Iudgment for the Plaintiff Bear for the Defendant I in a manner agree all the cases which have been put on the other side and I conceive that the Water-course is not Stagnum but Servitium which is due from the one land to the other It is but a liberty and therfore I agree Challenors case which is but a liberty that an Ejectione firmae doth not lye of it but Ejectione firmae lies De stagno For the first exception I answer and confesse that to alledge an Entry after the Darrain continuance without alledging an Ouster of the Tenant cannot abate the Writ for the Defendant may enter to another intent as appeareth in the Commentaries and with the assent of the Tenant But here it was alledged that a Feoffment was made and a Livery which implies another For the matter in Law I conceive that the Water-course is extinguished and it may be compared to 21 E. 3. 2. The case of a way which is extinguished by unity of possession Hill 36. Eliz. Rot. 1332. Hemdon and Crouches case Two were seised of two severall acres of Land of which the one ought to inclose against the other one purchase them both and lets them to severall men and there the opinion was and adjudged accordingly that the Inclosure is not revived but remains extinguished 39 Eliz. Harringtons case the same thing resolved and albeit in Dyer 295. is a quaere yet the better opinion hath been taken according to these resolutions H. 4. Jac. Jordan and Ayliffes Case when one had a way from one acre to another and afterwards he purchased the acre upon which he had the way and afterwards sold it and in that Case the opinion of 3. Iustices was that the way was extinguished also 11 H. 4. 50. and 11 H. 7. 25. prove this case for the said case is compared to the custome of Gavelkind and Burrough English and there the quaere is made whether by the custome it be revived and if it be a custome which runs with the Land the unity of possession doth not extinguish it Co. lib. 4. Terringhams case and 24 E. 3. 2. common appendant is destroyed by unity of possession and yet it is a thing of common right but a Water-course being a thing against common right a fortiori it shall be extinguished Now I will take some exceptions to the Declaration 1. Because he hath laid a prescription for a Water-course as to say that it was belonging to a Rectory to which c. and this is a good exception as appears by 6 E 6 Dyer 70. Ishoms case where exception was taken that before his prescription he doth not say that it was Antiquum parcum which exception as it is there said was the principall cause that Iudgment was given against him and also as the case is here it ought to be a Rectory impropriate and this cannot be before the time of H. 8. which is within time of memory for before the said time no lay person could have a Rectory impropriate and therfore I pray Iudgment for the Defendant Barksedale said that the prescription is well laid and that he would prove by 39 H 6. 32. and 33 H. 6. 26. and per curiam the prescription is good enough and albeit it is not said that it is Antiquae Rectoria yet it is well enough Mich. 1 Car. at Reading Term in Broek and Harris case he doth not say that it was Antiquum Messuage and yet resolved good Doderidge the case of 6 E. 6. differs in this point from this case for a Rectory shall alwaies be intended ancient and so is not a Park for this may be newly created and he put this case suppose I have a Mill and I have a Water-course to this in my own land and I sell the Land I cannot stop the Water-course Crew chief Iustice seemed of opinion that the prescription is gone and that the better opinion in Dyer 13 Eliz. hath alwaies been that the Inclosure is gone by unity of possession but yet the Water-course is matter of necessity Doderidge and Whitlock the way is matter of election but the course of water is
naturall Jones Iustice There is great difference between a way and a water-course as to this purpose for admit that this water-course after that it had been in the Curtilage of the Plaintiff goes further to the Curtilage of another shall not that other have the benefit of this water-course notwithstanding the unity of possession I think cleerly that he shall Doderidge my opinion is that the water-course is not extinguished by the unity of possession But some conceived that he had declared his opinion in terror to the Defendant And afterwards the same Term Barksedale for the Plaintiff said that he had agreed the case before and therfore would now only indeavour to answer some exceptions which had been taken to the Declaration 1. Exception hath been that no prescription or custom is made for this water-course but only that Currere solebat consuevit But I conceive thaâ— the Declaration is good notwithstanding this because the Plaintiff here doth not claim an interest in the Water-course but in the Land in which c. and therfore it is good and this appeareth by 12 E. 4. 9. the Prior of Lantonies case in a prescription in a Market overt generally and the reason there was because he was a stranger as in our case he is and this pleading appeareth also to be good by Cooks Book of Entries 18. Smiths case which was entred 9 Jac. Rot. 366. in this Court 2. Exception was because it is not said that it was Antiqua Rectoria 3. Exception because it doth not appear that he was a spiritual man to whom the Demise of the Rectory was made 4. Because it is not said that the Water-course Ad predict Rectoriam pertinet 5. Because the Water-course is alledged to be for his customary Tenants of the said Rectory and this is not good as appeareth by 21 Eliz. Dyer 363. Prescription Pro quolibet customar Tenente is not good but I conceive that this case is not our case for here is Customarius tenens Rectoriae and there it is agreed that Quilibet customarius tenens Maner had been good And the plea in Bar hath salved these objections and therfore he prayed judgment for the Plaintiff Jeremy for the Defendant And first for the matter in Law it seemed to him that by the unity of possession the Water-course is extinguished and the Water-course may well be compared to the case of the way for as a way is a passage for men over the land so water hath passage upon the land and a way is extinguished by unity as appeareth by 21 E. 3. 2. 11 H. 4 5. 21 Ass and Davies Reports 5. and in 4 Jac. Jordan and case it was the better opinion that a way was extinguished by unity of possession true it is that there Popham chief Iustice put the difference where the way is of necessity and where not for where the way is of necessity there it shall not be extinguished This case hath been compared to the case of a Warren in 35 H. 6. but I conceive that the cases are not a like because a Warren is a meer liberty 8 H. 7. 5. A man may have a Warren in his own Land and Co. lib. 7. Buts case by a Feoffment of Land a Warren doth not passe but this Water-course hath its originall out of the Land and this case cannot be compared to an ancient Water-course running to a Mill for notwithstanding the unity it shall passe with the Mill for otherwise it shall not be Molendinum aquatinum so that the water there is parcell of the thing and so of necessity ought to passe with the thing but here it doth not appear that it is a Water-course of necessity and for any thing that appeareth it may be filled with another Water-course Also I conceive that the Declaration is not good 1. Because neither prescription nor custom is laid for the Watercourse and it appeareth in Co. Book of Entries Holcome and Evans case and the old Book of Entries 616 617. Mich. 1. Car. Rot. 107. Turner and Dennies case in this Court in trespasse for breaking his Close c. the Defendant justified for a way c. and that he was possessed for years and for him and his Occupiers had a way over the Land the Plaintiff demurred and resolved that the prescription is not good 2. The Declaration is insufficient being an action upno the case for the stopping of a Water-course and it is not Vi armis nor Contra pacem Co. lib. 9. 50. the Earl of Shrewsburies case when there are two causes of an action upon the case the one Causa causans the other Causa causata causa causans may be alledged Vi armis for this is not the immediate cause of the action but Causa causata F. N. B. 86. H. and 92. E. in the end of the Writ of action upon the case shall be Contra pacem 3. Also he hath prescribed for the Tenants of the Rectory which is not possible for no Lay-man could be Tenant of a Rectory or of Tithes before the Statute of H. 8. and therfore I pray Iudgment for the Defendant Whitlock chief Iustice conceived that the declaration was good the bar is naught both for the form matter the question here is of Aqua profluens and I conceive that there needs no prescription or custome in this case for water hath its naturall course and as is observed by Brudnell in 12 H. 8. Natura sua descendit it may be called Usu captio or Vsage and he conceived that the action upon the case very well lies in this case like to the case where a man bath a house and windows in it and another erect a new house and stop the light then I may have an action upon the case but true it is that I shall not only count for the losse of the aire but also I ought to prescribe that time out of mind light have entred by these windows c. see 7 E. 3. If there be a School-master in a Town and another erect a new School in the same Town an action upon the case doth not lye against him because Schools are for the publike benefit and every private man may have a School in his house And for the exception that a Lay man cannot be possessed of a Rectory I conceive that the Declaration is good notwithstanding for a Lay-man may have a Rectory by Demise And for the Plea in bar it is not good for the form because that Searles entred and enfeoffed Pigot and it is not said that he entred and Expulit and if a man enter and make a Feoffment the owner being upon the Land the Feoffment is void and therfore an actuall Ouster ought to be shown And for the matter in Law he conceived that the Bar was not good for by the unity of possession the water-course is not extinguished and yet I agree the cases of a way and common upon the differences of Rights which are
was given this day The same Term in the same Court. Goodwin versus Willoughby GOodwin brought an action upon the case against Joane Willoughby wife of Thomas Willoughby and upon non Assumpsit pleaded it being found for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment 1. That the Plaintiff shews that Thomas Willoughby was indebted upon account and doth not shew that Joane Willoughby is Executrix or Administratrix and yet that she promised to pay wheras in truth she hath no cause to pay for there is no consideration and so Nudum pactum Jermy for the Plaintiff for the first because it doth not appear for what cause he accounted I answer that this is but a meer conveyance And for the second that she does not suppose that the Feme is executrix c. But here is a good consideration which is that she shall not sue or molest and that he gave day for payment this is a sufficient consideration But Stone of counsell with the Defendant said that the first is the ground of the action and therfore he ought to shew for what he accounted Crew chief Iustice two exceptions have been taken 1. For the alledging the manner of the account which I conceive is good enough and he need not shew the cause of the account And as to the second because it doth not appear that she is Executrix or Administratrix and so no consideration and so no Assumpsit But here she assumes to be Debtor and makes a promise to pay which is an acknowledgment of the Debt by inference and therfore he conceived that the Assumpsit was good Doderidge Iustice for the first it is good enough yet Cum indebitatus existit is no good Assumpsit but here he shows a speciall way of Debt and it would be long and tedious to describe his account For the second there is no cause of action because it doth not appear that she is Executrix or Administratrix or Executrix of her own wrong If I say to one do not trouble me and I will give you so much this is not actionable for there ought to be a lawfull ground and for this cause the Declaration Where forbearance without cause of action is no ground of an Assumpsit is void for it is only to avoid molestation Give me time c. this is no good Assumpsit for forbearance is no ground of action where he hath no cause to have Debt Jones Iustice agreed in the first with them because a generall action upon the case sufficeth and in truth it is but an inducement to the action but for the other part he doubted and he cited one Withypools case an Infant within age promised to pay certain money he makes an Executor and dies within age the Executor saith to him to whom the promise is made forbear and I will pay you and there an action upon the case did lye against the Executor upon this promise and yet it was a void Contract but there was colour of action forbear till such a time now the other hath lost the advantage of his Suit But he gave no opinion Crew It is a violent presumption that he is indebted But by Doderidge here is no colour to charge her but only by inference that she is Executrix If a stranger saith forbear such a Debt of J. S. and I will pay it it is a good consideration for the losse to the Plaintiff and in this case it appears not that there is any cause and Broom Secondary said that Withypools case before cited was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber Jones If an Infant makes a promise it is void and he may plead non Assumpsit which Doderidge did not deny But upon his Obligation he cannot plead Non est factum for he said that he shall be bound by his hands but not by his mouth The same Term in the same Court Drope versus Theyar IN Debt by Drope against Theyar an Inne-keeper upon Issue joyned and a Verdict for the Plaintiff Bolstred moved in Arrest of judgment for the Defendant and the matter was that one Rowly who was servant to Drope lodged in the White Heart at S. Giles and there had certain Goods of his Masters which were stoln from him in the night and Drope the Master brought an action therupon and it was moved by Bolstred that the Plaintiff was without remedy 1. Because it was in an Inne in London for the Register 105. is Quando quis depraedatus euns per patriam which as he said could not be extended to an Inne in London 2. It ought to be an Inne as Inne-keeper 3. He ought to be as a Guest lodging and this appeareth in Culeys case in 5 Jac. in Celly and Clarks case which was entred Pasch 4. Jac. Rot. 254. It was adjudged that where the Guest give his Goods to his Host to deliver to him three daies after and the goods are lost that an action is not maintainable against the Inne-keeper for them and this was in an Inne in Uxbridge And in one Sands case where the Guest came in the morning and his Goods were taken before night he shall have an action against the Inne-keeper 4. The Goods ought to be the Goods of the party who lodgeth there for the words are Ita quod hospitibus damna non eveniunt and here the Master who brought the action was not Guest But admit the Master shall have the action yet he ought to alledge a custom that the Master shall have the action for the Goods taken from his Servant Trin. 17 Jac. Rot. 1535. Bidle and the Master brought an action for Goods taken from the Servant and there it was resolved that he ought to conclude that Pro defectu c. and apply the custom to him being Master Sec Co. Book of Entries 345. And that a custom that for other mens Goods in the custody of Guests the Owner shall have an action against the Inne-keeper if they be stollen Ob. This is the Common Law and therfore ought not to be alledged Answ Where a man takes upon him to shew a custom he ought to shew it precisely he cited Heydons case Co. lib. 3. 28 H. 8. Dyer 38. And it was said for the Plaintiff that Goods are in the possession of the Master which are in the possession of his Servant and so here the Master might have had action well enough 8 E. 4. my Servant makes a Contract or â—â—ies Goods to my use I am liable and it is my act By the Court an Inne in London is an Inne and if a Guest be robbed in such an Inne he shall have remedy as if he were Enns per patriam But the cheife point was whether the master shall have the action in the case where the Servant lost the goods and by Jones Justice in 26 Eliz. in C. B. upon the Statute of Hue and Cry it was resolved that if the Servant be robbed the Master may have the Action and so by him
as a memorandum and afterwards there is an order that the Iudgement shall not be filed if the Iudgement upon this shall be stayd and speaks to it and by him the Case of 15. E. 4. 7. is nothing to this purpose for Iustices in Eyre were Iustices by commission and they had not the custody of their Records and so it differs from this case And Jones Justice which was not denyed if a Iudgement be pronounced here and be not entered the Iudges may alter it the next Term. It was said by Noy in this case that all Franchises in England are against common Right and execution of Iustice and for the present purpose he cited one Sir John Wells Case where in a Quo Warranto the Defendant had day to plead or otherwise that judgement should be entered to seise and he failed to plead at the day and the Iudgement was not filed and yet he could not be relieved But it was sayd by some of the Iustices that this was a case of great extremity But by Hendon it was affirmed in the Exchequer in one Sandersons Case and in the principall case the matter was adjourned for a fortnight and ordered that the plea should be accorded Mich. Term 2. Car. in the Kings Bench. Sharp versus Rust IN an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit between Sharp Plaintiff and Walter Rust Defendant upon non-Assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plaintiff and it was moved in arrest of judgement upon these words in the Declaration the Defendant being Father to the Plaintiffs Wife for whom the Apparrel was bought said to the Plaintiff deliver the Apparrel to my Daughter and I will pay for them and saith not to whom the payment shall be made And it was argued by Woobrich of Grayes-Inne that this is no sufficient cause to stay the Iudgement for by necessary implication and reference of the words precedent the certainty of the pers on appeareth to whom the payment ought to be made And he observed that in our Law the time the estate the thing and the person not being sufficiently expressed Where a thing incertain may be made certain both in time estate and person yet by necessary coherence and relation to matter precedent they are sometimes made certain enough 1. For the time Perkins P. 496. puts the Rule if a condition hath relation to an act precedent and no time is limited when it shall be done yet if ought to be done when the act precedent is done and therefore if I. S. be bound to me in 20 l. upon condition that if I enfeoff him of black acre that then he wil pay me 10 l. c. in this case presently when I have enfeoffed the obligor of black acre he ought to pay the 10 l. notwithstanding there be no time limited when it should be payd 2. For the thing being put incertainly yet the communication precedent makes this certain 30. H. 8. Dyer 42. in the Case of the Executors of Greenliffe where it is agreed that albeit it is not shown what thing is granted yet it shall be the Land of which the communication was 3. For the Estate although it be incertain yet sometimes it is made certain by the matter precedent as in the Case Co. lib. 8. A Stewardship was granted for life and afterwards an Annuity was granted for the exercise of that Office without declaring what Estate he should have in that Annuity and resolved that he should have the Annuity for life because he had the Office for life 4. For the person the consideration sometimes ascertains the person and therefore if land he given to one by Deed habendum sibi una cum filia donatoris in frankmariage this shall enure to both because the Feme is Causa donationis and by intendment of law the Land and the feme shal be given together to the man for the advancement of the Feme as it is Mich. 2. 3. Ph. Mary Dyer 126. a 4. E. 3. 4. Plow Com. 158. enfeoff him another and bind him and his heirs to warrant doth not say to whom he shall warrant yet the Feoffee and his heirs shall have advantage of this warranty for it cannot have any other intendment 6. E. 2. Voucher 258. 22. E. 4. 16. Kelleway 108. Co. lib. 8. Whitlocks Case In a Lease for years reserving rent it is the surest way to make the reservation to no person in certain but to leave it to the general intendment of the Law 15. H. 7. A man deviseth that his Land shall be sold for the payment of his debts and doth not say by whom they shall be sold by his Executors because they are lyable for the payment of his debts but if one devise that his land shall be sold saith not for the payment of his debts the devise is void because the Law doth not intend in this case to make the sale 40 E. 3. 5. 4. E. 3. Fitzherbert Obligation 16. Nota if a man be bound in debt or Covenant by writing and puts such a clause in the writing Et ad majorem hujus rei securitatem invenit fidei jussores quorum unusquisque in tot in solido se obligavit that although none speak there but the principall in the writing if the others put to their seals they accept that which the principal spake so become principal 2. E 4. 20. and here in our Case it appeareth that the Deed was so therefore it is reason that the Declaration should be so for there cannot be a material difference between the Declaration the deed especially being upon an agreement which is to be ruled according to the intention of the parties as it is in Plow Com. 140. a. In our Law if any parties be agreed upon a thing and words are expressed or written to make the agreement although they be not apt words yet if they have substance in them tending to the effect intended the Law shall take Intention of parties to be observed them of the same substance as words usuall for the Law regards the intention of the parties and here the intent appeareth that the assumption shall be mâ—de to the Plaintiff although there want expresse words and therefore he prayed Iudgement for the Plaintiff And afterwards the same Term Iudgement was given for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court. Beven versus Cowling IN an Action upon the Case Littleton mooved in arrest of Iudgment for the Defendant wherein the Case was this the Defendant assumed that if the Defendant would defer the payment of a bond in which one A. was bound to him and would not implead him upon it then he promised to pay it and he doth not say that he deferred the payment untill such a day and therefore this is no valuable consideration so that the action doth not lye for notwithstanding Action upon the Case upon a â—romise that if â—e would not sue such a
one he would pay it where good where not this he may implead him presently Mich 12. Jac Kebles Case A man promiseth to pay so much in consideration of a Lease at Will and it was holden no good consideration for by the same breath that he creates it he may defeat it Pasch 8. Jac. Austins Case A man promise that in consideration he would forbear another he would pay it and no time was limited and therefore it was holden no good consideration Trin. 38. Eliz. Rot. 523. A man promise quod non implacitabit and avers quod non implacitavit and because of the uncertainty it was holden no valuable consideration Doderidge Justice If there be no consideration at the time or no cause of Action the forbearance afterwards will not make it actionable and he said that it had been adjudged in this Court that a consideration to forbear for a little time is not good but by some to forbear for a reasonable time is good But in the principall Case upon the hearing of the Declaration read it appeared that it was that he should never implead him upon the said obligation so that if the Plaintiff brings an Action upon the obligation the Defendant here may have an Action upon the Case against him Also it was non implacitabit and this shall be taken indefinitely quod nunquam implacitabit and therefore the Iudgement was affirmed for otherwise the Plaintiff shall both take advantage of this promise and of the bond also and here he hath in a manner forsaken the benefit of his bond and hath betaken himselfe to the benefit of this Assumpsit By Jones and Whitlock Iustices if A. be bound to me and I enter into bond to him that I will not sue this Obligation I cannot sue him upon the first Obligation without forfeiture of my bond and by Doderidge if an Obligation be forfeited and I say to the Obliger do not sue the Obligor or do not implead him an Action upon the case lies against me The same Term in the same Court. Arnold versus Dichton IN an Action upon the Case and Non-Assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plaintiff and Noy mooved in arrest of Iudgement that there was no consideration to maintain this Action the Case being thus Arnold having married the Daughter of the Defendents Testator the Testator promised to give him 40 l. and meat â—nd drink for a year and a Featherbed and Bolster and afterwards the Testator in consideration that the Plaintiff would Assumpsit forbear to sue him all his life for it promised that he should have as good a portion at his death as any of his children and the Plaintiff declares that he gave to one Tho. P. one of his Sons 200 l. and that he left him at the time of his death but 30 l. but when he gave to Tho. P. the 200 l. appeares not peradventure it might be in his life time and this promise doth not extend to that which he had given before as if a man be bound to keep a Goale and that no prisoner shall escape this only extends to a future keeping and future escapes and not to other escapes which were before True it is that sometimes the Law will alter the sense as in the Case of 32. H. 6. where a man is bound that his Feoffees c. And at another day Doderidge said that the first promise was but an inducement to the second and the Defendant hath pleaded Non Assumpsit to the last promise and then comes the Plaintiff and shews that he gave to such a one 200 l. and doth not shew when this was given and this may be before the promise and therefore I conceive the Declaration is not good Jones agreed that the Declaration is not good for admit that in this case he had given to all his children but one great portions before the said promise and had given a small portion to one after the promise the Plaintiff now shall have but according to the said promise and it is alledged here that he gave to such a one 200 l. which may be before the promise and therefore the breach not well laid Whitlock contra and that the Plaintiff shall have according to the best gift in this case whether it were before or after the promise and that upon the intention of the promise for the intention is that the Plaintiff should have as good a marriage or portion with his Daughter as any other of his children should have But by Doderidge this construction cannot be made without offering violence to the words for then daret should be for dedisset and for any thing which appeareth he had a portion before and this was but a superaddition Jones put this case I am bound to enfeoff J. S. of so much Land as I will enfeoff J. D. this extends not to a Feoffment which I have made to J. D. before but only to a Feoffment which I shall make to him afterwards which was not denied by Whitlock and it was adjourned The same Term in the same Court. Barker versus Ringrose BArker brought an Action upon the Case against Ringrose and declared that whereas he was of good fame and exercised the Trade of a Wool-winder the Defendant spake these scandalous words of him that he was a Words Thou art a bankrupt Rogue Bankrupt Rogue and it was moved in arrest of Iudgement that those words were not actionable for the words themselves are not actionable but as they concern an Office or Trade c. and it appeareth by the Statute of 27. E. 3 that a Wool-winder is not any Trade but is but in the nature of a Porter so that the Plaintiff is not defamed in his function because he hath not any also it is not averred that he was a Wool-winder at the time of the words speaking Jones Justice If one saith of a Wool-winder that he is a false Wool-winder action upon the Case lieth and it was demanded by the Court A Wool-winder wâ—at he is what a Wool-winder was and it was answered that in the Countrey he is taken to be a Wool-winder that makes up the fleece and takes the dirt out of it and a Wool-winder in London opens the fleeces and makes them more curiously up and in London they belong to the Mayn of the staple Doderidge If one saith of a Sher-man that he is a Bankrupt Action lyes and so it hath been adjudged of a Shoo-maker and note that if one saith of any man who by his Trade may become a Bankrupt within the In what case to call a man Bankrupt is actionable Statutes that he is a Bankrupt an Action lies as of a Taylor Fuller c. And the Court seemed to incline that in this case being spoken of a Wool-winder in London the Action lies But Mich. 3. Car. the Case being moved again the Court was of opinion that the Action could not lye and would not give
Iudgement for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court NOta by Doderidge and Jones Iustices that upon the principall Iudgement reversed the outlawry is also Ipso facto reversed Also if an Outlawry reversed upon revers all of the principall judgement outlawry be awarded if it be not per Judicium Coronator unlesse it be in London the outlawry is voyd It was demanded by the Iustices when the outlawry and Iudgement are affirmed how the entry is And it was answered by Broome Secondary that the entry is generall Quod judicium affirmetur in omnibus and this sufficeth But if the Iudgement be affirmed and the outlawry reversed then the entry is Quod judicium affirmetur Utlagario cassetur The same Term in the same Court Calfe and others versus Nevil and others AScire facias was brought by Joseph Calfe and Joshua Executors of A. against Nevil Davyes and Bingley and the Case was this they became bayle to one Hall who was condemned in an Action to the Testator of the Plaintiff that the said Hall should either render his body to Prison or that he should satisfie the Iudgement the Defendents Plead that after the Scire facias returned and presently after the Iudgement the said Hall brought a Writ of Error in the Exchequor Chamber hanging which the said Hall reddidit se prisonae in exoneratione manucaptorum suor and there dyed and the Plaintiffe demurred upon this Plea because it was double and Calthorp argued for the Plaintiff that it was double or rather treble 1. That Reddidit se prisonae 2. That he was imprisoned 3. that he dyed in Prison And to prove the Piea double in this Case he cited 13. H. 8. 15. 16. 4. E. 4. 4. 21. H. 7. 10. The second matter that he moved against the former was that pendant the Writ of Error reddidit se prisonae and doth not conclude upon the Record hoc peratus est verificare as he ought to have done and for this he cited 7. H. 8. Kelleway 118. If J. S. bee bound in a Recognizance that A. shall appeare such a day before the Kings Iustices at Westminster if his appearance be not recorded hee shall not have any averment by Bricknell and Conisby and in 30. Eliz. It was one Wicks Case which is ours in effect in case of baile Dyer 27. 6. E. 4. 1. 2. For the matter the Plea is nought 1. Because by the Writ of Error brought the Scire facias against the baile is not suspended because the Bayle is a distinct record and upon this he cited the Case of the Ambassador of Spain against Captaine Gifford which was Trin. 14. Jac. That by the Writ of Error brought the baile was not suspended and he said that it was so resolved also in Goldsmith and Goodwins Case 2. For the render of the principall to prison it is not good because it doth not appear upon Record and for this he cited one Austin and Monkes Case which was in 14. Jac. In Scire facias against the baile it is pleaded that the principall had rendered himselfe to prison and upon the matter it appeared that the render was upon Candlemas day which is not Dies juridicis and so the Court this day had no power to commit him to prison for which the Plea was adjudged voyd 3. For the death it is no Plea the baile by it is not discharged because he hath not rendered himselfe in due time and for this he cited Justice Williams and Vaughans Case which was Mich. 3. Jac. where in Scire facias against the baile they pleaded that the principall was dead and thereupon the Plaintiff demurred and in this Case two points were resolved 1. There was no Capias mentioned to have issued against the principall and yet resolved that a Scire facias would lye against the Baile 2. That the Plea in Bar is not good because it may be that the principal dyed after the Capias awarded or after the return thereof because it appeareth that there was once a default in the principal and so the baile forfeited and no Plea afterwards would discharge it and upon this he put this Case A Prisoner escape out of Prison the Goaler makes fresh suit and before he hath taken him the Prisoner dies this is the act of God and yet because it was once an escape an Action of Escape lyes against the Goaler Jermy for the Defendent and he remembred a Case which was Hil 20. Jac. Cadnor and Hildersons Case that by the Writ of Error the bayle is suspended Nota that it was agréed by the Court in this case that by the Writ of Error brought in the bayle was not discharged because it is incertain whether the Iudgement shall be reversed or not Also it was agreed that if the principal dies before a Capias awarded against him that the bayle is discharged It was also agreed by the Court that the Plea was not double for the first matters are but an inducement to the last and yet by Doderidge if severall matters are pleaded in Bar and there be not any dependency on them the Where a Plea is double and where not Plea is double although none of them be materiall but one Jones Justice cited one Hobs and Tadcasters Case which was 43. Eliz. in B. R. where after a Writ of Error brought a Scire facias issued against the Bayle and upon Nihil returned the Plaintiff in the Scire facias brought in an Audita Quaerela and there the matter came in question whether upon the Iudgement the Principall ought presently render himself to prison or that he should stay until a Capias awarded against him and there it was resolved by Popham and all his Companions that the Principal is not bound to render himselfe to Prison untill a Capias be taken out so that if he dies after the Iudgement and before the Capias awarded against him the Bayle is discharged And in the principal Case here it was resolved that a Scire facias does not lye against the Bayle until a Capias be awarded against the Principal because no Capias in this case was awarded against the Principal which could not be by reason of the Writ of Error before his death And also the Plaintiff in his Declaration ought to have averred and shewn that the Capias was awarded against the Principal for these reasons Iudgement was given quod quaerens nil capiet per Billa The same Term in the same Court. Reynor versus Hallet IN an Action upon the Case for these words viz. Reynor is a base Gentleman Words Reynor is a base Gentleman he hath foâ—â— childâ—en by his seâ—vant Agnes and he hath killed or caused them to be killed he hath four children by his Servant Agnes and he hath killed them all or caused them to be killed and after a verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in arrest of Iudgement by Jermy that the words were not actionable For 1.
should be an exchaÌ„ge between them of the said Mannors because the Mannor of Gadmaston was the better Stroud covenanted with the Father and the Son to pay 1200 l. to the Father for the Demesnes of the said Mannor and Advowson and that at Michaelmas next insuing there should be a mutuall entry into the said Mannors and that in the mean time either of them should take the profits of their own MaÌ„nors and that they should deliver each to other their evidences and that Assurances should be made as Councel should advise the Plaintiff declare that they had performed all the Covenants which were to be performed on their part and that the Defendant had not paid the 1200 l. and that thereupon this action of Covenant was brought The Defendant protestando that the Plaintiff had performed the Covenants and had not produced their edidences c. for Plea saith that the Plaintiff after Michaelmas bargained and sold the Mannor of Gadmaston to J. S. and his Heirs upon which the Plaintiff demurs and he conceived that notwithstanding the sale after Mich. yet an action of Covenant lies for the 1200 l. but otherwise it had been if he had sold it before Mich. But it hath been objected that the money by the Covenant is to be payd pro the Mannor and therfore because the Defendant cannot have the Mannor he shall 〈◊〉 pâ—y the Money and for this 9. E. 4. 20. and 24. E. 3. 21. have been cited that pro implies a condition as pro servitio pro maritagio but these Cases do not resemble this case in reason because the fact to be done here rests upon an indiffinite time and the Defendant is to do the first Act the Defendant is bound to a certain time for the doing of this Act. For the first it is agreed that the Defendant shall pay 1200 l. and the Plaintiff agrees to make Assurances for this Mannor and that the Assurances should be made as Councel should devise and I conceive that the Defendant ought to procure the Councel to devise for mutuall Assurances ought to be made and either party ought to appoint what Assurances he would have and the one ought not to be a Carver to the other neither can one know what councel the other will have and upon this reason is the case 9. E. 4. 3. 4. and Plow 15. b. the Case of the Bell it shall be weighed by him who is to have the profit peradventure if it were in case of an Obligation to perform covenants there he ought to procure the Counsel for saving the penalty of the obligation but it is otherwise here in case of a Covenant Co. lib. 5. 22. b. 18. E. 3. 27. and 4. E. 3. 29. If a man be bound to be ready to levy a Fine such a day yet the other ought to bring the Writ of Covenant against him before that day for otherwise he cannot levy a fine But now the Law is altered for now fines are levied Writs of Covenant are sued out afterwards 17. E. 4. 2 per Pigot If I am bound to you in 20 l. to enfeoff you at such a day of such Land if you please to take the Feoffment you are bound to let me know your pleasure and here the Assurance is for the benefit of the Defendant and he cited Co. lib. 5. 23. and 7. E. 4. 13. 2. For the time this Assurance ought to be devised by Councel before Mich. or otherwise the Plaintiff shall be enforced to keep his Mannor all his life and shall be hindred of the sale of it for payment of his debts or other necessaries whatsoever And 17. E. 3. 1. liking ought to be shown in convenient time And it appears by the Articles that the time intended was before Michaelmas for every thing to be done by the Articles was to be done before Michaelmas Hill 37. Eliz. Rot. 99. B. R. between Mills and Parsons A man covenanted in consideration of 42 l. rent to be granted to him payable at Mich. and Lady day yearly to levy a fine of a Mannor to the use of c. and the assurance of the Rent is not made before Michaelmas and it was resolved that the Covenant was not performed for the grant of the Rent ought to be before Mich. for otherwise he could not have the benefit intended and cited also Dyer 347. and 20 Eliz. Dyer 361. and in this case there could be no execution of other Articles if the Councel did not devise them before Mich. But it hath been objected that the Plaintiff have not fully shown the performance of the Covenants of their part but only by implication albeit they have performed and they have not averred that the Defendant hath not devised Answ To which I answer that this is good enough but where I covenant to do an act upon a future contingent act to be done by another there I ougt to show it particularly but otherwise in this Case and this is for the benefit of the Defendant and therefore he ought to shew it and to this purpose is 3. E. 3 Fitz. Det. 157. and 18 E. 3. 4. c. Jones Iustice Suppose the Defendant had demanded the assurance after Mich and before the sale what shall be done Noy nothing can be done after Michaelmas and it was adjourned The same Term in the same Court. Sanders and others versus Meryton IN an Action of Covenant the case was this Amongst other Covenants in a certain Indenture made between Sanders and others to the Lessees and his two Lessors the Lessors covenant to discharge them of all Incumbrances done by them or any other person and the Plaintiff assign for breach that one of the Lessors had made a Lease and thereupon they brought this Action And Goldsmith moved in arrest of Iudgement that the breach was not well layd because it is onely layd to be done by one of them and the Covenant is to discharge them of incumbrances done by them which shall be intended joynt incumbrances Doderidge Iustice the Covenant goes aswell to Incumbrances done severally as joyntly for it is of all incumbrances done by them or any other person and so was the opinion of the other Iustices and therefore the exception was over-ruled The same Term in the same Court. Dickar versus Moland IN Replevin the case was thus A man made a Feoffment to the use of himselfe for life the remainder to his Son in taile which remainder over to the Defendant made conusance as Bayliff to the Son for 4 s. Rent due to him before the sayd time in which c. to wit 1. Jan. 18. Jac. which time was before the death of the Feoffor whereupon it was moved for the Plaintiff that the Avowry could not be good and Roll argued for the Defendant that it is good enough for the Ante predictum tempus quo c. is good enough and the scilicet is voyd for by this it appears that the Rent is due to
Execution shall be sued against him as Ter-tenant 2. There is not any lien as Heir for the Iudgment doth not mention the Heir and therfore he cannot be charged unlesse he be expresly bound and in the Record of the Recovery it doth not appear that the first lien shall bind the Heir for he declares that he bound himself and not that he bound himself and his Heirs 3. If the Heir were bound in the Obligation so that he were once bound as Heir yet the Iudgment determines the specialty so that now he is not bound and in the Iudgment the Heir is not mentioned as in 10 H. 4. 21. 24. If an Abbot contract to the use of the house without consent of the Covent this shall bind if he dies but if he takes an Obligation of the Abbot and then he dies this shall not bind the house for the Contract is determined by the Obligation and this is the reason that in the time of E. 3. in a recovery upon debt the Obligation was cancelled 4. Here he cannot be charged as Heir for it appeareth by the Record Where a debt is recorded upon bond the Obligation was cancelled that his Father is living for it is brought against him as Heir apparant which he cannot be but during the life of his Father And as to the objection that in this case he shall have his age and therfore shall be charged as Heir Non sequitur for if execution be sued against the Heir of a Purchasor he shall have his age and yet he is not Heir neither can charged as Heir to the Conusor But because it is a rule in Law that the Heir which hath by discent shall not answer where his Inheritance may be charged during his Nonage Whitlock to the same intent because the Heir is not charged here as Heir but as Ter-tenant wherby his false Plea shall not hurt him with which Jones also agreed and said that he here considered three things 1. That the lien of the Ancestor binds the Heir 2. How the Heir shall behave himself in pleading 3. Our point in question For the first there are two things requisite to bind one as Heir 1. A lien expresse for if one bind himself and not his Heir this shall not bind his Heir in any case 2. A discent of Inheritance for without this he shall not be bound by the act of his Ancestor and he is bound no longer then Assets discend for he alien before the Writ purchased the lien is gone 2. He ought to behave himself truly and plead truly and confesse the assets discended to him when debt is brought against him as heir otherwise his own Lands shall be charged with the debt as it is in Pepys case in Plow Com. But where it is said in Pepys case that upon a Nihil dicit or Non sum informatum c. If the Iudgment passe upon them that it shall be generall I am not of that opinion for the common experience of the Courts is that such a generall Iudgment shall not be given against the Heir unlesse it be upon a false plea pleaded with which agrees Lawsons case Dyer 81. and Henninghams case Dyer 344. where the Iudgment passed by Nihil dicit so that the saying in Plow 440. a. that what way soever the Heir be condemned in debt if he do not confesse the Assets c. that it shall be his proper debt is not now taken for Law And I also hâ—ld that if the Heir plead falsly and there is found more Assets Where upon a false plea by an Heir the Plaintiff may elect to take the Assets in execution or an Elegit of all his Land that yet it is in the election of the Plaintiff to charge him and to take execution of the Assets only or to take an Elegit of all his Land and he is not bound to take an Elegit of all his Land in this case for otherwise this inconvenience may arise If the Heir hath a 100. acres by discent and two by purchâ—se if upon the false Plea of the Heir the Plaintiff cannot have any other execution but an Eligit of the Moyety of his Lands then he by this is prejudiced for otherwise he might have all he Assets in execution and so the Heir by this way shall take advantage of his false plea. 3. He held as Whitlock before and for the same reason Doderidge Iustice How the Heir shall be bâ—und by the act of his Father is worthy of consideration upon which Prima facie the Books seem to disagree but being well considered accord with excellent harmony I have considered this case it was moved at Reading Term and because my Notes are not here I will speak more briefly and will consider 1. Hâ—w an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Father and as to that in debt against an Heir he is charged as Heir so that at this day it is taken as his proper debt wherby the Writ is in the Debet and Detinet How an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Father but in the Detinet only against Executors But in former time from the 18. of Ed. 2. till 7 H. 4. if an Executor had Assets the Heir was not chargable but in 7 H. 4. the Law changed in this point for now it is accounted his own debt and debt will lye against his Executor as it is said in Plow Com and so against the Heirs of the Heir to many generations albeit of this Plowden makes a doubt and his plea that he had nothing at the day of the Writ purchased nor ever after is good for if he alien the Assets he is discharged of the debt in regard he is not to wait the action of the Obligee 2. The Heir shall be châ—â—ged upon or Recognisance not as Heir but as Ter-tenant for he is not bound in the Recognisance but only the Conusor grant that the debt shall be levied of all his Lands and Tenements but not against his Heirs And here he is not meerly as Ter-tenant for he shall not have contribution agâ—â—st â—her Ter-tenants but only against those who are Heirs as himself is but to all other intents he is Ter-tenant and so charged Why an Heir is not chargable for debt after he hath fold the assets as 32 E. 3. and 27 H. 6. aâ—â— 3. That upon a Iudgment as our case is the Heir shall be charged as Ter-tenant and not otherwise The Book which hath been cited viz 33 E. 3. Execution 162. is expresse in the point the broken years of Fitzherbert are obsâ—urely reported but by comparing of cases it will appear to be our case exâ—resly 4. That albeit an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Ancestor where he is particularly bound yet upon his false plea no execution shall be but upon the assets So it seems to me that in the principall case the Iudgment shall be speciall and it seems to be a