should have been Commended You see by this that many things are made Crimes and no Crimes which are not so in their own Nature but by Diversity of Law made upon Diversity of Opinion or of Interest by them which have Authority And yet those things whether good or evil will pass so with the Vulgar if they hear them often with odious terms recited for hainous Crimes in themselves as many of those Opinions which are in themselves Pious and Lawful were heretofore by the Popes Interest therein called Detestable Heresie Again some Controversies are of things done upon the Sea others of things done upon the Land There need by many Courts to the deciding of so many kinds of Controversies What order is there taken for their Distribution La. There be an extraordinary great number of Courts in England First there be the Kings Courts both for Law and Equity in matters Temporal which are the Chancery the Kings-Bench the Court of Common-Pleas and for the Kings Revenue the Court of the Exchequer and there be Subjects Courts by Priviledge as the Court in London and other priviledg'd places And there be other Courts of Subjects as the Courts of Landlords called the Court of Barons and the Courts of Sherifs Also the Spiritual Courts are the Kings Courts at this day though heretofore they were the Popes Courts And in the Kings Courts some have their Judicature by Office and some by Commission and some Authority to Hear and Determine and some only to Inquire and to Certifie into other Courts Now for the Distribution of what Pleas every Court may hold it is commonly held that all the Pleas of the Crown and of all Offences contrary to the Peace are to be holden in the Kings Bench or by Commissioners for Bracton saith Sciendum est quod si Actiones sunt Criminales in Curia Domini Regis debent determinari cum sit ibi poena Câ—rporalis infligenda hoc coram ipso Rege si tangat personam suam sicut Crimen Laesae Majestatis vel coram Justitiariis ad hoc specialiter assignatis That is to say That if the Plea be Criminal it ought to be determin'd in the Court of our Lord the King because there they have power to inflict Corporeal punishment and if the Crime be against his person as the Crime of Treason it ought to be determin'd before the King himself or if it be against a private person it ought to be determin'd by Justices Assigned that is to say before Commissioners It seems by this that heretofore Kings did hear and determine Pleas of Treason against themselves by their own Persons but it has been otherwise a long time and is now For it is now the Office of the Lord Steward of England in the Tryal of a Peer to hold that Plea by a Commission especially for the same In Causes concerning Meum and Tuum the King may sue either in the Kings-Bench or in the Court of Common Pleas as it appears by Fitzherbert in his Natura Brevium at the Writ of Escheat Ph. A King perhaps will not sit to determine of Causes of Treason against his Person lest he should seem to make himself Judge in his own Cause but that it shall be Judged by Judges of his own making can never be avoided which is also one as if he were Judge himself La. To the Kings-Bench also I think belongeth the Hearing and Determining of all manner of Breaches of the Peace whatsoever saving alwayes to the King that he may do the same when he pleaseth by Commissioners In the time of Henry the 3d and Edward the 1st when Bracton wrote the King did usually send down every seven years into the Country Commissioners called Justices Itinerant to Hear and Determine generally all Causes Temporal both Criminal and Civil whose places have been now a long time supplyed by the Justices of Assize with Commissions of the Peace of Oyer and Terminer and of Goal-delivery Ph. But why may the King only Sue in the kings-Kings-Bench or Court of Common-Pleas which he will and no other Person may do the same La. There is no Statute to the contrary but it seemeth to be the Common-Law for Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst. setteth down the Jurisdiction of the kings-Kings-Bench which he says has First Jurisdiction in all Pleas of the Crown Secondly The Correcting of all manner of Errors of other Justices and Judges both of Judgments and Process except of the Court of Exchequer which he sayes is to this Court Proprium quarto modo Thirdly That it has power to Correct all Misdemeanours extrajudicial tending to the breach of the Peace or oppression of the Subjects or raising of Factions Controversies Debates or any other manner of Misgovernment Fourthly It may hold Plea by Writ out of the Chancery of all Trespasses done Vi Armis Fifthly It hath power to hold Plea by Bill for Debt Detinu Covenant Promise and all other personal Actions but of the Jurisdiction of the Kings-Bench in Actions real he says nothing save that if a Writ in a Real Action be abated by Judgment in the Court of Common-Pleas and that the Judgment be by a Writ of Error reversed in the kings-Kings-Bench then the kings-Kings-Bench may proceed upon the Writ Ph. But how is the Practice La. Real Actions are commonly decided as well in the kings-Kings-Bench as in the Court of Common-Pleas Ph. When the Kng by Authority in Writing maketh a lord-chief-Lord-Chief-Justice of the kings-Kings-Bench does he not set down what he makes him for La. Sir Edw Coke sets down the Letters Patents whereby of Antient time the Lord chief-Chief-Justice was Constituted wherein is expressed to what end he hath his Office viz. Pro Conservatione nostra tranquilitatis Regni nostri ad Justitiam universis singulis de Regno nostro exhibendam Constituimus Dilectum Fidelem nostrum P. B. Justitiarium Angliae quamdiu nobis placuerit Capitalem c. That is to say for the preservation of our self and of the Peace of our Realm and for the doing of Justice to all and singular our Subjects we have Constituted our Beloved and Faithful P. B. during our pleasure Chief Justice of England c. Ph. Methinks 't is very plain by these Letters Patents that all Causes Temporal within the Kingdom except the Pleas that belong to the Exchequer should be decidable by this lord-chief-Lord-Chief-Justice For as for Causes Criminal and that concern the Peace it is granted him in these words for the Conservation of our self and peace of the Kingdom wherein are contained all Pleas Criminal and in the doing of Justice to all and singular the Kings Subjects are comprehended all Pleas Civil And as to the Court of Common-Pleas it is manifest it may hold all manner of Civil-Pleas except those of the Exchequer by Magna Charta Cap. 11. So that all original Writs concerning Civil-Pleas are returnable into either of the said Courts but how is the Lord-Chief-Justice made now La. By these
words in their Letters Patents Constituimus vos Justitiarium nostrum Capitalem ad Placita coram nobis tenenda durante beneplacito nostro That is to say we have made you our Chief-Justice to hold Pleas before our self during our pleasure But this Writ though it be shorter does not at all abridge the power they had by the former And for the Letters Patents for the Chief-Justice of the Common-Pleas they go thus Constituimus dilectum Fidelem c. Capitalem Justitiarium de Communi Banco Habendum c. quamdiu nobis placuerit cum vadiis foedis ab antiquo debitis consuetis Id est We have Constituted our Beloved and Faithful c. Chief-Justice of the common-Common-Bench To have c. during our pleasure with the ways and Fees thereunto heretofore due and usual Ph. I find in History that there have been in England always a Chancellour and a chief-Chief-Justice of England but of a Court of Common-Pleas there is no mention before Magna Charta Common-Pleas there were ever both here and I think in all Nations for Common-Pleas and Civil-Pleas I take to be the same La. Before the Statute of Magna Charta Common-Pleas as Sir Edw. Coke granteth 2 Inst. p. 21. might have been holden in the kings-Kings-Bench and that Court being removeable at the Kings will the Returns of Writs were Coram Nobis ubicunque fuerimus in Anglia whereby great trouble of Jurors ensued and great charges of the parties and delay of Justice and that for these causes it was Ordain'd that the Common-Pleas should not follow the King but be held in a place certain Ph. Here Sir Edw. Coke declares his Opinion that no Common-Plea can be holden in the kings-Kings-Bench in that he says they might have been holden then And yet this doth not amount to any probable proof that there was any Court of Common-Pleas in England before Magna Charta For this Statute being to ease the Jurors and lessen the Charges of Parties and for the Expedition of Justice had been in Vain if there had been a Court of Common-Pleas then standing for such a Court was not necessarily to follow the King as was the Chancery and the kings-Kings-Bench Besides unless the Kings-Bench wheresoever it was held Plea of civil Causes the Subject had not at all been eased by this Statute For supposing the King at York had not the Kings Subjects about London Jurors and parties as much trouble and charge to go to York as the People about York had before to go to London Therefore I can by no means believe otherwise then that the Erection of the Court of Common-Pleas was the effect of that Statute of Magna Charta Cap. 11. And before that time not existent though I think that for the multiplicity of Suits in a great Kingdom there was need of it La. Perhaps there was not so much need of it as you think For in those times the Laws for the most part were in setling rather than setled and the old Saxon Laws concerning Inheritances were then practised by which Laws speedy Justice was Executed by the Kings Writs in the Courts of Barons which were Landlords to the rest of the Freeholders and Suits of Barons in county-County-Courts and but few Suits in the Kings Courts but when Justice could not be had in those Inferior Courts but at this day there be more Suits in the Kings Courts than any one Court can dispatch Ph. Why should there be more Suits now than formerly For I believe this Kingdom was as well Peopled then as now La. Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst. p. 76. assigneth for it six Causes 1. Peace 2. Plenty 3. The Dissolution of Religious Houses and dispersing of their Lands among so many several persons 4. The multitude of Informers 5. The number of Concealers 6. The multitude of Attorneys Ph. I see Sir Edw. Coke has no mind to lay any fault upon the Men of his own Profession and that he Assigns for Causes of the Mischiefs such things as would be Mischief and Wickedness to amend for if Peace and Plenty be the cause of this Evil it cannot be removed but by War and Beggery and the Quarrels arising about the Lands of Religious Persons cannot arise from the Lands but from the doubtfulness of the Laws And for Informers they were Authorised by Statutes to the Execution of which Statutes they are so necessary as that their number cannot be too great and if it be too great the fault is in the Law it self The number of Concealers are indeed a number of Couseners which the Law may easily Correct And lastly for the multitude of Attorneys it is the fault of them that have the power to admit or refuse them For my part I believe that Men at this day have better learn't the Art of Caviling against the words of a Statute than heretofore they had and thereby encourage themselves and others to undertake Suits upon little reason Also the variety and repugnancy of Judgments of Common-Law do oftentimes put Men to hope for Victory in causes whereof in reason they had no ground at all Also the ignorance of what is Equity in their own causes which Equity not one Man in a thousand ever Studied and the Lawyers themselves seek not for their Judgments in their own Breasts but in the precedents of former Judges as the Antient Judges sought the same not in their own Reason but in the Laws of the Empire Another and perhaps the greatest cause of multitude of Suits is this that for want of Registring of conveyances of Land which might easily be done in the Townships where the Lands ly a Purchase cannot easily be had which will not be litigious Lastly I believe the Coveteousness of Lawyers was not so great in Antient time which was full of trouble as they have been since in time of Peace wherein Men have leisure to study fraud and get employment from such Men as can encourage to Contention And how ample a Field they have to exercise this Mystery in is manifest from this that they have a power to Scan and Construe every word in a Statute Charter Feofment Lease or other Deed Evidence or Testimony But to return to the Jurisdiction of this Court of the Kings-Bench where as you say it hath power to correct and amend the Errors of all other Judges both in Process and in Judgments cannot the Judges of the Common-Pleas correct Error in Process in their own Courts without a Writ of Error from another Court La. Yes and there be many Statutes which Command them so to do Ph. When a Writ of Error is brought out of the Kings-Bench be it either Error in Process or in Law at whose Charge is it to be done La. At the Charge of the Clyent Ph. I see no reason for that for the Clyent is not in fault who never begins a Suit but by the advice of his Council Learned in the Law whom he pays for his Council given Is not
this the fault of his Councellor Nor when a Judge in the Common-Pleas hath given an Erroneous Sentence it is always likely that the Judge of the Kings-Bench will reverse the Judgment though there be no Question but as you may find in Bracton and other Learned Men he has power to do it because being Professors of the same Common-Law they are perswaded for the most part to give the same Judgments For Example if Sir Edw. Coke in the last Terme that he sate lord-chief-Lord-Chief-Justice in the Court of Common-Pleas had given an Erroneous Judgment that when he was removed and made lord-chief-Lord-Chief-Justice of the kings-Kings-Bench would therefore have reversed the said Judgment it is possi he might but not very likely And therefore I do believe there is some other power by the King constituted to reverse Erroneous Judgments both in the kings-Kings-Bench and in the Court of Common-Pleas La. I think not for there is a Statute to the contrary made 4 o Hen. 4. cap. 23. in these words Whereas as well in Plea Real as in Plea Personal after Judgment in the Court of our Lord the King the Parties be made to come upon grievous pain sometimes before the King himself sometimes before the Kings Council and sometimes to the Parliament to answer thereof anew to the great Impoverishing of the Parties aforesaid and to the subversion of the Common-Law of the Land it is ordained and established that after Judgment given in the Court of our Lord the King the Parties and their Heirs shall be there in Peace until the Judgment be undone by Attaint or by Error if there be Error as hath been used by the Laws in the times of the Kings Progenitors Ph. This Statute is so far from being repugnant to that I say as it seemeth to me to have been made expresly to confirm the same For the substance of the Statuâ—e is that there shall be no Suit made by either of the Parties for any thing adjudged either in the Kings-Bench or Court of Common-Pleas before the Judgment be undone by Error or Corruption prov'd and that this was the Common-Law before the making of this Statute which could not be except there were before this Statute some Courts authorised to examine and correct such Errors as by the Plaintiff should be assign'd The inconvenience which by this Statute was to be remedied was this that often Judgment given in the Kings Courts by which are meant in this place the Kings-Bench and Court of Common-Pleas the Party against whom the Judgment was given did begin a new Suit and cause his Adversary to come before the King himself here by the King himself must be understood the King in Person for though in a Writ by the words Coram nobis is understood the Kings-Bench yet in a Statute it is never so nor is it strange seeing in those days the King did usually sit in Court with his Council to hear as sometimes King James and sometimes the same Parties commenced their Suit before the Privy-Council though the King were absent and sometimes before the Parliament the former Judgment yet standing For remedy whereof it was ordained by this Statute that no Man should renew his Suit till the former Judgment was undone by Attaint or Error which Reversing of a Judgment had been impossible if there had been no Court besides the aforesaid two Courts wherein the Errors might be Assigned Examin'd and Judg'd for no Court can be esteemed in Law or Reason a Competent Judge of its own Errors There was therefore before this Statute some other Court existent for the hearing of Errors and Reversing of Erroneous Judgments What Court this was I enquire not yet but I am sure it could not be either the Parliament or the Privy-Council or the Court wherein the Erroneous Judgment was given La. The Doctor and Student discourses of this Statute cap. 18. much otherwise than you do For the Author of that Book saith that against an Erroneous Judgment all Remedy is by this Statute taken away And though neither Reason nor the Office of a King nor any Law positive can prohibit the remedying of any Injury much less of an unjust Sentence yet he shows many Statutes wherein a Mans Conscience ought to prevail above the Law Ph. Upon what ground can he pretend that all Remedy in this case is by this Statute prohibited La. He says it is thereby enacted that Judgment given by the Kings Courts shall not be examin'd in the Chancery Parliament nor elsewhere Ph. Is there any mention of Chancery in this Act It cannot be examin'd before the King and his Council nor before the Parliament but you see that before the Statute it was examin'd somewhere and that this Statute will have it examin'd there again And seeing the Chancery was altogether the highest Office of Judicature in the Kingdom for matter of Equity and that the Chancery is not here forbidden to examine the Judgments of all other Courts at least it is not taken from it by this Statute But what Cases are there in this Chapter of the Doctor and Student by which it can be made probable that when Law and Conscience or Law and Equity seem to oppugne one another the written Law should be preferr'd La. If the Defendant wage his Law in an Action of Debt brought upon a true Debt the Plaintiff hath no means to come to his Debt by way of Compulsion neither by Subpoena nor otherwise and yet the Defendant is bound in Conscience to pay him Ph. Here is no preferring that I see of the Law above Conscience or Equity for the Plaintiff in this case loseth not his Debt for want either of Law or Equity but for want of Proof for neither Law nor Equity can give a Man his Right unless he prove it La. Also if the Grand-Jury in Attaint affirm a false Verdict given by the Petty-Jury there is no farther Remedy but the Conscience of the party Ph. Here again the want of Proof is the want of Remedy for if he can prove that the Verdict given was false the King can give him remedy such way as himself shall think best and ought to do it in case the Party shall find surety if the same Verdict be again affirmed to satisfie his Adversary for the Dammage and Vexation he puts him to La. But there is a Statute made since viz. 27 Eliz. c. 8. by which that Statute of Hen. 4. 23. is in part taken away for by that Statute Erroneous Judgments given in the kings-Kings-Bench are by a Writ of Error to be examin'd in the Exchequer-Chamber before the Justices of the Common-Bench and the Barons of the Exchequer and by the preamble of this Act it appears that Erroneous Judgments are only to be reform'd by the High Court of Parliament Ph. But here is no mention that the Judgments given in the Court of Common-Pleas should be brought in to be examin'd in the Exchequer-Chamber why therefore may not the Court of Chancery
examinâ—â— Judgment given in the Court of Common-Pleas La. You deny not but by the Antient Law of England the Kings-Bench may examine the Judgment given in the Court of Common-Pleas Ph. 'T is true but why may not also the Court of Chancery do the same especially if the fault of the Judgment be against Equity and not against the Letter of the Law La. There is no necessity of that for the same Court may examine both the Letter and the Equity of the Statute Ph. You see by this that the Jurisdiction of Courts cannot easily be distinguished but by the King himself in his Parliament The Lawyers themselves cannot do it for you see what Contention there is between Courts as well as between particular Men. And whereas you say that Law of 4 Hen. 4. 23. is by that of 27 Eliz. cap. 8. taken away I do not find it so I find indeed a Diversity of opinion between the makers of the former and the latter Statute in the preamble of the latter and Conclusion of the former The Preamble of the latter is forasmuch as Erroneous Judgments given in the Court called the Kings-Bench are only to be reformed in the High Court of Parliament and the Conclusion of the former is that the contrary was Law in the times of the Kings Progenitors These are no parts of those Laws but Opinions only concerning the Antient Custom in that Case arising from the different Opinions of the Lawyers in those different times neither Commanding nor Forbidding any thing though of the Statutes themselves the one forbids that such Pleas be brought before the Parliament the other forbids it not But yet if after the Act of Hen. 4. such a Plea had been brought before the Parliament the Parliament might have Heard and Determin'd it For the Statute forbids not that nor can any Law have the force to hinder the Law of any Jurisdiction whatsoever they please to take upon them seeing it is a Court of the King and of all the People together both Lords and Commons La. Though it be yet seeing the King as Sir Edw. Coke affirms 4 Inst. p. 71. hath committed all his power Judicial some to one Court and some to another so as if any Man would render himself to the Judgment of the King in such case where the King hath committed all his power Judicial to others such a render should be to no effect And p. 73. he saith farther That in this Court the Kings of this Realm have sitten on the High Bench and the Judges of that Court on the Lower Bench at his feet but Judicature belongeth only to the Judges of that Court and in his presence they answer all Motions Ph. I cannot believe that Sir Edw. Coke how much soever he desir'd to advance the authority of himself and other Justices of the Common-Law could mean that the King in the Kings-Bench sate as a Spectator only and might not have answered all motions which his Judges answer'd if he had seen cause for it For he knew that the King was Supream Judge then in all causes Temporal and is now in all Causes both Temporal and Ecclesiastical and that there is an exceeding great penalty ordained by the Laws for them that shall deny it But Sir Edw. Coke as he had you see in many places before hath put a Fallacy upon himself by not distinguishing between Committing and Transferring He that Transferreth his power hath deprived himself of it but he that Committeth it to another to be Exercised in his name and under him is still in the Possession of the same power And therefore if a Man render himself that is to say Appealeth to the King from any Judge whatsoever the King may receive his Appeal and it shall be effectual La. Besides these 2 Courts the kings-Kings-Bench for Pleas of the Crown and the Court of Common-Pleas for Causes Civil according to the Common-Law of England there is another Court of Justice that hath Jurisdiction in Causes both Civil and Criminal and is as Antient a Court at least as the Court of Common Pleas and this is the Court of the Lord Admiral but the proceedings therein are according to the Laws of the Roman Empire and the Causes to be determin'd there are such as arise upon the Marine Sea For so it is ordain'd by divers Statutes and confirm'd by many Precedents Ph. As for the Statutes they are always Law and Reason also for they are made by the Assent of all the Kingdom but Precedents are Judgments one contrary to another I mean divers Men in divers Ages upon the same case give divers Judgments Therefore I will ask your Opinion once more concerning any Judgments besides those of the King as to their validity in Law But what is the difference between the proceedings of the Court of Admiralty and the Court of Common-Law La. One is that the Court of Admiralty proceedeth by two Witnesses without any either Grand-Jury to Indict or Petty to Convict and the Judge giveth Sentence according to the Laws Imperial which of old time were in force in all this part of Europe and now are Laws not by the Will of any other Emperor or Forraign Power but by the Will of the Kings of England that have given them force in their own Dominions the reason whereof seems to be that the causes that arise at Sea are very often between us and People of other Nations such as are Governed for the most part by the self same laws Imperial Ph. How can it precisely enough be determin'd at Sea especially near the mouth of a very great River whether it be upon the Sea or within the Land For the Rivers also are as well as their Banks within or a part of one Country or other La. Truly the Question is difficult and there have been many Suits about it wherein the Question has been whose Jurisdiction it is in Ph. Nor do I see how it can be decided but by the King himself in case it be not declar'd in the Lord Admirals Letters Patents La. But though there be in the Letters Patents a power given to hold Plea in some certain cases to any of the Statutes concerning the Admiralty the Justices of the Common-Law may send a Prohibition to that Court to proceed in the Plea though it be with a non-obstante of any Statute Ph. Methinks that That should be against the Right of the Crown which cannot be taken from it by any Subject For that Argument of Sir Edw. Coke's that the King has given away all his Judicial Power is worth nothing because as I have said before he cannot give away the Essential Rights of his Crown and because by a non-obstante he declares he is not deceived in his Grant La. But you may see by the Precedents alledged by Sir Edw. Coke the contrary has been perpetually practised Ph. I see not that perpetually for who can tell but there may have been given other Judgments in such cases
Council the Judges La. The Council Inform the Judges Ph. Why may they not as well Inform the Chancellor Unless you will say that a Bishop understands not as well as a Lawyer what is sense when he hears it Read in English No no both the one and the other are able enough but to be able enough is not enough when not the difficulty of the Case only but also the Passion of the Judge is to be Conquer'd I forgot to tell you of the Statute of the 36 Edw. 3. cap. 9. That if any Person think himself grieved contrary to any of the Articles above Written or others contained in divers Statutes will come to the Chancery or any for him and thereof make his Complaint he shall presently there have Remedy by force of the said Articles and Statutes without elsewhere pursuing to have Remedy By the words of this Statute it is very apparent in my opinion that the Chancery may hold Plea upon the Complaint of the Party grieved in any Case Tryable at the Common-Law because the party shall have present Remedy in that Court by force of this Act without pursuing for Remedy elsewhere La. Yes but Sir Edw. Coke Answers this Objection 4 Inst. p. 82. in this manner These words says he He shall have Remedy signifie no more but that he shall have presently there a remedial Writ grounded upon those Statutes to give him Remedy at the Common-Law Ph. Very like Sir Edw. Coke thought as soon as the Party had his Writ he had his Remedy though he kept the Writ in his Pocket without pursuing his Complaint elsewhere or else he thought that in the common-Common-Bench was not elsewhere than in the Chancery La. Then there is the Court of Ph. Let us stop here for this which you have said satisfies me that seek no more than to distinguish between Justice and Equity and from it I Conclude that Justice fulfils the Law and Equity Interprets the Law and amends the Judgments given upon the same Law Wherein I depart not much from the Definition of Equity cited in Sir Edw. Coke 1 Inst. Sect. 21. viz. Equity is a certain perfect Reason that Interpreteth and Amendeth the Law Written though I Construe it a little otherwise than he would have done for no one can mend a Law but he that can make it and therefore I say not it amends the Law but the Judgments only when they are Erroneous And now let us Consider of Crimes in particular the Pleas whereof are commonly called the Pleas of the Crown and of the punishments belonging to them and first of the Highest Crime of all which is High Treason Tell me what is High Treason Of Crimes Capital La. THe first Statute that declareth what is High Treason is the Statute of the 25 Edw. 3. in these words Whereas divers Opinions have been before this time in what Case Treason shall be said and in what not the King at the Request of the Lords and of the Commons hath made Declaration in the manner as hereafter follows That is to say when a Man doth Compass or Imagine the Death of our Lord the King of our Lady the Queen or of their Eldest Son and Heir or if a Man doth violate the Kings Companion or the Kings Eldest Daughter unmarried or the Wife of the Kings Eldest Son and Heir or if a Man do Levy War against our Lord the King in his Realm or be adherent to the Kings Enemies in his Realm giving to them Aid and Comfort in the Realm or elsewhere and thereof be provably Attainted by open Deed by People of their Condition And if a Man Counterfeit the Kings Great or Privy-Seal or his Money And if a Man bring false Money into this Realm Counterfeit to the Money of England as the Money called Lushburgh or other like to the said Money of England knowing the Money to be false to Merchandize and make payment in deceit of our said Lord the King and of his People And if a Man slay the Chancellor Treasurer or the Kings Justices of the one Bench or the other Justices in Eyre or Justices of Assises and all other Justices Assigned to Hear and Determine being in their Places and doing their Offices And is to be understood in the Cases above rehearsed that That ought to be adjudged Treason which extends to our Royal Lord the King and his Royal Majesty and of such Treason the Forfeiture of the Escheats pertains to our Lord the King as well the Lands and Tenements holden of others as himself And moreover there is another manner of Treason that is to say when a Servant Slayeth his Master or a Wife her Husband or when a Man Secular or Religious slayeth his Prelate to whom he oweth Faith and Obedience and of such Treason the Escheats ought to pertain to every Lord of his own Fee And because many other like Cases of Treason may happen in time to come which a Man cannot think nor declare at this present time it is accorded that if any Case supposed Treason which is not above specified doth happen before any Justices the Justices shall tarry without giving any Judgment of the Treason till the Cause be shewed and declared before the King and his Parliament whether it ought to be adjudged Treason or other Felony Ph. I desir'd to understand what Treason is wherein no Enumeration of Facts can give me satisfaction Treason is a Crime of it self Malum in se and therefore a Crime at the Common-Law and High Treason the Highest Crime at the Common-Law that can be And therefore not the Statute only but Reason without a Statute makes it a Crime And this appears by the Preamble where it is intimated that all Men though of divers Opinions did Condemn it by the name of Treason though they knew not what Treason meant but were forced to request the King to determine it That which I desire to know is how Treason might have been defined without the Statute by a Man that has no other faculty to make a Definition of it than by meer Natural Reason La. When none of the Lawyers have done it you are not to expect that I should undertake it on such a sudden Ph. You know that Salus Populi is Suprema Lex that is to say the safety of the People is the highest Law and that the safety of the People of a Kingdom consisteth in the safety of the King and of the strength necessary to defend his People both against Forraign Enemies and Rebellious Subjects And from this I infer that to Compass that is to design the Death of the then present King was High Treason before the making of this Statute as being a Designing of a Civil War and the Destruction of the People 2. That the Design to Kill the Kings Wife or to violate her Chastity as also to violate the Chastity of the Kings Heir apparent or of his Eldest Daughter unmarryed as tending to the Destruction of the certainty of
nor that any Judgment be given without due Process of Law Ph. This is no unreasonable Petition for the Common-Law is nothing else but Equity And by this Statute it appears that the Chancellors before that Statute made bolder with the Courts of Common Law than they did afterward but it does not appear that Common-Law in this Statute signifies any thing else but generally the Law Temporal of the Realm nor was this Statute ever Printed that such as I might take notice of it but whether it be a Statute or not I know not till you tell me what the Parliament Answer'd to this Petition La. The Kings Answer was the Wages heretofore shall stand so as the Kings Royalty be saved Ph. This is slatly against Sir Edw. Coke concerning the Chancery La. In another Parliament 17 Rich. 2. It is Enacted at the Petition of the Commons That forasmuch as People were Compelled to come before the Kings Council or in Chancery by Writs grounded upon untrue Suggestions that the Chancellor for the time being presently after such Suggestions be duly found and proved untrue shall have power to Ordain and Award Dammages according to his discretion to him which is so Travelled unduly as is aforesaid Ph. By this Statute it appears that when a Complaint is made in Chancery upon undue Suggestions the Chancellor shall have the Examination of the said Suggestions and as he may avoid Dammages when the Suggestions are untrue so he may also proceed by Process to the detemining of the Cause whether it be Real or Personal so it be not Criminal La. Also the Commons Petitioned in a Parliament of 2 Hen. 4. not Printed That no Writs nor Privy-Seals be sued out of Chancery Exchequer or other places to any Man to appear at a day upon a pain either before the King and his Council or in any other place contrary to the ordinary Course of Common-Law Ph. What Answer was given to this Petition by the King La. That such Writs should not be granted without necessity Ph. Here again you see the King may deny or Grant any Petitions in Parliament either as he thinks it necessary as in this place or as he thinks it prejudicial or not prejudicial to his Royalty as in the Answer of the former Petition which is a sufficient proof that no part of his Legislative Power or any other Essential part of Royalty can be taken from him by a Statute Now seeing it is granted that Equity is the same thing with the Law of Reason and seeing Sir Edw. Coke 1 Inst. Sect. 21. Defines Equity to be a certain Reason comprehended in no Writing but consisting only in right Reason which interpreteth and amendeth the Written-Law I would fain know to what end there should be any other Court of Equity at all either before the Chancellor or any other Person besides the Judges of the Civil or Common-Pleas Nay I am sure you can alledge none but this that there was a necessity of a Higher Court of Equity than the Courts of Common-Law to remedy the Errors in Judgment given by the Justices of Inferior Courts and the Errors in Chancery were irrevocable except by Parliament or by special Commission appointed thereunto by the King La. But Sir Edw. Coke says that seeing matters of Fact by the Common-Law are Tryable by a Jury of 12 Men this Court should not draw the matter ad aliud Examen i. e. to another kind of Examination viz. by Deposition of Witnesses which should be but evidence to a Jury Ph. To the Deposition of Witnesses any more or less then to evidence to the Lord-Chancellor 'T is not therefore another kind of Examination nor is a Jury more capable of duly examining Witnesses than a Lord-Chancellor Besides seeing all Courts are bound to Judge according to Equity and that all Judges in a Case of Equity may sometimes be deceiv'd what harm is there to any Man or to the State if there be a subordination of Judges in Equity as well as of Judges in Common-Law Seeing it is provided by an Act of parliament to avoid Vexation that Subpoenas shall not be granted till surety be found to satisfie the Party so grieved and vexed for his Dammages and Expences if so be the matter may not be made good which is contained in the Bill La. There is another Statute of 31 Hen. 6. cap. 2. wherein there is a Proviso cited by Sir Edw. Coke in these words Provided that no matter determinable by the Laws of the Realm shall be by the said Act determined in other Form then after the course of the same Law in the Kings Courts having the Determination of the same Law Ph. This Law was made but for Seven years and never continued by any other Parliament and the motive of this Law was the great Riots Extortions Oppressions c. used during the time of the Insurrection of John Cade and the Indictments and Condemnations wrongfully had by this usurped Authority and thereupon the Parliament Ordained that for 7 years following no Man should disobey any of the Kings Writs under the Great Seal or should refuse to appear upon Proclamation before the Kings Council or in the Chancery to Answer to Riots Extortions c. For the first time he should lose c. Wherein there is nothing at all concerning the Jurisdiction of the Chancery or any other Court but an extraordinary power given to the Chancery and to the Kings Privy-Council to Determine of those Crimes which were not before that time Tryable but only by the Kings-Bench or special Commission For the Act was made expresly for the punishment of a great Multitude of Crimes committed by those that had Acted by the said Cade's Authority to which Act the Proviso was added which is here mention'd that the Proceeds in those Courts of Chancery and of the Kings Council should be such as should be used in the Courts to which the said Courts before this Act was made do belong That is to say such causes as were Criminal should be after the order of the Kings-Bench and such Causes as were not Criminal but only against Equity should be Tryed after the manner of the Chancery or in some cases according to the Proceedings in the Exchequer I wonder why Sir Edw. Coke should cite a Statute as this is above two hundred years before expir'd and other two Petitions as if they were Statutes when they were not passed by the King unless he did it on purpose to diminish as he endeavours to do throughout his Institutes the Kings Authority or to insinuate his own opinions among the People for the Law of the Land For that also he endeavours by Inserting Latin Sentences both in his Text and in the Margin as if they were Principles of the Law of Reason without any Authority of Antient Lawyers or any certainty of Reason in themselves to make Men believe they are the very grounds of the Law of England Now as to the Authority you
the sustaining of his Soveraign power is to destroy the Propriety he pretends to The next thing I will ask you is how you distinguish between Law and Right or Lex and Jus. La. Sir Ed. Coke in divers places makes Lex and Jus to be the same and so Lex Communis and Jus Communis to be all one nor do I find that he does in any places distinguish them Ph. Then will I distinguish them and make you judge whether my distinction be not necessary to be known by every Author of the Common Law for Law obligeth me to do or forbear the doing of something and therefore it lies upon me an Obligation but my Right is a Liberty left me by the Law to do any thing which the Law forbids me not and to leave undone any thing which the Law commands me not Did Sir Ed. Coke see no difference between being bound and being free La. I know not what he was but he has not mention'd it though a man may dispense with his own Liberty that cannot do so with the Law Ph. But what are you better for your Right if a rebellious Company at home or an Enemy from abroad take away the Goods or dispossess you of the Lands you have a right to Can you be defended or repair'd but by the strength and authority of the King What reason therefore can be given by a man that endeavours to preserve his Propriety why he should deny or malignly contribute to the Strength that should defend him or repair him Let us see now what your Books say to this point and other points of the Right of Soveraignty Bracton the most authentick Author of the Common Law fol. 55. saith thus Ipse Dominus Rex habet omnia Jura in manu suâ est Dei Vicarius habet ea quae sunt Pacis habet etiam coercionem ut Delinquentes puniat habet in potestate suâ Leges nihil enim prodest Jura condere nisi sit qui Jura tueatur That is to say our Lord the King hath all Right in his own Hands is Gods Vicar he has all that concerns the Peace he has the power to punish Delinquents all the Laws are in his power To make Laws is to no purpose unless there be some-body to make them obeyed If Bracton's Law be Reason as I and you think it is what temporal power is there which the King hath not Seeing that at this day all the power Spiritual which Bracton allows the Pope is restored to the Crown what is there that the King cannot do excepting sin against the Law of God The same Bracton Lib. 21. c. 8. saith thus Si autem a Rege petitur cum Breve non curret contra ipsum locus erit supplicationi quod factum suum corrigat emendet quod quidem si non fecerit satis sufficit ad poenam quod Dominum expectet Vltorem nemo quidem de factis ejus praesumat disputare multo fortius contra factum ejus venire That is to say if any thing be demanded of the King seeing a Writ lyeth not against him he is put to his Petition praying him to Correct and Amend his own Fact which if he will not do it is a sufficient Penalty for him that he is to expect a punishment from the Lord No Man may presume to dispute of what he does much less to resist him You see by this that this Doctrine concerning the Rights of Soveraignty so much Cryed down by the long Parliament is the Antient Common-Law and that the only Bridle of the Kings of England ought to be the fear of God And again Bracton c. 24. of the second Book sayes That the Rights of the Crown cannot be granted away Ea vero quae Jurisdictionis Pacis ea quae sunt Justitiae Paci annexa ad nullum pertinent nisi ad Coronam Dignitatem Regiam nec a Corona separari possunt nec a privata persona possideri That is to say those things which belong to Jurisdiction and Peace and those things that are annexed to Justice and Peace appertain to none but to the Crown and Dignity of the King nor can be separated from the Crown nor be possest by a private Person Again you 'l find in Fleta a Law-Book written in the time of Edw. 2. That Liberties though granted by the King if they tend to the hinderance of Justice or subversion of the Regal Power were not to be used nor allowed For in that Book c. 20. concerning Articles of the Crown which the Justices Itinerant are to enquire of the 54th Article is this you shall inquire De Libertatibus concessis quae impediunt Communem Jâ—stitiam Regiam Potestatem subvertunt Now what is a greater hindrance to Common Justice or a greater subversion of the Regal Power than a Liberty in Subjects to hinder the King from raising Money necessary to suppress or prevent Rebellions which doth destroy Justice and subvert the power of the Soveraignty Moreover when a Charter is granted by a King in these words Dedita coram pro me Haeredibus meis The grantor by the Common-Law as Sir Edw. Coke sayes in his Commentaries on Littleton is to warrant his Gift and I think it Reason especially if the Gift be upon Consideration of a price Paid Suppose a Forraign State should say claim to this Kingdom 't is no Matter as to the Question I am putting whether the Claim be unjust how would you have the King to warrant to every Free-holder in England the Lands they hold of him by such a Charter If he cannot Levy Money their Estates are lost and so is the Kings Estate and if the Kings Estate be gone how can he repair the Value due upon the Warranty I know that the Kings Charters are not so meerly Grants as that they are not also Laws but they are such Laws as speak not to all the Kings Subjects in general but only to his Officers implicitly forbidding them to Judge or Execute any thing contrary to the said Grants There be many Men that are able Judges of what is right Reason and what not when any of these shall know that a Man has no Superiour nor Peer in the Kingdom he will hardly be perswaded he can be bound by any Law of the Kingdom or that he who is Subject to none but God can make a Law upon himself which he cannot also as easily abrogate as he made it The main Argument and that which so much taketh with the throng of People proceedeth from a needless fear put into their minds by such Men as mean to make use of their Hands to their own ends for if say they the King may notwithstanding the Law do what he please and nothing to restrain him but the fear of punishment in the World to come then in case there come a King that fears no such punishment he may take away from us not only our Lands Goods and Liberties but our Lives
could be made after the doer therefore every such killing was called Murder before it could be known whether it could be by Felony or not For a Man may be found dead that kills himself or was Lawfully kill'd by another This name of Murder came to be the more horrid when it was secretly done for that it made every Man to consider of their own danger and him that saw the dead Body to boggle at it as a Horse will do at a dead Horse and to prevent the same they had Laws in force to Amerce the Hundred where it was done in a sum defined by Law to be the Price of his Life For in those dayes the lives of all sorts of Men were valued by Money and the value set down in their Written Laws And therefore Sir Edw. Coke was mistaken in that he thought that killing a Man by misfortune before the Statute of Marlebridge was adjudged Murder and those secret Murders were abominated by the People for that they were lyable to so great a Pecuniary Punishment for suffering the Malefactor to escape But this grievance was by Canutus when he Reign'd soon eased For he made a Law that the Countrey in this Case should not be Charged unless he were an English-man that was so slain but if he were a French-man under which name were comprehended all Forraigners and especially the Normans though the slayer escaped the County was not to be Amerced And this Law though it were very hard and Chargeable when an English-man was so slain for his Friend to prove he was an English-man and also unreasonable to deny the Justice to a stranger yet was it not Repealed till the 14th of King Ed. the 3d. By this you see that Murder is distinguished from Homicide by the Statute-Laws and not by any Common-Law without the Statute and that it is comprehended under the general name of Felony La. And so also is Petit Treason and I think so is High Treason also for in the abovesaid Statute in the 25 Ed. 3d. Concerning Treasons there is this Clause And because that many other like Cases of Treason may happen in time to come which a Man cannot think or declare at the present time it is accorded that if any other Case supposed Treason which is not above specified doth happen before any the Justices the Justices shall tarry without any going to Judgment of the Treason till the Cause be shewed and declared before the King and his Parliament whether it be Treason or other Felony which thereby shews that the King and Parliament thought that Treason was one of the sorts of Felony Ph. And so think I. La. But Sir Edw. Coke denies it to be so at this day for 1 Inst. Sect. 745. at the word Felony he saith That in Antient time this word Felony was of so large an extent as that it included High Treason But afterwards it was resolved that in the Kings Pardon or Charter this word Felony should extend only to Common Felonies And at this day under the word Felony by Law is included Petit Treason Murder Homicide burning of Houses Burglary Robbery Rape c. Chance-medley se defendendo and Petit Larceny Ph. He says it was resolv'd but by whom La. By the Justices of Assize in the time of Hen. 4. as it seems in the Margin Ph. Have Justices of Assize any Power by their Commission to alter the Language of the Land and the received sence of words Or in the Question in what Case Felony shall be said it is referred to the Judges to Determine as in the Question in what Case Treason shall be said it is referred by the Statute of Edw. the 3d. to the Parliament I think not and yet perhaps they may be disobliged to disallow a Pardon of Treason when mentioning all Felonies it nameth not Treason nor specifies it by any description of the Fact La. Another kind of Homicide there is simply called so or by the name of Manslaughter and is not Murder and that is when a Man kills another Man upon suddain Quarrel during the heat of Blood Ph. If two meeting in the Street chance to strive who shall go nearest to the Wall and thereupon Fighting one of them kills the other I believe verily he that first drew his Sword did it of Malice forethought though not long forethought but whether it be Felony or no it may be doubted It is true that the harm done is the same as if it had been done by Felony but the wickedness of the Intention was nothing near so great And supposing it had been done by Felony then 't is manifest by the Statute of Marlebridge that it was very Murder And when a Man for a word or a trifle shall draw his Sword and kill another Man can any Man imagine that there was not some Precedent Malice La. 'T is very likely there was Malice more or less and therefore the Law hath Ordained for it a punishment equal to that of Murder saving that the Offender shall have the Benefit of his Clergy Ph. The Benefit of Clergy comes in upon another account and importeth not any extenuation of the Crime for it is but a Relick of the old usurped Papal priviledge which is now by many Statutes so pared off as to spread but to few Offences and is become a Legal kind of Conveying Mercy not only to the Clergy but also to the Laity La. The work of a Judge you see is very difficult and requires a Man that hath a faculty of well distinguishing of Dissimilitudes of such Cases as Common Judgments think to be the same A small Circumstance may make a great Alteration which a Man that cannot well discern ought not to take upon him the Office of a Judge Ph. You say very well for if Judges were to follow one anothers Judgments in Precedent Cases all the Justice in the World would at length depend upon the Sentence of a few Learned or Unlearned ignorant Men and have nothing at all to do with the Study of Reason La. A Third kind of Homicide is when a Man kills another either by misfortune or in a necessary defence of himself or of the King or of his Laws for such killing is neither Felony nor Crime saving as Sir Edw. Coke says 4. Inst. p. 56. that if the Act that a Man is a doing when he kills another Man be Unlawful then it is Murder As if A. meaneth to steal a Deer in the Park of B. Shooteth at the Deer and by the glance of the Arrow killeth a Boy that is hidden in a Bush this is Murder for that the Act was Unlawful but if the owner of the Park had done the like shooting at his own Deer it had been by Misadventure and no Felony Ph. This is not so distinguished by any Statute but is the Commonly only of Sir Ed. Coke I believe not a word of it If a Boy be Robbing an Apple-tree and falling thence upon a Man that stands under
Suit in the Spiritual Court here in a Temporal Cause there lay a Premunire and if perhaps some Judge or other hath since that time judged otherwise his Judgment was erroneous La. Nay but by the Statute of 16. Rich. 2. cap. 5. it appeareth to the contrary as Sir Edw. Coke here will shew you The effect saith he of the Statute of Rich. 2. is That if any Pursue or cause to be Pursued in the Court of Rome or elsewhere any thing which toucheth the King against him his Crown or Regality or his Realm they their Notaries c. shall be out of the Kings Protection Ph. I pray you let me know the very words of the Statutes as they ly La. Presently The words are if any Man Purchase or Pursue or cause to be Purchased or Pursued in the Court of Rome or elsewhere any such Translations Processes and Sentences of Excommunication Bulls Instruments or any other things whatsoever which touch the King against him his Crown and his Regality or his Realm as is aforesaid c. Ph. If a Man bring a Plea of Common-Law into the Spiritual Court which is now the Kings Court and the Judge of this Spiritual Court hold Plea thereof By what Construction can you draw it within the compass of the words you have now read To sue for my Right in the Kings Court is no pursuing of Translations of Bishopricks made or procur'd in the Court of Rome or any place else but only in the Court of the King nor is this the suit against the King nor his Crown nor his Regality nor his Realm but the contrary Why then is it a Premunire No. He that brings in or setteth out a Writing in any place whatsoever wherein is contained that the King hath so given away his Jurisdiction as that if a Subject be condemned falsly his Submission to the Kings Judgment is of none effect or that the King upon no necessity whatsoever can out of Parliament time raise Money for the defence of the Kingdom is in my opinion much more within the Statute of Provisors than they which begin suit for a Temporal Matter in a Court Spiritual But what Argument has he for this Law of his since the Statute Law fails him from the Law of Reason La. He says they are called Courts either because they proceed by the Rules of other Laws as by the Canon or Civil Law or by other Tryals than the Common Law doth Warrant For the Tryals Warranted by the Law of England for matter of Fact is by verdict of 12 Men before the Judges of the Common Law in matters pertaining to the Common Law and not upon Examination of Witnesses as in the Court of Equity so that Alia Curia is either that which is govern'd per aliam Legem or which draweth the Party ad aliud Examen For if Ph. Stop there Let us consider of this you have read for the Tryal warranted by the Law of England is by Verdict of 12 Men. What means he here by the Law of England Does it not warrant the Tryals in Chancery and in the Court of Admiralty by Witnesses La. By the Law of England he means the Law used in the Kings Bench that is to say the Common-Law Ph. This is just as if he had said that these two Courts did warrant their own way of Tryal but other Courts not so but were warranted by the King only the Courts of Common Law were VVarrants to themselves You see that alia Curia is this way ill expounded In the Courts of Common Law all Tryals are by 12 Men who are Judges of the Fact and the Fact known and prov'd the Judges are to pronounce the Law but in the Spiritual Court the Admiralty and in all the Courts of Equity there is but one Judge both of Fact and of Law this is all the difference If this difference be intended by the Statute by alia Curia there would be a Premunire for suing in a Court being not the Kings Court The Kings Bench and Court of Common Pleas may also be different kinds of Courts because the Process is different but 't is plain that this Statute doth not distinguish Courts otherwise than into the Courts of the King and into the Courts of the Forraign States and Princes And seeing you stand upon the name of a Jury for the distinguishing of Courts what difference do you find between the Tryals at the Common-Law and the Tryals in other Courts You know that in Tryals of Fact naturally and through all the World the Witnesses are Judges and it is impossible to be otherwise What then in England can a Jury judge of except it be of the sufficiency of the Testimony The Justices have nothing to judge of nor do but after the Fact is proved to declare the Law which is not Judgment but Jurisdiction Again though the Tryal be in Chancery or in the Court of Civil Law 1. The Witnesses are still Judges of the Fact and he that hath the Commission to hear the Cause hath both the parts that is to say of a Jury to judge of the Testimony and of a Justice to declare the Law In this I say lyes all the difference which is indeed enough to make a Dispute as the World goes about Jurisdiction But seeing it tends neither to the Disherison of the King nor of the People nor to the subversion of the Law of Reason i. e. of Common-Law nor to the subversion of Justice nor to any harm of the Realm without some of which these Statutes are not broken it cannot be a Premunire La. Let me read on For if the Freehold Inheritances Goods and Chattels Debts and Duties wherein the King and Subject have Right and Property by the Common-Law should be judged per aliam Legem or be drawn ad aliud Examen the 3 Mischiefs afore exprest would follow viz. the destruction of the King and his Crown the Disherison of his People and the undoing and destruction of the Common-Law always used Ph. That is to say of the Law of Reason From hence it follows that where there are no Juries and where there are different Laws from ours that is to say in all the World besides neither King nor People have any Inheritance nor Goods nor any Law of Reason I will examine his Doctrine concerning Cases Criminal no farther He no where defineth a Crime that we may know what it is An odious name sufficeth him to make a Crime of any thing He hath put Heresie among the most odious Crimes not knowing what it signifies and upon no other Cause but because the Church of Rome to make their usurped Power the more terrible had made it by long Preaching against it and Cruelty shown towards many Godly and learned Men of this and other Reformed Churches appear to common People a thing detestable He puts it in as a Plea of the Crown in the time of Queen Elizabeth whereas in her time there was no
Doctrine Heresie but Justice Stamford leaves it out because when Heresie was a Crime it was a Plea of the Mitre I see also in this Catalogue of Causes Criminal he inserteth costly Feeding costly Apparel and costly Building though they were contrary to no Statute 'T is true that by evil Circumstances they become sins but these sins belong to the Judgment of the Pastors Spiritual A Justice of the Temporal Law seeing the Intention only makes them sins cannot judge whether they be sins or no unless he have power to take Confessions Also he makes flattery of the King to be a Crime How could he know when one Man had flattered another He meant therefore that it was a Crime to please the King And accordingly he citeth divers Calamities of such as had been in times past in great favour of the Kings they serv'd as the Favourites of Hen. 3. Ed. 2. Rich. 2. Hen. 6. which Favourites were some imprisoned some banished and some put to death by the same Rebels that imprisoned banished and put to death the same King upon no better ground than the Earl of Strafford the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury and King Charles the first by the Rebels of that time Empson and Dudley were no Favourites of Hen. the 7th but Spunges which King Hen. the 8th did well Squeeze Cardinal Woolsey was indeed for divers years a favourite of Hen. the 8th but fell into disgrace not for flattering the King but for not flattering him in the business of Divorce from Queen Katharine You see his Reasoning here see also his Passion in the words following We will for some Causes descend no lower Qui eorum vestigiis insistunt eorum exitus perhorrescant this is put in for the Favourite that then was of King James But let us give over this and speak of the legal Punishments to these Crimes belonging Of Punishments ANd in the first place I desire to know who it is that hath the power for an Offence committed to define and appoint the special manner of Punishment for suppose you are not of the Opinion of the Stoicks in old time that all faults are equal and that there ought to be the same Punishment for killing a Man and for killing a Hen. La. The manner of Punishment in all Crimes whatsoever is to be determined by the Common-Law That is to say if it be a Statute that determins it then the Judgment must be according to the Statute if it be not specified by the Statute then the Custome in such Cases is to be followed But if the Case be new I know not why the Judge may not determine it according to Reason Ph. But according to whose reason If you mean the natural Reason of this or that Judge authorized by the King to have cognisance of the Cause there being as many several Reasons as there are several Men the punishment of all Crimes will be uncertain and none of them ever grow up to make a Custome Therefore a Punishment certain can never be assigned if it have its beginning from the natural Reasons of deputed Judges no nor from the natural of the Supream Judge For if the Law of Reason did determine Punishments then for the same Offences there should be through all the World and in all times the same Punishments because the Law of Reason is Immutable and Eternal La. If the natural Reason neither of the King nor of any else be able to prescribe a Punishment how can there be any lawful Punishment at all Ph. Why not For I think that in this very difference between the rational Faculties of particular Men lyeth the true and perfect reason that maketh every Punishment certain For but give the authority of defining punishments to any Man whatsoever and let that Man define them and right Reason has defin'd them Suppose the Definition be both made and made known before the Offence committed For such authority is to trump in Card-playing save that in matter of Government when nothing else is turn'd up Clubs are Trump Therefore seeing every Man knoweth by his own Reason what Actions are against the Law of Reason and knoweth what Punishments are by this authority for every evil action ordained it is manifest Reason that for breaking the known Laws he should suffer the known Punishments Now the person to whom this authority of defining Punishments is given can be no other in any place of the World but the same Person that hath the Soveraign Power be it one Man or one assembly of Men For it were in vain to give it to any Person that had not the power of the Militia to cause it to be executed for no less power can do it when many Offenders be united and combin'd to defend one another There was a Case put to King David by Nathan of a rich Man that had many Sheep and of a poor Man that had but one which was a tame Lamb The rich Man had a stranger in his House for whose entertainment to spare his own Sheep he took away the poor Mans Lamb. Upon this Case the King gave Judgment surely the Man that hath done this shall die What think you of this Was it a Royal or Tyrannical Judgment La. I will not contradict the Canons of the Church of England which acknowledgeth the King of England within his own Dominions hath the same Rights which the good Kings of Israel had in theirs nor deny King David to have been one of those good Kings But to punish with death without a precedent Law will seem but a harsh proceeding with us who unwillingly hear of Arbitrary Laws much less of Arbitrary Punishments unless we were sure that all our Kings would be as good as David I will only ask you by what Authority the Clergy may take upon them to determine or make a Canon concerning the power of their own King or to distinguish between the Right of a good and an evil King Ph. It is not the Clergy that maketh their Canons to be Law but it is the King that doth it by the Great Seal of England and it is the King that giveth them power to teach their Doctrines in that that he authoriseth them publickly to teach and preach the Doctrine of Christ and his Apostles according to the Scriptures wherein this Doctrine is perspicuously contained But if they had derogated from the Royal Power in any of their Doctrines published then certainly they had been too blame nay I believe that had been more within the Statute of premunire of 16 Rich. 2. c. 5. than any Judge of a Court of Equity for holding Pleas of Common Law I cite not this Precedent of King David as approving the breach of the great Charter or justifying the Punishment with loss of Life or Member of every Man that shall offend the King but to shew you that before the Charter was granted in all Cases where the Punishments were not prescribed it was the King only that could prescribe them
of another Man Then as Sir Edw. Coke says 3 Inst. p 56. it had been Murder Ph. There is indeed great need of good distinction in a Case of killing by misfortune but in this Case the unlawfulness of stealing Apples cannot make it Murder unless the falling it self be unlawful It must be a voluntary unlawful Act that causeth the death or else it is no Murder by the Law of Reason Now the death of the Man that was under the Tree proceeded not from that that the Apples were not his that fell but from the fall But if a Man shoot with a Bow or a Gun at another Man's Deer and by misfortune kill a Man such shooting being both voluntary and unlawful and also the immediate Cause of the Mans death may be drawn perhaps well enough sometimes to Murder by a Judge of the Common-Law So likewise if a Man shoot an Arrow over a House and by chance kill a Man in the Street there is no doubt but by the Law of Reason it is Murder for though he meant no malice to the Man slain yet it is manifest that he cared not whom he slew In this difficulty of finding out what it is that the Law of Reason dictates who is it that must decide the Question La. In the Case of misfortune I think it belongs to the Jury for it is matter of Fact only But when it is doubtful whether the action from which the misfortune came were Lawful or Unlawful it is to be judged by the Judge Ph. But if the unlawfulness of the action as the stealing of the Apples did not cause the death of the Man then the stealing be it Trespass or Felony ought to be punished alone as the Law requireth La. But for killing of a Man se defendendo the Jury as Sir Edw. Coke here says shall not in their Verdict say it was se defendendo but shall declare the manner of the Fact in special and clear it to the Judge to consider how it is to be called whether se defendendo Manslaughter or Murder Ph. One would think so for it is not often within the capacity of a Jury to distinguish the signification of the different and hard names which are given by Lawyers to the killing of a Man as Murder and Felony which neither the Laws nor the makers of the Laws have yet defined The Witnesses say that thus and thus the Person did but not that it was Murder or Felony no more can the Jury say who ought to say nothing but what they hear from the Witnesses or from the Prisoner Nor ought the Judge to ground his Sentence upon any thing else besides the special matter found which according as it is contrary or not contrary to the Statute ought to be pronounced La. But I have told you that when the Jury has found misfortune or se defendendo there is no judgment at all to be given and the Party is to be pardoned of course saving that he shall forfeit his Goods and Chattells Debts and Duties to the King Ph. But I understand not how there can be a Crime for which there is no Judgment nor how any Punishment can be inflicted without a precedent Judgment nor upon what ground the Sheriff can seize the Goods of any Man till it be judged that they be forfeited I know that Sir Edw. Coke saith that in the Judgment of hanging the Judgment of forfeiture is implyed which I understand not though I understand well enough that the Sheriff by his Office may seize the Goods of a Felon convicted much less do I conceive how the forfeiture of Goods can be implyed in a no-judgment nor do I conceive that when the Jury has found the special manner of the Fact to be such as is really no other than se defendendo and consequently no fault at all why he should have any Punishment at all Can you shew me any Reason for it La. The Reason lies in the Custom Ph. You know that unreasonable Customs are not Law but ought to be abolished and what Custom is there more unreasonable than that a Man should be punished without a fault La. Then see the Statute of 24 Hen. 8. cap. 5. Ph. I find here that at the making of this Statute there was a Question amongst the Lawyers in case one Man should kill another that attempted feloniously to Rob or Murder him in or near any Common High-way Court-way Horse-way or Foot-way or in his Mansion Messuage or Dwelling-place whether for the death of such a Man one shall forfeit his Goods and Chattells as a Man should do for killing another by Chance-medley or in his own defence This is the Preamble and penned as well as Sir Edw. Coke could have wished but this Statute does not determine that a Man should forfeit his Goods for killing a Man se defendendo or for killing him by misfortune but supposeth it only upon the opinion of the Lawyers that then were The body of the Statute is that if a Man be indicted or appealed for the death of such Person so attempting as aforesaid and the same by verdict be so found and tryed he shall not forfeit any thing but shall be discharged as if he had been found not Guilty You see the Statute now consider thereby in the case of killing se defendendo Frst if a Man kill another in his own defence it is manifest that the Man slain did either attempt to Rob or to Kill or to Wound him for else it was not done in his own defence If then it were done in the Street or near the Street as in a Tavern he forfeits nothing because the Street is a High-way So likewise it is to be said of all other Common-ways In what place therefore can a Man kill another in his own defence but that this Statute will discharge him of the forfeiture La. But the Statute says the attempt must be felonious Ph. When a Man assaults me with a Knife Sword Club or other mortal Weapon does any Law forbid me to defend my self or command me to stay so long as to know whether he have a felonious intent or no Therefore by this Statute in case it be found se defendendo the forfeiture is discharged if it be found otherwise it is Capital If we read the Statute of Glocester cap. 9. I think it will take away the difficulty For by that Statute in case it be found by the Countrey that he did it in his own defence or by misfortune then by the report of the Justices to the King the King shall take him to his Grace if it please him From whence it followeth first that it was then thought Law that the Jury may give the general verdict of se defendendo which Sir Edw. Coke denies Secondly that the Judge ought to report especial matter to the King Thirdly that the King may take him to his Grace if he please and consequently that his Goods are not to be seiz'd till the
King after the report of the Judge heard give the Sheriff command to do it Fourthly that the general verdict of the King hinders not the King but that he may Judge of it upon the special matter for it often happens that an ill-disposed Person provokes a Man with words or otherwise on purpose to make him draw his Sword that he may kill him and pretend it done in his own defence which appearing the King may without any offence to God punish him as the cause shall require Lastly contrary to the Doctrine of Sir Edw. Coke he may in his own Person be Judge in the case and annul the Verdict of the Jury which a deputed Judge cannot do La. There be some cases wherein a Man though by the Jury he be found not Guilty shall nevertheless forfeit his Goods and Chattells to the King For example a Man is slain and one A. hating B. giveth out that it was B. that slew him B. hearing thereof fearing if he be tryed for it that through the great power of A. and others that seek his hurt he should be condemned flieth and afterwards is taken and tryed and upon sufficient evidence is by the Jury found Not Guilty yet because he fled he shall forfeit his Goods and Chattels notwithstanding there be no such Judgment given by the Judge nor appointed by any Statute but the Law it self authoriseth the Sheriff to seize them to the use of the King Ph. I see no reason which is Common-Law for it and am sure it is grounded upon no Statute La. See Sir Edw. Coke Inst. 1. Sect. 709. and read Ph. If a Man that is Innocent be accus'd of Felony and for fear flieth for the same albeit that he be judicially acquitted of the Felony yet if it be found that he fled for the same he shall notwithstanding his Innocence forfeit all his Goods and Chattells Debts and Duties O unchristian and abominable Doctrine which also he in his own words following contradicteth For saith he as to the forfeiture of them the Law will admit no proof against the presumption of the Law grounded upon his flight and so it is in many other cases But that the general Rule is Quod stabitur praesumptioni donec probetur in contrarium but you see it hath many exceptions This general Rule contradicts what he said before for there can be no exceptions to a general Rule in Law that is not expresly made an exception by some Statute and to a general Rule of equity there can be no exception at all From the power of Punishing let us proceed to the power of Pardoning La. Touching the power of Pardoning Sir Edw. Coke says 3 Inst. p. 236. That no Man shall obtain Charter of pardon out of Parliament and cites for it the Statute of 2 Ed. 3. cap. 2. and says farther that accordingly in a Parliament Roll it is said that for the peace of the Land it would help that no pardon were granted but by Parliament Ph. What lawful power would he have left to the King that thus disableth him to practice Mercy In the Statute which he citeth to prove that the King ought not to grant Charters of Pardon but in Parliament there are no such words as any Man may see for that Statute is in Print and that which he says is in the Parliament Roll is but a wish of he tells not whom and not a Law and 't is strange that a private wish should be inroll'd amongst Acts of Parliament If a Man do you an injury to whom think you belongeth the Right of pardoning it La. Doubtless to me alone if to me alone be done that injury and to the King alone if to him alone be done the injury and to both together if the injury be done to both Ph. What part then has any Man in the granting of a pardon but the King and the party wrong'd if you offend no Member of either House why should you ask their pardon It is possible that a Man may deserve a pardon or he may be such a one sometimes as the defence of the Kingdom hath need of may not the King pardon him though there be no Parliament then sitting Sir Edw. Coke's Law is too general in this point and I believe if he had thought on 't he would have excepted some Persons if not all the Kings Children and his Heir apparent and yet they are all his Subjects and subject to the Law as other Men. La. But if the King shall grant pardons of Murder and Felony of his own head there would be very little safety for any Man either out of his House or in it either by Night or by Day And for that very cause there have been many good Statutes provided which forbid the Justices to allow of such pardons as do not specially name the Crime Ph. Those Statutes I confess are reasonable and very profitable which forbid the Judge to pardon Murders but what Statute is there that forbids the King to do it There is a Statute of 13 Rich. 2. c. 1. wherein the King promiseth not to pardon Murder but there is in it a clause for the saving of the Kings Regality From which may be inferr'd that the King did not grant away that power when he thought good to use it for the Common-wealth Such Statutes are not Laws to the King but to his Judges and though the Judges be commanded by the King not to allow pardons in many cases yet if the King by writing command the Judges to allow them they ought to do it I think if the King think in his conscience it be for the good of the Common-wealth he sinneth not in it but I hold not that the King may pardon him without sin if any other Man be damnified by the Crime committed unless he cause reparation to be made as far as the party offending can do it And howsoever be it sin or not sin there is no power in England that may resist him or speak evil of him lawfully La. Sir Edw. Coke denies not that and upon that ground it is that the King he says may pardon high Treason for there can be no high Treason but against the King Ph. That 's well therefore he confesseth that whatsoever the offence be the King may pardon so much of it as is an injury to himself and that by his own right without breach of any Law positive or natural or of any grant if his Conscience tell him that it be not to the dammage of the Common-wealth and you know that to judge of what is good or evil to the Common-wealth belongeth to the King only Now tell me what it is which is said to be pardoned La. What can it be but only the offence If a Man hath done a Murder and be pardoned for the same is it not the Murder that is pardoned Ph. Nay by your favour if a Man be pardoned for Murder or any other offence it is the Man that is
pardoned the Murder still remains Murder But what is pardon La. Pardon as Sir Edw. Coke says 3 Inst. p. 233 is deriv'd of per and dono and signifies throughly to remit Ph. If the King remit the Murder and not pardon the Man that did it what does the remission serve for La. You know well enough that when we say a Murder or any thing else is pardoned all English-men understand thereby that the punishment due to the offence is the thing remitted Ph. But for our understanding of one another you ought to have said so at first I understand now that to pardon Murder or Felony is throughly to save the offender from all the punishment due unto him by the Law for his offence La. Not so for Sir Edw. Coke in the same Chapter p. 238. saith thus A Man commits Felony and is attainted thereof or is abjur'd the King pardoneth the Felony without any mention of the attainder or abjuration the pardon is void Ph. What is it to be attainted La. To be attainted is that his Blood be held in Law as stained and corrupted so that no inheritance can descend from him to his Children or to any that make claim by him Ph. Is this attaint a part of the Crime or of the Punishment La. It cannot be a part of the Crime because it is none of his own Act 't is therefore a part of the Punishment viz. a disherison of the offender Ph. If it be a part of the Punishment due and yet not pardoned together with the rest then a pardon is not a through remitting of the Punishment as Sir Edw. Coke says it is And what is Abjuration La. When a Clerk heretofore was convicted of Felony he might have saved his life by abjuring the Realm that is by departing the Realm within a certain time appointed and taking an Oath never to return But at this day all Statutes for Abjuration are repeal'd Ph. That also is a Punishment and by a pardon of the Felony pardoned unless a Statute be in force to the contrary There is also somewhat in the Statute of 13 Rich. 2. c. 1. concerning the allowance of Charters of pardons which I understand not well The words are these No Charter of pardon for henceforth shall be allowed before our Justices for Murder or for the death of a Man by awayt or malice prepens'd Treason or Rape of a Woman unless the same be specified in the same Charter for I think it follows thence that if the King say in his Charter that he pardoneth the Murder then he breaketh not the Statute because he specifies the offence or if he saith he pardoneth the killing by awayt or of malice prepensed he breaketh not the Statute he specifies the offence Also if he say so much as that the Judge cannot doubt of the Kings meaning to pardon him I think the Judge ought to allow it because the Statute saveth the Kings liberty and regality in that point that is to say the power to pardon him such as are these words notwithstanding any Statute to the contrary are sufficient to cause the Charter to be allowed For these words make it manifest that the Charter was not granted upon surprise but to maintain and claim the Kings liberty and power to shew mercy when he seeth cause The like meaning have these words Perdonavimus omnimodam interfectionem that is to say we have pardoned the killing in what manner soever it was done But here we must remember that the King cannot pardon without sin any dammage thereby done to another Man unless he causes satisfaction to be made as far as possibly the offender can but is not bound to satisfie Mens thirst of revenge for all revenge ought to proceed from God and under God from the King Now besides in Charters how are these offences specified La. They are specified by their names as Treason Petit Treason Murder Rape Felony and the like Ph. Petit Treason is Felony Murder is Felony so is Rape Robbery and Theft and as Sir Edw. Coke says Petit Larceny is Felony now if in a Parliament-pardon or in a Coronation-pardon all Felonies be pardoned whether is Petit Larceny pardoned or not La. Yes certainly it is pardoned Ph. And yet you see it is not specified and yet it is a Crime that hath less in it of the nature of Felony than there is in Robbery Do not therefore Rape Robbery Theft pass under the pardon of all Felonies La. I think they are all pardoned by the words of the Statute but those that are by the same Statute excepted so that specification is needful only in Charters of pardon but in general pardons not so For the Statute 13 Rich. 2. cap. 1. forbids not the allowance of Parliament-pardons or Coronation-pardons and therefore the offences pardoned need not be specified but may pass under the general word of all Felonies Nor is it likely that the members of the Parliament who drew up their own pardons did not mean to make them as comprehensive as they could And yet Sir Edw. Coke 2 Inst. Sect. 745. at the word Felony seemeth to be of another mind for Piracy is one species of Felony and yet when certain English-men had committed Piracy in the last year of Queen Elizabeth and came home into England in the beginning of the Reign of King James trusting to his Coronation-pardon of all Felonies they were indicted Sir Edw. Coke was then Attorney General of the Piracy before Commissioners according to the Statute of 28 H. 8. and being found Guilty were hang'd The reason he alledgeth for it is that it ought to have been specified by the name of Piracy in the pardon and therefore the pardon was not to be allowed Ph. Why ought it to have been specified more than any other Felony He should therefore have drawn his argument from the Law of reason La. Also he does that for the Tryal he says was by the Common-Law and before Commissioners not in the Court of the Lord Admiral by the Civil-Law therefore he says it was an offence whereof the Common-Law could not take notice because it could not be Tryed by twelve Men. Ph. If the Common-Law could not or ought not to take notice of such offences how could the offenders be Tryed by twelve Men and found Guilty and hang'd as they were If the Common-Law take no notice of Piracy what other offence was it for which they were hang'd Is Piracy two Felonies for one of which a Man shall be hang'd by the Civil-Law and for the other by the Common-Law Truly I never read weaker reasoning in any Author of the Law of England than in Sir Edw. Coke's Institutes how well soever he could plead La. Though I have heard him much reprehended by others as well as by you yet there be many excellent things both for subtility and for truth in these his Institutes Ph. No better things than other Lawyers have that write of the Law as of a Science His