yet shall he perform it never a whit the lesse freely First in respect that he doth it not by coaction and necessitation and because he is as well pleased still to doe it as to promise it For as much as looke of what judgement and disposition he was when he promised of the same he is when he makes it good and consequently performes it as willingly as he made it It is not alwayes so with man in the execution of his promises If Gods one and indivisibly everlasting decree without any variety or shadow of change fitts all the changes severall dispositions and contingent actions of men and Angells as exactly as if he did conceive and shape a new Law for every one of them what mooved you heretofore to professe that the reservation of libertie and that to make grants and to revoke them is a point of so high perfection as that you would faine bestow it upon the nature of God What meane you here to professe that God ceaseth not to decree which to my understanding sounds as if the meaning were that God is still in making of new decrees Gods decrees continue I confesse as God himselfe continueth and more unalterable then lawes of Medes and Persians But neither could they bee said in this respect not to cease to make lawes so neither can God bee said not to cease to make decrees For like as while lawes are in making they are not yet made so to intimate that Gods decrees are in making as you doe while you say God ceaseth not to decree is to imply that Gods decrees are not yet made which you doe more plainly signifie in the words following when you say They are conceived and brought forth as well befitting them as the skinne doth the body which nature hath enwraped in it Wherby you manifestly profess that Gods decrees are brought forth in time not onely the executions of them and thus howsoever you flatter your readers eare with bestowing on Gods decrees the title of everlasting yet you plainly declare your minde that they are brought forth in time together with the execution of them And hereto properly tends that reservation of libertie which you magnified as an high perfection and the power of the Popes to make grants and revoke them as a power onely fit for God And to this purpose you seeme to discourse of eternall liberty making use thereof to draw his decrees to a temporall condition lest if they were eternall they should deprive God of liberty Let every indifferent reader judge whether this bee not the language of your heart disclosed by the tenour of your discourses howsoever you stile Gods decrees eternall herein like unto boat-men that looke one way and row another Besides by this discourse of yours you seeme to acknowledge no otherâ—d crees of God then in rewarding them according to their workes for hitherto tends the congruity of Gods decrees which after your manner you amplifie as no lesse congrâ—ous to the actions of men then the skinne to the body A very good resemblance by the way that as the skin doth befit the body so Gods recompences doe befit mens workes Yet this you apply most incongruously to Gods decrees for thereof runnes your discourse and not to the executions of them and withall as touching the actions of men though never so gracious though actions of faith love repentance these I say are not objects of Gods decrees in your Divinity but onely the rewards of them No not Cyrus his restoring of the Iewes nor Iosiahs burning of the Prophets bones upon the Altar nor the children of Israels comming out of Aegypt nor Pharaohs dimission of them and infinite the like God decreed none of these by your doctrine He decreed onely the contingency of these actions not the actions themselves Which doctrine of yours you are not willing to take notice of when in the next words according to your course of argumentation you tell us No man living as you take it will avouch any absolute necessity from all eternity that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Elies line from the priesthood or his two sonnes destructions by the Philistims For here you seeme to imply a grant that God decreed it but not inevitably and that upon his decree there followed a necessity of his deposition but not absolute Now it is well knowne that Solomon deposed Elies house in Abiathar freely and the Philistims by free actions of theirs were the death of Elies sonnes And therefore if God decreed them the very free actions of men are the objects of Gods decrees and consequently no action by the freedome thereof is any way hindred from being the object of Gods decrees All which is directly contrary to your opinion who maintaine contingency to bee the object of Gods decree and not the thing contingent as you have plainly exprest and professed in another Treatise and but erst you made the decrees of God to be brought forth suitable to the actions of men as if the actions of men were no objects at all of Gods decrees Againe is it a sober distinction which here you imply as if the decrees of God were some evitable some inevitable well it may be accommodated to the executions of Gods decrees but most absurdly to Gods decrees which being everlasting as you confesse were before any thing could have existence to avoid them Yet we plainly professe that God decreeth some things to come to passe necessarily as workes of natuâ—e some things contingently as the actions of men Againe some things to come to passe inevitably as the end of the world some things to come to passe evitably as the judgments of God which may bee avoided by repentance But you desiring to speake home tell us that no man will avouch that it was necessary that God should decree the deposition of Elies house Indeed decrees are free or else they are no decrees Neither the making of the world nor the ending of the world was necessarily decreed by God but freely Yet you come very soberly to this asseveration and adde very cautiously I take it implying this â—o bee your opinion not daring too confidently to avouch it to be the opinion of others And as if you were fearfull lest you should deliver something unawares that might lie open to exception you propose it of absolute necessity and so you think That no man living whether of them that be dead any have thought otherwise that matters not will avouch that from all eternity there was an absolute necessity that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Elies line So that though a man should say that it was necessary that God should decree such a deposition yet if hee doth not say that it was absolutely necessarie or if hee doth say it was absolutely necessary that God should decree it yet if hee doth not say that this was so from all eternitie or though he should say this also yet he shall not
Denique exactissima Theologorum examinatio rem omnem breviter ita concludit Quamohrem motor ipse qui animum propriè vertit ad infinitum est ipsamet sola infinita potestas quae mentem pro libera voluntatis natura modo quodam movet ad eligendas vias maxime libero Rursus pro infinita moventis potentia ad appetendum finem usque adeo incitat ut non appetere nequeat From the same Platonist D. Iackson might have learned also more sense then to outface all his readers with that unheard of stinking bulle of his owne proper forging which both in his epistle dedicatorie and also in divers parts of his treatises he maketh the basis of his vayne conceyts namely that if God should have certainly and immutably decreed any singular action or end of man then God should be deprived of his freedome For let him but looke in Marsil Ficin Theolog. Platonica de immort anim lib. 2. cap. 12. he shall finde this Title Voluntas Dei necessaria est simul libera And in the Chapiter it selfe he shall finde that the Platonists would be ashamed of such flim-flam In ipso bono certe summa naturae necessitas una cum summa libertate voluntatis concurrit Atque ibi naturae necessitas voluntatis confirmat libertatem libertas necessitati consentit usque adeo ut necessario liber voluntariusque Deus sit voluntarie necessarius A nobis id tantum ubique affirmari optamus quod Deo sit dignum quale est in Deo cum summa necessitate summam congredi libertatem Sed in hac re meminisse oportet ut placet Thomae nostro splendori Theologiae quamquam divinae voluntatis actus secundum conditionem positionemve quando dici potest rem hanc aut illam necessario velle viz. postquam semel eam voluit cum sit divina voluntas non aliter immutabilis quam essentia ipsum tamen suapte natura non habere eum necessitatis absolutae respectum ad effectus suos quem ad seipsum habet I would have englished these passages but that I conceyve no man to be in perrill of misguiding by D. Iacksons fustian kinde of writing except he understand not only a Latine stile but one of yron clay brasse sylver gold like the Babylonish image which none but Daniel could interpret Neyther is it needfull that I should go about the examining or discovering of D. Iacksons dreames It is done to my hands with singular learning and judgement in the ensuing censure Which as it seemeth was written by D. Twisse for his owne contentment as Scholars are woont to finde themselvs willing work in communing with those which bring forth extraordinary notions But in such a subject as this it could not long be kept private An honorable man therfore having gotten from the Author a copie could not but communicate the same with his friends by whom at length it came to the Printer whose profession is to make such workes publick as are of publicke use And howsoever upon Politicke considerations disputes of this kinde are forbidden and suppressed yet it were to be wished that more were found amongst those that are able to defende the truth which were not so servile unto the times as by their silence to become accessary unto the murder of that religion which they professe and beleive In reason also it were better that such as dislike of and undermine by piecemeal insinuations the doctrine hitherto receyved amongst us would lay us downe the full platforme of their opposite doctrine and not contente themselves with some plausible snatchinges and catchinges at commune tenents not manifesting in the meane time how they can bring their jarrings in those parts which they question to agree with others which as yet they dare not question It is by experience proved in the low Countries that Arminianisme tendeth directly to Socinianisme which is the only dangerous and damnabled heresie of this age If our Arminians can shew us how to bound these waves of the same lake or avoyd those rockes any better then they of Holland they have no reason to envy us the common courtesie of Sea-men Let them takeup therfore if they love plaine dealing the Remonstrants confession and Apologie and either testifie their full consent with them or signifie how farre we ought to sayle by that compasse and in what part of that Sea-card we are to leave them and where the danger lieth D. Iackson would perswade us pag. 1. sect 3. cap. 18. that if his doctrine of love and grace universall were well taught and pressed in the particulars of it all men would unfeignedly endeavour with fervent alacrity to be truly happy and that with astonishing fruit Surely if he know such particulars of any doctrine as would bring forth such miraculous fruit a hundred folde more then the doctrine of Christ himselfe and his Apostles could atteyne to who never brought all their auditors to unfeigned endeavour and fervent alacritie in seeking of God I say he knoweth such particulars and will not impart them to the World the engines which extorte confession might be better imployed about him then ever they were about any It is well knowne by experience that neyther the generalls nor the particulars eyther of the Iesuits doctrine concerning universall grace in Spaine or of the Lutherans in Germanie or of the Arminians in Holland have brought any such miraculous fruit of pietye Neyther have I yet heard of any such extraordinary successe upon D. Iacksons doctrine at Newcastel or Oxford but may at least be equalled to say no more by the successe of their doctrine which have pressed the contrarie tenents in a thousand congregations of England Except therfore he declareth his doctrine in the particulars of it he must pardon us if we make no more account of his generall colours then of those new inventions or projects which promise so incredible wonders that they can find no credite but onely with those that are willing to be deceyved TO THE PRAEFACE OR SOME PASSAGES IN THE EPISTLE DEDICATORIE I Desire to fetche a walke in your Paradise of contemplation allthoughe you professe to encampe therin are very martiall in your wordes phrases of terrour litle answerable to that expectation which a Paradise doth bespeake yet dothe it nothing dismay me because you professe opposition only against the enimies of God my selfe though a cheife of sinners yet have found mercy at the handes of God that I should be faithfull vnto him to his truthe in such sort as to doe nothing against it but rather ingage all my poore abilitie for it And in case I finde your selfe going not the right way to the truthe of God an errour incident to as great an Apostle as S. Peter I shall take boldnes to enterpose my iudgment forthe discovery of errour that I hope without all just blame or deserved censure in respect of that old acquaintance which hath
prepare him so much as the knowledge of Grammar yet he shall not be proud of it neyther Vasquius further telleth us that Aegidius was of opinion that this truthe that there is a God is a truthe knowne of it selfe And albeit Thomas Aquinas denyethe it to be a truthe per se notam quoad nos Yet in it selfe he professethe that it is per se nota for as much as the predicate is included in the very nature of the subject And to my judgement it seemes allso to be so quoad nos if it be duly considâ—red pondered what we understand by God to witt the most perfect nature of all others Nowe howe is it possible that that which is more pâ—rfect then all others shoulde not have beinge And every man knowes that that which hathe beinge is more perfect then that which neyther hathe nor can have beinge such as is the nature of God if it have no beinge For according to the Proverbe a live Dogge is better then a dead Lyon In the next place you inquire wherunto you shall liken him This indeede was the second thinge you proposed to be inquired into But in what congruitie to a Philosophicall or Theological discourse I leave it to others to examine I will be content to summe up the accoumpt of what you deliver rather then to argue the unseasonablenes of such a discourse Thoughe nothing can exactly resemble him yet somâ— thinge you say can better notify howe farre he is beyond all resemblance then others But truly what you meane herby is a mystery unto me I shoulde rather thinke the incomprehensible nature of God is not to be manifested by way of resemblance drawne from inferior thinges That he is the cause of all thinges dothe better represent the nature of God then the resemblance of him to any thinge especially consideringe what cause he is to witt an â—fficient cause of all thinges and that not univocall but equivocall consequently such as comprehendes all thinges eminently but in perfection without comparison beyond them For comparison hathe place only betweene things agreeinge in kinde or in proportion But God and his creatures agree in neyther This I confesse may drawe to admiration As the Philosopher who beinge demaunded what God was required three dayes libertie to put in his answeare and at three dayes ende required three more at the ende of these three dayes more giving this reason of his reiterated demurring upon the matter because the more he gave himselfe to thâ— contemplation of the nature of God the farther he foundâ— himselfe of from comprehendinge it but wheras you adde that such admiration will more more enlarge our longinge after his presence I doe no way like eyther your collection or the phrase wherby you expresse it For as for the presence of God of the very apprehension therof we are not capable in this World but by faithe Neyther can any naturall admiration arising from naturall inquisition after the nature of God consideration of the fruiteles issue therof drawe men to a longing after that presence of God which they knowe not Bothe the knowledge of the presence of God and a longinge desire after it I take to be a woorke of speciall grace and not any woorke of nature upon the power wherof I finde you doaâ—e too much in all your writings Painters you say can more exactly expresse the outward lineaments of thinges then we their natures Painters expressions are in colours our expressions are not so but rather in woordes And what a wilde comparison is it to compare thinges so heterogeneall in exactnes But though the expression of the one fayle in exactnes in comparison of the other yet the delight taken therin you say needes not And thus you plot to make the love of God a woorke of nature wherunto the naturall conceptions of him though nothing exact by meanes of the creature may leade us These conceptions of yours are in my judgement as farre from truthe as from pietie The frequent ebbes flowings of Euripus may cast a Philosopher into admiration not comprehending the reason of it yet bringe him nothing the more in love with it Angells are of very glorious natures in a manner quite out of the reach of our reason bothe touching their being in place their motion their understandinge the communicatinge of their thoughts exercising of their power yet all this bringeth us never a whit the more in love with them Impressions of love are wrought only by the apprehension of goodnes in the object which alone makes thinges amiable as a beautifull picture affecteth the sense with pleasure and delight But nowe I finde that from the impression of love you slip I knowe not howe to the impression of truthe this I confesse delightethe some mindes of purer metall as Aristotle speakes of the delight that a Man takes in the demonstration wherby it is prooved that the Diameter in a squate hathe no common dimension with the sides of it or that a triangle hathe three angles equall to two right Especially if the conclusion be rare long sought after but not founde as the squaring of a circle receaved as knowable in Aristotles dayes thoughe not knowne till of late as Pancirolla writes Salmuly in his commentaries upon him about 30. yeares before that time Yet some speculations may be as vayne as curious as to proove that two Men in the World there are that have iust so many hayres on their head one as another But to make a rayne bowe in the ayre by ocular demonstration proove the truthe of that which reason concludes namely that as often as a raynbowe appeares in the cloudes though it seeme but one yet indeede there are as many as there are Men that beholde it because it discoverethe a secret of nature very curious and nothing vayne For it is the glory of God to hide a thinge and it is the glory of a Kinge to finde it out And seeinge God hathe set the World in Mans heart thoughe a Man cannot finde out the woorke that God hath wrought from the beginninge to the ende yet it is good to be doinge to discover as much as we can especially such as have a calling herunto But to proceede you put your Reader in hope of great matters by your perfourmances namely to have a sight of some scattered rayes of a glorious light which Saints have in blessednes and to this purpose to elevate us to a certeyne Horizon whose edges and skirts shall discover this Thus you phrasify the matter gloriously prosecute your allegory in allusion to the brightnes that appeares in our Horizon after the Sunne set But surely that Sunne did never yet rise upon us and when it dothe surely it shall never sett And I much doubt least the glory of your phrases proove to be all the glory we are like to be acquainted with before we part Hence you proceede to a
hath his name from that nature wherof it participates as hot is that which participates of heate white is such a nature as participates of whitenes But God cannot be sayde to participate of essence In this I finde some defect First because you doe not shewe howe ens which you call a concrete is divided as concretes are into a part materiall participating and a part formall participated In a word you doe not once offer to resolve ens into the parts of its signification Secondly there is litle congruity betweene ens that which hath beinge hot or white that which hathe heate and whitenes For that which hathe whitenes in it or heate is a substance or subject really existent wherin the qualitie of heate or whitenes is founde But the word ens admittethe no division comparable or congruous herunto For you cannot with sobrietie say that ens signifieth a nature really existent wherin essence is found distinct from the nature signified or comming over and above unto it as heate dothe over and above to the constitution of the subject And therfore it followethe not that because hot dothe signifie a subject participating of heate therfore ens allso signifieth a subject participating of essence A great deale of difference there is betweene concretes of accidentall denomination and concretes of essentiall denomination As Homo Animall which may be accoumpted concretes in respect of such abstract notions as are conceaved under the termes of Humanitas and Animalitas The specificall essence beinge constituted by the abstract notion and not participating of it as bodies participate of heate The truthe is all compounds doe properly admitt a concrete denomination as in whome the suppositum as Homo and Animal differethe from the nature denominatinge it as Humanitas Animalitas But in things not compounde it is not so least of all in God For thoughe Homo be not Humanitas yet Deus est ipsa Deitas Aquin. 1 q. 3. art 3. De rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus nisi per modum compositorum a quibus cognitionem accipimus ideo de Deo loquentes utimur nominibus concretis ut significemus ejus subsistentiam quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi composita Et utimur nominibus abstractis ut significemus ejus simplicitatem Quod ergo dicitur Deitas vel vita vel aliquid hujusmodi esse in Deo referendum est ad diversitatem quae est in acceptione intellectus nostri non ad aliquam diversitatem rei That God is one by whome all thinges are is true but this description is litle congruous to the nature of God in as much as it could have no place before the creation or in case the World had never bene created Yet Gods nature is still the same I cannot admitt that thinges created participate of Gods being They have their beinge from God I grant but I cannot admitt their being to be any part of Gods beinge or Gods beinge to have parts Yet if all thinges are from him howe can you avoyde but that God himselfe shall be from himselfe Vnles the Apostle helpe you in this discoursinge In that he hath put all thinges under him it is manifest that he is excepted who did put all thinges under him But be it so that all other thinges are from him then allso accidents as well as substances are from him and can they participate of Gods being Of accidentall beinge I grant they doe participate and that from God but not of Gods beinge If so howe much more must faithe and repentance be acknowledged to have their production from God which I much feare you will be founde to deny if not at first hande yet at least in a second place by maynteyning it in such a manner to be the worke of God as upon condition of mans will which in my judgement is in effect to deny that God is the Author of them The name of God I am openeth a fayre way to the expoundinge of a mystery which you medle not with contenting your selfe with ventinge of phrases in settinge foorthe the nature of God The existence of all creatures may be accoumpted as a mere accident to their essence for as much as all of them have being after not beinge and from being eyther doe or may returne agayne to not beinge It is not so with God who is everlastinge and that formally by necessitie of nature So that wheras the essence of every creature abstract from existence includes a possibilitie formally indifferent to being or not being Gods essence includes a necessitie of beinge an impossibilitie of not beinge Your lines of amplification are eyther very wilde and without sense or my witts are too shallow to comprehend them the rest I cannot construe the close I can when you say the essence of God is the bond of all thinges that can be combined or linkt together I can construe these wordes but not comprehend their meaninge The combination of thinges together you understand it seemes in affirmations negations Nowe that Gods essence shoulde be the copula wherby the subject and predicate in all propositions are linkt together and that whether true or false Holy or profane may well passe I thinke for the tenthe woonder of the world God only is by nature all other thinges by the will of God I am that I am say the the Apostle but by the grace of God God only is in such sort as that his existence is his essence we are in such sort as that our existence is not our essence For sometimes we were not and if it pleased God we might cease to be But yet we live and moove and have our beinge all in him I cannot admitt that Angells participate of Gods essence or that God communicates his essence to any but to his Sonne They as all other things have their essence from God but not his Yet are they according to the Image of God Other creatures may have vestigia footestes of God In the reasonable nature alone is found the Image of God I say the Image of God but not the essence of God 2. Whether Angells are creatures and consequently of a finite nature no Christian makes question But as touching their nature understanding place and motion attributed unto them they are such secrets and mysteries unto me that I have no heart to medle with them The Scriptures tell us that a Legion of divells were in one man and of the good that the Angells of litle children doe allwayes behold the face of God their Father But touching the nature of God to say that his indivisible unitie comprehendeth all multiplicity is an ambiguous speeche both because multiplicitie is found in evill as well as in good and the phrase of includinge to my thinking inclines to signifie comprehension formall rather then vertuall As for Senecaes sentence which you so much magnify as if we coulde not say more of him in fewer words I judge to be
yea infinite I know not how neyther doe you once goe about to explicate how Secondly you will not have it called motion but a product of motions Had you sayd you wold not have these revolutions called one motion but many there had bene some sense in the speech though litle reason For you professe these revolutions to be successive and no where have you in the least manner signified them to be interrupt or discont nuall And if you take them as continuall why should they not be stiled one motion But this I thinke is not it you insist upon For you dislike the name of motion it selfe you will rather have it called the product of many motions Now here I am at fault in huâ—inge after the meaninge of your invention But yet as Plutarke makes the hounde to discourse in huntinge after an hare thus he went not that way nor that way therefore he came this way so will not I give over but inquire which way the hare runs Now then this your product of motions is to be understood eyther of a product Physicall or of a product Mathematicall and I explicate my selfe as you loue to involve your selfe thus The product of motion Physicall is the forme that is acquired by motion As for example in alteration a quality is produced in augmentation a certeyne measure of quantity in locall motion a new place or a new site Eyther in respect of the whole as it falls out in all direct motions or only in respect of the parts as in all motions Circular which new site is sayd to be new in respect of that which immediately went before Now in this motion of the Heavens in an instant supposed by you there is no such product Physicall for looke what site every part of the Heavens hath immediately before this instant the same it hath still And therfore you call it very significantly I confesse a vigorous permanency which is as much as to say no motion at all Neyther doe I thinke that by the product here spoken of you meane a product Physicall Let us come therefore to consider whether it may be verified of a product Mathematicall that is in the Arithmeticall operation of addition for if two numbers be added togeather it will produce a totall and that totall shall be the product Now here you speake of revolutions infinite which beinge added to greater make a product which you call a vigourous permanency which I professe in my judgement seemes to be delivered with admirable significancy and congruitye For if in teachinge my Schollar Arithmaticque I shall exercise him in addition and bid him write seven Cyphars in a rewe thus 0000000 and then bid him subscribe seven Cyphers under them thus 0000000 and then bid him adde one unto the other and tell me what in the product he will tell me that he finds seven Cyphers still which is as much as just nothinge In like sort suppose the Heavens standinge still immediately before this instant and in this instant to be turned round to the place where it was immediately before this deserves to be called a vigourous permanency that is no motion rather then a motion For to be where a body was immediately before is the definition of rest and not competible unto motion Nay take such an other revolution and adde unto the former this allso beinge rather a vigourous permanency and so no motion rather then motion adde no motion unto no motion and what will the product be but a vigorous parmanency and so in infinitum it shall be a vigorous permanency For no motion added to no motion while you will the product shall still be no motion but a vigourous permanency But I see no reason why you should call this vigorous permanency infinitely swifte And yet I confesse by this supposition of yours the Heavens are made to stand still faster then now they goe or run allbeit they run so incredibly swift in the judgement of some that they had rather set the earth goinge and make the Heavens stand still in a vigorous permanency though in a sense much different from the vigorous permanency you discourse of And this calleth to my remembrance one of Bastards Epigrams which he made of himselfe ridinge on Sarisbury plaine For beinge overtaken by a gentelman well mounted who desired to have his company Bastard Spurs his cutt the Gentleman reines his geldinge yet could Bastard keepe no way with him Whereupon he complains thus What shold I doe that was bestrided so His Horse stood still faster then mine could goe So the Heavens by your supposall stand still faster then now they goe I am not a litle sensible of the construction that some may make of this discourse of mine as namely a greate deale too light and vayne for a Divine especially in a matter of so high a nature as of the essence of God and his eternity I professe I am often striken with feare of transgression in this kinde and have often meditated the relinguishinge of it wholy I take so litle pleasure in these Schole quircks Yet another consideration affrights me more then this and that is lest comming to calculate the Divine attributes by discourse of reason in following the course of my weake understanding this way wherof in this case I am much suspicious I shoulde be founde to shape the attributes of God in such a manner as to attribute that unto God which dothe not become his Majestie or deny that unto him which dothe well become him and thus I may fall upon blasphemy before I am awave I had rather submitt unto the acknowledgement of attributes divine by faithe so farre foorthe as they are revealed unto us in Gods word then curiously inquire into the nature of them by reason quaint Scholasticall argumentation But agayne I consider that it may please God to make use of that illumination as well Philosophicall as Theologicall which he hathe given me to cleere some difficult points concerning the nature of God therby to prevent blasphemies each way And as by his grace I feare to enterteyne any indecent conceyte of the Majestie of God so I trust he will not expose me to have my feares brought upon me but rather by exercise perfect those seedes of knowledge of his Divine nature which have bene sowen in me bothe by the light of nature and by the light of grace and assist me allso even in these discourses and make them meanes to keepe others from being led away into erroneous opinions enormous conceytes concerning his nature and divine attributes And as for the censure of lightnes and want of gravitie passable upon this discourse let the Reader consider we are now upon the By and in consideration of a Monstrous supposition and most ridiculous prosecutions therupon and let him judge how such deserve to be enterteyned Agayne when we medle with an obscure perplexe and intricate manner of discourse if matter of refreshing both of mine owne and
annihilate without prejudice to his justice yea to inflict the torments of hell upon such a creature Medina maintaines that God as Creator hath such power over his creature Ex 〈◊〉 omnium Theologorum sententia yet doe wee distinguish betweene potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata God can doe that by power absolute which he cannot doe on supposition that he will not doe it for that were to change and that were impotency rather then power And to speake in proper termes It is not fit to say that God cannot doe this because he will not for there is no consequence in this either in respect of God or man Such a one will not doe this or that therefore he cannot doe it But supposing Gods will to doe this or that t is more proper to say that upon this supposition it is impossible God should do otherwise because it is impossible he should change his will For there are but two causes of the change of the creatures will and resolution the one ficklenesse of the will the other improvidence of the understanding in not foreseeing all that might come to passe But neither of these is possibly incident unto God So then if God hath promised ought t is unpossible that it should not bee performed or that God should provountrue If God loves a man t is as much as to say he is determined to doc him good and t is impossible it should be otherwise then he hath determined But to say that God in point of justice cannot performe that without performing whereof he shall be untrue is a paradox of paradoxes For if in performing it he shall be true then in not performing of it he shall be untrue And doth Gods justice binde him to be untrue you might as well say it bindes him to bee unjust Againe if God out of his love hath resolved to doe this or that good unto man shall his justice hinder the fulfilling of the counsailes and determinations of his owne will This is strange Divinity yet you deliver these uncouth assertions like a positive Theologue without all proofe as if they caried their evidence in their foreheards Men are bound by rules of a superiour power to worke after this or that manner and therefore it is not lawfull for them to doe many things from the doing whereof they are restrained by lawfull authority which commands them It is not so with God who doeth what hee will in heaven and amongst the inhabitants of the earth and no man can say unto him What dost thou In this sense you thinke you may say that all before Christ were theeves and robbers And though I thinke this interpretation is very aliene from the true meaning of the Text you point at yet I doubt not but that every one Christ excepted hath beene found in sinne and thereby more or lesse found to play the theefe and rob God of that glory of obedience which is due unto him I doubt not but the Angell of the Lord that discomfited the army of Senacherib might in like manner have smoakt away the army of the Romanes yea and God might have done so to even the one as well as the other had it pleased him without any prejudice to his justice For if it be justly possible to him to pardon our sinnes t is as justly possible to him to remove his judgements And both Suarez and Vasquez though opposite in some specialities about the justice of God yet concurres in acknowledging that there is no justice in God in reference to his creature but upon presupposition of his will T is just with God to approve a mercilesse warre And t is as just with God to approve a mercifull peace neither is it disgracefull to God though by his long suffering and patience he gives space for repentance although his goodnesse were despised unto the end As many live prosperously in sinfull courses unto the death and then obtaine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an easie departure at last as Guicciaâ—dine observes in the particular of Pope Alexander the sixt and no marvell for what is wanting in the condigne vengeance in this life God can and will supply to the full at the day of judgement And the reason why God leaves some mens sinnes unrequited in this world is out of a speciall providence as Chrysostome hath observed of old namely to this end that wee may entertaine some conceite of a resurrection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And though God doth not afflict them with outward terrours yet he hath inward terrours enough to exercise the wicked and to keepe peace as farre from them as a guilty and tormenting conscience is neare unto them according to that of Salomon The wicked flieth when no man pursueth him The Deere when hee is stricken albeit Sylvas saltusque peragrat Dictaeos yet haeret lateri laetalis arunde O what an uncomfortable sentence do you edge this Section withall as if Gods infinite power could not save them that stubbornly abandon the waies of peace and wilfully neglect saving health so often and lovingly tendred unto them For consider did you never abandon the waies of peace or wilfully neglect saving health lovingly tendred unto you Were you never out of the state of grace For Austine hath taught me that Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumatia Or were you converted at the first or second or at the third sermon that you heard Nay when Gods children are converted doe they not too often abandon the waies of peace and wilfully neglect saving health Did not David in the matter of Vriah and Bathsheba Did not Salomon in his idolatry Did not Manasses in his idolatrous fury sealing it with bloud Saint Paul exhorts Timothy to carry himselfe gently towards them without 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if at any time God give them repentance implying manifestly that God can at any time give repentance to any man if hee will Neither are wee taught that God hath denied possibility of renovation by repentance unto any but such as sinne the sinne against the Holy Ghost 3 You say it had beene unjust with God to strike the men of Sodome with blindenesse before lust had entred their eies A manifest untruth which yet you deliver satis magistraliter as a dictate without any reason to enforce it In the ninth of Iohn wee read of one that was borne blinde is it not just with God to deale with any one so as hee dealt with him You will not deny I hope this worke to have been the worke of God if you should our Saviour would convict you of errour when hee saith that hee was borne blinde to the end the mighty worke of God might bee manifest in the curing of him And this work to this end could be no others but Gods worke I had thought to have beene borne blinde had beene a judgement yet you make it to bee a blessing as whereby the Sodomites had beene guarded
implyeth any such impotency in God yet Austin long agoe did acknowledge this consequence Enchirid. 96. Deo quam facile est quod vult facere tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere Hoc nisi credamus periclitatur ipsum nostrae fidei confessionis initium qua consitemur in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere Neque veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens nisi quia quicquid vult potest nec voluntate cujusquam creaturae voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus Et cap. 27. In caelo in terra non quaedam voluit fecit quaedam vero voluit non fecit sed omnia quaecunque voluit fecit Et cap. 98. Quis porro tam impii desipiat ut dicat Deum malas hominum voluntates quas voluerit quando voluerit ubi voluerit in bonum non posse convertere And whereas you say that man is not capable of endlesse joyes unlesse he will be wrought by meere love without the impulsions of unresistible power to love him to love God the same insinite love which drawes him unto repentance in congruity leaving a possibility not to be drawne by it This is a notorious untruth For was there any possibility in Christ to sinne or not to bee drawne to that which was good I thinke you will not avouch it And was he not therefore capable of endlesse joyes And if Gods will be unresistible as the Apostle plainly testifieth shall not the operation whereby his will is accomplished bee irresistible And shall such a bug-beare deterre us from acknowledging God to be the author of repentance and move us to give the glory thereof to the will of man who through the hardnesse of his heart cannot repent as the Apostle speaketh Againe the Scripture testifieth that whatsoever God willeth that he doth both in heaven and earth whether it be by power resistible or unresistible is nothing to the purpose But you maintain that what God ardently willeth is not brought to passe by reason that man willeth not Neither doe wâ—e maintaine that God in working whom hee will unto repentance doth doe this by bereaving man of power to resist which alone denominates the operation of God irresistible but onely by taking away the will of resisting while ex nolentibus volentes facit And consequently wee say not that God takes away all possibility of refusing to be drawne by it For we maintaine that God brings to passe contingent things contingently that is with a possibility to the contrarie though supposing Gods wil to the contrary this possibility shall not be actuated And so when God workes a man to faith and to repentance nullum humanum resistit arbitrium No mans will resists and that the grace which God gives a nullo duro corde respuitur is refused by no hard heart So that all this is done without all coaction For neither can the will be constrained and God in making men volentes ex nolentibus cannot without great absurditie be said to constraine them as you would fain insinuate having no sound argument for it but such poore trickes to serve your turne withall And when God promiseth to circumcise the hearts of his people and thereby to make them love the Lord their God with all their heart and with all their soule hee doth not say he will constraine them to repent Deut. 30. 6. So when hee promiseth to take away their stony heart and give them an heart of flesh and put his owne Spirit within them and cause them to walke in his statutes and judgements and to do them Ezech. 36. 27. hee doth not signifie that hee will constraine them For God can change any mans will without constraining Nay in making them willing it is contradiction to say he doth constraine them to be willing for constraint is against the will but it is impossible a man should bee willing against his will yet this you obtrude upon your adversaries as though they maintained that God by his power did make them repent against their wils Neither yet can we like that other extreame which you approve that men must first be brought to a willingnesse and then God makes them repent For to will to repent is to repent for repentance is the very change of the will Neither can you in any sober manner expound unto us how God is said to make men repent after they are made willing hereunto And yet the very will to repent is the worke of God as who it is that worketh in us both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure Philip. 2. 13. not by such attractions onely you speake of though you are loath to betray your Pelagian Tenet though you expresse the threatning of judgement and thereby imply what you meane by attraction of love to wit the promises of reward Now this apparantly is not to worke it for this is onely suadere and suadere is not to worke it And the case is cleere even by your opinion that God doth not work it as oft as he doth exhort unto it which yet he should if suadere and hortari thereunto were to worke it And indeed suadere hortari ut resipiscamus is onely to exhort and perswade that wee would worke our selves unto repentance And in this sense to interpret S. Paul where he saith God workes in us both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure was of old the practise of the Pelagians as S. Austin hath discovered long agoe de grat Christi cont Pelag. Calest cap. 10. For thus Pelagius plaid the commentator upon S. Paul Operatur in nobis velle quod bonum est velle quod sanctum est dum nos terrenis cupiditatibus deditos mutorum more animalium tantummodo praesentia diligentes futurae gloriae magnitudine praemiorum pollicitatione succendit dum revelatione sapientiae in desiderium sui stupentem suscitat voluntatem dum nobis suadet omne quod bonum est And therefore he urgeth Pelagius to confesse another manner of grace then this if he will be accompted a Christian Ibid cap. 11. Nos eam gratiam volumus isti aliquando fateantur qua futurae gloriae magnitudo non solum promittitur verumetiam creditur us speratur Nec solum revelatur sapientia verumetiam amatur nec suadetur solum omne quod bonum est sed persuadetur hanâ— debet Pelagius gratiam consiteri si vult non modo vocari sed esse Christianus And thus to circumcise our hearts in causing us to love him and to walke in his wayes and to keepe his statutes and judgments and to doe them this I hope is not to strangle us yet here is no violent operation in all this For Dum non modâ—versas à vera side sed adversas verae fidei voluntates convertit ex volentibus nolentes facit it is so farre from violence that the will rejoyceth that God hath thus reformed it we do but as Scriptures
to be angry But if you take it for voluntas vindicandi this must needs be as everlasting as Gods will and if you deduce any cause herof from the creature you were as good to derive from the creature the cause of Gods will which Aquinas professeth never any man was so madde as to doe And Gods hatred of Esau is in Scripture made suitable to Gods love of Iacob and if this love be the will of election then hatred must be the will of reprobation And if the everlasting purpose of God to give both grace and glory be deservedly accoumpted Gods love why should not the everlasting purposu of God to deny unto others both grace and glory be as deservedly accoumpted Gods hatred You undertake to shew how Love and anger being passions or linkt with passions are rightly conceaved to be in God but I hope you will not attribute them unto God either a◠passibus or linkt with passions For albeit love and joy mans formally be attributed unto God because they include no imperfection yet not as passions saith Aquinas in the place lately alleaged out of him CHAP. XXI How Anger Love Compassion Mercy or other affections are in the divine nature II is true some Schoolemen thinke that distributive justice may be properly enough attributed unto God but not commutative not because this includes rationem dati accepti but rather because it includes aequalitatem dati accepti Yet others are of opinion that justice distributive can be attributed unto God with no greater propriety then justice commutative as may be seene in Vasque 1. in 1. part disput 86. Likewise I know none that thinke mercy is more properly to be attributed unto God then anger For voluntas vindicandi as properly and formally belongs to God as voluntas miserandi that being as easily abstracted from greife as this from compassion As for revenge there is no colour why that should not in greatest propriety be attributed unto God like as also reward To say that affections or morall qualities may be contayned in the divine essence eminently is a very poore justification of them to be the attributes of God For to be eminently in God is no more as your selfe heretofore have explicated it chap. 4. sect 2. then God to be the Author of them and produce them Now in this sense you may attribute the name of any body or beast unto God and say God is such or such a thing is God to wit eminently But who can doubt but voluntas miserandi and voluntas vindicandi are in God not eminently but formally Yet notwithstanding the very will of God is infinitly different from the will of man No passion as a passion is in God though that name which signifieth a passion in man may be truely verified of Gods signifying the nature of God in a certayne reference unto his creatures without all passion So there is a will and understanding in God but nothing like to the will and understanding of man For will and understanding in man are accidents they are not so in God Our anger at the best as being displeased only with such things that displease God though in some litle thing it be like Gods anger yet in many things it is very unlike For it is a passion in us not in God it riseth in us which before was not no such innovation in God Gods anger is vindicative ours ought not to be so but only in case we are his ministers For vengeance is myne I will repay sayth the Lord. I cannot justifie you in so speaking when you say that mercy is more reall and truly affectionate in God then his anger For taking them sequestred from theire imperfections each is formally attributed unto God though not as passions and not eminently only as you have delivered it As for the execution of each more or lesse that receaveth moderation merely from the pleasure of Gods will For he hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardneth and farre more hath he made vessels of wrath amongst the nation of men then vessells of mercy though it be reputed otherwise amongst the nation of Angelis Mercy consists in pardoning sinnes and saving sinners and no passion at all is required unto this in the nature of God but passion enough even unto death upon the crosse in the nature of man person of the Sonne of God The better use men have of reason the lesse are they subject to perturbation but no whit lesse doe they participate of affection for vertues are not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Aristotle hath taught us but the right ordering of them Christs soule was heavy unto the death at the approaching of his passion and wept often before this yet had he never a whit the worse use of reason For all this But no passion at all can be in God for passions rise and fall upon new occasion but no such alteration is incident unto God I know not what you meane by devouring affections They may be concealed or restrained not in a vertuous manner but vitious only to keepe the rankor of theire hearts from discovery as Absolon a long time sayd nor good nor bad to Amnon after he had defloured his sister Thamar he was not any whit the more charitable in that but playd the foxe in waiting opportunity to doe mischeife Likewise when Haman saw Mordecai in the Kings gate that he stood not up nor mooved for him then was hee full of indignation at Mordecai Neverthelesse Haman refrayned himselfe though hee had plotted the destruction both of him and all his natiō To say that passions are moderate in matters which men least affect is as much as to say that affections are moderate in matters which men least affect And indeede affections must needes be moderate when they are least in motion But perpetuall minding of a thing should argue strength of passion in my judgement rather then moderation To my thinkinge now you are in a vaine of writing essayes Yet I find no greate substance of truth in them How secret cariages can be violently opposed I conceave not For if opposed then no longer secret And the more cunning men are the more notice I should thinke they take of violent opposition unlesse they doe apparently see such opposites are like to overshoote or come short which is a very race case and comes ofter into a schollars fancy then into reall practise I finde no greate passion in Achitophel but rather as Caesar came soberly to the ruinating of his country So Achitophel proceeded soberly to the destroying of himselfe To have the mastery of his passions like enough is a greate poynt of pollicy undoubtedly to have a gracious mastery of them is true Christianity not allwayes to restraine them but even profusely to enlarge them whatsoever the World thinkes of them As Moses in the cause of God was mooved so farre as to breake the