good an innocents oppugning of the sword of Justice to rescue his owne life I dare confidently asfirme not the least title to this purpose No a man ought to discharge his Covenant though it be to his disadvantage And ruat Coelum fiat 〈◊〉 though heaven itselfe if it were possible should be destroyed yet let justice â—…ourish That were a way to open a gap for all disorder and breach of rule and society without which no common wealth can be of long subsistance If thou suffer unjustly God will abundantly remunerate thy sufferings and repay it upon the head of thine enemies wherefore much better it is for thee to submit to thy censure by patience than to incurr the breach of all society by dâ—…sobedience I but saith the Author If reason will not satisfie perhaps 〈◊〉 may Qâ—…i 〈◊〉 potestati ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt to resist the Magistrate 〈◊〉 And he saith that answer with which too many are deceived cannot excuse disobedience and Rebellion this 〈◊〉 obliges private men but not Magistrates Since inferiour Magistrates being opposed to the supreame power are but as pirvate men and in this respect the reason of obedience is common to 〈◊〉 T is not usuall with mee to intrenâ—…h upon another mans profession but seeing I am here inforced to it give me leave a little to sayle out of my way to answer the Author First for the taking up of Armes or the waging of a warre in generall I never heard any man oppose the legâ—…timation of that warre that had these three requisites or ingredients A lawfull authotity commanding 〈◊〉 as the â—…agistrate A just and lawfâ—…ll end or cause occasioning it as the defence of our Religion liberties and the like And a good affection in following of it as not with rashnesse or temeritie but after all other meanes sirst endeavoured And now I appeale to any indifferent man whom neither feare nor affection hath ingaged to the contrary whether all these are not exactly made good in this great â—…taking of the Parliament I but saith the Author how doth this anâ—…wer the taking up of armes against the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the King for 〈◊〉 all o her 〈◊〉 are but as private men compared with him To this I â—…nswer 〈◊〉 under he Aâ—…ors favour â—…he suprâ—…am power as I have made it good before is the people represented by a Parliaâ—…ent and then no doubt that precept of the Apostle comprehending the King aswell as other persons doâ—…h according to his owne Argument justifie he Parliament in their proceedâ—…s and make good â—…heir taking up of Armes in their owne just defence I but hen the Author 〈◊〉 hat of the Apostle that the Magistrate is Dei minister nobis in bonum Gods minister to thee 〈◊〉 thy good and though thou suffer by him unjusty yet there he is 〈◊〉 in bonum for that by thy patient suffering thou shalt thereby gaine an eternall reward Cerâ—…inly God never made Magistrates on purpose to aâ—…ict and 〈◊〉 over their pâ—…ople thâ—…t they by patient 〈◊〉 might enjoy the greâ—…ter happinâ—… hereafter No that they provâ—… corrupt issues from hemselves not from any divine determination and therefore if the Mâ—…gistrate doe prove to be Minister nobis in malum a Minister to thee â—…or thy ill he is not then 〈◊〉 minister Gods Minister for that he doth transgresse and goe beyond his commission and in such case under the favour of M. Doctor Ferne conscience doâ—…h not only deny obedience but command and justifie 〈◊〉 But in all this conceive me 〈◊〉 t is the magistrates not any 〈◊〉 opposition that I justifie and this being undertaken with the due circumstance is not a meanes to destroy order and societie but maintaine them But yet I hope our Auâ—…hor will be here informed that this is not our case For doe we take up armes against our Soveraign may he perish who in his thoughts intends him the least ill No t is as the Parliament have often declared against his Malignant Councellors such who endeavour whatever their 〈◊〉 may be to his Majesty the subversion of our Religion and the destruction of the publike And I hope there is nothing in the word of God that opposeth this O yes in opposing hâ—…s authority you fight against him Strange if it should be so when neither the law of God nor man do oblige obedience to commands unlawfull He that obeyes the magistrate upon such termes doth it at his owne perill and I hope t is lawfull for the Parliament to depresse any civill or private combustion I but what if that authority have the Kings person accompanying it may you in such case make resistance No question we may for t is not the person of the King that can legitimate an action that is in it selfe unlawfull nor adde any greater force or vigour to their Commission that obey Besides the personall presence of the King doth or doth not countermand his authority if it do countermand his authority then they have no power to warrant their actâ—…on if it do not yet the act is 〈◊〉 So then let them take their choise they see their termes Unhappy people who having committed themselves to the government of one King onely might not oppose the unlawfull and tyrannicall regiment of so many It being in effect objected as appeares befoâ—…e That a â—…emporall power meaning the Parliament cannot bee greater than that which is lasting and unalterable intending the King Is this were so saith the Observator the Romanes have done impolitickly in creating Dictators when any great extremity assayled them and yet we know it was very prosperous to them sometimes to change the â—…orme of government Hence we may conclude it good policy in imminent danger to trust to a Monarchy not 〈◊〉 Aristocâ—…y and much lesse to a Democracy What have we to do with Aristocracy or Democracy God be blessed we nor know nor desire any other government than that of Monarchy and we shall with all hâ—…mility cast our selvs upon his Majesties care and providence guided by his Parliament But if sedâ—…ced by malignant and destructive Counsell we are not bound to yeeld our selves as a prâ—…y to the ranâ—… and malice of his and our enemies The King objects if we allow the Lords and Commons to be more than Councellors wee make them Comptrollers and this is not â—…ble to Royalty To which the Observator answers 〈◊〉 say saith he that to coâ—…t is more than to counsell 〈◊〉 yet not aâ—…es so much as to command and comptroll True saith the Author not alwayes but then it is when their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impose a necessity upon the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 the like Doth their consent impose a greater necessity or ingagement upon the King than the consent or declaration of law in cases of publike conâ—…nt by former Parliaments hath done or than the judgement of his Judges in inferiour Courts doâ—…h do who are so Counsellours for the King as that the King may
not countermand their judgements and yet it were an harsh thing to say that they are therefore 〈◊〉 â—…nd Coâ—…rs of the King therefore it holds in Parliaments a â—…tiori I but saith the Author the 〈◊〉 why the King cannot countermand their judgement is because they 〈◊〉 his person and â—…is consent is by law involved in â—…at by law they do for that the act of a delegated power is his act and there would be no end if he should undoe what be hath done But saith hee in Paâ—…ament the Lords 〈◊〉 in a personall capacity and the House of Commoâ—…s as representing the body of the Kiâ—…me and therefore the cases doe not agree Under correction of the Author I shall make the case parallel notwithstanding this objection I do agree that in all acts of publique 〈◊〉 which â—…e but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only I hope it will not offend any one to say that they are Ministers to the Common-Wealth as in case of making and consenting to new Lawes or repealing of the old or the like there the Loâ—…ds sit in a personall capacity and the Commons as represeâ—…ting the body of the Kingdome But in all acts that are judiciall as in case of reversing of 〈◊〉 judgements or of declaring or explayning the law of the Land there they represent the person of the King for that he is â—…ons Iustitiae the fountaine of justice and noâ—…e câ—…n 〈◊〉 such a power without it be first delegated to them by the King and therefore in such a case their judgements doe â—…ly involve the judgement of the King and do oblige him as strongly as the 〈◊〉 oâ—… dâ—…terminations of the Judges Now none can deâ—…y their declaring of the law in case of the Militia to be a judiciall act therefore the consequence is cleare that the King is justly bound by it I but further he saith The judges sweare they will not assent to any thing 〈◊〉 may turne the King in damage or 〈◊〉 by any manner way or coloâ—… 18. E. 3. And do not the Parlâ—…ent â—…o the same by their oath of supremacy and their late Proteâ—…tion If you seriously examine them you will finde that their obligation is the same And now I hope the Aâ—…thor will make good his 〈◊〉 to mee who said that when I could make these thâ—…nges agree to the two Houses I should conclude from the Judges sentence to their votes wherefore I doe 〈◊〉 that there being the sâ—…e reason there oâ—…ght to be the same Laâ—… I but for a further answere seing his former will not hold saith the Author in matters of law there lyes an appeale to them a writ of errour being brought as to the highest Court not so in matters of State Beâ—…ause whilst they 〈◊〉 sentence according to known Lawes the State is no way indangered thereby but if they challenge to themselvs a liberty of passing sentence according to reason of State they may when they please overthrow our lawes The counties which 〈◊〉 them looke upon them as judges â—…ot Politiâ—…s T is not impossible they should be both and whatsoever the judgement of the Coâ—…ties were that intrusted them certaine I am that he is not fit to occupie a place in that great Assembly that is not at least in some reasonable measure so qualified that whilst the 〈◊〉 and other Sages skilled 〈◊〉 that profession are within guiding and directing of his great Ship 〈◊〉 to â—…aw men experienced in the Politiques may sit at Sterne to secure it from the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 invasion and civill combustion And whâ—…n the Author can produce so able a 〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 so much ingaged in the welfarre of the Kindome and so void of selfe respect then will we upoâ—… his request deâ—…ert our Parliament untill then I hope all faithfull and true hearted people will adhereunto them For that empty shadow and vaine dreame of a possibiliâ—… of theâ—…r 〈◊〉 the Law it is a wonder to me that any 〈◊〉 mans sancie should so abuse it selfe To 〈◊〉 the Authors language upon himselfe Can it be conceived that men in their wits who 〈◊〉 all that they have by the benefit of the Law and no doubt have as great a portion to lose 〈◊〉 others should exâ—…te that which is the principall evidence of theâ—…r 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of life or 〈◊〉 and so pinne themselves and their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upon unknowne 〈◊〉 t is extreame madnesse and folly to thinke it Wee ought not to conceive that they will either counsell or consent to any thing but what is publiquelâ—… advantagious When the King 〈◊〉 they doe not otherwise hee will 〈◊〉 willingly sollow their 〈◊〉 I dare confidently affirme that no antiquity or Records wâ—… 〈◊〉 are aâ—…le to 〈◊〉 one example of this nature where the Kings single conceipt or 〈◊〉 is opposed 〈◊〉 that oâ—… hâ—… whole Parliament But it canâ—… be expâ—… that they should 〈◊〉 while that the King by such malignant Coâ—…nsell is kept aâ—… so great a dâ—…st 〈◊〉 By such Counsâ—…ll and 〈◊〉 we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Kâ—…ng liâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Such a consâ—…nt in which his is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 not so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at all 〈◊〉 doth not limit but take it away Doth this 〈◊〉 which doth â—…citely 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 more 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 his power than that of their 〈◊〉 oâ—… 〈◊〉 than the 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉 The 〈◊〉 sai h hee doth not 〈◊〉 to have to 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 old or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 them Neither doe they without his 〈◊〉 they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so would he Aâ—…thor ingenioâ—…sly acknowledge if that he were not so much 〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉 and prejudice But happily hee doth not understand the difference bâ—…tweene constituting new or repealing the old Lawes and declaring or expounding the Lawes in being how did Ship-money destroy our propriety saith he but by this very consequence What a grosse mistake is this Because the Kiâ—…gs judgement is involved in that of his Parliaments and of his Judges according to law must it therefore follow thâ—…t the whole Kingdome should be obliged by his Majesties determination against Law Or because legally we coulâ—… not be divested of our property without our consâ—…nt must not therâ—…fore the King be bound by the judgement of his Parliament which doth tacitly include his consâ—…nt I but saith hee Ejus est velle qui potest nolle He onely haâ—â— freedome of consent or disagreement that may at his election do either 'T is true But this must be understood of an actuall consent or disâ—…greement and not of an implied For in Corporations or bodies politique whâ—…re the Major part carriâ—…s it will you say that the residue are not bound because that they had not â—…lection to â—…ssent or dissent as the case falls out to be This were a way to open a gappâ—… to all disorder and confusion So the Kings consent is included in that of his Judges and yâ—…t I hope you will not say that the King there had freedome of dissenting which is the
Paramount in every mans private property and so if occasion require may call for a part for the preservation of the whole and upon such termes he is unwise that will not freely disburse it yet it doth not therfore follow that this is seized by the same right that the Forts Castles are which are meerely for the publike defence and security For the Kingdom hath a peculiar proper interest in the one which it hath not in the other And though necessity may justly demand both for the Publique safety yet it is the proper worke and office of the one not soof the other That there is an Arbitrary power in every state somewhere t is true t is necessary no inconveniencefollows upon it If he mean by arbitrary a lagistative power this is granted yet not to part but the wholebody But what if one part do desert the other and refuse to concurre with hâ—…m must that 〈◊〉 still and do nothing But hee sayes this speakes not to the case for still they give us a certaine rule to live by And do not the Parliament do the same No law can be all equity nor all equity Law for so the one would confound and destroy the other but there must be a certaine rule upon which to make this equitable construction Why now I appeale to any one that knowâ—… any thing of the justice of their proceedings whether that they have not often laid downe this as an unquâ—…ionable position that the King by his Prerogative hath the sole ordering of the 〈◊〉 of the Forts Castles and Magazine throughout the Kingdome why then hâ—…re is your certaine rule to live by onely they make this equitable qualification of it and I must say that it were no just law if it would not admit of this construction that in case where 〈◊〉 Kingdome is in imminent danger of for reigne invasion or civill combustion and that the King seduced by evill and Malignant Counsellours will not receive their advise and Counsell for the securing of the same in such caâ—… they who are intrusted with the publike may seize the Forts and Magazine and 〈◊〉 the Militia for his Maâ—…esties and his peoples safety and preservation And doth this any whit destroy the rule Nay rather doth it not mainetaine and support it I but he saith that he is to justifie there is such a Paramount Law which shall make other lawes truely Oracles that is capable of contrary meanings so that now a man may be justly punished for doing such a thiâ—…g because he hath disobeyed the letter of the law a weeke after he shall be justly punished too for noâ—… doing of the same thing because he hath disobeyed the equity of the law This I shall justifie and yet let me tell the Author that this is no forcing or stâ—…ayning the lawes to contrary meaning but onely a Declaration of the true intention of them The Statuâ—…e de frangentibus prisenam doth enaâ—…t that it shall be felony for a prisoner to breake prison the prison by accident is set on fire tâ—…e prisoners may in such case break prison for the salvation of their lives and are no felons and yet this is against the expresse letter of the Statute and shall wee in such case say that this is a contrary meaning to the law No wee may not t is cleerely agreeable with the intention of it Agaâ—…ne the sole power of ordering of the Militia doth by the law reside in the King and if in time of peace and securâ—…ty the King duely discharging of his trust any one shall dare to execute any other Commission and by vertue of that shall traine muster or discipline any 〈◊〉 his Majesties subâ—…ects without his authority there hee is justly punishable as offending against the letter of the law But now on the other side if in time of publique distraction and feare of invasion from abroad or of civill and intestine combustion within the King shall refuse to hearken to the Counsell of his Parliament and shall listen to such advise as being followed mâ—…y prove the utter ruine and destruction of the Common-wealth In such case if they shall take upon them for to order the Militia for the securing of his Majesty and people and shall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Commissions to that purpose those that in sâ—…ch case shall disobey may be punished for not submitting to the equity of the law And yet still this is no contradiction or contrary â—…eaning to the law but an eqâ—…itable just â—…planation according to the intâ—…ntion of it And if this will not give the Author satifaction for my part I thinke nothing will I but then he cites us Aristotle which saith Those lawes are with greatest prudence 〈◊〉 shed which dâ—…fine most cases and which leave nothing which possibly may be determined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 breast of the judge And the Author gives the reason of it for that to leave an ample and large construction according to equity unto Iudges may be a meanes to satisfie corrupt ends T was a wise saying of Aristotle and no doubt t is a very admirable rule and direction for all legistative powers to make such lawes that might be their owne exposâ—…ours and that might if it were possible extend to all cases â—…hat so the selfe respect or corrupted judgement of their interpreters might not through the dubious ample or various sense of them be satisfied But since it is impossible for them so 〈◊〉 sorsee and inlarge the law but they must of necessity lâ—…ave some câ—…ses unprovided for and some incertaine which must râ—…st upon the judgement of the Iudges of it How doth it any way oppose law or reason where there is not for all cases an exact provision to allow a favourable and 〈◊〉 construction But then covertly 〈◊〉 to the condition of our times he tells us a large Story of the 〈◊〉 in Germany and of the Thirty Tyrants of Athens what a 〈◊〉 and large power they had got into their hands 〈◊〉 by insinuating themselves into the hearts of the people and how they did abuse that power by injustice and oppression and so concludes that upon proportionable grounds and principles such mischeifâ—…s being then may be againe Could the Author have made a worse compâ—…rison 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 would was ever greatâ—…r dishonour or indignity cast upon a Parliament upon such 〈◊〉 such groundlesse and inconsequent reasons and arguments The Anabaptists they abused Germany the thirty Tyrants Athens and therefore thâ—… Parliament do England the rest of His booke shewes this to be his meaning though hee conclude with a may be though he had not regarded his own credit and reputatiâ—…n yet hâ—…e should have had some respect to the honour and fame of his Countrâ—…y and have studied a better resemblance though he had not raised a better conclusion The bad actions or impostures of some are not infallible presidents for others to be judged by But to advertise the Author that he do not for the
the conclusion deduced thence he may finde as much difference between the tenses as betweene Democracy and Monarchy Give me leave to make the Premisses and doe you raise what conclusion you will The Observator who knew certainly to distinguish the Tenses as well as the Author seems to intend only thus much that if elegerit be taken in the future tense well and good it makes for him for then the King according to the very letter of his oath is bound under the heavy sinne of perjury to grant such lawes as aâ—…e requested of him by his people and then hee can have no negative voyce But admitting it be expounded in the preter perfect tense and not in the future why yet saith the Observator it matters not for by the oath and the Law of the land the king is bound to do justice and the granting of new laws unto his people upon their request is an act of justice necessary as well as the dispencing of the old therfore there being the same necessitity the publike trust must needs equally extend to both But the Aethor will shew us why elegerit must of necessity bee taken in the preterrerfect not in the future as this case is for saith he the word consuetudines which cannot referre to the future undenyably evinces it was meant of the time past Under favour this doth not infallibly conclude that elegerit must be taken in the preter perfect tense for no more then the King can grant such customes as the people shâ—…ll chuse for that it must be time not the Kings Patent that can create a custome so neither can the King grant such lawes or customs unto a people which they have already chosen and which have beene established and ratified unto them by all his predecessors for quod semel meum est ultra meum esse non potest that which is mine owne already cannot be given unto me So that the oath must bee construed reddendo singula singulis as we say in law that is that he will confirme their ancient customes which they doe already enjoy and that he will grant unto them such new laws as they shall hereafter make choyce of other reasonable construction the oath will not admit of and agreeing with this exposition is the first clause of his Magisties oath where demand is made whether his Majestie will grant and coâ—…firm unto his people their ancient lawes and customes who answers that he will And contrary to that which the Author doth assert the Parliament have made it clear and manifest by their declaration lately published how that elegerit hath been alwayes rendered in the future tense and not in the preter perfect tense So that I shall passe this over without any further trouble conceaving that the Author may if he have not resolved to the contrary upon these grounds be fully convinced in this particular The King is bound to consent to new Laws â—…f they be necessary as well as defend the old His Majestie never thought otherwise but he is not bound to an implicit faith to believe all necessary which is pretended to be so This is in plaine termes to invert the method for the King to chuse Lawes not the people for if he will consent to none be they of never so great necessity but such as hee himselfe holds convenient what then is become of the peoples election this is to prescribe and enforce lawes upon the people â—…ot to consent to them upon their election Besides who so proper a judge of the necessity or conveniency of a publiâ—…e law as the republike those that knowe the want of the benefit must needs be most sensible of the necessity The word elegerit if it be in the preterperfect tense yet shews that the peoples election had beene the ground of ancient â—…aâ—…es and customes and why the peoples election in Parliament should not be now of as great moment as ever I cannot discover The election there spoken of is the election of the diffusive noâ—… of any representative body that with the tacit consent of the Prince and so os much other authority Under favour it is of no other authority for though it should be conâ—…essed that at first the diffusive body did chuse their Lawes which had the tacit consent of the Prince and that since the people have granted the King a negative voyce in his Parliaments which is the representative body of the Kingdome yet being with this qualification that his Majesty grant all necessary lawes desired by the people hence it followes that the representative body having as great power and as good judgement to discern of laws necessary as the diffusive have the same power of election which ought to be of as great moment and consequence as ever For the representative their ancient right is not denyed no law shall be abrogâ—…ted none â—…acted without their assenâ—… But there is a meane betweene doing nothing aâ—…d all I wonder at the Author that he dare utter such palpable and knowne falsities How often have the priviledges of Parliament beene infringed even to amazement and wonder that all foregoing ages cannot produce the like and is there not an illegall commission of Array though not enacted yet ordained and set up in opposition to the Parliament But whtch is yet above all and strikes at their very essence are they not because others doe neglect their duty and the trust reposed in them by the publike denyed even the very name of a Parliament and therein the power and vertue of it and whether this be not a denying of their right let the world judge The Author saith true that there is a meane betweene doing nothing and all But I would faine know how we shall be assured of this meane if his Majestie upon pretence of unnecessary shall have power to deny whatsoever is requested by the Parlament The result of all is Our Kings cannot be said to have so unconditionate and high a propriety in all tâ—…e subjects lives liberties and possessions or in any thing else to the Crowne appertaining as subjects have in the Kings dignitie The Author saith That what should be meant by subjects having an unconditionate and hâ—…gh 〈◊〉 in the Kings dignity surpasses his understanding 〈◊〉 not the Author loved division he would not have thus severed the Observators words thereby to puâ—… a dylemma upon himselfe and others for the Observator saith before that the King was made for the people and not the people for the King and thence raiseth this conclusion which under savour is very naturall that therefore the King hath not that absolute right of property in the people and their interest as they have in his Majestie and his possession and now will any man except our Author who understands not deny this for a truth I but he sa th it seemes to sâ—…eake this wicked doctrine that subjects may dispose of the
Besides who can be so competent a Judge of any approaching danger or of any malignities or pressures in the Common wealth as they who speake out of the common sense and 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 However this is certaine the Kingdome cannoâ—… suffâ—…r by a Parliament iâ—… may withouâ—… If the Parliament make any transition in other matters than what be pleases to propose they are lyable to imprisonment at his pleasure The sense of his inference is this that because they cannot justifie the medling with things which belong not to their cognizance therefore they may bee punished if they meddle with those that doe This is the Authors inference not the Observators He doth not say that for executing their due power they may be imprisoned no such inconsequent concluâ—…ious we leave to the Author But this he seemeth to speake that it should be very hard and unreasonable that the power of judging of the jurisdiction and authority of a Parliament should reside only in the Kings breast when that none can determine aright of them but themselves for if so if the King at any time shall say they exceed their power they may be imprisoned at pleaâ—…ure The Author telling the people how farre their ingagement goes with the Parliament saith That if they exceed their 〈◊〉 and Vote things not belonging to their cognizance the people by no meanes is ingaged in it as having no legall way of expressing of themselves in such cases This is in plain termes to tell the people in what cases they are to submit to and maintain and desend the Parliament in what not certainly people cannot be so 〈◊〉 as to thinâ—… that the illegall acts of a Parliament sâ—…ould bind them but on the other side I hope they will not be so foolish as to believe every thing to be illegall which the Author is pleased to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but rather cast themselves upon their care as in duty they are bound whom they have entrusted with the publike securitie But I hope the Author will now be advised that on the contrary the people are no more ingaged in the illegall proceedings of the Prince in those things that he is intrusted with for the publike than of the Parliament It is impossible saith the King that the same trust should be irrevocably committed to us and our heires for ever and the same trust and a power above that trust for such is the power they pretend to be committed to others It is true saith the Observator Two supreames cannot be in the same sense and respect This is a weake answer saith the Author So weake that the Author cannot reply to it for nothing is more knowne or assented to than this that the King is singulis major yet universis minor It seemes sayes the Author the King hath taken the Oath of Alligeance as well as we and we may call him 〈◊〉 fellow subject Did we ever speake of two Kings or can there be so in one common wealth But much lesse can there be any alligeance due from the Soveraigne to the subject certainly the Author was not himselfe But to prove his reasoning yet more absurd we doe not say that the King is singulis minor but that he is universis minor and I hope â—…he universe or body politike never swore alligeance or supremacy to the King neither is it possible that it should for that it is a body only in consideration of Law that hath neither life nor motion like other individuals and therefore not capable of doing of any act in that capacity so that notwithstanding this shallow reaâ—… the King is universis minor I but saith the Author You tell us that he is greater than one you doe not tell us that he is better than two this is no greater supremacy than probably he had before he was a King The Prince is singulis major as well as â—…ee nay may not any Lord in the Land chal 〈◊〉 the same supremacy over all the Knights any Knight over all Esquiâ—…es What a poore and senslesse cavill is this doe not we say that he is universis minor and doth it not then consequently follow that we allow him major to all that is lesse than the universe When you can reduce the universe to so small a number as two then will his Majesty be lesse than those two untill then he is greater for those slender instances to prove as great a supremacy in the Prince nay in every nobleman over all Knights and in Knights over all Esquires I must tell him had not his senses bâ—…ene ravished by and swallowâ—…d up in Monâ—…rchy he would never have so much forgot himselfe can there be any one singulis major but the King he that accounts himself so high 〈◊〉 to be made lower by the head the Prince himselfe is not singâ—…lis major till he survive his Father To be short all others are but comparatively great the King only is great in the superlative I but to take us off these corrupt glosses I would there were no more 〈◊〉 in himâ—… the Author 〈◊〉 us to 24. H. 8. ca. 12. which as he saith 〈◊〉 the King to be universis major the preface of which statute 〈◊〉 thus that this Kingdome hath beene alwayes acknowledged to be an Empire governed by one supreame head and King having the dignity and regall estate of the same unto whom a body politique compact of all sorts and degrees of people c. been bounden and owen next to God a naturall and humble obedience Doth this prove the King universis major under favour nothing lesse for wee must not understand this that the body politike doth owe obedience but that the severall sorts and degrees of people of which this body is compacted and made that they doe owe obedience for to take it otherwise were to make an absurd and impossible construction For as I have said before how is it possible that a body politike which is a body only in judgement of law or contemplation that hath neither life sense nor motion that that should owe homage or obedience to any one much lesse a naturall obedience as the Statute speaketh so that cleerly this doth not aâ—… all disprove the former position If there were no King at all in England you would call this government an Aristocracy and why I beseech you do you not confâ—…sse the name now seeing the thing is altogether the same for if they give his voyce t is all one as if he had no voyce if their pâ—…wer must over-rule his t is all one as if he were 〈◊〉 of all Certainly Monarchy hath committed a Rape upon the Authors reason and understanding or els he could not bee thus overseene Doth the Parliament go about to take away the Kings voyce or to disrobe him of his power more than the knowne law of the land doth approve of Did they even declare or publish such a power to be in them that they
might enact any new lawes or abrogate the old without his Majesties consent Nay â—…ove they not frequently prosessed the contrary why then what have they done that should have the least colour of intitling them to an Aristocraticall Government O yes for they have voted and published it to the world that the power of declaring law 〈◊〉 Paul amento in case of any publike concernment doth refide in them and that though the King neither doth nor will consent yet he is obliged by their Votes And is this any greater power or priviledge than every other inferiour Court hath or is it more than they themselves formerly without the least scruple have exercised by declaring law in dubious points of Statâ—…s and erroneous judgements And is their ancient undoubted and unquestionable right now become a power Aristocraticall T is strange that the times should so vary the case and that long enjoyment or possession which doth usually confirme and strengthen a mans right should be a meanes to take it away But before I passe this over let me tell the Author that it is a most idle scandalous and false aspersion and if I do in all this wrong him let hee himself judge upon his owne inference which is this that the defending and maintaining of the ancient â—…ight and government is a labouring for an introducting of a new and if he chance to blush as he well may at his own inconsequent reasoning let him mend it hereaâ—…ter I but saith he I dare say that all Histories and Records except of such Parliaments which deposed their King which the Observâ—…or 〈◊〉 no free one ever did cannot produce an example of this nature that the two Howses should pretend to a power which must of necessity over-rule the King That there is not the least colour of a pretence to such a power I have before plainly evidenced it Kut I pray heare his reason why this power as to some respects may not be greater than the King Because saith he since the law hath given the King a power by dissolving of the Parliament to take away that power as is pretended greater than his owne if they had ever made claime to superiority over him he would quickly have put an end to that dispute This is in plaine termes to say that a power that is but temporary cannot be greater than that which is continuing and unalterable a strange fallacy why if the Kingmake one high Constable of England ad 〈◊〉 whom we know hath a power very extensive shall we conclude that his dignity or authority is inferiour to others of lesse qualitie and esteeme because dissolvable at the Kings pleasure Or if the King conferre the dignitie and Office of Lord Keeper to another by committing of the seale unto his custody is he therefore not superiour to the rest of the Nobility because removable at his Majesties will and discretion an absurditie to thinke it Before this power be challinged it would be fit to vote down that clause in a law made 2 H. 5 cited by his Majesty That it is of the Kings regality to grant or deny such of their petitions as pleaseth himselfe For that this is said to be cited by his Majesty I shall not question the truth of it though I have searched the Statutes and I cannot find any such clause But admitting it to be so did ever any one make a question whether that there were such a Prerogative in rerum natura as the Kings negative voyce certainly not The matter in debate is whether it be so absolute and uncircumscribed that the Parliament can doe nothing no not so much as declare what the common law is without his Majesties consent or whether it be boun ed and limited So that this great and most supreame Court may not be like a body without a soule or a numberlesse cypher And for thaâ—… of the Statute that he may deny their petitions can you thence deduce that he may deny their rights their right of declaring law in caâ—…e of publike concernment is not involved within the narrow compasse of a petition To the most absolute â—…mpire in the world this condition is most naturall and necessary that the safety of the people is to be valued above any right of his It is against common sâ—…nse to suppose a King that is in his â—…its who â—…ll not provide for the safety of his people nay who will not part with some of his right rather than they should perish because in their destruction he looseth all I would to God that sad experience did not inform us that you speak severall languages one thing to us another to his Majesty if it were not so the setling of the Militia by his Parliament by reason of the abuse of that trust to the endangering of the Kingdom by â—…he advise of ill affected counsellors would not have caâ—…sed this great combustion I but then the Author saith This doth not prove a King should part with his rights as often as they will pretend to be in danger Nor can it be thought reaâ—…onable if that a Parliament and in that a whole kingdome can use pretences Was ever age guilty of such disrespects to a Parliament If this were once admitted what wild plots would be invented what strange 〈◊〉 would be received â—…rom invisible spies Strange that a Parliament should fancy and invent nâ—…series to themselves and should thus frighten the publike with Phantasmes or Chimaeraes I hope thâ—… Author will prove it by experience that it is not so easie a mâ—…tter to deceive a whole Common wealâ—…h I saith he and so often as crafty men were ambitious or covetous so ofâ—…n the silly people were to be frighted More strange yet that ambition and covetousnesse should at once possesse a whole Parliament and that a whole Common-wealth should be accounted but a silly people so easie to be wrought upon I hope this disparagement to the publike will work an answerable acceptance to the people Since all naturall power is in those who obey they which contract to obey to their owne ruine or having so contracted they which esteeme sucâ—… a contract before their owne preservation are sellonious to themselves and rebellious to nature For example sayes the Author an agreement patiently to submit themselves to the Ordinary tryall of law and to suffer if it should se fall out tâ—…ough under an undeserved sentence In this case bee that doth not make resistance and prerr his preservation to his contract is pronounced Felo de se and a rebell to nature And he puts other examples of the like nature as that of the Martyrs â—…nd of our saviour Christ and demands our thoughts of â—…hem whether they were selfe murtherers or no What a strange affected mistake is this of the Author can there be the least colourable inference out of what the Observator hath delivered to justifie any individuall opposition and infringment of contract or to make
in the North 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King could be 〈◊〉 wisely or faithfully advised by any other Couâ—…t oâ—… 〈◊〉 his single 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before all advise whatsoever t were not only vaine but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the 〈◊〉 Kingdome should be troubled to make elections and that the 〈◊〉 eâ—… 〈◊〉 attend the publike 〈◊〉 The King never refused to advise with them What a 〈◊〉 falsitie is this No doubt the Author can 〈◊〉 London from Yorke And the Commission of Array from the Miâ—… But then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 us that the â—…all but not the onely forme of the Kings answere to such 〈◊〉 as they were not 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 L'Roy 〈◊〉 proves that after the advise of this his great 〈◊〉 he is yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 further with persons or 〈◊〉 as his owne 〈◊〉 shall thinke 〈◊〉 Master Crompton in his 〈◊〉 of Couâ—…ts â—…ells us â—…at when the King did consâ—… a Bill then he endorsed it L'Koy volt the King will hâ—… it so is â—…e did not â—…gree then he indorsed it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which as he â—…es was an absoluâ—… denyall why â—…hen no ground for this inâ—…erence that the King was at election to advisâ—… further with any other Coâ—…ll 〈◊〉 if it were so this proves de facto that thâ—… King hath had this powr but doâ—…h no way 〈◊〉 thâ—… Obs rvators reason how that if this might be permitted 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 to call Parliaments â—…sides they are the most supreame Councell in England and therefore according 〈◊〉 the rule of Law in â—…he presence of this Counsâ—…ll all infâ—…riour Councâ—…ls ought to cease Againe what they councell or detâ—…rmine is done in a legall and judiciall way and therefore not to bee 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 extra judiciall advice whaâ—…ever No nor by 〈◊〉 judgâ—…ment of any other Court but a subsequent Parliamâ—…nt And the Observator adds this as a reason why the Kings judgement onely ought not to bee 〈◊〉 for saith he the many eyes of so many chiefe Gentlemen out of all parts see more than sewer The same reason saith the Author which denys a liâ—…y of dâ—…ing to the King that is such a number who see more because they are more may deny it to the House of Peeres in comparison of the House of Commons and to that House too in comparison of the People and so 〈◊〉 King and Lords are voted out of Parliament What a poore evasion is this and contrary to common sense that this reason should deny a liberty of dislenting to the House of Peeres in comparison of the House of Commons for that they are much the major part of the Parliament and to that Hoâ—…se too in comparison 〈◊〉 the people For the first he may aswell argue that the major part of the Judges in the Kings Bench should binde the minor in the common Pleas or 〈◊〉 versá and as soone maintaine it for though both the Houses make but one Court yet they are so distinct that each doth officiate in its proper Spheare and the conclusions of the one cannot bind the other and for the lattâ—…r that the peoples judgement because the greater number should sway the House of Commons Hâ—…e may aswell reason that though I give away my â—…t yet the property is not altered and as soone prove it When hee can make 〈◊〉 pâ—…ople to represent the House of Commons not the House of Commons the people then shall the peoples judgâ—…ment for majority carry it Vntill then we must as wee are 〈◊〉 by our election submit to their determinations Besides four hundred choice grave and solid men may 〈◊〉 and discover as much as fâ—…ure hunâ—…d thousand 'T is no 〈◊〉 of number but 〈◊〉 qualification not the plurality of eyes bâ—… the 〈◊〉 that sees most yâ—…t as one good 〈◊〉 mâ—…y seâ—… more than many bad ones so iâ—… must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 many good ones must 〈◊〉 that one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Au 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sheweth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is noâ—… gâ—…lly truâ—… iâ—… it be 〈◊〉 true it is 〈◊〉 For 〈◊〉 he I dâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 almost any Paâ—…ent man hee will 〈◊〉 us upon the 〈◊〉 of a Bill 〈◊〉 one 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 Houâ—…e hath found 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and urged more exceptions than 〈◊〉 hunâ—… would 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 eâ—… This possibly may be but the str ng probability is on the oâ—…r fiâ—…le 〈◊〉 câ—…ally one may seâ—…â—…ore than 〈◊〉 â—…ndred is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 eiâ—…her probable or 〈◊〉 that it will be 〈◊〉 For my part I shall never waive a propable certainty for a meere 〈◊〉 nor in â—…quall judgemenâ—…s preferre an Vnite before a Pluralitie Thâ—…e 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nay whole Parliaâ—… 〈◊〉 beene 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 Null â—…y succeeding Paâ—…liaments and instances in many I shall not indeavour to maintaine an infallibility in a 〈◊〉 nor did I ever beleive considering them to be bâ—…t â—…n that they could not 〈◊〉 in judgement aswell as others But for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 to an 〈◊〉 to say that which ha h beene may be and therefore it 〈◊〉 is sâ—…ch a peece 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aâ—… I never 〈◊〉 oâ—… The â—…w 〈◊〉 ends 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 needs 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Coâ—…lls moâ—…e 〈◊〉 impeâ—…all and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ceâ—… 〈◊〉 mâ—…y 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as any other private Subject What may 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 casually meâ—… from the severall Counties strangers to each other the most 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 men for wisedome and mannâ—…rs and propably of the best forâ—…nes intrusâ—…d with the publique have as many bye and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and as soone infring their 〈◊〉 as any 〈◊〉 suâ—…iect When ever the 〈◊〉 makes this good I will sacrifice my reason to his will aâ—…d bâ—…ve all to be sound Doctrine which he preaches They are strangly transported with the love of a popâ—… state who can so 〈◊〉 their 〈◊〉 as to force themselves to thinke the members of it may not be extreamely subâ—…ect to amâ—…ition covetousnesse batred and affection And they are as strongly ravishâ—… wiâ—… the love of Moâ—…rchy who can belâ—…ive that all these may not sway the Scepâ—…er and rule the King to the oppressing anâ—… iâ—…aving of his Subjects But what doâ—…h the Author count this a popular State I never learned before that whâ—…re the people had one principâ—…ll Governor over them as a King that that should be a Democracy Doubtlesse he is noâ—… well read in the Politiques or if he be he doth much wrong himselfe and dishonour his King so grosly to mistake a Monarchy for a Democracy Then hee instances in the Bishop of Durhams case by which he saith Wee are told in the 3. cap. of the second Parliament held 1. Mariae how that that Bâ—…prick was dâ—…lved in a forme Parâ—…ament 7. Ed. 6. Which was compassed and brought to passe by the â—…nister labour great 〈◊〉 and corrupt meanes of certaine ambitâ—…s persons then being in 〈◊〉 â—…ather to iâ—…rich themselves and their friends with a great part oâ—… the possessions of 〈◊〉 saâ—…d â—…shopprick than upon just occasion
esteemeth any thing to be uncleane to him it is uncleane by this likewise it is cleare that what my conscience perswâ—…des mee is unlawfâ—…ll be the judgement of other men what it will ought not to be inforced upon mee Againe the last verse He that doubteth is damned if he eate because he eateth not of faith for whatsoever is not of faith is finne So that for my part I take it as an unquestionable â—…ruth that no Ecclesiasticall authority whatsoever hath power over a mans conscience though it be but in things indifferent But now on the other side I take it to be as evident and as 〈◊〉 an assertion that any Lay counsell may in 〈◊〉 meerely civill or morall no way reflecting upon the word of God oblige the conscience which indeed is but the bare opinion and judgement of a man by their conclusions and determinations and in such ease t is no sin for a man to oppose his owne reason by submission to the judgement of oâ—…hers And if this were not a truth Justice would be but slow payed and the law as various as the severall dispositions of men and every man would have power to infringe the law upon every 〈◊〉 of opposition to conscience 〈◊〉 but the Author goes on and tells us that though amongst probable Aâ—…guments that drawne 〈◊〉 the Authority of wise men carry with it greatest weight yet it must give place to a greater reasoâ—… T is â—…rue where the greater or better reason is evident but 〈◊〉 are not bound to renounce our owne understanding and to believe that to be the better reason which you affirme to be so The Parliament must in strength of probability give the better reason and when you can prove the contrary which as yet you fall much short of then shall we be of your beliefe untill then you must give us leave to retaine our owne Now to every man belongs a judgement of 〈◊〉 which must decide for what concernes his perticular duty T is true where he is sole Arbiter and where it coâ—…cernes his owne particular onely but where the publique is interested there it is otherwise So hee â—…aith in the Kings case The Votes which carry in them the authority of of both Houses shall beare great sway and is it be in things extreamely dubious they may turne the Scales of the other â—…ide This truth if firmely stood to as it ought would suddainely perâ—…d this sad contestation But alas how quickly t is broken For he saith if greater reason seeme to contradict them his Majesty will not hoodwinke his understanding and blindly â—…ollow whether they please to lead him he will walke by the greater light greater reason very much that the reason of the Court should preponderate that of the Parliament For example he saâ—…h 〈◊〉 Majestie perceiving how much his people may suster under arâ—… power is resolved never to make use of it and thâ—…nks it lesse fitting any other should I would to God hâ—…s Majestic had never been wrought upon by his evill Counsell to break his resolution Is it not an arbitrary way of rule for to takâ—… away mens property without their consâ—…nt And is iâ—… not arbitrary for the King to preâ—…e his owne single exâ—…udiciall judgement before that of his Parliaments But it is told him now the use of it will bee for their good by reason of appâ—…ent imminent dangers Hath the Author thus informed his Majestie certainly never any one else did it were happy both for King and people that it were no more practised by tâ—…e Court than it is by the Parliamenâ—… Concerning the Action at Hull the Observator agreeth to take possâ—…ssion of the Kings Towne and shuâ—… the gates against hâ—…m is treason if circumstances doe not vary the nature of the act as in this case he sayes thâ—…y doe for the first thing to be lookt on is that the King was meerely dâ—…ed enâ—…ance for that time his generall right was not denyed If then a subject take up 〈◊〉 against his Soveraigne in a tâ—…mporall warre it must not come 〈◊〉 the compasse of 〈◊〉 No whether it be temporary or coâ—…nuing so he hath the same Commission to justifie his action And he may legâ—…lly possesse 〈◊〉 of the Kings 〈◊〉 and maintaine them against him so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath no 〈◊〉 in them T is not his confessing that he hath no right for that all thâ—… world can judge of but his doing no wrong that excuses him No deâ—…ing language was given If a man take away my puâ—…se shall he be acquitted from â—…elony because he did not give mee ill language too Inventio tua nomen imponit operi 〈◊〉 t is the invention as we say in law that denominates the action And therefore though I cannot acquit him of felony that shall take away your purse and in exchange give you only good words yet if he shall rescue your purse out of the hands of Robbers or take it from your ownâ—… person being in danger for its better security and shall againe faithfully â—…ore it when you have liberty to enjoy your owne if he be felon 〈◊〉 dye for him No act of violence was used This he may say who hath picked anothers pocket but it is no sufficient plea against the Law Yes if he can shew a lawfull commission for it 〈◊〉 he used no violence though the King for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 together did stand within Musket sâ—…t c. It is no argument of innocence that he had 〈◊〉 to be more highly guilty and abstained T is true had he beene guilty at all The King used termes of desyance c. and this makes the Act mâ—…ely desensive or rather passive If this were true there was never any warre but defensive For those who by some great injustice oâ—…ed provoke a nation to right it sâ—…e fight aswell to maintaine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as what they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Tâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that offer any injustice or wrong though they take up aâ—…mes to secure themselves 〈◊〉 on the offensive pâ—…t nâ—…t the defensive But this rests to prove in our case How 〈◊〉 should 〈◊〉 to the King any grounds to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Yorke many men wonâ—… or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seeme the same 〈◊〉 to the King as if he had beene pursued to the gates 〈◊〉 â—…ke Certainly it was a 〈◊〉 ground not only to raise a guard for his safety but an Armie to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aâ—…d to right his 〈◊〉 A 〈◊〉 for his safety why Sir 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did not advance towards York nor ever〈◊〉 â—…sed it An army to punish thâ—…t hâ—…gh indignity Very just it should be sâ—… had there beene 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And to right his 〈◊〉 veâ—…y reasonable had his Maâ—…esty been any way dishonoured 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Townesmen out of their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be a 〈◊〉 who acts only by their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
fraudes holy salsehoods and religious untruth stood the Church of Rome c. And he concludes that wee ought to examine whether this policy worke not at least in the beginning till a discovery of their falsehoods is made and the people is undeceived the same effects in a civill State whether there are not such things as fraudes pretended to be Reipublicae salutares Here you have his apostasie you may see how suddainly he hath declined the truth for he is revolted againe into his pretences deceipts and falsehoods And I wish from my very heart that these had no greater influence upon the Actions of this man and such as he is than they have upon the proceedings of Parliament and then I am confident our sad Divisions and distractions would not be long lived I but then the Observator sayes It cannot be by force because they have no army visible A thing is said in law to be done by force not onely when men actually suffer if they make use of their liberty and refuse to satisfie the passion and humours of some but then also when they have just grounds of feare for this workes on the minde as strongly as the other on the body I but with the Authors favour this must be such a feare as may possesse a generous and setled spirit not every idle Phantasme or Chymaera such as they use to bugbearâ—… Children withall It remaines then we examine whether the names of many Gentlemen were not openly read in tumults I marry Sir here is onâ—… of the imaginary Spiriâ—…s that hath thus forced the understanding and reason of these men Doubtlâ—…sse this is not a sufficient ground of feare were it true which I much question to a resolved and setled judgement neither doth the law tâ—…ke hold of any such feare as thiâ—… is I but then he goes on whether that they were not poasted with directions to thâ—…ir perticular lodgings I here you have another of these Hobgoblins and deformed Images more fit to fray children with than men Because if that were true they were directed to their Chambers and never intended as the event cleares it to approach them therefore they complied or were silent and so that faction prevailed I but he goes yet further whether the way to the House were not set with clamarous multitudes that they must passe through the middest of them whilâ—…st they insorme them what is fit to be voted and inquire after their names and what side they take This is like indeed to carry the visage of truth with it May not men who are part of the collective body of the Common-wealth whom the Parliament represents considering that sua res agitur it is their bâ—…sinesse that is there transacted have recourse thi her with a full desire onely to be informed of the proceedings of Parliament and how thingâ—… succeed for their good but they must be branded with those ignominious stiles of unlawfull Assâ—…mblies and clamorous multitudes For their inquiring what their names were and which sâ—…de they tooke certainely 〈◊〉 they may do without 〈◊〉 and that can be no cause to make me dread a man because he knowes my name No nor his being privy to my actions nei 〈◊〉 if I am conscious to my self that they are such as are just and honourable â—…nd for their informing of them of what was fit to be voted that is as like to be true as that they shoâ—…ld vote what they had informed them For the other two of absence and accident he sayes they may be reduced to this I t is no wondâ—…r many stay away since they must be absent even whilest thâ—…y are there If their wills were absent by being a verse from the publique good whose fault was it that they stood Cyphers better in such case their rome than their company The Parliament requests of the King that all great Officers of State by whom pâ—…blique affaires shâ—…ll be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…e chosen by 〈◊〉 or nomination of the great Counsell Could the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for him c. if all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to 〈◊〉 Is that the â—…eason why each man preserves his owne right bâ—…cause he takes all the rest of mankinde for deadly enemies No but had I not a strong 〈◊〉 of such mens faith and loyaltie I should not upon just occasion 〈◊〉 to intrust my right with them I but can he with honour 〈◊〉 himselfe unfit to manage that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the law hath commuted to him 〈◊〉 not a disavowing of his owne ability to be ruled by the 〈◊〉 of his great Counsell the Parliament one may manâ—…ge a trust well and yet no dishoâ—…â—…hat a whole Kingdom may doâ—… it better With equall reason sayes he they may challenge to themselves the 〈◊〉 of all Bishops 〈◊〉 Sherâ—…ffes 〈◊〉 c. and dispose of all the preserments of England For thâ—… Bishops thouâ—…h our sad experience at this day doth informe us that they have been very bad yet we shall not speak of what necessity it might be that they likewise should be nominated by the great counsell for that it is boubtfull whether ever they shall come in nomination again For the Ministers likewise I shall leave them to the choyce and free elections of their Patrons But now for the Sheriffes Justices and other inferiour Officers of the law I must 〈◊〉 I much wonder how those can be brought within the ranke and order of great officers of State neither can there be the like reason possibly rendred for the nominating of these as for the other for though they may be corrupt in their way yet that is a prejudice only to some particular interests no danger to the publike The truth of it is this Kingdome hath and doth still suffer under the heaâ—… pressures of ill 〈◊〉 and Officers of Staâ—…e who instead of defending and propagating the good of the publike have and do most vilely and traiterously-corrode and gnaw out the very bowels of it Was not then their reqâ—…st and proposall very reasonable and safe both for King and people that they might nominate such of that known and publike trust and confidence who by their sedulous care honest and direct counsell and which is above all by their true and unfained zeale and affection to the common wealth might prevent the like distractions and miseries for the future But to passe this had his 〈◊〉 beene graciously pleased for to hearken and comply with this advise of the Parliament the greater had been his honour in that certaine pledge of continued happinesse and security to hâ—…s people If the King 〈◊〉 such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of his owne good liking only or upon recommendation of such a 〈◊〉 here 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 of no power but if it be upon the recommendation of the whole Kingdome in Parliament who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned this is an emptying himselfe of Majestie and 〈◊〉 himselfe of
power Is this will contâ—…nt them thâ—…y shall havâ—… as much power as be â—…rants to his Courtiers If this might be obtained I am consident they neede not make a second requâ—…st Nay could they be perswaded thâ—…t whatâ—… they could propose would be conceed by his Majesty I dare say 〈◊〉 owne modesty judgement and 〈◊〉 would not permit them to be guilty of so great dishonour to their King as to extend their peâ—…itions so farre for inâ—…rease of power as some lately to our sad experience have enjoyed I but he sayes 〈◊〉 must be like the outward senses and make a true represent at con the 〈◊〉 of reason is 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 to make judgement therein 〈◊〉 informatâ—…n is not alwayes faithfull This 〈◊〉 no way 〈◊〉 have deprived the King of the Office of reason for their 〈◊〉 did not 〈◊〉 away 〈◊〉 Majesties power of refusall upon just caâ—…se rendered If by his last words 〈◊〉 intends the information of the Court there he is in the right this age can 〈◊〉 to him that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not beene alwayes faithfull But if he do intend his great 〈◊〉 the Parliament there he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 against common judgement and understanding for that no age is able to wâ—…tnesse any unfaithfulnes or 〈◊〉 in a Parliament I but he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to their King and a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉 yet 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 themâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of their owne 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are 〈◊〉 in all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to expresse their 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And why so pray 〈◊〉 his reason For saith hee they must 〈◊〉 to suffer 〈◊〉 those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hoped for in a 〈◊〉 divided in it 〈◊〉 This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a fire in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which would 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For it cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Very tragically 〈◊〉 though without any 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 I 〈◊〉 that if 〈◊〉 Author 〈◊〉 but to make a 〈◊〉 he will easily informe himselfe 〈◊〉 that it is very 〈◊〉 to have great 〈◊〉 of State of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and it will be very difficult to 〈◊〉 men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that danâ—… incurred to by 〈◊〉 of such a power to the Parliament 〈◊〉 since there can be no absolute 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 on this side heaven but that all humane inventions whether of law or whatever else will retaine or contract either more or lesse some mixture or tincture of ill in them Why then sâ—…uld 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 benefit for a possible inconvenience or reject the unquestionable commodum for â—…are of a casuall incommodum the bread that a man doth now eat may choak him and his house that he now lives in fals upon his head shall he therefore deny himselfe the certain nutriment of the one or the secure habitation of the other for feare of these visible dangers t were phanatick â—…nd rediculous By this râ—…le a man should 〈◊〉 and declâ—…ne all terrene and sublunary happinesse whatsoever for that there is not so 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 condition that is not subject to a possible pollution and corruption Now I bâ—…lieve it doth fully appeare that the Law of that Remonstrance laid down by his Majesti by way of 〈◊〉 in seven positions is just and without offence â—…eing such as will bring unquestionable happinesse both to Church and 〈◊〉 not denying our obedience to the King 〈◊〉 our 〈◊〉 and faithfull service to God 1 That the Parliament hath an absolute and 〈◊〉 power of declaring Law This power must rest in 〈◊〉 or in the king or in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Courts or 〈◊〉 all suite must bee endlesse and it can no where rest more safely than in Parliament 〈◊〉 two Houses are not the Parliament The subject of such power is the intire body which consists of three estates If deserted by the King they are otherwise not I but he sayes some things are cleare and evident in law and want 〈◊〉 if otherwise all 〈◊〉 subjects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Iudge Very just and some things are dubious in law and want 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such is the case betweene the King and Parliament and this must rest upon the breast of the 〈◊〉 whiâ—…h in this case is the Parliament I but hâ—… sayes If the Houses should vote youâ—…ger brothers ought to 〈◊〉 by the law of England could this 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of the first 〈◊〉 A 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but most easily answered and resolved It is very manifest it could not for 〈◊〉 this is a case which is evident and cleare and here the law may be its owne judge and needs no other interpreter or declarer Besides this is a destroying or repealing of the old law and an intâ—…oduction of a new which canâ—…ot be done without the three estaâ—…es But they may declare what the common law of the land is without the King which is only a passing senâ—…ence upon the 〈◊〉 and reasoning of a new case by the old law so that the Judges are guided by this rule of law 〈◊〉 eadem ratio ibi idem 〈◊〉 where there is the same reason there ought to be the same law pray observe and this will correct your mistake though the case be new 〈◊〉 if it may be brought to the 〈◊〉 of the old law tis idem jus not 〈◊〉 the same no new law The truth of it is that law is but a more pure and 〈◊〉 reason and as reason is alwayes one and the same so of necessity must the law be That the Parliament are bound 〈◊〉 no Presidents Statute are not binding 〈◊〉 them why then should Presidents Yet there is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 This is an excellent ground to justifie their owne innocâ—…ncy against all the world For if they can make it appeare they are not bound â—…o keepe 〈◊〉 law no 〈◊〉 can accuse 〈◊〉 for the breach of any Our Author thinks he hath here got a strong hold and advantage against us Why wee shall allow as without 〈◊〉 the Law is that 〈◊〉 are binding to the two Houses of Parliament as well as others till repealed But doth this any way disprove 〈◊〉 position that they are not bound to Presidents You know what they say who are best acquainted with the bounds and 〈◊〉 of their owne power some Presidents are not to be followed 〈◊〉 being not 〈◊〉 and all may fall short and be different from the 〈◊〉 case and condition of things and therefore t is no reason that they should be bounds to the proceedings of a Parliament 3. That they are Parliaments and may judge of publike necessity withâ—…ut the King and dispose of any thing They may not 〈◊〉 the King but being 〈◊〉 by the King when the Kingdome is in 〈◊〉 they may judge of that