might be free of his own Authority and of absolute Power over himself and over the Laws to do what he pleased and leave undone what he list and this Decree was made while Augustus was yet absent Accordingly we find that Vlpian the great Lawyer delivers it for a Rule of the Civil Law Princeps Legibus solutus est The Prince is not bound by the Laws 9. If the Nature of Laws be advisedly weighed the Necessity of the Princes being above them may more manifest it self we all know that a Law in General is the command of a Superior Power Laws are divided as Bellarmine divides the Word of God into written and unwritten not for that it is not written at all but because it was not written by the first Devisers or Makers of it The Common Law as the Lord Chancellor Egerton teacheth us is the Common Custom of the Realm Now concerning Customs this must be considered that for every Custom there was a time when it was no Custom and the first President we now have had no President when it began when every Custom began there was something else than Custom that made it lawful or else the beginning of all Customs were unlawful Customs at first became Lawful only by some Superiour which did either Command or Consent unto their beginning And the first Power which we find as it is confessed by all men is the Kingly Power which was both in this and in all other Nations of the World long before any Laws or any other kind of Government was thought of from whence we must necessarily infer that the Common Law it self or Common Customs of this Land were Originally the Laws and Commands of Kings at first unwritten Nor must we think the Common Customs which are the Principles of the Common Law and are but few to be such or so many as are able to give special Rules to determine every particular Cause Diversity of Cases are infinite and impossible to be regulated by any Law and therefore we find even in the Divine Laws which are delivered by Moses there be only certain Principal Laws which did not determine but only direct the High-priest or Magistrate whose Judgment in special Cases did determine what the General Law intended It is so with the Common Law for when there is no perfect Rule Judges do resort to those Principles or Common-Law Axiomes whereupon former Judgments in Cases somewhat like have been delivered by former Judges who all receive Authority from the King in his Right and Name to give Sentence according to the Rules and Presidents of Antient Times And where Presidents have failed the Judges have resorted to the General Law of Reason and accordingly given Judgment without any Common Law to direct them Nay many times where there have been Presidents to direct they upon better Reason only have changed the Law both in Causes Criminal and Civil and have not insisted so much on the Examples of former Judges as examined and corrected their Reasons thence it is that some Laws are now obsolete and out of use and the Practice quite contrary to what it was in Former Times as the Lord Chancellour Egerton proves by several Instances Nor is this spoken to derogate from the Common Law for the Case standeth so with the Laws of all Nations although some of them have their Laws and Principles written and established for witness to this we have Aristotle his Testimony in his Ethiques and in several places in his Politiques I will cite some of them Every Law saith he is in the General but of some things there can be no General Law when therefore the Law speaks in General and something falls out after besides the General Rule Then it is fit that what the Law maker hath omitted or where he hath erred by speaking generally it should be corrected or supplied as if the Law-maker himself were present to Ordain it The Governour whether he be one Man or more ought to be Lord over all those things whereof it was impossible the Law should exactly speak because it is not easie to comprehend all things under General Rules whatsoever the Law cannot determine it leaves to the Governours to give Judgment therein and permits them to rectify whatsoever upon Tryal thy find to be better than the Written Laws Besids all Laws are of themselves dumb and some or other must be trusted with the Application of them to Particulars by examining all Circumstances to pronounce when they are broken or by whom This work of right Application of Laws is not a thing easie or obvious for ordinary capacities but requires profound Abilities of Nature for the beating out of the Truth witness the Diversity and sometimes the contrariety of Opinions of the learned Judges in some difficult Points 10 Since this is the common Condition of Laws it is also most reasonable that the Law-maker should be trusted with the Application or Interpretation of the Laws and for this cause anciently the Kings of this Land have sitten personally in Courts of Judicature and are still representatively present in all Courts the Judges are but substituted and called the King's Justices and their Power ceaseth when the King is in place To this purpose Bracton that learned Chief Justice in the Reign of Henry the Third saith in express terms In doubtful and obscure points the Interpretation and Will of our Lord the King is to be expected since it is his part to interpret who made the Law for as he saith in another place Rex non Alius debet Judicare si Solus ad id sufficere possit c. The King and no body else ought to give Judgment if he were able since by virtue of his Oath he is bound to it therefore the King ought to exercise Power as the Vicar or Minister of God But if our Lord the King be not able to determine every Cause to ease part of his Pains by distributing the Burthen to more Persons he ought to chuse Wise-Men fearing God c. and make Justices of them Much to the same purpose are the words of Edward the First in the beginning of his Book of Laws written by his appointment by John Briton Bishop of Hereford We will saith he that Our own Jurisdiction be above all the Jurisdictions of our Realm so as in all manner of Felonies Trespasses Contracts and in all other Actions personal or real We have Power to yield such Judgements as do appertain without other Process wheresoever we know the Right Truth as Judges Neither may this be taken to be meant of an imaginary Presence of the King's Person in His Courts because he doth immediately after in the same place severally set forth by themselves the Jurisdictions of his Ordinary Courts but must necessarily be understood of a Jurisdiction remaining in the King 's Royal Person And that this then was no New-made Law or first brought in by the Norman Conquests appears by a Saxon Law made by
Treason and he calls the Statute of 11 Hen. 7. an unjust and strange Act. But it may be Mr. Pryn will confess that Laws chosen by the Lords and Commons may be unjust so that the Lords and Commons themselves may be the Judges of what is just or unjust But where the King by Oath binds his Conscience to protect just Laws it concerns him to be satisfied in his own Conscience that they be just and not by an implicit Faith or blind Obedience no man can be so proper a Judge of the Justness of Laws as he whose Soul must lye at the Stake for the Defence and Safeguard of them Besides in this very Oath the King doth swear to do equal and right Justice and Discretion in Mercy and Truth in all His Judgments facies fieri in omnibus judiciis tuis aequam rectam justitiam discretionem in Misericordia Veritate if we allow the King Discretion and Mercy in his Judgments of Necessity he must judge of the Justness of the Laws Again the clause of the Oath quas vulgus elegerit doth not mention the Assenting unto or granting any new Laws but of holding protecting and strengthening with all his Might the just Laws that were already in Being there were no need of Might or Strength if assenting to new Laws were there meant Some may wonder why there should be such Labouring to deny the King a negative Voice since a negative Voice is in it self so poor a thing that if a man had all the Negative Voices in the Kingdom it would not make him a King nor give him Power to make one Law a Negative Voice is but a privative Power that is no Power at all to do or act any thing but a Power only to hinder the Power of another Negatives are of such a malignant or destructive Nature that if they have nothing else to destroy they will when they meet destroy one another which is the reason why two Negatives make an Affirmative by destroying the Negation which did hinder the Affirmation A King with a Negative Voice only is but like a Syllogism of pure negative Propositions which can conclude nothing It must be an Affirmative Voice that makes both a King and a Law and without it there can be no imaginable Government The Reason is plain why the Kings Negative Voice is so eagerly opposed for though it give the King no Power to do any thing yet it gives him a Power to hinder others though it cannot make him a King yet it can help him to keep others from being Kings For Conclusion of this Discourse of the negative Voice of the King I shall oppose the Judgment of a Chief Justice of England to the Opinion of him that calls himself an utter Barrister of Lincolns Inn and let others judge who is the better Lawyer of the two the words are Bracton's but concern Mr. Pryn to lay them to heart Concerning the Charters and Deeds of Kings the Justices nor private men neither ought nor can dispute nor yet if there rise a Doubt in the Kings Charter can they interpret it and in doubtful and obscure Points or if a word contain two Senses the Interpretation and Will of our Lord the King is to be expected seeing it is His part to interpret who makes the Charter full well Mr. Pryn knows that when Bracton writ the Laws that were then made and strived for were called the Kings Charters as Magna Charta Charta de Foresta and others so that in Bracton's Judgment the King hath not only a Negative Voice to hinder but an Affirmative to make a Law which is a great deal more than Master Pryn will allow him Not only the Law-maker but also the sole Judge of the People is the King in the Judgment of Bracton these are his words Rex non alius debet judicare si solus ad id sufficere possit the King and no other ought to judge if He alone were able Much like the words of Bracton speaketh Briton where after that he had shewed that the King is the Vice-roy of God and that he hath distributed his Charge into sundry portions because He alone is not sufficient to hear all Complaints of his People then he addeth these words in the Person of the King Nous volons que nostre jurisdiction soit sur touts Jurisdictions c. We Will that Our Jurisdiction be above all the Jurisdictions of Our Realm so as in all manner of Felonies Trespasses Contracts and in all other Actions Personal or Real We have Power to yield or cause to be yielded such Judgments as do appertain without other Process wheresoever we know the right Truth as Judges Neither was this to be taken saith Mr. Lambard to be meant of the Kings Bench where there is only an imaginary presence of His Person but it must necessarily be understood of a Jurisdiction remaining and left in the Kings Royal Body and Breast distinct from that of His Bench and other ordinary Courts because he doth immediately after severally set forth by themselves as well the Authority of the Kings Bench as of the other Courts And that this was no new-made Law Mr. Lambard puts us in mind of a Saxon Law of King Edgar's Nemo in lite Regem appellato c. Let no man in Suit appeal unto the King unless he cannot get Right at home but if that Right be too Heavy for him then let him go to the King to have it eased By which it may evidently appear that even so many years ago there might be Appellation made to the Kings Person whensoever the Cause should enforce it The very like Law in Effect is to be seen in the Laws of Canutus the Dane sometimes King of this Realm out of which Law Master Lambard gathers that the King himself had a High Court of Justice wherein it seemeth He sate in Person for the words be Let him not seek to the King and the same Court of the King did judge not only according to meer Right and Law but also after Equity and good Conscience For the Close I shall end with the Suffrage of our late Antiquary Sir Henry Spelman in his Glossary he saith Omnis Regni Justitia solius Regis est c. All Justice of the Kingdom is only the King 's and He alone if He were able should administer it but that being impossible He is forced to delegate it to Ministers whom he bounds by the limits of the Laws the positive Laws are only about Generals in particular Cases they are sometimes too strict sometimes too remiss and so oft Wrong instead of Right will be done if we stand to strict Law also Causes hard and difficult daily arise which are comprehended in no Law-books in those there is a necessity of running back to the King the Fountain of Justice and the Vicegerent of God himself who in the Commonwealth of the Jews took such Causes to His own cognisance and left
Prison by Privilege of Parliament upon the Judges Answer it was concluded That the Speaker should still remain in Prison according to the Law notwithstanding the Privilege of Parliament and that he was the Speaker Which Resolution was declared to the Commons by Moyle the King's Serjeant at Law and the Commons were commanded in the King's Name by the Bishop of Lincoln in the absence of the Arch-bishop of Canterbury then Chancellour to chuse another Speaker In septimo of Hen. 8. a question was moved in Parliament Whether Spiritual Persons might be convented before Temporal Judges for Criminal Cases There Sir John Fineux and the other Judges delivered their Opinion That they might and ought to be and their Opinion was allowed and maintained by the King and Lords and Dr. Standish who before had holden it the same Opinion was delivered from the Bishops If a Writ of Errour be sued in Parliament upon a Judgment given in the Kings Bench the Lords of the higher House alone without the Commons are to examine the Errours the Lords are to proceed according to Law and for their Judgment therein they are to be informed by the Advice and Counsel of the Judges who are to inform them what the Law is and so to direct them in their Judgment for the Lords are not to follow their own Opinions or Discretions otherwise So it was in a Writ of Errour brought in Parliament by the Dean and Chapter of Lichfield against the Prior and Covent of Newton-Panel as appeareth by Record See Flower Dew's Case P. 1. H. 7. fol. 19. FINIS Apud Selden 21 Edw. 3. fol. 60. Apud Selden Selden Selden Selden Selden Selden Cambden Cotton Stow. Selden Selden Selden Selden Chanc. Egerton * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 3. c. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 1. c. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. lib. 3. c. 8. Lib. 2. c. 8. (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 L. 2. c. 11. (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 L. 8. c. 12. (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 L. 31.5 (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 3. c. 7 (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 L. 3. c. 5. (c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 L. 3. c. 4. (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 L. 4. c. 8. (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 L. c. c. 13. (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 L. 3. c. 7. Lib. 3. c. 9. Lib. 3. c. 11. Lib. 6. c. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 L. 7. c. 9. Lib. 2. c. 8. (a) L. 3. c. 7. (b) L. 4. c. 10. (c) L. 3. c. 6. (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 De Cive cap. 1. sect 10. 94. 87. Lib. 4. c. 8. Lib. 1. c. 4. P. 3. P. 13. P. 6. P. 1. P. 12. P. 5. P. 40. P. 12. P. 14. P. 16. P. 15. P. 17. P. 5. P. 2. P. 6. P. 12. P. 7. P. 54. P. 7. P. 1. P. 12. P. 13. P. 8. P. 16. P. 17. P. 14. P. 17. P. 49. P. 17. P. 18. P. 38. P. 18. P. 25. P. 56. P. 25. P. 26. P. 38. P. 26. P. 28. Arist. Pol. l. 3. c. 16. Cap. 1. Lib. 1. Cap. 2. Cap. 2. Cap. 2. Cap. 2. Lib. 2. Qu. 4. Cap. 12. Lib. 5. Sect. 18. Cap. 1. Sect. 4. Cap. 4. Sect. 1. Lib. 2. Cap. 5. Cap. 7. Cap. 7. Sect. 1. Cap. 7. Sect. 2. Chap. 7. Sect. 1. Chap. 7. Sect. 1. Lib. 2. Cap. 2. Cap. 7. Sect. 2. Ainsworth upon Deut. 18. 1 King 20.16 Gen. 27.29 Arist Pol. Lib. 1. c. 2.
but of late Use or Institution for in Edward the Sixth's days it was a Chappel of the Colledge of St. Stephen and had a Dean Secular Canons and Chorists who were the Kings Quire at his Palace at Westminster and at the dissolution were translated to the Kings Chappel at White-hall Also I read that Westminster-hall being out of Repair Ric. 2. caused a large House to be builded betwixt the Clock-tower and the Gate of the great old Hall in the midst of the Palace Court the House was long and large made of Timber covered with Tiles open on both sides that all might see and hear what was both said and done four thousand Archers of Cheshire which were the Kings own Guard attended on that House and had bouche a Court and 6 d. by the day Thirdly he saith The Commons are to chuse their Speaker but seeing after their Choice the King may refuse him the Vse is as in the conge d' eslire of a Bishop that the King doth name a Discreet Learned man whom the Commons Elect when the Commons have chosen the King may allow of his Excuse and Disallow him as Sir John Popham was saith his Margin Fourthly he informs us That the first day of the Parliament four Justices assistants and two Civilians Masters of the Chancery are appointed Receivers of Petitions which are to be delivered within six days following and six of the Nobility and two Bishops calling to them the Kings Learned Councel when need should be to be Tryers of the said Petitions whether they were reasonable good and necessary to be offered and propounded to the Lords He doth not say that any of the Commons were either Receivers or Tryers of Petitions nor that the Petitions were to be propounded to Them but to the Lords Fifthly he teacheth us that a Knight Citizen or Burgess cannot make a Proxy because he is Elected and Trusted by multitudes of People here a Question may be whether a Committee if it be Trusted to act any thing be not a Proxy since he saith the High Power of Parliament to be committed to a few is holden to be against the Dignity of Parliaments and that no such Commission ought to be granted Sixthly he saith The King cannot take notice of any thing said or done in the House of Commons but by the Report of the House Surely if the Commons sate with the Lords and the King were present He might take notice of what was done in His Presence And I read in Vowel that the old Vsage was that all the Degrees of Parliament sate together and every man that had there to speak did it openly before the King and his whole Parliament In the 35 Eliz. there was a Report that the Commons were against the Subsidies which was told the Queen whereupon Sir Henry Knivet said It should be a thing answerable at the Bar for any man to report any thing of Speeches or Matters done in the House Sir John Woolley liked the Motion of Secrecy except only the Queen from whom he said there is no reason to keep any thing And Sir Robert Cecil did allow that the Councel of the House should be secretly kept and nothing reported in malam partem But if the meaning be that they might not report any thing done here to the Queen he was altogether against it Seventhly He voucheth an Inditement or Information in the Kings Bench against 39 of the Commons for departing without Licence from Parliament contrary to the Kings Inhibition whereof six submitted to their Fines and Edmund Ployden pleaded he remained continually from the beginning to the end of the Parliament Note he did not plead to the Jurisdiction of the Court of Kings Bench but pleaded his constant Attendance in Parliament which was an acknowledgment and submitting to the Jurisdiction of that Court and had been an unpardonable betraying of the Privileges of Parliament by so learned a Lawyer if his Case ought only to be tryed in Parliament Eighthly he resolves that the House of Lords in their House have Power of Judicature and the Commons in their House and both Houses together He brings Records to prove the Power of Judicature of both Houses together but not of either of them by it self He cites the 33 Edw. 1. for the Judicature of both Houses together where Nicholas de Segrave was adjudged per Praelatos Comites Barones alios de Concilio by the Prelates Earls and Barons and others of the Councel Here is no mention of the Judgment of the Commons Others of the Councel may mean the Kings Privy Councel or his Councel Learned in the Laws which are called by their Writs to give Counsel but so are not the Commons The Judgment it self saith Nicholas de Segrave confessed his fault in Parliament and submitted himself to the Kings Will thereupon the King willing to have the Advice of the Earls Barons Great men and others of his Councel enjoyned them by the Homage Fealty and Allegiance which they owed that they should faithfully counsel Him what Punishment should be inflicted for such a Fact who all advising diligently say That such a Fact deserves loss of Life and Members Thus the Lords we see did but Advise the King what Judgment to give against him that deserted the Kings Camp to fight a Duel in France Ninthly he saith Of later times see divers notable Judgments at the Prosecution of the Commons by the Lords where the Commons were Prosecutors they were no Judges but as he terms them general Inquisitors or the Grand Inquest of the Kingdom The Judgments he cites are but in King James his days and no elder Tenthly also he tells us of the Judicature in the House of Commons alone his most ancient precedent is but in Queen Elizabeths Reign of one Tho. Long who gave the Mayor of Westbury 10 l. to be elected Burgess Eleventhly he hath a Section entitled The House of Commons to many Purposes a distinct Court and saith Not a the House of Commons to many Purposes a distinct Court of those many Purposes he tells but one that is it uses to adjourn it self Commissioners that be but to examine Witnesses may Adjourn themselves yet are no Court. Twelfthly he handles the Privileges of Parliament where the great Wonder is that this great Master of the Law who hath been oft a Parliament-man could find no other nor more Privileges of Parliament but one and that is Freedom from Arrests which he saith holds unless in three cases Treason Felony and the Peace And for this freedom from Arrests he cites Ancient Precedents for all those in the House of Lords but he brings not one Precedent at all for the Commons Freedom from Arrests It is behooveful for a Free-holder to consider what Power is in the House of Peers for although the Free-holder have no Voice in the Election of the Lords yet if the Power of that House extend to make Ordinances that bind the Free-holders it is necessary
and Florence Becket should sue no further in their cause against Alice Radley Widow for Lands in Wolwich and Plumsted in Kent forasmuch as the matter had been heard first before the Councel of Edw. 4. after that before the President of the Requests of that King Hen. 7. and then lastly before the Councel of the said King 1 H. 7. In the time of Hen. 3. an Order or Provision was made by the Kings Councel and it was pleaded at the Common Law in Bar to a Writ of Dower the Plaintiffs Attorney could not deny it and thereupon the Judgment was ideo sine die It seems in those days an Order of the Kings Councel was either parcel of the Common Law or above it Also we may find the Judges have had Regard that before they would resolve or give Judgment in new Cases they consulted with the King 's Privy Councel In the case of Adam Brabson who was assaulted by R. W. in the Presence of the Justices of Assise at Westminster the Judges would have the Advice of the Kings Councel for in a like Case because R. C. did strike a Juror at Westminster which passed against one of his Friends It was adjudged by all the Councel that his right hand should be cut off and his Lands and Goods forfeited to the King Green and Thorp were sent by the Judges to the Kings Councel to demand of them whether by the Stat. of 14 Edw. 3.16 a word may be amended in a Writ and it was answered that a word may be well amended although the Stat. speaks but of a Letter or Syllable In the Case of Sir Thomas Ogthred who brought a Formedon against a poor man and his Wife they came and yielded to the Demandant which seemed suspitious to the Court whereupon Judgment was staid and Thorp said that in the like Case of Giles Blacket it was spoken of in Parliament and we were commanded that when any like should come we should not go to Judgment without good Advice therefore the Judges Conclusion was Sues au counsell comment ils voilent que nous devomus faire nous volums faire autrement ment en cest case sue to the Councel and as they will have us to do we will do and otherwise not in this Case 39 Edw. 3. Thus we see the Judges themselves were guided by the Kings Councel and yet the Opinions of Judges have guided the Lords in Parliament in Point of Law All the Judges of the Realm Barons of Exchequer of the Quoif the Kings learned Councel and the Civilians Masters of Chancery are called Temporal Assistants by Sir Edw. Coke and though he deny them Voices in Parliament yet he confesseth that by their Writ they have power both to treat and to give Counsel I cannot find that the Lords have any other Power by their Writ the Words of the Lords Writ are That you be present with us the Prelates Great men and Peers to treat and give your Counsel The Words of the Judges Writ are That you be present with Vs and others of the Councel and sometimes with Vs only to treat and give your Counsel The Judges usually joined in Committees with the Lords in all Parliaments even in Queen Eliz. Reign until her 39th Year and then upon the 7th of November the Judges were appointed to attend the Lords And whereas the Judges have liberty in the upper House it self upon leave given them by the L. Keeper to cover themselves now at Committees they sit always uncovered The Power of Judges in Parliament is best understood if we consider how the judicial Power of Peers hath been exercised in matter of Judicature we may find it hath been the Practice that though the Lords in the Kings Absence give Judgment in Point of Law yet they are to be directed and regulated by the Kings Judges who are best able to give Direction in the difficult Points of the Law which ordinarily are unknown to the Lords And therefore if any Errour be committed in the Kings Bench which is the highest ordinary Court of Common Law in the Kingdom that Errour must be redressed in Parliament And the manner is saith the Lord Chancellor Egerton If a Writ of Errour be sued in Parl. upon a Judgment given by the Judges in the Kings Bench the Lords of the higher House alone without the Commons are to examine the Errours The Lords are to proceed according to the Law and for their Judgments therein they are to be informed by the Advice and Councel of the Judges who are to inform them what the Law is and to direct them in their Judgment for the Lords are not to follow their own Discretion or Opinion otherwise 28 Hen. 6. the Commons made Sute that W. de la Pool D. of Suffolk should be committed to Prison for many Treasons and other Crimes the Lords of the higher House were doubtful what Answer to give the Opinion of the Judges was demanded their Opinion was that he ought not to be committed for that the Commons did not charge him with any particular Offence but with general Reports and Slanders this Opinion was allowed 31 Hen. 6. A Parliament being prorogued in the Vacation the Speaker of the House of Commons was condemned in a thousand Pounds Damages in an Action of Trespass and committed to Prison in Execution for the same when the Parliament was re-assembled the Commons made Sute to the King and Lords to have their Speaker delivered The Lords demanded the Opinion of the Judges whether he might be delivered out of Prison by Privilege of Parliament upon the Judges Answer it was concluded that the Speaker should remain in Prison according to the Law notwithstanding the Privilege of Parliament and that he was Speaker which Resolution was declared to the Commons by Moyle the Kings Serjeant at Law and the Commons were commanded in the Kings name by the Bishop of Lincoln in the absence of the Arch-bishop of Canterbury then Chancellor to chuse another Speaker 7 Hen. 8. A Question was moved in Parliament Whether Spiritual Persons might be convented before Temporal Judges for Criminal Causes there Sir John Fineux and the other Judges delivered their Opinion that they might and ought to be and their Opinion allowed and maintained by the King and Lords and Dr. Standish who before had holden the same Opinion was delivered from the Bishops I find it affirmed that in Causes which receive Determination in the House of Lords the King hath no Vote at all no more than in other Courts of ministerial Jurisdiction True it is the King hath no Vote at all if we understand by Vote a Voice among others for he hath no partners with him in giving Judgement But if by no Vote is meant He hath no Power to judge we despoil him of his Sovereignty It is the chief Mark of Supremacy to judge in the highest Causes and last Appeals This the Children of Israel full well understood when they petitioned for a King
to judge them if the dernier resort be to the Lords alone then they have the Supremacy But as Moses by chusing Elders to judge in small Causes did not thereby lose his Authority to be Judge himself when he pleased even in the smallest Matters much less in the greatest which he reserved to himself so Kings by delegating others to judg under them do not hereby denude themselves of a Power to judge when they think good There is a Distinction of these times that Kings themselves may not judge but they may see and look to the Judges that they give Judgment according to Law and for this Purpose only as some say Kings may sometimes sit in the Courts of Justice But it is not possible for Kings to see the Laws executed except there be a Power in Kings both to judge when the Laws are duly executed and when not as also to compel the Judges if they do not their Duty Without such Power a King sitting in Courts is but a Mockery and a Scorn to the Judges And if this Power be allowed to Kings then their Judgments are supream in all Courts And indeed our Common Law to this purpose doth presume that the King hath all Laws within the Cabinet of His Breast in Scrinio pectoris saith Campton's Jurisdiction 108. When several of our Statutes leave many things to the Pleasure of the King for us to interpret all those Statutes of the Will and Pleasure of the Kings Justices only is to give an absolute Arbitrary Power to the Justices in those Cases wherein we deny it to the King The Statute of 5 Hen. 4. c. 2. makes a Difference between the King and the Kings Justices in these words Divers notorious Felons be indicted of divers Felonies Murders Rapes and as well before the Kings Justices as before the King himself arraigned of the same Felonies I read that in An. 1256. Hen. 3. sate in the Exchequer and there set down Order for the Appearance of Sheriffs and bringing in their Accounts there was five Marks set on every Sheriffs Head for a Fine because they had not distrained every Person that might dispend fifteen pounds Lands by the Year to receive the Order of Knighthood according as the same Sheriffs were commanded In Michaelmas Term 1462. Edw. 4. sate three days together in open Court in the Kings Bench. For this Point there needs no further Proofs because Mr. Pryn doth confess that Kings themselves have sate in Person in the Kings Bench and other Courts and there given Judgment p. 32. Treachery and Disloyalty c. Notwithstanding all that hath been said for the Legislative and Judicial Power of Kings Mr. Pryn is so far from yielding the King a Power to make Laws that he will not grant the King a Power to hinder a Law from being made that is he allows Him not a Negative Voice in most Cases which is due to every other even to the meanest Member of the House of Commons in his Judgment To prove the King hath not a Negative Voice his main and in Truth his only Argument insisted on is a Coronation-Oath which is said anciently some of our Kings of England have taken wherein they grant to defend and protect the just Laws and Customs which the Vulgar hath or shall chuse Justas Leges Consuetudines quas Vulgus elegerit hence Mr. Pryn concludes that the King cannot deny any Law which the Lords and Commons shall make Choice of for so he will have vulgus to signifie Though neither our King nor many of his Predecessors ever took this Oath nor were bound to take it for ought appears yet we may admit that our King hath taken it and answer we may be confident that neither the Bishops nor Privy Councel nor Parliament nor any other whosoever they were that framed or penn'd this Oath ever intended in this word Vulgus the Commons in Parliament much less the Lords they would never so much disparage the Members of Parliament as to disgrace them with a Title both base and false it had been enough if not too much to have called them Populus the People but Vulgus the Vulgar the rude multitude which hath the Epithet of Ignobile Vulgus is a word as dishonourable to the Composers of the Oath to give or for the King to use as for the Members of the Parliament to receive it being most false for the Peers cannot be Vulgus because they are the prime Persons of the Kingdom next the Knights of the Shires are or ought to be notable Knights or notable Esquires or Gentlemen born in the Counties as shall be able to be Knights then the Citizens and Burgesses are to be most sufficient none of these can be Vulgus even those Free-holders that chuse Knights are the best and ablest men of their Counties there being for every Free-holder above ten of the Common People to be found to be termed the Vulgar Therefore it rests that Vulgus must signifie the vulgar or common People and not the Lords and Commons But now the Doubt will be what the Common People or Vulgus out of Parliament have to do to chuse Laws The Answer is easie and ready there goeth before quas vulgus the Antecedent Consuetudines that is the Customs which the Vulgar hath or shall chuse Do but observe the Nature of Custom and it is the Vulgus or Common People only who chuse Customs Common Usage time out of mind creates a Custom and the commoner an Usage is the stronger and the better is the Custom no where can so common an Usage be found as among the Vulgar who are still the far greatest part of every Multitude if a Custom be common through the whole Kingdom it is all one with the Common Law in England which is said to be Common Custom Thus in plain terms to protect the Customs which the Vulgar chuse is to swear to protect the Common Laws of England But grant that Vulgus in the Oath signifies Lords and Commons and that Consuetudines doth not signifie Customs but Statutes as Mr. Pryn for a desperate Shift affirms and let elegerit be the Future or Preterperfect Tense even which Mr. Pryn please yet it cannot exclude the Kings Negative Voice for as Consuetudines goeth before quas vulgus so doth justas stand before leges consuetudines so that not all Laws but only all just Laws are meant If the sole Choice of the Lords and Commons did oblige the King to protect their Choice without Power of Denial what Need or why is the Word justas put in to raise a Scruple that some Laws may be unjust Mr. Pryn will not say that a Decree of a General Councel or of a Pope is infallible nor I think a Bill of the Lords and Commons is infallible just and impossible to erre if he do Sir Edward Coke will tell him that Parliaments have been utterly deceived and that in cases of greatest Moment even in case of High
men and yet we find no particular Point of Pride charged upon him but that he enjoyned the Romans to labour in cleansing and casting of Ditches and paving their Sinks an Act both for the Benefit and Ornament of the City and therefore commendable in the King But the Citizens of Rome who had been Conquerours of all Nations round about them could not endure of Warriers to become Quarriers and Day-labourers Whereas it is said that Tarquin was expelled for the Rape committed by his Son on Lucrece it is unjust to condemn the Father for the Crime of his Son it had been fit to have petitioned the Father for the Punishment of the Offender The Fact of young Tarquin cannot be excused yet without wrong to the Reputation of so chaste a Lady as Lucrece is reputed to be it may be said she had a greater Desire to be thought chaste than to be chaste she might have died untouched and unspotted in her Body if she had not been afraid to be slandered for Inchastity both Dionysius Halicarnasseus and Livie who both are her Friends so tell the Tale of her as if she had chosen rather to be a Whore than to be thought a Whore To say Truth we find no other Cause of the Expulsion of Tarquin than the Wantonness and Licentiousness of the People of Rome This is further to be considered in the Roman Government that all the time between their Kings and their Emperours there lasted a continued strife between the Nobility and Commons wherein by Degrees the Commons prevailed at last so to weaken the Authority of the Consuls and Senate that even the last sparks of Monarchy were in a manner extinguished and then instantly began the Civil War which lasted till the Regal Power was quickly brought home and setled in Monarchy So long as the Power of the Senate stood good for the Election of Consuls the Regal Power was preserved in them for the Senate had their first Institution from Monarchy It is worth the noting that in all those places that have seemed to be most popular that weak Degree of Government that hath been exercised among them hath been founded upon and been beholden unto Monarchical Principles both for the Power of assembling and manner of consulting for the entire and gross Body of any People is such an unweildy and diffused thing as is not capable of uniting or congregating or deliberating in an entire Lump but in broken Parts which at first were regulated by Monarchy Furthermore it is observable that Rome in her chief Popularity was oft beholden for her Preservation to the Monarchical Power of the Father over the Children by means of this Fatherly Power saith Bodin the Romans flourished in all Honour and Vertue and oftentimes was their Common-weal thereby delivered from most imminent Destruction when the Fathers drew out of the Consistory their Sons being Tribunes publishing Laws tending to Sedition Amongst others Cassius threw his Son headlong out of the Consistory publishing the Law Agraria for the Division of Lands in the Behoof of the People and after by his own private Judgment put him to Death the Magistrates Serjeants and People standing thereat astonied and not daring to withstand his Fatherly Authority although they would with all their Power have had that Law for Division of Lands which is sufficient Proof this Power of the Father not only to have been sacred and inviolable but also to have been lawful for him either by Right or Wrong to dispose of the Life and Death of his Children even contrary to the Will of the Magistrates and People It is generally believed that the Government of Rome after the Expulsion of Kings was popular Bodin endeavours to prove it but I am not satisfied with his Arguments and though it will be thought a Paradox yet I must maintain it was never truly popular First it is difficult to agree what a popular Government is Aristotle saith it is where Many or a Multitude do rule he doth not say where the People or the major part of the People or the Representors of the People govern Bodin affirms if all the People be interessed in the Government it is a Popular Estate Lib. 2. c. 1. but after in the same Chapter he resolves that it is a Popular Estate when all the People or the greater part thereof hath the Sovereignty and he puts the Case that if there be threescore thousand Citizens and forty thousand of them have the Sovereignty and twenty thousand be excluded it shall be called a popular Estate But I must tell him though fifty nine thousand nine hundred ninety nine of them govern yet it is no popular Estate for if but one man be excluded the same reason that excludes that one man may exclude many hundreds and many thousands yea and the major part it self if it be admitted that the People are or ever were free by Nature and not to be governed but by their own Consent it is most unjust to exclude any one man from his Right in Government and to suppose the People so unnatural as at the first to have all consented to give away their Right to a major part as if they had Liberty given them only to give away and not to use it themselves is not only improbable but impossible for the whole People is a thing so uncertain and changeable that it alters every moment so that it is necessary to ask of every Infant so soon as it is born its Consent to Government if you will ever have the Consent of the whole People Moreover if the Arbitrary Tryal by a Jury of Twelve men be a thing of that admirable Perfection and Justice as is commonly believed wherein the Negative Voice of every single Person is preserved so that the dissent of any of the Twelve frustrates the whole Judgment How much more ought the natural freedom of each man be preserved by allowing him his Negative Voice which is but a continuing him in that Estate wherein it is confessed Nature at first placed him Justice requires that no one Law should bind all except all consent to it there is nothing more violent and contrary to Nature than to allow a major part or any other greater part less than the whole to bind all the People The next difficulty to discovering what a Popular Estate is is to find out where the Supreme Power in the Roman Government rested it is Bodin's Opinion that in the Roman State the Government was in the Magistrates the Authority and Council in the Senate but the Sovereign Power and Majesty in the People Lib. 2. c. 1. So in his first Book his Doctrine is that the ancient Romans said Imperium in Magistratibus Authoritatem in Senatu Potestatem in plebe Majestatem in Populo jure esse dicebant These four words Command Authority Power and Majesty signifie ordinarily one and the same thing to wit the Sovereignty or supreme Power I cannot find that Bodin knows how to
could not continue Or doth it make the Act of our Fore-fathers in abrogating the natural Law of Community by introducing that of Propriety to be a sin of a high presumption The prime Duties of the Second Table are conversant about the Right of Propriety but if Propriety be brought in by a Humane Law as Grotius teacheth then the Moral Law depends upon the Will of man There could be no Law against Adultery or Theft if Women and all things were common Mr. Selden saith That the Law of Nature or of God nec vetuit nec jubebat sed permisit utrumque tam nempe rerum communionem quà m privatum Dominium And yet for Propriety which he terms primaeva rerum Dominia he teacheth That Adam received it from God à Numine acceperat And for Community he saith We meet with evident footsteps of the Community of things in that donation of God by which Noah and his three Sons are made Domini pro indiviso rerum omnium Thus he makes the private Dominion of Adam as well as the common Dominion of Noah and his Sons to be both by the Will of God Nor doth he shew how Noah or his Sons or their Posterity had any Authority to alter the Law of Community which was given them by God In distributing Territories Mr. Selden saith the consent as it were of Mankind passing their promise which should also bind their Posterity did intervene so that men departed from their common Right of Communion of those things which were so distributed to particular Lords or Masters This Distribution by Consent of Mankind we must take upon Credit for there is not the least proof offered for it out of Antiquity How the Consent of Mankind could bind Posterity when all things were common is a Point not so evident where Children take nothing by Gift or by Descent from their Parents but have an equal and common Interest with them there is no reason in such cases that the Acts of the Fathers should bind the Sons I find no cause why Mr. Selden should call Community a pristine Right since he makes it but to begin in Noah and to end in Noah's Children or Grand children at the most for he confesseth the Earth à Noachidis seculis aliquot post diluvium esse divisam That ancient Tradition which by Mr. Selden's acknowledgment hath obtained Reputation every where seems most reasonable in that he tells us That Noah himself as Lord of all was Author of the Distribution of the World and of private Dominion and that by the appointment of an Oracle from God he did confirm this Distribution by his last Will and Testament which at his Death he left in the hands of his eldest Son Sem and also warned all his Sons that none of them should invade any of their Brothers Dominions or injure one another because from thence Discord and Civil War would necessarily follow Many Conclusions in Grotius his Book de Jure Belli Pacis are built upon the foundation of these two Principles 1. The first is That Communis rerum usus naturalis fuit 2. The second is That Dominium quale nunc in usu est voluntas humana introduxit Upon these two Propositions of natural Community and voluntary Propriety depend divers dangerous and seditious Conclusions which are dispersed in several places In the fourth Chapter of the first Book the Title of which Chapter is Of the War of Subjects against Superiours Grotius handleth the Question Whether the Law of not resisting Superiours do bind us in most grievous and most certain danger And his Determination is That this Law of not resisting Superiours seems to depend upon the Will of those men who at first joyned themselves in a Civil Society from whom the Right of Government doth come to them that govern if those had been at first asked if their Will were to impose this burthen upon all that they should chuse rather to dye than in any case by Arms to repel the Force of Superiours I know not whether they would answer That it was their Will unless perhaps with this addition if Resistance cannot be made but with the great disturbance of the Common-wealth and destruction of many Innocents Here we have his Resolution that in great and certain danger men may resist their Governours if it may be without disturbance of the Common-wealth if you would know who should be Judge of the greatness and certainty of the Danger or how we may know it Grotius hath not one word of it so that for ought appears to the contrary his mind may be that every private man may be Judge of the Danger for other Judge he appoints none it had been a foul Fault in so desperate a piece of Service as the resisting of Superiours to have concealed the lawful Means by which we may judge of the Greatness or Certainty of publick Danger before we lift up our hands against Authority considering how prone most of us are to censure and mistake those things for great and certain Dangers which in truth many times are no dangers at all or at the most but very small ones and so flatter our selves that by resisting our Superiours we may do our Country laudable Service without Disturbance of the Common-wealth since the Effects of Sedition cannot be certainly judged of but by the Events only Grotius proceeds to answer an Objection against this Doctrine of resisting Superiours If saith he any man shall say that this rigid Doctrine of dying rather than resisting any Injuries of Superiours is no humane but a Divine Law It is to be noted that men at first not by any Precept of God but of their own Accord led by Experience of the Infirmities of separated Families against Violence did meet together in Civil Society from whence Civil Power took beginning which therefore St. Peter calls an humane Ordinance although elsewhere it be called a divine Ordinance because God approveth the wholesom Institutions of men God in approving a humane Law is to be thought to approve it as humane and in a humane manner And again in another place he goeth further and teacheth us That if the Question happen to be concerning the primitive Will of the People it will not be amiss for the People that now are and which are accounted the same with them that were long ago to express their meaning in this matter which is to be followed unless it certainly appear that the People long ago willed otherwise lib. 2. cap. 2. For fuller Explication of his Judgment about resisting Superiors he concludes thus The greater the thing is which is to be preserved the greater is the Equity which reacheth forth an Exception against the words of the Law yet I dare not saith Grotius without Difference condemn either simple men or a lesser part of the People who in the last Refuge of Necessity do so use this Equity as that in the mean time they do not forsake the Respect of the
quovis tempore revocabile id est precarium as the Vandals in Africa and the Goths in Spain would depose their Kings as oft as they displeased them horum enim actus irriti possunt reddi ab his qui potestatem revocabiliter dederunt ac proinde non idem est effectus nec jus idem Here he doth teach in plain words the Effect doth depend upon the Will of the People By this we may judge how improperly he useth the instance of a Woman that appoints her self a Husband whom she must always necessarily obey since the necessity of the continuance of the VVife's obedience depends upon the Law of God which hath made the Bond of Matrimony indissolvable Grotius will not say the like for the continuance of the Subjects obedience to the Prince neither will they say that VVomen may chuse Husbands as he tells us the People may chuse Kings by giving their Husbands as little power and for as little a time as they please Next it is objected That Tutors who are set over Pupils may be removed if they abuse their power Grotius answers In Tutore hoc procedit qui superiorem habet at in Imperiis quia progressus non datur in infinitum omnino in aliqua persona aut coetu consistendum est We must stay in some one Person or in a Multitude whose faults because they have no superiour Judge above them God hath witnessed that he will have a particular care of either to revenge them if he judge it needful or to tolerate them either for Punishment or Tryal of the People It is true in Kingdoms we cannot proceed in infinitum yet we may and must go to the highest which by Grotius his Rule is the People because they first made Kings so that there is no need to stay in aliqua persona but in coetu in the People so that by his Doctrine Kings may be punished by the People but the faults of the People must be left to the Judgment of God I have briefly presented here the desperate Inconveniences which attend upon the Doctrine of the natural freedom and community of all things these and many more Absurdities are easily removed if on the contrary we maintain the natural and private Dominion of Adam to be the fountain of all Government and Propriety And if we mark it well we shall find that Grotius doth in part grant as much The ground why those that now live do obey their Governours is the Will of their Forefathers who at the first ordained Princes and in obedience to that Will the Children continue in subjection this is according to the mind of Grotius so that the Question is not Whether Kings have a fatherly Power over their Subjects but how Kings came first by it Grotius will have it that our Forefathers being all free made an Assignment of their Power to Kings the other Opinion denies any such general freedom of our Forefathers but derives the Power of Kings from the Original Dominion of Adam This natural Dominion of Adam may be proved out of Grotius himself who teacheth That generatione jus acquiritur Parentibus in Liberos and that naturally no other can be found but the Parents to whom the Government should belong and the Right of Ruling and Compelling them doth belong to Parents And in another place he hath these words speaking of the fifth Commandment Parentum nomine qui naturales sunt Magistratus etiam alios Rectores par est intelligi quorum authoritas Societatem humanam continet and if Parents be natural Magistrates Children must needs be born natural Subjects But although Grotius acknowledge Parents to be natural Magistrates yet he will have it that Children when they come to full age and are separated from their Parents are free from natural Subjection For this he offers proof out of Aristotle and out of Scripture First for Aristotle we must note he doth not teach that every separation of Children of full age is an Obtaining of liberty as if that men when they come to years might voluntarily separate themselves and cast off their natural Obedience but Aristotle speaks only of a passive Separation for he doth not say that Children are subject to Parents until they do separate but he saith until they be separated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Verb of the Passive Voice That is until by Law they be separated for the Law which is nothing else but the Will of him that hath the Power of the Supreme Father doth in many cases for the publick Benefit of Society free Children from subjection to the subordinate Parent so that the natural Subjection by such Emancipation of Children is not extinguished but only assumed and regulated by the Parent paramount Secondly Grotius cites Numb 30. to prove that the power of the Fathers over the Sons and Daughters to dissolve their Vows was not perpetual but during the time only whilst the Children were part of the Fathers Family But if we turn to the Chapter we may find that Grotius either deceives himself or us for there is not one word in that Chapter concerning the Vows of Sons but of Daughters only being in their Father's Family and the being of the Daughter in the Father's House meaneth only the Daughter 's being a Virgin and not married which may be gathered by the Argument of the whole Chapter which taketh particular order for the Vows of VVomen of all estates First for Virgins in the third Verse Secondly for VVives in general in the sixth Verse Thirdly for VVidows and VVomen divorced in the ninth Verse There is no Law for Virgins out of their Father's Houses we may not think they would have been omitted if they had been free from their Fathers we find no freedom in the Text for VVomen till after Marriage And if they were married though they were in their Father's Houses yet the Fathers had no power of their Vows but their Husbands If by the Law of Nature departure from the Father's House had emancipated Children why doth the Civil Law contrary to the Law of Nature give power and remedy to Fathers for to recover by Action of Law their Children that depart or are taken away from them without their consent Without the consent of Parents the Civil Law allows no emancipation Concerning Subjection of Children to Parents Grotius distinguisheth three several times The first is the time of Imperfect Judgment The second is the time of Perfect Judgment but whilst the Son remains part of the Father's Family The third is the time after he hath departed out of his Father's Family In the first time he saith All the actions of Children are under the dominion of the Parents During the second time when they are of the age of mature Judgment they are under their Father's command in those actions only which are of moment for their Parents Family In other actions the Children have a power or moral faculty of doing but they are bound in those
doth lawfully exercise it must receive it from a supream power on earth and practise it with such limitations as that superior power shall appoint To return to our Author He divides Monarchy into Absolute Limited Absolute Monarchy saith he is when the Sovereignty is so fully in one that it hath no limits or bounds under God but his own will This definition of his I embrace And as before I charged our Author for not giving us a definition of Monarchy in general so I now note him for not affording us any definition of any other particular kind of Monarchy but only of absolute it may peradventure make some doubt that there is no other sort but only that which he calls absolute Concerning absolute Monarchy he grants that such were the ancient Eastern Monarchies and that of the Turk and Persian at this day Herein he saith very true And we must remember him though he do not mention them that the Monarchs of Judah and Israel must be comprehended under the number of those he calls the Eastern Monarchies and truly if he had said that all the ancient Monarchies of the World had been absolute I should not have quarrel'd at him nor do I know who could have disproved him Next it follows that Absolute Monarchy is when a people are absolutely resigned up or resign up themselves to be governed by the will of One man Where men put themselves into this utmost degree of subjection by oath and contract or are born and brought unto it by Gods providence In both these places he acknowledgeth there may be other means of obtaining a Monarchy besides the contract of a Nation or peoples resigning up themselves to be governed which is contrary to what he after says that the sole mean or root of all Sovereignty is the consent and fundamental contract of a Nation of men Moreover the Author determines that Absolute Monarchy is a lawful Government and that men may be born and brought unto it by Gods providence it binds them and they must abide it because an Oath to a lawful thing is obligatory This Position of his I approve but his Reason doth not satisfie for men are bound to obey a lawful Governour though neither they nor their Ancestors ever took oath Then he proceeds and confesseth that in Rom. 13. the power which then was was Absolute yet the Apostle not excluding it calls it Gods ordinance and commands Subjection to it So Christ commands Tribute to be paid and pays it himself yet it was an arbitrary tax the production of an absolute power These are the loyal expressions of our Author touching absolute or arbitrary Monarchy I do the rather mention these passages of our Author because very many in these days do not stick to maintain that an arbitrary or Absolute Monarch not limited by Law is all one with a Tyrant and to be governed by one man's will is to be made a slave It is a question whether our Author be not of that mind when he saith absolute subjection is servitude and thereupon a late friend to limited Monarchy affirms in a discourse upon the question in debate between the King and Parliament That to make a King by the standard of Gods word is to make the Subjects slaves for conscience sake A hard saying and I doubt whether he that gives this censure can be excused from blasphemy It is a bold speech to condemn all the Kings of Judah for Tyrants or to say all their Subjects were slaves But certainly the man doth not know either what a Tyrant is or what a Slave is indeed the words are frequent enough in every mans mouth and our old English Translation of the Bible useth sometimes the word Tyrant but the Authors of our new Translation have been so careful as not once to use the word but only for the proper name of a man Act. 19.9 because they find no Hebrew word in the Scripture to signifie a Tyrant or a Slave Neither Aristotle Bodin nor Sir Walter Raleigh who were all men of deep judgment can agree in a definition or description of Tyranny though they have all three laboured in the point And I make some question whether any man can possibly describe what a Tyrant is and then tell me any one man that ever was in the World that was a Tyrant according to that description I return again to our Treatise of Monarchy where I find three DEGREES of absolute Monarchy 1. Where the Monarch whose will is the Law doth set himself no Law to rule by but by commands of his own judgment as he thinks fit 2. When he sets a Law by which he will ordinarily govern reserving to himself a liberty to vary from it as oft as in his discretion he thinks FIT and in this the Soveraign is as free as the former 3. Where he not only sets a rule but promiseth in many cases not to alter it but this promise or engagement is an after-condescent or act of grace not dissolving the absolute Oath of Subjection which went before it For the first of these three there is no question but it is a pure absolute Monarchy but as for the other two though he say they be absolute yet in regard they set themselves limits or Laws to govern by if it please our Author to term them limited Monarchs I will not oppose him yet I must tell him that his third degree of absolute Monarchy is such a kind as I believe never hath been nor ever can be in the world For a Monarch to promise and engage in many cases not to alter a Law it is most necessary that those many cases should be particularly expressed at the bargain-making Now he that understands the nature and condition of all humane Laws knows that particular cases are infinite and not comprehensible within any rules or Laws and if many cases should be comprehended and many omitted yet even those that were comprehended would admit of variety of interpretations and disputations therefore our Author doth not nor can tell us of any such reserved cases promised by any Monarch Again where he saith An after-condescent or Act of grace doth not dissolve the absolute Oath of subjection which went before it though in this he speak true yet still he seems to insinuate that an Oath only binds to subjection which Oath as he would have us believe was at first arbitrary whereas Subjects are bound to obey Monarchs though they never take oath of subjection as well as children are bound to obey their Parents though they never swear to do it Next his distinction between the rule of power and the exercise of it is vain for to rule is to exercise power for himself saith that Government is potestatis exercitium the exercise of a moral power Lastly whereas our Author saith a Monarch cannot break his promise without sin let me add that if the safety of the people salus populi require a breach of
the Monarchs promise then the sin if there be any is rather in the making than breaking of the promise the safety of the People is an exception implied in every Monarchical promise But it seems these three degrees of Monarchy do not satisfie our Author he is not content to have a Monarch have a Law or rule to govern by but he must have this limitation or Law to be ab externo from some body else and not from the determination of the Monarchs own will and therefore he saith By original constitution the Society publick confers on one man a power by limited contract resigning themselves to be governed by such a Law also before he told us the sole means of Soveraignty is the consent and fundamental contract which consent puts them in their power which can be no more nor other than is conveyed to them by such contract of subjection If the sole means of a limited Monarchy be the consent and fundamental contract of a Nation how is it that he saith A Monarch may be limited by after-condescent is an after-condescent all one with a fundamental contract with original and radical constitution why yea he tells us it is a secondary original constitution a secondary original that is a second first And if that condescent be an act of grace doth not this condescent to a limitation come from the free determination of the Monarchs will If he either formally or virtually as our Author supposeth desert his absolute or arbitrary power which he hath by conquest or other right And if it be from the free will of the Monarch why doth he say the limitation must be ab externo He told us before that Subjection cannot be dissolved or lessen'd by an Act of grace coming afterwards but he hath better bethought himself and now he will have Acts of grace to be of two kinds and the latter kind may amount as he saith to a resignation of absolute Monarchy But can any man believe that a Monarch who by conquest or other right hath an absolute arbitrary power will voluntarily resign that absoluteness and accept so much power only as the People shall please to give him and such Laws to govern by as they shall make choice of can he shew that ever any Monarch was so gracious or kind-hearted as to lay down his lawful power freely at his Subjects feet Is it not sufficient grace if such an absolute Monarch be content to set down a Law to himself by which he will ordinarily govern but he must needs relinquish his old independent commission and take a new one from his Subjects clog'd with limitations Finally I observe that howsoever our Author speak big of the radical fundamental and original power of the People as the root of all Soveraignty yet in a better mood he will take up and be contented with a Monarchy limited by an after-condescent and act of grace from the Monarch himself Thus I have briefly touched his grounds of Limited Monarchy if now we shall ask what proof or examples he hath to justifie his Doctrine he is as mute as a fish only Pythagoras hath said it and we must believe him for though our Author would have Monarchy to be limited yet he could be content his opinion should be absolute and not limited to any rule or example The main Charge I have against our Author now remains to be discussed and it is this That instead of a Treatise of Monarchy he hath brought forth a Treatise of Anarchy and that by his own confessions shall be made good First he holds A limited Monarch transcends his bounds if he commands beyond the Law and the Subject legally is not bound to subjection in such cases Now if you ask the Author who shall be Judge whether the Monarch transcend his bounds and of the excesses of the Soveraign Power His answer is There is an impossibility of constituting a Judge to determine this last Controversie I conceive in a limited legal Monarchy there can be no stated internal Judge of the Monarchs actions if there grow a fundamental variance between him and the Community There can be no Judge legal and constituted within that form of Government In these answers it appears there is no Judge to determine the Soveraigns or the Monarchs transgressing his fundamental limits yet our Author is very cautelous and supposeth only a fundamental variance betwixt the Monarch and the Community he is ashamed to put the question home I demand of him if there be a variance betwixt the Monarch and any of the meanest persons of the Community who shall be the Judge For instance The King commands me or gives judgment against me I reply His commands are illegal and his judgment not according to Law Who must judge If the Monarch himself judge then you destroy the frame of the State and make it absolute saith our Author and he gives his reason for to confine a Monarch to a Law and then to make him judge of his own deviaions from that Law is to absolve him from all Law On the other side if any or all the people may judge then you put the Soveraignty in the whole body or part of it and destroy the being of Monarchy Thus our Author hath caught himself in a plain Dilemma If the King be Judge then he is no limited Monarch If the People be Judge then he is no Monarch at all So farewel limited Monarchy nay farewel all Government if there be no Judge Would you know what help our Author hath found out for this mischief First he saith That a Subject is bound to yield to a Magistrate when he cannot de jure challenge obedience if it be in a thing in which he can possibly without subversion and in which his act may not be made a leading case and so bring on a prescription against publick liberty Again he saith If the act in which the exorbitance or transgression of the Monarch is supposed to be be of lesser moment and not striking at the very being of that Government it ought to be born by publick patience rather than to endanger the being of the State The like words he uses in another place saying If the will of the Monarch exceed the limits of the Law it ought to be submitted to so it be not contrary to God's Law nor bring with it such an evil to our selves or the publick that we cannot be accessory to it by obeying These are but fig-leaves to cover the nakedness of our Authors limited Monarch formed upon weak supposals in cases of lesser moment For if the Monarch be to govern only according to Law no transgression of his can be of so small moment if he break the bounds of Law but it is a subversion of the Government it self and may be made a leading case and so bring on a prescription against publick liberty it strikes at the very being of the Government and brings with
it such an evil as the party that suffers or the publick cannot be accessory to let the case be never so small yet if there be illegality in the act it strikes at the very being of limited Monarchy which is to be legal unless our Author will say as in effect he doth That his limited Monarch must govern according to Law in great and publick matters only and that in smaller matters which concern private men or poor persons he may rule according to his own will Secondly our Author tells us If the Monarchs act of exorbitancy or transgression be mortal and such as suffered dissolves the frame of Government and publick liberty then the illegality is to be set open and redresment sought by petition which if failing prevention by resistance ought to be and if it be apparent and appeal be made to the consciences of mankind then the fundamental Laws of that Monarchy must judge and pronounce the sentence in every mans conscience and every man so far as concerns him must follow the evidence of Truth in his own soul to oppose or not to oppose according as he can in conscience acquit or condemn the act of the Governour or Monarch Whereas my Author requires that the destructive nature of illegal commands shall be set open Surely his mind is That each private man in his particular case should make a publick remonstrance to the World of the illegal act of the Monarch and then if upon his Petition he cannot be relieved according to his desire he ought or it is his duty to make resistance Here I would know who can be the Judge whether the illegality be made apparent It is a main point since every man is prone to flatter himself in his own cause and to think it good and that the wrong or injustice he suffers is apparent when other moderate and indifferent men can discover no such thing and in this case the judgment of the common people cannot be gathered or known by any possible means or if it could it were like to be various and erroneous Yet our Author will have an Appeal made to the Conscience of all Mankind and that being made he concludes The Fundamental Laws must judge and pronounce Sentence in every mans Conscience Whereas he saith The Fundamental Laws must judge I would very gladly learn of him or of any other for him what a Fundamental Law is or else have but any one Law named me that any man can say is a Fundamental Law of the Monarchy I confess he tells us That the Common Laws are the foundation and the Statute Laws are superstructive yet I think he dares not say that there is any one branch or part of the Common Law but that it may be taken away by an Act of Parliament for many points of the Common Law de facto have and de jure any point may be taken away How can that be called Fundamental which hath and may be removed and yet the Statute-Laws stand firm and stable It is contrary to the nature of Fundamental for the building to stand when the foundation is taken away Besides the Common Law is generally acknowledged to be nothing else but common usage or custom which by length of time only obtains authority So that it follows in time after Government but cannot go before it and be the rule to Government by any original or radical Constitution Also the Common Law being unwritten doubtful and difficult cannot but be an uncertain rule to govern by which is against the nature of a Rule which is and ought to be certain Lastly by making the Common Law only to be the foundation Magna Charta is excluded from being a Fundamental Law and also all other Statutes from being limitations to Monarchy since the Fundamental Laws only are to be Judge Truly the Conscience of all mankind is a pretty large Tribunal for the Fundamental Laws to pronounce Sentence in It is very much that Laws which in their own nature are dumb and always need a Judge to pronounce Sentence should now be able to speak and pronounce Sentence themselves Such a Sentence surely must be upon the hearing of one party only for it is impossible for a Monarch to make his defence and answer and produce his Witnesses in every mans conscience in each mans Cause who will but question the legality of the Monarchs Government Certainly the sentence cannot but be unjust where but one mans tale is heard For all this the conclusion is Every man must oppose or not oppose the Monarch according to his own conscience Thus at the last every man is brought by this Doctrine of our Authors to be his own Judge And I also appeal to the consciences of all mankind whether the end of this be not utter confusion and Anarchy Yet after all this the Author saith This power of every mans judging the illegal acts of the Monarch argues not a Superiority of those who judge over him who is judged and he gives a profound reason for it his words are It is not authoritative and civil but moral residing in reasonable creatures and lawful for them to execute What our Author means by these words not authoritative and civil but moral perhaps I understand not though I think I do yet it serves my turn that he saith That resistance ought to be made and every man must oppose or not oppose according as in conscience he can acquit or condemn the acts of his Governour for if it enable a man to resist and oppose his Governour without question 't is authoritative and civil Whereas he adds That moral judgment is residing in reasonable creatures and lawful for them to execute he seems to imply that authoritative and civil Judgment doth not reside in reasonable creatures nor can be lawfully executed Such a Conclusion fits well with Anarchy for he that takes away all Government and leaves every man to his own conscience and so makes him an independent in State may well teach that authority resides not in reasonable creatures nor can be lawfully executed I pass from his absolute and limited Monarchy to his division or partition for he allows no division of Monarchy into simple and mixed viz. of a Monarch the Nobility and Community Where first observe a doubt of our Authors Whether a firm union can be in a mixture of equality he rather thinks there must be a priority of order in one of the three or else there can be no unity He must know that priority of order doth not hinder but that there may be an equality of mixture if the shares be equal for he that hath the first share may have no more than the others so that if he will have an inequality of mixture a primity of share will not serve the turn the first share must be greater or better than the others or else they will be equal and then he cannot call it a mixed Monarchy where only
Government as the former rule doth from limitation by Laws Thus in brief I have traced Aristotle in his crabbed and broken passages touching diversities of Kings where he first finds but four sorts and then he stumbles upon a fifth and in the next Chapter contents himself only with two sorts of Kings but in the Chapter following concludes with one which is the true perfect Monarch who rules all by his own will in all this we find nothing for a regulated or mixed Monarchy but against it Moreover whereas the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy affirms it as a prime Principle That all Monarchies except that of the Jews depend upon humane designment when the consent of a Society of men and a fundamental Contract of a Nation by original or radical Constitution confers Power he must know that Aristotle searching into the Original of Government shews himself in this point a better Divine than our Author and as if he had studied the Book of Genesis teacheth That Monarchies fetch their Pedigree from the Right of Fathers and not from the Gift or Contract of People his words may thus be Englished At the first Cities were governed by Kings and so even to this day are Nations also for such as were under Kingly Government did come together for every House is governed by a King who is the eldest and so also Colonies are governed for kindred sake And immediately before he tells us That the first Society made of many Houses is a Village which naturally seems to be a Colony of a House which some call Foster-brethren or Children and Childrens Children So in conclusion we have gained Aristotle's judgment in three main and essential points 1. A King according to Law makes no kind of Government 2. A King must rule according to his own will 3. The Original of Kings is from the right of Fatherhood What Aristotle's judgment was two thousand years since is agreeable to the Doctrine of the great modern Politician Bodin Hear him touching limited Monarchy Vnto Majesty or Soveraignty saith he belongeth an absolute power not subject to any Law Chief power given unto a Prince with condition is not properly Soveraignty or power absolute except such conditions annexed to the Soveraignty be directly comprehended within the Laws of God and Nature Albeit by the sufferance of the King of England controversies between the King and his People are sometimes determined by the high Court of Parliament and sometimes by the Lord Chief Justice of England yet all the Estates remain in full subjection to the King who is no ways bound to follow their advice neither to consent to their requests It is certain that the Laws Priviledges and Grants of Princes have no force but during their life if they be not ratified by the express consent or by sufferance of the Prince following especially Privileges Much less should a Prince be bound unto the Laws he maketh himself for a man may well receive a Law from another man but impossible it is in nature for to give a Law unto himself no more than it is to command a mans self in a matter depending of his own will The Law saith Nulla obligatio consistere potest quae à voluntate promittentis statum capit The Soveraign Prince may derogate unto the Laws that he hath promised and sworn to keep if the equity thereof be ceased and that of himself without the consent of his Subjects The Majesty of a true Soveraign Prince is to be known when the Estates of all the People assembled in all humility present their requests and supplications to their Prince without having power in any thing to command determine or give voice but that that which it pleaseth the King to like or dislike to command or bid is holden for Law wherein they which have written of the duty of Magistrates have deceived themselves in maintaining that the power of the People is greater than the Prince a thing which causeth oft true Subjects to revolt from their obedience to their Prince and ministreth matter of great troubles in Commonwealths of which their opinion there is neither reason nor ground for if the King be subject unto the assemblies and Decrees of the people he should neither be King nor Soveraign and the Commonwealth neither Realm nor Monarchy but a meer Aristocracy So we see the principal point of Soveraign Majesty and absolute power to consist principally in giving Laws unto the Subjects in general without their consent Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. To confound the state of Monarchy with the Popular or Aristocratical estate is a thing impossible and in effect incompatible and such as cannot be imagined for Soveraignty being of it self indivisible how can it at one and the same time be divided betwixt one Prince the Nobility and the people in common The first mark of Soveraign Majesty is to be of power to give Laws and to command over them unto the Subjects and who should those Subjects be that should yield their obedience to the Law if they should have also power to make the Laws who should he be that could give the Law being himself constrained to receive it of them unto whom himself gave it so that of necessity we must conclude That as no one in particular hath the power to make the Law in such a State that then the State must needs be a State popular Never any Commonwealth hath been made of an Aristocracy and popular Estate much less of the three Estates of a Commonweal Such states wherein the rights of Soveraignty are divided are not rightly to be called Commonweals but rather the corruption of Commonweals as Herodotus has most briefly but truly written Commonweals which change their state the Sovereign right power of them being divided find no rest from Civil wars and broils till they again recover some one of the three Forms and the Soveraignty be wholly in one of the states or other Where the rights of the Soveraignty are divided betwixt the Prince his Subjects in that confusion of state there is still endless stirs and quarrels for the superiority until that some one some few or all together have got the Soveraignty Id. lib. 2. c. 1. This Judgment of Bodin's touching Limited and Mixed Monarchy is not according to the mind of our Author nor yet of the Observator who useth the strength of his Wit to overthrow Absolute and Arbitrary Government in this Kingdom and yet in the main body of his discourse le ts fall such Truths from his Pen as give a deadly wound to the Cause he pleads for if they be indifferently weighed and considered I will not pick a line or two here and there to wrest against him but will present a whole Page of his Book or more together that so we may have an entire prospect upon the Observators mind Without Society saith the Observator men could not live without Laws men could not be sociable and without Authority
will and this they are forced to do to avoid discord for by reason of their great power they are subject to great dissentions not only among themselves but between them and the order of Knights which are the Earthly Messengers yea the Provinces are at discord one with another and as for Religion the diversity of Sects in Poland breed perpetual jars and hatred among the People there being as many Sects as in Amsterdam it self or any popular government can desire The danger of sedition is the cause that though the Crown depends on the election of the Nobility yet they have never rejected the Kings successour or transferred the Realm to any other family but once when deposing Ladislaus for his idleness whom yet afterward they restored they elected Wenceslaus King of Bohemia But if the Nobility do agree to hold their King to his conditions which is not to conclude any thing but by the advice of his Council of Nobles nor to choose any Wife without their leaves then it must be said to be a Commonweal not a Royalty and the King but only the mouth of the Kingdom or as Queen Christina complained that Her Husband was but the shadow of a Soveraign Next if it be considered how the Nobility of Poland came to this great power it was not by any original contract or popular convention for it is said they have neither Law Rule nor Form written or unwritten for the election of their King they may thank the Bishops and Clergy for by their holy admonitions and advice good and Religious Princes to shew their piety were first brought to give much of their Rights and Priviledges to their Subjects devout Kings were meerly cheated of some of their Royalties What power soever general Assemblies of the Estates claim or exercise over and above the bare naked act of Counselling they were first beholding to the Popish Clergy for it it is they first brought Parliaments into request and power I cannot find in any Kingdom but only where Popery hath been that Parliaments have been of reputation and in the greatest times of Superstition they are first mentioned As for the Kingdom of Denmark I read that the Senators who are all chosen out of the Nobility and seldom exceed the number of 28 with the chief of the Realm do chuse their King They have always in a manner set the Kings eldest Son upon the Royal Throne The Nobility of Denmark withstood the Coronation of Frederick 1559 till he sware not to put any Noble-man to death until he were judged of the Senate and that all Noble-men should have power of Life and Death over their Subjects without appeal and the King to give no Office without consent of the Council There is a Chancellour of the Realm before whom they do appeal from all the Provinces and Islands and from him to the King himself I hear of nothing in this Kingdom that tends to Popularity no Assembly of the Commons no elections or representation of them Sweden is governed by a King heretofore elective but now made hereditary in Gustavus time it is divided into Provinces an appeal lieth from the Vicount of every territory to a Soveraign Judge called a Lamen from the Lamens to the Kings Council and from this Council to the King himself Now let the Observator bethink himself whether all or any of these three Countries have found out any art at all whereby the People or community may assume its own Power if neither of these Kingdoms have most Countries have not nay none have The People or Community in these three Realms are as absolute Vassals as any in the World the regulating power if any be is in the Nobility Nor is it such in the Nobility as it makes shew for The Election of Kings is rather a Formality than any real power for they dare hardly chuse any but the Heir or one of the blood Royal if they should chuse one among the Nobility it would prove very factious if a stranger odious neither safe For the Government though the Kings be sworn to raign according to the Laws and are not to do any thing without the consent of their Council in publick affairs yet in regard they have power both to advance and reward whom they please the Nobility and Senators do comply with their Kings And Boterus concludes of the Kings of Poland who seem to be most moderated that such as is their valour dexterity and wisdom such is their Power Authority and Government Also Bodin saith that these three Kingdoms are States changeable and uncertain as the Nobility is stronger than the Prince or the Prince than the Nobility and the People are so far from liberty that he saith Divers particular Lords exact not only Customs but Tributes also which are confirmed and grow stronger both by long prescription of time and use of Judgments THE END THE POWER OF KINGS And in Particular OF THE KING OF ENGLAND THE POWER OF KINGS And in Particular Of the KING of ENGLAND TO Majestie or Soveraignty belongeth an Absolute Power not subject to any Law It behoveth him that is a Soveraign not to be in any sort Subject to the Command of Another whose Office is to give Laws unto his Subjects to Abrogate Laws unprofitable and in their stead to Establish other which he cannot do that is himself Subject to Laws or to Others which have Command over him And this is that which the Law saith that The Prince is acquitted from the Power of the Laws The Laws Ordinances Letters-Patents Priviledges and Grants of Princes have no force but during their Life if they be not ratified by the express Consent or at least by Sufferance of the Prince following who had knowledge thereof If the Soveraign Prince be exempted from the Laws of his Predecessors much less shall he be bound unto the Laws he maketh Himself for a man may well receive a Law from Another man but impossible it is in Nature for to give a Law unto Himself no more than it is to Command a man's self in a matter depending of his Own Will There can be no Obligation which taketh State from the meer Will of him that promiseth the same which is a necessary Reason to prove evidently that a King cannot bind his Own Hands albeit that he would We see also in the end of all Laws these words Because it hath so Pleased us to give us to understand that the Laws of a Sovereign Prince although they be grounded upon Reason yet depend upon nothing but his meer and frank good Will But as for the Laws of God all Princes and People are unto them subject neither is it in their power to impugne them if they will not be guilty of High Treason against God under the greatness of whom all Monarchs of the world ought to bow their Heads in all fear and reverence A Question may be Whether a Prince be subject to the Laws of his Countrey that he hath
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies a House Nor doth Aristotle confine a Family to One House but esteems it to be made of those that daily converse together whereas before him Charondas called a Family Homosypioi those that feed together out of one common Pannier And Epimenides the Cretian terms a Family Homocapnoi those that sit by a Common Fire or Smoak But let Suarez understand what he please by Adam's Family if he will but confess as he needs must that Adam and the Patriarchs had Absolute power of Life and Death of Peace and War and the like within their Houses or Families he must give us leave at least to call them Kings of their Houses or Families and if they be so by the Law of Nature what Liberty will be left to their Children to dispose of Aristotle gives the Lie to Plato and those that say Political and Oeconomical Societies are all one and do not differ Specie but only Multitudine Paucitate as if there were no difference betwixt a Great House and a Little City All the Argument I find he brings against them is this The Community of Man and Wife differs from the Community of Master and Servant because they have several Ends. The Intention of Nature by Conjunction of Male and Female is Generation but the Scope of Master and Servant is Preservation so that a Wife and a Servant are by Nature distinguished because Nature does not work like the Cutlers of Delphos for she makes but one thing for one Use If we allow this Argument to be sound nothing doth follow but only this That Conjugal and Despotical Communities do differ But it is no consequence That therefore Oeconomical and Political Societies do the like for though it prove a Family to consist of two distinct Communities yet it follows not that a Family and a Commonwealth are distinct because as well in the Commonweal as in the Families both these Communities are found And as this Argument comes not home to our Point so it is not able to prove that Title which it shews for for if it should be granted which yet is false that Generation and Preservation differ about the Individuum yet they agree in the General and serve both for the Conservation of Mankind Even as several Servants differ in the particular Ends or Offices as one to Brew and another to Bake yet they agree in the general Preservation of the Family Besides Aristotle confesses that amongst the Barbarians as he calls all them that are not Grecians a Wife and a Servant are the same because by Nature no Barbarian is fit to Govern It is fit the Grecians should rule over the Barbarians for by Nature a Servant and a Barbarian is all one their Family consists only of an Ox for a Man-Servant and a Wife for a Maid so they are fit only to rule their Wives and their Beasts Lastly Aristotle if it had pleased him might have remembred That Nature doth not always make one Thing but for one Use he knows the Tongue serves both to Speak and to Taste 4. But to leave Aristotle and return to Suarez he saith that Adam had Fatherly Power over his Sons whilst they were not made Free Here I could wish that the Jesuite had taught us how and when Sons become Free I know no means by the Law of Nature It is the Favour I think of the Parents only who when their Children are of Age and Discretion to ease their Parents of part of their Fatherly Care are then content to remit some part of their Fatherly authority therefore the Custom of some Countreys doth in some Cases Enfranchise the Children of suferiour Parents but many Nations have no such Custome but on the contrary have strict Laws for the Obedience of Children the Judicial Law of Moses giveth full power to the Father to stone his disobedient Son so it be done in presence of a Magistrate And yet it did not belong to the Magistrate to enquire and examine the justness of the Cause But it was so decreed lest the Father should in his Anger suddenly or secretly kill his Son Also by the Laws of the Persians and of the People of the Upper Asia and of the Gaules and by the Laws of the West-Indies the Parents have power of Life and Death over their Children The Romans even in their most Popular Estate had this Law in force and this Power of Parents was ratified and amplified by the Laws of the Twelve Tables to the enabling of Parents to sell their Children two or three times over By the help of the Fatherly Power Rome long flourished and oftentimes was freed from great Dangers The Fathers have drawn out of the very Assemblies their own Sons when being Tribunes they have published Laws tending to Sedition Memorable is the Example of Cassius who threw his Son headlong out of the Consistory publishing the Law Agraria for the Division of Lands in the behoof of the People and afterwards by his own private Judgment put him to Death by throwing him down from the Tarpeian Rock the Magistrates and People standing thereat amazed and not daring to resist his Fatherly Authority although they would with all their Hearts have had that Law for the Division of Land by which it appears it was lawful for the Father to dispose of the Life of his Child contrary to the Will of the Magistrates or People The Romans also had a Law that what the Children got was not their own but their Fathers although Solon made a Law which acquitted the Son from Nourishing of his Father if his Father had taught him no Trade whereby to get his Living Suarez proceeds and tells us That in Process of Time Adam had compleat Oeconomical Power I know not what this compleat Oeconomical Power is nor how or what it doth really and essentially differ from Political If Adam did or might exercise the same Jurisdiction which a King doth now in a Commonwealth then the Kinds of Power are not distinct and though they may receive an Accidental Difference by the Amplitude or Extent of the Bounds of the One beyond the Other yet since the like Difference is also found in Political Estates It follows that Oeconomical and Political Power differ no otherwise than a Little Commonweal differs from a Great One. Next saith Suarez Community did not begin at the Creation of Adam It is true because he had no body to Communicate with yet Community did presently follow his Creation and that by his Will alone for it was in his power only who was Lord of All to appoint what his Sons should have in Proper and what in Common so that Propriety and Community of Goods did follow Originally from him and it is the Duty of a Father to provide as well for the Common Good of his Children as the Particular Lastly Suarez Concludes That by the Law of Nature alone it is not due unto any Progenitor to be also King
by any Rules of Reason or of State Examine his Actions without a distempered Judgment and you will not Condemn him to be exceeding either Insufficient or Evil weigh the Imputations that were objected against him and you shall find nothing either of any Truth or of great moment Hollingshed writeth That he was most Unthankfully used by his Subjects for although through the frailty of his Youth he demeaned himself more dissolutely than was agreeable to the Royalty of his Estate yet in no Kings Days were the Commons in greater Wealth the Nobility more honoured and the Clergy less wronged who notwithstanding in the Evil-guided Strength of their will took head against him to their own headlong destruction afterwards partly during the Reign of Henry his next Successor whose greatest Atchievements were against his own People in Executing those who Conspired with him against King Richard But more especially in succeeding times when upon occasion of this Disorder more English Blood was spent than was in all the Foreign Wars together which have been since the Conquest Twice hath this Kingdom been miserably wasted with Civil War but neither of them occasioned by the Tyranny of any Prince The Cause of the Barons Wars is by good Historians attributed to the stubbornness of the Nobility as the Bloody variance of the Houses of York and Lancaster and the late Rebellion sprung from the Wantonness of the People These three Unnatural Wars have dishonoured our Nation amongst Strangers so that in the Censures of Kingdoms the King of Spain is said to be the King of Men because of his Subjects willing Obedience the King of France King of Asses because of their infinite Taxes and Impositions but the King of England is said to be the King of Devils because of his Subjects often Insurrections against and Depositions of their Princes CHAP. III. Positive Laws do not infringe the Natural and Fatherly Power of Kings 1. REgal Authority not subject to the Positive Laws Kings before Laws the King of Judah and Israel not tyed to Laws 2. Of Samuel's description of a King 1 Sam. 8. 3. The Power ascribed unto Kings in the New Testament 4. Whether Laws were invented to bridle Tyrants 5. The Benefit of Laws 6. Kings keep the Laws though not bound by the Laws 7. Of the Oaths of Kings 8. Of the Benefit of the King's Prerogative over Laws 9. the King the Author the Interpreter and Corrector of the Common Laws 10. The King Judge in all Causes both before the Conquest and since 11. The King and his Council have anciently determined Causes in the Star-Chamber 12. Of Parliaments 13. When the People were first called to Parliament 14. The Liberty of Parliaments not from Nature but from Grace of the Princes 15. The King alone makes Laws in Parliament 16. Governs both Houses as Head by himself 17. By his Council 18. By his Judges 1. HItherto I have endeavoured to shew the Natural Institution of Regal Authority and to free it from Subjection to an Arbitrary Election of the People It is necessary also to enquire whether Humane Laws have a Superiority over Princes because those that maintain the Acquisition of Royal Jurisdiction from the People do subject the Exercise of it to Positive Laws But in this also they err for as Kingly Power is by the Law of God so it hath no inferiour Law to limit it The Father of a Family governs by no other Law than by his own Will not by the Laws and Wills of his Sons or Servants There is no Nation that allows Children any Action or Remedy for being unjustly Governed and yet for all this every Father is bound by the Law of Nature to do his best for the preservation of his Family but much more is a King always tyed by the same Law of Nature to keep this general Ground That the safety of the Kingdom be his Chief Law He must remember That the Profit of every Man in particular and of all together in general is not always one and the same and that the Publick is to be preferred before the Private And that the force of Laws must not be so great as natural Equity it self which cannot fully be comprised in any Laws whatsoever but is to be left to the Religious Atchievement of those who know how to manage the Affairs of State and wisely to Ballance the particular Profit with the Counterpoize of the Publick according to the infinite variety of Times Places Persons a Proof unanswerable for the superiority of Princes above Laws is this That there were Kings long before there were any Laws For a long time the Word of a King was the only Law and if Practice as saith Sir Walter Raleigh declare the Greatness of Authority even the best Kings of Judah and Israel were not tied to any Law but they did whatsoever they pleased in the greatest Matters 2. The Unlimited Jurisdiction of Kings is so amply described by Samuel that it hath given Occasion to some to imagine that it was but either a Plot or Trick of Samuel to keep the Government himself and Family by frighting the Israelites with the Mischiefs in Monarchy or else a prophetical Description only of the future ill Government of Saul But the Vanity of these Conjectures are judiciously discovered in that Majestical Discourse of the true Law of free Monarchy wherein it is evidently shewed that the Scope of Samuel was to teach the People a dutiful Obedience to their King even in those things which themselves did esteem Mischievous and Inconvenient for by telling them what a King would do he indeed instructs them what a Subject must suffer yet not so that it is Right for Kings to do Injury but it is Right for them to go Unpunished by the People if they do it So that in this Point it is all one whether Samuel describe a King or a Tyrant for Patient Obedience is due to both no Remedy in the Text against Tyrants but in crying and praying unto God in that Day But howsoever in a Rigorous Construction Samuel's description be applyed to a Tyrant yet the Words by a Benigne Interpretation may agree with the manners of a Just King and the Scope and Coherence of the Text doth best imply the more Moderate or Qualified Sense of the Words for as Sir W. Raleigh confesses all those Inconveniences and Miseries which are reckoned by Samuel as belonging to Kingly Government were not Intollerable but such as have been born and are still born by free Consent of Subjects towards their Princes Nay at this day and in this Land many Tenants by their Tenures and Services are tyed to the same Subjection even to Subordinate and Inferiour Lords To serve the King in his Wars and to till his Ground is not only agreeable to the Nature of Subjects but much desired by them according to their several Births and Conditions The like may be said for the Offices of Women-Servants Confectioners Cooks and Bakers for
Lawful Kings as to any Conquerour or Vsurper whatsoever Whereas being subject to the Higher Powers some have strained these Words to signifie the Laws of the Land or else to mean the Highest Power as well Aristocratical and Democratical as Regal It seems St. Paul looked for such Interpretation and therefore thought fit to be his own Expositor and to let it be known that by Power he understood a Monarch that carried a Sword Wilt thou not be afraid of the Power that is the Ruler that carrieth the Sword for he is the Minister of God to thee for he beareth not the Sword in vain It is not the Law that is the Minister of God or that carries the Sword but the Ruler or Magistrate so they that say the Law governs the Kingdom may as well say that the Carpenters Rule builds an House and not the Carpenter for the Law is but the Rule or Instrument of the Ruler And St. Paul concludes for this Cause pay you Tribute also for they are God's Ministers attending continually upon this very thing Render therefore Tribute to whom Tribute is due Custom to whom Custom He doth not say give as a gift to God's Minister But 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Render or Restore Tribute as a due Also St. Peter doth most clearly expound this Place of St. Paul where he saith Submit your selves to every Ordinance of Man for the Lord's sake whether it be to the King as Supreme or unto Governours as unto them that are sent by him Here the very self same Word Supreme or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which St. Paul coupleth with Power St. Peter conjoyneth with the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thereby to manifest that King and Power are both one Also St. Peter expounds his own Words of Humane Ordinance to be the King who is the Lex Loquens a speaking Law he cannot mean that Kings themselves are an humane Ordinance since St. Paul calls the Supreme Power The Ordinance of God and the Wisdom of God saith By me Kings Reign But his meaning must be that the Laws of Kings are humane Ordinances Next the Governours that are sent by him that is by the King not by God as some corruptly would wrest the Text to justifie Popular Governours as authorized by God whereas in Grammatical Construction Him the Relative must be referred to the next Antecedent which is King besides the Antithesis between Supreme and Sent proves plainly that the Governours were sent by Kings for if the Governours were sent by God and the King be an Humane Ordinance then it follows that the Governours were Supreme and not the King Or if it be said that both King and Governours are sent by God then they are both equal and so neither of them Supreme Therefore St. Peter's Meaning is in short Obey the Laws of the King or of his Ministers By which it is evident that neither St. Peter nor St. Paul intended other Form of Government than only Monarchical much less any Subjection of Princes to humane Laws That familiar Distinction of the School-men whereby they subject Kings to the Directive but not to the Coactive Power of Laws is a Confession that Kings are not bound by the positive Laws of any Nation since the compulsory Power of Laws is that which properly makes Laws to be Laws by binding Men by Rewards or Punishment to Obedience whereas the Direction of the Law is but like the Advice and Direction which the Kings Council gives the King which no Man says is a Law to the King 4. There want not those who Believe that the first Invention of Laws was to bridle and moderate the over-great Power of Kings but the truth is the Original of Laws was for the keeping of the Multitude in order Popular Estates could not subsist at all without Laws whereas Kingdoms were Govern'd many Ages without them The People of Athens assoon as they gave over Kings were forced to give Power to Draco first then to Solon to make them Laws not to bridle Kings but themselves and tho many of their Laws were very severe and bloody yet for the Reverence they bare to their Law-makers they willingly submitted to them Nor did the People give any Limited Power to Solon but an Absolute Jurisdiction at his Pleasure to Abrogate and Confirm what he thought fit the People never challenging any such Power to themselves so the People of Rome gave to the Ten Men who were to chuse and correct their Laws for the Twelve Tables an Absolute Power without any Appeal to the People 5. The reason why Laws have been also made by Kings was this when Kings were either busied with Wars or distracted with publick Cares so that every private Man could not have Access to their Persons to learn their Wills and Pleasure then of necessity were Laws invented that so every particular Subject might find his Prince's Pleasure decyphered to him in the Tables of his Laws that so there might be no need to resort unto the King but either for the Interpretation or Mitigation of Obscure or Rigorous Laws or else in new Cases for a Supplement where the Law was Defective By this means both King and People were in many things eased First The King by giving Laws doth free himself of great and intolerable Troubles as Moses did himself by chusing Elders Secondly The People have the Law as a Familiar Admonisher and Interpreter of the King's Pleasure which being published throughout the Kingdom doth represent the Presence and Majesty of the King Also the Judges and Magistrates whose help in giving Judgment in many Causes Kings have need to use are restrained by the Common Rules of the Law from using their own Liberty to the Injury of others since they are to judge according to the Laws and not follow their own Opinions 6. Now albeit Kings who make the Laws be as King James teacheth us above the Laws yet will they Rule their Subjects by the Law and a King governing in a setled Kingdom leaves to be a King and degenerates into a Tyrant so soon as he seems to Rule according to his Laws yet where he sees the Laws Rigorous or Doubtful he may mitigate and interpret General Laws made in Parliament may upon known Respects to the King by his Authority be Mitigated or Suspended upon Causes only known to him And although a King do frame all his Actions to be according to the Laws yet he is not bound thereto but at his good Will and for good Example Or so far forth as the General Law of the Safety of the Common-weal doth naturally bind him for in such sort only Positive Laws may be said to bind the King not by being Positive but as they are naturally the Best or Only Means for the Preservation of the Common-Wealth By this means are all Kings even Tyrants and Conquerours bound to preserve the Lands Goods Liberties and Lives of all their Subjects not by any Municipial Law of the Land so
much as the Natural Law of a Father which binds them to ratifie the Acts of their ForeFathers and Predecessors in things necessary for the Publick Good of their Subjects 7. Others there be that affirm that although Laws of themselves do not bind Kings yet the Oaths of Kings at their Coronations tye them to keep all the Laws of their Kingdoms How far this is true let us but examine the Oath of the Kings of England at their Coronation the words whereof are these Art thou pleased to cause to be administred in all thy Judgments indifferent and upright Justice and to use Discretion with Mercy and Verity Art thou pleased that our upright Laws and Customs be observed and dost thou promise that those shall be protected and maintained by thee These two are the Articles of the King's Oath which concern the Laity or Subjects in General to which the King answers affirmatively Being first demanded by the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury Pleaseth it you to confirm and observe the Laws and Customs of Ancient Times granted from God by just and devout Kings unto the English Nation by Oath unto the said People Especially the Laws Liberties and Customs granted unto the Clergy and Laity by the famous King Edward We may observe in these Words of the Articles of the Oath that the King is required to observe not all the Laws but only the Upright and that with Discretion and Mercy The Word Upright cannot mean all Laws because in the Oath of Richard the Second I find Evil and Unjust Laws mentioned which the King swears to abolish and in the Old Abridgment of Statutes set forth in Henry the Eighth's days the King is to swear wholly to put out Evil Laws which he cannot do if he be bound to all Laws Now what Laws are Upright and what Evil who shall Judge but the King since he swears to administer Upright Justice with Discretion and Mercy or as Bracton hath it aequitatem praecipiat misericordiam So that in effect the King doth swear to keep no Laws but such as in His Judgment are Upright and those not literally always but according to Equity of his Conscience joyn'd with Mercy which is properly the Office of a Chancellour rather than of a Judge and if a King did strictly swear to observe all the Laws he could not without Perjury give his Consent to the Repealing or Abrogating of any Statute by Act of Parliament which would be very mischievable to the State But let it be supposed for Truth that Kings do swear to observe all the Laws of their Kingdom yet no man can think it reason that Kings should be more bound by their Voluntary Oaths than Common Persons are by theirs Now if a private person make a Contract either with Oath or without Oath he is no further bound than the Equity and Justice of the Contract ties him for a Man may have Relief against an unreasonable and unjust Promise if either Deceit or Error or Force or Fear induced him thereunto Or if it be hurtful or grievous in the performance Since the Laws in many Cases give the King a Prerogative above common Persons I see no Reason why he should be denied the Priviledg which the meanest of his Subjects doth enjoy Here is a fit place to examine a Question which some have moved Whether it be a Sin for a Subject to disobey the King if he Command any thing contrary to his Laws For satisfaction in this point we must resolve that not only in Humane Laws but even in Divine a thing may be commanded contrary to Law and yet Obedience to such a Command is necessary The sanctifying of the Sabbath is a Divine Law yet if a Master command his Servant not to go to Church upon a Sabbath-Day the best Divines teach us That the Servant must obey this Command though it may be Sinful and Unlawfull in the Master because the Servant hath no Authority or Liberty to examine and judge whether his Master sin or no in so commanding For there may be a just Cause for a Master to keep his Servant from Church as appears Luke 14.5 yet it is not fit to tie the Master to acquaint his Servant with his secret Counsels or present Necessity And in such Cases the Servant 's not going to Church becomes the Sin of the Master and not of the Servant The like may be said of the King 's commanding a Man to serve him in the Wars he may not examine whether the War be Just or Unjust but must Obey since he hath no Commission to Judge of the Titles of Kingdoms or Causes of War nor hath any Subject Power to Condemn his King for breach of his own Laws 8. Many will be ready to say It is a Slavish and Dangerous Condition to be subject to the Will of any One Man who is not subject to the Laws But such Men consider not 1. That the Prerogative of a King is to be above all Laws for the good only of them that are under the Laws and to defend the Peoples Liberties as His Majesty graciously affirmed in His Speech after His last Answer to the Petition of Right Howsoever some are afraid of the Name of Prerogative yet they may assure themselves the Case of Subjects would be desperately miserable without it The Court of Chancery it self is but a Branch of the King's Prerogative to Relieve men against the inexorable rigour of the Law which without it is no better than a Tyrant since Summum Jus is Summa Injuria General Pardons at the Coronation and in Parliaments are but the Bounty of the Prerogative 2. There can be no Laws without a Supreme Power to command or make them In all Aristocraties the Nobles are above the Laws and in all Democraties the People By the like Reason in a Monarchy the King must of necessity be above the Laws there can be no Soveraign Majesty in him that is under them that which giveth the very Being to a King is the Power to give Laws without this Power he is but an Equivocal King It skills not which way Kings come by their Power whether by Election Donation Succession or by any other means for it is still the manner of the Government by Supreme Power that makes them properly Kings and not the means of obtaining their Crowns Neither doth the Diversity of Laws nor contrary Customs whereby each Kingdom differs from another make the Forms of Common-Weal different unless the Power of making Laws be in several Subjects For the Confirmation of this point Aristotle saith That a perfect Kingdom is that wherein the King rules all things according to his Own Will for he that is called a King according to the Law makes no kind of Kingdom at all This it seems also the Romans well understood to be most necessary in a Monarchy for though they were a People most greedy of Liberty yet the Senate did free Augustus from all Necessity of Laws that he
3d Rich. 2. the three Henries 4 5 6. in Edw. 4. and Rich. 3. days was The King and his Parliament with the Assent of the Prelates Earls and Barons and at the Petition or at the special Instance of the Commons doth Ordain The same Mr. Fuller saith that the Statute made against Lollards was without the Assent of the Commons as appears by their Petition in these Words The Commons beseech that whereas a Statute was made in the last Parliament c. which was never Assented nor Granted by the Commons but that which was done therein was done without their Assent 17. How far the King's Council hath directed and swayed in Parliament hath in part appeared by what hath been already produced For further Evidence we may add the Statute of Westminster The first which saith These be the Acts of King Edw. 1. made at his first Parliament General by his Council and by the Assent of Bishops Abbots Priors Earls Barons and all the Commonalty of the Realm c. The Statute of Bygamy saith In presence of certain Reverend Fathers Bishops of England and others of the King's Council forasmuch as all the King's Council as well Justices as others did agree that they should be put in writing and observed The Statute of Acton Bunnel saith The King for Himself and by His Council hath Ordaind and Established In Articuli super Chartas when the Great Charter was confirmed at the Request of his Prelates Earls and Barons we find these Passages 1. Nevertheless the King and his Council do not intend by reason of this Statute to diminish the King's Right c. 2. And notwithstanding all these things before-mentioned or any part of them both the King and his Council and all they that were present at the making of this Ordinance will and intend that the Right and Prerogative of his Crown shall be saved to him in all things Here we may see in the same Parliament the Charter of the Liberties of the Subjects confirmed and a saving of the King's Prerogative Those times neither stumbled at the Name nor conceived any such Antipathy between the Terms as should make them incompatible The Statute of Escheators hath this Title At the Parliament of our Soveraign Lord the King by his Council it was agreed and also by the King himself commanded And the Ordinance of Inquest goeth thus It is agreed and ordained by the King himself and all his Council The Statute made at York 9. Edw. 3. saith Whereas the Knights Citizens and Burgesses desired our Soveraign Lord the King in his Parliament by their Petition that for his Profit and the Commodity of his Prelates Earls Barons and Commons it may please him to provide remedy our Soveraign Lord the King desiring the profit of his People by the assent of his Prelates Earls Barons and other Nobles of his Council being there hath ordained In the Parliament primo Edwardi the Third where Magna Charta was confirmed I find this Preamble At the Request of the Commonalty by their Petition made before the King and His Council in Parliament by the assent of the Prelates Earls Barons and other Great Men assembled it was Granted The Commons presenting a Petition unto the King which the King's Council did mislike were content thereupon to mend and explain their Petition the Form of which Petition is in these words To their most redoubted Soveraign Lord the King praying the said Commons That whereas they have pray'd Him to be discharged all manner of Articles of the Eyre c. Which Petition seemeth to His Council to be prejudicial unto Him and in Disinherison of His Crown if it were so generally granted His said Commons not willing nor desiring to demand things of Him which should fall in Disinherison of Him or His Crown perpetually as of Escheators c. but of Trespasses Misprisions Negligences and Ignorances c. In the time of Henry the Third an Order or Provision was made by the King's Council and it was pleaded at the Common Law in Bar to a Writ of Dower The Plantiffs Attorney could not deny it and thereupon the Judgment was ideo sine die It seems in those days an Order of the Council-Board was either parcel of the common-Common-Law or above it The Reverend Judges have had regard in their Proceedings that before they would resolve or give Judgment in new Cases they consulted with the King's Privy-Council In the Case of Adam Brabson who was assaulted by R. W. in the presence of the Justices of Assize at Westminster the Judges would have the Advice of the King's Council For in a like Case because R. C. did strike a Juror at Westminster which passed in an Inquest against one of his Friends It was adjudged by all the Council that his right hand should be cut off and his Lands and Goods forfeited to the King Green and Thorp were sent by Judges of the Bench to the King's Council to demand of them whether by the Statute of 14. Ed. 3. cap. 16. a Word may be amended in a Writ and it was answered that a Word may well be amended although the Statute speak but of a Letter or Syllable In the Case of Sir Tho. Oghtred Knight who brought a Formedon against a poor Man and his Wife they came and yielded to the Demandant which seemed suspitious to the Court whereupon Judgment was stayed and Thorp said That in the like Case of Giles Blacket it was spoken of in Parliament and we were commanded that when any like Case should come we should not go to Judgment without good advice therefore the Judges Conclusion was Sues au Counseil comment ils voillet que nous devomus faire nous volume faire auterment nient en cest case Sue to the Council and as they will have us to do we will and otherwise not in this case 18. In the last place we may consider how much hath been attributed to the Opinions of the Kings Judges by Parliaments and so find that the King's Council hath guided and ruled the Judges and the Judges guided the Parliament In the Parliament of 28 Hen. 6. The Commons made Suit That William de la Poole D. of Suffolk should be committed to Prison for many Treasons and other Crimes The Lords of the Higher House were doubtful what Answer to give the Opinion of the Judges was demanded Their Opinion was that he ought not to be committed for that the Commons did not charge him with any particular Offence but with General Reports and Slanders This Opinion was allowed In another Parliament 31. Hen. 6. which was prorogued in the Vacation the Speaker of the House of Commons was condemned in a thousand pound damages in an Action of Trespass and was committed to Prison in Execution for the same When the Parliament was reassembled the Commons made suit to the King and Lords to have their Speaker delivered the Lords demanded the Opinion of the Judges whether he might be delivered out of