dispositions so that although there be none of these things interdicted and forbidden the use of them in themselves yet by God that made them and us many of these things being hurtfull to many men the use of them is forbid to such That which he adde's neque ex parte creaturarum c. neither out of the creatures part is there any morall contradiction is not true there is a morall contradiction because many of these things are hurtfull to many men therefore it is a morall contradiction to say they should rightly be judged useful and my first disproportion mentioned the quantity of the creatures enlargeth the contradiction when the vessel will hold but a Pint it is a contradiction to say I will put in a Quarâ— into it when the narrow compass of any particular man's thoughts can make use of but a few things to say that it shall make use of all is a contradiction out of the vast quantity of the creature in respect of the narrowness of our abilities Sect. 7. He urgeth another Argument thus Unless this judgment by that reason instituted be right there can be given no rule according to which a judgment may be instituted of things which the Lord God hath granted man to use or what these things are which he hath withdrawn from his use I answer many wayes according to the condition of the place wherein â—e live's if in a desart unappropriated to any man God hath given him right to use any thing he meet 's with for his accommodation if he live's in a Polity God hath given him right to all such things as the Laws of the Nation entitle him to His third and last Argument for this cause is framed at the bottom of pag. 99. Aut omnes creaturae Either all creaâ—ures are granted to man's use or none I will stop here all creatures are granted to man's use but not to this particular man but to manâ—ind which that word man will involve now he was to prove that they were useful to every particular but he prove's his conclusion for saith he if it be lawful for me to mine own use to destroy any fit meat and natural form why not all if it shall be expedient I answer him first posito quolibet sequitur quidlâ—bet that if it may be expedient is an impossible supposal it cannot be expedient for any single man to destroy this world I answer secondly that it is a fallacy à bene divisiâ— ad malè conjuncta the instances before of meat and drink do evince this conclusion take another I am â—o ride a journey my friend offer 's me five or six horses give 's me power to use any one I can use but one they are all every one such as I have a right unto but cannot use more then one I had right to each singular horse but not to all We may conceive it just so with any particular man Suppose we should grant that God in his journey to heaven allow's man any creature in the world yet because he cannot make use of all he cannot say that he hath right to all conjunctim And then lastly I say as before if a man live in a Polity God hath given him use of such things onely which the Law of the Polity entitle's him unto if in a desart he hath granted him whatsoever he can gain to his use Thus I think his first discourse is clearly enough answered wherein I observe he is a true follower of Mr. Hobbes not in his conclusions onely but his way of proving them by most fallacious Arguments So saith he it is proved that out of the creatures part there is no obstacle in them but that a man may use singulis omnibus every single and all of them This he think 's he hath proved how weakly I have shewed Sect. 8. He go's on next to shew that there is no repugnance out of the part of my neighbour I will wait upon that with which he begin's this pag. 100. This we have proved saith he that man hath right to the use and possession of all things which lack reason I answer man hath but no particular man But saith he since my neighbour is constituted in the same dignity which God would have me sustain is his word he ought to enjoy the same privilege which I do therefore to him should belong a like and equal right â—ver all creatures neither out of the respect of the creatures is one part allotted to him another to me This seem's by him to be an introduction to what follow 's but indeed contain's a main Argument against him for two much less two millions of men particular men cannot have a right to the same thing Therefore saith he we must seek somewhere else to find what portion is allotted to him what to me and then saith he let the adversaries turn which way they will they must confess that the distinction of these creatures ariseth onely out of Covenant this pag. 101. and this saith he they do sufficiently declare who teach that in extreme necessity the ancient right doth revive and the use of those things is made lawful which they by Covenant had disposed away before Thus far he The case which he speak's of may be thus put A man ready to starve for want of food or clothes take's a piece of bread or meat or a warm garment which belong's to another man to supply his extremity here say his Authors in this extremity his right to these things revived therefore saith this Writer he had right to all creatures before or else his instance is weak I answer the consequence is very infirm he may have right to such parcels of the world yet not to all he who hath right to little pieces in a field hath not right to the whole I have shâ—wed in my former piece which I now defend that no right but by some Law the Law of humanity give 's him right to this by which we may and ought to suppose that men should do as they would be done unto and when necessity compell's a man to such an extremity he need not stay to ask for it which in that necessity he cannot do but take that leave which humane nature give 's one to another and by which he is entiteled to those poor fragments but what hath this to do with the universe to the partition of which neither he nor any man living conferr'd to divide Sest 9. Another instance he give 's in a dissolved Common-wealth where the Magistrate can no longer use his authority there it is lawful for men to invade their neighbour's goods so they have an honest intention to deliver them when he and the Commonwealth are restored I put down the sense of his words onely for brevitie's sake and answer That it is not true that it is lawful to take any neighbour's goods in such a case unless he have deserted them
there is a necessity of nature which maketh men in generall avoid death in generall as the thing by which he must needs expect the greatest paine for it often happens that there is little paine and people that have dyed with a sense of deaths ugliness and so with some impatience I have found complaining of common accidents and such which had no participation of death in them and no cooperation to the dissolution of soule and body by death as Aches in particular parts sometimes they were galled and that troubled them sometimes that there were clods or hardness in the Bed c. All which shewed that these paines not those of Death were more sensible then even death its selfe Sect. 9. He proceeds It is not against reason that a man doth all he can to preserve his own body and limbes both from death and paine had he put in that little word and esteemed a little thing by him justly and honestly he had said truth but alas else how unreasonable a thing it is that a man to save himself from a little pain should act things prejudiciall to the glory of God the publique good or else some greater good of his own any man who hath sense of any thing but sense and unworthy ease cannot choose but apprehend that the greater good should be chosen before the lesse such are those before specified Therefore in such Cases that they for paine or death its self are relinquished is against reason What he adde's And that which is not against reason we call right c. I agree to for certainly there is no wrong which is not against reason but his deduction It is therefore a right of Nature that every man may preserve his own life and limbes with all the power he hath This deduction by what is already said cannot be true but when his life and limbes are not opposed by some greater good CHAP. XXIII Of using or misusing meanes in order to their end The regulation of mans judgment in it The preservation of life and estate when necessary Of right and wrong Law c. Sect. 1. 1. I Come now to Number 7. which begins thus And because where a man hath right to the end and the end cannot be attained without the meanes that is without such things as are necessary to the end it is consequent that it is not against reason and therefore right for a man to use all meanes and doe whatsoever action is necessary for the preservation of his body How vile and illogicall is this had he proved that the body were the end of man or instead of body had he said for the preservation of that end his axiome explained thus might have borne him out in it but as it is puâ— there is no connexion for suppose a man hath right to the end his own happiness and by that right likewise to all meanes which conduce to it yet unlesse this body can be proved to be that end his application of it to the body is of no force Well I will examine his Aphorisme First he who hath right to the end hath not right to all meanes of getting it is apparent for he who hath right to an estate or an house hath not right to take it by force he must onely use legall meanes for the obtaining and preserving it and so though a man have right to his body or life yet he hath no right to preserve it by unlawfull actions It is a most just rule of law that a man must so use his owne as he must not hurt another a man hath right to water and a Meadow but he must not so use his water and his meadow as by overflowing his meadow he should drowne his neighbours Corne. So although a man have right to his life yet this right is not of such a transcendent power as to enable him for the preservation of that life to hurt others and destroy their lives But once again for further and clearer explication of that rule he gives concerning an end let us observe that it hath no truth but concerning the last end and in that it hath for since all mens actions are for an end that is his summum bonum his happiness every man out of necessity of nature doth what he doth for it and the utmost he can for it but this life or body is not mans happiness and for any second end there being no necessity of the end it self there is much less of any means which conduce to it and therefore of such ends of which nature mans temporall life and body are there is no manner of truth in it no more then if we should say it were right for a man to doe what he can any thing to obtain pleasure or profit upon which he sets his heart Sect. 2. His 8. Numb must be likewise examined which saith Also every man by right of nature is judge himself of the necessity of the meanes and of the greatness of the danger This hath some truth in it and yet not to be so understood that by right of nature a man may judge what he will and accordingly act and what he acts is right as he seems to imply here from hence enforces afterwards for as in our judicatures there must use be made of Judges and the decrees of those Judges will regulate and govern our possessions yet those Judges have rules by which their judicatures should be regulated and what they act contrary to those rules or Lawes although it may be effected yet it is wicked so it is in those no doubt but every man will in such an impossible state as he supposeth man judge of the meanes and necessity but yet there is a law of nature in every man by which his judgement should be guided and what he judgeth though never so congruent to his will contrary to this law is not right so that as a Judge though what he judgeth must be performed and he hath power to judge what he thinkes fit yet he hath right to judge only according to the law of that Nation which gave him the power of being a Judge all other judgement is by power but not by right so is it with this man he may act against the law of nature for the preservation of his life or Limbe but if not right it is wicked to doe so The Argument he brings for proofe of this Conclusion convinceth not me For saith he if it be against reason that I be Judge of mine own danger my self then it is reason that another may be Judge c. It is reason say I that in such a Case I am Judge but it is reason likewise that I judge according to Law and make my will be guided by reason not my reason regulated by my will because it is mine it is not therefore right but because mine according to the law of nature and right reason of which he himself afterwards
grants there are divers lawes both of men in society to men single and to men that live together although not united in a policy Sect. 3. In his 9. Number he affirms As a mans judgement in right of nature is to be imployed for his own benefit so also the strength c. of every man is then rightly imployed when he useth it for himself To use the Phrase of the time this Gent. is very selfish and indeed there is some reason in what he writes for as his judgement so his strength c. but his judgement is to be imployed according to the law of nature only for himself and so his strength when some greater good shall be proposed to him the good of his family his Nation the glory of God in his vertuous death then this life is to be neglected and contemned as a limb is to be lost rather then a life the lesse good rather then the greater so a private life rather then that of a Nation But his Argument is feeble and of no force when he saith Else a man hath no right to preserve himself for although it be right for a man to preserve himself yet not with those other greater losses it is right for a man to preserve each piece of his estate yet to preserve it by force or losse of a Sons life or his owne when that piece of his estate shall be inconsiderable it is not right for him to doe it In a word a mans understanding strength or whatsoever a man hath he hath right to bestow upon the preservation of this life but then when they are not called for by some more excellent and more desirable good then this life then they are to be bestowed upon that better imployment not this Sect. 4. Now I am arrived at his 10. and last Number which I meane to handle in this Chapter which begins thus Every man by nature hath right to all things that is to say to doe whatsoever he listeth to whom he listeth to possess use and enjoy all things he will and can A good large Commission I will examine it and to the understanding it I will return to his Leviathan where I left Pag. 64. and discussing the beginning of that 14. Chap. lay a foundation for that truth which this Number occasions me to deliver First then let me observe that as in the beginning of this Chap. he define's right by equity liberty so immediately after he define's liberty to be the absence of external impediments and again a little after putting a distinction betwixt right and law he saith that Law and Right differ as much as Obligation and Liberty which in one and the same matter are inconsistent in which proposition he discovers a mighty weakness for in his definition of right he make's it nothing but the power and ability to doe what he will as indeed he make's it afterwards when right implies an equitable title to what he doth and a man may have right when he hath not power to doe accordingly but is hindred by externall impediments from acting according to his right that definition of his is therefore very weak for what he speaks that Law and Right are inconsistent I am so directly in my judgement against it that I think there is no right to any thing but by law which I will thus confirme by what followes Sect. 5. Right and wrong or injury are opposite termes so that right is the convenience or agreement which one thing hath with another and wrong is the disagreement as it is a right line which agree's with the rule of streightness a crooked line or a wrong one which deviates from those rules a right shot that which hit's the white and a wrong which misseth So it is a right action which is according to the rules of Actions and a wrong which differ's from them These rules are that we call law which regulate's our actions and when they are done accordingly they are right and we have right to doe them and to this purpose he said in the preceding Chap. Where no law no injustice and I may say where can be no injustice there can be no justice contraries appertaine to the same subject and expell each other out of it So then if right be an agreeing with some rule or law it is so farre from being inconsistent with it that it cannot be without it As in a Common-wealth a man hath only such a right to use or act any thing as the law of that Common-wealth gives him so in the generality of this world a man can only have right to doe or act such things which the universal law of nature direct's or impowers him to doe Thus his Leviathan being touched concerning this point I will returne to his De Corpore politico where I left and shew what manner of right the law of Nature gives a man and whether there be such a large Charter as he expresseth or no. CHAP. XXIV Of the law and right of nature Man's subjection to God and dominion over the Creatures The rules of his actions Man exempted out of Adam's charter why Noah's Patent And his Sons pâ—ssâ—ssing themselves of the world The titles of propriety discussd Jus Vtile c. Sect. 1. TO understand which let us conceive that the law of Nature belonging to every thing is that law which was given it at the Creation and the right of nature or jus Naturale must be that authority or title is granted by that law to use or doe any thing which title can be nothing but that jus or right which God gave him Gen. 1.28 29. Which we find to extend to the Earth the Fowle the fishes the living things that move upon the earth the herbs and trees This is his Jus Naturale but yet this is not to be used as he will although he be Lord of them there are lawes for Lords as well as servants Kings as well as subjects and they must be subject to the King of heaven as their subjects to them yea in these things which they are made Lords over We may see in the 4. of Genesis that Cain and Abel brought Oblations to GOD of those things over which they had a most peculiar dominion they pay'd God as it were a tribute out of those things he gave them a right to by that law of nature which he gave them at their creation from whence it appeare's that man hath not such right to any thing much lesse to all things to do what he pleaseth with or to them for then they had had no right to have neglected that duty of Oblation and then they could have done nothing by which God should have put a difference betwixt Cain and his Oblation and Abel and his Oblation as he did Sect. 2. Then secondly let us consider that here is not in this Charter expressed any right a man hath over other men but this
which names doe import a restraint and confinement but is the perfection of all these so that no perfection of any thing can be denied of that which is infinite essentially to say that this infinite is not that Let us conceive a line infinite imagine such a thing This line you cannot say it is a span a foot a yard or mile long yet it contains in it all these measures without their limitation so doth an infinite being containe all beings without confinement in a more excellent and eminent manner What I have spoken concerning that which is infinite in essence or being may be applied to all other infinites in immensity in quantity what is immense must be beyond all bounds of quantity it must have no limits but contains eminently all quantities in it so must number be likewise if there be any such which I shall disprove God willing hereafter so must in respect of duration Eternity be It must comprehend all durations and its self be without beginning and end so must all Infinites in respect of quality be in regard of wisdome of mercy of power comprehend all those Acts of those qualities which are in that which is finite and themselves be without all bounds and limits Hâ—vâ—ng thus explained what is meant by infinitie let us return to that which occasioned this discourse neither man nor any thing which is not infinite saith he can have any conceipt of that which is infinite conceptionem ullam is his phrase Sect. 5. This I disprove for although a mans understanding is finite and cannot grasp or fully comprehend that which is infinite yet it can lay hold on it and apprehend though not comprehend it although it cannot inclose the whole being of that is infinite yet he can discover that it is incomprehensible and that discovery will give him some conceit of that infiniteness yea the very knowledge of finite things will yeeld him some conceit of that is infinite so he who travelleth in an enclosed Country can sever those hedges from his fancy and can conceit what that Country would be if those hedges and bounds were removed although he do not see them so removed yet he can conceive what manner of Country that would be if they were removed Men may conceive that which neither is nor ever was in the world as an empty place against which he hath disputed in his natural Philosophy although many learned are of opinion against him and therefore had a conceipt of it Men may and learned men have expressed their opinions to be of an infinite thing which is not that is of an infinite vacuity beyond the heavens which give bounds to this visible world therefore have a conceipt of that infinite which they dispute for men have had a conceit and methinks he is not far from it that this world hath had an eternal being and therefore they had a conceit of this we call Eternity which is an infinite duration men have a conceit of infinity of number and therefore somewhere in his Book of Philosophy I have forgot where he most ingeniously expresseth it that if a mans hand were as active as his head or to this purpose he might divide any quantity into infinite parts his head then is able to doe it and then he must needs have a conceit of his own work He spake therefore too much when he said no finite thing could have any conceit of that is infinite a conceit it may have but an imperfect one and so I goe on with him Sect. 6. Neque si quis ab effectu quocunque Neither saith he if a man from any effect to its immediate cause and from thence to his more remote and so continually shall ascend by a most right reasoning yet he cannot proceed to that which is Eternall but being tyred shall flag at the last and be ignorant whether he can go further or no Thus far he an ingenuous and handsome expression I confess but how true will be examined And first I hope Mr. Hobbes will not say he is the wisest man that ever was in the world or that he only found out right reasoning and yet he speaks somewhat like this now and then but howsoever because I write not onely to him but to other men and I hope he harh not gained an universal esteem of such with the generality I thus answer There was never any sort of reasoning men who denyed an Eternity for whether they held the world had a beginning or no beginning which all did and must doe those which held it had no beginning as Aristotle in my judgement held the world eternall those which held it had a beginning from Water as Thales or Ayre as Anaximenes or Fire as Heraclitus or from Atomes as Democritus by chance meeting together in the great and infinite Vacuum not to lose time in confuting all or any of these which are most absurd yet all these that held it was principiated by these meanes held likewise that that Principle was eternall so likewise Plato his Ideas and Chaos were eternall Let us from the fact consider the manner in one or two instances If with Democritus we make the world constituted by Atomes when we resolve these mixed bodies into their principles we come to their Elements then with Democritus those Elements may be resolved into their Atomes by Aristotle into their Principles matter forme and privation these Atomes according to Democritus are Eternall that matter according to Aristotle so here is an eternity found So likewise may be said of Aire Water which are by some imagined to be the Principles or Chaos and Ideas If any man can imagine any thing further that these had a beginning and were not eternall his judgement can fly to none but an eternal God So that still there is by the ratiocination of man found out something that is Eternal When he said that by the ascending from the immediate cause to the more remote a man would lose himself it was most ingenious and had a truth with it which perhaps will be farther examined hereafter if it had been applyed to efficient causes as out of what Egge this Hen was hatched and what Hen layd this egge c. But when we resolve things into their constitutive causes which make their natures that which they are then the work will be short as is shewed and the result easie man need not lose himself in the inquest What he saith that a man tyred in the search will be ignorant whether he can go further or no is not so boldly as finely affirmed by him for certainly although a man be weary in his journey yet he can discern whether he can go further or no. Sect. 7. He proceeds and I Nâ—que absurdi sequitur quicquam neither saith he would any absurdity follow whether the world be finite or infinite since whatsoever the workman should determine all those things which we now see would be seene I
in that down right sense which the words seem at first to beare and they who object it would inferre For Invocation or calling upon the name of the Lord as it is many times it being a principal piece of it is taken for the whole worship of God it cannot be that men should now begin to do that which without doubt Adam Abel Seth and all such as were godly must needs have done long before Nay although this Story of the Fathers is delivered by Moses in exceeding short notes yet in the 3. and 4. vers of this 4. Chap. it is recorded that both Cain and Abel brought Oblations to the Lord which was an Act of Religion so that Religion did not now begin There are many witty Expositions given and some in their Expositions destroy the Text but what seem's most probable to me is that as in every age men desirous of Gods honour studied which way to act it most laudably and give any addition to it so now they might at this time adde something to their natural worship by prostration on the ground and Oblaeions and sacrifices as Hymmes and Invocations of God which were not used before Men began to call upon the name of the Lord in such a way which afterwards improving it selfe to a generall Devotion amongst the sonnes of God as I think pious men were called in those dayes it gained that name in a peculiar manner to be attributed to it so that men began that worship which was known by the name of calling upon God As you may see in Confession every acknowledgement of a mans sins or God's goodnesse is Confession yet if you aske have you been at Confession It is understood of Confessing to a Priest and accounting your sinnes to him Instances might be very many in this kind take one more perhaps a little closer We know that every pious act is a service to God yet for the eminence and excellence of it The Common Prayer used in the Church hath so appropriated that name that if a man asked were you at Service to day it will be understood of Common Prayer If the Question be at what time did service begin The answer will be Nine Ten Two Three a clock and be applyed only to the beginning of serving God with it yea I have heard many answer I was at Sermon not at Service so distinctly is the word applied to that of Common Prayer I can adde one Instance more almost in the very words before specified that Doxologie which is used in the Church at the end of every Psalm and some other times in the Common Prayers used in divine Service Glory be to the Father c. did so gaine the approbation of that name Gloria Patri that although all religious devotions payd to God are honouring and glorifying of him yet when we heare men speake of Gloria Patri we know they meane this Doxologie and we can say of it that Gloria Patri began with Flavianus as Theodoret assisted by St. Chrysostom and Nicephorus so that although in the end of this Doxologie it is said As it was in the beginning is now c. that is that in all ages men did give Glory to the Father c. Yet we can say that at that time began Glory to the Father c. So was it in this occasion then began the Name of God to be glorified with some particular service although men did in all ages before glorifie him So that we may well beleeve that in that time of the birth of Enos or some years after began that piece of worship which for some eminency had that name of calling upon God by the use of speech appropriated to it Whether this addition was by the Institution of God immediately or Divine men as Seth or Enos introduced it in the Publique Religion I determine not being not revealed but conceive this the most reasonable way of expounding that place which cannot be understood in that grosse way it is urged Sect. 3 A second Argument to prove that there was an Idolatrous worship before the Floud is thus framed The punishment of Sinnes is proportioned to the Sins which are punished now the Floud being the greatest punishment that ever God afflicted the world with it is necessary that it should be for the worship of false Gods or Idolatry which are the greatest Sins To this is rightly answered that the punishment of Sins in this world is not alwaies proportioned to the sins All the temporal punishment that men have is lesse then they deserve and therefore may in justice be moderated according to Gods equitable kindnesse what punishment God layd upon these men who perished in the Floud after death was not revealed but the judgement was most right because they held the truth of God in unrighteousness as St. Paul Rom. 1.18 and as it is in the 21. verse of the same Because they knowing GOD glorified him not as God neither were thankful but became vaine in their imaginations So that the Condemnation upon the Gentiles was not alwaies for Errours in judgement but Errours in practise that although they did know God aright yet they did not worship him as God And therefore we may be satisfied concerning their sins with what the Scripture revealeth and need not make them worse then they were described there which sayes That the wickednesse of man was great in the Earth and that every Imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evill continually Gen. 6.5 and it is the same which S. Paul before they became vaine in their Imaginations that is their desires and affections as was described before they were given to all Luxury and sensuality So that here was a large scope for Gods justice to punish and the temporal punishment of this world Death by drowning was vehemently called for by the sins of those men who lived in that Age without any addition of false worship I therefore conclude for that first age in the first sense in respect of the God they worshipped there was none but the right God worshipt in the world but in regard of the second sense the manner of worship in their Religion to him unlesse these Oblations before spoke of we find nothing recorded before the Floud that is necessary to be assented to Sect. 4. For both these we cannot conceive that this Religion so formed was founded upon the Faith c. For although we may justly think that men who have either by an Innate principle or else by reason knowledge that there is a GOD of an infinite excellency to whom out of duty they owe this divine Worship which is called Religion we may likewise think that it is impossible for their capacities to find out what worship would be pleasing to him unlesse he reveale it and therefore did act all they did in that worship by his direction yet because there is no mention
right is equally granted to Man over those creatures there specified but none to any man over another Therefore all right that any man hath to doe any thing to another must either be by nature as Parents in regard of whose origination of their Children's lives and educaâ—â—â—â— of them they have naturally a right to governe and 〈◊〉 any things concerning them or else it must be by 〈◊〉 Covenant concession or yielding expressed or 〈◊〉 of one to the other but in the original Charter 〈◊〉 is not any grant or priviledge given to one over 〈◊〉 and therefore barbarous acts of inhumanity 〈◊〉 it is to be supposed that no man would yield 〈◊〉 should act upon him no man can have right to 〈◊〉 Upon these Considerations his proposition must 〈◊〉 perish when he saith every man hath right to any 〈◊〉 but he seemes to prove it thus For seeing all 〈◊〉 he willeth must therefore be good to him in his owne â—â—dgement because he willeth them and may tend to his preâ—â—â—vation some way or other or he may judge so and we have â—ade him judge thereof Sect. 8. If he had said I have â—ade him judge thereof the force of the Argument would quickly have been shatâ—ered because his authority is weake to constitute a Judge in so weighty affaires but when he said we I wonder who he meanes I am sure I was none of them nor doe I remember to have read any other but himself of that mind That every man must be judge of his own Cause I know every man will judge and act according to his judgement who is an honest and vertuous man but to be a Judge Authoritativè which that phrase we have made him judge thereof doth imply is that which no man saith but himself how he is a Judge I have shewed before by what right to judge by the law of Nature not by his making him his will hath not right with it to act any thing because he willeth it but because it is regulated by the lawes of nature and acts according to those rules therfore only he hath right to doe what he doth by them and therefore his Conclusion which he saith follow 's out of his premises is vain which is that all things may be rightly done by him Sect. 3. He goe's on with another for saith he for this cause it is rightly said Natura dedit omnia omnibus that nature hath given all things to all men the truth of this must next be examined Nature may be said to have given all things to all men those things before expressed in Gods charter at mans Creation but nature hath not given men right over one another which is mainly importuned by him in both these Treatises and must be understood in the latitude of that universall terme all things for unless other men all things cannot be given to him now that other men are not given to each other will appeare out of this that then God should not be offended with those acts which were done one to another where is no positive law for where there is no positive law of God's or man's prohibiting them only the law of nature is of force to restraine mens actions and to give right to every thing and without doubt God can be displeased with nothing that is right well then let us cast our eyes upon the 19. Chap. of Genesis we shall find there the Sodomites attempting a most wicked and unjust act upon two strangers way-faring men as they thought because the assault was so universal by the old and young of the City it is reasonable to think there was no positive law against that sin for men universally would not confront a positive law and againe if there had been any positive law it is probable Lot would have urged it to them but there being none and these men by the height of their lust which is one of Mr. Hobbes his titles having smothered the light of nature pursued the design and had the wrath of God falling on them by Fire why was God so angry Mr. Hobbes would have told him there is no positive law forbidding it and thou hast given all things to all men by Nature and it is lawfull for any man to doe any thing to any man Let us ascend higher and consider in the 4. of Genesis that Cain kills Abel in the 9 vers God questions Cain about him Where is thy brother Abel His answer was somwhat like Mr. Hobbes's I know not am I my brothers keeper and yet this was but like him it was very short of Mr. Hobbes's his impiety he only pleaded that he was not accomptable for him he was not to be charged with his condition be it what it will Mr. Hobbes he would have told God thou hast given him to me and I had right to doe what I would with him by thy Commission this villain wan thy favour from me and now I have taken him away by that naturall right which thou hast given me Mr. Hobbes he would have out-Cained Cain himself in his justification of these horrid acts by his Principles but because God whose anger is never but most just did express himself so severely against him could not be just unlesse these Sodomites and Cain had transgressed some Law which could be none but the law of Nature it must needs shew that these men had no right to doe what they would with any thing that is with other persons but had their right confined in many acts by the law of natuâ—e againe if every man had right over every other person then those men have mutually right over one anâ—â—her and the same persons in the same cause in respect of the same persons should be both superiours and infeâ—â—ours which is a contradiction and impossible to be I let this passe therefore without further trouble and come to examine how Nature hath given all those other things the Earth the Fowles the beasts to all men Sect. 4. To understand this we must have recourse to the Charter before mentioned in the first of Genesis as likewise Psal. 115.16 The earth hath he given to the Children of men which gift was made by the law of nature at the first Creation for else we find no other Grant unless some men may think it a new Patent which was made to Noah and his sons Gen. 9. Which yet upon examination will appeare no other but a renewing of the former Charter which being given to man in his integrity he might justly suspect to be lost by his sinne God therefore in this replanting the world repeats the former priviledges almost word for word after the Flood and therefore if it were a gift of God by nature at the first or with nature in the Creation it is now either a positive law or else a renewing of the former Charter Let us now examine it and begin with Noah for whâ—tsoever the other Charter to