Selected quad for the lemma: heaven_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
heaven_n	eye_n	know_v	see_v	5,071	5	3.4807	3	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A48890	Mr. Locke's reply to the right reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester's answer to his second letter wherein, besides other incident matters, what his lordship has said concerning certainty by reason, certainty by ideas, and certainty of faith, the resurrection of the same body, the immateriality of the soul, the inconsistency of Mr. Locke's notions with the articles of the Christian faith and their tendency to sceptism [sic], is examined.	Locke, John, 1632-1704.	1699 (1699)	Wing L2754; ESTC R32483	244,862	490

less skilful in this Art of Fencing Who can believe that upon so slight an account your Lordship should neglect your Design of writing against me The great Motives of your Concern for an Article of the Christian Faith and of that Duty which you profess has made you do what you have done will be believed to work more uniformly in your Lordship than to let a Father of the Church and a Teacher in Israel not tell one who asks him which is the right and safe Way if he knows it No no my Lord a Character so much to the Prejudice of your Charity no-body will receive of your Lordship no not from your self Whatever your Lordship may say the World will believe That you would have given a better Method of Certainty if you had had one when thereby you would have secured Men from the danger of running into Errors in Articles of Faith and effectually have recalled them from my way of Certainty which leads as your Lordship says to Scepticism and Infidelity For to turn Men from a way they are in the bare telling them it is dangerous puts but a short stop to their going on in it There is nothing effectual to set them a going right but to shew them which is the safe and sure way a piece of Humanity which when asked no body as far as he knows refuses another and this I have earnestly asked of your Lordship Your Lordship represents to me the Vnsatisfactoriness and Inconsistency of my way of Certainty by telling me That it seems still a strange thing to you that I should talk so much of a new Method of Certainty by Ideas and yet allow as I do such a want of Ideas so much Imperfection in them and such a want of Connection between our Ideas and the things themselves Answer This Objection being so visibly against the Extent of our Knowledge and not the Certainty of it by Ideas would need no other Answer but this that it proved nothing to the point which was to shew that my way by Ideas was no way to Certainty at all not to True Certainty which is a Term your Lordship uses here which I shall be able to conceive what you mean by when you shall be pleased to tell me what false Certainty is But because what you say here is in short what you ground your Charge of Scepticism on in your former Letter I Shall here according to my Promise consider what your Lordship says there and hope you will allow this to be no unfit place Your Charge of Scepticism in your former Letter is as followeth Your Lordship's first Argument consists in these Propositions viz. 1. That I say P. 125 That Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas 2. That I go about to prove That there are very many more Beings of which we have no Ideas than those of which we have from whence your Lordship draws this Conclusion That we are excluded from attaining any Knowledge as to the far greatest part of the Vniverse Which I agree to But with Submission this is not the Proposition to be proved but this viz. That my way by Ideas or my way of Certainty by Ideas for to that your Lordship reduces it i. e. my placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas leads to Scepticism Farther from my saying that the Intellectual World is greater and more beautiful certainly than the material your Lordship argues That if Certainty may be had by general Reasons without particular Ideas in one it may also in other Cases Answer It may no doubt But this is nothing against any thing I have said for I have neither said nor suppose That Certainty by general Reasons or any Reasons can be had without Ideas no more than I say or suppose that we can reason without thinking or think without immediate Objects of our Minds in thinking i. e. think without Ideas But your Lordship asks Whence comes this Certainty for I say certainly where there be no particular Ideas if Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas I answer we have Ideas as far as we are certain and beyond that we have neither Certainty no nor Probability every thing which we either know or believe is some Proposition Now no Proposition can be framed as the Object of our Knowledge or Assent wherein two Ideas are not joined to or separated from one another As for Example when I affirm that something exists in the World whereof I have no Idea Existence is affirmed of something some Being And I have as clear an Idea of Existence and something the two things joined in that Proposition as I have of them in this Proposition something exists in the World whereof I have an Idea When therefore I affirm that the intellectual World is greater and more beautiful than the material Whether I should know the truth of this Proposition either by Divine Revelation or should assert it as highly probable which is all I do in that Chapter out of which this Instance is brought it means no more but this viz. That there are more and more beautiful Beings whereof we have no Ideas than there are of which we have Ideas of which Beings whereof we have no Ideas we can for want of Ideas have no farther Knowledge but that such Beings do exist If your Lordship shall now ask me how I know there are such Beings I answer that in that Chapter of the Extent of our Knowledge I do not say I know but I endeavour to shew that it is most highly probable But yet a Man is capable of knowing it to be true because he is capable of having it revealed to him by God that this Proposition is true viz. That in the Works of God there are more and more beautiful Beings whereof we have no Ideas than there are whereof we have Ideas If God instead of shewing the very things to St. Paul had only revealed to him that this Proposition was true viz. That there were things in Heaven which neither Eye had seen nor Ear had heard nor had entred into the Heart of Man to conceive would he not have known the Truth of that Proposition of whose Terms he had Ideas viz. of Beings whereof he had no other Ideas but barely as something and of Existence though in the want of other Ideas of them he could attain no other Knowledge of them but barely that they existed So that in what I have there said there is no Contradiction nor Shadow of a Contradiction to my placing Knowledge in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas But if I should any where mistake and say any thing inconsistent with that way of Certainty of mine how I beseech your Lordship could you conclude from thence that the placing Knowledge in the Perception of the Agreement of Disagreement of Ideas tends to Scepticism That which