asleep sees any terrible Animal before his Eyes it is certain that the Idea of this Animal truly Exists and yet this Mountain of Gold and this Animal never were However Men being Naturally inclined to believe that there is none but Corporeal Objects which Exist they Judge of the Reality and Existence of things quite after another manner than they ought to do for as soon as they are sensible of any Object they will certainly have it that this Object Exists although it often happens that there is nothing without And further they affirm that this Object is exactly the same as they see it which never happens But in respect to the Idea which necessarily Exists and which can be nothing else besides what it appears to be they without any reflection commonly Judge it to be nothing as if Idea's had not a very great number of Properties As if the Idea's of a Square for instance was not very different from that of some number and did not represent things perfectly distinct which could never happen to nothing since nothing has no Propriety It is therefore indisputable that Idea's have a real Existence But let us examine their Nature and Essence and see what it can be in the Soul that is capable of representing all things Whatever things the Soul perceives are either in or out of its self those which are in the Soul are its own thoughts that is all its different Modifications for by these words Thought manner of Thinking or modification of the Soul I understand in general all things that can be in the Soul without her perceiving them as her own Sensations Imaginations pure Intellections or simple Conceptions even her Passions and Natural Inclinations Now our Soul has no need of Idea's to perceive all these things because they are within the Soul or rather the Soul it self after such or such a manner Even as the real roundness of some Body and its Motion are only this Body Figured and moved after such or such a manner But as for things that are out of the Soul we can perceive them only by the means of Idea's supposing that these things cannot be intimately united to it There are two sorts of them Spiritual and Material As for the Spiritual there is some probability that they may discover themselves to the Soul without Idea's and by themselves For although Experience teaches us that we cannot immediately and of our selves declare our Thoughts to one another but only by words or some other sensible Sign to which we have assixed our Idea's We may say that God has ordained it so only during this Life to hinder those Disorders that would soon happen if Men could make themselves be understood as they pleased But when Justice and Order shall Reign and we shall be delivered from the Captivity of our Bodies we shall perhaps make our selves mutually understood by an intimate Union of our selves as its probable the Angels do in Heaven so that it does not seem absolutely necessary to admit Idea's to represent spiritual things to the Soul because it may be we may see them by themselves although after a very imperfect manner I examine not here how two Spirits can be united one to the other and if they can after this manner mutually discover one anothers Thoughts I believe however that there is no Substance purely intelligible but that of God nothing can be evidently known but in his Light and that the Vnion of Spirits cannot make them Visible For although we are most strictly united to our selves we are and shall be unintelligible to our selves until we see our selves in God and that he represents to us the perfect intelligible Idea that he hath of our being included in his So that although I may seem here to grant that Angels can manifest one to another what they are and what they think 't is only because I will not dispute of it provided I am granted what is not to be doubted viz. That we cannot see material things by themselves and without Idea's I shall explain in the Seventh Chapter my Opinion how we know Spirits and will shew that at present we cannot absolutely know them by themselves although it may be they are united to us But I speak here chiesly of material things which certainly cannot be united to the Soul in such a manner as is necessary for us to perceive them Because being extended and the Soul not there is no proportion between them Besides our Souls go not out of our Bodies to measure the greatness of the Heaven and consequently they cannot see External Bodies but by the Idea's which represent them This is what all the World ought to grant We are assured then II. A division of the several ways whereby External Objects may be seen that it 's absolutely necessary that the Idea's we have of Bodies and of all other Objects which we perceive not by themselves proceed from these Bodies or these Objects or else that our Soul has the power of producing these Idea's or that God Created them with our Souls or that he produces them every time that we think of any Object or else that the Soul has all those Perfections in it self that it sees in these Bodies Or in fine that it is united with a perfect Being which in general includes all the Perfections of Created Beings We cannot see Objects but after one of these ways Let us examin without prejudice and without frighting our selves with the difficulty of the Question which of them seems most probable It may be we may resolve it very clearly although we do not pretend here to give such Demonstrations as will satisfie all sorts of persons but only convincing Proofs to those at least as will meditate with serious Attention upon them for perhaps it would be thought too rash if we should pretend otherwise CHAP. II. That material Objects do not emit Species which resemble them THe most common received Opinion is that of the Peripateticks who think that External Objects emit Species which resemble them and that those Species are carried by the External Senses to the Common Sense or Understanding They call these Species impressed because the Object imprints them on the External Senses These impressed Species being Material and Sensible are render'd intelligible by means of the active or active intellect and are fit to be received in the passive intellect These Species thus spiritualiz'd are called express'd Species because they are express'd by the impress'd ones and 't is by them that the Passive Intellect knows all material things We shall not stay to explain at large these sine things and the divers manners in which different Philosophers conceive them for although they do not agree as to the number of Faculties which they attribute to the Interior Sense and the Understanding and though there are not a few who doubt whether they have need of any active Intellect to know sensible Objects yet however they generally agree
that External Objects emit the Species or Images which represent them And 't is only upon this Foundation that they multiply their Faculties and defend their active intellect So that this Foundation having no Solidity as shall soon be shewn it will be unnecessary to spend any time to overturn the Superstructure We are assur'd then that it is improbable that Objects should emit their Images or Species which represent them for these reasons 1. From the impenetrability of Objects All Objects as the Sun Stars and all such as are near the Eyes cannot emit Species which are different from their respective Natures Wherefore Philosophers commonly say that these Species are Gross and Material in which they differ from express'd Species which are Spiritualised These impress'd Species of Objects then are little Bodies they cannot therefore be penetrated nor all the Spaces which are betwixt the Earth and the Heaven which must be full of them Whence it 's easie to conclude they must be bruis'd and broken in moving every way and thus they cannot render Objects visible Moreover one may see from the same place or point a great number of Objects in the Heavens and on the Earth therefore the Species of these Objects can be reduc'd into a Point But they are impenetrable since they are extended Therefore c. But one may not only see a multitude of very great and vast Objects There is no Point in all the great Spaces of the World from whence we cannot discover an almost infinite number of Objects and even Objects as large as the Sun Moon and the Heavens there is therefore no Point in all the World where the Species of all these things ought not to meet which is against all appearance of Truth The Second Reason is taken from the Change which happens in the Species Such as would know how all impressions of Visible Objects however epposite may be communicatedwithout being weaken'd may read Monsicur Descartes his Dioptricks it 's evident that the nearer any Object is the greater its Species ought to be since we see the Object 's greater But what is yet more difficult to conceive according to their Opinion is That if we look upon this Object with a Telescope or a Microscope the Species immediately becomes Six Hundred times as great as it was before for 't is yet more difficultly conceiv'd from what Parts it can grow so great in an instant The Third Reason is when we look upon a perfect Cube all the Species of its Sides are unequal nevertheless we see all the Sides equally Square So when we consider Ellipses and Parallelograms in a Picture which cannot but emit like Species yet we see Circles and Squares This manifestly shews that it is not necessary that the Object beheld should emit Species like it self that it may be seen In fine it cannot be conceiv'd how it can be that a Body which does not sensibly diminish should always emit Species on every Side which should continually fill all the great Spaces about it and that with an inconceivable swiftness For an Object that was hidden in that Instant that it discovers it self may be seen many Millions of Leagues on all Sides and what appears yet more strange is that Bodies in great Motion as Air and some others have not that power of pushing outwards these Images which resemble them as the more gross and quiescent Bodies such as the Earth Stones and generally all hard Bodies have But I shall not stay any longer to enumerate all the contrary Reasons to their Opinion there would be no end a very ordinary Judgment would raise innumerable Objections Those that we have brought are sufficient though they were not so necessary after what has been said upon the Subject of the First Book where the Errors of the Senses were explain'd But there are so great a number of Philosophers wedded to this Opinion that we believe it will be necessary to say something to encline them to reflect upon their own Thoughts CHAP. III. That the Soul has no power of producing Idea's The Cause of Mens Error in reference to this Subject THe Second Opinion is that of those who believe our Souls have any power of producing the Idea's of such things as they will think upon and they are excited to produce them by the Impressions which Objects make upon Bodies although these Impressions are not Images like the Objects which cause them they believe that 't is in this that Man is made after the Image of God and participates of his Power That even as God Created all things out of nothing and can reduce them to nothing again and then Create them anew so Man can Create and Annihilate the Idea's of all things as he pleases But there is great Reasons to distrust all these Opinions which extol a Man these are the Common Thoughts which arise from a vain and proud Original and which the Father of Light hath not inspir'd This participation of the power of God which Men boast of having to represent Objects and of doing many other particular actions is a participation which seems to relate to something of independance as independance is commonly explain'd it is also a Chimerical Participation which Mens Ignorance and Vanity make them to imagine They depend much more than they think upon the Goodness and Mercy of God But this is not a place to explain these things It 's enough if we endeavour to shew that Men have not the Power of forming the Idea's of things which they perceive No one can doubt that Idea's are real Beings since they have real Properties since they differ from one another and represent all different things Nor can we reasonably doubt that they are Spiritual and very different from the Bodies which they represent But it seems reasonable to doubt whether Idea's by whose means we see Bodies are not more Noble than the Bodies themselves for indeed the Intelligible World must be more perfect than the Material and Earthly as we shall see hereafter Thus when we affirm that we have the Power of Forming such Idea's as we please we shall be in danger of perswading our selves to make more Noble and Perfect Beings than the World which God hath Created However some do not reflect upon it because they imagin that an Idea is Nothing since it is not to be felt or else if they look upon it as a Being 't is a very mean contemptible one because they imagin it to be annihilated as soon as it is no longer present to the Mind But supposing it true that Idea's were only little contemptible Beings yet they are Beings and Spiritual Ones and Men not having the power of Believing it follows that they cannot produce them for the production of Idea's after the manner before explain'd is a true Creation and although Men endeavour to palliate and mollifie the hardness of this Opinion by saying that the production of Idea's presupposes something else but Creation
Extension of Bodies in Relation to the Testimony of our Eyes let us imagine that God had created a Heaven and an Earth of a Portion of Matter as little as a Hand Ball and Men upon this Earth in the same Proportions with those in our Great World These little Men would see one another and the parts of their own Bodies as also the little Animals which would be capable of incommoding them or else their Eyes would be useless as to their Preservation Upon this Supposition it is Evident that these little Men would have Idea's as to the bigness of Bodies very different from those that we have of them since they would have Relation to their Little World which tho' as a Ball in respect of ours they would look upon as surrounded with infinite Spaces such as we imagine about ours Or if it may more easily be conceiv'd let us suppose that God had made a World infinitely greater than ours so that this New World should be in respect of ours as ours was in comparison of that which we suppos'd before Let us also suppose that God had observ'd the same Proportion in all the Parts of this New World as he had done in ours It 's manifest that the Men of this last World would be greater than is the Space betwixt our Earth and the most distant Stars that we see this being suppos'd if they had the same Idea of the Extension of Bodies as we have they could not distinguish even some parts of their own Body and would see some others of prodigious greatness So that 't is ridiculous to think that they would see things of the same bigness as we see them 'T is evident from these two Suppositions that the Men of the Great or Little World would have very different Notions about the greatness of Bodies to what we have supposing only that their Eyes gave them Idea's of the Objects that were about them proportionably in bigness to their own Bodies Now if these Men were much assur'd upon the Testimony of their own Eyes that Bodies were as big as they saw them it 's evident they would be deceiv'd and no body can doubt of it yet it 's certain they would have full as much reason as we to defend their Opinion let us therefore at least by the Example of this Error apprehend our selves to be very uncertain of the greatness of those Bodies that we see and that all we can know by sight is the proportion that they have to our Bodies In a word that our Eyes are not given us to Judge of the Truth of things but only to discern those things that may either Profit or Injure us But Men do not only trust their Eyes in Judging of Visible but also of Invisible Objects they even conclude that nothing exists which they see not thus arrogating to their Sight a certain infinite perspicacity 'T is this which hinders them from knowing the true Causes of many Natural Effects If they attribute them to certain Faculties and imaginary Qualities the common Reason is because they do not see the real ones which consist in the different Configurations of these Bodies For Example They see not the Particles of Air and Flame much less those of Light or of other Matter yet more Subtile and this inclines them to believe they do not exist or at least to judge they have neither Power nor Action they have recourse to occult Qualities or imaginary Faculties to explain all the effects whereof these imperceptible Particles are the Natural Cause They choose rather to have recourse to the Horrour of a Vacuum for explaining the Elevation of the Water in Pumps than to the Weight of the Air to the Qualities of the Moon for the Flux and Reflux of the Sea than to the pressure of the Air which environs the Earth to attractive Faculties in the Sun for the Elevation of Vapours than to the Simple Motion or Impulsion caus'd by the parts of Subtile Matter which are continually dispers'd by the Sun They look upon that as an Impertinent Opinion which has recourse to Flesh and Blood to solve the Motions of Animals their Habits or the Corporeal Memory of Man which is owning in part to this that they conceive the Brain to be very little and consequently insufficient to conserve the traces of an almost infinite number of things which are there they are willing to believe tho' they know not how to conceive it that Beasts have a certain Soul which is neither Body nor Mind as also that there are Qualities and Intentional Species to solve the Habits and Memory of Men and such other like things of which they have no particular Notion in their Minds It would take up too much time to enumerate the Errors which this prejudice begets in us almost all the Errors in Physicks are owing to it and whoever attentively considers it will be amaz'd thereat Altho' I 'm unwilling to insist much upon this head yet I can't but take notice of the Contempt which Men commonly have for Insects and other little Animals which are generated as they say out of Corrupted Matter this is an unjust Contempt which is founded only upon the Ignorance of the thing despis'd and the prejudices already mention'd There is nothing Contemptible in Nature all the Works of God are worthy our respect and admiration especially if we consider the admirable ways by which God makes and preserves them The least Flies are as perfect Animals as the biggest Creatures the proportion of their Members is as Just as those of the others and it even seems that God has given them more Ornaments to recompence the littleness of their Bodies they have Crowns Helmets and other Curiosities on their Heads which outdo the most Luxuriant Fancies of Men and I may confidently aver that they who have never seen any thing but with their naked Eye have never beheld any thing so fine so exact and even so magnificent in the Houses of the greatest Princes as what we discover with Microscopes upon the Head of a silly Fly It 's true these things are very small but yet the more surprizing because there are so many Beauties crouded in so small a Space and altho' they are very common yet they are not the less valuable nor less perfect in themselves on the contrary the Wisdom of God is more apparent who hath with so much Magnificence and Profusion perform'd almost an infinite number of Miracles in Creating them Nevertheless our Sight reaches not these Beauties but makes us despise the Works of God so worthy our admiration and because these Animals are little in comparison of our Bodies it makes us consider them as absolutely little and contemptible because of their smâ—llness as if Bodies could be little in themselves Let us then endeavour to distrust the Impressions of our Senses in Judging about the bigness of Bodies and when we say for Example that a Bird is little let us not absolutely
very little We shall clearly see that 't is a fault to imagine so great differences in the Objects of our Senses But I must here mention by the by that there 's nothing to be objected against these Terms Form and Essential difference Hony is certainly Hony by its form and 't is thus that it essentially differs from Salt but this form or this essential difference consists only in the different Configuration of its parts 't is this different Configuration which causes Hony to be Hony and Salt Salt And altho' its only accidental to Matter in general to have the Configuration of the parts of Hony or Salt and so to have the form of Hony or Salt it may nevertheless be said that it is essential to Hony or Salt to be what they are to have such or such a Configuration of Parts Even as Sensations of Cold Heat Pleasure and Pain are not essential to the Soul as a Soul but because it is by these Sensations that it 's said to be sensible of Heat Cold Pleasure and Pain CHAP. XVII I. Another Example drawn from Morals which shows that our Senses only offer us false Goods II. That 't is God only who is our true Good III. The Origine of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stoics IT has been sufficiently proved in my Opinion that this Prejudice Our Sensations are in Objects is a very fruitful Principle of Error in Physics it must now be shown from Reasons drawn from Morals that the same Prejudice join'd with this That Objects are the only and true Causes of our Sensations is also very dangerous There 's nothing so common in the World I. An Example drawn from Morals that our Senses only offer us false Goods as to see Men who are Wedded to Sensible Goods Some love Musick others good Eating and others are passionate for other things Now thus they reason to perswade themselves that all these Objects are Goods viz. All these agreeable Tastes which please us in Banquets these Sounds which affect the Ear and these other Pleasures which we perceive upon other occasions are certainly included in Sensible Objects or at least 't is these Objects that are the occasion of them or in sine we cannot have Sensations without them Now 't is impossible to doubt whether Pleasure be Good whether Pain be Evil we are inwardly convinc'd thereof and consequently the Objects of our Senses are very real Goods which we ought to enjoy that we may be happy This is the Reasoning that we ordinarily I shall explain in the last Book in what sense Objects work upon Bodies and inconsiderately make and this is that which inclines us to believe that our Sensations are in Objects that Objects have in themselves the power of making us Sensible that we look upon things as our Goods which are infinitely below us which can only act upon our Bodies by producing some Motions in their Fibres but can never act upon our Souls or make us sensible of Pleasure or Pain Certainly if it is not the Soul which acts upon it self upon occasion of what passes in the Body nothing else but God can do it and if it is not the Soul which causes Pleasure or Pain according to the different shaking of the Fibres of its Body as it 's very likely it does not since it often perceives Pleasure and Pain without its consent I know no other Hand that is powerful enough to produce this Sensation in it but that of the Author of Nature Indeed there 's none but God that is our true Good II. That 't is God only who is our Good and that all Sensible Objects can't make us sensible of Pleasure 't is he only that can affect us with all these Pleasures we are capable of and who in his Knowledge and Love haâ—â— Decreed to excite them in us And these Pleasures which he hath link'd to the Motions which pass in our Body to make us careful of our own Preservation are very little very weak and very short altho' we are enslav'd to them in this State whereinto Sin has reduc'd us but the Pleasures which he will excite in his Elect in Heaven are infinitely greater since he made us to know and love him for according to the Order of Nature greater Goods affect us with greater Pleasure and since God is infinitely above all things the Pleasure of those that shall enjoy him will certainly surpass all Pleasures What we have said of the Cause of our Errors III. The Original of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stoâ—es in reference to Good does sufficiently inform us of the falsness of the Opinions of the Stoics and Epicureans about the Supream Good The Epicureans placed it in Pleasure and because they felt it as well in Vice as in Vertue and even more commonly in the first than the second they gave themselves up to all sorts of Voluptuousness Now the first Cause of their Error was that Judging falsely there was something agreeable in the Objects of their Senses or that they were the true Causes of the Pleasures they felt and being besides this convinc'd by an inward Sensation which they had in themselves that Pleasure was a Good for them or at least for the time they enjoy'd it they gave themselves up to the Government of all the Passions which they apprehended would not incommode them afterwards whereas they ought to have consider'd that the Pleasure which is felt in Sensible Things cannot be in these things as their true Causes nor after any other manner and consequently that Sensible Goods cannot be such in respect of our Soul They should also have consider'd the other Things which we have explain'd The Stoics on the contrary being perswaded that Sensible Pleasures were only in the Body and for the Body and that the Soul ought to have its particular Good placed its Happiness in Vertue Now this is the Origine of their Errors they believ'd that Sensible Pain and Pleasures were not in the Soul but only in the Body they made use of this false Judgment as a Principle for other false Conclusions as that Pain is not an Evil nor Pleasure a Good That the Pleasures of Sense are not good in themselves but that they are common to Men and Beasts And nevertheless it is easie to show that altho' the Epicureans and Stoics were deceiv'd in many things yet they were in the right in some for the happiness of the Happy consists in an accomplish'd Vertue I would say in the Knowledge and Love of God and is a very great Pleasure which continually attends them Let us then well remember that external Objects include nothing neither agreeable nor disagreeable that they are not the Causes of our Pleasures and that we have no reason either to fear or love them but that God only is to be fear'd and lov'd because he only is able to Punish or Reward us to make us Sensible of Pain or Pleasure In fine 't
she lets go her Metaphysical Thoughts and pure Intellections to apply her self only to her own Sensations Thus it seems Children cannot consider the pure Idea's of Truth with sufficient attention being so often and easily disturbed by the confused Idea's of their Senses Yet we may answer first that it is more easie for a Child of seven years to be deliver'd from the Errors whereinto the Senses lead it than for a person of Sixty who has all his life time followed the prejudices of Infancy Secondly that if a Child is not capable of the clear and distinct Idea's of Truth it is at least capable of being advertised that its Senses deceive it upon every occasion and if we do not teach it the Truth we ought not at least to entertain or fortify it in its Errors And lastly that the youngest Children how wedded soever they may be to agreeable and painful Sensations learn soon what grown Persons can't do in much more time as the Knowledge of the Order and Relations that there is between all Words and all Things which they see and hear For altho' these Things depend chiefly on the Memory yet it is plain enough that they must make great use of their Reason in the manner whereby they learn their Tongue But since the facility that the Fibres of Childrens Brains have for the receiving the impressions of sensible Objects II. Advice for the well Educating of Children is the reason why they are incapable of Judging of abstracted Sciences it is very easie to remedy it For 't is certain that if Children were taken without fear without desires and without hopes if we did not make them suffer pain and if we kept them as much as possible from their little pleasures we might as soon as they cou'd speak teach them the most difficult and most abstracted or at least the most sensible parts of the Mathematics Mechanics and other things of the like Nature which are necessary in the sequel of life But their Minds are not fit to be applied to abstracted Sciences when they are agitated by desires and troubled with frights which is requisite to be well considered For as an ambitious Man who shou'd lose his Riches and Honour or who shou'd have been raised all of a sudden to a great Dignity which he cou'd not have hoped for wou'd not be in a condition to resolve Metaphysical Questions or Algebraick Equations but only to do such things as his present passion inspired him with So Children in whose Brain an Apple and Sugar-plumb make as deep impressions as Offices and Grandeurs do in that of a Man of Forty are not in a condition of hearing such abstracted Truths as we teach them So that it may be affirmed there is nothing more contrary to the advancement of Children in the Sciences than the continual Divertisements wherewith they recompence them and the continual Punishments they threaten them with But what is infinitely more considerable is that these fears of Chastisement and these desires of sensible Recompence with which they fill Childrens Minds extreamly diverts them from Piety Devotion is yet more abstracted than Science it is less relished by corrupted Nature The Mind of Man is very much inclined to Study but it is not so to Piety If therefore great agitations permit us not to study altho' we naturally have some pleasure in it how is it possible that Children which are taken up with sensible Pleasures wherewith they recompence them and with the Pains they fright them with shou'd preserve a sufficient freedom of Mind to give them any inclination to Piety The capacity of the Mind is very much limited many things are not requisite to fill it and when it is full it is incapable of new Thoughts except it empties it self of some it had before But when the Mind is filled with sensible things it cannot part with them when it will to conceive this we must consider we are all naturally inclined to Good and Pleasure being the Character whereby we distinguish it from Evil it is necessary that Pleasures shou'd affect us and employ us more than all the rest Pleasure then being united to the use of sensible things because they are the Goods of Mans Body there is a kind of necessity that these goods shou'd fill the capacity of our Minds until God by imbittering them gives us a distaste and horror of them and by his Grace makes us feel the sweetness of Heaven which effaces all the Pleasures of this World S. Aug. Dando menti caelestem delectationem quâ omnis terrena delectatio superetur But because we are as much inclined to shun Evil as to love Good and Pain is the Character that Nature has united to Evil all that we have said of Pleasure must in a contrary sensce be understood of Pain Since those things therefore that make us feel Pleasure and Pain fill the capacity of the Mind and that it is not in our power to quit or not to be affected with them when we please it is plain that we cannot make Children be inclined to Piety no more than Men if we do not begin with them according to the Precepts of the Gospel by a privation of all things that touch the Senses and which excite great desires and great fears since all the Passions darken and extinguish Grace and that inward love to our Duty which God has implanted in us The least Children have reason as well as Men altho ' they have not experience they have also the same natural inclinations tho' they are carried to very different Objects they must therefore be accustom'd to guide themselves by reason since they have it and excited to their Duty by rightly managing their good Inclinations It destroys their reason and corrupts their best inclinations to engage them to their Duty by sensible impressions They appear then to be in their Duty but 't is only an appearance Virtue is neither engraven in their Mind nor Heart they scarcely know it and they love it much less Their Mind is full of fears and desires of aversions to and love of sensible things which they cannot disingage themselves from to gain their Liberty and to make use of their Reason Thus Children who are educated after this base and servile manner accustom themselves by little and little to a certain insensibility of all the Sentiments of honest Men and good Christians which continues with them all their Lives and when they think themselves freed from Chastisements either by their Authority or Craft they abandon themselves to whatever flatters their Concupiscence and their Senses because indeed they know no other good than what is sensible It is true there are some occurrences wherein it is necessary to instruct Children by their Senses but it must only be done when Reason is not sufficient They must first be perswaded to their Duty by Reason and if they are not capable of acknowledging their obligations to it it will be best
Disposition of their Heart Those who begin their Conversion have commonly need of a prepossessed and an indeliberate Pleasure to free them from their Sensible Goods to which they are united by other preventing and indeliberate Pleasures Sadness and Remorse of Conscience is not enough and they do not yet taste any Joy But the Just can live by Faith and in Want and it 's even in this Condition that they deserve more because Men being reasonable God will be lov'd by them with a Love of Choice rather than with a Love of Instinct and an indeliberate Love like that by which they love Sensible things without knowing them to be Good otherwise than by the Pleasure which they receive from them However the greatest part of Men have little Faith and being continually led to taste Pleasure they cannot long preserve their elective Love for God against a Natural Love for Sensible Goods if their Delight in Grace does not uphold them against the Efforts of Pleasure for a Delight in Grace begets preserves and increases Charity as Sensible Pleasures do Desire It is evident from what has been said V. Of Mens Ignorance That Men being never without some Passion or agreeable or disagreeable Sensations much of the Capacity and Extension of their Mind is taken up with them And when they are willing to employ the rest of their Capacity to examine some Truth they are often diverted by some new Sensations or by a Disgust which they find in this Exercise and by an Inconstancy of the Will which agitates and runs the Mind from one Object to another so that unless they have accustom'd themselves to overcome these Oppositions from their Youth as has been explain'd in the Second Part they will at last be incapable of penetrating into any thing that is a little Difficult or which requires a little Application We must then conclude That all Sciences especially those that include Questions very difficult to be resolv'd are full of an infinite Number of Errors and that we ought to suspect all those great Volumes which are every day composed upon Physicks Natural Philosophy and Morality and especially upon the particular Propositions of these Sciences which are much more compounded than general ones We ought even to judge that these Books are so much the more to be Contemned as they are better received by the generality of Men I mean those who are but little capable of Application and who know not how to make a good use of their Judgment because the Applause of the Vulgar in any difficult Matter is a certain Argument of the Falsity of that Opinion and that it is only maintained upon the delusive Notions of the Senses or some false Lights of the Imagination Yet it is not impossible but that a Man may of himself discover a greater Number of Truths which have been conceal'd from former Ages provided he does not want a good Judgment but lives in some retired place where nothing can divert him if he Seriously apply himself to an enquiry into Truth Wherefore those are very unreasonable who despise the Philosophy of Descartes without knowing it only for this reason because it appears impossible that one Man of himself should be able to discover the Truth in so Mysterious a Subject as that of Nature But if they knew the Manner how this Philosopher lived the Method he took in his Studies to prevent the Capacity of his Mind from being diverted by any other Objects besides those whose Truth he would discover the Clearness of the Idea's upon which he establish'd his Philosophy and generally all the Advantages he had over the Ancients by new Discoveries I say If they consider these things they would doubtless receive a more reasonable Prejudice in favour of Descartes than of Antiquity which Authorizes Aristotle Plato and many others Yet I advise them not to stop at this Prejudice nor to believe that Descartes is a great Man and that his Philosophy is good because he may be advantageously spoke of Descartes was a Man subject to Error and mistakes like others There are none of his Works even not excepting his Geometry wherein there are not some Footsteps of the Weakness of the Humane Mind He must not therefore be believ'd upon his Word but be read with Precaution as he himself advises us to do examining if he was not deceiv'd and believing nothing of what he says but what Evidence and the Secret Reproaches of our Reason oblige us to believe for indeed the Mind knows nothing truly but what it sees evidently We have shown in the preceding Chapters that our Mind is not infinite but on the contrary that it had a very mean Capacity which is commonly filled with the Sensations of the Soul And lastly That the Mind receiving its Direction from the Will cannot firmly consider any Object without being soon diverted from it through its Inconstancy and Levity These things are certainly the most general Causes of our Errors and we might longer insist upon them here but what I have said is sufficient to discover the Weakness of the Humane Mind to Persons that are capable of any Attention In the Fourth and Fifth Book we shall treat more largely of the Errors which our Inclinations and Passions lead us into and of which we have already said something in this Chapter THE SECOND PART OF THE Pure Understanding Of the Nature of IDEA'S CHAP. I. I. What is meant by Idea's That they truly Exist and that they are necessary to perceive all material Objects II. A division of all the Modes by which External Objects may be seen I Think every one will confess that we do not perceive External Objects by themselves We see the Sun the Stars and many Objects without us and it is not probable that the Soul should go out of the Body and walk as it were through the Heavens to Contemplate all those Objects there She does not then see them by themselves and as the immediate Object of Mind when it sees the Sun for instance it is not the Sun but something which is nearly united to our Soul and it is that which I call Idea So that here by this word Idea I mean only what is the immediate Object or the nearest the Mind when it perceives any thing It must be observed that to make the Mind perceive any Object it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Object should be actually present of which we can have no doubt but it is not requisite that there should be some external Object which resembles this Idea for it often happens that we perceive things which are not and which never had a being So that we often have in our Minds real Idea's of things which never were For instance when a Man imagins a Mountain of Gold it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Mountain should be really present to his Mind When a Mad Man a Man in a high Fever or a Man that is
the Water is converted into Wine That as between Three and Four there can be no Number since true Unity is Indivisible so it is necessary that the Water be Converted into the Nature and Essence of the Wine or that the Wine lose its Nature That as all Quaternary Numbers are perfectly alike so the Essence of the Water is perfectly alike in all Waters That as the Number of Three differs Essentially from the Number of Two and that it cannot have the same Proprieties as that has so two Bodies of different Species differ Essentially and in such a manner that they have never the same Proprieties which proceed from Entity and other like things Nevertheless if Men would consider the true Idea's of things with some Attention they would soon discover that all Bodies being Extended their Nature or Essence has nothing resembling Numbers and that it cannot consist in an Indivisible Men do not only suppose Identity Resemblance or Proportion in the Nature Number and Essential Differences of Substances they also suppose them in all things they see Most Men Judge that all the fix'd Stars are fastened to the Heavens as to a Roof at an Equal Distance from the Earth Astronomers did pretend for a long while that the Planets moved in perfect Circles and they have invented a great number of them as Concentriques Excentriques Epicycles c. to Explain the Phoenomena which contradicted their Opinions It is true that in these later Ages the most Learned have Corrected the Errors of the Ancients and believe that the Planets describe Ellipses by their Motion But if they pretend that the Ellipses are Regular as People are inclin'd to believe because the Mind supposes Regularity where it sees no Irregularity they fall into an Error which is more difficult to be Corrected because the Observations that can be made on the Course of the Planets cannot be so Exact and so Just as to shew the Irregularity of their Motions Nothing but Natural Philosophy can Correct that Error for it is infinitely less remarkable than that which we find in the System of perfect Circles But something particular has happened about the Distance and Motion of the Planets For Astronomers not having been able to find an Arithmetical or Geometrical Proportion in the same that being absolutely repugnant to Observations some imagin'd that they observ'd a kind of Proportion which is called Harmonical in their Distances and Motions From thence it is that an * Riccioli Vol. Astronomer of this Age in his New Almageste begins the Section which is Entitled De Systemate Mundi Harmonico with these words There is no Astronomer Neme est paulo eruditior in Astronomicis qui Coelorum ordinem contemplatus non agnoscat harmoniam quamdam in Planetarum intervallis motibus though never so little acquainted in what relates to Astronomy but acknowledges a kind of Harmony in the Motions and Intervals of Planets if he considers the Order of the Heavens Attentively Nor is this the only Author that is of this Opinion For Observations have made him sufficiently sensible of the Extravagancies of that Imaginary Harmony which has nevertheless been admir'd by several Ancient and Modern Authors whose Opinions Father Riccioli Relates and Refutes Moreover some affirm Pythagoras and his Followers to have believ'd that the Heavens by their Regular Motions made a most Wonderful Concert which Men do not hear because they are used to it just like those that Inhabit near the Fall of the Waters of Nile do not hear the Noise of it But I only relate that particular Opinion of the Harmonical Proportion of the Distances and Motions of the Planets to shew that the Mind is delighted with Proportions and that it often Fancies them where they are not The Mind also supposes Uniformity in the duration of things and imagins they are not liable to Change and Instability when it is not in some measure forced by the Relation of the Senses to Judge otherwise All Material Things being Extended are capable of Division and consequently of Corruption Those who reflect on the Nature of Bodies discover Visibly that they are Corruptible Yet there has been a great number of Philosophers who fancied that the Heavens though Material were Incorruptible The Heavens are at too great a Distance from us to discover the Revolutions that happen there and 't is very rare that any happen there so great as to be discovered here That alone has been sufficient to perswade many that they were really Incorruptible And which has the more Confirm'd their Opinion is that they attribute to the Contrariety of Qualities the Corruption to which Sublunary Bodies are subject For as they have never been in the Heavens to see what passes there so they have had no Experience that this Contrariety of Qualities is there which has induced them to believe that there is really no such thing there Therefore they have concluded that the Heavens were free from Corruption because that which Corrupts all Bodies here below according to their Opinion is not above It is Visible that this Argument has no Solidity for I cannot see why there should be no other Cause of Corruption than those Contrarieties of Qualities which they imagin nor upon what Foundation they can affirm That there is neither Heat nor Cold nor Drought nor Moisture in the Heavens That the Sun is not Hot and that Saturn is not Cold. There is some appearance of Reason to say that very hard Stones Glass and other Bodies of that Nature do not Corrupt since we see they subsist long in the same State and though we are near enough to see the Alterations that should happen to them But being at so great a distance as we are from the Heavens it is directly contrary to Reason to conclude that they do not Corrupt because we feel no contrary Qualities in them nor see that they Corrupt Nevertheless some not only say that they Corrupt not but they affirm absolutely that they are Unalterable and Incorruptible And the Peripateticks want but little of saying that the Celestial Bodies are so many Divinities as Aristotle their Master did believe of them The Beauty of the Universe does not consist in the Incorruptibility of its Parts but in the Variety that is found in them And this great Work of the World would not be so admirable without that Vicissitude of things which we observe in it Matter infinitely Extended without Motion and consequently without Form and Corruption would indeed discover the Infinite Power of its Author but it would give no Idea of his Wisdom This is the reason that all Corporeal Things are Corruptible and that there is no Body but what receives some Change which Alters and Corrupts it in Time God Forms even in the Bosom of Stones and Glass Animals more perfect and admirable than all the Works of Men. Those Bodies though very hard and dry are Corrupted in time The Air and Sun to which they are
very Good according to Scripture Valde bona Therefore God Loves them and moreover it is his Love which preserves them for all Beings only subsist because God Loves them Diligis omnia quae sunt says the Wise Man Nihil odisli eorum quae fecisti Nec enim odiens aliquid constituisti fecisti Quomodo autem posset aliquid permanere nisi tu voluisses aut quod à to vocatum non esset conserveretur In effect it is not possible to conceive that things which do not please a Being which is infinitely Perfect and Powerful should subsist since all things only subsist by his Will Therefore God wills his Glory as his principal End and the Preservation of his Creatures for his Glory The Natural Inclinations of Humane Minds being certainly continual Impressions of the Will of him that has created them and does preserve them It is in my Opinion necessary that those Inclinations should be intirely like unto those of their Creator and Preserver Therefore Naturally they can have no principal End but his Glory nor no other Second End but their own Preservation and that of others but always in relation to him from whom they have their Being For it seems undeniable to me that since God cannot desire that the Will he has created should Love an Inferior Good more than a Greater that is That it should Love that which is less Lovely more than that which is more Lovely He can create nothing without inclining it towards himself or commanding it to Love him above all things though he may create it Free and with a Power to withdraw and to stray from him Whereas there is properly but one Love in God III. Human Minds are meerly prone to particular Good through the Tendency they have to Good in General which is the Love of himself And that God can Love nothing but by that Love since he can Love nothing but in relation to himself So God likewise Imprints but one Love in us which is the Love of Good in General and we can Love nothing but by that Love since we can Love nothing but what is or seems to be Good It is the Love of Good in General which is the Principle of our particular Affections since that Love really is nothing but our Will For as I have said already in another place The Will is nothing but the continual Impression of the Author of Nature which inclines the Mind of Man towards Good in General Certainly we must not imagine that this Power we have of Loving proceeds from us or is at our Disposition Nothing but the Power of not Loving well or rather of misplacing our Affections is at our own Disposition by reason that being Free we may apply and actually do apply to particular Objects and consequently to false Objects the Good Love which God does not cease to imprint in us while he does not cease to preserve us But not only our Will or our Love for Good in General proceeds from God but Inclinations for particular Goods which are common to all Men though not equally strong in all Men as our Inclination for the Preservation of our Being and of those that are united to us by Nature are also Impressions of the Will of God upon us for in this place I give promiscuously the Name of Natural Inclinations to all the Impressions of the Author of Nature which are common to all Minds I said but even now that God loved his Creatures IV. The Source of the Chief Natural Inclinations which will make up the Division of this fourth Book and also that it was his Love which gave them to exist and did preserve their Being Therefore as God continually imprints in us a Love like unto his since it is his Will which makes and which regulates ours he likewise gives us all those Natural Inclinations which are not at our Choice and which incline us of necessity to the Preservation of our Being and of those we live with For though Sin has Corrupted all things it has not destroy'd them Although our Natural Inclinations do not always propose God as their End by the Free Choice of our Will God is always their Object in the Institution of Nature For God who produces and preserves them in us only produces and preserves them for himself All Sinners tend towards God by the Impression they receive from God though they withdraw from him by the Error and Distraction of their Mind They love Good for we can never love otherwise since God makes us Love but they Love ill Objects Ill only because God who gives even Sinners the Power of Loving forbids their Loving them because since the Fall they withdraw their Affection from him For Men imagining that Creatures occasion in them the Pleasure they injoy upon their account incline their Affections violently towards the Body and fall into an absolute Forgetfulness of God who does not appear before their Eyes We have still then the same Natural Inclinations or the same Impressions of the Author of Nature which Adam had before the Fall We have even the same Inclinations which the Blessed have in Heaven for God neither Creates nor Preserves any Creatures without giving them a Love like unto his He Loves himself he Loves us he Loves all his Creatures Therefore he Inclines all Humane Minds to Love him to Love themselves and to Love all Creatures But were as all our Inclinations are only Impressions of the Author of Nature which incline us to Love him and all things for his sake they cannot be right unless we love God with all our Power and all things for his sake by the Free Choice of our Will For we cannot without Injustice abuse the Love God gives us for himself by applying it to any thing but himself or which has no relation to himself Thus we are now sensible not only what our Natural Inclinations are but also what they ought to be in order to be well regulated and according to the Institution of their Author For all the Disorder of our Inclinations consists in that we place our final End in our selves and that instead of doing all things in relation to God we do all things in relation to our selves We have then in the first place an Inclination for good in General which is the Principle of all our Natural Inclinations of all our Passions and of all the Free Actions of our Will Secondly We have an Inclination for the Preservation of our Being and of our Happiness Thirdly We have all an Inclination for the other Creatures when they are of use to us or to those we Love Moreover we have several other particular Inclinations which depend on these but we shall speak of them elsewhere We only design in this Fourth Book to refer the Errors of our Inclinations to these three Heads viz. To the Inclination we have to Good in General To Self-Love And to the Love of our Neighbour CHAP. II. I.
in Favour of them That Men are but little attentive to what is spoken at that time That the most Exact are sometimes guilty of it and that they do not desire their Words should be collected like those of Scaliger and of Cardinal du Perron There is some Reason in these Excuses and we are willing to believe that such kind of Faults deserve some Indulgence People are desirous to speak in Conversation but there are unhappy days in which they do not hit things right We are not always in a Humour to think and to express our selves well and Time is so short on certain Occasions that the least Cloud and the least absence of Mind makes those which have the greatest Interest and Penetration of Min stumble unluckily into Extravagant Absurdities But if the Faults which the Pretenders to Learning commit in Conversation are excusable the Faults they are guilty of in their Books after mature Deliberation are by no means pardonable especially if they are frequent and are not aton'd by some good thing For those who write an ill Book make abundance of People lose their time in reading of it besides their falling into the same Errors they are guilty of and this occasions many more which is a thing of very ill Consequence But though it be a greater Fault than People imagine to compose an ill Book or only an useless one it is a Fault that sooner meets with Reward than Punishment For there are Crimes which Men do not punish whether it be that they are in Fashion or because their Reason is not commonly so steady to condemn as Criminals whom they look upon to be Men of better Sense than they are themselves Authors are commonly look'd upon as Extraordinary Men who soar much above others and so they are respected instead of being punish'd Therefore there is no likelihood that Men should ever erect a Tribunal to Examine and Condemn all such Books as only serve to Corrupt Reason So that we must never expect to see the Republick of Letters better regulated than other Republicks are since both are compos'd by Men. Moreover it is very necessary in order to remove Error to allow the Republick of Letters more Liberty than others in which Novelty is always very Dangerous For should the World Incroach upon the Liberty of Learned Men and Condemn all Novelties without Discernment it would confirm us in our Errors Therefore there is no reason to find fault with my speaking against the Government of the Republick of Letters and with â—my endeavouring to show that often those great Men which are admir'd by others for their Profound Learning are at the bottom only Vain Proud Men without Judgment and without any true Science I am oblig'd to speak thus of them least People should blindly submit to their Decisions and follow their Errors The Proofs of their Vanity III. Of the Books of Pretenders to Learning of their Want of Judgment and of their Ignorance are apparent in their own Works Those who will give themselves the Trouble to examine them with an Intent to Judge of them by the Rule of Common Sense and without Prejudice of Esteem for those Authors will find that most of the Designs of their Study are grounded upon an unjudicious Vanity and that their principal End is not to perfect their Reason and much less to regulate the Motions of their Heart but only to Confound others in order to appear more Learned than they This is the Reason as we have already observed that they always fix upon odd extraordinary Subjects and that they only use odd and extraordinary Expressions to explain themselves and quote none but odd and extraordinary Authors They seldom explain themselves in their own Language it is too common nor yet with a clear plain easie Latin they do not speak to be understood but to be admir'd They seldom apply themselves to Subjects which are useful for the Conduct of Life that seems too common to them They neither endeavour to be useful to others nor to themselves but only to be thought Learned They give no Reasons for what they say or else they are such Mysterious and Incomprehensible ones as neither themselves nor any body else conceives with Evidence They have no clear Reasons and if they had they would not use them Those Reasons do not surprise the Mind they look too plain and too common every body is capable of them They rather chuse to relate Authorities to prove or to seem to prove their Thoughts for often the Authorities they alledge prove nothing by the Sense they contain they only prove because they are Greek or Arabick But it will not be amiss to speak of their Quotations it will in some respect discover the Disposition of their Minds It is very evident in my Opinion that nothing but False Learning and the Spirit of Polimathy could make Quotations so much in vogue as they have been hitherto and as they are still among some of the Learned for it is not very difficult to find Authors who quote large Passages every Moment without any reason for it either because the things they advance are so clear that no body doubts them or because they are so Obscure that the Authority of their Authors cannot prove them Or lastly Because the Quotations they alledge can add no Ornament to what they say It is repugnant to Common Sense to introduce a large Greek Passage to prove that the Air is Transparent because it is a thing that is known by every body To use the Authority of Aristotle to persuade us that there are Intelligences which move the Heavens because it is evident that Aristotle could know nothing of it Or to mix Forteign Languages Arabick and Persian Proverbs in French and Latin Books compos'd for every bodies use because those Quotations can add no Ornaments to them or else they are Fanrastical Ornaments which disoblige a great many People and can oblige but very few Nevertheless most of those that would be thought Learned take so much delight in those kind of Quotations that they are not asham'd sometimes to introduce them in Languages they do not understand and they strain hard to force an Arabick Passage into their Books which perhaps they cannot read Thus they puzzle themselves to compass a thing which is contrary to Common Sense yet pleases their Vanity and makes them cry'd up by Fools They have also another Defect which is very considerable and that is They take little care to show they have read with Choice and Judgment they only desire to appear to have read much and particularly Obscure Books in order to be thought great Scholars Books that are Scarce and Dear least People should think they want any thing Wicked and Impious Books which Honest Men dare not read Just like those that brag of Crimes which others dare not commit Therefore they will rather quote you very Dear very Scarce very Ancient and very Obscure Books than such as
that is Because they shall be Happy Those that suffer Persecution for Justice are thereby Just Virtuous and Perfect because they are in the Order that God has prescrib'd and Perfection consists in following him but they are not Happy because they Suffer A time will come when they will Suffer no more and then they will be Happy as well as Just and Perfect However I do not deny but that the Righteous may be Happy in some measure even in this Life by the strength of their Hope and Faith which render those future Felicities as it were present to their Mind For it is certain that when the Hope of some Happiness is strong and lively it draws it nearer to the Mind and gives it a taste thereof before-hand And thus it makes us Happy in some measure since it is the taste and possession of Good and of Pleasure which makes us Happy Therefore it is unreasonable to tell Men that sensible Pleasures are not Good and that those that enjoy them are never the Happier since it is not true and at the time of Temptation they discover it to their misfortune We must tell them that those Pleasures are good in themselves and capable to make them Happy in some measure Nevertheless they ought to avoid them for the Reasons beforementioned but they cannot avoid them of themselves Because they desire to be Happy through an Inclination which they cannot overcome and those transitory Pleasures which they ought to avoid satisfie it in some measure Thus they are in a miserable Necessity of losing themselves unless they are assisted It is necessary to tell them these things that they may distinctly know their Weakness and the want they have of a Redeemer We must speak to Men like Jesus Christ and not like the Stoicks who neither understand the Nature nor Distemper of Human Minds They must continually be told that they must hate and despise themselves and not look for an Establishment or Happiness on Earth That they must daily carry their Cross or the Instrument of their suffering and that they must lose their Life at present in order to preserve it Eternally They must be taught that they are oblig'd to act contrary to their desire to make 'em sensible of their inability to good For Men wou'd be invincibly Happy and they cannot be actually so unless they do what they please Perhaps being convinced of their present Evils and knowing their future sufferings they may humble themselves on Earth Perhaps they may invoke the Assistance of Heaven and seek a Mediatour be afraid of sensible Objects and timely abhor whatever flatters their Senses and Concupiscence And it may be they may thus obtain that Spirit of Prayer and Repentance which is so necessary to obtain Grace and without which there is no Power no Health nor no Salvation to be expected We are inwardly convinc'd that Pleasure is Good II. It must not incline us to the Love of sensible Delights and that the inward Conviction thereof is not False for Pleasure is really Good We are Naturally Convinc'd that Pleasure is the Character of Good and that Natural Conviction is certainly true for that which Causes Pleasure is certainly very Good and very Lovely But we are not convinc'd that either sensible Objects or our Souls themselves are capable of producing Pleasure in us for there is no reason to believe it and there are a Thousand against it Therefore sensible Objects are neither Good nor Lovely Were they necessary toward the Preservation of Life we ought to use them But as they are not capable of Acting in us we ought not to Love them The Soul must only Love him that is Good who only is capable to make it Happier and more perfect Therefore it should only Love that which is above it since it can receive its Perfection from nothing that is either below or equal to it But whereas we judge that a Thing is the Cause of some Effect when it always attends it we fancy that they are Sensible Objects which act in us because at their approach we have new Sensations and because we do not see him that produces them really in us We taste a Fruit and we find a Sweetness we impute that Sweetness to that Fruit we conclude that it causes it and even that it contains it We do not see God as we see and as we feel that Fruit we do not so much as think on him nor perhaps on our selves Therefore we do not conclude that God is the real Cause of that Sweetness nor that the said Sweetness is a Modification of our Soul we impute both the Cause and the Effect to that Fruit which we eat What I have said of Sensations which have a relation to the Body is also to be understood of those that have no relation to it as those which are found in pure Intelligences The Mind considers it self it sees that nothing is wanting to its Happiness and Perfection or else it sees that it does not possess what it desires At the sight of its Happiness it feels Joy at the sight of its Misfortunes it endures Sorrow It straight fancies that it is the sight of its Happiness which produces in it self that Sentiment of Joy because the said Sentiment always attends that sight It also imagines that it is the sight of its Misfortune which produces in it self that Sentiment of Grief since the said Sentiment is the Consequence of this sight The real Cause of those Sentiments which is God alone does not appear before it It does not so much as think on God for he acts in us without our knowing it God rewards us with a Sentiment of Joy when we know that we are in the Condition in which we ought to be that we may remain in it that our Disquiet may cease and that we may fully enjoy our Happiness without suffering the Capacity of our Mind to be filled with any thing else But he produces a Sentiment of Grief in us when we are Sensible that we are not in the State in which we ought to be so that we may not remain in it and that we might earnestly seek after the Perfection that is wanting in us For God pushes us continually toward Good when we are Sensible that we do not possess it and he fixes us powerfully upon it when we find that we possess it fully So that it seems evident to me that the Intellectual Sentiments of Joy or of Grief as well as the Sensible ones are no voluntary Productions of the Mind Therefore we ought continually to acknowledge by our Reason that Invisible Hand which fills us with Bliss and which disguises it self to our Mind under Sensible Appearances We must Adore it we must Love it but we must also Fear it for since it fills us with Pleasures it may also overwhelm us with Grief We ought to Love it by a Love of Choice by a Sensible Love by a Love worthy of God when
us well to remember that the Violent Inclinations we have for Divertisements Pleasures and generally for all that does affect us throws us into a great number of Errors Because the Capacity of our Mind being Bounded that Inclination withdraws our Mind continually from the Attention we should give to the clear and distinct Idea's of the Understanding which are proper to discover Truth to apply it to the false obscure and deceitful Idea's of our Senses which Influence the Will more by the hope of Good and Pleasure than they Instruct the Mind by their Light and Evidence CHAP. XII Of the Effects which the thought of Future Bliss and Sufferings is capable of producing in the Mind IF it happens often that the little Pleasures and slight Pains which we actually feel nay more which we have a Prospect of strangely disturb our Imagination and hinder us from judging of things according to their true Idea's we have no reason to believe that the prospect of Eternity cannot act upon our Mind But it will be necessary to consider what it may be capable of producing there We must observe in the First Place that the hopes of an Eternity of Pleasures does not Act so powerfully upon the Mind as the fear of an Eternity of Torments The Reason of it is Men do not Love Pleasure so much as they Hate Pain Moreover by the Internal Knowledge they have of their Disorders they are sensible that they deserve Hell and they see nothing in themselves to Merit such great Rewards as to participate of the Felicity of God himself They are sensible when they please and even sometimes against their Will that far from deserving Rewards they are worthy of the greatest Chastisements for their Conscience never leaves them but they are in the like manner continually convinc'd that God is willing to shew his Mercy upon Sinners after having satisfy'd his Justice upon his Son Therefore the Just themselves have more Lively Apprehensions of the Eternity of Torments than Hopes of an Eternity of Pleasures The prospect of Pain then consequently is more prevailing than the prospect of Reward and here is partly that which it is capable of producing not alone but as a principal Cause It produces an infinite number of Scruples in the Mind and confirms them so much that it is almost impossible to get rid of them It Extends as it were even Faith to prejudices and makes us pay the Worship which is only due to God to Imaginary Powers It obstinately fixes the Mind on vain or dangerous Superstitions It makes Men earnestly and zealously Embrace Human Traditions and Practices that are useless for Salvation Judaick and Pharisaick Devotions which have been invented by servile Fear Finally it sometimes throws Men into a blindness of Despair Insomuch that looking confusedly on Death as an Annihilation they foolishly hasten to make away with themselves to be freed of the Mortal Disquiets which possess and frighten them There is often more Charity than Self-Love in the Scrupulous as well as in the Superstitious but there is nothing but Self-love in the desperate For taking the thing rightly those must needs Love themselves extreamly who chuse rather not to be than to be uneasie Women Young People and Weak Minds are the most subject to Scruples and Superstitions and Men are more liable to Despair It is easie to know the reason of these things For it is Visible that the Idea of Eternity being the greatest the most terrible and the most frightful of all those that surprise the Mind and strike the Imagination it is necessary it should be attended with a long Train of Accessory Idea's to make together a considerable Effect upon the Mind because of the Relation they have to that great and terrible Idea of Eternity Whatever has any relation to Infinity cannot be Little or if it is Little in itself it receives an immense greatness by that Relation which cannot be compar'd to any thing that is Finite Therefore whatever has any relation or even what we fancy to have any relation either to an unavoidable Eternity of Torments or Delights which is propos'd to us must needs frighten those Minds that are capable of any Reflection or Thought The Fibers of the Brains of Women or young People and of weak Minds being as I have said elsewhere Soft and Flexible receive deep Marks of one of these two And when they have abundance of Spirits and are more capable of Thought and Just Reflection they receive by the Vivacity of their Imagination a very great number of false Impressions and Accessary Idea's which have no Natural Relation to the Principal Idea Nevertheless that Relation though Imaginary maintains and fortifies those False Impressions and Accessary Idea's which it has created When two Lawyers are ingag'd in some great Cause which wholly takes up their Mind and yet do not understand the Case they often have vain Fears being in dread that certain things may Prejudice them which the Judges have no regard to and which experienced Lawyers do not fear The Affair being of very great Consequence to them the Motion it produces in their Brains diffuses it self and is communicated to distant traces which have naturally no relation to it It fares just in the same manner with the Scrupulous they unreasonably form to themselves Subjects of Fear and Disquiet and instead of examining the Will of God in the Holy Scriptures and of relying on those whose Imagination is not tainted their Mind is wholly taken up with an Imaginary Law which disorderly Motions of Fear impress on their Brains And though they are inwardly convinc'd of their Weakness and that God does not require from them certain Duties which they prescribe to themselves since they hinder them from serving him they cannot forbear preferring their Imagination to their Understanding and from submitting rather to certain Confused Sentiments which frighten and plunge them into Error than to the Evidence of Reason which gives them Assurance and leads them again into the right way to Heaven We meet often with a great deal of Charity and Virtue in Persons that are afflicted with Scruples but there is not near so much in those that are addicted to some Superstitions and who imploy themselves chiefly about some Judaick or Pharisaick Practices God will be ador'd in Spirit and in Truth He is not satisfied with Gestures and External Civilities as kneeling in his Presence and being Praised by the Motion of the Lips when the Heart has no share in it Men indeed are satisfied with those Marks of Respect but 't is because they cannot search into the Heart for even Men would be serv'd in Spirit and in Truth God requires our Mind and our Heart he has only made it for himself and he only preserves it for himself But there are many People who unfortunately for themselves refuse him those things over which he has absolute Right They harbour Idols in their Hearts which they adore in Spirit
of our Prince and even the new Discoveries of the new World seem to add something to our Subsistance Being united to all these things we rejoyce at their Grandeur and Extension we could even wish that this World had no Limits and that thought of some Philosophers that the Works of God have no Bounds does not only seem worthy of God but also very agreeable to Man who feels a Secret Joy at his being a part of Infinity because as little as he is in himself he fancies that he becomes as it were Infinite by defusing himself into the Infinite Beings that are about him It is true that the Union which we have with all the Bodies that move in those great Spaces is not very strict and therefore it is not Sensible to most Men And there are some who matter the new Discoveries that are made in the Heavens so little that one might believe they are no-wise united to it by Nature if it were not known that it is either for want of Knowledge or because they are too much engag'd to other things The Soul though united to the Body it Animates does not always feel the Motions of it or if it does it does not always apply it self to them The Passion which moves it being sometimes greater than the Sensations which affects it it seems to be more powerfully engag'd to the Object of its Passion than to its own Body For it is principally by the Passions that the Soul defuses it self upon External Objects that it feels it is really united to every thing about it as it is chiefly by Sensation that it defuses it self in its own Body and is Sensible that it is united to all the Parts that Compose it But whereas one cannot conclude that the Soul of a Passionate Person is not united to his Body because he is prodigal of his Life and takes no Care for the Preservation of it So there is no reason to imagine that we are not naturally engag'd to all things because there are some for which we are not concern'd Would you for Example know whether Men are united to their Prince or their Country Seek out some who understand their Interest and have no particular Affairs to take up their Mind Then you will see how Earnest they are for News their Disquiet for Battles their Joy for Victories their Affliction in Defeats There you will clearly see that Men are strictly united to their Prince and their Country In like manner Would you know whether Men are united to China Japan or the Planets and fix'd Stars Seek out some or else imagine some whose Country and Family enjoy a profound Peace that have no particular Passions and that do not actually feel the Union that unites them to things that are nearer us than the Heavens and you will find that if they have any Knowledge of the Greatness and Nature of those Stars they will rejoyce at the Discovery of any of them they will consider them with Pleasure and if they are Ingenious they will willingly take the Trouble to observe and Calculate their Motions Those who are busied with Assairs seldom mind whether any Comet appears or whether there is an Eclipse But those who are not so closely united to the things that are near them are very fond of these sort of Events because there is nothing to which we are not united though we do not always feel it as we do not always feel that our Soul is united I do not say to our Arm or to our Hand but to our Heart and to our Brain The strongest Natural Union which God has put between us and his Works is that which united us with those Men we live with God has commanded us to Love them like our selves and that the Love of Choice by which we love them may be Firm and Constant he upholds and strengthens it continually by a Natural Love which he imprints in us In order thereunto he has laid upon us some Invisible Tyes which necessarily oblige us to Love them to watch their Preservation like our own to look upon them as necessary parts to the whole which we compose with them and without which we cannot Subsist There is nothing more Admirable than those Natural Relations which are found betwixt the Inclinations of the Minds of Men between the Motions of their Bodies and between these Inclinations and Motions All this Secret Chain is a Wonder which can never be sufficiently admir'd and which can never be apprehended At the sight of any Pain which Surprises or that is felt for example we cry out that Cry which often comes out before we are aware of it by the Disposition of the Machine Infallibly strikes the Ears of those that are near enough to afford us the Assistance we stand in need of It penetrates through them and makes it self understood to People of all Nations and of all Qualities whatever for that Cry is of all Languages and of all Qualities as indeed it ought to be It moves the Brain and in a Moment changes the whole Disposition of the Body of those that are struck by it Morcover it makes them run to assist before they are aware of it But it is not long without acting upon the Mind and without obliging them to be willing to relieve them and of thinking of Means to secure those that have made that Natural Prayer provided always the said Prayer or rather this pressing Command be Just and according to the Rules of Society For an Indiscreet Cry made without a Cause or out of a vain Fear produces Indignation and Scorn in the Assistants instead of Compassion because in crying without a cause we abuse things establish'd by Nature for our Preservation That Indiscreet Cry naturally produces Aversion and the Desire of revenging the Abuse that has been offer'd to Nature I mean to the Order of things provided he that made it did it voluntarily But it ought only to produce the Passion of Laughter mix'd with some Compassion without Aversion and a Desire of Revenge when it proceeds from Fear that is from a false Appearance of a pressing Necessity which has induced any one to cry out For Laughter or Jest is necessary to repel their Fear and to correct them and Compassion is necessary to Succor them as Weak It is impossible to conceive any thing better order'd I do not pretend to explain by Example which are the Springs and the Relations which the Author of Nature has placed in the Brains of Men and all Animals to maintain the Consent and Union which is necessary for their Preservation I only make some Reflections upon those Springs that People may think upon them and may carefully inquire not how those Springs move nor how their Motion is communicated by the Air by the Light and by all the little Bodies that surround us for that is almost Incomprehensible and is not necessary but at least to know what are the Effects of it One may
of Dislike which for instance proceeds from the strong Imagination they have of the Dirt in what they Eat The reason of it is that when two Motions are made in the Brain at the same time the one is never excited after the other except it be after a considerable time Thus because the agreeable Sensation never comes without this other disgustful one and because we confound things that are produced at the same time we imagine that this Sensation that was formerly agreeable to us is now no longer so Yet if it is always the same it is necessary that it should always be agreeable So that if we imagine it is not agreeable 't is because it is join'd and confounded with another that causes more distaste than the other does of agreeableness There is more difficulty to prove that Colours and some other Sensations which I have called weak and languishing are not the same in all Men because all those Sensations so little affect the Soul that we cannot distinguish them so well as we can Tastes or other Sensations more strong and lively the one being more agreeable than the other and thus to discover the diversity of Sensations that are found in different Persons by the variety of their pleasure or dislike Reason which always shows that the other Sensations are not the same in different Persons tells us also that there will be a variety in the Sensations they have of Colours And indeed there is no doubt but there is much diversity in the Organs of Sight in different Persons as well as in those of the Ear or the Taste for there is no reason to suppose a perfect resemblance in the disposition of the Optic Nerve in all Men since there is an infinite variety in every thing in Nature and chiefly in those that are Material 't is therefore very probable that all Men see not the same Colours in the same Objects Yet I believe it never or very rarely happens that Persons see White or Black to be of any other Colour than we do altho' they do not see it equally White or Black But for mixt Colours as Red Yellow and Blue and chiefly such as are compounded of all three I believe there are few Persons who have perfectly the same Sensation of them For Instance there are some Persons who when they look upon cettain Bodies with one Eye take them to be Yellow and when they behold them with the other see them to be Green or Blue yet if we suppos'd these Persons Born blind of one Eye or with both their Eyes so dispos'd to see that Blue which we call Green they wou'd believe they saw Objects of the same colour as we see them because by Green or Blue they wou'd always have understood what they see Yellow or Red. We may further prove that all Men see not the same Objects of the same Colour because according to the observation of some the same Colours do not equally please all sorts of Persons and if these Sensations were the same they wou'd be equally agreeable to all Men but because very weighty doubts may be raised against the Answer I have given to the precedent Objection I do not believe it solid enough to insist upon it Indeed it is very seldom that we are as much more pleased with one Colour than another even as we are much more pleased with one Taste than another The reason is the Sensations of Colours are not given us to Judge whether or no Bodies are proper for our Nourishment that is distinguished by Pleasure and Pain which are the Natural Characters of Good and Evil Objects in respect to their Colour are neither good nor bad to Eat If Objects appear agreeable or disagreeable to us in respect to their Colour their sight wou'd be always followed with the course of those Spirits which excite and accompany the Passions since the Soul cannot be touched without moving it and we shou'd often hate good Things and love bad so that we shou'd not long preserve our lives In fine the Sensations of Colours are only given us to distinguish Bodies from one another and therefore it does as well if we see Herbs Red as if we see them Green provided the Person that sees them Red or Green sees them always after the same manner But we have said enough of these Sensations let us now speak of Natural Judgments and the free Judgments which accompany them which is the fourth thing that we confound with the three others that we have already mention'd CHAP. XIV I. Of the false Judgments that accompany our Sensations and which we confound with them II. Reasons of these false Judgments III. That Error is not in our Sensations but only in these Judgments 'T IS easily foreseen I. Of the false Judgments that accompany our Sensations and which we confound with them that we shall not meet with many Persons that will not be offended with this General Proposition that I here advance viz. That we have no Sensation of External Objects which include not one or many Judgments we know very well that the generality of the World do not believe that there is so much as one Judgment in our Sensations either true or false so that these Persons being surprized with the Novelty of this Proposition will say without doubt in themselves But how can it be I do not Judge this Wall to be white I see very well what it is Nor do I Judge Pain to be in my Hand I most certainly feel it to be there And who can doubt of things so certain if they do not feel Objects otherwise than I do Indeed their Inclinations for the Prejudices which they have imbib'd from their Infancy carries them much further and if they do not Reproach and Contemn those whom they believe to be perswaded of a contrary Opinion to their own without doubt they deserve to be placed in the Number of Moderate Persons But we must not here stay to Prophesie of the ill success of our Thoughts it will be more to the purpose to endeavour to produce them with the strongest Proofs and so clearly discover them that they may be no sooner well examin'd or attentively consider'd but they must be submitted to Since 't is necessary to prove that we have no Sensation of External Objects which does not include some false Judgment take it thus It seems Indisputable to me that our Souls do not fill those vast Spaces which are between us and the fixt Stars altho' it shou'd be granted that themselves are extended so likewise it is not reasonable to believe that our Souls are in the Firmament when they behold the fixt Stars there Nor is it Credible that they should go out of their Bodies a thousand Paces to see Houses at that distance It is therefore necessary that our Souls see Houses and Stars where they are not since it goes not out of the Body where it is and yet sees them out
of it self Now as the Stars which are immediately united to the Soul which are those only that it can see are not in the Heavens it from thence follows that all Men who see Stars in the Heavens and afterwards voluntarily Judging that they are there make two false Judgments whereof the one is Natural and the other Free One is a Judgment of the Senses or a Compounded Sensation according to which we ought not to Judge the other is a Free Judgment of the Will which we cannot hinder our selves from making and by conquence which we ought not to do if we would avoid Error But the reason that we believe that these Stars II. The Reasons of these false Judgments which we see immediately are out of the Soul and in the Firmament is because it is not in the power of the Soul to see them when it pleases for it cannot perceive them when the Motions to which the Idea's of these Objects are Naturally ty'd happen in its Brain Now because the Soul perceives not the Motions of its Organs but only its own Sensations and that it knows these same Sensations are not produced in it by its own power it is induced to Judge that they are without and in the cause which represents them to it and it hath so often made these kind of Judgments in the same time it perceived the Objects that it can scarcely hinder it self from making them It will be very necessary to explain the foundation of what I have said to shew the usefulness of this infinite number of little Beings that we call Species and Idea's which are as nothing and which represent all things that we create and destroy when we please and that our Ignorance hath made us imagine to render a Reason for things that we understand not We shou'd show the solidity of their Opinion who believe God is the true Father of Light who only Instructs all Men without whom the most simple Truths cou'd not be Intelligible and the Sun tho' never so bright wou'd not be so much as Visible to us who acknowledge no other Nature than the Will of God and who upon these Reflexions have confessed that the Idea's which represent the Creatures to us are only the Perfections of God which answer to these same Creatures and represent them to us It wou'd be requisite also to show the Nature of Idea's and then it wou'd be easie to speak more clearly of what I have mentioned but that it wou'd carry us too far In the third Book these things shall be more fully explained and order requires it shou'd be referred till then It suffices for the present that I bring a most Sensible and Indisputable Example wherein we shall find many Judgments confounded with one and the same Sensation I believe there is no body in the World who looks upon the Moon but sees it about a thousand Paces from himself and who thinks it not greater when it Rises or Sets than when it is very high above the Horizon and it may be also that we only believe we see it greater without thinking that we make any Judgment in its Sensation Yet it is Indisputable that if there was not some kind of Judgment included in the Sensation we shou'd not see the Moon in the distance it appears to be And besides it wou'd appear less to us when it rises than when it is got a great way above the Horizon since we see it great when it rises only because we believe it farther off by a Natural Judgment which I have spoken of in the 6th Chapter But besides our Natural Judgments which we may look upon as compounded Sensations there is almost in all our Sensations a free Judgment for Men not only determine by a Natural Judgment that Pain for instance is in their Hand but they also make a free Judgment thereof they not only feel it there but likewise believe it so and have so habituated themselves to form such Judgments that they find it very difficult to avoid it Yet these Judgments are very false in themselves altho' very useful for the preservation of Life for our Senses Instruct us only for our Bodies and all our free Judgments which are conformable to our Senses are very far from the Truth But that we may not leave all these things without giving some Means to discover the Reasons thereof we must know that there are two sorts of Beings such as our Soul sees immediately and others that it knows only through the Means of the first For Instance when I perceive the Sun rising I first perceive that which I see immediately and because I perceive that first Sun only by reason there is something without me which produces certain Motions in my Eyes and Brain I Judge that this first Sun which is in my Soul is without and that it Exists It may further happen that we see this first Sun which is intirely united to our Soul tho' the other be not upon the Horizon and even whether it exists or no so we may see this first Sun greater when the other rises than when it is very high and altho' it be true that this first Sun that we immediately see be greater than the other rises it follows not from thence that this other be greater for 't is not properly that which rises that we see since it is distant from us many Millions of Miles but it is that first that is truly greater and such as we see it because all things that we immediately see are always what we see them to be and we deceive our selves only because we Judge that what we immediately see is in the External Object which causes that Vision in us So when we see Light in seeing this first Sun which is immediately united to our Mind we do not deceive our selves in believing we see it it is not possible to doubt thereof But our Error is our Willing without any Reason nay against all Reason that this Light that we immediately see exists in the Sun which is without us 'T is also the same thing in respect to other Objects of our Senses III. Error is not in our Sensations but only in our Judgments If we observe carefully what has been said in the beginning and continuation of this Work we shall easily see that of all things that happen in each Sensation Error proceeds from the Judgments we make by which we think that our Sensations are in the Objects First it is not an Error to be ignorant that the Action of Objects consists in the Motion of some of their parts and that this Motion communicates it self to the Organs of our Senses which are the two first things to be observed in each Sensation for there is a great deal of difference between being ignorant of a thing and having a false Notion of it Secondly we deceive our selves not in the third which is properly Sensation when we feel Heat see Light Colours