be confined to one place more then to another yea to the Court of Heaven rather then to the basest corner of the earthe is so absurd to my judgement that I professe ingenuously all the reason and witt that I have is not sufficient to make it good of Angells as being Spirits abstract from materiall extension And I will remember how Aquinas makes Angells to be in place only in respect of their operation And places are for the natures of bodies and not of Spirits and Durand discoursethe strange things of the nature of Angells and such things as I am willingly content they should continue as they doe without the reach of my comprehension How much more absurd were it to confine the essence of God more to one place then to another And indeede to my judgement to be in place is too base a denomination to be attributed unto God And Durand as allready I have shewed professethe that God secundum se is in no place but only secundum effectus and so every where for as much as he fillethe all places with his effects And as God is sayde to have bene in seipso in himselfe before the World was made is he not so to be accoumpted still according to those verses of course in this argument Dic ubi tunc esset cum praeter eum nihil esses Tunc ubi nunc inse quoniam sibi sufficit ipse And is there not reason for it For Gods essence hathe no respect to outward thinges as his power hathe and his operation hathe And see whether by ascribing place to him you shall not be driven to acknowledge that God is in Uacuo which opinion but erst you impugned For suppose many Angells existent in the ayre as some are called Princes of the ayre and so within the hollowe of the moone and suppose God should annihilate all that body of Element or Elements within the hollowe of the moone the bodies and spheares of the Heavens only remayninge It will not followe herehence that the Angells supposed to be within the hollowe of the moone shall be annihilated because they being abstract substances and undependant on any matter shall exist still and consequently shall be in Uacuo For Uacuum is only a voydenes of bodies not of Spirits And who doubts but that God could have created spirituall substances only and not bodily in which case they must be sayde to be in Uacuo or no where without them Then agayne suppose these Spirits themselfes within the hollowe of the moone shoulde be annihilated yet God shall not cease to be existent there upon the annihilation of Angells like as Angells did not cease to exist there upon the annihilation of bodies and consequently God himselfe shall exist in Vacuo and all this commeth to passe by placing his essence there in distinction from his presence and from his power Doe not all confesse that God is no where without himselfe as conteyned but only as conteyninge now to conteyne is the worke of his power and of his will not of his essence save as his essence and power and will are all one realitie in God And so God may be sayde to be every where not only three manner of wayes to witt by his essence by his presence by his power but more manner of wayes to witt by his knowledge by his wisedome by his will by his goodnes Yet all these shall be but one way as all these are but one in God But yet in proper speeche as Gods essence is no where but it may content us to say that God ever was and is in himselfe only so his goodnes is no where but in himselfe his knowledge wisedome and understanding no where but in himselfe his will mercy and justice no where but in himselfe his power to make to preserve to worke no where but in himselfe but the operations of all these united in himselfe are every where and so sayth Durand God fillethe all thinges with his sweete influence and effects of his power wisedome and goodnes all which are as it were the Trinitie of his one essence Thus we may say his power and wisedome and goodnes reachethe unto the earthe and to every thinge within this canopy eyther by way of influence naturall or by way of influence gracious like as in the Pallace of the third Heaven by way of influence glorious All which are not properly his wisedome and power and goodnes but rather the effects of them of them I say which yet are all one thinge with his essence But Gods essence is such as implyethe no respect unto outward thinges as his wisedome power and goodnes doe bothe in the way of mercy and in the way of judgement It implyes contradiction to affirme his power or wisedome to be more infinite then his essence if so be we conceave his power and wisedome to be his essence And yet to be in many places more then another thing is is not to make it infinite because all places put together are but finite much lesse to make it more infinite Not only some great Schoolemen as you speake but all of them for ought I knowe to the contrary distinguishe of Gods being in all thinges by his essence by his power by his prosence and so the vulgar verse runnes Enter praesenter Deus est ubique potenter Allthoughe they take severall courses in the explication of them as we may reade in Vasquez Three of which explications he takes upon him to confute to witt that of Alexander Halensis as allso the way of Bonaventure and lastly the way of Durand resteth himselfe upon the explication of Aquinas followed as he saythe by Cajetan Albertus Aegidius Ricardus Capreolus Gabriel the exposition there set downe is this 1. God is in all thinges by his essence because his substance is not distant from things but joyned with them whether in respect of himselfe or in respect of his operation 2. By his presence because he knowes all thinges 3. By his power because his power reachethe unto every thinge Nowe I freely professe I cannot satisfy my selfe in this distinction And to my judgement presence is only in respect of essence or of that individuall substance whatsoever it be which is sayde to be present whether it hathe knowledge or no what power soever it hath much or litle whether it worke or no. Nowe the essence of God is never parted from his knowledge and power And God indeede cannot be sayde in proper speeche to be more distant from one place or thinge then from any other But he may be sayde I confesse to be in one place more then in another in as much as he dothe manifest himselfe more in one place then in another He is in all places as the Author of nature communicating the gifts of nature in speciall sort he is sayde to be in his Church as the Author of grace communicating the gifts of grace but in most
no light unto it but barely suppose the truthe of it Secondly because you limit it in comparison of the like causes before the flood As if there were no Anakims knowne since the flood Of late yeares in the place where I dwell hathe bene taken up the bone of a mans legge broken in the digging of a well the bare bone was measured to be two and twentie inches about in the calfe and the spurre about the heele was founde allso that of a very vast proportion It seemes the whole body lyethe there If King Iames were alive and heard of it it is like enoughe that out of his curious and Scholasticall Spirite wherby he was caryed to the investigation of strange things he woulde give order that the body might be digged up the parts to be kept as monuments of the great proportion and stature of men in former times As touching the stature of men in these dayes what dothe Capteyne Smith write by his owne experience of the Sasque Sahanocts borderers upon Virginia on the Northe He professethe they seemed like Gyants to the Englishe One of their weroâ—nees that came aboord the Englishe the calfe of his legge was 3. quartars of a yard about and the rest of his limbes answearable to that proportion Sure I am the siege of Troy was since the flood and Homer writinge of the stone that Aeneas tooke up to throwe at his enimies calleth it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And he was litle acquainted with Noahs flood that sayde Terra malos homines nunc educat atque pusillos Thirdly in these dayes some are very lowe some very tall of stature in comparison yet the vigour of causes nutritive and augmentative is the same to each So in all likelihood both before the flood and after such difference was founde The Spyes sent by Iosuah to take a viewe of the land of Canaan having seene the Sonnes of Anak seemed in their owne sight but as grassehoppers in comparison unto them Yet the vigour of foode and nourishment was the same to both Farre better reasons might be alleaged if I mistake not of this difference and withall I see no reason to the contrary but that men might be of a great stature in these dayes as in former times and that by course of nature if it pleased God to have it so But I have no edge to enter upon this discourse it is unseasonable and I desire rather to deale with you in matter of Divinitie and especially to encounter you in your Arminian Tenets The question followinge why vegetables of greatest vigour doe not ingrosse the properties of others lesse vigorous is a senseles question For whether you understande it of vegetables in the same kinde or of a diverse kinde it is ridiculous As for example Woulde any sober man enquire after the cause why that vegetable which is of the greatest heate hathe not the propertie of such a vegetable that is of lesse heate Or why that which is vigourous in heate hathe not the propertie of that which is vigorous in colde or in any other disparate qualitie Nay why shoulde any man expect a reason why different kindes of thinges have different qualities Is it not satisfaction sufficient to consider that they are different kindes of things and therfore no merveyle if they have different properties The cause herof derived from the vigour of that which propagates is very unsound For that which propagates and that which is propagated is of the same kinde and consequently of the same propertie And the question proceedes equally as well of the one as of the other If you shoulde aske how it comes to passe that man is not so intelligent a creature as an Angell it were very absurde to say the reason is because the Father of a man was not so intelligent as an Angell and therfore he coulde not propagate a man as intelligent as an Angell least so he shoulde propagate a more intelligent creature then himselfe I say this manner of answeare woulde give little satisfaction For the question was made of man not of this man in particular but of mankind which comprehendes the Father as wel as the Sonne And agayne the Sonne may be more intelligent then the Father though not after the same manner intelligent as the Angells are The followinge question is as litle worthe the proposinge as the former For what hostilitie is to be feared betweene the ayre and the water But you make choyse to instance in the hostilitie betweene the earthe and the water as a matter of dangerous consequence You demaunde the reason why the restles or raging water swallowes not up the dull earth I had thought the earthe had bene fitter to swallowe up water then water to swallowe up earthe For suppose the Sea shoulde overflowe the Land shoulde it therby be sayde to swallowe it up Then belike the bottome of the Sea is swallowed up by the Sea And by the same reason the Element of the Ayre swalloweth up both Sea and Land because it covereth them and the Element of fire in the same sense swalloweth up the Element of the ayre And the heavens swallowe up all the Elements for as much as they doe encompasse them Every Naturalist conceaves that it is not out of any hostilitie that the Element of water is disposed to cover the earth but out of inclination naturall to be above the earthe beinge not so heavy a body as the massie substance of the earth is And we knowe it is withdrawne into certeyne valleys by his power who jussit subsidere valles as the Poet acknowledgethe who was but a mere naturalist that in commodaâ— habitationem animatium that the earthe might become a convenient habitation for such creatures in whose nostrills is the breathe of life of whome the cheife is man made after the likenes and image of his maker and made Lord over his visible creatures The last question is worst of all and all nothinge to the purpose but mere extravagants What sober man would demaund a cause why the heavens doe not dispossesse the elements of their place might you not as wel demaunde why the fire dothe not dispossesse the ayre and then why it dothe not dispossesse the water lastly why it dothe not dispossesse the earthe of her seate which is as much as to say why is not the heaven where the eartheis and the earthe where the havens are wheras every man knowes that the more spacious place is fitter for the more spacious bodies and the higher places more agreable to lighter bodies like as the lowest place is most fitt for the body of the earthe To say that the nature of the heavens hathe not so much as libertie of egresse into neighbour elements is as if you shoulde say that light thinges have not so much as libertie of mooving downewards nor have heavy thinges libertie of moovinge upwardes Yet there are cases extraordinary when a
It is true God is where any thing is but howe as conteyning it not as conteyned by it but it is untrue that God is where any thing may be For without the Heavens something may be but God is not without the Heavens For without the Heavens is Uacuum but God is not in Uacuo as before your selfe have disputed And indeede how should he be there seing he coulde neyther be there as conteyninge nor as conteyned For that which is nothing is neyther fitt to conteyne nor fitt to be conteyned In fine I observe how Gods being in all things you reduce unto two heads The one is his creation the other his preservation of them And so I confesse God is not distant from any of us for as much as we live and moove and have our beinge in him as the Apostle speakethe 4. The two wayes as you make them of Gods being every where as you construe the Prophet Ieremy are by Piscator conceaved to be but one the latter wordes Can any hide himselfe in secret places that I shoulde not see him being but an explanation of the former Am I a God at hande and not a God a farre off As much as to say that God seethe as well thinges done in earthe as thinges done in Heaven So that in Scripture phrase thinges done in earthe are called things done a farre of God speaking herein according to vulgar apprehension Wheras God is sayde to fill Heaven and Earthe hence it is that God is sayd to be neyther circumscriptively in place as bodies are nor definitively as Angells are but repletively that is filling all thinges but howe that is saythe Durand with his effects God dothe more then fill Heaven and Earthe For he hathe made them and dothe maynteyne them not only fillethe them with all creatures fitt for them Water filles the bucket and the bucket conteynes the water But God forbid we should so conceave of the nature of God as by filling the Heavens and the Earth to be conteyned in them His infinite power and wisedome serves his turne first to make them afterwards to preserve them and unto proper congruous endes to order them and with his various effects to fill them but not with his essence least we should be driven to ascribe extension to his essence and maynteyne that he was and is in Uacuo as before I have shewed Vndoubtedly Gods essence is as present with us on earthe as with the Angells and Saints in Heaven and no more distant or absent from us then from them But how is God present Not as praesensibus Corporis according to Austins exposition of the word praesent for God is no sensible thinge for then he were corporall and to be praesensibus animi is nothing to the purpose God dothe coexist with every thing that is For they doe exist and God doth exist But doth God coexist with them in time they doe exist in time that is their measure of duration but God in eternitie that is the measure of his duration to witt himselfe They doe exist in place that is the measure of corporall extension but doth God exist in place who hathe no extension dothe he not rather exist in his owne immensitie which is all one with himselfe like as is his eternitie In a word the severall beings of one thing in another are usually comprehended in these verses Insunt pars totum Species Genus calor igni Rex in Regno res in sine locoque locatum Now see whether any of these are competible unto God Your selfe have observed and approoved the Hebrewes conceyte in calling him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Place Let this then passe for a peculiar being of God in all his creatures whether visible or invisible corporall or spirituall namely that as he hath made them so he conteynes them praeserves them ordereth them fillethe them all with his effects and workes the good pleasure of his owne will in them and by them And this his presence it is impossible he should withdrawe from them â—ave as he shall be pleased â—o destroy them and take all beinge from them and lastly that his very essence is as indistant from the meanest worme as from the most glorious Angell But to talke of Gods piercing or penetrating all thinges not with his effects only but with his essence as the light piercâ—th the ayre I dare not enterteyne any such gâ—osse conceyte of the most simple and spirituall nature of God for feare attributinge extension unto his essence and such as should continue thoughe the World were destroyed and make roome for the essence of God to extende it selfe in Uacuo and the parts therof which are merely imaginary as well as in the World and in the parts therof like as before I have argued The power of God dothe exercise it selfe according to the pleasure of his will And therfore it seemes wonderous strange to me that you should ascribe power to God to dispose of his essence as touching the placinge of it in space locall Neyther doe I see cause why glorious Angells should be required to prepare a place of residence for God more then bodies inglorious God I acknowledge to be as well in the basest worme as in the most glorious Angell And so farre foorthe as it beto Gods essence to be every where I presume no sober Divine will maynteyne that it is other then a naturall attribute unto God not in his power freely to dispose of his essence eyther otherwise or so And therfore when you aske whether upon the creatinge of a newe Heaven it is not possible that God should be therin I answere looke in what sense God is sayde to be any where in that sense it is impossible that God should not be here And yet without all change in them thoughe not without change in things without him one creature beinge annihilated and another created a newe And thoughe Angells be subject to change yet God is not But when you shall proove that change is no fruite of impotency I will renoâ—nce the Prophet that laythe The Lord is not changed and take you for my Apostle And surely if not to be changed were to be impotent how impotent must God needes be with whome is no variablenes nor shadowe of change 5. Gods immensitie is no more subject to his will and power to be streitned then his eternitie But as God is not in time that being a measure only fitt for creatures subject to mutation but in his owne eternitie which is all one with himselfe So neyther is he in place a measure fitt for creatures only subject to extension but in his owne immensitie which is all one with himselfe And as by his eternitie he doth transcendently and supereminently comprehend all times so by his immensitie dothe he comprehend all places So that neyther doe we say that the first could not be neyther doe we say that this your second way can be Only we dare not say
thinges then hinders or excludes the conceyte of coextension with the things that are especially wheras you maynteyne that God is in all thinges not only as conteyning them with cannot be attributed unto God in respect of his essence as I have shewed but rather in respect of his power and wil but by way of penetration thoroughe all and that in respect of his essence and not in respect of his power only like as light is diffused thoroughe our Hemi spheare which similitude I am bolde to adde because you fayle in affoording us any resemblance to succour our capacitie of apprehension this way But I dare not adventure vpon such an apprehension because in my opinion it is too grosse to be attributed to the nature of God I content my selfe with this that as God before the world was in himselfe so he is in himselfe still according to that old verse Tunc ubi nunc in se quoniam sibi sufficit ipse But then nothing being made he had nothing to conteyne governe and worke by or in as nowe he hathe As touchinge all other manner of being in all thinges I content my selfe with ignorance You magnify Trism gâ—sts definition of Gods immensitie and much good doe it you It is suitable with your dicourse But doe you remember what censure Aristotle passed vpon Empedocles for this figurative obscure manner of expressions in Philosophicall discourse And indeede when we take paynes in searching out the truthe why shoulde we encumber our selves with resolving figures into playne speeches that so we may have somethinge wheron to dispute Hertofore you tolde us that God was the center of all thinges and that of supportance now out of Trismegist you tell us that God hathe a Center and that every where but not of supportance passive I thinke as wherby he shoulde be supported but of supportance active wherby he supporteth all thinges Now herof we can easily finde bothe a center and a circumference For Gods supporting of the earth may well be accoumpted the Center and Gods supporting the heavens may well be accoumpted the Circumference of Gods supportinge the earthe In as much as there is no divine supporting without it at least of materiall creatures but all with it Thoughe it be true that God coulde can make the world much bigger then it is But Gods will hathe herein circumâ—scibed himselfe thus farre to proceede as he dothe in supporting all thinges no farther I doe not like your phrase of inlarging the actuall coexistence of Gods essence For dare any sober divine say that Gods actuall existence hathe boundes and that these boundes may be more or lesse enlarged And yet the face I confesse of your discourse lookes hitherwardes How then doe you say that the boundes of Gods coexistence with his creatures are or can be enlarged The only way to helpe it is to say that Gods existence is never enlarged but the existence of creatures by the encreasing of newe may be enlarged and consequently Gods coexistence with them may be sayde to be enlarged not that his existence is more then it was but that the existence of created substances is more then it was And more creatures coexisting with God then formerly there did he doth coexist with more then he did His existence is no greater then it was nor hathe no larger boundes then it had but creatures are supposed to exist by the power of God more then formerly did exist And yet the omnipotency of God hathe pitcht a circumference to Gods coexistence with his creatures and that is the circumference of the world For without it God seems to have no coexistence with his creatures but all within And albeit God coulde make the world greater and greater yet still it shoulde be but finite as there should be a circumference of all creatures existing so likewise of Gods coexisting with them To say that God only truly is is one of the paradoxes That God alone is id quod est that is that whatsoever is attributed unto God is essentiall to him not accidentall I have often read But that God only truly is I never read but in your writings In him we live and moove and have our being saythe Saint Paul but this by your subtile commentary must be understood with a distinction In him we live but not truly in him we moove but not truly in him we have our being but not truly That God conteynes all things and is not conteyned in any thing we easily grant Spheares doe conteyne by way of place but I hope you will not say that God in such sort conteynes any thinge thoughe therfore called by the Hebrewes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because he conteynethe all thinges And yet certeinly there is no Spheare conteynes so much but that a square figure may conteyne as much thoughe not under the same limits And can any man make doubt but God coulde make a World of a square figure that shoulde conteyne as much as this World dothe thoughe in this case the Circumference of the World shoulde be greater then now it is But because that all thinges cannot comprehend God therfore you say He is rightly resembled to a spheare whose Circumference is no where A proper resemblance of the nature of God to a thing utterly impossible and fitt matter for Atheists to make themselfes sport withall I say impossible more then one way For first it is a thing impossible that a body should be infinite Secondly it is impossible that a body infinite should be Sphericall If you aske of what figure then shoulde it be my answeare is it should be of no figure For figures are the boundes of quantities it is contradiction to make a boundles quantitie consist of boundes or a bounded and figured quantitie without boundes And yet if all this were receaved as fitt and convenient what shall we gayne therby when all this while we imagine him to be merely corporall who indeede is merely spirituall For I doe not thinke you looke to finde spheares any other where then among bodies We reade and heare of the Spheares of Heaven but I never read or heard of the Spheares of Angells or Spirits as if they might be of a round or square figure as bodies are much lesse is any such figure fitt to resemble God Yet upon these conceytes as extraordinary atchievements of yours in the way of Metaphysicall discourse you proceede in the next place to the solution of certeyne difficulties that so Drismagist his definition of Gods immensitie may finde the more easy admittance into the Articles of our imagination if not into the Articles of our Creede Which yet truly I should not have excepted against but rather have admitted if to no other ende yet to this even to cutt of curious speculations about the immensitie of God had you not so farre magnified it as if it had bene some Oracle of natures light and made use of it not as a Rhetoricall flashe and
suitable to the power of so infinite an Agent And consider finite thinges are able to produce finite thinges equall unto themselves why then may not God being infinite produce something that is infinite It may be answeared that the experience of producinge equalls to the producers themselves is true only in the way of generation And so God allso in the way of eternall and incomprehensible generation producethe a Sonne equall to himselfe yea the same with himselfe as touching his nature But this is grounded upon a mystery of faithe which hathe no evidence unto reason naturall For allthoughe by reason meditation on Gods woorkes we may atteyne to the knowledge of God as touching the unity of his nature yet can we not therby atteyne to the knowledge of God as touchinge the Trinity of persons Adde unto this that diverse have not only believed but undertaken to proove allso that God is able to produce that which is infinite in extension eyther in quantitie continuall or discrete And Hurtado de Mendosa a Spanishe Iesuite and a late Writer is most eager in the mayntenance of this So farre of are your propositions from caryinge evidence in their for heads Yet you suppose an argument which is very inconsequent For you suppose that whatsoever hath cause of beinge hath allso a beginninge of beinge and that in time But this is notably untrue unto us Christians For the Sonne and Second person in the Trinitie hathe a cause of his beinge to witt the Father Likewise the H. Ghost hathe not only a cause but causes of his beinge to witt bothe the Father and the Sonn for he proceedethe from them bothe yet hathe he not such beginninge of beinge as you speake of For bothe he and the Sonne are everlasting like unto the Father Your second reason is woorst of all as when you say For omnis causa est principium omne causatum est principiatum For in the meaning of this proposition causa and principium are taken for voces synonymae woordes of the same signification not signifying two thinges the one wherof is consequent unto the other And what sober Scholer would affirme that omnis causa est principium as principium signifiethe the beginninge of beinge wheras indeede it is the cause of beginninge of beinge to its effect rather then formally to be stiled the beginninge of beinge it selfe That which followethe of the limits of thinges more easily or more hardly discerned accordinge as the cause is founde to be preexistent in time or no is an assertion as wilde as the similitude wherby you illustrate it and all nothing to the purpose to proove that whatsoever hathe cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge thoughe still you proceede ambiguously without distinction eyther of beinge or of the limits therof For first where the cause is not preexistent in time as in things risinge by concomitance or resultance yet the effects are as easily seene to be limited as when the cause is preexistent in time as for example the light of the Sunne and the light of the candle which flowe from those bodies by naturall emanation was as easily seene to be limited the first time it was as after the light is a long time hid from us and afterward appeares agayne unto us Secondly what if the limits be not seene what I say is that to the purpose Angells are invisible yet we knowe their natures are limited Thirdly what thinke you of the World hathe it limits or no You thinke no doubt it hathe yet was not God the cause therof preexâ—stent in time but only in eternitie For before the World no time had any existence Agayne suppose the Wolrd had bene made from everlasting which some Scholemen have helde to be possible in this case God shoulde have no preexistence eyther as touching time actuall or as touchinge time possible Yet I hope that limits of the World even in that case had bene as discernable to Aristotle as nowe they are to you As for the similitude wherby you illustrate it that rather sheweth howe in such cases when effects doe rise by way of concomitance or resultance they are hardly distinguished from their causes then how their limits are hardly discernable Yet what shoulde moove you thus to amplify howe hard it is to discerne such effects from their causes I knowe not For what hardnes I pray is there in discerninge light to be different from the body of the Sunne that gives it or from the body of a Candle or of a Glowewoorme or of some kinde of rotten wood or from the scales of some fishes that cast light in the darke Yet is all this nothinge pertinent to the confirmation or illustration of the last proposition propounded by you Howe farre dependance upon a cause dothe inferre limits of beinge upon the thinge dependinge I have allready spoken What meant you to distinguishe of the consideration of effects and causes accordinge to the consideration of them eyther distinctly or in grosse unles it be to puzle the Reader as much as you confound your selfe when eftsoones you manifest that you speake of them bothe as they have causes which is to consider them only as effects For that notion alone hathe reference to a cause But whether this dothe inferre that they are limited I have allready therupon delivered my minde 3. Hence you proceede to the solution of newe problemes and that as a mere naturalist Why men in these dayes are not Gyants why Gyants in former times were but men And the reason you give is because the vigour of causes productive or conservative of vegetables of man especially from which he receavethe nutrition and augmentation is lesse nowe then it hathe bene at least before the flood The latter of your two questions is wilde For what doe we understand by Gyants but men of a Gyantlike stature is it a sober question to aske howe it commethe to passe that men of an huge stature are but men For suppose men were of never so vast a proportion of parts as great as the Image that Nabucliodonosor sett up in the playne of Dura or as great as the Colossus at Rhodes shoulde not men notwithstandinge be men still and neyther Angells nor beasts much lesse eyther inferior to the one or superior to the other If the heavens were infinite as some conceave that an infinite body may be made by God yet shoulde those heavens be heavens still and a body still Neyther dothe it followe that therfore those Gyants were men still because the matter of nutrition and augmentation was finite limited For thoughe they had bene turned into Woolves or other beastes the matter of nutrition had bene limited still yet in such a case they had ceassed to be men As touchinge the stature of men so much lessened in these dayes in comparison unto former times I no way like the reason therof assigned by you First because it caryethe no evidence with it you give
certeyne universall nature mooves them contrarily to their speciall inclinations for mayntenance of the integritie of the whole and for avoydance of all vacuity I see no reason for that other assertion of yours that nature cannot sett boundes to bodies naturall but rather is limited in them What thinke you of the soules of men doe not these as other soules prescribe limits unto the matter Materia prima was accoumpted in our Vniversitie to have dimensiones in determinatas and that it receaved the determination therof from formes but by the operation of Agents in their severall generations I confesse nature it selfe is but the effect and instrument of God who is the God of nature as well as of grace But yet whether every thinge that hathe boundes of nature as the World hathe dothe herby evidence and inferre the creation therof is such a question wherin Aristotle and his followers did peremtorily maynteyne the negative and the Scripture it selfe do the impute unto faithe our acknowledgement of the Creation 4. Nowe we come to the scanninge of your second Principle Whatsoever hathe no cause of beinge can have no limits or boundes of beinge This in part hathe evidence of truthe thus Whatsoever hathe no efficient cause of beinge the same hathe no beginninge of beinge But if it proceede of limits of essence or of qualitie or of quantitie it requires helpe of reason to make it good For as many as denyed the World to have a beginninge denyed as it seemes that it had any cause of beinge and thought the beinge therof to be by necessitie of nature Yet did they maynteyne that the World had limits of quantitie and qualitie For they maynteyned that Infinitum magnitudine was absolutely impossible as Aristotle by name By your distinction followinge of diverse wayes wherby beinge may be limited you make no mention of limitation by havinge a beginninge therof which yet hathe bene the cheife if not only limit which hitherto you have mentioned Agayne why shoulde you make but two wayes confoundinge the limits of quantitie with the limits of intensive perfection in every several kinde It were too much in my judgement to confound limits of quantitie with limits of qualitie which yet are both accidentall But most unreasonable it seemes to confound eyther of these with intensive perfection of every severall kinde But howe will you accommodate the members of this distinction to the former proposition Allmightie God hathe no cause of beinge therfore he hathe no limits of beinge Nowe I pray apply this to the members of your distinction concerninge the kinde of limits of beinge Is he without limits in number why then belike he is numberles Yet indeede he is but one and can be but one in nature and in persons can be but three must needes be three Is he without limits in quantitio and so infinite therin But in very truthe he hathe no quantitie at all Is he without limits in qualities not materiall for such are not incident to him but spirituall so infinite therin Are there no boundes of the degrees of his goodnes why but consider in God there are no degrees no qualities at all As touching perfections created therof indeede we have severall kindes but none such are to be found in God Only because God is able to produce them therfore they are sayde to be eminently in God thoughe not formally But the like you may say as well of any materiall attribute as of spirituall For God can produce all alike Therfore all are eminently alike in God Of thinges visible the most perfect you say are but perfect in some one kinde It is true of invisible creatures as well as of visible but this kinde is to be understood of a kinde created But you may not say that God is perfect in all such kindes but rather in none of them For that were to be perfect in imperfections Gods perfection transcendes all created kindes and he is the Author of them producinge them out of nothing They that maynteyne the World to have bene eternall maynteyne it to have bene so by necessitie of nature And all such would peremtorily deny that it was possible for the World not to have bene and therfore in this discourse of yours it would have becommed you rather to proove the contrary then to suppose it Howe the Heaven of Heavens shoulde be accoumpted immortall I knowe not seing they are not capable of life And seing deathe properly is a dissolution of body and soule immortalitie must consist proportionably in an indissoluble conjunction of the body and the soule which is not incident to Angells much lesse to Heavens which have neyther bodies nor soules wherof to consist Neyther dothe Seneca in the place by you alleaged speake of Angells in my judgment but rather of the Species of thinges generable particulars thoughe subject to corruption beinge inabled for generation and therby for perpetuation of their kindes and consequently for the mayntenance of the World and that for ever It is well knowne that the Platonickes thoughe they maynteyned the World to have a beginninge yet denyed the matter wherof the World was made to have had any beginninge Of the same opinion were the Stoicks Their common voyce was De nihilo nihil in nihiluâ— nil posse reverti accordingly they might well conceave that God might be hindered in his operation by reason of the stubbornes and churlishnes of the matter so the censure of Muretus upon such Philosophers I conceave to be just Yet by your leave I doe not thinke that any creature capable of immortalitie in what sense soever applyable to Angells as well as unto men can be made immortall by nature Yet I doubt not but God can make creatures in such sort immortall by nature as that no second cause can make them ceasse to be For it is apparant that God hathe many such as namely the Angels and soules of men Yet still their natures are annihilable in respect of the power of God Neyther can I believe that to be immortall in Senecaes language was to be without beginninge For I doe not finde but that the Stoicks together with Plato conceaved that the World had a beginninge But in this respect he calleth them eternall I shoulde thinke because the World together with the kindes of thinges therin conteyned subject to corruption and generation in particulars should have no ende and that by the Providence of God We believe that nothinge is absolutely necessary but God But Aristotle believed the World allso to be everlasting without beginninge of absolute necessitie For that the World shoulde be created originally out of nothinge all Philosophers helde impossible and that the matter shoulde be everlastinge and of absolute necessity wherof the World was to be made that seemed impossible unto Aristotle and that upon good reason The creation therfore is to be justified against Philosophers by sound argument and not avouched only by bare contestation That which followethe
As if this consequence were evident of it selfe wheras on the contrary all Philosophy is against it For Aristotle maynteyned the World to be independent all others maynteyned the matter wherof the world was made to be independent Yet none conceaved that herehence it woulde followe that eyther of them was therfore illimited or at all illimited That Gods attributes are not really distinguished we all confesse you neede not have brought in Austins authoritie to justify this But you take upon you to confront Atheists by evidence of demonstration wherin you fayle very much For it will not followe that if these attributes be distinct among themselves or from the essence of God then the Divine essence is limited Like as on the contrary it will not followe that if the essence of something be limited the attributes therof must needes be distinct from the essence For the soule of man is limited yet some have maynteyned that the faculties of the soule are not really distinct from the essence of the soule as Scotus that by shrewde arguments And Zabarell professethe that Intellectus practicus is all one with Voluntas And all beit the power of God be distinct from the wisedome of God yet if bothe be acknowledged to be infinite each in his kinde what prejudice is this to the infinitenes of Gods essence Neyther will it followe that one attribute shall want so much of infinite beinge in his kinde as another hathe of proper being distinct from it consideringe that these notions are of different kindes As for example if a body as put the case the outward heaven were infinite there shoulde be bothe infinite lengthe and infinite breadthe and infinite thicknes neythers infinitenes being any whit prejudiciall to the infinitenes of the other because they are of different kindes And what colour of reason have you why infinitenes of power should prejudice the infinitenes of wisedome thoughe they were distinct really which yet we believe they are not And what thinke you if some attributes be founde answerable to personall distinctions in the Trinity Is it not commonly sayde that the second person in Trinity is the wisedome of the Father and commethe from the Father per modum intellectus and that the H. Ghost proceedeth from bothe per modum voluntatis But I have no edge to looke into the Arke or suffer my disputation to trenche upon these mysteries Yet I confesse thoughe the Father be not the Sonne nor the H Ghost c. Yet they are not really distinct one from the other In the Trinity there is alius alius not aliud aliud But you maynteyne that Gods power is his wisedome c. which yet notwithstanding I mislâ—ke not but only doe question the argument wherby you endeavour to proove it and to my judgement it seemes very superficiall But my comfort is this if you weakely maynteyne the nature of God you will as weakely oppose the grace of God Agayne I say it will not followe that if the severall beings of wisedome and power were distinct and not identically the same with the essence of God then the essence should not be infinite For it may be sayde that the essence is infinite in a beinge substantiall the power and wisedome of God are infinite in a being accidentall thoughe such as necessarily flowes from the nature of God Indeede if it were prooved that there is no accident in God then the case were cleere that these attributes were not distinct from the essence of God as indeede they are not but this is more then hitherto you have prooved And till you have prooved it they may be conceaved as distinct from the essence as before hathe bene sayde without any prejudice to the infinity of Gods essence or danger of exposing it unto nakednes for ought your discourse hathe as yet alleaged to the contrary 5. As for that definition of a thing absolutely infinite Infinitum est extra quod nihil est which you make so much reckonninge of I take it to be a vayne conceyte considering that the Philosophers who urged it never made any such construction of it as you doe but applyinge it only to materiall bodies of quantitie and extension maynteyned that in this sense the World was infinite But Aristotle dothe not approove of such a notion of infinite as nothinge agreable with the denomination the world being finite rather then infinite in his opinion and yet as they all thought without the world nothing was Yet some in my knowledge have avouched the world to be infinite thoughe I nothing commend eyther their learninge or their honestie herein And in those former dayes finitum infinitum were taken only for materiall differences of bodies nothing at all belonging to immateriall natures abstract from bodily or materiall extension of parts And Zabarell as I remember observes as much as touching the opinion of Aristotle upon the last chapters of the eighthe booke of Physicks And howe farre foorthe infinitum is to be acknowledged in nature Aristotle in his Physicks hath discoursed Now in the sense before spoken of it is very absurd to attribute such a definition of infinity unto God who is not only a Spirite but the Father of Spirits and incapable of parts much more of extension in any materiall manner But let the wordes be shaped after such a construction as you devise to make the definition suitable to the nature of God to witt as if he were such an entitie as comprehendes all entitie I say it is manifestly untrue For is not the World all the parts therof from Angells unto the basest woorme that creepethe and drop of mire or sparkle of fire or the least cinder are not all these something and that extra Deum For thoughe eminently they may be sayde to be in God yet undoubtedly they are extra Deum formally and to my understanding it is absurde to say they are identically conteyned in Gods essence It is true that Gods essence dothe represent them For God knowes them not but by knowing of himselfe and his essence and beinge of infinite power can produce any thing that implyes not contradiction I cannot represent a fitt comparison but such as the creature can affoard if you give me leave to make use of I say that every thing which a glasse represents is not identically conteyned in the glasse neyther is it true that whatsoever is knowne by the understanding of man or Angell is identically conteyned in the understanding or spirite of man or Angell As I have sayde so I say agayne I see no evidence of that consequence you make thus God is illimited therfore all thinges are in God and therfore allso all thinges that are in God or are attributed unto him are all one That which you adde when you say whatsoever is uncapable of limit is uncapable of division or numericall difference is very ambiguous and the ambiguitie being cleered will proove partly to be without all question and nothinge
imaginary distance you speâ—ke of I have read the question proposed by Vasquius and thâ— opinion of some mentioned who maynteyned that God was in Uacâ— but very fewe yet he reckonnethe Cajetan for one but wheâ—ce dothe he fetche this â—pinion of Cajetan noâ— out of his Commentaries upon Aquinas hiâ— Summes where is the proper place for a Schooleman to manifest his opinion herabouts but out of his Commentaries upon Ioâ—n 1. v. 12. which makes me suspect the fidelitie of his relation or interpretation of Cajetan The other which he mentionethe is Major upon the 1. of the sentences and 37. distinction And sincâ— we are fallen upon it I am willingly to conferre discourse with you herabouts And first I say that Scripture and reason seeme to favour it For King Solomon professeth that the Heavens of Heavens doe not conteyne the Lord likewise Iob saythe of him that He is higher then the Heaven and deeper then Hell certeinly God is able to produce a body without the Heavens and consequently in Vacuo herupon it seemes to some that in good reason God should first have a being there before he produce the any body there And this is one reason of many which Brad wardine usethe to proove that God is in Vacuo for thaâ— is his opinion though Vasquius was not acquainted with him Now by your leave I will consider your reasons to the contrary First you demaund whether this locall distance be created or noâ— whether it be something or nothing I answeare that â—rteinly it is not created as being just nothing yet so as that it is possible a body shoulde be where before was no body As for example where now the World is before the World was 〈◊〉 no body yet was it then possible there should be a body So without the Heavens is no body yet is it possible that a body shoulde be without the heavens You proceede sayinge If it be nothing then they had an imagination of an infinite space which really was nothing and we grant they had For they helde it only an imaginarie space or distance Further you inferre If really nothing then it coulde not be truly termed an imaginary space before the World was created A manifest inconsequence For as men may imagine thinges that are not so such things may be truly termed imaginary things which are not reall And there is no such difference as you avouche betweene these two To imagine an infinite space and to say that There is an imaginary infinite space For whersoever there is the imagination of an infinite space there must needes be an infinite space imagined And therfore as often as there is in man the imagination of an infinite space without the heavens this is as much as to say there is an infinite space imagined by man to be without the heavens But I observe your subtiltie following Before the heavens you say there coulde be no imagination of any such space therfore there was no such space imagined I answeare thoughe before the heavens there was no man at all to imagine it yet neverthelesse was it imaginable and now you confesse it is so imagined And not only doe we imagine a Uacuum to have bene before the World was but even since the World is to witt without the Heavens And taking it aright is not only nowe so imagined by us but a truthe that a Uacuum is without the heavens and was before the world was where now the world is For the errour of the imagination is to mistake in the right meaninge of Vacuum For commonly it is imagined under the notion of a space existent wheras indeede it is rather the negation of a body existent joyned with the possibilitie of a body to exist So without the heavens is no space or body yet possible is it that a bodly space shoulde be Neyther is it required herunto that it should be created by God for only reall things are created by God but the negation of bodies existent requires no creation but rather the suspension of creation You thinke the reality of this imagination to be God whome the Hebrewes call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 place I rather thinke the realitie of it is a voydenes of a body or bodies with the possibility of existence of a body or bodies Touching which possibilitie if it be demaunded in what subject it is I remember what answeare Ioannes Grammaticus made to the like question reported by Averroes on the 12. booke of Aristotles Metaphysicks namely that it was in God to witt fundamentally not formally For I nothing doubt but his meaning was this In God allone is found an almighty power to make the world out of nothing whence it followeth that before the world was there was a possibilitie that the world should be and the mere active power of God is sufficient to denominate this possibilitie A possibilitie physicall or naturall requires a subject to support it but a possibilitie logicall not so as being only negatio repugnantie a want of repugnancy And if God was able to make a world out of nothing then surely it was no contradiction that the world should be and consequently the world was possible before it was And yet to drawe a litle nearer unto you in this I professe I finde it more hard to maynteyne that God i any where as in a place then to maynteyne that God is in Uacuo For marke howe Durand distinguishethe Place saythe he is considered two wayes eyther as a naturall thing or as conteyning the thing placed therein As it is a naturall thinge God is in every place but as it conteynethe the thing that is sayde to be therin so God is in no place secundum se in respect of himselfe For nothing without him is able to conteyne him but in respect of his effects he is in all places because he is conteyned of nothing but rather conteyneth all things and preservethe them But in respect of his effects he is every where For he fillethe every place with his effects in this sense it is proper to God to be every where Herupon some may conceave that God may be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 place because he conteynethe all thinges rather then is conteyned Yet we knowe that the continency of place is corporall and ordinarily the place is more base then the things conteyned therein But Gods continency is merely vertuall and spirituall and in dignitie infinitely beyoud the most noble creatures And we have no great cause to doate upon the Rabbines whose Philosophy was never a whit better then their divinitie Yet one thing more The question was whether God might be sayde to be in Uacuo and your discourse is only to deny that there is any such infinite space as is imagined eyther now to be without the heavens or hertofore to have bene before the world was but you take no notice of the Arguments made to the contrary much lesse doe you take
Divine essence as it is without beginning so it is without end and nothing past with him nor nothing to come to him as it is with all creatures which are subject to motion in some kind or other if not of corruption yet of perfection at least capable of it if no such thing were yet as they come from nothing so they might returne to nothing But that God as he gave them theyr being so he continueth it As for God he receaveth not his being from anything no not from himselfe But is most necessary to exist and most necessary to continue without loosing of ought that is in himselfe no not so much as a thought nor receaving any thing into himselfe no not so much as a new thought or a new affection All which and changes in respect thereof are incident unto Angells though not so much as unto us who allso have materiall motions as locall and alteration that tending to corruption In a word as mans existence is as it were an accident to his essence because the nature of a man is only of it selfe passively possible to exist and God can give existence to such a nature or make the humane nature to exist as he hath done so likewise to Angelicall natures existence is but an accident And as existence is an accident to such essences according to our conceit of them so is continuance an accident to such existences In which respect every day and houre both man and Angell may be sayd to receave a new accident which before they had not But it is quite otherwise with God For as his existence is all one with his essence because it is absolutely impossible his essence should not exist so his continuance is no accident to his existence because it is necessary that God should be so be as to be without beginning and without end And therfore though our continuance be new to us as being an accident unto us and wrought by motions yet Gods continuance is no accident unto him For it is impossible he should not continue who is of necessary being But of this and of the indivisible nature of Gods continuance more hereafter I willingly confesse that because Angells were made of nothing therefore theyr continuance is meerly at the pleasure of God and have parts divisible in regard that God can set an end to them whensoever it pleaseth him But I know no cause to denie that they enjoy an entire self-fruition For though they have not all theyr continuance at once yet seing theyr continuance is no part of their essence which is a thing indivisible I see no reason why they should be denied entirely to enjoy themselfes Man growes to perfection in parts integrall though not in parts essentiall which perfection of parts integrall as it daily groweth so it makes him daily more fitt to performe the offices of nature and duties of his calling and so may be sayd not to enjoy himselfe intirely according to that perfection which belongeth unto him but by degrees But it is not so with Angells yet may they acquire something unto themselfes accidentally which before they had not God can acquire nothing His duration 't is true is indivisible For there is no prius nor posterius therein For he is subject to no kind or manner of motion I doe not like the manner of your justifying this indivisibility of Duration in God as when you say he cannot gayne ought to day which yesterday he had not or loose to daye what yesterday he had For this in my judgement is incident to glorified creatures For shall not the glorious condition of men and Angells be at full without gayning any new or loosing any old Yet no doubt theyr duration notwithstanding shal be divisible God is not Perhaps you will say they loose the former dayes existence and gayne the following dayes existence And so we doe much more properly in this world but without impediment to the same-nes of our existence For to loose the former dayes existence and gayne the following dayes existence is but to loose our coexistence with the former day and gayne a coexistence with the day following Now this is no impediment to the same-nes of existence in duration which I prove thus It is incident to God yet is he still the same in duration And that 't is incident to God I prove thus God himselfe was yesterday coexistent to yesterday and now he is not for if he were then yesterday should now exist which is not only untrue but impossible to be true for then time past should be present And the reason why this is no impeachment to the most perfect sameâ—nes in duration is manifest for to coexist with some thing yesterday and not to day may arise from no variablenes from within but only from variablenes in something from without As namely therefore God doth not coexist to day with many things to day with which he did coexist yesterday is not because of any change in God but by reason of change in these outward things which had a being yesterday but to day have not In that which followes you manifestly betray your cause For that God hath such fulnes of joy and sweetnes of life that nothing can be added thereto in joy or sweetnes doth no way inferre that therefore the duration hereof cannot be added unto him and the continuance thereof Your comparison utterly overthrowes you For as in a bodie infinite though there cannot be a middle nor extreame yet there are parts without parts by waye of extension So in infinite life though it hath no extremes as being without beginning and without end yet this hinders not but that it may have parts going before and parts comming after by way of succession And whereas you say that Natures capable of these differences have alwayes the one accomplished by the other is either without sense as if you meane it of the parts of time as if one were accomplished by the other For how I pray you is time past or present accomplished by that which is to come or that which is present or to come accomplished by that which is past Or if in respect of natures subject to time which are perfected by time or rather in the course of time thus as it is sometimes true so sometimes it is notoriously false For as there is a time of growth in perfection so it is wel knowne that there is a time of diminution corruption also And I pray you how doth a mans dotage accomplish him either in soule or bodie And in the Kingdome of Heaven what accomplishment by time when our glorious condition shal be as full and perfect at the first as in the progresse for what space imaginable soever As for this state 't is well knowne that as there is a time of repayring and encreasing so there is a time of impayring and decaying And though perfection cannot be perfected yet it may be continued so it is
parts succeeding Lastly your disiâ—nctive is not good as when you say in the false same instant or in the least parcell of time For your supposit on is of the revolution of the heavens not in the least parcell of time at all but in an instant which you well knowe is no parcell of time Yet I thinke to charme the absurditie of your former supposition which perhaps makes you weary of it and something confounded in the prosecution therof you would fayn turne it into some small parcell of time but then all that you builde herupon falls utterly to the ground One sentence remayneth to be considered wherby in prosecuting your former supposition you desire to lay a ground for the commodious illustration of Gods eternitie and that is this Every starre in the eyghthe spheare should be converted into a permanent circle and so in one circle there shoulde be circles for number infinite as many circles as there be points or divisibilities in the eclipticke circle All this I may be bolde to say is nothing to the purpose but proceedeth merely from affectation of holdinge your Reader in admiration at the wonderfull conclusions which yet being not superficially but exactly considered conteyne most superficiall conceytes the thinges you here deliver so farre foorthe as they have any truthe are as well verified in respect of every days motion of the heaveÌ„ yea as well verified in a tennis ball at every turning round therof For looke how many circles are made upon the eighthe spheares turninge round in a moment so many circles are made by the turning of it rounde in 24. houres For the body of the heavens is divisible alike whether it turne round in a day or in an houre or in a moment savinge that the turning of it round in a moment deserves rather to be accoumpted a vigorous rest and may be called a cessation from motion as your selfe have professed and consequently a cessation from making any circles at all But howsoever I say the body of the heavens is alike divisible and that in infinitum because it is corpus continuum and for the same reason a tennis ball is so too upon his turning rounde you may as well imagine infinite circles made by him according as the points therin are infinite Now we come to the application of this fiction prosecuted with much varietie partly of Chimericall and partly of vulgar inventions unto eternitie it selfe as followeth Thus in him that is eternall or being infinite and in eternitie are actually conteyned durations successively infinite Thus in him say you and what I pray may an Atheist reply out of that heart of his wherin he saythe There is no God For may he not rejoyne in this manner And if it be but Thus like as the fiction here supposed by you is of a thing utterly impossible so you give us libertie to conceave alike of the Eternitie of your God not to reiterate the varietie of vayne conceytes which have bloomed from the severall branches of this your discourse in prosecutinge so vile a fiction to represent Gods eternitie therby Agayne how dothe God conteyne durations successively infinite Not formally you well knowe but only eminently for as much as he can produce them But no such thing appeares nor any modell therof in this your fiction For this revolution in an instant conteynes only it selfe formally it conteynes the motion of no other body neyther formally nor eminently Yet thus you say Gods eternall being conteynes durations successively infinite thoughe there be no more resemblance betweene them then betweene harpe and harrowe a foxe and a ferne bushe no nor any thing like so much Yet you proceede in your accommodation thus The former supposition admitted we coulde not say that the inferior orbes mooving as now they doe did moove after the eighthe spheare but that the times of their motions were continually conteyned in it For the eighthe spheare being mooved in an instant should loose the divisibilitie of time and the nature of motion with all the properties that accompany them not by defect as if it no way comprised them but by swallowing up time or duration successively infinite into an actuall permanency To this I answeare first The Heavens moovinge as nowe they doe I cannot subscribe unto you intimatinge that the inferior Orbes doe moove after the eighthe spheare But rather as in respect of their proper motion they goe against it supposing the eighthe spheare to be the uppermost Heaven so in respect of Diurnall motion they moove not after it but motu raptus are drawne a long with it this is on the By. Nowe to the mayne I deny that upon your supposition it will followe that the times of these inferior orbes motions were eminently conteyned in the motion of the eighthe spheare Your contrary affirmation seemes to me wonderous absurde neyther can I devise any reason for it or in what sense you take this phrase to conteyne eminently For the common acception of it is this That conteynes another thinge eminently which not conteyninge it formally is able to produce it So the Sunne is commonly reputed to conteyne heate eminently for as much as not being formally hot it selfe yet is able to produce heate in bodies capable So your selfe before have acknowledged all thinges to be in God not formally for he is neyther man nor Angell much lesse any inferior creature but yet is able to produce all these But it is impossible that the motion of the eighthe spheare supposed to be in an instant should produce the times of the inferior Orbes motions It cannot produce their motions they mooving as now they doe For how should an instantaneous or momentany motion in one body produce a temporall motion in another body Much lesse can it produce the times of their motions For that is only in the power of God He alone that gives existence to any thinge can give duration and time unto it Neyther dothe it conteyne their motions formally For their motions are supposed to be temporall that is in time the motion of the eighthe spheare is supposed to be momentany that is in an instant But a momentany or instantaneous motion cannot formally conteyne a motion that is made in time A swifter motion can conteyne a motion lesse swift because it is bothe so swift and swifter allso And here by accident and ere I am aware I have a glimse of your meaninge and while I dispute against it I may seeme to you to make for it For this instantaneous motion is supposed by you to be infinitely swift and therfore it may well conteyne the motions of Inferior orbes which are lesse swift as mooving rounde no soever then in the space of 24. houres wheras the eighthe spheare is supposed to moove round in a moment I thinke I have sprunge the partridge now let me see whether I have not a springe to take him First then I say this is not to conteyne eminently but formally rather
so much Act. 4. And such decrees of God though free continue immutable and that from everlasting as indeed being from everlasting And wee say there is no reason why God should alter what he hath decreed considering that he knoweth no more now then he did from everlasting In that which followeth we agree with you that immutabilitie is a perfection mutability an imperfection likewise that to worke freely is a perfection to worke necessarily is an imperfection and where both immutability and freedome of operation meet the perfection of that nature is so much the greater But this I finde not so scholastically expressed when you say That if man were as immortall as the heavens are hee would be more perfect then they can be This I say wants much of accuratenesse For the heavens are not immortall Aristotle conceived them to be incorruptible but not immortall For like as in case they were corruptible yet could they not bee counted mortall because they have no life to lose so though they be granted to be incorruptible yet could they not thereupon be accounted immortall and that for the same reason because they have not life which alone makes a thing capable of the denomination of immortall and for want of life the meanest of creatures having life doe in excellency surpasse the heavens And if Aristotle had lived in our dayes to bee acquainted with such Astronomicall observations as we are of so many Comets and blazing Starres in the celestiall Region not only above the Moone but even in the firmament it selfe and that of long continuance and at length wasted and consumed it is more then probable that his opinion concerning the incorruptibility of the heavens would have beene changed considering his apologies and excuses in his bookes De Caelo that the bodie of the heavens being so farre remote and little certaine experience whereupon all natuall reason is grounded to be had of such things as might discover the nature thereof therefore his discourse thereof whatsoever to bee taken in the better part and extraordinary performances thereabouts not to be expected from a naturall Philosopher And concluding his discourse concerning the incorruptibilitie of the heavens he professeth that all experience did justifie his opinion in that point for as much as there was never knowne any alteration there So then had he knowne of any alterations there this might justly have altered the case with Aristotle and that no alteration was then knowne was to be attributed to the weake nature of Astronomicall observations in those dayes whereabouts he was to depend upon the credit of others in their professions being no Astronomer himselfe In the next place you tell us that Though freedome in it selfe be a great perfection yet to be free to doe evill is a branch of imperfection which springs from the mutability of the creatures freedome This deserves well the scanning Adam in his innocency was free to doe evill was he not Yet was he made very good and after the image of God and no sinne had yet estranged him from the life of God and therefore his state and condition deserved to be accounted a state of perfection rather then of imperfection Although I deny not but there be greater perfections then this of Adam As the perfection of God is above the perfection of any of all creatures The perfection of Angells is above the perfection of man The perfection of men in the state of glory above the perfection of man in the state of innocency Yet I see no cause why Adams state in creation should be counted a state of imperfection rather then of perfection And for ought I see freedom unto evill is no more favouring of imperfection then freedome unto good considering that they both make but one morall freedome For to be morally free to doe good quoad exercitium is to be free to choose whether a man will doe good or no and quoad specificationem is to be free to choose whether he will doe good or evill So to be morally free to evill quoad exercitium is to be free to choose whether he will doe evill or no quoad specificationem is to be free to choose whether he will doe evill or good This discourse of mine hath proceeded according to your owne phrase that speaks of freedom unto evill but to speak in mine owne phrase I should not hastily speake of any freedome of the will of man to evill You may say as well that the will of man in thâ— use of the eye is free to behold either colours or sounds which he will or in the use of the eare is free to judge of sounds or colours as he will There is a Common sence within I confesse whereby the will is able to judge of these but by the eye or eare she cannot The reason is no facultie extends beyond his object Within the compasse of his owne object it may be extended to any kind or particular but it reacheth not beyond his object Now the object of the eye is onely colour and the object of the eare is onely sound And a man may looke upon what colours he will of many that are presented unto him so by the eare take notice of any sounds that are but neither the eye can behold that which is not coloured nor the eare apprâ—heÌ„d ought that is not of the nature of sound In like soâ— the will within the compasse of her owne object may settle upon what she will but beyond her object she cannot extend Now the object of the will is good not evill and therefore she is of free choyce to settle upon what good she will but not upon evill But here some may say how then can any evill be committed I answere two wayes First by errour of judgment For it is the nature of the will to follow the judgement of the understanding therefore it is called a reasonable appetite Secondly by preferring a lesse good before a greater as in making choice of doing something because it is profitable or pleasureable or some way or other advantageous for the present notwithstanding that it is dishonest and such as will bring a farre greater dammage unto us for the time to come Or thus because we make choice of something as before mentioned notwithstanding a superiour authority hath forbidden it both because an evill inclination maks us preferre things presently pleasing and profitable and withall prowd that we cannot endure to be in subjection to lawfull authority such as undoubtedlie is the authority of God Hence it comes to passe that we are sayd also to be free to good or evill which we may call a morall liberty in distinction from the former which is liberty naturall and consisteth in being indifferent to doe ought that lyes in our power to be done provided that it may seeme convenient to be done As for that morall liberty it scarce ever was to bee found in the world For it consisteth in an indifferent inclination