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A15542
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The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe, by Thomas Vuilson
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Wilson, Thomas, 1525?-1581.
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1551
(1551)
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STC 25809; ESTC S102785
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107,443
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347
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but in .ii. seueral sentences as thus Is the study of Philosophy praise worthy or is it not Lykewise a propositioÌ„ which is a sentence vttered in plain wordes eâ—presly signifiyng either truth or falshed is either single or doble A single Proposition as thus Wicked men caÌ„not abide to reade the word of God Of the whiche you may make a double proposition by addyng somwhat therunto as thus Wicked men not onely can they not abide to reade the word of God but also they seke by al meanes possible to ouer throwe the same ¶ Of the â—iue Predicables otherwise called the fiue common wordes which are spoken of other WHen we go about to expound any matter first we must beginne with the definition to know the very nature of the thing the whiche we cannot do except we first learne the predicables for thei shew the largenes and the narrownes of wordes how farre they do extende and how muche they comprehende in them As when I se one afarre of come vnto me first I know that he is a man then when he commeth nigher I know whether he be of mine acquaintance or no. Likewise when I go aboute to declare what one is to open the nature of any thiÌ„g I vse the largest words so it must nedes bee that I begin with the Predicables because they shewe how muche euery worde doth comprehende in it selfe and how large or narrow it is They be called Predicables because some one thing is spoken of an other And they are as a maÌ„ wold say markes or notes of words that are spoken of many shewing how by what manner the same words are atributed to other They be .v. in number Genus The general worde Species The Kinde Differentia The difference Proprium The properte Accidens The thing chauÌ„cing or cleuing to the substance GENVS is a general word Genus the which is spoken of many that differ in their kind as when this Question is asked What it is As Animal A liuing creature Ars an Arte. Virtus Uertue Gemma A precious stone Or els thus Genus is a general worde vnder the whiche diuers kindes or sortes of things are compreheÌ„ded as vnder a liuiÌ„g creature are coÌ„preheÌ„ded men beastes Under art are coÌ„preheÌ„ded Logique GraÌ„mer Retorique c. Euery general word hath diuers kindes is spokeÌ„ euermore of theim al. As Gemma A precious stone comprehendeth in it self A Saphire A Rubie A Christal A Turkas As thus Saphirus est gemma A Saphire is a precicious stone And so of other ¶ Euery general worde is .ij. wayes considered and commonlye called the châ—ef general in latin Genus â—â—mum and the midle general in latin Genus intermedium The chief general is soâ— that where as it is the head of al aboue al it can neuer become inferior to be of any kinde or sort in thinges As the Substance the Quantitee the Qualitee are euer chief generall wordes and cannot bee comprehended vnder any other The middle general is the same that beyng comprehended betwixt the chief general and the lowest kinde or sort in thynges maye be also some kynde or fourme it self as a body a liuing creature the whiche .ij. beyng compared with their inâ—eriors are generall wordes beyng referred to their superiors they are Species That is to say shapes kindes or sortes in thinges Species seu foâ—ma the kinde or sort of any thing comprehended vnder a worde more vniuersall is thesame of whome the general woorde is spoken when the question is asked what it is As when I aske What is Iustice I answere a Uertue Therfore in this proposition Iustice is a vertue Iustice is the Species and vertue is the general worde which comprehendeth the sayde Iustice and is spoken of the same Or thus Species â— is a common word that is spoken of many whiche differ only in number as manne is spoken of Socrates Plato Aristotle and of euery proper name belonging to any man As Socrates is a man Plato is a man Aristotle is a man Euery Species or kinde in thinges is of .ij. sortes The one is called the lowest kind whiche is alwayes spoken of euery proper name euer is Species neyther can it at any tyme be Genus although somtime it beare the name of genê° The other is called Species iÌ„termedia that is the kind placed betwixt the higheste and the loweste whiche at diuers times and by diuers considerations may both be Genus and Species For that whiche is vnder the generall Woorde that same maye be called Species or Kinde that whiche comprehendethe other maye bee called the general word ¶ A Nowne proper is that wherof the kinde is rehersed As Cato est Homo Cato is a man in this proposition Cato is the Nowne proper which belongeth to one man only and Man is the kinde whiche is more large and comprehendeth all men THis Table sheweth the Order of euery substaunce and kinde as they are apoiÌ„ted by nature what are the chief generall woordes what are the midle general what are the lowest kindes in euery thing and what are the kindes bewixt bothe with body A Substance Without bodie as God Angelles Spirites The soule of man Compounded of diuers elementeâ— A body Withoute mixtur as the iiij elementes Fire Ayer Water Earth heauen and al the planetes Being a liuing thing A body coÌ„pouÌ„ded With oute life as Stones Metalles Liquores â—auing the sence of feliÌ„g A body liuing Withoute Sence or feling at al as a Tree a Shrubbe an Hearbe Endued with reason A liuing creature Withoute the gift of reason as Beastes birdes or fishe some liuing vpoÌ„ the lande in the Water in the Ayer or in bothe  A man as Scipio Socrateâ— AlexaÌ„der and euery seueral maÌ„ liuing  Diâ—â—erentia ¶ Differentia that is to say the difference is the same that is spoken of many whiche differ in fourme and kinde when the question is asked What maner of thing it is as when wee saye Quale quid est homo What maner of thing is man we must answere He is endued with reason Yf the question be asked what is a man we must answere by his Genus or general word he is a liuing creature If the questioÌ„ be asked what maner of thiÌ„g a beast is We may sai He is without the gift of reasoÌ„ Euery difference that is moost proper to euery thing is naturally and substaÌ„cially ioyned to the kindeâ—â—hiche is coÌ„prehended vnder the general worde Proprium PROPRIVM That is to say a properte is a natural proâ—eâ—es manner of doyng whiche agreeth to one kinde and to the same onely and that euermore And also mai be spoken of the same kind and by conuersion the same kinde may be spoken of him also As to speake to haue power to laugh doeth only agre to man to none other creature earthely And as I may say Whosoeuer is a man hath power geuen him of nature to speake So may I
Crete and saied they ware lâ—ers Againe if ye iudge that Epimenidâ—s said false and that the people there be no liars then Epimenides saied truth euen when he said the people of Crete are liars because he himself was a maÌ„ of Crete But this subtiltie is thus auoided yf ye will saie that where as mentioÌ„ is made of the people in Crete yet all are not comprehended vnder the same neither is the Proposicion vniuersal but indefinite that is to say not comprehendyng all but certaine as thus The people of Câ—ete are lyars truth it is that many of them be liars yâ—t Epimenides may be excepted be a true man of his worde notwithstandyng As also he that was warned in his slepe not to giue credite to any dreames did not thinke that dreame vaine although he iudged many other to be litle estemed and smal hede to be taken to them For by this dreame he was warned not to beleue gretly other dreames and yet not withstandynge he was warned to beleue this dreame NOw that I haue brought this rude worke to some ende and for this tyme framed it so wel as I coulde I desire of al men thâ—re fauourable helpe to supporte my weakenes or at the least to geue me none euell reporte for my well meanyng then I shall thinke my selfe sufficientlie rewarded But if offence shoulde breede through laboure susteined and no fauour gotteÌ„ when gentlenesse had bene offered it had bene as good in my minde to plaie and lose nothyng as to take paines and lose all But my trust beyng stayed vpon the honest and godlie affected I haue trauailed without feare hopyng well that my doynges shal be taken without blame And therfore this obteiâ—ed I shal desire al men for the loue of God to embrace the truthe and not to wedde themselfes to any opinion without some staye or sure foundation of goddes truth And where as God is the authour of peace and coÌ„coâ—de and loueth theÌ„ that vnfeynedly call vpon hym in truth I shall hartely praie to God that al we maie drawe after one line and seke one vniforme and sounde doctrine to the prayse of God and the comfort of our soules And because some heades are very bolde to entre farther then witte can retche or elâ— haue a mynde vaynelie to question of thynges not nedâ—full I thought it not amysse to set forth here Aristoteles minde as touchyng thynges that shold not be brought in question There be foure thynges saieth he which should not be examined by reason And first no maÌ„ ought to argue of those thynges wherein if any one put doubte he deserueth punishement As to reason whether there be a God or no. And therefore Tullie sayeth very wel it is a wicked and an vngodly custome to dispute or talke against God either in earnest or yet in sporte Again it is fondnesse to reason of those thynges which our senses iudge to be true As to know by reason whether fire be hote or no. the whiche were madnesse to aske and surely if any one should so reason with me I would bidde hym putte his fynger in it Thirdely it is euell to reason of those thynges whiche can not bee knowen by mans witte As to knowe what God the father is in persone what the holy ghoste is howe they sytte and are placed in heauen or of what makyng the soule of man is Fourthlie to talke and dispute of those thynges whiche are vndoubtedly true As in Arithmetike .iii. and .iij. are syx In Philosophie The whole is greater then the parte In all whiche matters to moue any earnest questioÌ„ or to doubte ouermuch in thinges nothing doubtefull is either starke madnesse or els playne foolyshnesse Therefore I wyshe of GOD that all oure reasonyng myght be fastened vpon suche mâ—tters as are necessary both for the bearer to learne and also good for the godlye reasoner to teache Wherein though I haue done nothyng so well my selfe as my good will was thereunto yet I trust al honest hartes wil testifie with me that I haue moste earnestlie mynded the glorie of God and the settyng forth of his holy name throughout the whole course of this my rude and symple booke the whiche ones done and knowenâ— I hope the gentle reader will beare with me in other thynges and pardone such faultes as through ignoraunce haue escaped or els for lack of tyme could not well be altered God be praysed An admonition to the reader for faultes escaped in the Printyng SO it was gentle and louyng reader that I wrote this boke in suche a tyme as when I had not so conuenient leasour for the good placing and true examinyng therof as sence I came to the printing of the same I wyshed that I had And the maner of imprintyng beyng suche that whatsoeuer is not made perfite before it cometh to the prynte cannot without the great losse and hynderaunce of the Prynter bee then altered or amended By reason whereof certayne sentences herein are passed muche sleyghter then with aduisement either they should or that I would haue suffered if other wise I myght haue remedied them And therefore moste humbly and hâ—rtely I desyre the whatsoeuer thou be to reade this worke frendly and fauourably and where cause of imperfection is found to set to thy amendyng hande consideryng that no one thyng that euer was wrought by man was made perfight at the first and then shal I haue no cause to feare but that these my labours shal be accepted in good parte howsoeuer either by ignoraunce or by negligence any thyng shall seme to be omitted or not done accordyngly And thus moste hartely fare well Imprinted at London by Richard Grafton printer to the Kynges Maiestie Anno. M. D. LI. Cum priuilegio ad Imprimendum solum