Extension of Bodies in Relation to the Testimony of our Eyes let us imagine that God had created a Heaven and an Earth of a Portion of Matter as little as a Hand Ball and Men upon this Earth in the same Proportions with those in our Great World These little Men would see one another and the parts of their own Bodies as also the little Animals which would be capable of incommoding them or else their Eyes would be useless as to their Preservation Upon this Supposition it is Evident that these little Men would have Idea's as to the bigness of Bodies very different from those that we have of them since they would have Relation to their Little World which tho' as a Ball in respect of ours they would look upon as surrounded with infinite Spaces such as we imagine about ours Or if it may more easily be conceiv'd let us suppose that God had made a World infinitely greater than ours so that this New World should be in respect of ours as ours was in comparison of that which we suppos'd before Let us also suppose that God had observ'd the same Proportion in all the Parts of this New World as he had done in ours It 's manifest that the Men of this last World would be greater than is the Space betwixt our Earth and the most distant Stars that we see this being suppos'd if they had the same Idea of the Extension of Bodies as we have they could not distinguish even some parts of their own Body and would see some others of prodigious greatness So that 't is ridiculous to think that they would see things of the same bigness as we see them 'T is evident from these two Suppositions that the Men of the Great or Little World would have very different Notions about the greatness of Bodies to what we have supposing only that their Eyes gave them Idea's of the Objects that were about them proportionably in bigness to their own Bodies Now if these Men were much assur'd upon the Testimony of their own Eyes that Bodies were as big as they saw them it 's evident they would be deceiv'd and no body can doubt of it yet it 's certain they would have full as much reason as we to defend their Opinion let us therefore at least by the Example of this Error apprehend our selves to be very uncertain of the greatness of those Bodies that we see and that all we can know by sight is the proportion that they have to our Bodies In a word that our Eyes are not given us to Judge of the Truth of things but only to discern those things that may either Profit or Injure us But Men do not only trust their Eyes in Judging of Visible but also of Invisible Objects they even conclude that nothing exists which they see not thus arrogating to their Sight a certain infinite perspicacity 'T is this which hinders them from knowing the true Causes of many Natural Effects If they attribute them to certain Faculties and imaginary Qualities the common Reason is because they do not see the real ones which consist in the different Configurations of these Bodies For Example They see not the Particles of Air and Flame much less those of Light or of other Matter yet more Subtile and this inclines them to believe they do not exist or at least to judge they have neither Power nor Action they have recourse to occult Qualities or imaginary Faculties to explain all the effects whereof these imperceptible Particles are the Natural Cause They choose rather to have recourse to the Horrour of a Vacuum for explaining the Elevation of the Water in Pumps than to the Weight of the Air to the Qualities of the Moon for the Flux and Reflux of the Sea than to the pressure of the Air which environs the Earth to attractive Faculties in the Sun for the Elevation of Vapours than to the Simple Motion or Impulsion caus'd by the parts of Subtile Matter which are continually dispers'd by the Sun They look upon that as an Impertinent Opinion which has recourse to Flesh and Blood to solve the Motions of Animals their Habits or the Corporeal Memory of Man which is owning in part to this that they conceive the Brain to be very little and consequently insufficient to conserve the traces of an almost infinite number of things which are there they are willing to believe tho' they know not how to conceive it that Beasts have a certain Soul which is neither Body nor Mind as also that there are Qualities and Intentional Species to solve the Habits and Memory of Men and such other like things of which they have no particular Notion in their Minds It would take up too much time to enumerate the Errors which this prejudice begets in us almost all the Errors in Physicks are owing to it and whoever attentively considers it will be amaz'd thereat Altho' I 'm unwilling to insist much upon this head yet I can't but take notice of the Contempt which Men commonly have for Insects and other little Animals which are generated as they say out of Corrupted Matter this is an unjust Contempt which is founded only upon the Ignorance of the thing despis'd and the prejudices already mention'd There is nothing Contemptible in Nature all the Works of God are worthy our respect and admiration especially if we consider the admirable ways by which God makes and preserves them The least Flies are as perfect Animals as the biggest Creatures the proportion of their Members is as Just as those of the others and it even seems that God has given them more Ornaments to recompence the littleness of their Bodies they have Crowns Helmets and other Curiosities on their Heads which outdo the most Luxuriant Fancies of Men and I may confidently aver that they who have never seen any thing but with their naked Eye have never beheld any thing so fine so exact and even so magnificent in the Houses of the greatest Princes as what we discover with Microscopes upon the Head of a silly Fly It 's true these things are very small but yet the more surprizing because there are so many Beauties crouded in so small a Space and altho' they are very common yet they are not the less valuable nor less perfect in themselves on the contrary the Wisdom of God is more apparent who hath with so much Magnificence and Profusion perform'd almost an infinite number of Miracles in Creating them Nevertheless our Sight reaches not these Beauties but makes us despise the Works of God so worthy our admiration and because these Animals are little in comparison of our Bodies it makes us consider them as absolutely little and contemptible because of their smâ—llness as if Bodies could be little in themselves Let us then endeavour to distrust the Impressions of our Senses in Judging about the bigness of Bodies and when we say for Example that a Bird is little let us not absolutely
that External Objects emit the Species or Images which represent them And 't is only upon this Foundation that they multiply their Faculties and defend their active intellect So that this Foundation having no Solidity as shall soon be shewn it will be unnecessary to spend any time to overturn the Superstructure We are assur'd then that it is improbable that Objects should emit their Images or Species which represent them for these reasons 1. From the impenetrability of Objects All Objects as the Sun Stars and all such as are near the Eyes cannot emit Species which are different from their respective Natures Wherefore Philosophers commonly say that these Species are Gross and Material in which they differ from express'd Species which are Spiritualised These impress'd Species of Objects then are little Bodies they cannot therefore be penetrated nor all the Spaces which are betwixt the Earth and the Heaven which must be full of them Whence it 's easie to conclude they must be bruis'd and broken in moving every way and thus they cannot render Objects visible Moreover one may see from the same place or point a great number of Objects in the Heavens and on the Earth therefore the Species of these Objects can be reduc'd into a Point But they are impenetrable since they are extended Therefore c. But one may not only see a multitude of very great and vast Objects There is no Point in all the great Spaces of the World from whence we cannot discover an almost infinite number of Objects and even Objects as large as the Sun Moon and the Heavens there is therefore no Point in all the World where the Species of all these things ought not to meet which is against all appearance of Truth The Second Reason is taken from the Change which happens in the Species Such as would know how all impressions of Visible Objects however epposite may be communicatedwithout being weaken'd may read Monsicur Descartes his Dioptricks it 's evident that the nearer any Object is the greater its Species ought to be since we see the Object 's greater But what is yet more difficult to conceive according to their Opinion is That if we look upon this Object with a Telescope or a Microscope the Species immediately becomes Six Hundred times as great as it was before for 't is yet more difficultly conceiv'd from what Parts it can grow so great in an instant The Third Reason is when we look upon a perfect Cube all the Species of its Sides are unequal nevertheless we see all the Sides equally Square So when we consider Ellipses and Parallelograms in a Picture which cannot but emit like Species yet we see Circles and Squares This manifestly shews that it is not necessary that the Object beheld should emit Species like it self that it may be seen In fine it cannot be conceiv'd how it can be that a Body which does not sensibly diminish should always emit Species on every Side which should continually fill all the great Spaces about it and that with an inconceivable swiftness For an Object that was hidden in that Instant that it discovers it self may be seen many Millions of Leagues on all Sides and what appears yet more strange is that Bodies in great Motion as Air and some others have not that power of pushing outwards these Images which resemble them as the more gross and quiescent Bodies such as the Earth Stones and generally all hard Bodies have But I shall not stay any longer to enumerate all the contrary Reasons to their Opinion there would be no end a very ordinary Judgment would raise innumerable Objections Those that we have brought are sufficient though they were not so necessary after what has been said upon the Subject of the First Book where the Errors of the Senses were explain'd But there are so great a number of Philosophers wedded to this Opinion that we believe it will be necessary to say something to encline them to reflect upon their own Thoughts CHAP. III. That the Soul has no power of producing Idea's The Cause of Mens Error in reference to this Subject THe Second Opinion is that of those who believe our Souls have any power of producing the Idea's of such things as they will think upon and they are excited to produce them by the Impressions which Objects make upon Bodies although these Impressions are not Images like the Objects which cause them they believe that 't is in this that Man is made after the Image of God and participates of his Power That even as God Created all things out of nothing and can reduce them to nothing again and then Create them anew so Man can Create and Annihilate the Idea's of all things as he pleases But there is great Reasons to distrust all these Opinions which extol a Man these are the Common Thoughts which arise from a vain and proud Original and which the Father of Light hath not inspir'd This participation of the power of God which Men boast of having to represent Objects and of doing many other particular actions is a participation which seems to relate to something of independance as independance is commonly explain'd it is also a Chimerical Participation which Mens Ignorance and Vanity make them to imagine They depend much more than they think upon the Goodness and Mercy of God But this is not a place to explain these things It 's enough if we endeavour to shew that Men have not the Power of forming the Idea's of things which they perceive No one can doubt that Idea's are real Beings since they have real Properties since they differ from one another and represent all different things Nor can we reasonably doubt that they are Spiritual and very different from the Bodies which they represent But it seems reasonable to doubt whether Idea's by whose means we see Bodies are not more Noble than the Bodies themselves for indeed the Intelligible World must be more perfect than the Material and Earthly as we shall see hereafter Thus when we affirm that we have the Power of Forming such Idea's as we please we shall be in danger of perswading our selves to make more Noble and Perfect Beings than the World which God hath Created However some do not reflect upon it because they imagin that an Idea is Nothing since it is not to be felt or else if they look upon it as a Being 't is a very mean contemptible one because they imagin it to be annihilated as soon as it is no longer present to the Mind But supposing it true that Idea's were only little contemptible Beings yet they are Beings and Spiritual Ones and Men not having the power of Believing it follows that they cannot produce them for the production of Idea's after the manner before explain'd is a true Creation and although Men endeavour to palliate and mollifie the hardness of this Opinion by saying that the production of Idea's presupposes something else but Creation
Disposition of their Heart Those who begin their Conversion have commonly need of a prepossessed and an indeliberate Pleasure to free them from their Sensible Goods to which they are united by other preventing and indeliberate Pleasures Sadness and Remorse of Conscience is not enough and they do not yet taste any Joy But the Just can live by Faith and in Want and it 's even in this Condition that they deserve more because Men being reasonable God will be lov'd by them with a Love of Choice rather than with a Love of Instinct and an indeliberate Love like that by which they love Sensible things without knowing them to be Good otherwise than by the Pleasure which they receive from them However the greatest part of Men have little Faith and being continually led to taste Pleasure they cannot long preserve their elective Love for God against a Natural Love for Sensible Goods if their Delight in Grace does not uphold them against the Efforts of Pleasure for a Delight in Grace begets preserves and increases Charity as Sensible Pleasures do Desire It is evident from what has been said V. Of Mens Ignorance That Men being never without some Passion or agreeable or disagreeable Sensations much of the Capacity and Extension of their Mind is taken up with them And when they are willing to employ the rest of their Capacity to examine some Truth they are often diverted by some new Sensations or by a Disgust which they find in this Exercise and by an Inconstancy of the Will which agitates and runs the Mind from one Object to another so that unless they have accustom'd themselves to overcome these Oppositions from their Youth as has been explain'd in the Second Part they will at last be incapable of penetrating into any thing that is a little Difficult or which requires a little Application We must then conclude That all Sciences especially those that include Questions very difficult to be resolv'd are full of an infinite Number of Errors and that we ought to suspect all those great Volumes which are every day composed upon Physicks Natural Philosophy and Morality and especially upon the particular Propositions of these Sciences which are much more compounded than general ones We ought even to judge that these Books are so much the more to be Contemned as they are better received by the generality of Men I mean those who are but little capable of Application and who know not how to make a good use of their Judgment because the Applause of the Vulgar in any difficult Matter is a certain Argument of the Falsity of that Opinion and that it is only maintained upon the delusive Notions of the Senses or some false Lights of the Imagination Yet it is not impossible but that a Man may of himself discover a greater Number of Truths which have been conceal'd from former Ages provided he does not want a good Judgment but lives in some retired place where nothing can divert him if he Seriously apply himself to an enquiry into Truth Wherefore those are very unreasonable who despise the Philosophy of Descartes without knowing it only for this reason because it appears impossible that one Man of himself should be able to discover the Truth in so Mysterious a Subject as that of Nature But if they knew the Manner how this Philosopher lived the Method he took in his Studies to prevent the Capacity of his Mind from being diverted by any other Objects besides those whose Truth he would discover the Clearness of the Idea's upon which he establish'd his Philosophy and generally all the Advantages he had over the Ancients by new Discoveries I say If they consider these things they would doubtless receive a more reasonable Prejudice in favour of Descartes than of Antiquity which Authorizes Aristotle Plato and many others Yet I advise them not to stop at this Prejudice nor to believe that Descartes is a great Man and that his Philosophy is good because he may be advantageously spoke of Descartes was a Man subject to Error and mistakes like others There are none of his Works even not excepting his Geometry wherein there are not some Footsteps of the Weakness of the Humane Mind He must not therefore be believ'd upon his Word but be read with Precaution as he himself advises us to do examining if he was not deceiv'd and believing nothing of what he says but what Evidence and the Secret Reproaches of our Reason oblige us to believe for indeed the Mind knows nothing truly but what it sees evidently We have shown in the preceding Chapters that our Mind is not infinite but on the contrary that it had a very mean Capacity which is commonly filled with the Sensations of the Soul And lastly That the Mind receiving its Direction from the Will cannot firmly consider any Object without being soon diverted from it through its Inconstancy and Levity These things are certainly the most general Causes of our Errors and we might longer insist upon them here but what I have said is sufficient to discover the Weakness of the Humane Mind to Persons that are capable of any Attention In the Fourth and Fifth Book we shall treat more largely of the Errors which our Inclinations and Passions lead us into and of which we have already said something in this Chapter THE SECOND PART OF THE Pure Understanding Of the Nature of IDEA'S CHAP. I. I. What is meant by Idea's That they truly Exist and that they are necessary to perceive all material Objects II. A division of all the Modes by which External Objects may be seen I Think every one will confess that we do not perceive External Objects by themselves We see the Sun the Stars and many Objects without us and it is not probable that the Soul should go out of the Body and walk as it were through the Heavens to Contemplate all those Objects there She does not then see them by themselves and as the immediate Object of Mind when it sees the Sun for instance it is not the Sun but something which is nearly united to our Soul and it is that which I call Idea So that here by this word Idea I mean only what is the immediate Object or the nearest the Mind when it perceives any thing It must be observed that to make the Mind perceive any Object it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Object should be actually present of which we can have no doubt but it is not requisite that there should be some external Object which resembles this Idea for it often happens that we perceive things which are not and which never had a being So that we often have in our Minds real Idea's of things which never were For instance when a Man imagins a Mountain of Gold it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Mountain should be really present to his Mind When a Mad Man a Man in a high Fever or a Man that is
asleep sees any terrible Animal before his Eyes it is certain that the Idea of this Animal truly Exists and yet this Mountain of Gold and this Animal never were However Men being Naturally inclined to believe that there is none but Corporeal Objects which Exist they Judge of the Reality and Existence of things quite after another manner than they ought to do for as soon as they are sensible of any Object they will certainly have it that this Object Exists although it often happens that there is nothing without And further they affirm that this Object is exactly the same as they see it which never happens But in respect to the Idea which necessarily Exists and which can be nothing else besides what it appears to be they without any reflection commonly Judge it to be nothing as if Idea's had not a very great number of Properties As if the Idea's of a Square for instance was not very different from that of some number and did not represent things perfectly distinct which could never happen to nothing since nothing has no Propriety It is therefore indisputable that Idea's have a real Existence But let us examine their Nature and Essence and see what it can be in the Soul that is capable of representing all things Whatever things the Soul perceives are either in or out of its self those which are in the Soul are its own thoughts that is all its different Modifications for by these words Thought manner of Thinking or modification of the Soul I understand in general all things that can be in the Soul without her perceiving them as her own Sensations Imaginations pure Intellections or simple Conceptions even her Passions and Natural Inclinations Now our Soul has no need of Idea's to perceive all these things because they are within the Soul or rather the Soul it self after such or such a manner Even as the real roundness of some Body and its Motion are only this Body Figured and moved after such or such a manner But as for things that are out of the Soul we can perceive them only by the means of Idea's supposing that these things cannot be intimately united to it There are two sorts of them Spiritual and Material As for the Spiritual there is some probability that they may discover themselves to the Soul without Idea's and by themselves For although Experience teaches us that we cannot immediately and of our selves declare our Thoughts to one another but only by words or some other sensible Sign to which we have assixed our Idea's We may say that God has ordained it so only during this Life to hinder those Disorders that would soon happen if Men could make themselves be understood as they pleased But when Justice and Order shall Reign and we shall be delivered from the Captivity of our Bodies we shall perhaps make our selves mutually understood by an intimate Union of our selves as its probable the Angels do in Heaven so that it does not seem absolutely necessary to admit Idea's to represent spiritual things to the Soul because it may be we may see them by themselves although after a very imperfect manner I examine not here how two Spirits can be united one to the other and if they can after this manner mutually discover one anothers Thoughts I believe however that there is no Substance purely intelligible but that of God nothing can be evidently known but in his Light and that the Vnion of Spirits cannot make them Visible For although we are most strictly united to our selves we are and shall be unintelligible to our selves until we see our selves in God and that he represents to us the perfect intelligible Idea that he hath of our being included in his So that although I may seem here to grant that Angels can manifest one to another what they are and what they think 't is only because I will not dispute of it provided I am granted what is not to be doubted viz. That we cannot see material things by themselves and without Idea's I shall explain in the Seventh Chapter my Opinion how we know Spirits and will shew that at present we cannot absolutely know them by themselves although it may be they are united to us But I speak here chiesly of material things which certainly cannot be united to the Soul in such a manner as is necessary for us to perceive them Because being extended and the Soul not there is no proportion between them Besides our Souls go not out of our Bodies to measure the greatness of the Heaven and consequently they cannot see External Bodies but by the Idea's which represent them This is what all the World ought to grant We are assured then II. A division of the several ways whereby External Objects may be seen that it 's absolutely necessary that the Idea's we have of Bodies and of all other Objects which we perceive not by themselves proceed from these Bodies or these Objects or else that our Soul has the power of producing these Idea's or that God Created them with our Souls or that he produces them every time that we think of any Object or else that the Soul has all those Perfections in it self that it sees in these Bodies Or in fine that it is united with a perfect Being which in general includes all the Perfections of Created Beings We cannot see Objects but after one of these ways Let us examin without prejudice and without frighting our selves with the difficulty of the Question which of them seems most probable It may be we may resolve it very clearly although we do not pretend here to give such Demonstrations as will satisfie all sorts of persons but only convincing Proofs to those at least as will meditate with serious Attention upon them for perhaps it would be thought too rash if we should pretend otherwise CHAP. II. That material Objects do not emit Species which resemble them THe most common received Opinion is that of the Peripateticks who think that External Objects emit Species which resemble them and that those Species are carried by the External Senses to the Common Sense or Understanding They call these Species impressed because the Object imprints them on the External Senses These impressed Species being Material and Sensible are render'd intelligible by means of the active or active intellect and are fit to be received in the passive intellect These Species thus spiritualiz'd are called express'd Species because they are express'd by the impress'd ones and 't is by them that the Passive Intellect knows all material things We shall not stay to explain at large these sine things and the divers manners in which different Philosophers conceive them for although they do not agree as to the number of Faculties which they attribute to the Interior Sense and the Understanding and though there are not a few who doubt whether they have need of any active Intellect to know sensible Objects yet however they generally agree
conceiv'd by it self Therefore it is not the manner of any Being and consequently it is a Being it self Thus it proves the Essence of Matter since Matter is only one Being and not a Compound of divers Beings as abovesaid But many Philosophers are so wedded to general Idea's and Logical Entities that their Mind is more taken up with them than with those that are Particular Distinct and Physical This is sufficiently apparent in that their Arguments upon Natural Things are only grounded upon Notions of Logick Act and Power and of an Infinite Number of Imaginary Entities which they do not distinguish from those that are Real Therefore those Men finding a wonderful Facility of seeing according to their own way what they have a mind to see fancy that they see better than others and that they see distinctly that Extension supposes something and that it is only a Propriety of Matter of which it may even be divested Nevertheless when they are desir'd to explain that thing which they pretend to see in Matter besides Extension they do it in different ways which all shew that they have no other Idea of it than that of Being or of Substance in General This appears clearly to those that observe that the said Idea includes no particular Attributes which are proper to Matter For in removing Extension from Matter they take away all the Attributes and all the Proprieties which we distinctly conceive do belong to it although one should leave that thing which they fancy to be the Essence of it It is visible that they could neither make a Heaven nor Earth of it nor any thing that we see And on the contrary in removing what they fancy to be the Essence of Matter provided Extension be left we leave all the Attributes and all the Proprieties which we conceive to be distinctly included in the Idea of Matter For it is certain that with Extension alone may be form'd a Heaven an Earth and all the visible World besides an infinite Number of others Therefore that something which they suppose besides Extension having no Attributes which can be distinctly conceiv'd to belong to it and which are clearly included in the Idea we have of it is nothing real if we believe Reason and it can be of no use to explain Natural Effects And what they urge that it is the Subject and the Principle of Extension is spoken at random without conceiving distinctly what they say that is without having any other Idea thereof than a General or Logical one as of Subject and Principle So that one might still imagine a new Subject and a new Principle of that Subject of Extension and thus on ad Infinitum because the Mind represents to it self general Idea's of Subject and of Principles as it pleases Indeed it 's very probable that Men would never have obscur'd the Idea they have of Matter so much unless they had had some Reasons for it and several maintain Sentiments contrary to ours through Principles of Divinity Without doubt Extension is not the Effence of Matter if that be contrary to Faith we grant it We are Thanks be to God fully perswaded of the Weakness and Limitation of the Humane Mind We very well know that it has too little Extent to measure an Insinite Power That God can do Infinitely more than we can conceive That he only gives us Idea's to know things that happen according to the Order of Nature but he conceals the rest from us Therefore we are ever ready to submit our Mind to Faith but there must be better Proofs than those that are commonly alledg'd to destroy the Reasons abovesaid because the manner of Explaining the Mysteries of Faith is not of Faith and they are believ'd even without apprehending that the manner of them can ever be clearly explain'd We believe for Example the Mystery of the Tâ—â—nity though the Humane Mind cannot conceive it and nevertheless we believe that things which do not dister from the same Third do not diâ—â—er among themselves though this Proposition seems to destroy it For we are perswaded that we must never make use of our Mind unless on Subjects that are proportion'd to its Capacity and we must not look fixedly on Mysteries for fear of being dazled by them according to this Advertisement of the Holy Ghost Qui scrutator est Majestatis opprimetur à Gsoria Nevertheless if it were thought proper for the Satisfaction of some Men to explain how far the Opinion we have of Matter agrees with what Faith teaches us about Transubstantion we might perhaps do it clearly and distinctly enough and without offending the Decisions of the Church but we are of Opinion that we may very well forbear making that Explication especially in this Work For we must observe that the Holy Fathers have mostly spoken of that Mystery as of an Incomprehensible Mystery that they have not Philosophis'd to explain it and that commonly they have only us'd Comparisons that have not much Exactness in them fitter to discover the Doctrine than to give an Explanation that might satisfie the Mind So that Tradition is for those who do not Philosophise upon that Mystery and who submit their Mind to Faith without puzzling themselves to no purpose in those dissicult Questions Therefore it would be unreasonable to desire Philosophers to give clear and easie Explanations of the manner how the Body of Jesus Christ is in the Eucharist for that would be to desire them to tell Novelties in Divinity And should Philosophers Imprudently answer that Question they could not avoid the Condemnation either of their Philosophy or of Divinity For if their Explanations were Obscure the Principles of their Philosophy would be despis'd and thould their Answer prove clear or easie Men would reasonably suspect the Novelty of their Divinity Since then Novelty in Point of Divinity bears the Character of Error and that Men have a Right to despise Opinions only because they are new and have no Foundation in Tradition we ought not to undertake to give easie and intelligible Explanations of things which the Fathers and the Councils have not fully explain'd and it is sufficient to believe the Doctrine of Transubstantiation without pretending to explain the manner of it For otherwise we should spread Seeds of new Disputes and Quarrels of which there are but too many already and the Enemies of Truth would not fail to make a malicious use of it to oppress their Adversaries Disputes in Point of Explanations of Divinity seem to me to be the most Useless and the most Dangerous and they are the more to be fear'd by reason that even Pious Persons think themselves oblig'd to break the Bonds of Charity with those that are not of their Opinion We have but too many Instances of it and the reason of it is plain enough Therefore it is always the best and safest way not to be over-hasty in speaking of things of which we have no Evidence and which others are
the Water is converted into Wine That as between Three and Four there can be no Number since true Unity is Indivisible so it is necessary that the Water be Converted into the Nature and Essence of the Wine or that the Wine lose its Nature That as all Quaternary Numbers are perfectly alike so the Essence of the Water is perfectly alike in all Waters That as the Number of Three differs Essentially from the Number of Two and that it cannot have the same Proprieties as that has so two Bodies of different Species differ Essentially and in such a manner that they have never the same Proprieties which proceed from Entity and other like things Nevertheless if Men would consider the true Idea's of things with some Attention they would soon discover that all Bodies being Extended their Nature or Essence has nothing resembling Numbers and that it cannot consist in an Indivisible Men do not only suppose Identity Resemblance or Proportion in the Nature Number and Essential Differences of Substances they also suppose them in all things they see Most Men Judge that all the fix'd Stars are fastened to the Heavens as to a Roof at an Equal Distance from the Earth Astronomers did pretend for a long while that the Planets moved in perfect Circles and they have invented a great number of them as Concentriques Excentriques Epicycles c. to Explain the Phoenomena which contradicted their Opinions It is true that in these later Ages the most Learned have Corrected the Errors of the Ancients and believe that the Planets describe Ellipses by their Motion But if they pretend that the Ellipses are Regular as People are inclin'd to believe because the Mind supposes Regularity where it sees no Irregularity they fall into an Error which is more difficult to be Corrected because the Observations that can be made on the Course of the Planets cannot be so Exact and so Just as to shew the Irregularity of their Motions Nothing but Natural Philosophy can Correct that Error for it is infinitely less remarkable than that which we find in the System of perfect Circles But something particular has happened about the Distance and Motion of the Planets For Astronomers not having been able to find an Arithmetical or Geometrical Proportion in the same that being absolutely repugnant to Observations some imagin'd that they observ'd a kind of Proportion which is called Harmonical in their Distances and Motions From thence it is that an * Riccioli Vol. Astronomer of this Age in his New Almageste begins the Section which is Entitled De Systemate Mundi Harmonico with these words There is no Astronomer Neme est paulo eruditior in Astronomicis qui Coelorum ordinem contemplatus non agnoscat harmoniam quamdam in Planetarum intervallis motibus though never so little acquainted in what relates to Astronomy but acknowledges a kind of Harmony in the Motions and Intervals of Planets if he considers the Order of the Heavens Attentively Nor is this the only Author that is of this Opinion For Observations have made him sufficiently sensible of the Extravagancies of that Imaginary Harmony which has nevertheless been admir'd by several Ancient and Modern Authors whose Opinions Father Riccioli Relates and Refutes Moreover some affirm Pythagoras and his Followers to have believ'd that the Heavens by their Regular Motions made a most Wonderful Concert which Men do not hear because they are used to it just like those that Inhabit near the Fall of the Waters of Nile do not hear the Noise of it But I only relate that particular Opinion of the Harmonical Proportion of the Distances and Motions of the Planets to shew that the Mind is delighted with Proportions and that it often Fancies them where they are not The Mind also supposes Uniformity in the duration of things and imagins they are not liable to Change and Instability when it is not in some measure forced by the Relation of the Senses to Judge otherwise All Material Things being Extended are capable of Division and consequently of Corruption Those who reflect on the Nature of Bodies discover Visibly that they are Corruptible Yet there has been a great number of Philosophers who fancied that the Heavens though Material were Incorruptible The Heavens are at too great a Distance from us to discover the Revolutions that happen there and 't is very rare that any happen there so great as to be discovered here That alone has been sufficient to perswade many that they were really Incorruptible And which has the more Confirm'd their Opinion is that they attribute to the Contrariety of Qualities the Corruption to which Sublunary Bodies are subject For as they have never been in the Heavens to see what passes there so they have had no Experience that this Contrariety of Qualities is there which has induced them to believe that there is really no such thing there Therefore they have concluded that the Heavens were free from Corruption because that which Corrupts all Bodies here below according to their Opinion is not above It is Visible that this Argument has no Solidity for I cannot see why there should be no other Cause of Corruption than those Contrarieties of Qualities which they imagin nor upon what Foundation they can affirm That there is neither Heat nor Cold nor Drought nor Moisture in the Heavens That the Sun is not Hot and that Saturn is not Cold. There is some appearance of Reason to say that very hard Stones Glass and other Bodies of that Nature do not Corrupt since we see they subsist long in the same State and though we are near enough to see the Alterations that should happen to them But being at so great a distance as we are from the Heavens it is directly contrary to Reason to conclude that they do not Corrupt because we feel no contrary Qualities in them nor see that they Corrupt Nevertheless some not only say that they Corrupt not but they affirm absolutely that they are Unalterable and Incorruptible And the Peripateticks want but little of saying that the Celestial Bodies are so many Divinities as Aristotle their Master did believe of them The Beauty of the Universe does not consist in the Incorruptibility of its Parts but in the Variety that is found in them And this great Work of the World would not be so admirable without that Vicissitude of things which we observe in it Matter infinitely Extended without Motion and consequently without Form and Corruption would indeed discover the Infinite Power of its Author but it would give no Idea of his Wisdom This is the reason that all Corporeal Things are Corruptible and that there is no Body but what receives some Change which Alters and Corrupts it in Time God Forms even in the Bosom of Stones and Glass Animals more perfect and admirable than all the Works of Men. Those Bodies though very hard and dry are Corrupted in time The Air and Sun to which they are
great Images upon the bottom of the Eye as those Faces which are nearer as the Senses only Perceive but never Judge to speak properly 'T is certain that this Judgment is nothing but a compounded Sensation which consequently may be sometimes false However V. That these Judgments deceive us in some particular Occurrences that which is nothing else but Sensation in us may be consider'd in respect of the Author of Nature who excites it in us as a kind of Judgment I speak sometimes of Sensations as of Natural Judgments because this way of speaking serves to give a reason of Things as may be seen here in the Ninth Chapter towards the end and in many other places Altho' these Judgments which I have spoke of are useful to correct our Senses very many ways and that without them we should very frequently be deceiv'd yet they are also occasions of Error For Instance If it happens that we see the top of a high Steeple behind a great Wall or a Mountain it will appear very near to us and very little but if afterwards we should see it at the same distance yet with many Fields and Houses betwixt it would doubtless appear the greater and at a farther distance altho' in each Station the Projection of the Rays of the Spire or its Image which is Painted at the bottom of our Eyes would be altogether the same Now it may be said that we see it greater because of a Judgment that we Naturally make viz. that since there is so much Land betwixt us and the Steeple it must be further and consequently greater But on the contrary if we saw no Fields betwixt us and the Steeple altho' we even knew there were many and that it was a great way off which is very remarkable it would always appear very near and very little as I have said And it may also be suppos'd that this is done by a Natural Judgment of our Soul which thus sees this Spire because it Judges it about five or six hundred paces distant for commonly our Imagination does not represent a greater distance between Objects and us if it be not assisted by a Sensible view of other interjacent Objects beyond which it can yet imagine farther 'T is for this cause See the 9th Chapter towards the end that when the Moon Rises or Sets we see it greater than when it is elevated above the Horizon for when it is very high we see no Objects betwixt it and us whose greatness we know to Judge of that of the Moon by comparing them together but when it is near Setting we see betwixt it and us many Fields whose breadth we know very near and so we Judge it at a greater distance because we see it at a greater It 's observable that when the Moon is Risen above our Heads altho' our reason assures us that it is at a very great distance yet it seems to us to be very little and very near for indeed these Natural Judgments of Sight are only built upon the Perceptions of the same Sight and Reason cannot correct them So that they very often deceive us in causing us to form free Judgments which perfectly agree with them for when we Judge by our Senses we are always deceiv'd but we are never deceiv'd when we conceive for a Body only Instructs as a Body but God always teaches us Truth as I shall show hereafter These false Judgments deceive us not only as to the distance and bigness of Bodies but also in making us see their Figure other than it is We see for Example the Sun and Moon and other Spherical Bodies very distant as if they were Plains and Circles because at this great distance we cannot distinguish whether the opposite part is nearer to us than the others and because of this we Judge it at an equal distance 'T is for the same reason we Judge that all the Stars and the blue which appears in the Heaven are at the same distance and as it were a perfectly Convex Vault because our Mind supposes an Equality where it sees no Inequality altho' it ought not positively to conclude but where it sees evidently I shall not tarry here to Explain at large the Errors of the Sight as to the Figures of Bodies because any Book of Optics will save me that Labour This Science indeed does only show how the Eyes are deceiv'd and all its direction consists but in helping us to make those Natural Judgments we have spoke of at such time as we ought not to make them and this may be done after so many ways that there is not one Figure in the World which may not be Painted after a thousand different manners so as that the Sight will Infallibly be deceiv'd thereby But this is not a place to Explain these things thorowly what has been said is sufficient to show that we must not trust to our Eyes when they represent the Figure of Bodies to us altho' we are not so subject to be deceiv'd by Figures as other things CHAP. VIII I. That our Eyes do not inform us of the greatness or swiftness of Motion consider'd in it self II. That duration which is necessary to be understood to know what Motion is is unknown III. Examples of the Errors of Sight in respect of Motion and Rest WE have discover'd the principal and most general Errors of the Sight about the Extension of Figures we must now correct those in which it deceives us about the Motion of Matter and this will not be a very difficult performance after what we have said about Extension for there is so great a relation betwixt these two things that if we are deceiv'd about the bigness of Bodies we must unavoidably be deceiv'd in their Motion But to offer nothing except what is clear and distinct we must first take away the Equivocation of the word Motion for this Term commonly signifies two things the first is a certain power that is imagin'd in a mov'd Body which is the Cause of its Motion the second is a continual removal of a Body that is departing from or approaching to another that is consider'd as in a State of Rest When we say for Instance that a Bowle hath communicated its Motion to another the word Motion is here taken in the first signification but if it be said simply that a Boul is in Motion it is taken in the second Sense And indeed this term Motion signifies both the Cause and Effect together which yet are in themselves two different things They seem to me to be in the grossest and most dangerous Error concerning force who attribute to it Motion and the transportation of Bodies these fine terms of Nature and impressed Qualities seem to me to be only a proper Subterfuge for the Ignorance of the falsly Learn'd See the 3d Chapter of the Second Part 6. l. and impious Libertines as may be very easily proved but this is not a fit place to
distinguishes it from Admiration from Desire and Love from a Square a Circle and Motion in fine he discerns it very different from all things which are not this Pain that he feels Now if he had no knowledge of Pain I wou'd fain know how he can have any certainty that what he feels is none of these things We have some knowledge therefore of what we immediately feel when we see Colours or when we have any other Sensation and even 't is most certain that if we knew it not we cou'd know no sensible Object for 't is evident we cou'd not distinguish Water from Wine if we did not know that the Sensations we have of one of them is different from those we have of the other and so of all things we know by our Senses It is true that if I was pressed and required to explain what Pain Pleasure and Colour is c. I cou'd not do it as it ought to be done by Words but it follows not from thence that if I see Colour or burn my self I do not know at least after some manner what I actually feel Now the reason why all Sensations cannot be well explained by Words as all other things are is III. Objection and Answer because it depends upon the Will of Man to affix the Idea's of Things to such Names as they please they may call Heaven Ouranos Schamajim c. as the Greeks and Hebrews did but even those Men cannot at their pleasure affix their Sensations to Words or even to any other thing they see not Colours altho' they speak of them if they open not their Eyes They relish not Tastes if no change happens in the order of the Fibres of their Tongue or Brain In a word Sensations depend not upon Mans Will and it is only he who hath made them that preserves them in the mutual Correspondence that is between the Modifications of the Soul and those of the Body so that if any one shou'd desire me to represent to him Heat or Colour I cannot find Words for that but I must impress in the Organs of his Senses the Motions to which Nature unites these Sensations I must take him to the Fire and show him some Pictures This is the Reason why 't is impossible to give the Blind the least Knowledge of what we mean by Red Green Yellow c. For since we cannot make our selves be understood when he that hears us has not the same Idea's as we that speak It is manifest that Colours not being united to the sound of Words or to the motion of the Nerve of the Ear but to that of the Optic Nerve they cannot be represented to the Blind since their Optic Nerve cannot be shaken by coloured Objects We have then some Knowledge of our Sensations let us now see from whence it is that we seek yet to know them and believe our selves ignorant thereof this is without doubt the reason The Soul IV. Why it is we imagine we do not know our own Sensations since Original Sin is become as it were Corporeal by its inclination its love for Sensible Things continually diminishes the Union or Relation that it hath to Intelligible Things It is with great disgust that it conceives Things which do not produce some Sensations in it and it immediately ceases to consider them It does all that is in its power to produce some Images in its Brain which represent them and it is so much accustomed to this kind of Conception from our Infancy that it even thinks it cannot know what it cannot imagine Yet there are many things which not being Corporeal cannot be represented to the Mind by Corporeal Images as our Soul with all its Modifications But when our Soul wou'd represent to it self its own Nature and Sensations it does all it can to form a Corporeal Image thereof It seeks it self in all Corporeal Beings and takes it self sometimes for one and sometimes for another one while for Air and then again for Fire or for the Harmony of the parts of its Body Thus being willing to find it self amongst Bodies and imagining its own Modifications which are its Sensations to be the Modifications of Bodies we must not wonder if it Errs and is intirely Ignorant of it self What yet induces it further to be willing to imagine its Sensations is that it Judges them to be in the Objects and that they are even Modifications thereof and consequently that 't is something Corporeal and which can be Imagin'd It Judges therefore that the Nature of its Sensations consists only in the Motion that causes them or in some other Modification of a Body but when it finds that which is different from what it feels which is neither Corporeal nor can be represented by Corporeal Images this embarasses it and makes it believe that it does not know its own Sensations As for those who do not make these vain Efforts See the Explanations of the 7th Chapter of the 2d Part l. 3. to represent the Soul and its Modifications by Corporeal Images and yet are Solicitous to know the Nature of their Sensations they must consider that neither the Soul or its Modifications are to be known by the Idea's taking the word Idea in its true sense as I have determin'd and explain'd it in the Third Book but only by an inward Sensation So that when they desire the Soul and its Sensations to be explain'd by some Idea's they require what is impossible for all Mankind to give them since Man cannot Instruct us in giving us Idea's of Things but only in making us reflect upon those we already have The second Error we are subject to in respect to our Sensations is our attributing them to Objects as has already been explained in the 11th and 12th Chapters The third is V. That we dâ—ceive our selves in believing that all Men have the same Sâ—nsations of the same Objects our Judging that every one has the same Sensations of the same Objects For Example we believe all Mankind that sees the Sky takes it to be Blue and the Fields to be Green and all Visible Objects to be after the same manner as they appear to us and so of all other Sensible Qualities of the rest of our Senses Many persons will wonder that I shou'd bring such things in question as they have thought Indisputable yet I dare affirm they have never had any reason to Judge of them after the manner they have done and altho' I cannot Mathematically demonstrate to them that they are deceived yet I can demonstrate 't is by the greatest Chance in the World if they are not deceived Nay I have sufficient Reasons to be assur'd that they certainly are in an Error To know the Truth of what I advance we must remember what I have already proved viz. that there is a great difference between Sensations and the causes of them for from thence we may Judge that its possible absolutely speaking
of it self Now as the Stars which are immediately united to the Soul which are those only that it can see are not in the Heavens it from thence follows that all Men who see Stars in the Heavens and afterwards voluntarily Judging that they are there make two false Judgments whereof the one is Natural and the other Free One is a Judgment of the Senses or a Compounded Sensation according to which we ought not to Judge the other is a Free Judgment of the Will which we cannot hinder our selves from making and by conquence which we ought not to do if we would avoid Error But the reason that we believe that these Stars II. The Reasons of these false Judgments which we see immediately are out of the Soul and in the Firmament is because it is not in the power of the Soul to see them when it pleases for it cannot perceive them when the Motions to which the Idea's of these Objects are Naturally ty'd happen in its Brain Now because the Soul perceives not the Motions of its Organs but only its own Sensations and that it knows these same Sensations are not produced in it by its own power it is induced to Judge that they are without and in the cause which represents them to it and it hath so often made these kind of Judgments in the same time it perceived the Objects that it can scarcely hinder it self from making them It will be very necessary to explain the foundation of what I have said to shew the usefulness of this infinite number of little Beings that we call Species and Idea's which are as nothing and which represent all things that we create and destroy when we please and that our Ignorance hath made us imagine to render a Reason for things that we understand not We shou'd show the solidity of their Opinion who believe God is the true Father of Light who only Instructs all Men without whom the most simple Truths cou'd not be Intelligible and the Sun tho' never so bright wou'd not be so much as Visible to us who acknowledge no other Nature than the Will of God and who upon these Reflexions have confessed that the Idea's which represent the Creatures to us are only the Perfections of God which answer to these same Creatures and represent them to us It wou'd be requisite also to show the Nature of Idea's and then it wou'd be easie to speak more clearly of what I have mentioned but that it wou'd carry us too far In the third Book these things shall be more fully explained and order requires it shou'd be referred till then It suffices for the present that I bring a most Sensible and Indisputable Example wherein we shall find many Judgments confounded with one and the same Sensation I believe there is no body in the World who looks upon the Moon but sees it about a thousand Paces from himself and who thinks it not greater when it Rises or Sets than when it is very high above the Horizon and it may be also that we only believe we see it greater without thinking that we make any Judgment in its Sensation Yet it is Indisputable that if there was not some kind of Judgment included in the Sensation we shou'd not see the Moon in the distance it appears to be And besides it wou'd appear less to us when it rises than when it is got a great way above the Horizon since we see it great when it rises only because we believe it farther off by a Natural Judgment which I have spoken of in the 6th Chapter But besides our Natural Judgments which we may look upon as compounded Sensations there is almost in all our Sensations a free Judgment for Men not only determine by a Natural Judgment that Pain for instance is in their Hand but they also make a free Judgment thereof they not only feel it there but likewise believe it so and have so habituated themselves to form such Judgments that they find it very difficult to avoid it Yet these Judgments are very false in themselves altho' very useful for the preservation of Life for our Senses Instruct us only for our Bodies and all our free Judgments which are conformable to our Senses are very far from the Truth But that we may not leave all these things without giving some Means to discover the Reasons thereof we must know that there are two sorts of Beings such as our Soul sees immediately and others that it knows only through the Means of the first For Instance when I perceive the Sun rising I first perceive that which I see immediately and because I perceive that first Sun only by reason there is something without me which produces certain Motions in my Eyes and Brain I Judge that this first Sun which is in my Soul is without and that it Exists It may further happen that we see this first Sun which is intirely united to our Soul tho' the other be not upon the Horizon and even whether it exists or no so we may see this first Sun greater when the other rises than when it is very high and altho' it be true that this first Sun that we immediately see be greater than the other rises it follows not from thence that this other be greater for 't is not properly that which rises that we see since it is distant from us many Millions of Miles but it is that first that is truly greater and such as we see it because all things that we immediately see are always what we see them to be and we deceive our selves only because we Judge that what we immediately see is in the External Object which causes that Vision in us So when we see Light in seeing this first Sun which is immediately united to our Mind we do not deceive our selves in believing we see it it is not possible to doubt thereof But our Error is our Willing without any Reason nay against all Reason that this Light that we immediately see exists in the Sun which is without us 'T is also the same thing in respect to other Objects of our Senses III. Error is not in our Sensations but only in our Judgments If we observe carefully what has been said in the beginning and continuation of this Work we shall easily see that of all things that happen in each Sensation Error proceeds from the Judgments we make by which we think that our Sensations are in the Objects First it is not an Error to be ignorant that the Action of Objects consists in the Motion of some of their parts and that this Motion communicates it self to the Organs of our Senses which are the two first things to be observed in each Sensation for there is a great deal of difference between being ignorant of a thing and having a false Notion of it Secondly we deceive our selves not in the third which is properly Sensation when we feel Heat see Light Colours
very little We shall clearly see that 't is a fault to imagine so great differences in the Objects of our Senses But I must here mention by the by that there 's nothing to be objected against these Terms Form and Essential difference Hony is certainly Hony by its form and 't is thus that it essentially differs from Salt but this form or this essential difference consists only in the different Configuration of its parts 't is this different Configuration which causes Hony to be Hony and Salt Salt And altho' its only accidental to Matter in general to have the Configuration of the parts of Hony or Salt and so to have the form of Hony or Salt it may nevertheless be said that it is essential to Hony or Salt to be what they are to have such or such a Configuration of Parts Even as Sensations of Cold Heat Pleasure and Pain are not essential to the Soul as a Soul but because it is by these Sensations that it 's said to be sensible of Heat Cold Pleasure and Pain CHAP. XVII I. Another Example drawn from Morals which shows that our Senses only offer us false Goods II. That 't is God only who is our true Good III. The Origine of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stoics IT has been sufficiently proved in my Opinion that this Prejudice Our Sensations are in Objects is a very fruitful Principle of Error in Physics it must now be shown from Reasons drawn from Morals that the same Prejudice join'd with this That Objects are the only and true Causes of our Sensations is also very dangerous There 's nothing so common in the World I. An Example drawn from Morals that our Senses only offer us false Goods as to see Men who are Wedded to Sensible Goods Some love Musick others good Eating and others are passionate for other things Now thus they reason to perswade themselves that all these Objects are Goods viz. All these agreeable Tastes which please us in Banquets these Sounds which affect the Ear and these other Pleasures which we perceive upon other occasions are certainly included in Sensible Objects or at least 't is these Objects that are the occasion of them or in sine we cannot have Sensations without them Now 't is impossible to doubt whether Pleasure be Good whether Pain be Evil we are inwardly convinc'd thereof and consequently the Objects of our Senses are very real Goods which we ought to enjoy that we may be happy This is the Reasoning that we ordinarily I shall explain in the last Book in what sense Objects work upon Bodies and inconsiderately make and this is that which inclines us to believe that our Sensations are in Objects that Objects have in themselves the power of making us Sensible that we look upon things as our Goods which are infinitely below us which can only act upon our Bodies by producing some Motions in their Fibres but can never act upon our Souls or make us sensible of Pleasure or Pain Certainly if it is not the Soul which acts upon it self upon occasion of what passes in the Body nothing else but God can do it and if it is not the Soul which causes Pleasure or Pain according to the different shaking of the Fibres of its Body as it 's very likely it does not since it often perceives Pleasure and Pain without its consent I know no other Hand that is powerful enough to produce this Sensation in it but that of the Author of Nature Indeed there 's none but God that is our true Good II. That 't is God only who is our Good and that all Sensible Objects can't make us sensible of Pleasure 't is he only that can affect us with all these Pleasures we are capable of and who in his Knowledge and Love haâ—â— Decreed to excite them in us And these Pleasures which he hath link'd to the Motions which pass in our Body to make us careful of our own Preservation are very little very weak and very short altho' we are enslav'd to them in this State whereinto Sin has reduc'd us but the Pleasures which he will excite in his Elect in Heaven are infinitely greater since he made us to know and love him for according to the Order of Nature greater Goods affect us with greater Pleasure and since God is infinitely above all things the Pleasure of those that shall enjoy him will certainly surpass all Pleasures What we have said of the Cause of our Errors III. The Original of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stoâ—es in reference to Good does sufficiently inform us of the falsness of the Opinions of the Stoics and Epicureans about the Supream Good The Epicureans placed it in Pleasure and because they felt it as well in Vice as in Vertue and even more commonly in the first than the second they gave themselves up to all sorts of Voluptuousness Now the first Cause of their Error was that Judging falsely there was something agreeable in the Objects of their Senses or that they were the true Causes of the Pleasures they felt and being besides this convinc'd by an inward Sensation which they had in themselves that Pleasure was a Good for them or at least for the time they enjoy'd it they gave themselves up to the Government of all the Passions which they apprehended would not incommode them afterwards whereas they ought to have consider'd that the Pleasure which is felt in Sensible Things cannot be in these things as their true Causes nor after any other manner and consequently that Sensible Goods cannot be such in respect of our Soul They should also have consider'd the other Things which we have explain'd The Stoics on the contrary being perswaded that Sensible Pleasures were only in the Body and for the Body and that the Soul ought to have its particular Good placed its Happiness in Vertue Now this is the Origine of their Errors they believ'd that Sensible Pain and Pleasures were not in the Soul but only in the Body they made use of this false Judgment as a Principle for other false Conclusions as that Pain is not an Evil nor Pleasure a Good That the Pleasures of Sense are not good in themselves but that they are common to Men and Beasts And nevertheless it is easie to show that altho' the Epicureans and Stoics were deceiv'd in many things yet they were in the right in some for the happiness of the Happy consists in an accomplish'd Vertue I would say in the Knowledge and Love of God and is a very great Pleasure which continually attends them Let us then well remember that external Objects include nothing neither agreeable nor disagreeable that they are not the Causes of our Pleasures and that we have no reason either to fear or love them but that God only is to be fear'd and lov'd because he only is able to Punish or Reward us to make us Sensible of Pain or Pleasure In fine 't
she lets go her Metaphysical Thoughts and pure Intellections to apply her self only to her own Sensations Thus it seems Children cannot consider the pure Idea's of Truth with sufficient attention being so often and easily disturbed by the confused Idea's of their Senses Yet we may answer first that it is more easie for a Child of seven years to be deliver'd from the Errors whereinto the Senses lead it than for a person of Sixty who has all his life time followed the prejudices of Infancy Secondly that if a Child is not capable of the clear and distinct Idea's of Truth it is at least capable of being advertised that its Senses deceive it upon every occasion and if we do not teach it the Truth we ought not at least to entertain or fortify it in its Errors And lastly that the youngest Children how wedded soever they may be to agreeable and painful Sensations learn soon what grown Persons can't do in much more time as the Knowledge of the Order and Relations that there is between all Words and all Things which they see and hear For altho' these Things depend chiefly on the Memory yet it is plain enough that they must make great use of their Reason in the manner whereby they learn their Tongue But since the facility that the Fibres of Childrens Brains have for the receiving the impressions of sensible Objects II. Advice for the well Educating of Children is the reason why they are incapable of Judging of abstracted Sciences it is very easie to remedy it For 't is certain that if Children were taken without fear without desires and without hopes if we did not make them suffer pain and if we kept them as much as possible from their little pleasures we might as soon as they cou'd speak teach them the most difficult and most abstracted or at least the most sensible parts of the Mathematics Mechanics and other things of the like Nature which are necessary in the sequel of life But their Minds are not fit to be applied to abstracted Sciences when they are agitated by desires and troubled with frights which is requisite to be well considered For as an ambitious Man who shou'd lose his Riches and Honour or who shou'd have been raised all of a sudden to a great Dignity which he cou'd not have hoped for wou'd not be in a condition to resolve Metaphysical Questions or Algebraick Equations but only to do such things as his present passion inspired him with So Children in whose Brain an Apple and Sugar-plumb make as deep impressions as Offices and Grandeurs do in that of a Man of Forty are not in a condition of hearing such abstracted Truths as we teach them So that it may be affirmed there is nothing more contrary to the advancement of Children in the Sciences than the continual Divertisements wherewith they recompence them and the continual Punishments they threaten them with But what is infinitely more considerable is that these fears of Chastisement and these desires of sensible Recompence with which they fill Childrens Minds extreamly diverts them from Piety Devotion is yet more abstracted than Science it is less relished by corrupted Nature The Mind of Man is very much inclined to Study but it is not so to Piety If therefore great agitations permit us not to study altho' we naturally have some pleasure in it how is it possible that Children which are taken up with sensible Pleasures wherewith they recompence them and with the Pains they fright them with shou'd preserve a sufficient freedom of Mind to give them any inclination to Piety The capacity of the Mind is very much limited many things are not requisite to fill it and when it is full it is incapable of new Thoughts except it empties it self of some it had before But when the Mind is filled with sensible things it cannot part with them when it will to conceive this we must consider we are all naturally inclined to Good and Pleasure being the Character whereby we distinguish it from Evil it is necessary that Pleasures shou'd affect us and employ us more than all the rest Pleasure then being united to the use of sensible things because they are the Goods of Mans Body there is a kind of necessity that these goods shou'd fill the capacity of our Minds until God by imbittering them gives us a distaste and horror of them and by his Grace makes us feel the sweetness of Heaven which effaces all the Pleasures of this World S. Aug. Dando menti caelestem delectationem quâ omnis terrena delectatio superetur But because we are as much inclined to shun Evil as to love Good and Pain is the Character that Nature has united to Evil all that we have said of Pleasure must in a contrary sensce be understood of Pain Since those things therefore that make us feel Pleasure and Pain fill the capacity of the Mind and that it is not in our power to quit or not to be affected with them when we please it is plain that we cannot make Children be inclined to Piety no more than Men if we do not begin with them according to the Precepts of the Gospel by a privation of all things that touch the Senses and which excite great desires and great fears since all the Passions darken and extinguish Grace and that inward love to our Duty which God has implanted in us The least Children have reason as well as Men altho ' they have not experience they have also the same natural inclinations tho' they are carried to very different Objects they must therefore be accustom'd to guide themselves by reason since they have it and excited to their Duty by rightly managing their good Inclinations It destroys their reason and corrupts their best inclinations to engage them to their Duty by sensible impressions They appear then to be in their Duty but 't is only an appearance Virtue is neither engraven in their Mind nor Heart they scarcely know it and they love it much less Their Mind is full of fears and desires of aversions to and love of sensible things which they cannot disingage themselves from to gain their Liberty and to make use of their Reason Thus Children who are educated after this base and servile manner accustom themselves by little and little to a certain insensibility of all the Sentiments of honest Men and good Christians which continues with them all their Lives and when they think themselves freed from Chastisements either by their Authority or Craft they abandon themselves to whatever flatters their Concupiscence and their Senses because indeed they know no other good than what is sensible It is true there are some occurrences wherein it is necessary to instruct Children by their Senses but it must only be done when Reason is not sufficient They must first be perswaded to their Duty by Reason and if they are not capable of acknowledging their obligations to it it will be best
to speak meerly for Talkings sake like many that speak boldly of every thing that comes next 'em they are therefore concern'd to find out Words proper to express as they ought to do their thoughts which are not common Though we have a great Veneration for Persons of Piety Divines Old Men and generally for all those who have justly acquir'd great Authority over other Men nevertheless we thought our selves oblig'd to say this of 'em it often happens that they believe themselves infallible because all other Men hearken to 'em with Respect because they make little use of their Reason in the discovery of Speculative Truths and for that they condemn with too much freedom whatever they dislike before they have seriously consider'd it Not that they are to be blam'd for not applying themselves to many Sciences of little use for they are allow'd both to let 'em alone and to despise them if they think convenient but they are not to judge of 'em rashly as their fancies lead 'em nor upon ill grounded suspitions For they are to consider that the Gravity of their Delivery the Authority which they have acquir'd over the Minds of Men and their common custom of confirming what they say by some Passage of the Holy Scripture will infallibly lead into Error all those that listen to 'em out of Respect and who being incapable throughly to examine things suffer themselves to be surpriz'd by Manners and Appearances When Error hath the appearance of Truth it is oftimes more respected than Truth it self and this false Respect is attended with dangerous Inconveniencies Pessima res est errorum Apotheosis pro peste intellectus habenda est si vanis accedat veneratio Thus when certain Persons either out of false Zeal or out of a Love for their own thoughts have made use of Scripture to establish false Principles of Natural Philosophy or any other Science they have oft been listen'd to as Oracles by Men that have believ'd 'em upon their Words because of that Veneration which they owe to Sacred Authority but it has likewise happen'd so that Vicious and Corrupted Minds have hence taken an occasion to despise Religion So that by a strange Inversion the Holy Scripture has been the Cause of Error to some and Truth has been the Motive and Original of Impiety to others We ought therefore to be careful as the Author above cited well observes how we seek for dead things among the living and never to pretend by the strength of our own Wits to discover in Sacred Scripture what the Holy Ghost hath not thought fit to reveal Ex divinorum humanorum malesana admixtione continues he non solum educitur Philosophia Phantastica sed etiam Religio Haretica Itaque salutare admodum est si mente solâ—ia fidei cantum deatur quae fidel sunt All Persons then who have Authority over others ought to be so much the more cautions in their Decisions by how much they find 'em to be most adher'd to Divines especially ought to take care how they being Religion into contempt through their false Zeal out of vain glory either to exalt themselves or disseminate their Opinions But because it is not for me to tell 'em their Duty let 'em bear St. Thomas Opuse 9. who being interrogated by his General what he thought of some Articles answered him out of St. Austin in the following manner Multum autem nocet alia que ad pietatis Doctrinam non speclant vel asscrere vel negate quasi pâ—â—tinentia ad sacram doctrinam Dicit enim in 5. Confâ—ss cum audio Christianum aliquem fratrem ista quae Philosophi le caeâ—â— aut stellis de Solis Lunae motibus dixerunt nescientem aliud pro alio sentientem patienter intucor opinantem hominem nec illi obesse video cum de te Domine Creator omnium nostrorum non credat indigna si forte sitûs habitûs Creaturae Corporalis ignoret Obest autem si haec ad ipsam doctrinam Pietatis pertinere arbitretur pertinacius affirmare audeat quod ignorat Quod autem obsit manifestat August in 1. super Genesin ad Litteram Turpe est inquit nimis perniciosum ac maxime cavendum ut Christianum de his rebus veluti secundum Christianas literas loquentem ita delicare quilibet Infidelis audeat ut quemadmodum dicitur toto Coelo errare conspiciens risum tenere vix possit Et non tamen Molestum est quod errans homo videatur Sed quod Auditores nostri ab eis qui foris sunt talia sensisse creduntur cum magno eorum Exitio de quorum salute satagimus tanquam indocti reprehenduntur respumtur Vnde mihi videtur tutius esse ut haec que communes Philosophi senserunt nostrae Fidei non repugnant neque esse sic asserenda ut dogmata Fidei licet aliquando sub nomine Philosophorum introducantur neque sic esse neganda tanquam Fidei contraria ne Sapientibus hujus Mundi contemnendi Doctrinam Fidei occasio praebeatur It 's very dangerous to speak decisively upon Matters which do not belong to Faith as if they did St. Austin tells us in his 5th Book of Confessions When I see says he a Christian that is not acquainted with the Opinions of Philosophers concerning the Heavens the Stars and the Motions of the Sun and Moon and would take one thing for an other I let 'em alone in these Opinions and Doubts For I don't see that Ignorance in the situation of Bodies the different ordering of Matter can injure 'em provided he has not unworthy Sentiments of thee our Lord who art the Creator of us all But it does him an Injury if he is persuaded that these things concern Religion and if he is so bold as obstinately to affirm what he knows not The same Saint explains his Thoughts yet more clearly upon this Subject in the first Book of the Literal Explication of Genesis in these Terms A Christian must take a great deal of Care that he does not speak of these Things as if they were Holy Scripture for an Infidel who should hear him speak Extravigances that should have no appearances of Truth could not forbear laughing at him so the Christian is only Confounded and the Infidel would be very little Edified Yet what is more mischievous in these Encounters than a Man's being deceiv'd is that these Infidels that we endeavour to Convert imagine falsely and to their inevitable ruine that our Authors have very extravigant Sentiments so that they condemn and despise 'em as ignorant Men it is therefore in my Opinion more proper not to affirm the common receiv'd Opinions of Philosophers as Matters of Faith which are not contrary to our Faith although we may sometimes make use of the Authority of Philosophers to make 'em be receiv'd We must not also reject these Opinions as contrary to our Faith that we may give no occasion
very Good according to Scripture Valde bona Therefore God Loves them and moreover it is his Love which preserves them for all Beings only subsist because God Loves them Diligis omnia quae sunt says the Wise Man Nihil odisli eorum quae fecisti Nec enim odiens aliquid constituisti fecisti Quomodo autem posset aliquid permanere nisi tu voluisses aut quod à to vocatum non esset conserveretur In effect it is not possible to conceive that things which do not please a Being which is infinitely Perfect and Powerful should subsist since all things only subsist by his Will Therefore God wills his Glory as his principal End and the Preservation of his Creatures for his Glory The Natural Inclinations of Humane Minds being certainly continual Impressions of the Will of him that has created them and does preserve them It is in my Opinion necessary that those Inclinations should be intirely like unto those of their Creator and Preserver Therefore Naturally they can have no principal End but his Glory nor no other Second End but their own Preservation and that of others but always in relation to him from whom they have their Being For it seems undeniable to me that since God cannot desire that the Will he has created should Love an Inferior Good more than a Greater that is That it should Love that which is less Lovely more than that which is more Lovely He can create nothing without inclining it towards himself or commanding it to Love him above all things though he may create it Free and with a Power to withdraw and to stray from him Whereas there is properly but one Love in God III. Human Minds are meerly prone to particular Good through the Tendency they have to Good in General which is the Love of himself And that God can Love nothing but by that Love since he can Love nothing but in relation to himself So God likewise Imprints but one Love in us which is the Love of Good in General and we can Love nothing but by that Love since we can Love nothing but what is or seems to be Good It is the Love of Good in General which is the Principle of our particular Affections since that Love really is nothing but our Will For as I have said already in another place The Will is nothing but the continual Impression of the Author of Nature which inclines the Mind of Man towards Good in General Certainly we must not imagine that this Power we have of Loving proceeds from us or is at our Disposition Nothing but the Power of not Loving well or rather of misplacing our Affections is at our own Disposition by reason that being Free we may apply and actually do apply to particular Objects and consequently to false Objects the Good Love which God does not cease to imprint in us while he does not cease to preserve us But not only our Will or our Love for Good in General proceeds from God but Inclinations for particular Goods which are common to all Men though not equally strong in all Men as our Inclination for the Preservation of our Being and of those that are united to us by Nature are also Impressions of the Will of God upon us for in this place I give promiscuously the Name of Natural Inclinations to all the Impressions of the Author of Nature which are common to all Minds I said but even now that God loved his Creatures IV. The Source of the Chief Natural Inclinations which will make up the Division of this fourth Book and also that it was his Love which gave them to exist and did preserve their Being Therefore as God continually imprints in us a Love like unto his since it is his Will which makes and which regulates ours he likewise gives us all those Natural Inclinations which are not at our Choice and which incline us of necessity to the Preservation of our Being and of those we live with For though Sin has Corrupted all things it has not destroy'd them Although our Natural Inclinations do not always propose God as their End by the Free Choice of our Will God is always their Object in the Institution of Nature For God who produces and preserves them in us only produces and preserves them for himself All Sinners tend towards God by the Impression they receive from God though they withdraw from him by the Error and Distraction of their Mind They love Good for we can never love otherwise since God makes us Love but they Love ill Objects Ill only because God who gives even Sinners the Power of Loving forbids their Loving them because since the Fall they withdraw their Affection from him For Men imagining that Creatures occasion in them the Pleasure they injoy upon their account incline their Affections violently towards the Body and fall into an absolute Forgetfulness of God who does not appear before their Eyes We have still then the same Natural Inclinations or the same Impressions of the Author of Nature which Adam had before the Fall We have even the same Inclinations which the Blessed have in Heaven for God neither Creates nor Preserves any Creatures without giving them a Love like unto his He Loves himself he Loves us he Loves all his Creatures Therefore he Inclines all Humane Minds to Love him to Love themselves and to Love all Creatures But were as all our Inclinations are only Impressions of the Author of Nature which incline us to Love him and all things for his sake they cannot be right unless we love God with all our Power and all things for his sake by the Free Choice of our Will For we cannot without Injustice abuse the Love God gives us for himself by applying it to any thing but himself or which has no relation to himself Thus we are now sensible not only what our Natural Inclinations are but also what they ought to be in order to be well regulated and according to the Institution of their Author For all the Disorder of our Inclinations consists in that we place our final End in our selves and that instead of doing all things in relation to God we do all things in relation to our selves We have then in the first place an Inclination for good in General which is the Principle of all our Natural Inclinations of all our Passions and of all the Free Actions of our Will Secondly We have an Inclination for the Preservation of our Being and of our Happiness Thirdly We have all an Inclination for the other Creatures when they are of use to us or to those we Love Moreover we have several other particular Inclinations which depend on these but we shall speak of them elsewhere We only design in this Fourth Book to refer the Errors of our Inclinations to these three Heads viz. To the Inclination we have to Good in General To Self-Love And to the Love of our Neighbour CHAP. II. I.
in Favour of them That Men are but little attentive to what is spoken at that time That the most Exact are sometimes guilty of it and that they do not desire their Words should be collected like those of Scaliger and of Cardinal du Perron There is some Reason in these Excuses and we are willing to believe that such kind of Faults deserve some Indulgence People are desirous to speak in Conversation but there are unhappy days in which they do not hit things right We are not always in a Humour to think and to express our selves well and Time is so short on certain Occasions that the least Cloud and the least absence of Mind makes those which have the greatest Interest and Penetration of Min stumble unluckily into Extravagant Absurdities But if the Faults which the Pretenders to Learning commit in Conversation are excusable the Faults they are guilty of in their Books after mature Deliberation are by no means pardonable especially if they are frequent and are not aton'd by some good thing For those who write an ill Book make abundance of People lose their time in reading of it besides their falling into the same Errors they are guilty of and this occasions many more which is a thing of very ill Consequence But though it be a greater Fault than People imagine to compose an ill Book or only an useless one it is a Fault that sooner meets with Reward than Punishment For there are Crimes which Men do not punish whether it be that they are in Fashion or because their Reason is not commonly so steady to condemn as Criminals whom they look upon to be Men of better Sense than they are themselves Authors are commonly look'd upon as Extraordinary Men who soar much above others and so they are respected instead of being punish'd Therefore there is no likelihood that Men should ever erect a Tribunal to Examine and Condemn all such Books as only serve to Corrupt Reason So that we must never expect to see the Republick of Letters better regulated than other Republicks are since both are compos'd by Men. Moreover it is very necessary in order to remove Error to allow the Republick of Letters more Liberty than others in which Novelty is always very Dangerous For should the World Incroach upon the Liberty of Learned Men and Condemn all Novelties without Discernment it would confirm us in our Errors Therefore there is no reason to find fault with my speaking against the Government of the Republick of Letters and with â—my endeavouring to show that often those great Men which are admir'd by others for their Profound Learning are at the bottom only Vain Proud Men without Judgment and without any true Science I am oblig'd to speak thus of them least People should blindly submit to their Decisions and follow their Errors The Proofs of their Vanity III. Of the Books of Pretenders to Learning of their Want of Judgment and of their Ignorance are apparent in their own Works Those who will give themselves the Trouble to examine them with an Intent to Judge of them by the Rule of Common Sense and without Prejudice of Esteem for those Authors will find that most of the Designs of their Study are grounded upon an unjudicious Vanity and that their principal End is not to perfect their Reason and much less to regulate the Motions of their Heart but only to Confound others in order to appear more Learned than they This is the Reason as we have already observed that they always fix upon odd extraordinary Subjects and that they only use odd and extraordinary Expressions to explain themselves and quote none but odd and extraordinary Authors They seldom explain themselves in their own Language it is too common nor yet with a clear plain easie Latin they do not speak to be understood but to be admir'd They seldom apply themselves to Subjects which are useful for the Conduct of Life that seems too common to them They neither endeavour to be useful to others nor to themselves but only to be thought Learned They give no Reasons for what they say or else they are such Mysterious and Incomprehensible ones as neither themselves nor any body else conceives with Evidence They have no clear Reasons and if they had they would not use them Those Reasons do not surprise the Mind they look too plain and too common every body is capable of them They rather chuse to relate Authorities to prove or to seem to prove their Thoughts for often the Authorities they alledge prove nothing by the Sense they contain they only prove because they are Greek or Arabick But it will not be amiss to speak of their Quotations it will in some respect discover the Disposition of their Minds It is very evident in my Opinion that nothing but False Learning and the Spirit of Polimathy could make Quotations so much in vogue as they have been hitherto and as they are still among some of the Learned for it is not very difficult to find Authors who quote large Passages every Moment without any reason for it either because the things they advance are so clear that no body doubts them or because they are so Obscure that the Authority of their Authors cannot prove them Or lastly Because the Quotations they alledge can add no Ornament to what they say It is repugnant to Common Sense to introduce a large Greek Passage to prove that the Air is Transparent because it is a thing that is known by every body To use the Authority of Aristotle to persuade us that there are Intelligences which move the Heavens because it is evident that Aristotle could know nothing of it Or to mix Forteign Languages Arabick and Persian Proverbs in French and Latin Books compos'd for every bodies use because those Quotations can add no Ornaments to them or else they are Fanrastical Ornaments which disoblige a great many People and can oblige but very few Nevertheless most of those that would be thought Learned take so much delight in those kind of Quotations that they are not asham'd sometimes to introduce them in Languages they do not understand and they strain hard to force an Arabick Passage into their Books which perhaps they cannot read Thus they puzzle themselves to compass a thing which is contrary to Common Sense yet pleases their Vanity and makes them cry'd up by Fools They have also another Defect which is very considerable and that is They take little care to show they have read with Choice and Judgment they only desire to appear to have read much and particularly Obscure Books in order to be thought great Scholars Books that are Scarce and Dear least People should think they want any thing Wicked and Impious Books which Honest Men dare not read Just like those that brag of Crimes which others dare not commit Therefore they will rather quote you very Dear very Scarce very Ancient and very Obscure Books than such as
of our Prince and even the new Discoveries of the new World seem to add something to our Subsistance Being united to all these things we rejoyce at their Grandeur and Extension we could even wish that this World had no Limits and that thought of some Philosophers that the Works of God have no Bounds does not only seem worthy of God but also very agreeable to Man who feels a Secret Joy at his being a part of Infinity because as little as he is in himself he fancies that he becomes as it were Infinite by defusing himself into the Infinite Beings that are about him It is true that the Union which we have with all the Bodies that move in those great Spaces is not very strict and therefore it is not Sensible to most Men And there are some who matter the new Discoveries that are made in the Heavens so little that one might believe they are no-wise united to it by Nature if it were not known that it is either for want of Knowledge or because they are too much engag'd to other things The Soul though united to the Body it Animates does not always feel the Motions of it or if it does it does not always apply it self to them The Passion which moves it being sometimes greater than the Sensations which affects it it seems to be more powerfully engag'd to the Object of its Passion than to its own Body For it is principally by the Passions that the Soul defuses it self upon External Objects that it feels it is really united to every thing about it as it is chiefly by Sensation that it defuses it self in its own Body and is Sensible that it is united to all the Parts that Compose it But whereas one cannot conclude that the Soul of a Passionate Person is not united to his Body because he is prodigal of his Life and takes no Care for the Preservation of it So there is no reason to imagine that we are not naturally engag'd to all things because there are some for which we are not concern'd Would you for Example know whether Men are united to their Prince or their Country Seek out some who understand their Interest and have no particular Affairs to take up their Mind Then you will see how Earnest they are for News their Disquiet for Battles their Joy for Victories their Affliction in Defeats There you will clearly see that Men are strictly united to their Prince and their Country In like manner Would you know whether Men are united to China Japan or the Planets and fix'd Stars Seek out some or else imagine some whose Country and Family enjoy a profound Peace that have no particular Passions and that do not actually feel the Union that unites them to things that are nearer us than the Heavens and you will find that if they have any Knowledge of the Greatness and Nature of those Stars they will rejoyce at the Discovery of any of them they will consider them with Pleasure and if they are Ingenious they will willingly take the Trouble to observe and Calculate their Motions Those who are busied with Assairs seldom mind whether any Comet appears or whether there is an Eclipse But those who are not so closely united to the things that are near them are very fond of these sort of Events because there is nothing to which we are not united though we do not always feel it as we do not always feel that our Soul is united I do not say to our Arm or to our Hand but to our Heart and to our Brain The strongest Natural Union which God has put between us and his Works is that which united us with those Men we live with God has commanded us to Love them like our selves and that the Love of Choice by which we love them may be Firm and Constant he upholds and strengthens it continually by a Natural Love which he imprints in us In order thereunto he has laid upon us some Invisible Tyes which necessarily oblige us to Love them to watch their Preservation like our own to look upon them as necessary parts to the whole which we compose with them and without which we cannot Subsist There is nothing more Admirable than those Natural Relations which are found betwixt the Inclinations of the Minds of Men between the Motions of their Bodies and between these Inclinations and Motions All this Secret Chain is a Wonder which can never be sufficiently admir'd and which can never be apprehended At the sight of any Pain which Surprises or that is felt for example we cry out that Cry which often comes out before we are aware of it by the Disposition of the Machine Infallibly strikes the Ears of those that are near enough to afford us the Assistance we stand in need of It penetrates through them and makes it self understood to People of all Nations and of all Qualities whatever for that Cry is of all Languages and of all Qualities as indeed it ought to be It moves the Brain and in a Moment changes the whole Disposition of the Body of those that are struck by it Morcover it makes them run to assist before they are aware of it But it is not long without acting upon the Mind and without obliging them to be willing to relieve them and of thinking of Means to secure those that have made that Natural Prayer provided always the said Prayer or rather this pressing Command be Just and according to the Rules of Society For an Indiscreet Cry made without a Cause or out of a vain Fear produces Indignation and Scorn in the Assistants instead of Compassion because in crying without a cause we abuse things establish'd by Nature for our Preservation That Indiscreet Cry naturally produces Aversion and the Desire of revenging the Abuse that has been offer'd to Nature I mean to the Order of things provided he that made it did it voluntarily But it ought only to produce the Passion of Laughter mix'd with some Compassion without Aversion and a Desire of Revenge when it proceeds from Fear that is from a false Appearance of a pressing Necessity which has induced any one to cry out For Laughter or Jest is necessary to repel their Fear and to correct them and Compassion is necessary to Succor them as Weak It is impossible to conceive any thing better order'd I do not pretend to explain by Example which are the Springs and the Relations which the Author of Nature has placed in the Brains of Men and all Animals to maintain the Consent and Union which is necessary for their Preservation I only make some Reflections upon those Springs that People may think upon them and may carefully inquire not how those Springs move nor how their Motion is communicated by the Air by the Light and by all the little Bodies that surround us for that is almost Incomprehensible and is not necessary but at least to know what are the Effects of it One may
Animals were perhaps Created with all those of the same Species which they have and shall Engender to the end of the World We might carry this Thought yet farther and possibly with much Reason and Truth but we think it not safe to search too deep into the Works of God which are altogether infinite not only our Senses and Imagination are limited in their Comprehension but also the pure Mind wholly disengag'd from Matter is too gross and feeble to penetrate into the least of his Works 't is lost and dissipated dazled and affrighted at the sight of what we call an Atome according to the Language of the Senses but the pure Mind has always this advantage above the Imagination and Senses that it knows its own weakness and the greatness of God that it perceives the infinity in which it is lost whereas our Imagination and Senses debase the Works of God and raise in us a foolish Considence which blindly precipitates us into Error Our Eyes beget in us no Idea of all these things that we discover by Microscopes or by Reason we see no less a Body with our Eyes than a Worm in the Skin or a Mite the half of which is nothing if compar'd with our selves A Mite is but as a Mathematick Point in respect of us it cannot be divided but it must be anniâ—â—â—lated Our Sight then does not represent Extension to us as it is in it self but according to what it is in proportion to our Body and because the half of a Mite bears no proportion to our Body and can neither profit nor injure it therefore we can't see it But if our Eyes were made as Microscopes or rather if they were as small as those of Hand-worms or Mites we should judge otherwise of the magnitude of Bodies for without doubt these little Animals have Eyes qualified to see all that is about them as also their own Body in a much larger proportion than we see it if not they would not receive those impressions that are necessary for the preservation of themselves and then their Eyes would be wholly useless To explain these things thoroughly we must consider that our own Eyes are indeed nothing else but Natural Spectacles that their Humours produce the same Effect as the Glasses in Spectacles and that according to the Figure of the Chrystaline Humour and its distance from the Retina we see Objects very differently insomuch that we are certain there are not two Men in the World who see things in the same bigness unless their Eyes were in all respects alike This is a Proposition that must be received by all those that study Opticks viz. That Equidistant Objects appear so much the greater by how much the Image of them is painted greater in the inward part of the Eye Now 't is certain that those Eyes whose Crystaline Humour is more Convex have lesser Images depaiâ—ted in 'em in proportion to their Convexity Those then who are the nearest sighted having the Chrystaline Humour more Convex see Objects in a lesser proportion than old Men who have occasion for Spectacles in Reading or those who have common Convexity and see very well at a distance All these things are easily demonstrated Geometrically and if they were not commonly known we should insist the longer upon them but because many have treated upon these Matters those that would be better inform'd are desir'd to consult Authors upon it Since 't is certain that there are not two Men in the World who see Objects in the same bigness and that commonly the * See the Journal des Scavans du Mois de Janvier 1969. same Person sees the same things greater with one Eye than another 't is plain that we are not to trust to the proportion of things which our Eyes represent to us we must rather consult our Reason which proves that we cannot determine the absolute bigness of Bodies that are about us nor what Idea we ought to have of the Extension of a Foot Square or of that of our own Body so as that this Idea should truly represent it to us for Reason tells us that the least of all Bodies consider'd in it self would not be little since it is compos'd of an infinite number of parts out of every one of which God could form a World which would be but as a Point in respect of all the rest joined together Thus the Mind of Man is incapable of forming an Idea great enough to comprehend the least Extension in the World since it is limited but the Idea of Matter is infinite It is true the Mind can very near apprehend the proportions that are betwixt these Infinites whereof the World is Compos'd that one for Instance is the double of another that a * A French Measure Toise contains 6 Feet yet we cannot form an Idea that represents what these things are in themselves We 'll suppose that the Mind is susceptible of those Idea's which are equal to or which measure the Extension of Bodies that we see for it would be very difficult to perswade Men to the contrary Let us examine then what may be concluded from this Supposition This doubtless that God does not deceive us that he has not given us Eyes like Convex Glasses to enlarge or diminish Objects therefore we must believe that our Eyes represents things as they are It is true God never deceives us but we often deceive our selves in judging of things with too much precipitation for we often judge that Objects whereof we have Idea's do exist and that they perfectly resemble our Idea's yet it frequently happens that the Objects are either unlike our Idea's or else have no Existence at all so that if we have an Idea of any thing it does not follow from thence that such a thing exists much less that it should wholly resemble the Idea we have of it for altho' God produces in us such a sensible Idea of Magnitude when a Toise is before our Eyes it follows not from thence that this Toise hath only the Extension which by this Idea is represented to us For first all Men have not the Sensible Idea of this Toise since all have not their Eyes dispos'd after the same manner Secondly even the same Person has not the same Sensible Idea thereof when it is seen with one Eye and then with the other as we Instanc'd before Lastly it often happens that the same Person hath very different Idea's of the same Objects at different times according as he believes them to be nearer or farther off him which shall be elsewhere Explain'd 'T is then an unreasonable Prejudice to believe that we see Bodies according in their just bigness for our Eyes being only given us for the Preservation of our Body they very well discharge their Office when they cause those Idea's of Objects in us that are proportionate to the bigness of it But that we may the better comprehend how we ought to Judge of the
of Dislike which for instance proceeds from the strong Imagination they have of the Dirt in what they Eat The reason of it is that when two Motions are made in the Brain at the same time the one is never excited after the other except it be after a considerable time Thus because the agreeable Sensation never comes without this other disgustful one and because we confound things that are produced at the same time we imagine that this Sensation that was formerly agreeable to us is now no longer so Yet if it is always the same it is necessary that it should always be agreeable So that if we imagine it is not agreeable 't is because it is join'd and confounded with another that causes more distaste than the other does of agreeableness There is more difficulty to prove that Colours and some other Sensations which I have called weak and languishing are not the same in all Men because all those Sensations so little affect the Soul that we cannot distinguish them so well as we can Tastes or other Sensations more strong and lively the one being more agreeable than the other and thus to discover the diversity of Sensations that are found in different Persons by the variety of their pleasure or dislike Reason which always shows that the other Sensations are not the same in different Persons tells us also that there will be a variety in the Sensations they have of Colours And indeed there is no doubt but there is much diversity in the Organs of Sight in different Persons as well as in those of the Ear or the Taste for there is no reason to suppose a perfect resemblance in the disposition of the Optic Nerve in all Men since there is an infinite variety in every thing in Nature and chiefly in those that are Material 't is therefore very probable that all Men see not the same Colours in the same Objects Yet I believe it never or very rarely happens that Persons see White or Black to be of any other Colour than we do altho' they do not see it equally White or Black But for mixt Colours as Red Yellow and Blue and chiefly such as are compounded of all three I believe there are few Persons who have perfectly the same Sensation of them For Instance there are some Persons who when they look upon cettain Bodies with one Eye take them to be Yellow and when they behold them with the other see them to be Green or Blue yet if we suppos'd these Persons Born blind of one Eye or with both their Eyes so dispos'd to see that Blue which we call Green they wou'd believe they saw Objects of the same colour as we see them because by Green or Blue they wou'd always have understood what they see Yellow or Red. We may further prove that all Men see not the same Objects of the same Colour because according to the observation of some the same Colours do not equally please all sorts of Persons and if these Sensations were the same they wou'd be equally agreeable to all Men but because very weighty doubts may be raised against the Answer I have given to the precedent Objection I do not believe it solid enough to insist upon it Indeed it is very seldom that we are as much more pleased with one Colour than another even as we are much more pleased with one Taste than another The reason is the Sensations of Colours are not given us to Judge whether or no Bodies are proper for our Nourishment that is distinguished by Pleasure and Pain which are the Natural Characters of Good and Evil Objects in respect to their Colour are neither good nor bad to Eat If Objects appear agreeable or disagreeable to us in respect to their Colour their sight wou'd be always followed with the course of those Spirits which excite and accompany the Passions since the Soul cannot be touched without moving it and we shou'd often hate good Things and love bad so that we shou'd not long preserve our lives In fine the Sensations of Colours are only given us to distinguish Bodies from one another and therefore it does as well if we see Herbs Red as if we see them Green provided the Person that sees them Red or Green sees them always after the same manner But we have said enough of these Sensations let us now speak of Natural Judgments and the free Judgments which accompany them which is the fourth thing that we confound with the three others that we have already mention'd CHAP. XIV I. Of the false Judgments that accompany our Sensations and which we confound with them II. Reasons of these false Judgments III. That Error is not in our Sensations but only in these Judgments 'T IS easily foreseen I. Of the false Judgments that accompany our Sensations and which we confound with them that we shall not meet with many Persons that will not be offended with this General Proposition that I here advance viz. That we have no Sensation of External Objects which include not one or many Judgments we know very well that the generality of the World do not believe that there is so much as one Judgment in our Sensations either true or false so that these Persons being surprized with the Novelty of this Proposition will say without doubt in themselves But how can it be I do not Judge this Wall to be white I see very well what it is Nor do I Judge Pain to be in my Hand I most certainly feel it to be there And who can doubt of things so certain if they do not feel Objects otherwise than I do Indeed their Inclinations for the Prejudices which they have imbib'd from their Infancy carries them much further and if they do not Reproach and Contemn those whom they believe to be perswaded of a contrary Opinion to their own without doubt they deserve to be placed in the Number of Moderate Persons But we must not here stay to Prophesie of the ill success of our Thoughts it will be more to the purpose to endeavour to produce them with the strongest Proofs and so clearly discover them that they may be no sooner well examin'd or attentively consider'd but they must be submitted to Since 't is necessary to prove that we have no Sensation of External Objects which does not include some false Judgment take it thus It seems Indisputable to me that our Souls do not fill those vast Spaces which are between us and the fixt Stars altho' it shou'd be granted that themselves are extended so likewise it is not reasonable to believe that our Souls are in the Firmament when they behold the fixt Stars there Nor is it Credible that they should go out of their Bodies a thousand Paces to see Houses at that distance It is therefore necessary that our Souls see Houses and Stars where they are not since it goes not out of the Body where it is and yet sees them out