Selected quad for the lemma: heart_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
heart_n	affection_n	good_a	spirit_n	2,849	5	4.8243	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A14270	The casket of iewels contaynynge a playne description of morall philophie [sic], diligently and after a very easie methode declared by the well learned and famous author Cornelius Valerius: lately turned out of Latin into Englishe, by I.C.	Valerius, Cornelius, 1512-1578.; Chardon, John, d. 1601.	1571 (1571)	STC 24583; ESTC S119018	51,195	190

The Harbourough forsouthe of them all is featelie disposed in the harte to whom there is a greate familyarity with will whiche either may couet or els eschew if any thing be obiected whiche may seem either to pleasure or domage nature Of loue Cap. iiij LOue is an inclination of will prone to that which is thought good For when as any thinge is profered which either is good in deede or els deliteth with a certain likelyhood of good through that opinion the greedy faculti of the Soule is vehemently inticed to enioy and possesse the same And of the goods which are sought for of men we tolde that there were three kindes Honest Profitable and Pleasant whiche cōmonly are coupled together because one thyng both may be honest and profitable and pleasant yet not by and by that which is either profitable or pleasant is honest whereas these now and than may appere to contende with honestie But for all this nothinge is in deed either profitable or pleasāt which same is not honest Certes what is honest that is onely required for the proper behoofe no consideration had neither of commoditie nor of delectation How greate the power of loue is the verses of Poets do beare witnesse and wee deeme that there be very few whiche can quite them selues cleare of all loue Plato constituted a threefolde loue the first which embraceth and cherisheth only Vertue but this is exempted from the number of affections he appeareth rather to be reckned among vertues because he vseth the iudgemēt of vpright Reason The other filthie which cloueth to the pleasure of bodie The thyrde whiche mindeth the Soule and Body Nothyng is more noble than the first nothynge more foule than the other The thyrd truly is a companion of bothe but yet he rometh abrode no lesse than the other By reason he reuerenceth the personage of the body and ardenly esteemeth it Vnlesse wee repine this loue resortyng amorously and strokyng the minde with sugred words and except this loue sike soule brought vnto another bayte Feates of Phisick should be practised in vayne when as now the loue shall growe in vse eake shal haue taken deeper rootes Of Desire and Hope Cap. v. DEsire is a luste to enioye that good whiche as yet is not presente If so that be in place it is loued but if it bee out of sight it is coueited Out of this Fountain if the sentence of reason be neglected and the desire bee immoderate and excéede the boundes and Limits of Nature who is apaid with few thinges many vices do arise as Niggardlines Ambicion Sensualitie Riot such other Hope is defined of Cicero an expectation of good to whom dispaire is contrarye a supposed difficultye and mistrust of a good thinge to be atchiued the which shal be Recapitulated heareafter among the fourmes of sadnesse It is the guise of a wise man to hope for those thinges whiche he maye attaine neither rashly to dispaire whither he may atchiue through trauaile And this hope verely by which we wish for good either trewe or shadowed differeth from that whiche is tearmed Theologicall and it is a vertue eke is depainted to be a waytinge for eternall felicitie Vnto whom in like case the repugnant vice is Desperatio despeire Of Gladnesse Cap. vi GLadnesse is an affection which is stirred with the opinion of some present goodnesse wherwith the minde is delited Cicero doth distynguish Gaudiū and Laetitiam ioye and gladnesse in this wise that the minde should be mooued with ioy paciently and constantly but with gladnesse vainely and prodigally With this affection the Nature is merueilously delighted and the hert enlarged and as it were embracynge that whiche is apparant good doth stirre the minde sweetly and delectably and faustreth life in the hert whiche sorow the contrarie passion doth oppresse And this pleasantnesse and delectacion for the amplitude of the good which is propounded may be greater or lesser and either honest or filthy It shabe honest if it be answerable to the meane of nature and vnto reason what one is gottē through the contemplation and studies of commendable thinges But filthy if it be immoderate and dissonant to reason what one is receiued of corporal delites of peruerse exercises and of yll will as if any man should be delited with another mans harme than which vice nothing ought to be more abrogate from a man especially a Christian Of Hatred and anger and like affections Cap. vij COntrarye to Loue is hatred which is defined of Cicero Ira inueterata a longe festred Anger that is to wit of longe continuance This affection is ingendred of the discontenting of the minde detestinge the harme which is vnderstanded damaged either with the deede or sayinge of som man or deming him selfe hurted and sometimes abhorring from anothers freendship through a priuy instinct of nature Euen as perdie by Loue all all men are accorded so by hatred they are vnyoked than whiche nothynge is more pernicious to humaine societie which also by so much is more irkesom by how much more secretly it inuadeth To contempne vices it profiteth but to loue a man Christian charitie commaūdeth and to forgeue him whiche offendeth But to hate a man for no cause is very obsurde and most dissonant from vpright iudgement Vnto hatred are ascribed many affection whiche are to be auoyded of a godly man As dispight as anger as Hostilitie Despight whereby any man thinketh another more base then himselfe Whereas truly there is no cause why any one shoulde suppose himselfe to be preferred before his felow by reason that he cannot commonstrate any thinge of himselfe whiche he hath not receiued els where as it ought to be most euident vnto the Christians by holy Scriptures Anger is defined a lust to punish him who may seeme to haue hurted with iniury This affection appeareth to be mingled with sorowe and a greedinesse of reuengemēt which greeuously racketh a man and sharpely kindleth agaynst him of whome he is thought to be displeasured the moste troublesome of all the affections by which not only the minde but also the whole body is brought into suche a perplexitie that for anger a man can vneth see and moderate his senses and scarcely speake Hereto doth Hostilitie belonge which is defined an anger of punishing obseruynge oportunitie And hither discorde the destruction of the cōmon weale and hither all hatred is referred Iracundia doth differ from Ira because Iracundia is a natiue faculty by which any man is made prone to anger But Ira is a commocion of this vertue and a rage bended from reason Wherby now and than the minde is so turmoyled that the angrie man doth very litle disagree from the Frantike And truly it may be verified of Horace Ira fu●or breuis anger is a shorte furie and of Ennius Insaniae principium the originall of Madnesse The bloud is incensed with this passyon and waxeth hotte in the bodie and the Spirites sodenly disquieted doo so

trouble a man and cause him so vnagreable to him selfe that he is sayd to be out of his Wittes neither to become his owne man before that the hot brayned moode shall asswage and the vehemencie relinquisht But not euery anger is lyke contentious for one is easier eake sooner prouoked and haleth a man vnwares but abideth not longe Another is more gentell truly yet more bitter and of greater induraunce and cleuyng to hatred and seekyng auengement Neither ought euery anger appere vicious sithe in sacred Scriptures wee may reade in this wise Irascimini nollite peccare Become you angrie and sinne not Neither vncommodiously of Aristotle the mediocritie of anger betwixt excesse and defect is renowned and moderate anger linked as a companion of worthy prowesse vnto fortitude which the auncient Academikes Cicero bearing record reported to be as it weare the Whetstone of valiaunt courage that is to witte the assistaunte which Seneca geueth in precept to vse not as a Capitain but as a souldiar We must then be agréeued with vngodlinesse wronge and other vices and our mind must be aduaunced when nede is when time and place do require but rest raigned if no such occasion be ministred of anger And by how much more greeuously the minde is solicitated by so much more painfully we shall brydle Choler wee shall maister the brayde and with all meane and might shall oppresse it forthwith the dominion of reason reuoked and that dismounted which kendled the wrath we shall extinguish the feruency or els the punishment differred till another season we shall extenuate the passion Of Sadnesse Cap. viij SAdnesse or heauinesse is a perturbacion drawinge together oppressynge the minde which is defined of Cicero a freshe opinion of present euill wherupon it may seem leifull the mind to be enlarged and contracted And after a bréefer way Heauinesse is a shrincking of the minde reason repining This taketh beginninge through the contemplacion of som euil or els through the wante of some good thing From this Fountaine proceede sundry passions which Cicero numbreth in the end of the third booke of Tusculans Questions and in the fourth when as he had constituted foure sortes of perturbacions had explaned them he recompteth them beyng reckned in these words But vnto ech disturbance more partes of the same secte are adiected as vnto sadnesse enuy emulation backbiting compassion but this we suppose to be a good affectiō not a greef of the mind vexacion wailing sorow infelicity wofulnesse lamentacion pensiuenesse disquietnesse affliction dispeire of which belowe we shall debate and if any moe be of the same stocke Hitherto Cicero whom reade you your selfe defining euery of the fourmes As euery pleasure is not saide to be vicyous so neither euery sadnesse And as it is a laudable thinge to triumphe at vertue so to be sorrowfull for vice to restreigne the minde immoderatly deliting is profitable neither semeth it an vnhoneste thing measurably to bewaile our wiues children or Parentes Of Feare Cap. ix FEare is a wayting of euill either a carefull remembraunce of pensiuenesse about to ensew as Cicero recordeth and it is repugnant to hope Feare is ingendred of the haling togeather of the hart throughe an opinion of imminent perill Moderate feare is profitable assenting to the counsaile of reason But the vnmeasurable or ouer small is discommended Som are more timorous some more bolde which the Phisicions déeme to be attributed to the Complexion of body but yet in this place their Iudgemente is of no simple importaunce by which timidity either is increased or diminished This perturbacion doth very sore disprofite Nature and cheefely so tormenteth a man ●n sodaine cases that who is horribly ●stonished may appeare no lesse to fall ●t of his right wittes than he which is ●reeuously displeased Vnder feare be many fourmes comprehended of which all there is one cause the ende perdie and opinion of euil is diuerse Slouth terrour shame feare quaking dismaiyng trouble dreade whose definitions you shall eftsones finde with Cicero in the same fourthe booke of Tusculans questions To these béen adioyned flatterie whiche also is termed Timorous inticement Suspicion a feare through a consideracion of mischiefe at hande dispeyre a low abashement of the minde Pensiuenesse a prickinge care through the expectation of euill and some other mo fourmes Cicero hath descriued shame and hath not defined it The definicion may be absolued that shame may be a feare of dishonesty whome blushing doth follow wherof hereafter we will debate more at large in Chapiter of Sober moode Of Boldnesse Cap. x. BOldenesse is gaged against feare that we may in this place vnderstand a moderate vertu of aduenturing and a confidence of the mind a certain mediocrity betwixt to much and to litle either betweene timiditie and vnmeasurable hope by which any one neither dreadyng mischief like to chaunce nor present doth aduenturously icoperde his ioynctes This is engendred otherwise than feare through the extending of the harte the Spirites augmenting the heat therof through whose force by reason that the mind is gouerned more often than by reason and counsell the appellacion of boldnes is welme taken in the worse parte It is disagreeable vnto true Fortitude which when as prudently the daunger is throughly examined aduentureth the same with a manly courage And doubtlesse hetherto of affections whose moderation is verye requisite for such as contende to the wished end by vertues that also we may enioye a certaine tranquilitye of minde in the Earth which in Greeke is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whiche Democritus defined the bound of good thinges and the ●igure and semblaunce of that vnfained Beatitude to come The which without the benefite of Christ who only is of power to appease the moodes of men through the cōfidence of life which shall happen no wight at any season hath obteined Of Vertue and her diuision and Originall Cap. xi VNto the ende purposed in the beginning all the actions of menne are directed to the whiche they aspire vertue beinge the guide which very breefely may be defined A perfection by which the will is pricked to do agreably to right reason For vnder the appellacion of right reason we vnderstand the law of Nature and the knowledges of those thinges which are ingendred with vs and ingraffed from aboue in our minds that we may iustly determine of things good and bad honest and filthy as that God is to bée worshipped that no man is to be hurted and such like the whiche shall gaily be called the Squire of vertue vnto whiche the operation of the whole life may be directed with whom lesse it doth consente it can not be nominated a vertue Vertue is defined of Saint Augustine Ars bene re●●eque viuendi A science to liue well and perfectly Of Cicero it is termed somtimes Recta ratio a right reason sometimes Animi Habitus a custome of the minde aunswerable vnto humane nature meane and reason sometimes Affectio animi constans