that when he sware I will give thee so much he understood if I owe it thee or if thou demand it before the Magistrate But as this mentall reservation is built upon the same sand with verball equivocation so is it destroyed with the same dash for it rooteth all faith and assurance out of men makes God an Imposter is deceitfull unto our neighbour perverteth the use and end of oathes setteth open a great gate to all kinde of lies and perjuries and is so much worse then equivocation as more difficult to be prevented For equivocation foreseen or suspected may be prevented by such diligent explication of the words as may leave no loop-hole of ambiguity But no humane art or providence if men will be jugling can prevent this pouch of this Reservation Where will you finde a knot to tye this Vertumnus unto one shape Binde wicked Proteus in chain A thousand fold 't is all in vain Jesuites and Priests reserving unto themselves the liberty to reserve any thing are not afraid with a serious brow to take our oath of Allegiance though penned with such accuratenesse of words as leaveth no hold for cavill nor way for escape yet that very clause where in expresse words they promise that they will faithfully observe all the premises according unto the tenor of the words pronounced by them and according to the plain and naturall sense and true intent of those words without any equivocation or mentall reservation they understand at the same time with this reservation to wit that I will tell you SECT VI. THey lye neverthelesse at a ward to put by perjury for say they of the verball and mentall sentence one entire sentence is compounded in which taken altogether there is no falsehood For example if a Priest swear in express words that he is no Priest with the addition reserved in his minde but not uttered that I should tell it you this whole sentence say they put together is true viz. I am not a Priest that I should tell it you Nor doth any reason seem to forbid a man the liberty if he please to compose his speech of verball and mentall terms For why in our prayers if one should pronounce those words only our daily bread and expresse those other give us this day in his thought only should the speech be intire and lawfull and acceptable unto God and unlawfull to doe the like in an oath That this Jesuiticall Legerdemain may fully be discovered First it is admirable that these most acute Artificers should not perceive the Fabrick of this defence not to be raised but upon the utter ruines of faith in all humane judgements contracts and promises For the argument they use if it were of any weight would as well justifie the practise of this equivocation before a lawfull Judge and in a just matter which they say ought not to be as before an incompetent Judge and in an unjust matter seeing that a sentence composed of the verball and mentall parts is in each of the same truth or falsehood And this answer may suffice ad hominem but ad rem I say secondly that a sentence composed as hath been said of the verball and mentall parts may be admitted when a man converseth with his own thoughts as in private meditation or when he addresseth himself to God alone as in prayer or thanksgiving But when the hath to do with men as in oathes where he is to bear such testimony as may be heard and understood by others a sense mixed of verball and mentall parts is in no wise to be admitted The reason of this difference is manifest because that which he beareth hidden in his brest is no further known unto others then he declareth it by word of mouth But to God before whom nothing is hidden the darkest secrets of the heart are transparent So that when men pray or meditate it is all one as to the point of truth or falsehood whether they pronounce their whole thoughts or part of them or none at all But men who cannot dive into the heart further then words and actions discover it must weigh the truth or falsehood of a speech by those things only which may yeeld testimony unto the hearers Which since those reservations which are kept within cannot effect the truth of a speech is to be judged only by the words pronounced and not by mentall Reservation SECT VII THe fourth Case followeth the fact for as before and in the act of swearing there ought to be a purpose of fulfilling the promise in the same sense wherein it was proposed without any equivocation or mentall reservation so ought there afterwards to be a desire and endeavour in due time faithfully to perform the same according unto that sense wherein it was sworn without any evasion or subterfuge and as it is one kinde of perjury to strain the words during the act of swearing unto another sense then that wherein they are understood by the Auditors so is it another kinde of perjury having sworn honestly not to proceed sincerely but decline and elude the strength of the oath though the words be preserved with some new forged invention variously turning and dressing the words to cloke the guilt of their Consciences as Tacitus saith of some Stobaeus telleth a prety tale from Herodotus of one Archetimus who had deposited money in the hand of his friend Cydias Archetimus upon a time desirous to have the same restored Cydias loath to part with the gold disclaimeth that he ever received it The matter brought before the Judges the Plaintiffe accuseth the Defendant denyeth each with like confidence neither by any witnesse The Judges other proofs being wanting decreed the determination of the controversie by Oath the day is appointed Cydias in the mean time putteth the gold into an hollow staffe which he had cunningly boared and withall counterfeiteth sicknesse then appearing at the time with his staffe as newly recovered delivereth the same unto Archetimus to hold whilest he approached the Altar and till he had performed the solemnity of his oath This done with a most composed minde and countenance he sweareth that he had received gold from Archetimus but had restored it again unto him At which Architemus netled with his losse and transported with indignation to see perfidiousnesse joyned with so much impudence threw the staffe so hard against the pavement that it brake and discovered the money the fraud of Cydias and the whole truth of the matter Which act the writer of the story cals an imbroydered ly and observeth that Cydias in reward of his perfidy came to a miserable end Many such examples are extant both in Historians and common practise out of which I shall collect some profitable observations The first is that even dishonest men are so far touched with some Conscience and obligation of an oath that though none at all or very small regard be had to justice and honesty yet through an instinct of nature
of these or the like be answered it is an oath whosoever useth such form is ipso facto obliged and if he perform not the thing promised guilty of perjury But in this now Will you give me an hundred I will give you them the very words adding no further confirmation of faith make but a bare Promise You told me you would give me an hundred will you give me them Certainly I will Believe me I will not deceive you Here some kinde of confirmation is added unto the promise but it is plain by the very form that this is but a meer Asseveration neither an Oath nor so much as an Obtestation seeing God is neither called to witnesse nor any other pawn of faith engaged How shall I know that you will give me that hundred which you promised Here 's my hand By the faith of an honest man I will give you them As truly as the Sun shineth I will doe it Never believe me more if I dot not c. The words themselves shew that they contain more then a bare asseveration but they are not an oath yet These therefore are rather Obtestations wherein for further Confirmation of a matter promised or assevered we interpose something which is dear unto us or certain and manifest unto all as a pawn of our faith Wherefore if it plainly appear by the meer form that the thing assumed for confirmation of the promise be properly an Oath a bare Asseveration or an Obtestation there needeth no furâ—her â—xamination SECT VI. BUt because it happeneeh very often through the resemblance of some ambiguous or large signification of a word or some other cause that it cannot certainly be judged by the words uttered whether it be an oath or no in the second place we must be attentive unto the proper and genuine sense of those words and from thence make the Judgement For it may appear by the forms that all those speeches which appeal unto the Name of God or wherein the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Latine Per or the English By are used with the accusative case are formally oathes Led by which reason only Soto conceived so much difference between the terms By my faith and In faith By my troth and In troth that he determined those to be formally oathes these none But if the genuine sense of the words be well looked into there will be no difference between the Propositions By and In being applyed unto the same thing for we are to judge of them as the thing they are applyed unto is Sacred or Civill The form By God is properly an oath by vertue of the words for the Name of God is a sacred thing and he who speaketh after that manner calleth God to witnesse But that By my faith though by the custom of some Countrey or intention of him who speaketh it may be an oath is no oath by vertue of the words but a meer Asseveration or at the most an Obtestation Because humane faith is not a sacred but a civill thing and he who speaketh after that manner calleth not God to witnesse but speaketh as he believeth or declareth that the thing is uttered with serious and sincere deliberation of minde For the genuine Interpretation of the words By my faith whether in an assertory or promissory matter is this I speak from my heart I tell you my very thought I pawn my faith to you that the thing is so If to my knowledge I deceive you let me never be believed more c. Wherefore the interposition of faith maketh not an oath by vertue of the words unlesse perhaps it recall us to some oath which we have formerly made As in this University when a man is required to answer unto a question by vertue of his Oath according to this form You shall speak by your faith given unto this University And when Convocations are solemnly called whereunto the Doctors Masters Regent and Non-Regent are warned by the Beadles to repair Per fidem per fidem per fidem The like in my opinion though others I know think otherwise is to be said of that of Paul By our rejoycing which I have in Christ I dye daily to wit that it is properly no oath but a serious asseveration only that as he was subject unto death so he was daily prepared for death when it should please God to call him SECT VII NOw it may perhaps by so much as hath been said be conveniently determined what is to be thought of those words whereupon Interpreters variously dispute of Joseph unto his Brethren By the life of Pharaoh ye are Spies Some are of opinion that Joseph having been long conversant with Pharaohs Courtiers as infected with a touch of their disease began to savour at the least in this point of their manners and example the AEgyptians being accustomed to swear by the Kings life as the Romans in latter ages were by the Genius of the Emperour But I cannot easily suffer my self to judge otherwise of the words and actions of men famous for piety then necessity compelleth I see divers of the Antients in contributing unto the fame of the Saints too indulgent unto their own wits whilest they would cover apparent defects with specious excuses An error much more pardonable then theirs who in this Age delighted with the contrary love to be curious enquirers into the faults of devout men and lest matter should be wanting unto calumny by perverting blamelesse actions bestow cracks upon Crystall glasses as it were in the washing Others allow a more favourable Interpretation unto the speech of Joseph that he used for once only this form of swearing familiar unto the Courtiers as an accomplishment of his disguise and that he might more skilfully represent the person of an AEgyptian Prince which he counterfeited lest he should be discovered by his Brethren But I doe not like to lay this burthen though somewhat lighter upon the shoulders of the most holy man without any necessity The third opinion is theirs who absolve Joseph from all guilt but with this reason that they think it was lawfull for any man before Christ forbad that kinde of oath to swear by the creature Which opinion I confesse so far as it acquitteth Joseph of sin I allow but of the reason for it I cannot allow For first it appeareth not that Christ did more especially forbid oathes by creatures then such as are made by God for he generally prohibited the unnecessary ones of either kinde A new prohibition of that which was alwayes unlawfull would have been needlesse And that which he spake of oathes by the creature in particular tendeth to shew that this kind of oath once made contrary to what the Jews thought of it is no lesse obligatory then those which are made by the Name of God expressed Secondly neither is it true that it was lawfull before Christ for pious men by any dispensation or divine indulgence to swear by the creature seeing
respect of that whether person or thing by whom or which it is sworn where two cases occur The first ease is whether he who sweareth by the creature be and how far he is obliged That oathes by the Creator are binding is most certain and generally granted but of oathes by the creature there is some doubt Neverthelesse by way of answer I say first that to swear by a creature absolutely ultimately and terminatively so as to constitute the end and strength of the oath in any creature without relation to God is simply unlawfull The reason is manifest because by that means the reverence due unto God only is given unto the creature For an oath as hath been said is Cultus Latriae which ought not to be given to any creature for as much as the party swearing by invocation of God as witnesse and revenger acknowledgeth him ipso facto searcher of hearts to whom it is known whether the minde agree with the words and the most just and powerfull punisher of sinners whereof neither is in the power of any created thing Nay such an oath were even by the consession of Papists apparently idolatrous Secondly I say to swear by the creature relatively and as it were transitively as Papists use to doe by the blessed Virgin or other Saints or reliques of Saints that is as they expound it not ultimately and terminatively to place the worship upon them but relatively and transitively to passe it by and through them upon God is at the least superstitious because it appeareth neither by light of reason nor testimony of Scripture that the power of searching hearts or punishing perjury is by God entrusted with or delegated unto any of his creatures how holy soever Thirdly I say to mention any creature in swearing without mention of the Name of God as if a man should swear by his head y his soul by his salvation by this fire by this bread c. though for the danger of scandall and shew of evill it were much better to abstain from such forms yet meerly for this reason that we ought to swear by God only is not unlawfull Because either in these forms we swear not at all or by God only Which that it may be the better understood lest I should seeme to bring some new and suspected doctrine into the Church or to be indulgent unto that execrable custome of swearing by the creature which to the grief of good men is grown so common It is to be noted that in forms of this kinde wherein mention is made of some creature as it were by way of swearing that the oath neverthelesse is in truth often sworn interpretatively by God himself As in all those which after the common manner of utterance have in them a kinde of execratory sense Upon my soul Upon my salvation I will doe this or that where the sense is Let not God blesse my soul Let not God give me eternall Salvation if I doe it not And in those also wherein such things are nominated as are apt to stir us up unto some remembrance of God as when the Jews anciently sware By heaven By this holy sacrifice c. meaning By God whose Throne is in Heaven By God unto whom this holy Sacrifice is offered c. But where the names of such things are used which have not in their nature any specially or obvious aptitude of raising us unto any thought of God nor seem to imply any execratory sense as if a man should swear at the table or at the chimney By this bread By this fire c. though by the manner of the expression these forms may seem to be a particular kinde of oath yet in truth and interpretatively they are not oathes but rather meer obtestations as anon in the third doubt shall be more fully explained Fourthly I say every oath made by the creature whether lawfully or unlawfully that is whether it be terminated in the creature as the worship of Images is by the vulgar Papists which is Idolatrous or sworn by the creature transitively that thence mediately and ultimately it may extend to God with which little trick the Popish Doctors endevour to defend their Image-worship which neverthelesse is superstitious if it be really and formally an oath and not an obtestation only obligeth no lesse the party swearing unto the performance of his promise then if he had sworn in expresse words by God himself The reason is because in every oath truly and formally such God is in some sort invoked witnesse Fifthly I say though by that perhaps which I have now said this kinde of oath may in some sort be defended as not simply and generally unlawfull at least if it be understood as I have expressed it yet seeing it is certainly no lesse obligatory then other oathes and that no necessity enjoy neth the use of it because where it is expedient to swear we may use other forms and where it is not expedient we ought not to swear at all It is the duty of that Christian who would seriously provide for the peace of his own conscience wholly to abstain from this kinde of form Whereunto they will easily be perswaded who shall throughly consider the Originall or issue of the same It 's Originall it oweth partly to the Idolatry of the Chaldaeans AEgyptians and other superstitious Nations who sware by the Sun the Fire and other creatures which they esteemed Gods partly unto the reverence of the Divine Name and Majesty amongst the people of God which happily in the beginning just and pious in processe of time degenerated by degrees into superstition the debauchery of oathes so heightned by evill custom that ordinarily they chose rather to swear by obvious things then as Philo saith to have recourse unto the Creator and Father of all things The same practise amongst the Antient Greeks most of whose rites and manners may easily be tracked from emulation of the Hebrews is observed by Interpreters of the Greek Poets who write that they were not ordinarily wont to swear by the Gods but by such things as were next â—at hand or before the eyes as Bread Fire Water Fowl Serpents and the like But that which seemeth to have been begun in reverence of Divine power is at length shrunk unto so great irreverence and contempt of the same that through the craft of the Devill and just judgement of God suffering sin for the punishment of sin piety degenerated into superstition shot up again into open impiety For when once they began to abstain from the name of God and swear by the Creature licentiousnesse of oathes would admit of no bounds nor stand in any awe of perjury A Poet elegantly decides the perjury of a Prince Who thought his Scepter not the Gods He thought it lawfull having sworn by his Scepter to doe otherwise then he ought to have done had he sworn by the Gods Augustine saith of the Maniches they sware frequently by the creature and
concealeth his meaning in such sort that the Auditors understand one thing and he another This is that verball equivocation which amongst some other Casuists and Scholasticks the Jesuites especially maintain and practise examples whereof are most frequently found in assertory oathes because by their Doctrine the chief use of this equivocation is when a man examined by an impotent Judge or not legally or having some other reason to dissemble the truth fitteth the words uâ—to his occasion by changing their genuine sense into one more strained and remote from the matter in question As if a Jesuite apprehended should swear that he were a Smith meaning that his name was Smith or an Apprentice commanded to tell where his Master is should swear he dyed a moneth ago meaning that he then dyed stockings The like may happen in promissory oathes as if a Generall having made a Truce with an Enemy for ten dayes should give him a Camifado because in the Capitulation mention was made of the dayes onely not of the night Livy and others relate the story of the ten Romanes taken by Haniball and after they had sworn upon certain conditions to return unto his Camp dismissed one of which saith he others say two most unlike a Roman returned the same day pretending something forgotten but intending to absolve himself of his promise and before night overtook his Companions which deceiptfull trick of his was accounted so base that he was not only scorned by the vulgar branded with ignominy by the censors but adjudged by the Senate to be taken and by a publick Guard delivered unto Hannibal Neverthelesse Jesuites so vigorously defend this equivocation that Jo. Molanus Professor at Lovain justifieth the murder of John Huss perpetrated against the publick faith engaged unto him for his safe Conduct for this reason that the Conduct undertook for his safe coming not for the safety of his return And now let Jesuites confidently complain of the great injuries done them whilest we say they hold faith not to be kept with Hereticks for if this be to keep faith they need not much trouble themselves with whomsoever it be contracted whether it ought to be kept or broken But whole Bookes of this Jesuitism are largely and solidly confuted by the Reverend Father in Christ John Morton now Bishop of Duresm Henry Mason and other of our Countrey-men worthy the perusall of such as desire further satisfaction in this point In the mean time our result is that the party swearing after this manner both sinneth in his equivocall oath and is notwithstanding that tacite equivocation bound in Conscience unto the performance of his promise in that sense which the words yeeld of themselves and are without constraint apt to beget upon the mindes of others unlesse he act accordingly he is not guiltlesse of perjury SECT IV. SOme reasons of this assertion I have already alleadged in the confirmation of our first Hypothesis I shall now adde but briefly a few more The first an oath according unto the sum of that Hypothesis ought to be most simply and effectually understood unto which simplicity this artifice of industrious ambiguity is repugnant The second it is a great profanation of the Name of God to invoke him as witnesse and searcher of hearts to attest the truth of words which agree not with the heart of the party swearing for what were this if not as far as lyeth in mans power to make God who can neither deceive nor be deceived an Impostor and Patron of base dissimulation The third equivocation is contrary to the very institution and nature of an oath whose chief use is to be an end of strife and controversie and to give as certain security in uncertain things as humane nature is able to afford it being Expediendarum litium maximum remedium But that certainty which we seek in an oath is losâ— in equivocation for what certainty can there be in his answer whose meaning is uncertainty nor are Controversies thus ended but aggravated The fourth the party so swearing deludeth his neighbor and knowingly deceiveth contrary to the precept Ne juret in dolo and to the ancient form Si sciens fallo The fifth promise in the promissory is as affirmation and negation are in the assertory and containeth an answer unto the question or intergatory proposâ—d by the Deferent which unlesse it quadrate and agree with the Intergatory proposed is no truth but a lye For out of the question and the answer springeth as it were one proposition which must be utterly false where the answer is made in a different sense from that wherein the question was asked Noâ— doth that qualification to which the Patrons of this simulation fly afford them refuge To wit that we may not use this equivocation at our pleasure but onely before an incompetent Judge such as have no right to require an oath or who compelleth us to swear without just cause or exacteth that which is not due or the like But to omit that these are but their bare allegations only not confirmed by authority of Scripture of the antient Church or indeed of good and solid reason the force of these arguments by which we maintain the contrary is neither overthrown nor weakened by this qualification And although it should be granted that an unjust force might null that obligation made to man because it is not reasonable that an unjust act should acquire any right yet no injury done unto us by men can give us just cause to injure God by casting off that obligation which we made unto him the searcher of hearts to whom such right by every oath occurreth through the Invocation of his Name To conclude this Jesuiticall Doctrine licenseth the lust of lying and perjury unto impious men notwithstanding that qualification which though it remain yet the sole judgement when it is and when not expedient to use it is left unto the party swearing Wherefore if a man against right and reason be constrained to swear he ought either absolutely to refuse the oath or to take it in that sense wherein it is given without simulation or equivocation SECT V. THe third Case allyed unto this is of mentall Reservation which the Jesuites defend with the same reasons and define with the same qualification they doe verball equivocation For as in that by wresting the words pronounced unto another sense so in this by some addition not pronounced but conceived in minde the party swearing eludeth the Intergatory So they say a Priest if he be examined by an Hereticall Magistrate whether he be a Priest may answer that he is no Priest meaning of Bacchus or Apollo And an adulterous wife if she be questioned of adultery by her jealous husband may swear unto him that she committed not adultery meaning not to the end to tell him The like they hold in promissory oathes that a Traveller to save his life may swear to give money unto a Theef though he never intend it provided
they think themselves bound to quit themselves of their faith engaged by performance of the same The second that unl esse corrupt affections be vigorously withstood that spark which is left in us of naturall light will goe near to be altogether extinguished by them or so raked up in that heap that we shall rather give our mindes artificially to palliate then sincerely to avoid perjury Thirdly that he who desireth to keep himself free from all spot of perjury must diligently ponder every word in its own strength and sense of the oath which he is to take that if it ought not to be kept it may not be taken or if it be fit to be taken it may be fulfilled without deceit or simulation for unadvisedly to chop up holy things is impious and too late when they are once swallowed to chew them And so much for the first doubt which amounteth unto this sum That the words of an oath where they are so clear in themselves that amongst honest men there can be no question of their meaning the party swearing is obliged in that sense which they apparently afford and may not either in swearing or when he hath sworn stretch those words upon the Last of his interest by any studyed Interpretation SECT VIII THe second doubt is where the sense of the words is in question and the Cases are three The first of spontaneous oaths as in promises proceeding from the meer motion of good will and a kinde of liberty of the minde rather then duty of right or respect The common and true answer is that these promises are to be taken according to the intention of the party swearing because every man is the best interpreter of himself For example if any of us should binde our selves by a vow or promise to give unto the poor of a Village or Collector for them ten shillings a month if the poor seeing month as we use it is an ambiguous word should by the promise pretend unto the first pension upon the 28. day of January and so for the rest of the months upon the same day taking a month for the space of four weeks which is one signification of the word and he on the other side should say that it was not due till the last of January and so forth taking month for the twelfth part of a year according to the distribution of the year in the Calender which is another signification of the word it were most just that the ambiguity should be interpreted rather in his sense then theirs because that Pension was not due in justice and before the promise but in charity and by vertue of the free promise without agreement or contract And of this kinde of oath ought these words to be understood which are cited in the glosse upon the Canon Law It is manifest that God taketh not the oath as he unto whom it is sworn but as he who sweareth understandâ—th the same But that this may rightly be apprehended two things are observable One that it holdeth especially in spontaneous oathes and promises for in such as are required the reason differeth as shall be said anon The other that the party swearing is in the present case obliged to hold unto his promise in that sense which he either really intended when he sware or was willing the Auditors should beleive And not in any which he shall please afterwards to impose For God who beholdeth the heart is not deluded by words Nor ought the intention to serve the words but the words the intention SECT IX THe second case is of oathes and promises which are offered unto or required of the party swearing whether of right or under pretence of right such especially as Rulers of authority command their Subjects or Laws ordain as with us those of Supremacy and Allegiance those which the Statutes of the University require of Graduates and the like Also those which either party in lawfull Covenants demandeth of the other or are used in Bargains Leagues and other mutuall Contracts for the confirmation of mutuall faith For answer in this case I say that this kinde of oath ought regularly to be understood in that sense which the party unto whom the oath is made seemeth probably to intend so that the party swearing is bound under pain of perjury to fulfill his promise if it be lawfull and honest according to the intention of the deferent The words are understood according to the minde and intention of him to whom the oath is made saith the Lawyer The reason is because this kinde of oath is taken to the end he to whom it is sworn may by interposition of the same be assured that the promise of the party swearing shall be performed unto him but he would be no whâ—t the more assured of that performance if the words were to be interpreted at the will of the party swearing and not according to his own sense for there is a different nature of obligation where debt is claimed by promise and where promise is claimed by debt God himself who is by Law no mans debtor maketh himselfe through his free promises our debtor and he who obligeth himself by a voluntary vow oath or promise unto any deed of Charity ipso facto contracteth debt But because this debt is not founded upon his right unto whom the promise is made but floweth meerly from the free act of the party promising it is most just that he should be his own Interpreter who is most concerned to know how much how far and in what sense he intended to oblige himself On the other side where the promise is founded upon some antecedent right either that of subjection and duty by Superior Authority or of Justice and contract by agreement between parties Because he to whom the promise is made hath right to enquire the same and is most concerned that it be faithfully performed reason requireth that the obligation of the promise should rather be judged according to his mind and interpretation then by the sense of the party promising SECT X. THe third case is where the Deferent offering an oath of ambiguous sense desireth only that the words be sworn leaving it unto the judgement of the party swearing to take them in what sense he pleaseth I say it may very well be suspected that some deceit is couched in them and that a pious prudent man ought therefore to refuse an oath proffered upon such conditions which I shall make good by a threefold proof First in regard of the oath it selt in which the first thing required is truth for a speech of indefinite and ambiguous sense before it be distinguished is no true proposition indeed no proposition seeing a proposition as by the definition thereof is known even to children ought to signifie a truth or falsehood without ambiguity Secondly in regard of him to whom it is sworn For the proper end of an oath is that he to whom it is made may have
oath is not to be taken with an unsatiâ—fied Conscience SECT I. THe solution of the bond or tye wherewith he who sweareth bindeth his soul and whereof we have hitherto so largely discoursed is the task of this day and conclusion of the work proposed Of which solution before we descend unto the particular kindes two things are to be observed in generall First that solution of the bond is proper unto a Promissory oath and hath nothing to doe at all with the Assertory In every oath whether assertory or promissory there ought to be truth but with this difference in the assertory a single truth and for the present sufficeth where in the promissory a double truth is required one respecting the present the other the future The present truth regardeth the act of swearing and consisteth in this that the party swearing say true when he sweareth that is that his minde agree with his words and that he be resolved to hold unto that which he promiseth Which act of swearing in the promissory wholly agreeth as to the truth and falsehood with the act of swearing in the assertory For the matter of that truth in either act seeing it regardeth the time present passeth as it were into a kinde of immutable necessity in as much as an oath so soon as it is made may instantly be said to have been true or false which truth or falsehood when the act hath once passed is as impossible to be altered as it were to make a fact to have been no fact That obligation therefore whereby the party swearing is bound for the present to say truth falleth upon the act it self of swearing and is inseparably conjoyned with that act and for that reason cannot be loosed nor separated from the oath and of an assertory oath except this for the present there is no further obligation because the matter thereof is some fact past or present But in a promissory oath the matter whereof is a thing to be performed for the future another truth is also required for the future which regardeth the matter of the oath and consisteth in this that the party swearing make that which he hath promised to be true that is that he fulfill his promise Now seeing the matter of a promissory oath to wit things to be performed for the future are through the uncertainty of future events obnoxious to manyfold changes and alterations hence it cometh to passe that the obligation which falleth upon that matter and whereby the party swearing is bound in future to fulfill his promise is mutable and separable from the oath And this is that which we call Solution of the Bond. From whence also followeth that which is to be observed in the second place to wit that the solution of the Bond in a promissory oath ought not to be understood in relation unto the former obligation which ariseth from truth for the present and is common with this and the assertory oath but ought to be understood only in relation unto the later obligation which ariseth from truth for the future which is proper and peculiar unto this That is to say every person swearing promissorily ipso facto and by vertue of the act of swearing is simply and indissolubly obliged in present to intend faithfully and from his heart to effect that afterwards which he promiseth but having sworn it may come many wayes to passe that he may not be bound for the future to fulfill that afterwards which he formerly promised and intended In a word thus He is alwayes forsworn who intendeth not that which he promiseth but he is not alwayes forsworne who performeth not that which he promised SECT II. NOW that a thing promised may neverthelesse lawfully and without danger of perjury or other sin not be performed must necessarily happen one of these two wayes either that there was no obligation from the beginning or that it was by solution of the bond since taken away If the thing promised were when it was sworn either impossible or unlawfull the oath taken unto the same imposeth no obligation nor needeth solution but penitence for as much as in so swearing grievous sin is contracted but no bond for we have already shewn that impossible things and unlawfull things are in no wise obligatory Wherefore solution of the bond supposeth antecedent obligation and implyeth that the same may be afterwards so taken away or at the least obstructed that he who was formerly bound up so close with the bond of his oath that he might not under pain of perjury doe otherwise then he had promised is now no farther bound unto the performance of his promise The businesse therefore now in hand is to find out a certain reason whereupon he who hath obliged himself by the bond of an oath unto the performance of a thing may rest secure in his Conscience that he is delivered from that bond and no farther bound unto the performance of that promise To which solution those five wayes commonly assigned we shall examine in their order SECT III. THe first Case is of the dispensability of an oath Whether and in what the dispensation of a Superiour may take away the obligation thereof Dispensation as the word is commonly taken signifieth exemption of a person from the ordinary course of Law granted by speciall favour of him who is in authority As if a man who is subject to any Law should by especiall grace of his Prince be exempted from obedience unto that Law as we see daily practised in Universities where upon reasonable grounds dispensations are usually granted unto particular persons whereby they are in some things freed from the observation of the Statutes Now the right of dispensation is founded upon that equity which requireth that sometimes the rigour of Law be in some things remitted to the end that equity may not be excluded For seeing Laws were of necessity made in generall tearms and have regard unto that which is commonly and for the most part good and profitable for the publick which neverthelesse pro hic nunc may happen to be unprofitable or at the least lesse convenient it therefore seemed good where that which is established by Law appeareth to be exceeding burthensome or inconvenient to some private person and the publick to receive no great detriment by the omission thereof that the Prince or other legitimate Superiour should have power to determine that the Law in such cases is not to be observed And this is that which in Law we call Dispensation Now what power is in secular Princes to dispense with their Laws the same doe the Popes of Rome arrogate to themselves in dispensing with Vows and Oathes Whose impudence in this kinde whilest they absolve subjects of their Allegiance to Kings null Leagues and Contracts made by Princes untye the straightest knots of vows and oathes by commutation relaxation dispensation contrary command or other artifices at their pleasure and for their profit I could wish some who
all obligation both towards God and man Fifthly I say that solution of the Bond by Relaxation of the party extendeth so far as pleaseth the party relaxing As if Caius have sworn to pay Titius an hundred pounds and Titius have afterwards remitted fifty pounds the obligation is not wholly absolved but in part That is the bond as to the fifty pound remitted is void but it remaineth good as to the fifty pound not remitted Again if Caius have sworn to pay Titius an hundred pounds within 20 dayes and Titius perceiving that Caius cannot without inconvenience unto himself pay the mony at the time appointed give him other twenty days This Relaxation made by Dilation or propagation of the time remitteth so much of the obligation that he is not bound to pay the money within the time limited by his oath yet he is bound and that by vertue of his first oath to make payment within forty dayes Sixtly I say that Relaxation by a party is of force so far as that party is concerned but is not of force to the prejudice of a third person The reason is because any man may by act remit as much of his own right as he pleaseth but no man can diminish the right of another without his knowledge and against his will Let men therefore so recede from their own that the rights of others receive no detriment Thus Abraham Gen. 14. receded from his right when after the victory won upon the four Kings he bestowed his whole share of the spoyl upon the King of Sodome reserving unto the three Commanders his fellows in arms their due proportions Whence Caius sworn to pay an hundred pound unto Titius and Julius if Titius pardon him his part of the debt he is absolved as to that which was due unto Titius but remaineth bound as to that which is due unto Julius Upon the same ground Relaxation by consent of the parties availeth nothing in Contracts of Marriage because therein mans profit is not regarded only but the Ordinance of God also to whom great injury would be done if that contract though with mutuall consent of the party should be violated For the vertue and and efficacy which this Relaxation whereof we now speak hath to null obligation supposeth that act which introduced obligation to have considered nothing else but the good and profit only of the party relaxing If any other party be by right of his own interessed that the obligation should not be remitted the obligation is not remitted SECT IX NOw the sum of what hath been said concerning Solution of the Bond in an Oath is briefly this That the Bond of an Oath cannot be released by Dispensation of any Superiour or Commutation so as to free the Conscience of the party swearing from performance of the promise but may neverthelesse be rescinded and made void by a Superiour having lawfull authority cease through defect of the matter or be relaxed by him unto whom the promise was made so as to lose all strength of obligation The promise which I made at my entrance upon the Office of Publique professor being now by Gods assistance performed according to my talent with as much brevity pâ—rspicuity and fidelity as I have been able I thought fit to adde some few admonitions concerning the use and abuse of Oathes as Corollaries whereby our lives and Consciences may be profitably directed not by way of exhortation as they use in Sermons but remembring I teach in the School and not in the Church by way of Thesis or practicall Conclusions briefly proposed and clearly explained SECT X. THe first Conclusion is against Anabaptists and Socinians That the use of Oathes is lawfull I prove it first by the practise in the Old Testament The godly Patriarchs sware Controversies were determined by oath according to the Institution of Moses in the Law the Prophets prescribed the condition of oathes to be observed Nor can any just reason be rendered why this should be lawfull for the pious under the Old and not for the faithfull under the New Testament seeing it is apparent from the end of an oath whose use is perpetuall that it appertaineth not unto the Ceremoniall Law abrogated by Christ and from the form which seemeth to have nothing common with the type I prove it secondly by the example of God of Angels of Apostles those being often introduced in holy Scripture swearing after the manner of men these Historically Thirdly by the custome of all Nations who directed by the light of Nature have judged the bond of an oath for the convenience of Civill Society the surest confirmation of Faith then which there can be no clearer discovery of the Law of Nature Fourthly from the end of an oath which is the confinmation of truth in doubtfull matters where all other proofs are defiâ—int which end seeing it is necessary for the composing and determination of Controversies it must needs be that the necessary means unto the end should be at the least lawfull Fifthly from the nature of an oath containing nothing in it self which is intrinsecally evill for neither is a religious act evill nor the Confirmation of a doubtful thing evill nor Invocation of Divine testimony evill of which members the essentiall definition of an oath consisteth SECT XI THe second Conclusion The use of Oathes in common discourse is unlawfull The first proof is from the nature of an oath Because every religious act being a part of Divine Wotship ought to be performed with due reverence and with some both preparation and attention all which must needs be far off when oathes are rashly scattered without judgement or heedlesly without consideration The second from the end which is the confirmation of a doubtfull businesse seeing our ordinary discourse is for the most part upon frivolous matters which either are not doubtfull or not of moment to require religious confirmation or if they were would be little more credited for his oath who maketh swearing his common custome for such will be assoon believed if that which they say seem true without an oath or if otherwise no whit the sooner for swearing The third from the Cause whence such kinde of Oathes are derived which is either a vitious habit contracted by long and pernicious custome which habit is the fruit and mark of a profane if not Atheisticall heart or some exorbitant perturbation of the mindâ— as excessive anger intemperate joy with which whilest the minde boyles the mouth foameth to the dishonour of God and at which those words of James seem peculiarly to aim Chap. 5. vers 1â— But above all things my Brethren swear not neither by Heaven neither by the Earth In the foregoing verâ—es he exhorteth the faithfull to suffer injuries with patience and in the following vâ—râ—e teacheth the Christian how to entertain himself whether he be sad or cheerfull a place worthy to be the exercise of learned men and something more diligently considered then as yet it hath been by