faithfull Friend and Servant Ed. Wigorn. Sept. 22. 1697. FINIS ERRATA PAge 22. line 16. after thing insert common P. 103 Margin r. p. 253. P. 115. l. 14. r. Plotinus P. 130. l. 26. r. this P. 175. l. 11. blot out it Books written by the Right Reverend Father in God Edw. L. Bishop of Worcester and sold by H. Mortlock at the Phoenix in St. Paul's Church-Yuard A Rational account of the Grounds of the Protestant Religion being a Vindication of the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury's Relation of a Conference c. from the pretended Answer of T. C. 2d Edit Fol. Origines Britannicae or the Antiquities of the British Churches with a Preface concerning some pretended Antiquities relating to Britain in Vindication of the Bishop of St. Asaph Folio Irenicum A Weapon-Slave for the Churches Wounds Quarto Origines Sacrae Or a Rational account of the Grounds of Christian Faith as to the Truth and Divine Authority of the Script and the matters therein contained 4 to A Discourse concerning the Idolatry practised in the Church of Rome and the hazard of Salvation in the Communion of it Octavo An Answer to several late Treatises occasioned by a Book entituled A Discourse concerning the Idolatry practised in the Church of Rome and the hazard of Salvation in the Communion of it Part I. Octavo A Second Discourse in Vindication of the Protestant Grounds of Faith against the pretence of Infallibility in the Roman Church in Answer to the Guide in Controversie by R H Protestancy without Principles and Reason and Religion or the certain Rule of Faith by E W. with a particular enquiry into the Miracles of the Roman Church Octavo An Answer to Mr. Cressy's Epistle apologetical to a Person of Honour touching his Vindication of Dr Stillingfleet Octavo A Defence of the Discourse concerning the Idolatry practised in the Church of Rome in answer to a Book entituled Catholicks no Idolaters Octavo Several Conferences between a Roman Priest a Fanatick Chaplain and a Divine of the Church of England being a full Answer to the late Dialogues of T G Octavo A Discourse concerning Bonds of Resignation of Benefices in point of Law and Conscience in Octavo A Discourse concerning the Illegality of the Ecclesiastical Commission in Answer to the Vindication and Defence of it wherein the true notion of the Legal Supremacy is cleared and an Account is given of the Nature Original and Mischief of the Dispensing Power The Unreasonableness of Separation or an Impartial account of the History Nature and Pleas of the present Separation from the Communion of the Ch. of England Quarto The Grand Question concerning the Bishops Right to vote in Parliament in Cases Capital stated and argued from the Parliament-Rolls and the History of former times with an Enquiry into their Peerage and the Three Estates in Parliament Octavo A Discourse concerning the Doctrine of Christ's Satisfaction or the true Reasons of his Sufferings with an Answer to the Socinian Objections To which is added A Sermon concerning the Mysteries of the Christian Faith Preached April 7. 1691. With a Preface concerning the true state of the Controversie about Christ's Satisfaction The second Edition 8 vo Twelve Sermons preached upon several Occasions Vol. I. Octavo Ten Sermons preached upon several Occasions Vol II. Octavo A Third Volume will be shortly published A Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity with an Answer to the late Socinian Objections against it from Scripture Antiquity and Reason And a Preface concerning the different Explications of the Trinity and the Tendency of the present Socinian Controversie The second Edition Octavo The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Lock 's Letter concerning some Passages relating to his Essay of Humane Understanding mentioned in the late Discourse in Vindication of the Trinity With a Postscript in Answer to some Reflections made on that Treatise in a late Socinian Pamphlet The Bishop of Worcester's Charge to the Clergy of his Diocess in his Primary Visitation begun at Worcester September 11. 1690. 4 to The Effigies of the Right Reverend Father in God Edward Lord Bishop of Worcester Engraven on a Copper-plate by Robert White Price 6 d. The Rule of Faith Or an Answer to the Treatise of Mr. I. S. entituled Sure-footing c. by Iohn Tillotson D. D. to which is adjoyned a Reply to Mr. I. S's third Appendix c. by Edward Stillingfleet D. D. A Letter to Mr. G. giving a true Account of a late Conference at the D. of P's A Second Letter to Mr. G. in answer to two Letters lately published concerning the Conference at the D. of P s. Veteres Vindicati In an Expostulary Letter to Mr. Sclater of Putney upon his Consensus Veterum c. wherein the absurdity of his Method and the weakness of his Reasons are shewn His false Aspersions upon the Church of England are wiped off and her Faith concerning the Eucharist proved to be that of the Primitive Church Together with Animadversions on Dean Boileu's French Translation of and Remarks upon Bertram An Answer to the Compiler of Nubes Testium Wherein is shewn That Antiquity in relation to the Points in Controversie set down by him did not for the first five hundred Years Believe Teach and Practice as the Church of Rome doth at present Believe Teach and Practice Together with a Vindication of Veteres Vindicati from the late weak and disingenuous Attempts of the Author of Transubstantiation Defended by the Author of the Answer to Mr. Sclater of Putney A Letter to Father Lewis Sabran Jesuit in answer to his Letter to a Peer of the Church of England wherein the Postscript to the Answer to the Nubes Testium is Vindicated and Father Sabran's Mistakes farther discoverd A second Letter to Father Lewis Sabran Jesuit in answer to his Reply A Vindication of the Principles of the Author of the Answer to the Compiler of Nubes Testium in answer to a late pretended Letter from a Dissenter to the Divines of the Church of England A Discourse concerning the Nature and Grounds of the Certainty of Faith in answer to I. S. his Catholick Letters The Council of Trent Examin'd and Disprov'd by Catholick Tradition in the main Points in Controversie between Us and the Church of Rome with a particular Account of the Times and Occasions of Introducing them Part. I. To which a Preface is prefixed concerning the True Sense of the Council of Trent and the Notion of Transubstantiation An Historical Examination of the Authority of General Councils shewing the False Dealing that hath been used in the publishing of them and the Difference amongst the Papists themselves about their Number The Second Edition Corrected 4 to The Folly and Unreasonableness of Atheism demonstrated from the Advantage and Pleasure of a Religious Life The Faculties of Human Souls The Structure of Animate Bodies and the Origine and Frame of the World in Eight Sermons Preached at the Lecture Founded by the Honourable Robert
to have had you explained your self to the general Satisfaction yet since you decline it I do insist upon it that you cannot clear your self from laying that Foundation which the Author of Christianity not mysterious built upon For your Ground of Certainty is the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas as expressed in any Proposition Which are your own Words From hence I urged That let the Proposition come to us any way either by Humane or Divine Authority if our Certainty depend upon this we can be no more certain than we have clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas contained in it And from hence the Author of Christianity not mysterious thought he had Reason to reject all Mysteries of Faith which are contained in Propositions upon your Grounds of Certainty By this it evidently appears that although I was willing to allow you all fair ways of interpreting your own Sense yet I by no means thought that your Words were wholly misunderstood or misapplied by that Author but rather that he saw into the true Consequence of them as they lie in you Book And what Answer do you give to this Not a word in the proper Place for it But afterwards for I would omit nothing that may seem to help your Cause you offer something towards an Answer For there you distinguish the Certainty of Faith and the Certainty of Knowledge and you humbly conceive the Certainty of Faith if I think fit to call it so hath nothing to do with the Certainty of Knowledge and to talk of the Certainty of Faith seems all one to you as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing a way of speaking not easie for you to understand So that if I shake never so much the Certainty of Knowledge it doth not at all concern the Assurance of Faith that is quite distinct from it neither stands nor falls with Knowledge Faith stands by it self and upon Grounds of its own nor can be removed from them and placed on those of Knowledge Their Grounds are so far from being the same or having any thing that when it is brought to Certainty Faith is destroyed 't is Knowledge then and Faith no longer So that whether you are or are not mistaken in the placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas Faith still stands upon its own Basis which is not at all alter'd by it and every Article of that hath just the same unmoved Foundation and the very same Credibility that it had before This is the Substance of what you say about this Matter and is the most considerable Passage in your Book towards clearing this Matter But I was aware of this as appears by these Words Is Faith an unreasonable Act Is it not an Assent to a Proposition Then if all Certainty in Acts of Reason be derived from the perceiving the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contained in it either there can be no Certainty in the reasonable Act of Faith or the Grounds of Certainty must be laid some other Way But this is a Matter of too great Weight and Consequence to be easily past over because the main strength of your Defence lies in it and therefore I shall more strictly examine what you say and set this Point of the Certainty of Faith in as good a Light as I can and shew the Inconsistency of your Notion of Ideas with the Articles of the Christian Faith To talk of the Certainty of Faith say you seems all one to you as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing a way of speaking not easie for you to understand But how comes the Certainty of Faith to become so hard a Point with you Have not all Mankind who have talked of Matters of Faith allow'd a Certainty of Faith as well as a Certainty of Knowledge although upon different Grounds In your former Letter you told us that if we knew the Original of Words we should be much helped to the Ideas they were first applied to and made to stand for Now what is there in the Original of the word Certainty which makes it uncapable of being applied to Faith I had thought that our Word was taken from the Latin and that among the Romans it was opposed to doubting Nil tam certum quam quod de dubio certum And therefore where the Mind upon examination of the Grounds of Assent saw no Reason for doubting it might properly be said to be certain If it sees no Cause to doubt from the Evidence of the Thing it self or the clear Deduction of Consequences that is Certainty of Knowledge but where it sees no Reason to doubt from the Authority of him that speaks that is Certainty of Believing and the greater the Authority of him that speaks the less Reason there is to doubt and therefore the greater Certainty of Faith And this I think is very easie to be understood and so have the Generality of Mankind thought to this Day But it seems our old Words must not now pass in the current Sense but then it is fit they be called in and new stampt that we may have none but New milled Words to talk with but in common Justice a competent Time ought to be allow'd for it that none be surprized and in the mean time they ought to pass in their current Sense and that is all the Favour I desire in this Matter But I am utterly against any Private Mints of Words and think those Persons assume too much Authority to themselves who will not suffer common Words to pass in their general Acceptation but will set such Bounds and Limits to the Sense of them as suit best with their own Speculations But is not this all one as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing For what Reason Knowledge and Faith are too distinct things the one relates to Evidence and the other to Testimony but Certainty is common to them both unless you think it impossible to be certain upon any Testimony whatsoever You tell us in your Postscript which I hope may be brought hither without Offence that it is a shame among Christians to raise such a Doubt of this Whether an infinitely powerfull and wise Being be veracious or no. Then I suppose the Veracity of God is a certain and undoubted Principle and if there be sufficient Means to assure us of Divine Revelation as I doubt not but you yield there are what should hinder one that believes upon such Grounds as are sufficient to convince him from attaining to a Certainty of Faith But you take Certainty as belonging only to Knowledge So do the Papists as belonging only to Infallibility and say there can be no Certainty of Faith where there is not an Infallible Proponent but neither you nor they are to impose upon the Understandings of Mankind who know how to distinguish the Grounds of Certainty both from Knowledge and Infallibility You allow such a thing as Assurance of Faith
proceeds so far as to question every thing in order to the discovering the true Ground of Certainty he cannot be satisfied with finding out only some Modes of Being but that which he aims at is satisfaction as to his real Existence But this wholly depends upon the Truth and Certainty of this Fundamental Maxim That Nothing can have no Operations and therefore whatever thinks or doubts or reasons must certainly be And since by another Fundamental Maxim it is impossible for the same Thing to be and not to be he cannot entertain any possible doubt of his own Existence It may be said that this reaches only to bare Existence and not to the Being Men. I answer that for the Certainty as to that there are other general Maxims of necessary Use As That all different sorts of Beings are distinguished by Essential Properties That the Essential Properties of a Man are to Reason Discourse c. That these Properties cannot subsist by themselves without a real Substance And therefore where these Properties are found those who have them must be real and substantial Men. You may possibly say that these Maxims are useless because you affirm that nothing can be more evident to us than our own Existence and that we have an internal infallible Perception that we are But I answer that these Maxims do not at all appear to be useless because the Certainty we enquire after is a Certainty of Reason and not of bare Perception And if it be a Certainty of Reason some Ground of Reason must be assigned for it but all that the Perception reaches to are those Acts mention'd by you I think I reason I feel pleasure and pain but the Question goes farther as to the Subject of those Acts and the Nature of that Subject whether it be a Man or not Now here lies the main Difficulty whether without the help of these Principles you can prove to any that doubt that they are Men And I shall now shew that in your Way of Ideas you cannot For 1 You suppose that we must have a clear distinct Idea of that which we are certain of in the Way of Ideas 2 You deny that we have any such clear and distinct Idea of Man 1. You suppose that we must have a clear and distinct Idea of that we are certain of For in your Chapter of Maxims you say that every one knows the Ideas that he has and that distinctly and unconfusedly one from another Which always being so I pray mark that and judge whether you do not make clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty he can never be in doubt when any Idea is in his mind that it is there and is that Idea it is and that two distinct Ideas when they are in his mind are there and are not one and the same Idea From whence you infer the Necessity of Certainty when the Ideas are clear and distinct This is so plain and clear that I wonder how you came to forget it and to think that I did you wrong when I charged you with holding clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty But of that in the Beginning of this Discourse 2. But let us now examine your Idea of Man whether that be clear and distinct or not and if not then according to your Principles very rational Men cannot be certain that they are Men. For if they have no Way of Certainty but by Ideas and you allow no clear and distinct Idea of Man then they can come to no Certainty and I hope you will not deny them to be very rational Men if they follow the Way of Ideas First you shew that there can be no Demonstration in the Way of Principles what Man is Secondly that there are very different Ideas of Man some you say make the Idea of a Man without a Soul as Children do Others add Laughter and rational Discourse and these may demonstrate by general Principles that Ideots and Infants are no Men by this Maxim that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be and you have discoursed with very rational Men who have actually denied that they are Men. Others take in the Idea of Body in general and the Powers of Language and Reason and leave out shape and so a Man may be a Four-footed Creature or in whatever Body or Shape he found Speech and Reason joined that was a Man But where is the clear and distinct Idea of a Man all this while We can have no Certainty by Principles you say and you offer none in the Way of Ideas for the Ideas are very confused imperfect and repugnant to each other and so in this new Method of Certainty by Ideas we cannot be so much as certain that we are Men. But is it possible to suppose that a rational Man should talk of Certainty by Ideas and not be able to fix the Idea of a Man One would have thought this had been only an Omission in this place out of pure Zeal against Principles but certainly in other places this Idea of a Man must be made clear and distinct So far from it that in other places you industriously set your self to disprove the common Idea of a Man It could not possibly be say you that the abstract Idea to which the Name Man is given should be different in several Men if it were of Natures making and that to one it should be animal rationale to another animal implume bipes latis unguibus From whence it is plain that you allow no clear and distinct Idea of Man and you endeavour to expose the sacred Definition as you call it of animal rationale which was never exposed by any Man without Cause But you conclude That we are far from knowing certainly what Man is though perhaps it will be judged great Ignorance to doubt about it And yet you think you may say That the certain Boundaries of that Species are so far from being determined and the precise Number of simple Ideas which make that nominal Essence so far from being setled and perfectly known that very material Doubts may still arise about it So that I begin to think I. S. was in the right when he made you say That you had discoursed with very rational Men who denied themselves to be Men. But this is a little too hard to deny themselves to be Men. If it had been only who doubted whether they were Men or not you could not deny them to be very rational Men because they went upon your Grounds that we can have no Certainty either by Principles or by any clear and distinct Ideas what a Man is Thus I have shew'd how inconsistent your way of Ideas is with true Certainty and of what Use and Necessity these general Principles of Reason are I now come to the Certainty of Reason in making Deductions And here I shall briefly lay down the Grounds of Certainty which the Ancient Philosophers went