Selected quad for the lemma: friend_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
friend_n	efficient_a	final_a	stupidity_n	30	3	15.8358	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A61287	The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.	Stanley, Thomas, 1625-1678.	1656 (1656)	Wing S5238; ESTC R17292	629,655	827

wisdome by the first naturall appetite afterwards more esteem that wisdome then those things whereby we arrived at it And as our limbs are given to us for a certain reason of living so the appetition of the soul is given not for every kinde of life but for one certain form of living so likewise reason and perfect reason For as action is proper to a Player motion to a Dancer yet not any but one certain kinde so the life that is to be acted is in one certain kinde not in any which kinde we call convenient and consentaneous Wisdome is not like the art of a Pilot or a Physician but rather to that Action we mentioned and to Dancing that the extream that is the effection of the Art be in the Art it selfe and not extrinsecall There is another similitude betwixt Wisdome and these Arts for in them are those things which are done rightly yet are not all the parts whereof they consist contained therein Things done rightly or Rectitudes contain all numbers of vertue for only wisdome is wholly converted into it selfe which is not in other Arts. But improperly is the Art of a Pilot and a Physician compared with the ultimate of Wisdome For wisdome includeth Fortitude and Justice and judgeth all things that happen to man to be below it which happen●th not in other Arts but none can hold these vertues which we last mentioned unlesse he affirm there is nothing that is different but honest and dishonest CHAP. V. Of Good and III. HItherto of Appetites we come next to their Objects Things according to Zeno are whatsoever participate of Essence Of things some are good some ill some indifferent Good is severall waies defined by the Stoicks but their definitions tend all to one end Good is profit or that which differeth not from profit Profit is vertue and vertuous action not different from profit is ● vertuous man and a friend For vertue being a quodammodotative Hegemonick and vertuous action being an operation according to vertue is plainly profit A vertuous man and a friend is not different from profit for profit is a part of Vertuous as being the Hegemoniack thereof Now the wholes are neither the same with their parts for a man is not a hand nor different from their parts for they subsist not without parts wherefore the whole is not different from its parts and consequently a vertuous man being the whole in respect of his Hegemoniack which is profit is not different from profit Good is by some defined that which is expetible in it selfe by others that which assisteth to felicity or compleateth it by Diogenes that which is absolute by nature or that which is perfect according to the nature of a rationall creature The consequent thereof is a beneficient motion or state absolute in nature Whereas things are known either by use or conjunction or similitude or collation by this fourth kinde is the knowledge of good for when from those things which are according to nature the minde ascendeth by collation of reason then it attaineth the notion of good Good is known and named not by accession increase or comparison with other things but by its proper power For as Hony though it be most sweet yet in its proper kinde of tast not comparative to any other we perceive it to be sweet So this good of which we speak is that which is most to be esteemed but that estimation consisteth in the kinde not the magnitude For estimation being neither amongst the good nor ill whatsoever you apply it to it will remain in its kinde Different therefore is the proper estimation of vertue which consisteth in the kinde not in increase To Good belongeth all vertue as Prudence Justice Temperance Fortitude and whatsoever participates of those as vertuous actions and persons Accessions hereto are joy cheerfulnesse and the like Ills are the contrary vices as Imprudence Injustice Intemperance Pusillanimity and whatsoever participates of vice as vicious actions and persons The accessions hereunto are discontent affliction and the like Of Goods some as we have said are Vertues others not-vertues as Joy Hope and the like In like manner of Ills some are Vices as those already mentioned others not-vices as Griefe and Fear Again of Goods some are continuall in all the vertuous and at all times such is all vertue sounde sence wise appetition and the like Others are intermissive as joy hope and prudent counsell which are not in all the wise nor at all times In like manner of Ills some are continuall in all and alwaies in the imprudent as all vice and imprudent sence and imprudent appetite Others intermissive as griefe fear and imprudent answer which are not alwaies in the wicked nor at all times Again of Good there are three kinds The first from which profit commeth as from its first cause such is vertue The second by which profit commeth as vertue and vertuous action The third that which may profit as vertue and vertuous actions and a vertuous man and a friend and the Gods and good Demons Thus the second signification includeth the first and the third both the first and second In like manner of Ills there are three kinds First that from which hurt originally proceedeth as vice Secondly that by which hurt commeth as vicious actions Lastly and most largely whatsoever is able ●o hurt Again of Goods some are in the Soul as vertue and vertuous actions some without the Soul as a true friend a good Country and the like some neither within nor without the soul as good and vertuous men In like manner of Ills some are within the Soul as vices and vicious actions some without the Soul as imprudent friends enemies and the like some neither within nor without the Soul as wicked men and all that participate of vice Of goods within the Soul some are habits some affections some neither habits nor affections The vertues themselves are affections their studies habits nor affections their acts neither habits nor affections In like manner of Ills some are affections as vices some habits only as infirmities of minde and the like some neither habits nor affections as vicious actions Again of Goods some are finall some efficient some both finall and efficient A friend and the benefits arising from him are efficient goods Fortitude magnanimity liberty delectation joy tranquillity and all vertuous actions are finall goods Both efficient and finall as all vertues as they perfect felicity they are efficient as they constitute it as parts thereof finall In like manner of Ills some are finall some efficient some both A friend and the dammages incurred by him are efficient Fear basenesse servitude stupidity frowardnesse griefe and all vicious actions are finall participant of are vices as they procure misfortune they are efficient as they constitute it as parts thereof finall Again of goods some are

Instruments It is not the same in God and Man neither is it equall amongst good men for it may somtimes be taken away by oppression of miseries Hence it is to be doubted whether a man may be termed happy as long as he is alive considering the uncertainty of Fortune whence Solon said Consider the end of a long life whether it be happy Those who sleep are not participant of Beatitude but after some manner as the function of the Soule is capable of awaking Lastly they added Nature because every waking of good men is not the use of perfect Vertue but only that which is according to Nature that is free from madnesse for madnesse as well as sleep depriveth men of use and of this Reason and maketh them like Brutes As Beatitude is said to be the use of Vertue so is misery of Vice yet not so that as this sufficeth to misery so that doth to Beatitude Life is made four and unpleasant to the Good by excessive adversity to the ill even in prosperity because they sin more nor can rightly be termed happy Having asserted Beatitude to be the chief Good it followeth that we expound how many waies it is taken Good is understood three waies First for that which is the cause of preservation to all beings next for that which is predicated of every good thing Lastly for that which is expetible in it self The first is God the second the Genus of Goods the third the end to which all are referred Beatitude That which is expetible in it selfe is said three waies either that for which something is done or for which all things are done or some part of these Again of these some are finall some efficient finall are the actions proceeding according to vertue efficient the materials of expetible things Of goods some are honourable some laudable some faculties some profitable Honourable as God our Prince Parent Laudable as Riches Empire Liberty Profitable the efficient as Health Again of things good and expetible some are expetible in themselves some for others in themselves as the honourable laudable and faculties for others as the Profitable which effect and conserve other things Again of things good in themselves some are ends others not ends Ends as Iustice Vertue Health and whatsoever consisteth of these Not ends as Ingenuity Memory Learning Again of Goods some are wholly perfect others not of the first are Vertue and Prudence which benefit all of the latter Riches and Power which require to be used by a good man The same things whereof a good man maketh right use a wicked man abuseth as the same which a good Musician useth well he who is ignorant of Musick useth amisse Whosoever maketh ill use of any thing is hurt thereby as a good horse which is a help to him that knoweth how to ride hurts the unskilfull rider Again of Goods some are in the soul some in the body some externall In the soul are ingenuity art vertue wisdome prudence pleasure in the body health soundnesse of sense beauty strength soundnesse of limbs and all parts with their faculties and functions Externall are riches glory nobility power friend● kindred country The goods of the soul are either conferred by na●ure as Wit and Memory or acquired by diligence as the Liberall Sciences or fall into perfection as Prudence Iustice and lastly Wisdome Again of Goods some may be both obtained and lost as Riches some obtained but not lost as Felicity and Immortality some lost but not obtained as Sense and Life some neither obtained nor lost as Nobility Again of Goods some are only expetible in themselves as Pleasure and Indolence some efficient only as Riches some both efficient and expetible in themselves as Vertue Friends Health Goods are divided more waies then these as not belonging all to one Genus but to all the ten Categories These things laid down we come next to speak more accurately concerning Vertue which they place in both parts of the soul In the rationall part Integrity Prudence Wisdome Memory and the like In the irrationall part Temperance Iustice Fortitude and other vertues These say they may be extinguished by excesse which they prove by testimony of the senses as things obscure by manifest For as by excesse or defect of exercise health is corrupted but by moderate exercise is preserved In like manner is it in Temperance Fortitude and other vertues For as we do call him who feareth the Thunder mad not valiant so on the contrary he who feareth shadowes is a coward but he is valiant who neither feareth all things nor nothing These things encrease or extinguish vertue being moderate they encrease courage being too great or too little they extinguish it In like manner are all other vertues extinguished by excesse or defect increased by mediocrity Neither is vertue only limited by these but by pleasure and griefe likewise in as much as for pleasure we commit wickednesse and for griefe shun good To explain this more fully they un●old the nature of the soul wherein are seen three things passions faculties habits Passions as anger fear hate love emulation pitty and the like to which is subsequent pleasure or griefe Faculties by which we make use of passions and are angry do emulate and the like Habits are those from which the functions of these proceedeth rightly or otherwise If any man be so disposed that he is angry upon any occasion he hath the habit of anger if so as to be angry upon no occasion he hath the habit of stupidity both which are blamable The laudable habit is that of meeknesse by which we are angry in due time and place Vertues therefore are habits by which the functions of passions become laudable All vertue consisteth in action all action is continuous Whatsoever things are continuous like magnitude have excesse defect and mediocrity either in relation to one another or to us The mean relating to us is in all the best this is not quantitative but qualitative and therefore is perfect whereas the extreams excesse and defect being contrary are repugnant to one another and to the mean But the mean is to both extreams as equality is to inequality greater then the least lesse then the greatest Vertue therefore is a deliberative habite consisting in mediocrity relating to our selves Theophrastus having laid down some qualities following his Master endeavoureth to conclude from each of them The examples he alledgeth are these Temperance Intemperance Stupidity Meekness Wrath Indolence Fortitude Boldnesse Timidity Justi●e Liberality Prodigality Avarice Magnanimity Pusillanimity Arrogance Magnificence Ostentation For of these habits some are ill through excesse or defect others good through mediocrity He is not temperate who desireth nothing nor he who desireth all things one like a stone desireth not even naturall expetibles the other through excessive desire becommeth intemperate He only is temperate who desireth honest things with reason in due time and measure He is not meek who is angry upon all