acknowledged by all Nay the Learned est Men that ever were out of the Church of God as Aristotle and his Followers have utterly denyed the World to have had a beginninge as you well knowe And therfore unles the contrary be prooved these Philosophers confuted we have herby nothing profited in convicting Mens consciences of this truthe by the light of reason That there is a God and so are farre enoughe from baptizinge Atheists into the name of God the Father Much more from baptizinge them into the name of the Father of the Sonne and of the H. Ghost And therfore I am persuaded that your proposition is not delivered in this sense but rather you extende the word limites or boundes to a greater generalitie of signification in which sense you woulde have it supposed that All thinges besides God himselfe have limite and boundes of beinge not in regard only that they had a beginninge which is questionable but in regard that they are Entia finita which is out of question In like sort the woord being is of ambiguous signification For it may be taken eyther for beinge of essence or for beinge of existence The limits of existence or duration are such as wherby thinges are sayde to have a beginninge or an ende and that at such a time or other But the limits boundes of thinges according to their essence are such in respect wherof Entia are sayde to be finiâ—a or infinita Nowe in this latter sense your proposition hathe bene very questionable amongst the most learned Philosophers that have bene For Aristotle and his Peripatericks never doubted but that this visible World was finite Yet that he did acknowledge a cause of it is no where evident Nay he opposethe Plato the rest before him who maynteyned that the World was made so accordingly that it had a beginninge wherby it seemes that he denyinge the creation of the World denyed therwithall that the World had any efficient cause And indeede whosoever maynteynes that the world had a beginning by creation must therwithall maynteyne that eyther it was made of somethinge or of nothinge You will not say that t is a thing evident that the World was made of some preexistent matter which matter had existence without creation For that is unto us Christians a manifest untruthe Therfore you must be driven to maynteyne that it is a truthe evident of it selfe that the World was made originally out of nothinge or at least that it may be immediately concluded evidently by a principle which is evident of it selfe thus Whatsoever hath boundes of beinge hath bene made the World hath boundes of beinge therfore it hath bene made and seing it was not made of any thing pre-existent therfore it was made of nothing Now what Wise man will acknowledge this discourse to be evident considering howe many Learned Philosophers conceaved it to be a thing impossible that any thing coulde be made out of nothinge as allso consideringe that the H. Ghost imputethe the acknowledgement herof not to any naturall evidence but only unto faithe as where the Apostle saythe by faithe we believe that the World was made so that things which we see were made 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not of things that doe 2. You proceede to the enlargement of this position tell us that this maxime is simply convertible thus Whatsoever hath cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge because it hathe beginninge of beinge For omnis causa principium omne causatum principiatum There is litle soundnes eyther of Logicke or Philosophy in all this For to say that a proposition is simply convertible is in a Logicall phrase to say that it is a good consequence which is drawne from the proposition converted to the convertent that is to the proposition wherinto the conversion is made But this is untrue of the proposition convertible which you speake of For an affirmative universall cannot be thus converted by simple conversion but only an Vniversall negative a particular affirmative But I leave your wordes and take your meaninge You say it is allso true that Whatsoever hath cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge Nowe bothe this proposition is naught and the reason worse For the Sonne of God the second person in Trinity hathe cause of beinge from his Father for he is begotten of him And the H. Ghost hathe cause of beinge bothe from the Father and from the Sonne For he proceedethe from them bothe Yet neyther God the Sonne nor God the holy Ghost have any limits of their beinge If you say the Persons are limited thoughe the nature of the Godhead be not I woulde gladly knowe howe the Person of the Sonne and of the H. Ghost are more limited then the Person of the Father For of the Sonne and H. Ghost I knowe no other limitation then this that the Sonne is not the Father nor the H. Ghost Likewise the H. Ghost is neyther the Father nor the Sonne And in this sense the Father is limited as much as eyther For as the Sonne is not the Father so the Father is not the Sonne and as the H. Ghost is not the Father so the Father is not the H. Ghost You shoulde have sayde All thinges that have cause of beinge by creation have allso limits or bounds of being Or thus All thinges that have cause of beinge in time and not from everlastinge have limits and boundes of beinge Or if you woulde apply it to generation thus All things that have cause of being by generation of sinite Agents have limits and boundes of beinge Yet none of these is to the purpose save the first And that first proposition supposethe the creation which yet is not evident but unto faithe So then you see howe weake this proposition is Yet the reasons you bring for the proofe of it are much woorse Your first reason is this because it hathe beginninge of beinge Nowe if by limits of beinge you meane limits of existence such as is the beginninge of duration then your proofe is merely identicall But if you meane by limits of beinge limits of essence wherby a thing is sayde to be Ens sinitum the consequence is true I confesse but nothing more evident is the conclusion by this reason then it was before of it selfe For that it hathe a cause efficient which producethe it dothe as well argue a finite condition of the thing produced then that it hathe a beginninge Yet neyther dothe the havinge of an efficient cause sufficiently argue that the effect produced is finite unles the efficient cause be finite For to say that a finite thinge coulde produce an effect infinite is to maynteyne that a cause in workinge shoulde exceede the spheare of his activity But there is no place for this exception in case the efficient cause be infinite And I have knowne some inferre herehence that the World is infinite Otherwise say they there shoude be no effect of God
to the purpose partly as questionable as ever where it is to the purpose For that that which is infinite in essence must be one and not many I thinke is without question even amongst Atheists nowadayes that have any learning in them allthough a man may fayle in the demonstration of it as here you doe For to be infinite in essence is to comprehend all specificall entities not numericall For such as such differ not in essence And for it to be multiplied according to numericall differences only seemes nothing prejudiciall to the infinitie of the essence save only as infinity of essence is corruptly conceaved to imply quantitie Infinity of power dothe more evidently include opposition to numericall pluralitie then infinity of essence in my judgement But be it not only without question but allso supposed to have bene made evident by some demonstration of yours yet is it nothing to the present question For the question in present is not whether there may be two Gods but only whether in the one nature of God there be not thinges different to witt whether Gods wisdome be not different from his power and both these different from his goodnes that is in a word whether there be not any accident in God And yet unto this question you are arrived but in a very indecent and incongruous manner For wheras before you had undertaken to proove that all thinges were in God accordinge to ideall perfections by all thinges understandinge substances cheifly as of Angells and men and beasts of all sorts And in this chapter doe undertake to shewe that all things thus being in God are not in him by way of pluralitie but drawne to unitie and accordingly should herby proove that the essence of an Angell and the essence of a man yea and the essence of a beast and of every base thing is so in God as one with him and one with every thinge You shift of from this and in the place therof only mention how Gods life and wisedome and power and goodnes are all one in God And this you proove only from this that God is illimited which is as sory a consequence as that wherby you prooved his illimited condition to witt from this that he is independent and receaved not his being from any thinge Which consequence of yours is so farre from naturall evidence that it is repugnant to all Philosophers of olde who maynteyned eyther the World or the first matter not to speake of Intelligences to be independent of any efficient cause and without all makinge yet did never conceave that herehence it must followe that eyther of them should be infinite No lesse inconsequent is that which followeth allso as when you say Whersoever it can be truly sayde this is one and that another or this is and is not that each hath distinct limits I say this is untrue For suppose a body were infinite In this case bothe lengthe and bredthe and thicknes were infinite yet lengthe were only lengthe and not bredthe yet never a whit the lesse infinite Neyther is infinity in thicknes any hinderance to infinity in breadthe though breadthe be not thicknes nor infinity in breadthe any hinderance to infinity in lengthe thoughe lengthe be not breadthe In like sort the infinity of Gods power shoulde be no prejudice to the infinity of his wisedome though his wisedome be not his power Nor the infinitie of his goodnes any prejudice to the infinitie of his power and wisedome thoughe his power and wisedome and goodnes were different in themselves But to come nearer what thinke you of the Persons in the Trinitie The Father is the Father and neyther is he the Sonne nor the Holy Ghost will you herehence conclude that he is not infinite The Sonne is the Sonne but he is neyther the Father nor the Holy Ghost will you therfore say he is not infinite The Holy Ghost is the Holy Ghost but neyther the Father nor the Sonne will you hence inferre that he hathe limits and is not infinite And is it not confessed not only by great Schoolemen but even by our divines allso that the Sonne is produced of the Father per modum intellectus Is he not the wisedome of the Father and what difference betweene the wisedome of God and the understanding of himselfe And doe they not allso confesse that the H. Ghost proceedes from bothe per modum voluntatis And as we say Gods understanding is not his will though it be no different thing from his will and Gods will is not his understandinge thoughe it be no different thinge from his understandinge so we may adore the indivisible unitie of the Godhead notwithstanding the Trinity of the Persons thoughe we are not able to comprehended the mystery herof It is true our understanding is such as that oportet intelligentem phantasmata speculari imaginatio non transcendit continuum Yet notwithstandinge we atteyne by discourse to the acknowledgment of thinges immateriall as of our soules yea and of Angells yea and of the God both of men Angells yet not by materiall thinges as by the pictures of them as you phrasify it but rather as in the effects wherein as it were in glasses doe shine the causes of them Thus Aristotle from the motions of the heavens hathe inferred the existence of immateriall and abstract substances as the moovers of them And we commonly say that the World is as a glasse wherein the glory of God is represented His eternall power and Godhead being made manifest by his workes as the Apostle speakethe Rom. 1. 20. Of Gods illimited beinge we make no question but well we may question the soundnes of your arguments wherby you proove it as allso the soundnes of those consequences which you make from it And farre better it is to content our selves with the simplicitie of our Christian faithe in believinge of God what Gods word teachethe us then to depend upon weake reason for the confirmation therof For weake reasons doe rather betray a cause then justify it We believe that God is one and that there is no pluralitie of natures in him but only of Persons And we must take heede that the Metaphysicall extract of vis unita fortior which you speake of doe not so farre possesse us with the contemplation of Gods unity as to deny the Trinity And touchinge the attributes of God as neyther distinct from the essence of God nor from themselves we doe not much affect curiosity of demonstration but if any man voluntarily undertake such a taske we looke for substance of sound proofes and are not content to have our mouthes filled with emty spoones You seeme to gratify God with your hyperboles but surely he dothe not put us to tell any untruthes for him as man dothe for man to gratify him You enterteyne a conceyte of Gods power above all conceyte of infinite power of Gods wisedome above all conceyte of infinite wisedome of Gods goodnes above all conceyte of infinite
But in God his wisedome and power though different notions yet the substance of them is all one and precisely one in God The same is the proportion betweene infinite wisedome and power infinite as betweene sinite wisedome and power finite But finite wisedome doth not evacuate finite power therfore neyther doth infinite wisdome evacuate the necessitie of infinite power But to salve the matter you adde that it evacuates the necessitie of power distinct from it T is true indeede in God though the notions of wisedome and power are distinct yet the thinges signified are one essence in God And looke in what manner soever infinite wisedome doth inferre the indistinction of power with it after the same manner doth infinite power inferre the indistinction of wisedome with it For as much as God is essentially wise and powerfull and therefore infinite in both both indistinct in him whose essence is most simple and admitts no parts That wisedome is the father and power the Mother of all Gods workes is such an assertion that I doe not thinke you can finde any to father it or mother it but your selfe Will you not give us leave to accommodate it unto the workes of man and pronounce proportionably that his Wisedome is the Father and his power the Mother of his actions I take it to be absurd to inquire after a Father and Mother of workes save in case the workes themselfes doe admitt these different sexes as being male or female yet in such a case it hath a Father and Mother only in respect of univocall generations not equivocall And as for the proportion to justifie your allegorie we are content rather to expecte your pleasure to acquainte us with it then to trouble our witts aboute the deviseing of it Yet Philo the Platonicks are a rubbe in your way who as you say for I confesse I am not so well seene in them make knowledge the mother of all Gods workes To remoove this you acquainte us with your conjecturall dictates First that t is probable they dreamed of a created knowledge A most improbable conjecture that they should conceave that God brought his works to passe by the knowledg of a creature not by his owne knowledge Yet that creature by whose created knowledge God is conjectured to have wrought by in theire opinion being one of Gods workes how coulde that creatures knowledge be possibly accoumpted his mother in creation Your second conjecture is that under these termes they covered some transformed notion of the second person in the Trinitie Such a person more fitt by farre to be the Author of all Gods works in order under God the Father But equally improbable it is that this second person in Trinitie should be called by them The Mother of Gods workes Rather Sapientia in Latine and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Greeke being the feminine gender in this grammaticall notion they might accoumpt it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mother of all thinges created which yet is more then my learning will encourage me to ascribe unto them And Christ you deny not to be the wisedome of the Father but you adde that he is the wisedome personall but you speake here not of the wisedome personall but of the wisedome of the Godhead as it is essentially in the whole Trinitie Danaeus upon the 32. distinction of Peter Lumbards first booke of sentences professeth the Sonne to be called the wisedome of the Father for as much as he maketh the Father knowne unto us But though you speake of wisedome as it is essentiall and not personall yet you may remember that even the essentiall attributes are severally appropriated unto the Person by divines and in the course of this appropriation power is attributed to the Father Wisedome unto the Sonne and goodnesse unto the Holy Ghost How suitable this is of makeing wisedome the Father of Gods actions lett every intelligent Reader judge Agayne I finde that Gabriell Vasquius proposeth a question Whether the power of God doth any manner of way differ from Gods knowledge and his will And herein recites the opinion of Durand mainteyning that Gods wisedome and his will are but the remote causes of divine actions and that the power of God is the immediate cause of all The contrary wherunto he maynteynes namely that power or execution is needelesly attributed unto God as distinct from his knowledge and his will and this he delivers according to the doctrine of Scotus Bassolis Ferrariensis Caietan and Aquinas Neyther of these opinions as I conceave serves your turne in making wisedome the Father and power the Mother of Gods actions These flashes of conceyte are farre distante from the conceites of any Schoole divine that I am acquainted with 3. Wisedome you say as all agree is the excellency of knowledge from which it differs not save only in the dignitie or usefullnesse of matters known or in the more perfect manner of knowing them This promiseth no greate depth yet it passeth my slender capacitie to comprehend your meaning herein or to make any good sense therof You have so long inured your selfe to a phrase of speech and expression beyond the capacitie of your Reader that I knowe not whether at length you may attaine to such a facultie of speech as may transcende the Authours owne comprehension Who they are that agree in this that Wisedome is the excellency of knowledge I professe I know not And I woonder you proceede to discourse of wisedome without distinction seing it may be taken in some sense by Philosophers in which it is not taken by Canonicall writers Agayne in some sense it may be taken by Canonicall writers in which it is not taken by Philosophers There is a wisedome to salvation which the Scriptures communicate to the meanest of Gods children which kinde of Wisedome was nothing knowne to Philosophers And there is a Metaphysicall wisedome in knowing Ens quà ens where abouts Philosophers did busie theire braynes which you shall hardly finde notice taken of throughout the Scriptures Againe wisedome is sometimes taken for that knowledge that rest in contemplation sometimes t is taken for such a knowledge as is not commendable nor right unlesse it be referred to actiō Solomons Wisedome it seemes comprehended both For the Wisedome that he prayed for was the wisedome of government which respects action but God gave him other wisedome allso For this is reckoned up as a parte of his wisedome that he spake of trees from the Cedar tree that is in Lebanon even to the hyssope that springth out of the wall he speake allso of beast and of foules and of creepeing thinges and of fishes And in this respecte it seemes that hee excelled the wisedome of all the Children of the East and all the wisedome of Aegypt For of Moses it is sayde that hee was learned in all the wisedome of the Aegyptians Act. 1. 22. And this wisedome I conceave to have bene in sciences contemplative and not practicall Yet
suitable to the power of so infinite an Agent And consider finite thinges are able to produce finite thinges equall unto themselves why then may not God being infinite produce something that is infinite It may be answeared that the experience of producinge equalls to the producers themselves is true only in the way of generation And so God allso in the way of eternall and incomprehensible generation producethe a Sonne equall to himselfe yea the same with himselfe as touching his nature But this is grounded upon a mystery of faithe which hathe no evidence unto reason naturall For allthoughe by reason meditation on Gods woorkes we may atteyne to the knowledge of God as touching the unity of his nature yet can we not therby atteyne to the knowledge of God as touchinge the Trinity of persons Adde unto this that diverse have not only believed but undertaken to proove allso that God is able to produce that which is infinite in extension eyther in quantitie continuall or discrete And Hurtado de Mendosa a Spanishe Iesuite and a late Writer is most eager in the mayntenance of this So farre of are your propositions from caryinge evidence in their for heads Yet you suppose an argument which is very inconsequent For you suppose that whatsoever hath cause of beinge hath allso a beginninge of beinge and that in time But this is notably untrue unto us Christians For the Sonne and Second person in the Trinitie hathe a cause of his beinge to witt the Father Likewise the H. Ghost hathe not only a cause but causes of his beinge to witt bothe the Father and the Sonn for he proceedethe from them bothe yet hathe he not such beginninge of beinge as you speake of For bothe he and the Sonne are everlasting like unto the Father Your second reason is woorst of all as when you say For omnis causa est principium omne causatum est principiatum For in the meaning of this proposition causa and principium are taken for voces synonymae woordes of the same signification not signifying two thinges the one wherof is consequent unto the other And what sober Scholer would affirme that omnis causa est principium as principium signifiethe the beginninge of beinge wheras indeede it is the cause of beginninge of beinge to its effect rather then formally to be stiled the beginninge of beinge it selfe That which followethe of the limits of thinges more easily or more hardly discerned accordinge as the cause is founde to be preexistent in time or no is an assertion as wilde as the similitude wherby you illustrate it and all nothing to the purpose to proove that whatsoever hathe cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge thoughe still you proceede ambiguously without distinction eyther of beinge or of the limits therof For first where the cause is not preexistent in time as in things risinge by concomitance or resultance yet the effects are as easily seene to be limited as when the cause is preexistent in time as for example the light of the Sunne and the light of the candle which flowe from those bodies by naturall emanation was as easily seene to be limited the first time it was as after the light is a long time hid from us and afterward appeares agayne unto us Secondly what if the limits be not seene what I say is that to the purpose Angells are invisible yet we knowe their natures are limited Thirdly what thinke you of the World hathe it limits or no You thinke no doubt it hathe yet was not God the cause therof preexâ—stent in time but only in eternitie For before the World no time had any existence Agayne suppose the Wolrd had bene made from everlasting which some Scholemen have helde to be possible in this case God shoulde have no preexistence eyther as touching time actuall or as touchinge time possible Yet I hope that limits of the World even in that case had bene as discernable to Aristotle as nowe they are to you As for the similitude wherby you illustrate it that rather sheweth howe in such cases when effects doe rise by way of concomitance or resultance they are hardly distinguished from their causes then how their limits are hardly discernable Yet what shoulde moove you thus to amplify howe hard it is to discerne such effects from their causes I knowe not For what hardnes I pray is there in discerninge light to be different from the body of the Sunne that gives it or from the body of a Candle or of a Glowewoorme or of some kinde of rotten wood or from the scales of some fishes that cast light in the darke Yet is all this nothinge pertinent to the confirmation or illustration of the last proposition propounded by you Howe farre dependance upon a cause dothe inferre limits of beinge upon the thinge dependinge I have allready spoken What meant you to distinguishe of the consideration of effects and causes accordinge to the consideration of them eyther distinctly or in grosse unles it be to puzle the Reader as much as you confound your selfe when eftsoones you manifest that you speake of them bothe as they have causes which is to consider them only as effects For that notion alone hathe reference to a cause But whether this dothe inferre that they are limited I have allready therupon delivered my minde 3. Hence you proceede to the solution of newe problemes and that as a mere naturalist Why men in these dayes are not Gyants why Gyants in former times were but men And the reason you give is because the vigour of causes productive or conservative of vegetables of man especially from which he receavethe nutrition and augmentation is lesse nowe then it hathe bene at least before the flood The latter of your two questions is wilde For what doe we understand by Gyants but men of a Gyantlike stature is it a sober question to aske howe it commethe to passe that men of an huge stature are but men For suppose men were of never so vast a proportion of parts as great as the Image that Nabucliodonosor sett up in the playne of Dura or as great as the Colossus at Rhodes shoulde not men notwithstandinge be men still and neyther Angells nor beasts much lesse eyther inferior to the one or superior to the other If the heavens were infinite as some conceave that an infinite body may be made by God yet shoulde those heavens be heavens still and a body still Neyther dothe it followe that therfore those Gyants were men still because the matter of nutrition and augmentation was finite limited For thoughe they had bene turned into Woolves or other beastes the matter of nutrition had bene limited still yet in such a case they had ceassed to be men As touchinge the stature of men so much lessened in these dayes in comparison unto former times I no way like the reason therof assigned by you First because it caryethe no evidence with it you give
As if this consequence were evident of it selfe wheras on the contrary all Philosophy is against it For Aristotle maynteyned the World to be independent all others maynteyned the matter wherof the world was made to be independent Yet none conceaved that herehence it woulde followe that eyther of them was therfore illimited or at all illimited That Gods attributes are not really distinguished we all confesse you neede not have brought in Austins authoritie to justify this But you take upon you to confront Atheists by evidence of demonstration wherin you fayle very much For it will not followe that if these attributes be distinct among themselves or from the essence of God then the Divine essence is limited Like as on the contrary it will not followe that if the essence of something be limited the attributes therof must needes be distinct from the essence For the soule of man is limited yet some have maynteyned that the faculties of the soule are not really distinct from the essence of the soule as Scotus that by shrewde arguments And Zabarell professethe that Intellectus practicus is all one with Voluntas And all beit the power of God be distinct from the wisedome of God yet if bothe be acknowledged to be infinite each in his kinde what prejudice is this to the infinitenes of Gods essence Neyther will it followe that one attribute shall want so much of infinite beinge in his kinde as another hathe of proper being distinct from it consideringe that these notions are of different kindes As for example if a body as put the case the outward heaven were infinite there shoulde be bothe infinite lengthe and infinite breadthe and infinite thicknes neythers infinitenes being any whit prejudiciall to the infinitenes of the other because they are of different kindes And what colour of reason have you why infinitenes of power should prejudice the infinitenes of wisedome thoughe they were distinct really which yet we believe they are not And what thinke you if some attributes be founde answerable to personall distinctions in the Trinity Is it not commonly sayde that the second person in Trinity is the wisedome of the Father and commethe from the Father per modum intellectus and that the H. Ghost proceedeth from bothe per modum voluntatis But I have no edge to looke into the Arke or suffer my disputation to trenche upon these mysteries Yet I confesse thoughe the Father be not the Sonne nor the H Ghost c. Yet they are not really distinct one from the other In the Trinity there is alius alius not aliud aliud But you maynteyne that Gods power is his wisedome c. which yet notwithstanding I mislâ—ke not but only doe question the argument wherby you endeavour to proove it and to my judgement it seemes very superficiall But my comfort is this if you weakely maynteyne the nature of God you will as weakely oppose the grace of God Agayne I say it will not followe that if the severall beings of wisedome and power were distinct and not identically the same with the essence of God then the essence should not be infinite For it may be sayde that the essence is infinite in a beinge substantiall the power and wisedome of God are infinite in a being accidentall thoughe such as necessarily flowes from the nature of God Indeede if it were prooved that there is no accident in God then the case were cleere that these attributes were not distinct from the essence of God as indeede they are not but this is more then hitherto you have prooved And till you have prooved it they may be conceaved as distinct from the essence as before hathe bene sayde without any prejudice to the infinity of Gods essence or danger of exposing it unto nakednes for ought your discourse hathe as yet alleaged to the contrary 5. As for that definition of a thing absolutely infinite Infinitum est extra quod nihil est which you make so much reckonninge of I take it to be a vayne conceyte considering that the Philosophers who urged it never made any such construction of it as you doe but applyinge it only to materiall bodies of quantitie and extension maynteyned that in this sense the World was infinite But Aristotle dothe not approove of such a notion of infinite as nothinge agreable with the denomination the world being finite rather then infinite in his opinion and yet as they all thought without the world nothing was Yet some in my knowledge have avouched the world to be infinite thoughe I nothing commend eyther their learninge or their honestie herein And in those former dayes finitum infinitum were taken only for materiall differences of bodies nothing at all belonging to immateriall natures abstract from bodily or materiall extension of parts And Zabarell as I remember observes as much as touching the opinion of Aristotle upon the last chapters of the eighthe booke of Physicks And howe farre foorthe infinitum is to be acknowledged in nature Aristotle in his Physicks hath discoursed Now in the sense before spoken of it is very absurd to attribute such a definition of infinity unto God who is not only a Spirite but the Father of Spirits and incapable of parts much more of extension in any materiall manner But let the wordes be shaped after such a construction as you devise to make the definition suitable to the nature of God to witt as if he were such an entitie as comprehendes all entitie I say it is manifestly untrue For is not the World all the parts therof from Angells unto the basest woorme that creepethe and drop of mire or sparkle of fire or the least cinder are not all these something and that extra Deum For thoughe eminently they may be sayde to be in God yet undoubtedly they are extra Deum formally and to my understanding it is absurde to say they are identically conteyned in Gods essence It is true that Gods essence dothe represent them For God knowes them not but by knowing of himselfe and his essence and beinge of infinite power can produce any thing that implyes not contradiction I cannot represent a fitt comparison but such as the creature can affoard if you give me leave to make use of I say that every thing which a glasse represents is not identically conteyned in the glasse neyther is it true that whatsoever is knowne by the understanding of man or Angell is identically conteyned in the understanding or spirite of man or Angell As I have sayde so I say agayne I see no evidence of that consequence you make thus God is illimited therfore all thinges are in God and therfore allso all thinges that are in God or are attributed unto him are all one That which you adde when you say whatsoever is uncapable of limit is uncapable of division or numericall difference is very ambiguous and the ambiguitie being cleered will proove partly to be without all question and nothinge
God by in this argument of eternity as you did devise in the other of Immensitie That saying of TertulliaÌ„ you mention is no more appliable to Gods eternity as t is sayd he was to himselfe Time then to his immensity as 't is therein sayd he was unto himselfe a World And for ought I see God is so still and not onely was so before all things in as much as he hath no more need of them then before all things he had You say we cannot properly say God was in time before the world was made I say such a speech in my judgement seemes to be neyther proper nor improper but directly false even as false as to say God was in place before he made the world For before the world was made there was neyther time nor place Nowe he is in neyther as conteyned in them but only as conteyning both time and place which before the World absolutely were not at all consequently could not be conteyned by him I doe not think that Austin himselfe was conscious of any acutenes in inferring that God could not have bene before all times if he had alwayes bene in time for common sense doth justifie that that legge which was ever in the stockes was never out of the stockes But whereas you say that we believe God to be as truly before all times future as before all times past seeme to affect it as a subtlety of opinion herein I willingly professe that if it be a subtlety it is of so subtle a sense as quite passeth mine intelligence I had thought it might be avouched of every thing that is past that it is before all times to come And that all future things are behind the things that are past Neyther had I thought any reason needfull to be given of this because common sense I think doth justifie it Yet you seeme to make this a peculiar propertie of God that like as he is before all times past so allso he is before all times to come Yet I gesse at your meaning For we now existent allbeit we are before the things that are to come yet it is not necessary that we should be after them But God as he is before all so if it please him he may be after all For God is that which was is is to come that is which shall be and that for ever of himselfe Now this phrase to be after all in a sublimate streyne of conceyt attributed unto God is more truly and perfectly to be accoumpted his being before all then after all in your opinion as it seemes like as the Heavens invironning the Earth though they seeme to sense to be under the Earth and under our Antipodes yet indeed they are above them So God in being after all things future is more properly and truly to be accoumpted before them This mystery I seeme to find by your subsequentd iscourse and I wonder what you meane to carry your selfe so in the cloudes when you might have exprest your selfe playnly And surely it is no glory to affect a lofty understanding of your owne phrase above the apprehension of your Reader when your termes are not sufficient to expresse your meaning This is to equivocate like the Iesuites Of that conceyt of yours I will prepaÌ„re my selfe to consider against the time I shall arrive to your more full discourse thereof in the paâ—s subsequent of this Chapter In the next place you propose a conclusion which is this His eternity then is the inexhaustible founteyne or Ocean from which time or Duration successive doth perpetually flow But I can neither justifie this inference nor the truth of the proposition inferred For I know not from what premises of yours it can be inferred That which went immediately before was this God is before all times future as well as all times past Now to inferre that God was before all time therfore all time flowes from his eternity is no good consequence You might as well argue thus God was before all place therfore all places flowes from Gods eternity We our selfes are before all times that are to come but herehence it followes not that all times to come flow from our eternity or from us Suppose Angells had bene made before the World yet would it not thence followe that the World did flow from them Now for the proposition it selfe inferred it is subject to exceptions divers wayes The phrase to flow savoureth of a natural necessary emanation so much the more when it is resembled by the flowing of water from a founteyne But nothing created doth in such sort flow from God Naturall emanations from God are not to be found but in God and that in respect of the Persons the Sonne being naturall and necessarily begotten of the Father the H. Ghost naturally and necessarily proceeding both from the Father the Sonne Againe the water that floweth from the founteyne on from the Ocean is of the same nature with the founteyne on with the water of the Ocean so is not time of the same nature with eternity from whence you say it flowes Agayne it is untrue that eternity produceth time or duration of things created for the duration of them is nothing els but the continuance of their existence Therefore looke what produceth the things themselves maynteynes them being produced from thence they are to be accoumpted to have their beginning Now it is the power and will of God wherby things are created and preserved not the eternity of God By the Word of the Lord were the Heavens made all the hoast of them by the breath of his mouth We no where read that by the eternitie of God all things were made Angells and Men Heaven and Earth And so likewise as by his word he made all things so by the power of his mighty word he supports all things Heb. 1. And therefore all things both touching theyr being and duration depend upon the mighty word of God this we have ground for But that they depend upon his eternity we have no ground to affirme though it is true that both God and his Word and Spirit are eternall otherwise he could not be the Creator of the World Vpon the back of this you come in with a new Paradox namely that From all eternity there was a possibility for us to be as if it were possible for a creature to be from all eternity Yet I know some Scholemen have maynteyned it as what will not wild witts dare to undertake but doth it therefore become a Divine to suppose it without all proofe I hold it to be impossible and Durands reasons to the contrary are more pregnant in my judgement then any that are brought for it to witt that then yeares and months dayes and hours should be equall for each of them even yeares should be infinite and dayes and houres yea and minutes past should be but infinite whence he inferres that to every minute
judgement then invention though formally it is a quality of the will as all morall vertues are and not any habitt of the understanding But suppose he miscarry in all then a mans patience must needes bidd farewell to invention to support it and it is high time to relye upon judgement Yet I trust patience which must have her perfect worke Iam. 〈◊〉 may have course in this case allso though it be an hard matter you say to keepe from fowle play if the game whereat a man shootes be fayre and good and most of his stringes allready be broken It is good they say to have two stringes to a mans bowe A vertuous man hath more then two you suppose as much for you suppose many to be broken yet not all And surely vertue is not vertue if it keepe not from foule play The Stoickes mainteyned that a vertuous man might descend into Phalaris bull without the interrupâ—ion of his happines We Christians are taught and disciplined to rejoyce even in tribulation and marke well our bow stringes because tribulation worketh patience and patience experience and experience hope and hope maketh not ashamed because the love of God is shed in our hearts by the Holy Ghost that is given unto us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sayth S. Paule I am able to endure all thinges by the power of Christ that enables me and herupon he exhorts Timothy to be partaker of the affliction of the Gospell to witt by the power of God The power of Christ and the power of God are two such stringes to our blowe of patience as can never be broke We know his grace to be sufficient for us and when his power is made perfect in our weakenes we shall have cause to rejoyce in our infirmities For when we are weake then are we strong In a mans owne strength no man shall be strong But blessed art thou o people who art the saved of the Lord who is the sheild of thy strength and the sword of our glory He can make us to be as a Gyants sword and he is a wall of fire round about Ierusalem All that sight against it theyr fleshe shall consume away though they stand on theyr feete and theyr eyes shall consume in theyr holes and theyr tongues shall consume in their mouthes But to returne The contingency of the issue is within the horizon of our fore sight As for horizons of contrivances let such as fancy them make themselfes merry with them All this while the matter of your discourse being of Gods infinite wisedome and to that purpose preluding of the imperfect wisedom of man I have wondred what you meant to enter upon the consideration of patience unlesse it were to prepare your reader therby with a more willing entertaynment of your discourse But now I perceive you desire to gratify God with a commendation of his patience which that it might seeme the more congruous you pretend that the infinitenes of his wisedome carries him herunto And this patience consists in bearing with sinners which as you say every minute of theyr life 's violently thwart and crosse some particular meanes ordeyned for his glory and theyr good Gods patience in forbearing us and our sinnes in provoking him are greate enough in theyr proper colours they neede no inconsiderate amplification to bombast them by saying that every minute of life we violently crosse them For surely eyther you must suppose man every minute of his life to be waking or els you delivered this as it were slumbering But to touch upon something more materiall I pray remember that you treate of the wisedome of God as exercised in intending a right end and prosecuting a right choyse of meanes for the effecting of it Now would you be so good as to consider what is the end that God aymes at in this and particularly whether it be all one in bearing thus with all and that of an ambiguous nature thus that in case they doe at length repent and turne unto God he may magnify his mercy in theyr salvation if still they stand out and dye in impenitency he may magnify himselfe in theyr just condemnation And withall I pray consider whether this be the course of any wisedom finite or infinite in God or man to intend ends after this ambiguous manner I mention no other end of Gods patience and long suffering because I know no other end agreable to your opinion That which followeth tendes rather to the commendation of the goodnes of Gods will then the wisedome of his understanding therfore so much the more heterogeneall and extravagant as when you say out of the Apostle that He is light and in him is no darknes and that He distingvisheth the fruites of light from fruits of darknes before they are even before he gave them possibility of being An amplification partly idle partly unsound For God must eyther distinguish them before they are or not at all For there is no change in his understanding unsound in saying God gives them possibility of being The being of things is from the gift of God but not the possibility of being But you proceede in the same stringe As impossible it is for his will to decline from that which he disernes truly good as for his infinite essence to shrinke in being God indeede cannot shrinke for he is indivisible and you well know what thereupon you have wrought for the amplification of his power in the former chapter But I would you had told us what is that truly good discerned by God from which you say his will cannot decline I cannot be satisfied with your concealments in this particular What I pray is more truly good then the setting forth of Gods glory eyther in his patience and long suffering or in ought else whatsoever And is it impossible thinke you for Gods will to decline this If so then it were impossible that God should decline the making of the World Is not this a faite way to Atheisme Many thinges you say may and every thing that is evill doth fall out against Gods will but nothing without his knowledge or besides his expectation In Scripture phrase we find that many thinges fall out not onely besides but contrary to Gods expectation as Esa. 5. where God complayneth of the house of Israel that while he looked for grapes they brought forth wilde grapes And Arminius urgeth this as if it were spoken in a proper speeche By the proposition in this place it must be sayde that God expects sowre grapes as well as sweete for otherwise they shoulde fall out besides his expectation which you here deny So then God did expect that Shimei should rayle on David that Absolon should defloure his Fathers Concubines that Iudas should betray his Master that David should defile his neighbours wife and cause hir husband to be slayne by the sword of children of Ammon and that the Iewes should crucify the Holy Sonne
as by those Christians that doe believe it And as for the making of the world it is in holy Scripture the language of God attributed to the word of God to the breath of God to the wisedome of God to the power of God to the counsell of God but never that I know ascribed to the goodnesse of God And it had need of explication to shew how Gods goodnesse is communicated unto all much more how it is communicated unto a stone yet the earth is filled with his goodnesse in as much as God provides for every thing that which is good for it so that whatsoever we partake of for our comfort wee call it Gods goodnesse for as much as things which are good to us are derived to us from God and therein we have a taste of his goodnesse towards us in that he doth good unto us Your last position I have heretofore spoken of and shewed the incongruity of it That which is good and that whereunto it is good must be different but the entitie of any thing is not different from it selfe and therefore it cannot be good unto it selfe as you affirme 8. God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 serus irarum slow to wrath even against sinners that dishonour him to his face But to say hee is never swayed to sudden revenge is a more bold assertion then sound Did not Zimri and Cosbi perish in their incestuous act and give up both lust and ghost together without leisure to enjoy their sinne much lesse respite for repentance Perhaps you will say their persons were formerly forborne notwithstanding former sinnes though the vengeance of God cannot be denied to be most sudden So perished Herod in his pride and Balthasar in his revellings and the Israelites in the wildernesse while the meat was in their mouthes and the delicate flesh of Quailes lay betweene their teeth the heavy wrath of God came upon them and before they could swallow their sweet morsels sent them to the graves of lust to bee swallowed by them Againe Sodome and Gomorrah were consumed with fire from heaven were not some children in their mothers wombs some hanging at their mothers breasts some newly come to the use of reason all consumed to ashes and made an example of Gods wrath and suffered the vengeance of eternall fire as Inde speaketh Here is no forbearance of divers particular persons so it was in the daies of Noah so shall it bee at the comming of the Sonne of man for while they shall say peace and safetie sudden destruction shall come upon them as sorrow upon a woman in travaile and they shall not escape The difference you make betweene man and God I like well man by forbearance may bereave himselfe of power to execute vengeance God cannot and this is a good reason of his forbearance towards the verie reprobates but towards his elect a power exercised in another kind yet a power too namely to sanctifie the consideration of his forbearance to bring them unto repentance as also a power to provide for satisfaction to be made for their sinnes by the blood of his Sonne A sentence related out of the booke of Wisedome ch 12. 15 16 you say is canonicall although the Author bee not a distinction that I never read nor heard of before And if the truth of a sentence be sufficient to make it canonical the canonicall Scriptures shal be multiplied unreasonably not out of the book of Wisdome only but out of the rest of the works of Philo the Iew and Iosephus too yea and out of Senecaes workes and Plutarchs morals not to speake of Plato and Aristotle or your Plotinus But let us consider this canonicall sentence you speake of and weigh the truth of it in the ballance of the Sanctuarie I pray wherein had our Saviour Christ and the Sonne of God deserved to be punished And did not God thinke you thinke it agreeable to his power to condemne him notwithstanding his innocencie and his fervent prayers to be delivered from that cup but with submission to the will of his Father I pray consider the martyrdome of Gods Saints were their punishmēts according to their deserts Nay what thinke you is it not agreeable to Gods power to annihilate the holiest man that ever was yet wee doe not say that God condemnes any man that hath not deserved to be punished the Sonne of God and our Saviour onely excepted But the desert of eternall death is not onely in sinne actuall but in sinne originall also which Pelagius did not say Arminius doth not whether you doe or no I know not the latter clause which is this Because thou art the Prince of all it maketh thee to be gracious to all makes a shew to plead for universall grace I cannot tell whether you licke your lips at this yet the author of the booke could not be ignorant what a difference as touching the participation of his grace God had put betweene the Iewes and the Gentiles for He had shewed his word unto Iacob his statutes and ordinances unto Israel But hee had not dealt so with every nation neither had the Heathen knowledge of his lawes And the Apostle who undoubtedly was canonicall to speake in your owne phrase hath plainly professed that God hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth And as for the reason here used drawne from this that he is Lord of all the Apostle himselfe taketh notice of it but in a different manner Rom. 10. 12. There is no difference between the Jew and the Grecian for he that is Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him and who are they that call upon him but they that beleeve in him for it followeth How can they call upon him in whom they have not beleeved Yet like as it is the part of parents not onely to bring children forth but after to provide for their bringing up so God doth not onely make things but also preserveth them and for their preservation causeth the Sunne to shine and his raine to fall as well on the wicked as on the just alwaies provided that even this providence of God is to be dispensed of no other right but meerly according to the good pleasure of his owne will For what grace was shewed to infants either unborne or hanging at their mothers breasts which perished in the flood and in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah by fire from heaven and therefore though there were sixscore thousand persons in Ninivie that could not discerne betweene the right hand and the left and also much cattell yet God was not bound to spare them And can you doubt but as many as these if not in Sodome and Gomorra yet at least or rather many more perished in Noahs flood Yet by the way this sparing of the Ninivites was but as touching salvation temporall not spirituall You have but trifled a long time now you beginne to bee serious yet in little or no
hath taken up the hearts and tongues of his Prophets and Apostles to deliver his oracles unto his people And though God is not bound to reveale himselfe unto any yet if it be his pleasure to reveale himselfe he is not capable of any such inducement to deliver an untruth as man is man may advantage himselfe by untruth when by other meanes hee cannot it is not so with God who needs not untruth thereby to advantage himselfe But whereas you say that Gods veracity is coeternall to his essence in my judgement it is a very wilde phrase For veracity hath no place where speech is not and seeing that God speakes not but by his Ministers it followeth that before the world was he never spake at all and seeing he could have forborne the making of the world hee might have never spoken at all so farre off from truth is it that veracity which supposeth speech is coeternall to his essence For if speech be not coeternall to his essence how can truth of speech or truth in speech be coeternall to his essence Yet veracity taken fundamentally as a disposition in God to deliver truth whensoever he is pleased to cause speech or to speake by his Ministers so it is all one with the nature of God and no marvell if in this sense it bee coeternall to his essence Intemperancy and consequently the opposite vertue of temperance and chastity is found onely in bodies not in spirits and as it is no commendation to the nature of an Angell to bee chaste so neither is it to the nature of God You say God could not give a law for the authorizing of promiscuous or preposterous lust Yet it is manifest that promiscuous lust in bruit beasts in all sorts hath its course without any transgression and it being a course of nature in them it cannot bee denied to bee a worke of God And Suarez though hee takes upon him to maintaine a tenet like unto yours namely that God cannot dispense as touching his morall law yet he professeth that God may make it lawfull for one man to have many wives And I pray you why may hee not as well make it lawfull for one woman to have many husbands and what then I pray you will this want of promiscuous and preposterous lust It may be plurality of husbands to one wife may bring a greater inconvenience in the course of nature as touching the corrupting of conceptions and hindring the course of generation then plurality of wives but how in morality it should be more intolerable then the other I know not And withall we reade of Massalina that notwithstanding all her luxurious courses this way yet not onely brought forth children but also those like unto her husband also and being demanded how that came to passe made this answer Non nisi plâ—na nave vectorem fero For the brother and sister to know one another carnally we count it incest yet unlesse Adams sonnes had maried with their sisters it was impossible there should have beene any propagation of mankinde And in like sort Abraham is supposed to have beene the Vncle of Sarah and doe you thinke that holy Patriaroh would have continued in so sinfull a course after his calling had it beene such that God could not any way have made it lawfull You proceed and tell us That to legitimate violence or entitle oppression unto the inheritance bequeathed to conscionable and upright dealing is without the prerogative of Omnipotencie and in stead of giving a reason of your opinion you expresse it in 〈◊〉 double phrase as if you would make up in figures what is wanting in argument and say It cannot be ratisied by any Parliament of the Trinity and indeed I read in Virgil of a Parliament sometimes called in heaven by Iupiter but I doubt you are of Ovids fault who as Seneca writes knew not when it was well But you overdoe onely in words and underdoe in argument and as if you had not phrasified enough you further tell us that The practice or countenancing of these and the like are evill not in us onely to whom they are forbidden but so evill in themselves that the Almighty could not but forbid and condemn them as profest enemies to his most sacred Majestie Thus to phrasifie with you is to fetch Divinity from the fountaine and not from the trenches though you bring neither evidence of Scripture nor evidence of reason to justifie it That which you doe bring such as it is is rather from reason then from Scripture And if it be so manifest in reason as you seeme to signifie the lesse need I should thinke there was of forbiddng it yet you say God could not but forbid it And where I pray must he forbid it and by what law Is it by the law revealed in his word or by the law of nature As for the law revealed in his word that was communicated onely to the Iewes and why God was necessitated to forbid it to one small nation and not to another I can devise no reason The law of nature I confesse is generall forbidding such things as are knowne to be evill by the light of nature but doth it teach that God cannot legitimate any such actions Iephte thought otherwise as appeares by the message hee sent to the King of Ammon Wilt thou not possesse that which Chemish thy god giveth thee to possesse So whomsoever the Lord our God shall drive out from before us them will we possesse And it is observable that whereas in other particulars you have derived the absolute unlawfulnesse of such actions from the incongruitie of them to the nature of God as namely because he is true therefore he hateth falshood because pure therefore he hateth lust wheras to touch one thing more by the way that was omitted it is well knowne that God is as pure from lawfull lust as from lust unlawfull here in this place you make no mention at all of any condition in God whereunto the practice of violence should bee incongruous but in place of reason which you bring not so much as in shew you make us amends with variety of phrases Yet what more violent act then for the father to cut the throat of his most innocent childe and you well know God sent Abraham that holy Patriarch in such an errand as this Samsons faith is commended by S. Paul his first rising against the Philistins was as the subject rising against their Princes as the men of Iudah signified unto him saying Knowest thou not that the Philistins are rulers over us and thereupon they were content to deliver him into their hands to manifest themselves to be no confederates with him in this insurrection Afterwards we reade how he died flaming with desire of revenge upon the Philistins and that for his two eyes and to the end he might be revenged on them was content to be his owne assassinate and all this in an holy manner
And if to inflict the torments of hell upon these or these for their sinnes be to hate them surely to intend to inflict the torments of hell upon them for their sinnes is to hate them And seeing God from everlasting intended to doe whatsoever hee doth in time it followeth that from everlasting hee did hate them Yet this truth you dare secretly to outface without taking any notice of it But here you argue well let us consider it For men to blesse God and to curse men doth argue a dissolution of that internall harmony which should be in the humane nature therfore for God to hate some men and to love others would necessarily inferre a greater distraction in the indivisible essence besides the contradiction which it implies to insinite goodnes This latter clause is thrust in to make weight and to turne the scale but being nothing save meere breath and aire makes it rather lighter Like as when the Spaniard to make his state weigh as much as the state of France and finding that Spaine and other places would not serve the turne clapt in Millane and Naples into the ballance whereupon it was found well the lighter Yet I am content to consider that also in its turne But first of the argument My answer hereunto is twofold First as touching the antecedent I say and have already shewed that the passage of Iames whereat you aime proceeds of cursing onely as it signifies cursed speaking not as it signifies the pronouncing of a curse which may be in an holy manner it being cleere that both God and man both God the Father and God the Sonne may and have pronounced curses in an holy manner without giving evidence of any dissolution of that internall harmony which should be in them and yet such a dissolution is to be acknowledged to have its place more or lesse in the best of men in this world for they have flesh in them as well as spirit but neither is nor can be in God Secondly I deny the consequence for it doth not follow that because it is not lawfull for man to curse therefore it is not lawfull for God to curse Are not Devills accursed At the day of judgement shall not our Saviour pronounce that sentence on thousands Go ye cursed into everlasting fire And why should this argue any distraction in God more then in a Iudge that absolveth some and condemneth others So our Saviour at the day of judgement will say unto some Go yee cursed into everlasting fire unto others Come ye blessed of my Father receive the kingdome prepared for you from the beginning of the world If you do not speake of blessing and cursing in the way of execution of judgement and reward what meane you to walke thus in the cloud of generalities If you speake not of execution but of intention as God doth execute judgements for sinne and rewards of obedience so doth he from everlasting intend both the one and the other as it is impossible it should be otherwise Your selfe acknowledging in words Gods decrees to be eternall And doth it not become God from everlasting to intend to proceed in the day of judgement as before spoken of As great a divine as you are taken for I much doubt you little understand the state of the question wherein you seem to oppose some body for I cannot be perswaded you doe wilfully dissemble it But there is another course of Gods providence in another matter and farre different from the execution of punishment and reward maintained by your opposites and impugned by you but you are loath to bee seene in your opposition therein and to have your opinion knowne particularly for feare lest the common voice should cry shame upon you as upon a profest Arminian a manifest impugner of the soveraignty of God in shewing mercy on whom he will and denying mercy to whom he will and so hardening whom he will Now here you have no comparison to helpe your selfe withall drawne from the condition of man For in mans power it is not either to give grace or to deny it But to the contrary wee finde that Superiours have the dispensation of favours and gratifications in their power which they enlarge or restraine at their pleasure and extend to whom they will How much more shall the Lord of all take liberty unto himselfe to have mercy on whom hee will have mercy and to shew compassion on whom hee will shew compassion yea and as to have mercy on whom hee will so to harden whom he will also and that I hope without contradiction to his goodnesse which you besides the word of God cast in to outface the proclamation of God himselfe For as Gods goodnesse did not binde him to make the world so neither doth it binde him to save the world And as when he made the world he made as many creatures as he thought good so in saving the world he saves as many creatures as he thinkes good both amongst men and Angels by giving grace to whom he will and denying grace to whom he will When you say that To love the worke of his owne hands is more essentiall to him that made all things out of his meere love then it is unto the fire to burn matter combustible This speech of yours is a grosse unsavory speech transforming God into a naturall and necessary agent for it is well knowne that the fire burnes naturally and necessarily And if God doth more essentially love his creatures then he must naturally and necessarily preserve them in being and cannot destroy them And because it is out of the same love that you derive the creation of the world it followeth that God was necessitated by the necessity of nature to make the world and consequently that the world was everlasting without beginning and so shall continue without end Behold the flowers that grow in the paradise of your contemplation fitter for Aristotles Physicks or Metaphysicks then for the meditations of a Christian Divine as being fit onely to make a nosegay for the Devill The love of God towards himselfe is essentiall towards his creatures is meerely accidentall Hee needed not to have made them neither is it any whit necessary that he should preserve them And as creation and preservation are attributed of extrinsecall denomination unto God so is his love towards his creatures also Neither was it out of love to the creature that he made the world but out of love to himselfe as who is the end of all For both Salomon professeth that God made all things for himselfe and Saint Paul likewise gives us to understand that as things are from him so all things are for him also But Gods love is infinite therefore say you it extends to all seeing all are lesse then infinite A proper argument and as well suitable unto your text which undertaketh onely to shew that Gods love is infinite to mankinde And this argument proves