Affection pre-requisit to Faith derogates nothing from it's Certainty but is perfectly consistent with the Evidence of those Motives which are to generate it and that the Governours and Officers of the Church though proposing the most convincing reasons in the world for the Authority conveying down Faith to us can prevail nothing unless the Great Governour of the world and Giver of every good gift by his peculiar Power plant antecedently in their hearts this good disposition and prepare terram bonam that their endeavours may take effect and the Sowers Seed take root no more than Paul though miraculous could convert all that saw his Miracles or heard his Preaching but only such whose hearts God open'd as he did Lydia's It appears also by the same discourse how the Acts of Faith are free that is as depending on this pious disposition of the Will which sets the Understanding on work to consider the Motives and so produce them The whole Humane Action is free because the Will orders it though she do not produce it all or though freedom be not formally in the Body so the Act of Faith is free because it is order'd by the Will which is free though no freedom be found in the Understanding which is incapable of such a qualification but pure necessity of assenting when the Motives are seen to be Conclusive No need then is there upon any account of a pious disposition of the Will to peece out the defect of the Reasons why we believe and to oblige the Understanding to assent beyond the Motive that is assent to a degree beyond what it had reason to do An Impossibility in Humane Nature rightly and connaturally govern'd and I much fear no small disgrace to Christian Faith considering the obstinate bent of the Church's Adversaries to confound the Speculative Thoughts of Divines explaining Faith and its Grounds less carefully with their Sentiments issuing naturally from them as Christians nay with the Doctrin of the Catholick Church it self What can revincingly be reply'd to an Atheist objecting on this occasion that Christians make the Evidence of Faith's grounds stand need to be pecc'd out by Obscurity our Knowledg of them by Ignorance and the Rationality of them by Will without Reason that is Willfulness Wherefore I carnestly obtest and beseech even per viscera Christi all who shall read this Treatise and yet have Speculatively held and maintain'd this Opinion I here impugn for practically and as Christians they hold the contrary Conclusion seriously to weigh the Point once more and not to obstruct the Resolving Christian Faith into immoveable Principles or absolutely Certain Grounds by an Opinion onely sprung from the conceited difficulty in making out those Grounds to be Impossible to be False which yet themselves to a man profess and hold as they are Christians I humbly beg leave to propose to them these few Considerations First 'T is Certain Faith is no less Faith or an Assent upon Authority though that Authority be demonstrated to be Infallible but on the contrary that 't is both firmer and more rational even for that very regard Secondly 'T is Certain that the Generality of Christians hold their Faith to be True or Impossible to be False that is 't is True to us and withall perfectly Rational and consequently that its Grounds or Principles are so able to ascertain it that they place it beyond Possibility of Falshood Thirdly 'T is no less evident that an inclination or motion of the Will being of such a nature that it can have neither Truth nor Falshood in it can be no Rational Principle or Ground of our Assents or Acts of Faith that is apt to ascertain them or indeed apt to establish the Truth of any Tenet Fourthly That 't is most evident from my foregoing Discourse that an antecedent pious disposition of the Will is still requisite to Faith notwithstanding the perfect Conclusiveness of the Grounds on which 't is built and that all Acts of Faith depend on this quoad exercitium at least as the Schools speak which in the Judgment of many Divines is sufficient Fifthly That 't is the common Opinion of the solidest Divines that Faith consists with Evidence in the Attester Sixthly That Faith or a firm and immoveable Assent upon Authority is not thoroughly rational and by consequence partly faulty if the Motives be not alone able to convince an Understanding rightly dispos'd without the Will 's Assistance for what can be said for that degree of Assent which is beyond the Motive or Reason Is it not evident from the very Terms that 't is Irrational or without any Reason But the worst is that whereas all good Christians hold their Faith Impossible to be False or judge their Acts of Faith Immoveable Assents these Authors as Speculaters put all the Reasons for Faith to leave it still Possible to be False and make this pious Affection the onely thing which elevates it to Impossibility of Falshood which is vastly higher in point of Certainty as if a rational Creature not deviating totally from its nature but acting according to right Reason ought therefore to hold a Point Impossible to be False because it self has an Affection or as we say a great mind it should be so Seventhly This Assertion renders the Impossibility of Faith's Falshood not only unmaintainable as hath been now shown but also unperswadable to others for how shall I be able to give account to others that my Affection which works this Perswasion in me is rational and not apt to mislead me when as the very Position obliges me to profess the contrary and to grant that this Affection pushes forward my Understanding to assent beyond the reason it has that is as to this degree in my Assent which is no small one since it raises it from judging Faith possible to be false to judge it Impossible to be such without reason Or will not this Speculative Tenet seem to force this Inference that the Grounds of Faith as to its most intrinsecal consideration viz. the Impossibility of its Falshood is made by this Doctrin full as dark a hole as 't is to alledge the private Spirit Nor can the Reverence due to the Divine Authority suffice for such an Effect both because 't is Impossible God should will that Mankind for his sake should act irrationally as also because there is no poison in the world so pestilent as an Errour abetted by the most Sacred Patronage of God's Authority as the Histories of the Fanaticks in all ages and our home-bred experience testifies Whence that very Reverence to the Divine Authority obliges us to be so sure 't is engag'd for a Truth e're we admit it for such that we may securely though with an humble truth say with Richardus de Sancto Victore Domine si error est quod credimus à te decepti sumus so that there is indeed no greater injury and abuse to the Divine Name imaginable than to hazard the making it
is a crooked path and a False Light leading it into Errour What therefore they are to do in the circumstances they have brought themselves into is to show that they destroy not the Truth of Faith that is the Nature of Faith it self and the Nature of the Way to that Truth or the Rule of Faith by putting them both possible to be False I saw they did and therefore was oblig'd to begin my discourse higher and to Settle the Existence of Faith by removing the possibâ—lâ—ty of it's Falshood that so it might be shown able to bear the having a Rule which while it was in the tottering and uncertain condition to which Mr. T. and Mr. St. had reduc't it that is in a Possibility of being all a Ly and indeed is an Actuality of being as to us not-Truth but at most a great Likelihood it was utterly incapable of Since therefore in the right method of discoursing An est ought to antecede Quid ests they have lost their right to be discours't with about the Quid est of the Rule of Faith or what is that Rule till they can justify themselves not to have destroy'd the very An est or Existence of Rule and Faith both with which Mr. T. is now challeng'd from his own words and Mr. St. from his abetting him and espousing his Patronage Both Nature therefore and Art excuse me from replying to Mr T. and Mr. St. where the just Laws of severe and rigorous Reason exactly obseru'd and so 't is onely a voluntary Courtesy not an obligatory duty to afford them or any other Writers thus Principled any Answer at all or to admit them to a dispute about this Point What is the Rule of Faith Lastly hence is inferr'd that a Conclusive Method or short way of ending all Controversies between the Catho lik Church and all her relinquishers is settled by this Doctrin For if right Faith must be Impossible to be False to us or to the Generality of Christians that is if the Motives to embrace Christianity must be thus firm then 't is Evident that that Party whose Writers renounce the having any such Motives in case those writers speak the sense of that Party is not rightly Christian or truly Faithfull but a distinct Sect from the body of right Christians or it being most unjust that the discourses of private Speculaters should be pinn'd upon the whole party if they write things deniable by that party in case any such Party should think fit to disclaim such Writers as private discoursers and their Tenet of Christian Faith's not being Absolutely Certain which they are at liberty to do and set some other writers to maintain the opposit Thesis it will quickly be seen whether they are able to bring Infallible Grounds of Faith I mean any Authority conveying Christ's Faith down to us infallibly which they must bring if they will prove Faith Impossible to be False distinct from what the Catholik Church holds to and which themselves renounc't when they forsook her Communion But that there are any such Grounds as these that is Grounds Inerrably bringing down the Knowledg of Christs Faith to us that is a Rule of Faith Impossible to be False to us I could never yet discern by the carriage writings or Discourse of any Party that dissented from the Catholick Church to be their Tenet If then it be a most Certain Truth that Faith must be Impossible to be false as I hope I have abundantly concluded 't is also most Certain that those who deny they have such a Faith do by that very denyal confess they have no True Faith nor are truly Faithfull nor of the True Catholick Church Postscript THus Reader thou seest I still endeavour candidly to put Controversy home as far as my discourse can carry it and that I have resum'd here all the scatter'd ends of voluminous disputes into one point By which means the sincere Protestant and all others out of the Church may see at a short view what they are to do If they look into their own breasts as they are Professors of Christianity they will find it writ there in Capitals That CHRISTIAN FAITH CANNOT BE AN ILLUSION ' OR FALSHOOD Also that Faith is to be held by them True and that they ought to suffer all Persecutions and Death it self for the professing it to be such This found and duly reflected on the next thing to be done is that they press their Learned men by whom they are led to shew them by such Grounds as their separation from the Catholick Church permits them to hold that is by their Grounds that Christian Faith is Impossible to be False If they can as hitherto they have told us they cannot then their Adherents may in reason hope well of their own condition till they see those attempts evidently shown invalid But if they profess still they cannot and that Faith needs no such Certainty then not onely the natural dictamen of Christianity in their own breasts ought to make them distrust the Principles of their Party found to be so destructive to Christian Faith but also I shall hope there are some Proofs in this foregoing Treatise which they will judg require an Answer I expect my Answerer will sow together many thin Rhetorical fig-leaves to cover the Deformity of that abominable Thesis that Faith may be False which to propose undisguiz'd were too openly shameful But I hope thou wilt be able to discern their sense through their Rhetorick and heedfully to mark with a stedfast Eye that in how quaint and elegant phrases soever they cloak their Tenet yet the genuin downright and natural sense of the position they go about to defend will still be this The mysteries of Christian Faith may all be so many Lies for any thing any man living absolutely knows and the whole Body of Christian Doctrine a Bundle of Falshoods I expect also many plausible Instances and pretended Parallels of the sufficiencie of inferiour degrees of Certitude for such and such particular ends But what thou art to consider is whether those Ends be Parallel or equal to that highest End and Concern of Christian Faith These things I expect but I expect not that so much as one Principle that will be found to deserve that name will ever be thought prudent to be produc't to justify a Tenet every way so Irrational and unprincipled or rather destroying the Certainty and consequently the Essence and Nature of the Best Body of Principles that either Nature or the Author of Nature and Grace himself ever instill'd into Mankind Lastly I beseech thee to obtain for me if thou canst that if any think fit to reply to this Treatise they would be perswaded to set aside all WITTY PREVARICATION and ELEGANT DROLLERY the two chief and in a manner onely Sticklers in the pretended Answer to Sure-Footing and beginning with First Principles to draw thence Immediate Consequences as I have constantly endeavour'd in this Discourse By
FAITH VINDICATED FROM Possibility of Falshood OR The Immovable Firmness and Certainty of the Motives to Christian Faith Asserted Against that Tenet which denying Infallibility of Authority subverts Its Foundation and renders It Uncertain Desistes adversus alios dicere caeterùm ita pro Veritate loquêris ut ea quae dicuntur argui refellique non possint Dionys. Areopag Epist. 6. LOVAIN A. D. MDCLXVII Introduction THough nothing be more natural than that all who deny the Certainty of the Rule of Faith should deny also the Certainty of Faith it self since the Certainty of this later depends on the Certainty of the former and it is impossible the Conclusion should be held Certain unless the Premisses be held so too yet the conceit which the Generality of those who call themselv's Faithful or Christian have of their Faith and consequently the nature of that kind of Assent is such that nothing can sound more horridly and blasphemously to their ears than bluntly and without disguise to say That all their Faith may possibly be a Ly for any thing any man living absolutely knows For a certain goodness of Rational Nature has fixt this apprehension in them that since the World is made for the Salvation of Mankind it is unsuitable to the Wisdom and Goodness of Providence which has furnisht us with means of Certainty for our inferiour concerns that the Principles on which Eternity depends should fall short of that Certainty and consequently of strength and efficacy to move carry us on to a steady pursuit of that greatest and in comparison onely Interest Notwithstanding so unresistible is the force of this evident truth that whoever has deserted the Catholick Church and her Rule of Faith Tradition can have no absolute Certainty of Faith that is indeed no true Faith for that truly is Faith which the Generality of those who use the Word mean by it that the more intelligent amongst them conscious of the manifest weakness of their Grounds are necessitated in their Controversies when they should defend their Faith in plain terms to disgrace and betray it chusing rather candidly to confess it to be all a possible Falshood than to undertake that impossible performance to maintain that it is an Absolute Truth I cannot resemble this Natural Conceit of the perfect Certainty of Faith inbred as it were in the Generality of those who have had even a glimmering of Christianity to any thing so well as to the apprehension the former World had of a Godhead For as natural Instinct forc't those who had not light to know the True God to affix the Notion of a Deity to some false one as some eminent Heroe the Sun Thunder Fire nay there was nothing so ridiculous but they would make a God of it rather than forgoe the tenet of a Soveraign Power so deeply rooted in them by Nature so our modern Misbelievers rather than they will relinquish their Opinion that Faith and the means to know the way to Heaven is absolutely-Certain springing naturally from the conceit they have that God has a Providence for the Salvation of Mankind chuse to misplace the notion of the Certain means to know God's will or Rule of Faith in the most unlikely things imaginable as in a ridiculous whimsy of Fancy little better than a Dream nay sometimes in a dream it self or in the motion of some hypocondriacal vapour as do the Fanaticks others in other things seemingly wiser as in their opinions of some men they esteem Good and Learned in meerly their being educated thus by Parents who confess they have relinquish'd what themselves had been educated to in Interpretations of words by Grammatical skill which were writ long ago and in dogmatical points where every word is capable of equivocalness nay which is indeed as mad as the most extatick of them all to affirm that such words are so plain to every Reader that none can miss the right sense of them All which though plainly confuted by this Principle which Nature teaches the rudest that That can never be a way which many follow to their power and yet the greater part are misled joyn'd to their plain Experience that many followers of these wayes exceedingly differ yet so prevalent is the force of the other Truth that they will wink at this later to embrace that insomuch that none of those I except Seekers by what name soever they are call'd as not being pretenders to Faith but were they ask'd whether they be not as Certain of their Faith as that they live would readily and heartily answer affirmatively I mean those of every sort who follow meerly the Guidance of uncorrupted nature in this affair Notwithstanding as in the Pa gan World There were found many Witty men who out of Unacquaintance with the True Godhead and the Unworthyness of the False Gods then in vogue or out of a conceit of many misgovernments in the world speculated themselves out of their natural notions and went about to deny absolutely there was any God at all so it happens that amongst those who have deserted the Catholick Church there are found diverse men of speculative and searching brains who out of Unacquaintance with or at least their sleightly penetrating the nature of the Catholick Rule of Faith the Living Voice and Practice of the Church or TRADITION and withal seeing the Vanity and manifest Inability of their own pretended Rules to ascertain them absolutely their Faith is True joyn'd with the experienc't Disagreement in Faith amongst diverse Pretenders to it would speculate themselves out of their Natural Christianity and deny any Absolute Certainty at all of Faith or the way to Salvation contenting themselves with a Probability in the Grounds 't is built on miscall'd by them Moral Certainty confessedly consistent with a Possibility of Falshood Which kind of Grounds permits that perhaps all may chance to be shown to morrow a meer Illusion and a bold Lye and all the Christian World hitherto to have been possibly led by the nose by a False Impostùre nay to have held that Imposture Most Sacred and preferr'd the adhering to it before all the Goods Life or Nature could bestow How near this wicked Tenet approaches to Atheism appears hence that 't is next to the Denial of a God-head to deny that in proper speech we know Him or the Way to Him Yet this is the very Position of those who put a Possibility of Falshood in Faith since none can truly be said to know that to be true which he sees and acknowledges may not be true at the same time This Seed of Infidelity sown when the Rule of Faith was renounc'd first dar'd to appear publickly above Ground in the writings of Mr. Chillingworth and the L. Falkland and though had it been propos'd barefac't in another occasion it could have hop'd for no welcome Reception even amongst the Generality of the Protestants themselves who were made believe ever since their Breaking from the Church their Faith
had the Word of God for its Basis which they honestly understood to have the same Certainty as if God himself had spoke it yet being drest up by their plausible Rhetorick and advanc'd in a circumstance when they were confuting the Papists the middle sort of Protestant Readers at unawares let it pass as meritorious to their party and the wiser sort embrac'd it both as a real Truth and also as making best for the Interest of their Cause when they would oppugn us what disservice soever it did tot he Common Cause of Religionor Christianity For they were not at all sollicitous so strangely did faction transport them so they could in their conceit overthrow the Infallibility of the Catholick Church though they reduc'd all Faith into Incertainty and all the Grounds on which 't is built into a tottering Contingency It seem'd to threaten a Mischief considerable enough to Christianity that such a pernicious Tenet should be publickly own'd in Controversy to taint the wiser sort of Readers with Atheism in which it hath been too successful but it grew intolerable when it durst take the boldness to appear in Sermons pronounc'd in very Honourable Assemblies and afterwards publish'd in Print where under the Title of The Wisdom of being Religious and a great many seeming shows and I heartily think very real Intentions of impugning Atheism by an ill-principled and in that circumstance imprudent and unnecessary confession in equivalent Terms of the possible falshood of Faith nay even as to the chiefest and most Fundamental point the Tenet of a Deity Religion receives a deep wound and Atheism an especial Advantage as may perhaps more particularly be shown hereafter I envy not that Sermon and some other Productions of Mr. Tillotson their Authour their due commendations though he be my Adversary I acknowledge that in his clear Method or disposition of his matter and the cleanness of his style which fit him for an Excellency in Preaching he hath few Equals and that had he good Principles he would deliver them as intelligibly as any man I know onely I could wish he had right Principles to Ground his discourse without which he can never make a Controvertist but must needs undermine the solid Foundation of Christianity if he undertake to meddle with the Grounds of it even while he goes about to defend it What I am on this occasion chiefly to reflect on is my own obligation which is the boldness of owning and publishing the Incertainty of Christian Faith being come to the height to assert it's Absolute Firmness and Certainty in the best manner God shall enable me and his Providence seems to require it of me at present In regard 't is expected I should reply to Mr. Tillotson 's pretended Answer to Sure Footing whose first Principle in that Reply seems to be this that what he deems the Rule of Christian Faith and consequently that Faith it self is possible to be False for by virtue of this Position which he defends p. 118 and in diverse other places implies and builds on he more oppugns my discourse than by any other Thesis whatever The contrary to which if I evince then the Protestants own confession that they have no Absolutely-Certain Ground or Rule of Faith confutes them without more ado and concludes them to have relinquish'd its onely right because its onely truly certain Rule TRADITION Yet were it not my chief design to establish the Absolute Truth of Christian Faith in it self by all the Arguments I can imagin and not meerly to confute Protestant Controvertists I needed not take the pains thus to multiply Demonstrations or even alledg so much as one For since whatever they pretend seemingly to Antiquity or Authority of Fathers by their voluminous quotations yet they will finally and heartily stand to nothing in contests about Faith as Conclusive but their own Interpretations of Scripture Which being so weak a Ground that every dayes Experience shows it's Failings an ordinary Probability is abundantly enough to overthrow their Discourses whose very Principle is not onely Improbable but evidently a False one Whence the meanest Catholick writer cannot fail to have the advantage over their Best in a Prudential man's Esteem because he cannot possibly miss of a Medium more probable than is their main Ground I declare then that my Chief End in this Treatise is to settle Christian Faith or to demonstrate that it must be truly or Absolutely Certain and that my applying it now and then to my Opposers is onely a Secundary Intention and meerly Occasional Ere I fall close to my Proofs that Faith cannot possibly be False to avoid Equivocation in the words I declare that by the word Faith I am not sollicitous whether be meant our Act of Faith or the Points of Faith that is the Object of that Act but judg that distinction wholly Impertinent in this present discourse and the reason is because I cannot affirm a Point True or False but as it stands under Motives able to make me judge assent or beleeve 't is such or such which Motives if they be such as are able to convince that the Point cannot but be so then my Iudgment or Assent tothose Points thusconcluded that is my Act of Faith cannot but be True because it depends intirely on Grounds Impossible to be False viz. those Motives But if those Motives are not of such a nature as is absolutely Conclusive the thing is then both the Thing Object Point or Proposition of Faith as being onely Knowable by virtue of them may be otherwise and also my Act of Faith or Belief of those Points may be a wrong or erroneous Iudgment that is both of them may be False To ask then if Faith can possibly be False is to ask whether the Motives laid by God's Providence for Mankind or his Church to embrace Christian Faith must be such as of their own nature cannot fail to conclude those points True and to affirm that Faith is not possible to be False is equivalently to assert that those Motives or the Rule of Faith must be thus absolutely Conclusive Firm and Immovable Hence is seen that I concern not my self in this discourse with how perfectly or imperfectly diverse persons penetrate those motives or how they satisfy or dissatisfy some particular Persons since I onely speak of the Nature of those Motives in themselves and as laid in Second Causes by Gods Providence to light Mankind in their way to Faith to which the dimness of eye-sight neglect to look at all or looking the wrong way even in many particular men is Extrinsecal and Contingent Lastly to avoid Mistake and Confusion I declare that there being two sorts of Questions one concerning the Existence of a thing call'd An est viz. whether there be any Certainly-Conclusive Rule of Faith or no and the other about what is the Certain or truely-Conclusive Rule of Faith call'd Quid est I am not now discoursing about the later that was the work
none but onely an Affection or determination of a Thing both known by plain Nature whatever som Schoolmen speculate For these put meer Experience teaches us that that thing which is call'd Pillar is the same thing which is call'd Round or which is all one that in this Proposition The Pillar is round the two extream notions are indeed that is with a Conformity to the Thing identifi'd or that that Proposition is True But to return home to our purpose 'T is clear that Pillar and Roundness Existing by the same existence or in the same Thing are found in the thing after it's manner and in my Judgment or Soul as apt to judg after it 's that is judgingly But Truth hath nothing to do with either of these manners of Being as was discourst formerly in the parallel case of Notions but purely and adequately consists in the Unity or Community of Form which my Judgment has with the Thing by having which in her the Soul gains a Conformity to it In this Common Form consider'd as in the Thing consists it's Metaphysical Verity or it 's Being what it is and this Verity consider'd as apt to stamp or imprint it self on my Iudging Power is call'd Objective Truth as receiv'd in me and fashioning or conforming my said Power to the Thing as in it self and so making my Judgment True 't is call'd Formal Truth This declar'd I deny that I any where confound Objective Truth with Formal or what 's in the Thing with what 's in me as in me for that were to identifie those two most vastly and most evidently different States A Supineness too gross for any attentive Discourser to fall into I conceive then what the Objecter would alledge is that I confound those Truths spoken of with Truth to us or quoad nos as the Schools speak For though what 's Truth to us must needs be Truth in it self and in us in regard we cannot know that to be which is not yet what 's Truth in it self or Truth in us is not therefore Truth to us in regard one may upon probable nay improbable or even False Grounds light upon a right judgment in which case his mind as judging is conformable to the thing or True yet still that thing is not true to him in regard he hath no reason able to conclude it such or to make him see it to be true Truth then to us is the same with our Sight of it that is with Certainty or Determination of our Understanding by force of Intellectual Motives and this indeed I often seem to confound with Truth in the two former Acceptions but I therefore seem to do it because I am loath to transcribe and apply so often my Postulata and suppose my Judicious Reader bears them in mind Which if he pleases to understand as subjoyn'd to those Discourses it will follow that what is so in the thing it self or perhaps in us if it be so severely obligatory to be thus constantly profest and held so and consequently by my later Postulatum necessary to be known to be so all my mistaken proofs will be brought to conclude it True to us that is Certain You will say why is it not enough for God to provide that our Acts of Faith be indeed True in us since so they would perfect our Understandings by conforming them to the thing and guide us right but they must also be True to us or be known to be True I answer for two Reasons One because God's Government of Mankind would by this means be preternatural obliging him to hold profess and dye for professing the Truth of those Points which he knows not to be such The other Reason is because every Act of Faith as exercis'd would perpetually involve an Errour in case the Motives to those Assents were not conclusive of the Truth of those Points For however one may light by hap-hazard or through weakness on a Truth from an Inclusive Motive yet since 't is impossible a rational Creature should assent but upon some Motive good or bad hence every Assent practically implies 'T is true for this reason Wherefore if the Reason grounding such Assents be unapt to conclude the Truth of the thing that Judgment necessarily involves a Falshood or Errour however it be otherwise conformable to the thing abstractedly consider'd Truths then being bastard illegitimate and monstrous both the Intellectualness and Supernaturalness of that Virtue call'd Faith make it scorn to own such defective Prâ—ductions Objection III. The Meanings of Words are indeed to be taken from the Vulgar but the Truth of Propositions is to be taken onely from the Judgments of Learned Men though then that be indeed the meaning of the word Faith which the Generality of Christians mean by it yet the Truth of this Proposition Faith is possible to be False must be judg'd of by the Sentiments of the most Learned Divines the Generality at least the Best of which and Catholicks amongst the rest grant the Grounds of Faith as to our Knowledg and consequently Faith it self to be Possible to be False Answer That Maxim is to be understood of those Propositions which require some Speculation to infer them in which case also even the Unlearned are not bound to Assent upon the Authority of Learned men taken precisely as men of Skill because generally 't is Practically-self-evident to them that such Speculative men differ oft times in their Sentiments and they are unfurnisht of due means to discern which is in the right yet if they are to act in such affairs they are bound in Prudence to proceed upon the Judgments of that part which is generally reputed most and ablest and then their proceedure is laudable because they do the best secundum ultimum potentiae or that lies in the power Whence Learned men who have ability to judg of the Reasons those Speculaters give behave themselves imprudently and blameably if they even proceed to outward action meerly upon their Judgments without examining the Reasons they alleadge in case they have leasure and opportunity to do so But now the Maxim holds not all for those Propositions in which 't is either self-evident or evident to common and uncultivated Reason that the Predicate is to be connected with the Subject as 't is for example in this Man is a rational Creature or this which is palpably consequent from the former Man is capable of gaining Knowledg for in such as these the natural Sentiments of the Vulgar are full as Certain as those of Speculaters perhaps Certainer And with the same Evidence the Predicate Possible to be False must necessarily be seen to be connected with Faith by all those who esteem themselves oblig'd by Gods Command to profess and dye for the Truth of those Points they believe Besides they hold that Faith makes them know God and his Will that their Assent of Faith is to be Immoveable or adher'd to all their lives that is such as cannot be
overthrown or shown False by any Reasons brought against it both which equivalently imply Impossibility of Falshood Again 't is deny'd that Catholick Divines even as Speculaters hold Faith Possible to be False since they all to a man whatever they hold besides hold the Catholick Church Infallible and that we ought to receive our Faith from her Living Voice and Practice Now the Tenet of Infallibility in the Proposer necessarily draws after it the Tenet of Impossibility of Falshood in what is propos'd that is in Faith But because it may be said this is their Sentiment as Catholicks not as Schoolmen let the Angel of the Schools speak for the Schools themselves his Expressions are common and so reach all Scientia saith he Sum. Theol. 2â 2e q. 1â a. 50 ad 4m cum opinione simul esse non potest simpliciter de eodem quia de ratione scientiae est quòd id quod scitur ex â—stimetur Impossibile esse aliter se habere de ratione autem opinionis est quod id quod est opinatum existimetur possibile aliter se habere sed id quod fide tenâ—tur propter fidei certitudinem existimatur etiam Impossibile aliter se habere And again in the same Question ao 4o. ad 2o. Ea quae subsunt Fidei dupliciter considerari possunt uno modo in speciali sic non possunt esse simul visa credita alio modo in generali scilicet sub communi ratione credibilis et sic sunt VISA ab eo qui credit non enim crederet nisi VIDERET ea esse credenda vel propter EVIDENTIAM signorum vel propter aliquid hujusmodi It were easie for me to avail my self by these Testimonies to confirm the main of my Doctrine but what method will permit me and leads me to at present is only this to show that this Great Father of the Church and Doctour of all Schools declares the common Sentiment drawn out of the conceit of Faith's Certainty to be this that 't is Impossible that Points of Faith should be otherwise or false and that we must e're we believe have Evidence of the Grounds of our Belief which amounts to the same All then that can be objected from some of our Divines is this that they explicate their Tenet so as by consequence Faith is left possible to be false but what is this to the purpose since 't is one thing to hold a Tenet and another thing to make it out In the former they all agree in the later as is the Genius of Humane Understandings where our heavenly Teacher has not settled them they disagree with one another sometimes with themselves Nor can it bear any Objection nor breed scandal that the Ground of Faith should be more particularly and distinctly explicated now than formerly for since Controversie is a Skill why should it be admir'd nay why should it not be expected that it should receive Improvement that is better explain its proper object the Rule of Faith than formerly since we experience a progress in all other Arts and Sciences which are frequent in use as this has been of late dayes Objection IV. A great part of the First Eviction in case it proceed concerning Truth in us as it ought supposes the vulgar Skilful in Logick and to frame their Thoughts and Assents in the same manner as Artificial Discoursers do Answer It supposes no Skill or Art in the vulgar or Generality of Christians but onely declares artificially what naturally passes in rational Souls when they Assent upon Evidence And this it ought to do For the Art of Logick frames not it's Rules or Observations at randome but takes them from the Thing or it's Object as all other Skills do that is from what is found in rational Souls as rational or apt to discourse by observing the motions of which when it behaves it self rationally the Logicians set down Rules how to demean our Thoughts steadily and constantly according to right Reason So that the manner of working in Artificial discoursers in this onely differs from that of Natural ones that the one acts directly the other reflectingly For example a vulgar Soul when it assents interiourly a thing is or affirms has truly in it what a Logician call's a Proposition and that Proposition has truly in it what corresponds to the notions of Subject Copula and Predicate though he reflects not on it as does a Logician In the same manner when he gathers the Knowledg of some new Thing he has truly in that discourse of his what corresponds to Major Minor and Conclusion nay he has practically in him what necessitates the Consequence or that Maxim The same is the same with it self of whose Truth it being a Principle of our Understanding he cannot possibly be ignorant Though all this while he reflects not how or by virtue of what he acquires this Knowledg And hence Light is afforded us to understand in common how the vulgar come to have Practical Self-Evidence of divers Truths For the Maxims which even scientifical men have of the Objects of several Sciences being taken from the Things or the Objects of those Sciences and those Maxims being Common or General ones from the obvious or common Knowledg of those things which the vulgar who convers with them cannot chuse but have Again nature imbuing them with the Knowledg of that Principle on which the force of all Consequences is Grounded as also with the knowledg of all those we call Principia Intellectûs or Principles of our Understanding hence their rational nature is led directly by a natural course to see evidently and assent to divers Conclusions without any Reflexion or Speculation which rude but unerring draught of Knowledg is call'd by me in Sure Footing and elswhere Practical Self-evidence because 't is a natural Result of Practice or ordinary converse with those things An Instance would at once clear this and if rightly chosen be serviceable to the Readers of Sure Footing An unlearned person that cannot read a word believes fully there was such a man as K. Iames and that we may not mistake the Question we will put him to be one that has a handsom degree of conversation in the world We finde him assent to the Affirmative heartily But the point is how he is led into that Assent and whether rationally To ask him a reason why is bootless for this puts him to behave himself like a Reflecter on his own Thoughts which he is not whence we shall find him upon such a question at a puzzle to give the particular reason though as taught by Experience he will stand stiffly to it in common that he has a reason for it and a good one too To help him out then the way is to suggest the true reason to him for then he will easily acknowledg it finding it experimentally in himself which done deny the Goodness of it and you shall find he will as taught by nature
for the establishment or propagation of Christianity that is how insufficient for the Body of the Faithful or the Church how unfit for the Ends and unable to produce the Effects true Faith or the Faith found in the Generality of the Faithful ought to do needs no declaration to manifest it since no person of ordinary capacity can without difficulty refrain from smiling at the ridiculous levity of such kind of Assenters INFERENCES From the foregoing Discourses concluding all Controversy 1. IT rests then evinc'd and demonstratively concluded with as great Firmness as First Principles made use of for Premisses and Immediate Consequences from those Principles can establish it that that most firm or Unchangeable Assent call'd Christian Faith laying an obligation on its Profâ—ssors to assert it with the greatest Seriousness Constancy and Pledges imaginable to be TRUE and its Object Points of Faith to be TRUTHS is not possible to be False to us that is to be an Erroneous Iudgment or a Mistake of our Understanding 2. 'T is with the same Certainty concluded that the Ground of Faith as to our Knowledge and so the Rule of Faith must be likewise Impossible to be False For since nothing can or ought in true Reason be stronger than the Ground it stands on if This be not Impossible to be False it can be no Rule of Faith because it would weaken Faith it self which is built on it into a Possibility of Falshood inconsistent with its nature 3. It follows with the same Clearness that if the Rule of Faith or the Immediate Means to convey the Knowledg of Christ's Doctrin to us be any Living Authority that Authority must be Infallible as to that Effect For if Fallible Faith which is built on it would still be Possible to be False As Likewise that if it be any Book both the Letter of that Book must be known to be Impossâ—ble to have been corrupted as to what concerns Faith built on it and withall the Sense known to be Impossible to be â—istaken For in case either of these all the Causes being put to preserve them such as we have said be truly judg'd or found to be Possible Faith which is to depend on them will still be left possible to be False 4. It follows immediately that those pretended Faithfull who have not Grounds of Faith thus qualify'd have no true Faith that is no Act of Belief but what notwithstanding all that they know or can know of it may possibly be False nor consequently are they to be accounted truly Faithfull as not having true Faith that is in our case an Assent built either on Infallible Living Authority or on unmistakeable Letter and Sense of a Book § 3. but Opinion onely 5. It follows with like Evidence that a Controvertist being one who is to assert Faith not by looking into the Mysteries of Faith and explaining them this being the Office of a School-Divine but into the Motives to it or Rule of Faith if he goes not about to bring Proofs which he judges and is ready to maintain nay which are of their own nature apt to shew Faith and its Rule Impossible to be False he does not the duty he ows to Faith nor behaves himself like a Controvertist but he betrays Faith by his Ineffectual and Probable managery of it making it seem a sleight Opinion or lightly grounded Credulity Especially if he professes that all Proofs which can be produc'd in this matter are Possible to be False For then 't is a plain and open Confession all his Endeavours are to no purpose because he is to shew Faith the Subject of his Discourse to be what in reality it is that is Impossible to be false Nay since Faith must be thus Certain he manifestly destroys Faith when he should defend and establish it by professing all its Proofs or Grounds possible to be false 6. It follows immediately that unless some other Medium can be found or way taken in that Skill or Science call'd Controversie which is able to show Faith Impossible to be false than what is laid down in Sure-footing which partly by our Adversaries confession of the Inability of theirs to reach Infallible Certainty partly out of the nature of the Thing as is seen Sure-footing Corol. 16 and 40. is evidently impossible nor was it ever yet attempted by any other Means except by looking into the nature of Tradition It follows I say that as it is Certain that Faith and its Grounds are Impossible to be false that is false to us or may be shown thus Impossible to be False So 't is by consequence Certain likewise that the main Doctrin there deliver'd will stand whatever particular miscarriages may have happen'd in the managing it which are to be judg'd of by the strength of my Reasons there given and the force of my Adversaries Objections 7. 'T is necessarily consequent from the foregoing Paragraphs that if I have discours'd right in this small Treatise of mine and have prov'd that Faith and consequently its Grounds must be Impossible to be False then Mr. Tillotson's Confession p. 118. to which M. Stillingfleet's Doctrin is consonant that It is Possible to be otherwise that is to be False that any Book is so antient as it pretends to be or that it was written by him whose name it bears or that this is the sense of such and such passages in it is a clear Conviction that neither is the Book-Rule he maintains the True Rule of Faith § 3. nor have he and his Friends True Faith § 4. and consequently there being no other Rule owned taking away Private Spirit but Tradition that Tradition is the onely-true-Rule of Faith § 6. and so the main of Sure-Footing stands yet firm and lastly 't is evinc'd that his own Book which opposes it opposes the onety-true because the onely-impossible-to-be-False Ground of Faith that is he is convinc't in that Supposition to go about to undermine all Christian Faith Whence the Title of his Probable-natur'd Book is manifested to be an improper Nick-name and the Book it self to merit no Reply 8. This last point is hence farther confirm'd because Mr T. and Mr. St. can claim no admittance into a dispute whether this or the other be the True Rule of Faith till they approve themselves to be Christians and show they hold there is such a thing as Faith or that it can bear the having any Rule at all since an Assent to a point seen and acknowledg'd Possible to to be False can never rise to be more than an Opinion nor can the Motive of assenting to what may possibly be False in true speech be call'd The Rule of Faith both because there is in that case no Faith Infer 1. and so it cannot be a Rule to what is not as also because what we see Possible to be False cannot with any propriety be cal'd a Rule to the Understanding directing it to Truth in regard for any thing it sees 't
of SURE FOOTING but the former onely Indeed in my first discourse there I endeavour'd to evince this Truth from par 1. to par 17. by diverse Arguments but because Mr. T. waves the speaking to those Premises as they tend to infer my Conclusion and onely discourses a little Mistakingly against the Conclusions themselves therefore being resolv'd to write a Treatise to establish Christian Faith I thought fit to apply it to his proceedure there that so I may both more forcibly invite him to that necessary though neglected Duty and withall that by settling the Existence Nature of Faith and it's Rule first I may clear the way methodically to discover what and onely what can be the right Rule of Faith And possibly in my next Treatise if Mr. T. and Mr. St. think fit to continue on this discourse forwards by answering this they may by denying that in true speech the Points of Faith are Truths or Faith is True oblige me to begin yet higher and make use of such Mediums as are more direct and immediately fit to confute Atheism The understanding Reader will easily pardon the Speculativeness of this Treatise in great part of it if he reflects that discourses built on Intrinsecal Mediums and manag'd in the way of Severe Reason do naturally nay must necessarily bear up to the First Principles yet by the Harmony and Connexion of Truths with one another there will be found also very many Proofs fairly Intelligible by the middle sort of Prudential men especially in those Arguments which are drawn from Practice and if I flatter not my self some Proofs and those Convincing ones too suitable to every Capacity This comfort my Readers may expect to reap by this Procedure that it must forcibly shorten Disputes and bring Controversies after a while to a period unless our Adversaries be still obstinately bent to play the Drolls instead of soberly and pertinently disputing For hardly can Errour hide her deformity when she is exposed naked to the view of Rational nature in the noon-day-light of FIRST-PRINCIPLES Faith Vindicated FROM Possibility of Falshood First Eviction § 1. I Lay for the Basis of my present Discourse these two Propositions 1. Christians are oblig'd to hold firmly profess and stand to it even with the loss of their Lives that Points of Faith are TRUTHS 2. None can be thus oblig'd to hold profess and maintain that to be TRUTH which they know not to be so The later of these is as certain as that God the Imposer of this Obligation is Good For how unworthy his Infinit Goodness were it to will that rational Nature or Mankind should act irrationally by holding firmly what it has no firm Grounds to hold that is what it knows not to be so Or to sacrifice its very Being to testifie the truth of those Points concerning which if it work according to right reason the nature God has given it and deviate not from that by a weak credulity it can never be perfectly satisfy'd that they are indeed Truths which it can never be if notwithstanding all it knows they yet may possibly be Falshoods No man in true morality ought to say what he knows not much less so asseverantly as to seal it with his blood As for the former Proposition which I account most fundamental to the ensuing Discourse I am to declare that by Holding c. a thing to be a Truth I understand the holding that the thing absolutely in reality or indeed is so as I judge Whence to this Holding a Thing to be Truth 't is not enough that a man hold it is so to the best of his judgment but 't is requir'd moreover that he hold he is not deceiv'd in making such a judgment and this because he holds his Thought conformable to the Thing For this settles Verity or Truth on its proper and firm Foundation the thing and not on the unstable motions of his Judgment as does the other My first and chief Postulatum thus understood I esteem to be self-evident to all that converse with Christianity taken in its largest sense as I declar'd in my Introduction setting aside that sort of Speculaters I mean those of our modern Adversaries against whom I dispute at present and of whom the Question is now agitated whether they are indeed to be held right Christians or no. And I conceive that he who should deny it must be bound to put the contradictory Position and to affirm that Christians are not bound firmly to hold profess and maintain with the loss of their lives the TRUTH of their Faith but its Likelihood onely He that affirms this if he would be held a Christian is to be confuted by the contrary sentiment of the generality of Christians from whom he dissents in so Fundamental a Point as is the rightly understanding the nature of Faith which they profess and which it so highly imports them to know that is indeed in rightly understanding the meaning of the word Faith If he be no Christian yet hold the Godhead 't is to be demonstrated partly from the proper effects of Faith and the nature of the great difficulties both intellectual and moral which 't is ordain'd to master partly out of the nature of God and his Attributes obliging him to lay means proportion'd to an intended end or to establish every thing according to the Concern that depends on it which Concern in our case is the highest imaginable to wit the Salvation of Mankind the End of creating those very Entities on which the Certitude of Science is built Or lastly if he be an Atheist the Deity and it's Attributes are first to be demonstrated as also what is Man's summum bonum and the immediate Disposition to it and then the nature and Certitude of Faith and consequently of it's Rule are to be demonstrated Supposing then my later Postulatum to be evident to all that know there is a wise and good Governour of the world and who understand the common Principles of Morality and my former Postulatum to be clear and undeniable matter of Fact to those who converse with Christianity and therefore to have unavoidable force upon all that would be held Professors thereof I shall be bold to proceed upon them And first Logick whose proper office 't is to look into the nature and actions of our Soul as Rational and as it were to anatomize her Thoughts takes up the discourse and proceeds thus § 2. Truths are found in Propositions a Proposition consists of two Notions called Subject and Predicate and a third whose office 't is to connect them whence to know a thing to be Truth or true is to see the Connâ—xion between the two Notions spoken of or to see that the third truly connects them Now there are but two wayes imaginable abstracting from Experience how this may be seen Either by seeing immediately that those two Notions are the same with one another out of the very Notions themselves or
else by seeing that they are each of them the same with a Third whence follows that unless that Third Notion can fail to be the same with it self those two Notions which are the same with it cannot possible fail to be the same with one another The former is called Self-Evidence this later Evidence by deduction Both are built immediately upon this grand Verity that The same is the same with it self wherefore unless it be seen that the Truth of that most Self-Evident Axiom is engag'd in their Patronage they cannot be even known to be True and if it be seen that it is thus engag'd they must needs be known impossible to be false since 't is most manifestly impossible that First Principles should be false or that the same should not be the same with it self Wherefore either Points of Faith need not be known to be Truths or else they must by Reflecteâ—s at least be known impossible to he false § 3. The same is evinc't from the nature of the Subject in those Propositions which affirm the Truth of any point of Faith For if we look narrowly we shall find that the Subject in those is either formally or in effect a Proposition it self as when we say This Proposition Christ is really in the Sacrament is true That God is one and three is true c. Where the Subjects are manifestly these Christ is really in the Sacrament God is one and three or a Trinity is A Proposition then being a Speech apt to express Truth or Falshood nay necessarily determin'd to do the one excepting those which speak of a future Contingent it follows that who ever is bound in reason to affirm that the Proposition expressing the point of Faith is True is bound likewise to affirm 't is impossible to be false if taken in the same sense he means it that is indeed if taken for the same Proposition since 't is impossible Truth should be Falshood Either then Christ's followers are not oblig'd to affirm the Points they profess are true which thwarts the Sentiments of the Christian part of mankind or else they must necessarily be oblig'd withall to affirm them impossible to be false § 4. The same is concluded from the nature of the Copula is whose office being to connect or identifie the notions of the Subject and Predicate that is to express that what is meant by those two notions is to be found in the same Thing or that they have one common stock of Being its proper signification is Being or Existence not absolutely as if it meant that either of the Terms exists in Things but comparatively or conditionally as it were that that Being which belongs to one of the Terms is the same Being with that which belongs to the other or that by the same Being whereby one of the Terms is the other is also Now then this kind of Expression or Signification being such as has no latitude between it and its utmost Opposit or Contradictory is not it being the most uncompounded notion that is and not capable to be mingled with any alloy or participation of its Opposit as it happens in Contraries it follows that who holds the Truth of the Proposition or which is all one the Identification of the two Terms exprest by the Copula is must hold it absolutely and the Opposite to be impossible to be false nothing being more impossible than that is and is not should both be true at once or that the same thing should be the same and not the same in the same respect that is should be true and not be true And hence it is that though distinctions use to fall upon the Equivocalness of the two Terms yet no man that knows what Logick meant ever distinguisht the meer Copula its simplest notion not admitting any possible division § 5. Our Argument from the Copula is particularly strengthen'd from the nature of the Predicate in the Propositions we speak of I mean in such Speeches as affirm such and such Points of Faith to be True For True means Existent in Propositions which express onely the An est of a thing as most Points of Faith do which speak abstractedly and tell notwherein the nature of the Subject it speaks of consists or the Quid est So that most of the Propositions Christians are bound to profess are fully exprest thus A Trinity is Existent a Christ God-and-man is Existent c. and the like may be said of those Points which belong to a Thing or Action past as Creation was Christs Crucifying was c. For Existent is the Predicate in these too onely affixt to another difference of time and 't is equally impossible such Subjects should neither have been nor not have been or have been and have not been at once as it is that a thing should neither be nor not be at present or both be and not be at present Regarding then stedfastly the nature of our Predicate Existent we shall find that it expresses the utmost Actuality of a Thing and as taken in the posture it bears in those Propositions that Actuality exercis'd that is the utmost Actuality in its most actual state that is as absolutely excluding all manner or least degree of Potentiality and confequently all Possibility of being otherwise which is radically destroy'd when all Potentiality is taken away This Discourse holding which in right to Truth I shall not fear to affirm unconcern'd in the drollery of any Opposer to be more than Mathematically demonstrative as shall be shown more particularly hereafter it follows inevitably that who so is bound to profess a Trinity Incarnation c. is or was Existent is also bound to profess that 't is impossible they should be not-Existent or which is all one that 't is impossible these points of Faith should be false § 6. The same appears out of the nature of distinction or division apply'd to our Predicate Existent as found in these Propositions For could that Predicate bear a pertinent distinction expressing this and the other respect or thus and thus it might possibly be according to one of those respects or thus consider'd and not be according to another that is another way consider'd But this evasion is here impossible for either those distinguishing Notions must be more Potential or antecedent to the Notion of Existent and then they neither reach Existent nor supervene to it as its Determinations or Actuations which Differences ought to do nor can any Notion be more Actual or Determinative in the line of Substance or Being than Existent is and so fit to distinguish it in that line nor lastly can any determination in the line of Accidents serve the turn for these suppose Existence already put and so the whole Truth of the Proposition entire and compleat antecedently to them 'T is impossible therefore that what is thus affirm'd to be True should in any regard be affirm'd possible to be false the
impossibility of distinguishing the Predicate pertinently excluding here all possibility of divers respects § 7. The same is demonstrated from the impossibility of distinguishing the Subjects of those Faith-Propositions for those Subjects being Propositions themselves as was shown § 3. and accepted for Truths as is suppos'd they are incapable of Distinction as shall be particularly shown hereafter Evict 3. § 5. Besides those Subjects being Points of Faith and so standing in the Abstract that is not descending to subsuming respects even in that regard too they are freed from all pertinent distinguishableness § 8. The same is demonstrated from the nature of Truth which consists in an Indivisible Whence there is nothing of Truth had how great soever the conceived approaches towards it be till all may-not-bees or Potentiality to be otherwise be utterly excluded by the Actuality of Is or Existence which put or discover'd the Light of Truth breaks forth and the dim twilights of may-not-bees vanish and disappear § 9. The same is demonstrated out of the nature of Connexion found in the aforesaid Propositions For 't is evident their Truth consists in the connexion of those Notions which make the Subject and Predicate Whoever therefore sees not the Connexion between those Notions in the Principle of Faith sees not the truth of any of those Propositions that is those Propositions are not to such a man True Wherefore Connexion excluding formally Inconnexion so that 't is clearly impossible they should be found together in the self-same Subjects and the falshood of such Propositions consisting in the Unconnectedness of their Terms it follows that he who is oblig'd to profess those Faith-Propositions True must see the Connexion between their Terms and consequently that they cannot possibly be inconnected or false Again since all approaches or vicinity to Connexion by how near degrees soever they are made are not Connexion it follows that all Connexion consists in an Indivisible and can admit no Latitude for a Possibility to be otherwise to be grounded on Lastly all Connexion being necessarily Immediate or seen by virtue of Immediateness and to see Immediate Connexion being the Producer of Certain Knowledg or of Assurance the Thing cannot but be so it follows that to see the Truth of such Propositions or which is all one the Immediate Connexion of their Terms is to see they cannot but be so or that they are absolutely void of all Possibility of Falshood § 10. By this time we are brought orderly to look into the nature of Opinion Which word I take not here in a large sense for any kind of Assent however produc 't but for an Assent or Adhesion to a Tenet without sufficient Grounds to evince the Thing is so as the Opiner judges as it is taken in that Proverb Turpe est opinari Now 't is most evident that there would be sufficient Grounds to convince in case the Term or Point were seen to be deduc't by immediate steps or a Train of immediate Connexions to that very Conclusion 'T is manifest then that 't is therefore Opinion and blame-worthy because its Grounds as they are laid in the understanding of the Assenter want or fall short of this immediate Connexion So that Opinion is a judgment upon remote or unimmediate Considerations By which means it comes to pass that the most necessary verity of that Grand Principle The same is the same with it self upon which all Certainty both of first Principles and of Deduction is built and whose perfect Self-Evidence and Interessedness in whatever belongs to right discourse seem to make the very Light of Reason consist originally in It is not engag'd in the Opiners discourse whence wanting Immediateness it becomes unconnected incoherent weak and slack or rather indeed null No wonder then if all Opinion how near soever it approaches seemingly to Immediate Connexion and how strongly soever it be supported by an experienc'd seldomness of such Effects or the conceiv'd unaptness and fewness of Causes fit to produce them yet it admits Possibility of being otherwise in regard it fails in its very Root and Basis by not relying on the main Principle and Foundation of all steadiness in humane Discourse and which is of so necessary a Truth that 't is impossible to falter or give way to uphold and exempt it from a liableness to disconnexion of those Notions which it pretended and ought to Identify that is from a liableness to Errour § 11. From this declaration of the nature of Opinion it is render'd manifest out of what Fountain-head all Rational Assents flow namely from seeing the Immediate Connexion of one Term with another or which is all one that this Principle The same is the same with it self stands engag'd for their verity Also that the Light of Reason consists fundamentally in this and formally in deriving the perfect Visibleness of this to make other Propositions also visible to the Eye of our Understanding Likewise that Assents not springing from this Light of Reason must be as such Irrational and arise necessarily from the Will taken as not following the Light of Understanding but as prompted and put forward by some passion viz. some irrational desire or inclination the thing should be so which prest and precipitated the understanding into Assent before due motives forc't it As likewise that since none can be bound constantly to profess what he cannot steadily see to be true a Christian who is thus bound to profess his Faith True must see that the First Principle now spoken of which gives all Steadiness to our Intellectual Sight is interessed in the patronage of the Proposition he assents to Whence true Faith by reason of its Immoveable Grounds can bear an asserting the absolute Impossibility of its being False whereas who ever affirms Faith may possibly be false makes it built upon remote mediums that is such as are either not immediate or which is all one not seen to be immediate to the two Terms of the Proposition assented to and so they become destitute of the Invincible strength of that first Principle which establishes all deduc't Truths and legitimates all Assents to them Whence follows inevitably that he turns all Faith into Opinion makes Faith absurd preternatural and irrational importing that 't is a thing which men must assent to or say interiorly 't is so and yet see no solid Grounds why it must be so profess stoutly 't is true and that they are sure of it and yet if they will speak truly profess with all that it may be false and that the whole world may be mistaken in it and lastly he leaves all Christs Doctrine Indefensible and utterly unmaintainable to have absolutely speaking either any solidity or steadiness in its Grounds or one true word in it self Second Eviction § 1. FRom this not-seeing the Connexion of the two Terms in the Conclusion by a Medium immediately connected to them both but by distant Glances onely which have not
vast Oceans on either side America to overswell the Continent and so destroy it they are forc'd to confess interiourly America may for any thing they know possibly not be whence they are forc'd to suspend as to its Existence and only Assent to it's extream Likelihood of existing § 4. The use I make of this discourse at present is this that though Likelyhoods have a great latitude yet Assent being the terminus of those Inclinations towards it which gradually exceed one another consists in an Indivisible as does the notion of is on which either seen or deem'd to be seen 't is built and to which it goes parallell That all Acts falling short of Assent to the Existence of a thing advance no farther than great Assents to it's Likelihood and fall under the head of suspensive Acts as to that things Existence as the Soul will discover upon reflexion and that when we mistake one for the other 't is for not distinguishing well the great resemblance between assenting as to outward Action and as to the speculative Truth as also between assenting to the extream Likelihood of a thing and assenting to its Existence That whensoever we see the Possibility of a things being False or not-Existent which in our case is all one we cannot have an Assent to it's Existence but to the likelihood of it only and suspend as to its Existence or actual being and that therefore they who acknowledg that notwithstanding all the Means used and all the Grounds it has Faith may possibly be false to us cannot be held to assent to the Existence or Truth of those points but to suspend concerning their truth and to assent only to their likelihood to be true Which whether it be a sufficient disposition to denominate such persons Christians will easily and best be determin'd by the vulgar of Christianity who possess the genuin and natural meaning of the word Faith untainted with the frantick conceits sprung from such speculations as are taken out of Fancy not as they ought from the nature of the Thing § 5. The same Argument may be made from the nature of firmly Holding as was from Assent and the self-same discourse mutatis mutandis since 't is most Evident none can firmly hold a thing to be true which he sees and acknowledges that is holds may be False however he may hold it Very likely to be True § 6. The same is evinc'd from the notion of knowing which word I take here abstractedly unconcern'd what kind of knowledg it be provided it be True and proper knowledg and not abusively so call'd For since nothing can be known to be but what is nor known to be such but what is such again since Christians if they have either Honesty or Wit in them must some way or other know points of Faith to be true whose truth they esteem themselves bound to profess and stand to even with the loss of their lives it follows those points must be what they are known to be that is True and consequently unless knowledg can be Ignorance impossible not to be or to be False § 7. What hath been said of Assent and Holding and Knowing may also be discours'd from the notion of Certainty for this has the same nature with the former as it is a determination of the Understanding I mean Intellectual determination is the common Genus to them all and they differ only in this that Knowledg and Certainty are proper Effects of Evidence whether sprung from the thing or from the Attester nor can they be where there is wanting the Intellectual Light issuing from that First Principle of all Evidence so oft spoken of whereas Hâ—lding or Assenting can proceed from the Blindness of Passion or from Ignorance as well as from the clear Sight of the Understanding Now that the Nature of Certainty consists in an Intellectual Determination thus originiz'd and consequently when put excludes all possibility of being otherwise which is the point I aym to evince appears partly from the Etymology and most evidently from the Use of the Word For Certus signifies Determinate As then when the matter spoken of restrains that word to Volition it signifies an Absolute Determination of Will or Resolution as certus â—undi so when we are speaking of the Ground of Intellectual Certainty and say the thing is Certain we intend to express full as much as when we say the thing is which speaks Ultimate Determination and Actuality in the Object consider'd in it self and in like Manner when the same word is intended to signifie Formal Certainty in Us or that Disposition of the Understanding whereby it is said to be Certain it must necessarily signifie unless contrary to the nature of Words it's most formal Notion be less rigorous then those which are less formal a Determinate state of the Understanding or an Intellectual Determination Whence as a thing is then Certain or Determinate when it is so the Understanding is then Determin'd according to it's Nature or Certain when the Thing is seen to be as it is which immediate Effect of the other is impossible but by virtue of the first Principle of Evidence making that clear discovery and This engaged all Intellectual Potentiality or Possibility of not being seen to be is totally and formally that is most absolutely excluded The true and genuine Notion then of Certainty imports an absolute impossibility that that judgment which so fixes and determines the Understanding should be an Errour or False Since nothing can be seen to be but what really is § 8. Again since Determination in any kind is the Terminus of all Indetermination in the same kind and so beyond it it follows that Certainty or Intellectual Determination is plac'd beyond all possible degrees of Indetermination of the mind or Uncertainty Certainty therefore is not attain'd till all possible degrees of Uncertainty and consequently Possibility of Falshood to us or Errour be transcended and overcome Faith then must be deny'd to be Certain if it be put Possible to be False §9 And as my former Discourse has endeavour'd to display the Nature of Certainty from its Genus and Difference which compound it's Definition so the same will be still more satisfactorily evinc't from observing the Language of Mankind when they use the word Certain For that being most evidently the signification of a word which the intelligent Users of that word intend to express by it if by divers sayings of theirs we can manifest that they meant to signifie such a Conception by that Word that will infallibly be the true meaning of it and that Conception will have in it the true Nature of Certainty Let us observe then attentively what is at the bottom of their hearts when they use these and the like familiar Discourses which naturally break from them How frequent is it when any one asks another Is such a thing true and the other replies I verily think it is he returns
are not reducible to these Grounds nay are made use of by Persons who declare against having any such Grounds for Faith signifie just as much as if they should say I beseech you Sir be so good natur'd as to believe me though to tell you true I acknowledg sincerely neither can I bring nor can there possibly be brought any Ground able to make good what I say or any undeniable Premisses to force my Conclusion Third Eviction § 1. THus far Logick Let 's see next what Nature and Metaphysicks say to the Point in which Quest yet we must not leave Logick's Assistance And first these Sciences assure us that as all Capacity of different Beings springs from First Matter so all Capacity of contrary Determinations arises from what we call Potentiality or Indifferency in the Subject Now the Subject in our present case is not so much our meer Faculty of Understanding as the Points of Faith it self in our Soul or the judging Power of our Soul consider'd precisely as affected with these Points for 't is these or our judging Power taken meerly as conversant about These that is our Judgments which our Opponents must affirm True yet Possible to be False Since therefore both the Points themselves and our Judgments consist formally in Affirmation and Negation that is in is and is not which are indivisible and constituted such by a Formality the most formal and actual that can be as hath been shown they can have as such no Indifferency or Potentiality in them to the contrary neither Natural nor Metaphysical nor consequently Possibility of Falshood § 2. The Position of our Adversaries is still render'd more absurd by this Consideration that even in Nature where there is the greatest Potentiality that is viz. First Matter the Subject is not yet capable of opposit Qualities at once but successively at least in the same part Whereas their Position is not that Faith which is now True is possible to be False afterwards upon the Alteration of some Contingent Matter but that 't is Possible now to be False or possible to be now False for any thing any man knows that is the understanding may have possibly Truth and Falshood in it at once and as to the same Part or Point § 3. But 't is still far more irrational in regard these seeming Contraries True and False apply'd to the Propositions we speak of have in them the perfect nature of Contradictories it being necessary that in those which speak de praesenti one should be exprest by is existent the other by is not existent as 't is in those which speak preteritly and futurely that one should be exprest by hath been or shall be the other by hath not been or shall not be To think then they can at once be True and False is to judg that Contradictories may be verified of the same or that both sides of the Contradiction may be true § 4. Again Truth being a Conformity of the mind to the Thing and Falshood a Disconformity to say a Proposition is True and yet possible to be False is to say that the mind consider'd as judgingly conversant about that Proposition may be at once Conformable and Disconformable to the same thing Too wild a Position to be introduc'd into a rational nature by any thing but such a wilful and blind passion as must first actually corrupt and in fine tend to destroy the very nature it self § 5. And to void this Thesis from all possible evasion here can be no different Respects according to which these Affirmations and Negations may be made so to avoid Contradiction but all such Respects are excluded both out of the nature of the Predicate in most of those Propositions as hath been shewn Evict 1. § 5. as also out of the nature of the Points of Faith which standing in the abstract descend nor to nor meddle with subsuming Respects but have their Notions compleated in the common words which express them And lastly because Truths and Falshoods are not capable of Distinctions and Respects For however a Proposition taken into Consideration and scanning whether it be true or no may admit Respects and Distinctions and so be affirm'd to be in this regard True in that False yet what is once accepted to be True cannot in any Respect afterwards be affirm'd possible to be not True or False For example this Proposition An Ethiopian is white is distinguish'd by Respects to several parts and in regard to his Teeth 't is true to his skin 't is false But after those Respects have distinguish'd the Ambiguity of it and so by dividing it into two Propositions settled one to be True the other to be False there can be no further use of Respects or Distinctions which are to antecede to Truth and Falshood by clearing the doubtfulness of Propositions and can have no place after the Truth is once acknowledg'd or supervene to it He then that once acknowledges Points of Faith to be Truths can have no Assistance from recourse to this and the other Respect to evade a Contradiction when he affirms they may be False § 6. Again 't is particularly opposite to the nature of a Soul to have such an Act in her as to judg a thing True yet possible to be False at the same time For our Soul as to her Judging Power is essentially a Capacity of Truth whence the First Principles which ground all Truths are so connatural to her that she cannot but embrace them and judg them true Nothing therefore being more opposit to Truth than a Contradiction it follows that nothing is more impossible to be receiv'd or subjected in the Soul according to her Judging Power than a Contradiction that is no implicatory or contradictory Act can settle there Now to judg a Proposition or Point to be true is to judg the thing to exist just as it affirms and to judg it Possible to be False is to judg it Possible not to exist as it affirms and this not in order to different times but the same that is to judg a Proposition or Point true yet possible to be false is the same as to judg the thing actually is and yet perhaps is not at the same time and this as appears by our former Discourse not to be avoided in our case by difference or diversity of Respects Wherefore since such an Act is not possible to be in the Judging Power of the Soul 't is most manifest that he who holds one side of the Contradiction cannot possibly hold the other that is he who holds Faith may be False cannot hold that 't is True and that if it be held and profest to be True it ought also to be held and profest Impossible to be false § 7. Moreover the Soul antecedently to its being inform'd by the Object was indifferent and undetermin'd to judg it True or False that is to be or not to be but when it
came afterwards through consideration of the Thing or Object to judg it True it became determin'd and how but by a Notion the most determinative of any other viz. that of being or is wherfore since to put in her at the same time a Judgment of its possibility to be False puts her to be indetermin'd and this in order to the same This Position puts the Soul to be at once determinate and indeterminate as to the same which states are as vastly distant as actual Being and not-actual Being can remove them Nay this monstrous Thesis makes the Soul Indeterminate to either side that is to Truth as well as to Falshood even after it had suppos'd her determin'd to Truth For to judg a Point possible to be False puts the Judgment Potential or Indetermin'd as to the Falshood of it and False signifying not-true possible to be False must signifie possible to be not True and so include Potentiality or Indetermination to Truth also in regard were it actually True it could not be Possible to be not True or not it self The Soul must then be Indeterminate to either that is neither judg it true nor false even after she was supposed to judg it true in case she can then judg it possible to be false and consequently this Position of Faith's possibility to be false cannot without highest contradâ—ction stand with a hearty conceit that Faith is True To think to escape the force of this Argument by alleadging the respect to different Motives or that the Understanding was not perfectly but partly determin'd is in our case frivolous For I ask was it determin'd enough by any Intellectual or Rational Motives to judg the thing is if not what made it judg so when those Motives could not Is it not evident it must be some weakness or some blind motive in the Will not Light of Understanding But if it were determin'd enough to judg the thing is or is true 't is also enough for my Argument and Purpose § 8. Especially the force of this Argument will be better penetrated when it shall be well consider'd in what Truth and Falshood formally consist and that taken rightly they are certain Affections or Dispositions of our Understanding For that is not to be called True by me which is not True to me not is any thing True to me but when 't is seen by me to be so in the Object and to be thus seen by me is the Object to inform and actuate my Understanding Power as 't is Judicative whence that Power as 't is thus actuated gains a Conformity to the thing it self in which consists the precise nature of Truth However then Truth come from the Object which is the ground or cause of it yet 't is formally no where but in the Understanding or Judgment as appears evidently from this that Truth is found in Propositions now Propositions are not in the thing formally though when true they are deriv'd hence but in the mind only and significatively in words Truth then is that whereby I am true or veracious when I say interiourly the Thing is or is thus and thus wherefore the Truth of any Point is not had till this Actuation or Determination of my Power by the Object which as it's Formal Cause makes this Conformity to it be put And this put to think that at the same time or at once the mind can be unactuated undetermin'd potential or disconformable to it is too gross a conceit to enter into the head of any man endued with the common Light of Reason Whoever then affirm's Faith or those Propositions which express Faith possible to be false he is convinc't by the clearest Light of Reason in case the desperation of maintaining the Truth of Faith for want of grounds drives him not to say any thing but that he speaks candidly what he thinks not to judg or say from his heart His Faith is indeed True having never experienc't in his Soul for want of Principles to put it there that the Object or Ground of his Faith hath wrought in it that Conformity to the thing in which Truth consists and consequently that when he professes Points of Faith to be Truths he either by a fortunate piece of folly understands not what he sayes or collogues and dissembles with God and the world for honour or some other Interest § 9. 'T is hence farther demonstrated that the Position we impugn destroys the Notion of Metaphysical Unity consisting in an Indivision or Indistinction of any Notion Nature or Thing in it self and a Division or Distinction of it from all other For according to this Tenet Truth or the Conformity of our Understanding to the Object put by our joynt supposition that the Proposition of Faith is true may possibly be Disconformity or Falshood and this Determinate State Indeterminate which makes the mind as having in it One Notion that is indeed that One Notion capable to admit into its bowels Another not only disparate but Opposit that is One possible to be not One but Another § 10. The same is demonstrated concerning Metaphysical Verity For this Position makes the self-same mental Proposition or Disposition of the Understanding we call Truth possible to be Falshood that is Possible not to be the same with it self which subverts all Metaphysical Verity that is the Foundation or ground of all Formal Verity or Truth in the World § 11. The same injury demonstratively accrues to Metaphysical Bonity or Goodness For it makes that Conformity of the mind to the thing which is Truth and so the Good or Perfection of the Understanding to be at once possible to be Falshood that is possible to be not good but harmful and destructive to it § 12. I make no question but my Adversaries will think to elude the force of these three last Demonstrations and perhaps of some others by alleadging that they deny absolutely Truth can possibly be Falshood and that they mean only that though the Points of Faith appear now upon considerable Motives to be True yet those Motives secure it not from being absolutely False but not so that they can really be both And I grant this would be a good Answer in case they did not affirm Points of Faith to be really True upon which Supposition taken from the common Language and Sentiments of all that profess Christianity even theirs too as Christians I proceed but only profest they were Likely to be True for then it would be so far from following that Truth could be Falshood or that the same Points could be both true and not true at once that in that case it would follow they ought to affirm they were neither True nor False since likely to be True and True indeed are no more the same than a Statue which is like a man is the same with a man But if all Christians be bound to profess and themselves actually do so that their Faith is indeed
True then let us see how they will avoid the consequences of my former discourse when they assert it withall Possible to be False For it is that very individual judgment they make concerning a Point of Faith or an Act of Faith which they must affirm to be True or a Truth that is conformable to the thing and 't is of the self-same Judgment though call'd by them a Truth of which they affirm that 't is possible to be False or disconformable to the Object And this is not so meant as if it should become so afterwards either by some Alteration of that Judgment into another or of the thing to which it is Conformable but that even that very self-same Judgment while they speak and hold it after their Fashion True may even then possibly be False from which 't is evident that for want of solid Grounds to settle Poinâ—s of Faith in their Soul as Truths they hold them indeed only Likelihoods whose Nature 't is to be Possible to be Fâ—lse and yet forc't by the natural sense and language of Christianity which 't is dishonourable to them too palpably to contradict they become oblig'd to profess them Truths whose firm Grounds make them Impossible to be False though at the same time they affix to them the proper badg of Likelihoods Possibility of Falshood Whence by confounding the purest and solidest nature of Truth 's Gold with other Notions of so base an alloy that it cannot admit any mixture with them all Principles which are to support the true Natures or Beings of things are by consequence attacqu't and could their Position stand would quite be overthrown Fourth Eviction § 1. THe very first Principle of all Truth cannot escape the pernicious Attempts of this Erroneous Tenet 'T is this Quicquid est dum est impossibile est non esse or The same thing cannot both be and not be at once For in Faith-Propositions especially those in which Existent is the Predicate as the Trinity is c. 't is the same to say the Proposition is True as to say the Subject is Existent and the same to say it may be False as to say 't is Possible to be not Existent or that it may not be and our Adversaries relate not this to a several circumstance of time in which they may be conceiv'd to agree to the Subject successively for their sense is that this Proposition a Trinity is c. may for any thing they know even now possibly be False while they pronounce it true Since then to affirm a thing Existent and yet Possible to be not Existent at the same time is to say directly that it may be and may not be at once 't is most manifest that either they must not say a Trinity is Existent or else 't is not possible not to be Existent at the same time that is if indeed that Point of Faith be True they must withall affirm it Impossible to be False as also that they who affirm both profess to hold direct Contradictories So that while these men go about to violate the Sanctuary of Faith whose solid Nature is so built that 't is intrinsecally repugnant to Falsity they by consequence subvert the Ground-work and Bottom-Principles of all Truth So wisely did that best Master of Mankind settle his Doctrin that we cannot call into question that which makes us Christians without renouncing all that makes us Men. § 2. I foresee my Adversaries will still object that I mistake them and impose upon them to relate their Discourse to the real Being of the thing as it stands in the thing it self whereas they intend it only to mean the thing as standing under Notion or consider'd according to divers Motives they either have or may have to perswade or disswade them as to the Verity of it and in plain terms that they mean only this that Faith is not so conveniently proposed to them but that the grounds of it for any thing appears evidently are possible to be False I answer that I also speak of the thing as standing under Notion else how could I put it in Propositions and discourse from the nature and contradictoriness of those Propositions as I do all along But yet lest my Notions should be aiery and empty I am careful to take them from the nature of the thing and to rate the Truth of my Propositions from the Conformity they have to the Object as in it self and the force of my Motives from the relation they have to First Principles and then I am sure to discourse and speak solidly The same I expect from them Whence I ask them whether they assent to this Proposition A Trinity is Existent that is judg it really and indeed True or not If not I argue not against them at present but leave them to be confuted by the natural Sentiments and punsh'd by the abhorrence of all that profess themselves Christians even their own party of whom I have so good an Opinion that they will heartily abominate that man who shall make any difficulty to profess and maintain that there is indeed a Trinity or that his Faith is True But in case they do assent indeed to this Proposition A Trinity is or judg it True then I contend farther that they must be forc't likewise to affirm it to be so in the thing in it self as they predicate that is there is found in the same Thing or Being what corresponds to the Notion of Trinity and the Notion of Existent which put and that they thus judg it to pass in the Thing I affirm that out of the formal Opposition between Existent and not-Existent and their Incompossibility in the same subject which they cannot but know it follows necessarily that they must judg it Impossible it should be not-Existent or that that Proposition should be false at the same time they judg it true and the thing existent nor ever afterwards unless the thing whence it 's Truth is taken be Alterable I will endeavour to explain my self a little clearer if I can As real existence so ultimately determines and actuates the Thing in which it is that it excludes while there all possibility of real non-Existence so Intellectual or Iudg'd Existence exprest by the word is so ultimately determines and actuates the Soul as to its Judging Power that it excludes whiles there all Possibility of judg'd non-Existence in such sort that the Soul being by Nature fram'd a Capacity of Truth 't is no less Impossible it can judg a thing may be and may not be at once than 't is that a thing should at once be and not be in reality Again I affirm that 't is equally impossible the Motive which in case she acts rationally convinces the Soul the Thing is should consist with a Possibility of it 's not Being as 't is that the Soul can at once judg it to be and not to be or that the thing can both be and not be
really since this Motive was the Cause of the other Iudgment and an Effect of the Thing 's Being so in reality and depends on the same Incompossibility of Being and not-Being or on the simplicity of the Notion is and lastly on a Maxim as evident as what is most namely that the same is the same with it self Whence I make account whoever has sufficient Grounds to affirm a Point of Faith is or is true that is is more than Likely to be True has withall true Grounds to affirm it Impossible to be False and that who confesses it Possible to be False disclaims any true Grounds of judging or professing it is or is True and so judges it in his heart to be but a high Probability or a good Likelihood at most which is enough for plausible Talkers but falls far short of making a man a true Christian. § 3. And hence we may with horrour and pitty reflect upon the perniciousness of Heresy in corrupting the Understanding that eye whose defect fills as our Saviour discourses it the whole Body with darkness by subverting fundamentally all those Principles in which the Common Light of all Knowledg consists and perverting as much as the Goodness of Nature establish't by our Creator will suffer it that very Faculty which makes us Men in what is most Intrinsecal and Essential to it the knowledg of the first Principles that is despoiling it quite of all Intellectual Perfection due to it's nature But to return to our Arguments § 4. Can any discourse be taken higher than from first Principles Yes in some sort there can that is from the First Cause or Being or à Patre Luminum the Father of lights from whom all created Natures whence those Principles are borrowed and the very nature of our Understanding it self where they are found derive their Origin This First Being Metaphysicks demonstrate to be Self Existent that is Infinit and Unlimited in Existence and consequently in all perfections amongst which since to be a Self-determination to act according to right Reason is one God has or rather is that too It being then according to right Reason to do what is seen clearly to be best all things consider'd God seeing what is absolutely Best must therefore be Self-determin'd to do still what is Best This put looking into the notions of Good and Best we find them to be both relative and that what is good to none is is not good at all Applying which to God's Perfection every way Infinit and no way farther perfectible 't is seen manifestly that when he is said to operate exteriourly in this world what is Best it cannot mean what is Good or Best to Himself or any thing which is His own Good or Perfection but what is good or best to his Creatures And hence we settle this most comfortable most evident and most enlightning Conclusion that God does what 's best for his Creatures And it being evidently Best for them to be guided or govern'd according to the true natures which he has given them it follows also that God governs his Creatures connaturally or sutably to their right natures § 5 Hence it follows that if we can once demonstrate that to Act thus or thus is most Connatural to such a Species or Nature we can demonstrate from the Highest First Best and most Immutable Cause that however Contingency finds place in divers particulars yet that kind as 't is subjected to Gods guidance is govern'd most agreeably to its true and right nature which his Creative Wisdom and Goodness had at first given it § 6 Particularly 't is consequent that it cannot be God should command or expect from his Creatures what is opposit to the true Nature he had given them For since their being what they are or their Metaphysical Verity is fixt by the Idea's in his own divine Understanding from which in their Creation they unerringly flow'd hence as to put them at first was to act conformably to himself or his own Wisdom so to violate them is to work Disconformably and unlike to himself which it cannot be thought God should do through Inclination or Choice and as little be made to do it through force § 7. Again since we can no otherwise discourse of God but by such Notions as we gather here from Creatures which however improper yet all grant to be truly pronounc't of him if they signify Perfection Hence if we can demonstratively evince that such an Action is truly agreeable to Wisdom Goodness Mercy c. and such others disagreeable we can know Demonstratively that those are worthy to proceed from him These Impossible to have so infinitely perfect an Author § 8. What use may be made of this Principle of Supream Wisdom God does what is best for his Creatures will be seen hereafter The use we make of it at present is to adde a new degree of establishment to our former Discourses by applying it to them I argue then thus Since 't is agreeable to rational Nature or rather since 't is the very Nature it self not to hold any thing but upon the tenure of Immediate Connexion or seeing that the first Principle of all rational discourse The same is the same with it self is engag'd for the Truth both of the Premisses and Consequence since Assents not thus abetted are but Opinions and as such deprave Humane Nature since nothing but true Certainty can fix the Understanding in a steadness of Judgment since 't is connatural to Rational Nature to proceed upon Principles which is not to be had where there is Possibility of Falshood since this Possibility renders Faith unmaintainable and so contrary to rational nature makes Christians hold and profess what they cannot make good since the putting Points of Faith to be Truths yet possible to be False puts the Soul in violent and Incompossible States as of Indetermination and Determination Conformity and Disconformity to the Object nay subjects her to the judging Contradictions True which is most repugnant to her Nature since it subverts all the Principles of our Understanding both Logically and Metaphysically consider'd that is radically and fundamentally destroys all possible Rationality since it destroys the Nature of Faith it self and by consequence the stability of all the Natures in the world since I say these things are so as hath been particularly prov'd in my precedent Discourses it follows that 't is the greatest Impossibility that God who does the best for his Creatures can govern or manage his Darling-Creature Mankind on this preternatural fashion But 't is Certain that the way to arrive at Faith is particularly laid by Gods Providence and so is an especial part of his Government of Mankind 't is known also and acknowledg'd that he has commanded us to profess the Truth of our Faith in due occasions Therefore 't is Impossible the Means Grounds or Rule of Faith and consequently Faith it self should be capable to be False Seeing this last Position joyn'd
the Nature of Faith is plac'd beyond all Proportions of its failing to its standing and all degrees of Contingency that is 't is Impossible to be False § 6. Moreover to say 'T is a thousand to one Faith is True or there is a Trinity is not to say 'T is True or There is a Trinity Christians therefore ought in due candor then when they are to profess their Faith express onely how much over-proportion in a Moral Estimation its Likelihood bears to its Unlikelihood and not to stand telling a Lie when they are to make Profession of their Faith saying 'T is True when 't is onely to such a degree Likely to be True that is Lying when they should be doing a chief duty of Religion And which is worst of all as being not onely most unwise and imprudent but most diabolically wicked and impudent to stand stiff in the Profession of that Ly though they hazard the loss of their Estates and even Lives too by the bargain Yet this imputation of such a most foolish and most damnably-dishonest Obstinacy is Unavoidably to be affixt upon Christians if they thus profess their Faith True in case it be Possible to be false that is in case it be onely a thousand to one for example that 't is True If it be said they saw not perhaps this possibility of Falshood and so acted virtuously in that Absolute Profession of its Truth because of their good meaning the Answer is ready First that Mr. Tillotson Mr. Stillingfleet and such who maintain and so if they write what they think see Faith Possible to be False are bound not to profess Faith to be True and to forewarn others not to make such a Lying Profession Next that if God have commanded us to make such a Profession as all Christians grant he has then not onely their Meaning but the Act it self is good and laudable Which joyn'd to these mens Principles and their Natural Consequences laid open in our former Discourse signifies that Dishonesty is Honesty and a most foolish and wicked Obstinacy a high Virtue as being commanded by God Nay that God is the Author of Sin commanding them to tell a Ly in Professing their Faith True Positions most abominable as well as contradictory but 't is most fit the Nature of all Goodness should go to wrack when the Nature of Truth is once violated § 7. Again if Contingency have place in Faiths Basis there must be some stint of this Contingency according to the moral estimation of things be it then for Example a thousand to one or what other proportion you please for it alters not the present case If then it be but a thousand to one Faith is True then 't is One to a thousand 't is not-true that is it will bear a Wager that Faith is a Ly and a Christian according to these Principles may without injury to his Faith or its Grounds and with a great deal of Honesty lay a wager that his Faith is actually False Nay if he get any one to cope with him at excessive odds he is bound in Reason and Prudence to undertake him and lay a wager all Christian Faith is a Ly. Which sounding highest Impiety in the ears of all reputed Christians of what Sect soever that govern themselves by the Natural conceit they have of Faith 't is plain that the Nature of Faith is plac'd beyond all Contingency of failing that is all Possibility of Falshood If it be objected such a Wager could never be try'd and so it could never in Prudence come to be layd I reply my Discourse is unconcern'd how able or unable mans Understanding is to decide it and onely contends that the Nature of the thing that is of Faith no better settled would bear or justify it which is unavoidably consequent § 8. Particularly 't is strange that none of the Christian Martyrs who from time to time have dy'd for their Faith should when their life lay at stake endeavour to mitigate the fury of their Persecutors with such like language I beseech you Great Nero or Dioclesian understand us Christians right we deny not absolutely the possibility of your opposit Tenets being true nor assert our own Faith so far as to say it may not possibly be False What we profess is onely this that it seems to us so highly probable or Morally-Certain that we have no Actual Doubt of it at present though we cannot absolutâ—ly say but we may come to discover it to be false hereafter and your opposit Tenets true and so renounce Christianity and joyn with you Indeed we dare venture a thousand to one or perhaps something more that our Faith is true yet for all that we shall not stick to lay one to a thousand 't is false These had been moderate and mollifying Expressions and questionless might have sav'd the lives of very many which why they should not have used they being according to our Adversaries Principles true and honest to profess them and highly prudent to do it their lives being concern'd nay Consciencious too for there is none but holds it highly sinful to conceal any Truth which may save another mans life no other reason can be given but this that the Possibility of Faiths falshood had never enter'd into their hearts but they held Gods promises of a better life full as Certain as was their present possession of this or present determination of losing it for Christ's Name All their Expressions sounded the Certainty of the Truth they profest and their most comfortable Hopes grounded upon that Certainty Nor did any of the circumstant Faithfull ever judg them too lavish of their bloud for standing so stiff upon their avowing the rigorous Truth of their Faith and the Falshood of its Contradictory but always esteem'd their Action no less Wise and Honest than it was Undaunted What kind of Profession of his Faith a Protestant thus principled would make in case of imminent Martyrdom I know not but I should esteem my self the foolishest Knave living to tell aly to hang my self by professing my Faith true which I could never heartily judg it to be whilst I held it Possible to be False and so at best onely Likely to be True § 9 Note here that I have conceded very much in yeilding a thousand to one of the Likelyhood of Christian Faith in the Protestant Grounds without Traditions Certainty which they deny rather taking in the Incredibleness of the Mysteries it would be in that Hypothesis above five to one speaking modestly that all Faith is False For since 't is Evident the Certainty of Books cannot be had at all without the Certainty of Tradition and Protestants deny the Certainty of Tradition and bring multitudes of exceptions against it as may be seen in Mr. Tillotson's Answer or rather Abuse of Sure Footing there is some degree of Incredibleness in the right Conveyance of Christ's Doctrine hitherto to which difficulty add the Incredibleness
of the Mysteryes themselves exceedingly enhauncing the other 't is manifest there would be a high disadvantage on Faith's side Nay granting a pretty high Probability which is perhaps as much as they care for yet the not-onely Improbability but seeming-Impossibility of the Mysteries of Faith if taken not as standing under Authority but as Objects of our Humane Reason as in this counter-ballancing case they ought to be would quite overpoise the Probable motive and incline the Soul strongly towards Dissent unless Interest Custom or some other Affection come in to the Assistance of the weaker Motive Printing it in a bigger Letter and diminishing the difficulty in the Object by not letting it be considered or penetrated that is by hindring the working of Right Reason Now in this case if this Discourse holds a Protestant may with a safe Conscience lay odds and wager two to one at least his Faith is all a Fâ—lshood A strange Impiety but yet the natural Consequence of that impious Tenet Faith is possible to be False as this is the genuine Sequel of denying the right Rule of Faith § 10. The same is deduc'd from the very notion of a Martyr and the proper signification of that word which is to be a witness and this as appears by his Circumstances of all witnesses the most Solemn and serious and the perfectest under that Notion that can be imagin'd as engaging not onely his word but his Life and dearest Bloud for what he testifies Now all witnessing or Attestation being most evidently of what the Witnesser knows to be True and nothing sounding more unnaturally or being more disagreeable to the nature of that kinde of Action than to have a Likelyhood for its object or to witness what he knows not as will appear by the constant practice of it in all other occasions it follows that a Martyr or Witness of the Truth of Christs Faith must know it to be True that is he must know it to be more than likely to be True and consequently nothing being more Impossible than that one can know what is not Impossible not to be True or to be False § 11. No less unnaturally would it sound should we gather together and make use of all the Equivalent Speeches to this Proposition Faith is Possible to be False such as are There is no Certain way to Heaven No man knows there is a Heaven a Hell a Iesus Christ a Trinity c. No man sees any reason securing Faith from being a lye The Ground of all our Hope is unstable and may be overthrown Absolutely speaking it may be there is no such thing as that which Christians are to profess and ought to dye for It may be Points of Faith are so many lyes and false as so many old-Wives Tales The Light of Faith may be Spiritual Darkness and Errour What we hold to come from God the Author of all Truth may perhaps come from the Devil the Author of all Lyes All our Supernatural Truths may be Diabolical Falshoods Faith has no Principles The Points of Faith are not Truths but Likelihoods onely These and innumerable such others are all Equivalent Periphrases to this Proposition Faith is Possible to be False as in this Treatise has been manifested but how horrid and blasphemous needs no proof but thebare rehearsing of them § 12. From the Language and Practise of the Generality of the Faithful professing Faith we come next to the Practise of the Wits of Christianity not proceeding as Speculaters and Scholars a most trifling impertinent Topick when we are speaking of Faith yet most frequently us'd by our Adversaries especially Mr. Stillingfleet and Mr. Pool who are obstinately bent to practise that wilful mistake but as Christians or Faithful and this not only acting or speaking in Abstraction from Humane Knowledg but as in direct Opposition to it and as it were in defiance and despight of it Now with these intelligent Persons 't is very solemn after by penetrating the Grounds of Faith they have come to embrace Faith itself immediately to discard renounce all Tenets opposit to the said Faith how Certain soever they held them formerly Nay to stand with a mind prepared to disassent to anypiece of Humane Learning how Scientifical soever it look't which they saw evidently to thwart any of those Believed Truths Making account it was their duty captivare Intellectum in obsequium Fidei to captivate their Understandings to the Obedience of Faith or to yeild them totally up by an absolute and perfect Assent to the Truth of those Mysteries and not to heed or credit any objections or Proposals of Humane Reason to the contrary when once the stable and immovable Grounds or Motives of Divine Belief that is the Rule of Faith had subdu'd their Judgments to that invincible Assent but to rest well assur'd that all reasons were fallacious and all Positions False which went against those Sacred and Establish't Truths This was ever their unanimous and constant Profession particularly the Fathers are full of Expressions of that kind An Evident Argument that as Christians they ever held Faith and it's Grounds Impossible to be False for otherwise they had bin oblig'd by Honesty and their love of Truth not to have so readily rejected their formerly-conceited Truths nor to have stop'd their ears so obstinately to new Reasons against Faith but as long as Faith was possible to be False they ought in due candor to have still weigh'd the Opposit Thesis and the Objections perpetually alledg'd against the strength of Faith and it's Rule and consider'd which was more likely to be true and not have still concluded so partially on Faiths side and obstinately resolv'd to hear nothing against it bearing themselves as if all must needs be True which Faith's Rule teacheth us that is indeed as if Faith could not possibly be false § 13. Whence follows that all who hold Faith is possible to be false ought in Conscience and their natural duty or love to Truth remain Seekers all their Lives For however they may hope at present that what they adhere to is true yet since they hold 't is possible to be false for any thing they know they ought the affair and its concern being so weighty to be still examining it's Grounds and casting about to see whether this Possibility of Falshood which they already see be not indeed Actually such though as yet they see it not or at least whether some other Profession may not after long consideration appear less possible to be False and another still less than that that so they may go as near Truth as they can weighing discreetly and impartially what Deism Paganism Turcism and such others wisely represented without their Poetical Fancyes and Fooleries can say for themselves Or lastly if they come to such a Scepticism in Religion which I doubt is the true case as to judg such a quest lost labour because when all 's done the sullen Dame Truth
bind the Understanding to Assent not from their relation to other extrinsecall Proofs corresponding or discorresponding with them but from the Truth of the Premisses on which they intrinsecally depend and the Goodness of the Consequence and finally by virtue of their being built on first or self-evident Principles If then the Motives one man has at present be sufficient of their own nature to oblige him acting according to right reason to judg Faith True who ever has humane Reason ought to assent upon them and if Faith be still possible to be False that is False to us that is be possible to be shown False or possible that others may have just ground to hold it so put those Grounds also in the same man and since they must be convictive of humane understanding they ought to have their formal Effect where they are that is convince it of Faith's Falshood too which however absurd yet 't is the genuine and necessary sequel of this Source of Absurdities viz. That Faith and its Rule may possibly be False How the force of this Discourse is avoidable but by alledging that no man acting according to right reason has just grounds to hold his Faith True to us or can ever have just Grounds to hold it False to us which is to deny the Possibility of Faith's Falshood to us the Opposers own position I profess my self utterly unable to discern Now he that holds these Positions is a perfect Sceptick or a Pyrrhonian as to matters of Religion since he puts an absolute desperateness of knowing the Truth on either side in that matter or subject Objection VI. When 't is said that Faith and its Rule may be False the Arguer misunderstands it to mean that we assert it may actually and indeed be shown so whereas 't is only meant by those words that 't is Possible to be False for any thing we know or for any thing the Grounds of Faith as to our knowledg evince or force to the contrary Answer I know not what Possibility to any thing means if it be not a relation to its being actually and indeed nor a Possibility of being False to us but a Possibility of being actually and indeed such that is of being actually shown so to us And all this must be forcibly admitted by him who puts no proper or necessary Causes in the Thing nor consequently Conclusive Motives in mens Understandings why this Faith now profest should necessarily be the same Christ and his Apostles taught 'T is indeed a different thing to say it may be so and to say I do not know but it may be so But he who maintains that Faith may possibly be False if he be honest knows what he maintains to be True otherwise certainly he were very wicked who would thus disgrace or diminish Faith if he did not know his Position to be a Truth whence follows that such a man must not onely say I know not but it may be False but he must if he will speak out what he thinks be oblig'd to say I know it may be False however he be loath to declare Categorically and sincerely his Tenet in so odious a Point or hazard his credit with the Generality of Christians whose Sentiment he contradicts so expresly Objection VII 'T is enough that Faith be as Certain as that the Sun will rise to morrow that America will not be drown'd as that there was a Henry the Eighth c. which are onely Morally Certain and enough for humane action since they exclude Actual Doubt or leave no suspicion of doubt behind them which as Mr. Stilling fleet tells us App. p. 76. is the highest actual Certainty which the mind of any reasonable man can desire In the same manner as it is Certainty enough for me to use my house that I am morally certain it will not fall on my head though I have no Absolute Security but it may And this kind of Certainty seems more suitable to Mankind being more easily penetrable by the Generality than the other rigorous and over-straining Certainty which seems more fit and proper for the higher sort of Speculaters than for a world of men which comprehends capacities of all degrees and sorts and the greatest part of them perhaps of little Learning Answer The Objecter must prove that all those Instances are only-Morally-Certain or Possible to be False e're he alleadge them for such That of Henry the Eighth which does indeed oblige the understanding to belief I affirm to be Practically Self evident and demonstrable and so Impossible to be False As for the rest they are utterly unfit to parallel Faith's Certitude being all of material things whose very Essence is to be mutable whereas Points of Faith being Truths and in matters not subject to Contingency are essentially incapable of being otherwise than they are that is still Truths So that far easier is it that all material nature should undergo all the Changes imaginable than that any such Truth can not be it self or the Principles on which 'c is built in us desist to be True or Conclusive In particular I would askâ— whether it be enough for Faith to be as Certain to us Christians as it was to those immediately before the Flood that the whole world should not be drown'd which exceeds the case of America's possible destruction or as it was to those after the Flood that the Sun should never stand still or go back or lastly as it is that a house of whose Firmness none had actual doubt should fall If so then the Standing of the Sun in Ioshuah's time and it's Retrogradation in Ezekiah's show the unparallelness of these Instances You 'l say these were both miraculous But this alters not the case first because it was never heard nor can it be held by any sober man that even Miracle can make such Truths Falshoods or those Motives which are of their own nature able to conclude the Truth of any such Points Inconclusive or Invalid Next because if the Motives to Faith and so Faith it self are Possible to be false for any thing we know 't is Impossible to give a satisfactory Answer to a Deist demanding how in case they should prove indeed False we can be assur'd Gods Goodness to Mankind will not step in even miraculously to discover the vanity of so universal an Illusion and the Abuse of Falshoods so absurdly imposing upon the world as to obtain the highest repute of Sacred and Divine Truths Concerning the last Instance of the Moral Certainty of a houses standing which hath been objected to me by learned Protestants as sufficient to make me act as steadily and heartily as if I had a Demonstration that it would not possibly fall besides the General Answer that Points of Faith are Truths which renders the case unparallel I reply that the two houses the one in Holborn the other in Kings Street which of late years a third in Cock Lane which of late days fell when
none had the least actual doubt or suspicion of doubt of it else surely they would never have staid in them inform us sufficiently to what a changeable tottering and ruinous condition Christian Faith would be reduc'd by these Principles and Parallels No fewer than three Houses fell in the compass of a short time and none had the least suspicion of doubt beforehand of such an Event therefore may an Atheist say Down falls Christian Faith too whose Foundation was by this Doctrin but Parallel for strength to the other or if it fall not in so long time it has only something better luck not better grounds than had the three Houses As for the objected Unsuitableness of such a Certainty as I require 't is reply'd that nothing is more natural for the Generality of Mankind than to be led by Authority nothing more penetrable by those of all sorts than the Infallibleness and Veracity of exceedingly vast and grave Authorities relating matter of Fact as we experience in their beleef that there was a Q. Elizabeth and such like to comprehend and assent immovably to which costs them not the least over straining as the Obiecter imagins Which being so I make account that God both in his power and wisdom could in his Goodness would render the Authority of his Church the Ground and Pillar of Truth as evident to all her Children both as to its Inerrableness and Veracity as the other nay incomparably more it being in every regard so requisit Objection VI. If the Motives to Faith must be Impossible to be False to us they would necessarily conclude the Truth of Faith wherefore they would of themselves oblige the Understanding to assent and so there would need no precedent pious affection of the Will which yet both Councils Fathers and Catholick Divines with one consent require Nay more were not such a pious affection put Acts of Faith would not be Free Answer If Experience teaches us that even assent to Humane Sciences though Evident from Intrinsecal reasons Comprehensible by our Understanding and purely Speculative is not to be acquir'd without an affection to see Truth as is evident from the carriage of meer Scepticks who having entertain'd a conceit of it's hopelesness come thence to want Love or Affection for it and so never come to see it how Conclusive soever the reasons be Much more by far must some good affection be pre-requisit to assent to Divine and Supernatural Truths which are Obscure in themselves as depending upon Authority Incomprehensible to our natural reason and Practical that is obligingly-Efficacious to break out into Christian Action or Love of Heaven above all sublunary things as True Faith must be The First obstacle of the three mention'd has this difficulty that the beams of Truth which come directly from the things themselves are generally apt to strike our Understanding more naturally penetrate it more deeply and to stick in it more immovably than those which are reflected to us from the Knowledg of another such as are Points of Faith besides the new difficulty of seeing the Veracity of the Attester which how evident soever it be yet it puts the Understanding to double pains whereas Evidence had from the Thing is but a single labour and so less confounding and distracting the thought The Second Obstacle Incomprehensibleness is apt to stupify the Understanding and retard Assent nay even to deter it from considering them as Truths The Atheistical temper of the world which could not subsist were Metaphysicks duly advanc'd sufficiently informs us how difficult it is for men to apply and fix their thoughts upon those considerabilities in things and those natures which are abstracted from matter the reason whereof is because it being natural that our Fancy be in act while our Understanding is so and there being not Proper Phantasms the onely agreeable ones to material men who are not strong enough to guide their Judgments purely by Principles and Connexions of Terms which sute to such abstracted Conceptions but Metaphorical ones onely which the Understanding must in rigour deny to be right ones even while by necessity 't is forc't to make use of them Hence the life of a Christian as such being to serve God in Spirit and Truth and so the Objects and Principles of his new Life for the most part and principally Spiritual ones it comes to pass that for this very regard alone there will need a great love of Truth and Spiritual Goods to make the Understanding appliable to them or even admit a consideration of them I was told by a worthy Friend of mine that discoursing with an acute man but a great hater of Metaphysicks and mentioning a Spirit he in a disgust broke out into these words Let us talk of what we know By which expression 't is manifest that he mistook the Question An est for Quid est But what makes for my purpose is that the unknowableness of the Essence or nature of a Spirit to us in this State obstructed even his desire to consider whether there were any such thing or no consequently that there needs a contrary desire or affection to know Spiritual things to make us willing even to entertain a thought of their being much more to conceit it But incomparably more needful is such an Affection when to the Spirituality of those points there shall be added an Incomprehensibleness nay if onely those points be consider'd an Incredibleness when no Parallel can be found in Nature nor scarce any similitude weakly to shadow out the thing and it's possibility nay when some of those points directly thwart the course of natural Causes whence all our other Knowledges have their Stability Then I say if ever there is requisit an Affection for the Nobleness and Excellency of those high Spiritual Objects to make us willing to hearken to any Authority proposing them how evident soever the Motives be for the Credibleness of that Authority The third Obstacle follows taken from the End for which Faith is essentially ordain'd that is from what it essentially is viz. a mover of the Will to Virtue and Goodness or a Practical Principle Now nothing is more evident than this Truth that by-affections and contrary inclinations are apt to hinder the understanding from assenting or even attending candidly and calmly to these Reasons how clear soever they be which make against any beloved Interest whence there needs a contrary affection to these other to remove the mists those passions had rais'd and purge the Eye of the Mind that so it may become capable of discerning what it could not before though in it self most visible How much more not only requisite but even necessary must some pious affection be to permit the mind freely to embrace the doctrin of Christian Faith containing Principles which enjoyn a disregard and posthabition of all that is sweet to Flesh and Blood nay even of Livelihood and Life it self 'T is most manifest then that a Plous
their attempting or neglecting to do this and onely by that Test it will be seen whether my Evictions stand or fall whereas from flashy wit so little is gain'd that even what 's solid suffers disgrace by such a managery And I here very penitently beg pardon of my Readers that I have sometimes heretofore spent my precious time and less-fruitful labour which might have been better employd in pursuing that way of Folly For such my more deliberate Thoughts now discover it however the reputed profoundness but indeed real shallowness of my Adversaries made it at that season seem most convenient FINIS Corrections of the Press PAge 6. line 5. built upon p. 14. l. 13. the Ten et p. 25. l. 10. Acts. as p. 33. l 5. not be is p. 43. l. 9 is deniable p. 89. l 25. Objects on p. 112. l. ult 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 121. l. 2. 't is neither Affirmation nor l. 9 usually p. 126. l. 26. Such Truths p. 128. l. 9. their power l. 18. at all p. 130. l. 25. of the Schools p. 134. l. 26. find p. 139. l. 18. being to l. 21. both at p. 149. Objection VIII p. 161. l. 13. parologysm l 21 nut at p. 164 l. 1. Objection IX l. 5. to have p. 171. l. 22. onely-true Postulata The Thesis demonstrated from the nature of Evidence From the nature of the Subject in Faith-Propositions From the nature of the Copula From the nature of the Predicatâ— in most of those Propositions From the nature of Distinction as apply'd to the Predicate From the impossibility of distinguishing the subjects of Faith-propositions From the nature of Truth consisting in an Indivisible From the nature of Connexion From the nature of Opinion The Origin and Natures of Suspence and Assent The Point evinc't from the natures of Suspence and Assent From the nature of Holding From the nature of Knowing From the nature of Certainty in many regards From the Impossibility that what may be false can have any Principles From the Identity of Certainty with Infallibility From the contrary opinion's unavoidably subjecting Faith to Chance and Contingency From the Incompossibility of Truth with Falsehood From the nature of Disputation and the Impossibility otherwise to evince the Truth of faith The main Thesis demonstrated from the want of Potentiality in the Subject From the otherwise necessity of putting a consistency of Truth with Falshood From the otherwise necessity of putting Contradictories to be true From the otherwise necessity of putting it possible the minde should be at once conformable and disconformable to the thing From the Impossibility of different Respects here so to avoid a Contradiction From the nature of the Soul From the necessity of putting the Soul at once determin'd and indetermin'd in order to the same Point From the Formal Natures of Tâ—uth and Falshood From the notion of Metaphysical Unity From the notion of Metaphysical Verity From the notion of Metaphysical Bonity or Goodness From the contrary Thesis being destructive to the Fiâ—st Principle in all Metaphysicks From the Impossibility of a sufficient Motive to judg a thing True with a Motive to judg it possible to be False From the nature of the First Cause or the Deity From the nature of the proper Agent in instructing Mankind From the nature of the Persons instructed From Faith's being a Virtue From Faith's being an Intellectu al Virtue From Faith's being a Supernatural Virtue From the firmness Supernatural Faith ought to hâ—vâ—â—bove Natural Another Proof from the same head From the requisiteness that Christian Action should proceed from the Acters in the perfectest manner That otherwise Christian Religion would be more defective in point of Principles than any other Art or Science From Faith's being the Knowledg of our last End and of the way to it From the Certainty the Heathens had of the Principles of their imperfect Morality From mans last End being only attainable by Intellectual means From Virtue 's being the connatural Effect of Truth and Vice of Falsehood From the otherwise Inability of Faiâ—h to resist overcome Temptations From the otherwise Uncertainty of the Existence of Spiritual Goods or the Attainableness of them in the next life From the otherwise preternaturaliâ—y in producing a due love of Heaven From the Incredibleness of the Mysteries nor superable by any Motive possible to be False From the otherwise greater plausibility of Objections against Faith From Faith's being a Knowledg of God of his Will From Faith's being plac'd beyond Contingencie From the manner in which Christians express themselves when they profess their Faith From this that otherwise it were lawful to lay a wager Christian Faith is a Ly. From the Carriage of the Martyrs if suppos'd Honest Prudent From the Blasphemousnes of the Equivalencies to this Proposition Faith is Possible to be False From the Practice of Learnedst Christians in captivating their understandings to Faith From the Duty incumbent on the maintainers of the impugn'd Tenet to remain Seekers all their lives From the inefficaciousness it brings to Christian Preaching and Exhortation From the Churches constant Practice of Obliging to Belief * Rule of Faith * Infer 4 * Infer 2.
patronize Falshoods against this deceit our Saviour hath fore-arm'd us by his fore-warning us with a Nolite credere when any one pretends Loe here is Christ or there is Christ. Lastly 't is visible to any indifferent understanding that those Divines who defend this influence of the pious Affection upon the settling of Faith's Certainty though in other Points very rational and acute yet when they come to this they are at an utter loss and can make nothing cohere Philippus de Sancta Trinitate contradicts himself twice or thrice in one leaf while he attempts to defend it But I instance in one for all that is Father Vincentius Baronius a Doctour of Tholouse and of the Holy Order of S. Dominick a Person of as much Eminency Gravity and Learning as any of late dayes This Great Writer in his Manuductio ad Moralem Theologiam p. 130 131. falls upon Caramuel in these words Distinguit Caramuel duplicem honestatis Certitudinem seu veritatem formalem unam vocat alteram objectivam istam negat cuilibet opinioni probabili ill am concedit c. Sed hoc nobis ignorantiae prodiglum est aut temeritatis dari veritatem aut falsitatem certitudinemque cui nulla Objectiva correspondeat Hoc ne deo quidem concessum est ut Scientiam habeat rei non scibilis i. e. veritatem formalem rei quae objectivâ careat Yet the same Authour p. 271 is forc't by the defence of this ill grounded Tenet which he had espous'd into the same paralogysm which he had so gravely severely and learnedly reprehended in another Where putting the Objection very home he asks Si praevium illud ad Fidem Iudicium sit intra probabilitatis fines quâ ratione poterit mens assurgere in assensum illo seu opinione firmiorem ergo fidei Certitudo nutlat si ab illo Iudicio quod prudenter probabile dixi pendeat nec aliunde repetatur This done acknowledging that tota Controversia fidei summa is contain'd as indeed it is in this argument he addresses himself to answer it First sleightly by an example that this precedent Judgment is to Faith as Accidental Alteration to the Substantial Form and so being onely a disposition to it may be less noble or Certain than Faith is it self whereas if our Assent of faith ought to be thoroughly rational this previous Judgment being that on which this Assent is built as to us or as to our knowledg must at least be Firm and Immovable it self since the Assent of Faith built on it ought to be such and consequently beyond Probability whence the example is most unsuitable signifying that as Nature disposes matter by imperfect degrees towards a perfect and ultimate Effect so infirm Principles may rationally beget a firm Assent After this he alledges that the Certainty of Faith is to be fetch 't from God the Authour of it who infuses Light and gives most efficacious strength to beleeve But the question is whether God ordinarily and abstracting from Miracle infuses Light into rational Creatures but by means of motives or reasons and whether it requires such strength or rather be not an unwise Credulousness that is a great weakness to beleeve beyond what we have reason to do and so unworthy God the giver of every good and perfect gift Lastly he affirms that the Certainty of Faith is to be fetch 't from the pious Affection of the will qui mentem rebus credendis indubitato immoto assensu alligat quasi nodo indissolubili Which as it were by an indissoluble Knot ties the mind to the things to be believ'd with an undoubted and unmov'd Assent But the question is how this knot is indissoluble in case the probable reason prove false unless the Soul be wilfully blind or why a resolvedness in the will can rationally establish a true Intellectual Certainty What I chiefly conclude from these answers of his is that he perpetually waves Certainty had from the Object and so unavoidably is forc't to put a formal Certainty in as to which no Objective Certainty corresponds which his excellent wit in another circumstance saw to be prodigiously faulty and a Certainty that is a perfection not competent even to God himself So Impossible 't is that Errours prejudicing the Rule of Faith should not either by Opposition to First Principles be discover'd to be Falshoods or by self-contradictions in their maintainers confess it themselves Objection VII 'T is manifest that diverse weak people assent upon very Inconclusive nay silly or less than probable Motives whom yet no sober man will deny have saving Faith the true nature of Faith then requires not necessarily motives Impossible to be False or that Faith be True to us but may be without any such qualification Answer When we say Faith is Impossible to be False we take the word Faith in its proper and primary signification now that being the proper signification of a word that is most usual and that most usual which is found in the Generality of the users of it the proper signification that is the true nature of Faith is that which is found in the generality of Christians which being evidently an Assent to be adher'd to all one's life to be dy'd in and dy'd for and the Object or Form of that Assent being Truths and so it self True 't is most manifestly in each of those regards imply'd that it must be Impossible to be False to us or to the Generality of Christians that is it must have Grounds able to show it nay actually showing it so to them whatever Contingency may happen in a few particulars for want of applying to them the right Rule of Faith Besides Faith must be a Knowledg of Divine things a virtuous Act and so ratâ—onal and a most efficacious Cause of working for Heaven Also its Grounds must be apt to establish the most Speculative Faithful to convert or confound the most acute Witts denying or opposing it c. all which and much more is prov'd in the First discourse of Sure Footing by arguments as yet not attempted to be invalidated by any however something hath been offer'd against those Conclusions Which Attributes it cannot possibly justify nor yet perform those Offices without being True to us or having Grounds Impossible to be False The word Faith then apply'd to those weak persons now spoken of signifies not the same as when 't is found in the Generality of Assenters but meerly a simple credulity of any thing told them by a person that looks seriously when he speaks it and is conceited by the Beleever to be wiser or to have heard more than himself Which kind of Assent if it be seconded by favourable circumstances laid by God's Providence especially by such means as are found in the Discipline of the Church so as it begets a love of Heaven above all things may suffice to save those weak and well meaning Catholicks But how incompetent an Assent no better grounded were