we should not do and not doing that which we should do if we should do a thing it supposeth we can do it otherwise it would seem absurd No dispute but we do and can will evil as evil and consequently the Definition is erroneous 2. The second Solution doth not clear the point in supposing that the evil which we do will we will it not as evil but as apparent good This is futil for what is apparent good but a real evil A thing must either be formally evil or formally good betwixt these there can be no Medium The third is grounded upon a false distinction because good as it is good doth not imply formally honesty usefulnesse or pleasure neither is it universally coveted by all bodies as it is affected with any of these accidents but as it doth perfect them So that a pleasant good is frequently not coveted as a pleasant good but as a pleasant evil and we do know that same pleasant evil to be so before we do will it The same may be said concerning good as it is usefull Neverthelesse may good be also coveted sometime as it is pleasant or usefull or honest but these are only accidental to good III. Diogenes the Stoick defines Good to be that which is perfect in its own nature Herein he confounds perfection with good which are formally different one from the other as I have shewed in my Metaphysicks Besides Good is here considered as it is relative or related to another Being although in Metaphysicks it is treated of as absolute to a Being IV. Good is whose end is to perfect that which doth bend to it all Beings bend to each other because they perfect one another By perfection understand the further constitution and conservation of a Being for all Beings are further constituted and conserved by other Beings This end may prove frustraneous to many bodies but that is not through the default of Good but of that Body to which it proveth frustraneous although bent to it Note that it doth not follow that all which a Being is bent unto is good for it although it followeth that all which doth perfect a Being is good All Beings are essentially bent to what is good but accidentally they bend also to what is evil A depravate will is accidental to man and therefore man doth accidentally covet evil This evil although it is coveted accidentally by man yet by his will it is desired formally and per se. IV. There are several degrees of good which do not differessentially from one another but have a resemblance and proportion one to the other so that one can become the other or change into the nature of the other According to this good is gradually distinguisht into Moral Good and Theologick Good V. Moral Good is whose end is to perfectionate man as he is in a natural state Moral Evil is whose end is to corrupt man as he is in a natural state VI. Theologick Good is which doth perfectionate a man in a supernatural state Theologick Evil is which doth corrupt a man as he is in a preternatural state Of these I purpose to treat of distinctly in the next ensuing Chapter CHAP. IV. Of Moral Good and Moral Evil. 1. An Explanation of the Definition of Moral Good What is understood by a Natural State The ambiguity of the word Natural 2. What Moral Good it is which doth respect the Body What Moral Good it is which respecteth the Soul 3. An Explanation of the Definition of Moral Evil. That God doth not properly bend to his creatures 4. The Distinction between these two predicates to be Good and to do Good 5. How Moral Good turns to Moral Evil. 6. That Man as he is in a neutral state is in a middle state between supernatural and preternatural FIrst It is requisite to unfold the ambiguities of the terms contained in the Definition of Moral Good What it is to perfectionate I have already declared It remains to amplifie how man is understood to be in a Natural State A Natural Being is frequently taken for a Being which is in the same state wherein it was created or produced A man then is said to be Natural when he is in the same state wherein he was created There is a two-fold Creation 1. There is an immediate Creation of man whom God did create immediately through himself no other mediate effect being interposed 2. A mediate Creation of man is whereby he is mediately through his Parents created by God Man being created by an immediate creation as long as he continued in that nature and state wherein he was created was natural but having corrupted that state through his appetite after Evil he became counter-natural in respect to his former state A Natural Being is also understood for that which continueth in the same state wherein it is as it is produced by a mediate creation and in this sense we are to apprehend it here Here may be offered an Objection That a Being cannot be said to be created by a mediate Creation and yet be counter-natural Pray observe me well here in this place I say that man who is created by a mediate Creation is counter-natural but I do not say that God who created him did create him counter-natural for he created him Natural Of this more at large elswhere And to return to my purpose Man as he is natural according to the latter acception doth perfectionate himself by that Moral Good which he doth bend unto and that same moral Good doth conservate and further constitute a man in that nature wherein he was created by a mediate Creation Man is sometimes taken disjunctly for his body and soul or else joyntly and integrally as he doth consist of both united II. According to the first distinction there is moral Good which chiefly concerns the Body of man as meat drink and cloaths There is also a moral Good chiefly respecting the soul as speculative and practick objects are morally good to the soul. You may demand how practick and speculative objects do perfectionate the soul I answer That they by their objectivenesse do conservate the souls action in its goodnesse for had the soul no moral good object to act upon it would be without a moral good action which is repugnant to that Maxim Omne quod est est propter operationem All which is is for to operate In like manner do food and cloaths conservate the Body of man in its natural state III. Moral Evil doth corrupt a man as he is in a Natural state and makâ—â— him counter-natural that is worse than he is in a Natural state I am required here to illustrate two obscurities 1. How Moral Good can be said to be good 2. How Moral Good turneth to Moral Evil. In reference to the first we are to call to mind the definition of Good which is whose end is to perfect that which doth bend to it If then Moral Good obtains a virtue to perfect
else but where we are at present The falshood of this Theorem is evident because that greatest happinesse which we enjoy in this world is like but in an inferious degree to that which we expect in the other Neither is any happinesse to be parallel'd to the greatest but which is a true Theologick happinesse If so then a Theologick happinesse must be our Summum Bonum No wonder therefore if Philosophers being destitute of this Theologick habit were false Philosophers This is the reason why Aristotle and other supposed Philosophers never arrived to the possession of the greatest happinesse because they were ignorant of God And is it not therefore unworthy of a Philosopher to be a slave to their Dictates which affected slavery hath proved an obvious cause of the greatest errours in Church and State How full of Anguish fear jealousle and uncertainties were their souls through their not knowing the true God They could never enjoy any durable happinesse as long as their minds were perplexed with them doubts In what perplexity did Aristotle die even when his languishing soul pressed out these words In doubts have I lived and in more anguish do I die whither I shall go I know not wherefore thou Being of Beings have mercy upon me What did the joys and pleasures of Epicure amount unto when he was tormented with such miserable pains of the strangury as chased his soul out of his body II. The greatest happinesse is which of all things makes a man most happy Happinesse is a concomitant of a joyfull thing or an effect wrought by a joyfull object upon man the reception of which makes him truly happy Here we will first enquire Whether the greatest happinesse is the neerest End of Natural Theology 2. How it is otherwise called 3. What it is 4. Which is the subject of this habit 5. How it is to be procured In answer to the first I say that the greatest happinesse is not the neerest and principal end of Theology I prove it That which doth not chiefly and immediately move a man in Theology is not the neerest and principal end but the greatest happinesse doth not chiefly and immediately move a man in Theology Therefore it is not the neerest and principal end of Theology 2. It is the next end to the neerest and an inseparable concomitant of the neerest end I prove it That which we do enjoy next after the possession of the habit of Natural Theology and of the Summum Bonum is the next end to the neerest But we do chiefly enjoy the greatest happinesse next after the possession of the habit of Theology and of the Summum Bonum Therefore it is the next end to the neerest There is none which ever did possesse the habit of Theology but confirms the truth and assurance of the Minor 4. The greatest happinesse is sometime called Summum Bonum or the greatest good from its causality because it doth through its presence confer the greatest happinesse upon that Subject which it doth irradiate Hence Austin de Civ Dei lib. 8. cap. 3. Finis autem boni appellatur quo quisque cum pervenerit beatus est That is called the end of good which maketh every man happy that doth attain to it Note that the greatest happinesse is only tropically named Summum Bonum from a Metonomia causae pro effectu CHAP. III. Of GOOD 1. What Good is 2. That Aristotle 's Definition of Good is erroneous 3. Diogenes his Definition of Good 4. The Explanation of the Definition of Good How the several kinds of Good differ from one another 5. What Moral Good is what moral evil is 6. What Theologick Good and evil is BOnum Good is that which doth make the subject which doth possesse it perfect Or Good is that which all Beings do incline unto for to perfect themselves The highest and greatest Good must then be that which makes a man most perfect and happy or that which all men need to perfect themselves with the same perfection which man had when he was first created I said need and not desire or incline into because all men do not desire the Summum Bonum for all men do not come to the knowledge of it yet all men need it for to perfect themselves II. There are many definitions of Good spread among Philophers whereof some are false either in not adequating the whole definitum or else in attributing falsities by it to the definitum or subject defined Among these that of Aristotle is counted most authentick* Good is that which all things do incline unto or covet This definition must either agree with Good as it is proper to all Beings and Transcendent or as it is restricted to rationals and animals in which only there is an appetite and coveting or as it is most limited to rationals only If we take it according to the first acception the definition is not formal but only accidental for it is accidental to beings as they are Good to be coveted or be desired from another being Neither doth it hold true in the last acception because we desire many things which are evil and hurtfull to us To this may be answered that a being so far as it is desired is good although it prove accidentally hurtfull This answer is not satisfactory for we do oftentimes desire things knowing them to be evil and therefore we do desire them as evil for the will doth covet things as they are understood if then the understanding doth understand them to be evil the will must consequently will them as evil Possibly some do reply that the understanding doth conceive them very things which a man afterwards doth covet To be good otherwise he could not desire them For Did he desire them as evil then he would desire his own destruction and be inferiour to all other creatures which are onely bent to that which doth perfect their nature or you may return your answer thus that good is either apparent or real and truly good and that the understanding doth understand all beings to be good apparently or really or otherwise you may distinguish good in good which is honest or profitable and usefull or pleasant and state that the understanding doth conceive all things either as they are honest useful or pleasant This doth not remove all objections as to the first The will of man is not restrained to a certain object as Naturals are but is also extended to contrary objects to wit to good and evil Neither is it singly limited to contradictories as to will evil and to leave it because to desist from an action is no action and for that reason we cannot properly say that the actions of the will are free quoad contradicentia tantum only in willing evil and ceasing from it Secondly Should God punish us for doing evil when we cannot act any thing but evil it would appear somewhat severe for punishment is to punish a delict and sinne in doing that which
the Peripateticks touching the Souls action That according to the same Opinion a Substance is said not to act immediately through it self but through superadded Powers p. 85. 2. That a Substance acteth through as many different Powers as it produceth different Acts. p. 86. 3. That the said Powers are really and formally distinct from the essence of the Soul ib. 4. That Powers are concreated with the Soul and do immediately emanate from her Essence p. 87. 5. That immaterial Powers are inherent in the Soul as in their Agent Material ones in the Matter as in their Subject ib. 6. That Powers are distinguisht by their Acts and Objects The Authors Intent in treating of the Faculties of the Soul ib. CHAP. II. Of all the usual Acceptions of power 1. The Etymology of Power The Synonyma's of Power p. 88. 2. The various Acceptions of power ib. 3. What a Passive Natural Power and a Supernatural Passive or Obediential Power is ib. 4. Various Divisions of Power p. 89. CHAP. III. Of the Nature of Power according to the Author 1. The Analogal Concept of Power as it is common to all its Analogata p. 90. 2. Whether there be Real Powers 91. 3. Certain Conclusions touching Powers p. 93. 4. That all Substances act immediately through themselves p. 95. 5. That a Peripatetick Power is a Non Ens Physicum p. 97. 6. That all Powers are really Identificated with their Subject ib. 7. That Powers are distinguisht modully from their Subject p. 98. 8. How Powers are taken in the Abstract ib. 9. The Manner of the Remission and Intention of Powers p. 99. 10. The Number of the Formal Acts caused by a singular Substance ib. 11. The Number of the Formal Acts caused by an Organical Substance p. 101. 12. The Solutions of several Doubts touching Powers ib. 13. That all Creatures have an absolute Power secundum quid of acting p. 102. 14. In what sense Hippocrates and Galen apprehended Powers ib. The FIRST PART The Fourth Book CHAP. I. Of the Nature of Natural Theology 1. What Theology is p. 1. 2. That Theosophy is a fitter name to signifie the same which is here intended by Theology That in knowing God we become Philosophers p. 2. 3. What a Habit is ib. 4. What it is to live happily That there is a mean or middle way of living which is neither living in happiness or living in misery p. 3. 5. How Theology is divided ib. 6. What Natural Theology is What Supernatural Theology is The first Doubts of a Natural man ib. 7. The Dignity of Theology p. 4. CHAP. II. Of the end of Natural Theology 1. Wherein Moral Philosopy differeth from Natural Theology and wherein it agreeth with it That the Heathen Philosophers were no true Philosophers Aristotle his dying words Epicure his miserable death after so pleasant a life p. 5. 2. A Description of the greatest Happiness Queries touching the greatest Happiness p. 6. 3. Whether the greatest Happiness is the neerest and principal end of Theology ib. 4. How the greatest Happeness is otherwise called p. 7. CHAP. III. Of GOOD 1. What Good is p. 7. 2. That Aristotle 's Definition of Good is erroneous ib. p. 8. 3. Diogenes his Definition of Good 9. 4. The Explanation of the Definition of Good How the several kinds of Good differ from one another ib. 5. What Moral Good is what moral evil is p. 10. 6. What Theologick Good and evil is ib. CHAP. IV. Of Moral Good and Moral Evil. 1. An Explanation of the Definition of Moral Good What is understood by a Natural State The ambiguity of the word Natural p. 10. 2. What Moral Good it is which doth respect the Body What Moral Good it is which respecteth the Soul p. 11 3. An Explanation of the Definition of Moral Evil. That God doth not properly bend to his creatures p. 12. 4. The Distinction between these two predicates to be Good and to do Good ib. 5. How Moral Good turns to Moral Evil. p. 13. 6. That Man as he is in a neutral state is in a middle state between supernatural and preternatural ib. CHAP. V. Of Theologick Good and Theologick Evil. 1. An Explanation of the Definition of Theologick Good p. 14. 2. An Explication of the Definition of Theologick Evil. ib. 3. What honest usefull and pleasant Good is p. 15. 4. What Natural Sensible and Moral Good is ib. CHAP. VI. Of the greatest and highest Good 1. A further illustration of the greatest Good p. 16. 2. That the highest Good is the neerest end of Natural Theology ib. 3. What the Summum Bonum is otherwise called That the greatest Good is our last end p. 17. 4. The inexpressible Joy which the soul obtains in possessing the greatest Good ib. 5. Two great benefits which the soul receiveth from the Summum Bonum p. 18. CHAP. VII Of the false Summum Bonum 1. The Summum Bonum of the Epicureans unfolded and rejected p. 19. 2. That Wealth is a greater terment than a Summum Bonum The Riches of Seneca That we ought to follow his example p. 20. 3. That to be taken up in merry discourses is not the greatest happiness ib. p. 21. 4. That it is not the greatest happiness to be merry twice or thrice a week at a mans country house p. 22. 5. That honour is not the greatest good ib. 6. That swearing is no happiness ib. 7. The Author's ground why he was compelled to make use of so light a style in this Chapter p. 23. 8. That all these enumerated instances are highly to be embraced as good but not as the greatest Good That meat and drink are to be taken with temperance ib. 9. That Riches are not absolutely to be rejected p. 24. 10. That mutual converse is commendable ib. 11. That a constant society is necessary to man ib. 12. That we ought to give honour to whom honour is due p. 25. 13. That we ought not to refuse an Oath tendred by the Magistrate ib. CHAP. VIII Of the Subject of Natural Theology 1. Man consisting of Body and Soul is the adequate subject of Natural Theology p. 26. 2. Reasons proving the Soul to be the original and principal subject of Theology ib. 3. That the Understanding and Will are really and formally one The confutation of the vulgar definition of will A full explication of the will and the manner of its acting What speculative and practical signifie p. 27 c. 4. What the will is in a large sense p. 34 5. What the will is in a strict sense ib. 6. An explanation upon the first description of will p. 35. 7. The effects of the will Whether appetibility doth not equally imply volibility and appetibility in a strict sense p. 36. 8. Whether mans appetite is distinct from his will ib. CHAP. XIX Of Free-will by reason 1. Wherein man doth most differ from Animals or Naturals p. 38. 2. To what acts the freedom of man's will in reference to its acting doth extend What the
freedom of will is quoad exercitium actus and what Libertas Contradictionis is ib. 3. What the second kind of freedom of will importeth p. 39. 4. That the speculative understanding in the act of speculation is practick ib. 5. That the will is not constrained to will a good thing although present but hath a power of rejecting it ib. 6. That the will willeth evil for an evil end That some men are worse than Devils p. 40. 7. What the will 's freedom is in specifying its acts ib. 8. What free-will is in refference to its faculty ib. 9. Velten rejected for asserting that the will is not indifferent to each contrary That the will is indifferent to each contradictory opposite p. 41. 10. That the will is free to act or not to act p. 42. 11. That the will is free to act upon particular objects whether good or evil The state of the controversie ib 12. That man as he is in a natural and corrupt state hath a free-will of doing a moral good or a moral evil act ib. 13. That man hath not a free-will of doing a theologick good act immediately through him self without an extraordinary concurrence of God with him p. 43. 14. Man hath a free-will of doing a theologick good act with an extraordinary concurrence of God with him That he hath a free-will of election ib. 15. That man as be is in a natural state hath a free-will through himself and without Gods extraordinary concurrence to procure Gods extraordinary concurrence and assistance to him in his actions That our being and conversation in it and all our actions depend from the ordinary concurrence of God Reasons why God did not conferre upon him an absolute power of acting without his ordinary concourse The cause of man's fall That that which is only morally good will prove theologick evil at last ib. 44. 16. Arguments to prove a free-will in man A reconciliation of the Calvinists with the Arminians That man hath a rement of theologick good surving in him The state of the controversie The division of it 45 c. CHAP. X. Of Free-will from Scripture 1. Objections from Scripture against man's free-will p. 48. 2. An Answer to the said Objections p. 49. 3. Objections proving that moral good is evil ib. 4. The first Objection answered p 50. 5. The second Objection removed ib. 6. Some other Texts produced against free-will in man p 51. 7. The first Text reconciled ib. 8. The second Objection removed 52. 9. Arguments deduced from faith An answer to the said Arguments ib. 10. The first Argument drawn from Scripture to prove man's free-will to good and evil p. 53. 11. A second Argument proving the same ib. 12. A third Argument ib. 13. Many other Texts inferring the same p. 54. 14. Texts proving a remnant of good in man ib. 15. Texts proving that a natural man cannot do a theologick good act through himself and being only assisted with the ordinary concurss of God ib. 16. Scriptures inferring that a supernatural man hath no free-will to direct contraries that is to do theologick good and evil An answer to some Texts produced by Bellarmin p. 55 56. 17. Scripture proofs concluding that the means whereby God's extraordinary concurrence is procured is in man and adheres to his free-will p. 57. 18. Whether man's actions performed with God's extraordinary assistance are to be taken for the actions of God or of man ib. 19. A reconciliation of the ninth to the Romans The unfolding of Predistination or of God's eternal Decree p. 58 c. CHAP. XI Of the Command of the Will 1. Whether the will can be forced 64. 2. What elicited and imperated acts are p. 65. 3. What command the will exreciseth over the inferiour faculties What a politick and despotick command is ib. 4. That the irascible and appetitive faculty are under a politick obedience to the will p. 66. 5. That the locomotive faculty is not alwayes under a servile obedience to the will ib. 6. That the will doth not command over the practick understanding ib. CHAP XII Of Voluntary and Involuntary 1. That the Understanding as it is speculative and practick is the internal principle of the ultimate and intermediate actions That God or Angels are improperly said to be external principles That God is the coefficient of man's actions How Angels whether good or evil Wizords and Witches concur to the specification of man's actions p 67. 2. What a humane action is p. 68. 3. That it is absurd to assert man to do a thing ignorantly ib. 4. Whether evils of omission through ignorance are to be termed involuntary ib. 5. How humane actions are divided p. 65 c. CHAP. XIII Of Natural Faith 1. That Faith is the sole means through which we are to attain to our greatest good What Faith is The Definition confirmed by Arguments deduced from reason p. 70. 2. The two-fold object of Faith A proof from reason that God is the Creator of man That God and Nature are one p. 71. 3. An enquiry into the end of man's creation p. 72. 4. That man doth know the summe of God's Law through the light of Nature A summary enumeration of the Law of God as it is imprinted upon every man's heart ib. 73. 5. Moral virtues compared with the moral Law A comprehension of all moral virtues p. 74 75. CHAP. XIV Of Man's Fall and of Atheism 1. A rational enquiry into man's primitive estate The manner of man's fall p. 76 2. Grounds whence a man may rationally collect hopes for his restoration p. 77. 3. That Atheism is the worst of sins and that an Atheist is unable of performing the least good act Wherein the goodness of an action doth consist ib. 78. 4. A character of an Atheist That confirmed Atheism is the onely sin against the holy Ghost A full discovery of an Atheist ib. 79. CHAP. XV. Of the Means and Manner of Man's Escape and Restauration 1. What is requisite for a man to consider in order to his escape and restitution p. 83. 2. How a man may naturally find out a means tending to his restitution ib. 3. The description of God's mercy 84. 4. The explanation of the precedent description p. 85. 5. The act through which God's mercy doth succour a natural soul in her contention ib. CHAP. XVI Of the Light and Darknesse of Man's practick Understanding 1. That Light and Darknesse are analogal to principles of Good and Evil. p. 86. 2. Queries concerning Light and Darknesse ib. 3. The two kinds of Light What the first Light is and how it produceth the second Light ib. 4. What the Habit of Light is That the first Man acted without Habits How a Habit is acquired ib. 5. That the first Man acted through a natural disposition and not through any Habits p 87. CHAP. XVII Containing rational discoveries of Man's primitive and second estate 1. That Man was created most perfect A proof from reason inferring God to be a
both particularly to man for whose sake the same extended also to other creatures We are likewise to remember man in his twofold state to wit of Integrity and Deficience Gods Ordination then upon man was that he and all other Animals and Vegetables for his sake should encrease after their own kind during mans Integrity This Ordination upon Gods Creatures is answered and effected by Powers and Dispositions created by him in them According to which Powers all Creatures acted All the Actions of man did therefore depend from his Powers to wit his Propagation from his Generative Power which again was subjected to his Phansie and that to his will and understanding Wherefore as long as his will and understanding did will and understand nothing but what was perfect his Phansie could receive no other Impression but of Perfections which could not cause any Errour in the Generative power and therefore had man abided in his entire state he nor any other Creatures could have generated Monsters Man having through his deficience corrupted his Faculties no wonder if their Acts are also corrupted and their effects corrupted and corruptible Hence then it is beyond scruple that Gods Ordination did immediately relate to the Powers of all Creatures and herein are all beings true and answerable to their end and therefore perfect You may urge an Inconvenience to follow this Solution because thereby God seems to be the original cause of Monsters or evil for if God had conferred perfect powers upon man man could not have changed them of himself wherefore God must be supposed to alter them dispositions and faculties I Answer That God was not the original cause of this alteration but man himself through his sin which therefore was the first impulsive cause 'T is certain that God was the efficient cause of this Alteration of Powers yet Gods Act was not evil therein but good and perfect because his Justice did require it for this change upon man was his punishment If so none can or will attribute the evil following a punishment of a Malefactor to him that punisheth or to the punishment it self but to the Malefactor whose Default and Crime was the cause of that evil which befel him after his punishment IV. Austin in the 5th Chap. 2 Book of his Soliloquies states the Description of Truth Truth is that which it is and in the same Chapter openeth his meaning Truth is that which is so in it self as it appeareth to him that perceiveth it if he will and can perceive it Hence do Hurtad Disp. 7. Met. Sect. 1. and Soar Disp. 7 Sect. 5. infer the Nature of Truth to consist in a cognoscibility of a being to the understanding of that which it is This Opinion as it is obscure so it is expos'd to doubts if not to falshood The truth of a man doth not consist in my knowing a man to be a man and that he is no other thing but a man for that is a quidditative Concept of a man namely to know him to be a man but to know a man to be that which he was intended for is the concept of his truth Wherefore Soar in the same Chapter doth well recal himself in asserting that truth is relative to created and increated Knowledge Truth doth not superadd extrinsecally ex parte actus any denomination really distinct from a being since it is concurrent to the constituting of the nature of a being for take away truth and you take away the essence of a being V. Falshood is defined by most Philosophers to be that which appears to be that which it is not It is strange that falshood which is not in rerum natura should be defined It is not in rerum natura because all beings are true If it can be defined it is a being For nothing is definible unless it is a being had it been described by a Negative then indeterminatively we might have perceived it as thus Falshood is which doth not appear to be that which it is or which it was intended for I say indeterminatively because we know a falsum falshood to be a falshood because it doth not determinate our Concept through its truth so that this is a privative or accidental knowledge CHAP. XVIII Of Goodness 1. What Goodness is The Improbation of several Definitions of Goodness 2. The Difference between Goodness and Perfection 3. What Evil is 4. What the absolute active End of Goodness is 5. That Goodness is improperly divided in Essential Accidental and Integral Goodness 6. How Goodness is properly divided 7. That the Division of Good in Honest Delectable c. doth belong to Ethicks I. GOodness is an Attribute of a Being whereby it is for an end Many Philosophers do omit the Definition of Goodness because they can find no distinction between Truth and Goodness Others define it to be a convenience of a being with the Appetite which is erroneous for Goodness is in a being that is a partial being without the Appetite 2. Goodness is absolute a Convenience is relative Timpl. Chap. 9. of his Metaph. 2 Book defines Goodness to be an act of Good as far as it is good or is a Quality from which a being is denominated Good This is Idem per Idem and Obscurum per Obscurius II. Goodness is formally distinct from Perfection because a being according to what it is good only is not perfect Wherefore Goodness is erroneously defined by some to be a Perfection III. Evil Malum is that which doth not appear to us to be for any End IV. The Absolute active End of Goodness is to constitute that which it is The Passive is to be constitured that which it is V. Goodness is improperly divided into Essential Accidental and Integral Goodness because Good is that which is essential of it self to a being and therefore cannot be accidental as it is opposite to Essential It may be an Essential part because it concurs with the rest of the Attributes to the constitution of the Essence of a Being VI. Goodness is divisible according to the divisibility of a being which is either Natural Animal or Humane VII The Division of Goodness into Honest Delectable and Profitable or Useful doth not appertain to this Doctrine but is referred to Ethicks CHAP. XIX Of Distinction 1. The Authors Description of Distinction That the privative sense of not being moved is a Note of Distinction whereby the understanding distinguishes a Non Ens from an Ens. That the Positive sense of being moved in another manner than another Ens moves the understanding is a Note of Distinction between one Being and another 2. How Distinction is divided What a real Distinction is 3. What a Modal Difference is 4. That the vulgar Description of a real Distinction is Erroneous 5. That the terms of a Distinction between two or more real beings are requisite both or more to exist 6. That one term of Distinction although in existence cannot be really predicated of another not
a Material one but none Real XIII Besides all this there is an Absolute Power conferred upon Gods Creatures in general and upon man in particular I do not mean Absolute Simpliciter for that were Repugnant as I have proved in my Theol. but secundam quid I will further explain it to you The Power which all Creatures have of being and acting at that present Moment wherein they enjoy their being and do act is absolute because they cannot but enjoy that same being and act at that Moment wherein they have a Being and do act Ergo it is Absolute but not simpliciter for were it so then they would obtain that absolute power of being from and out of their own Nature which we know is dependent from Gods Power and according to this sense none consisteth of an absolute power but God alone because his Nature is alone independent It is then absolute secundum quid because God hath ordained that which is to be and that which ever hath been to have been and that which shall be to come to pass In short Absolute secundum quid I take for that which is unchangeable as all beings and their Actions are in that sense as I have proposed They are unchangeable because Gods Ordination in Creating Giving Forbearing and in all other Particulars is unchangeable This Distinction is of that use that many Points in Divinity cannot be resolved but by its being applied to them I shall content my self with the having named it since I have Treated of it at large in another Part of my Philosophy XIV The Absolute secundum quid powers which God hath conferred upon his Creatures are by Physitians otherwise termed Faculties Facultates which are derived from a faciendo doing that is they are actual dispositions whereby Effects are done Hence Galen Lib. 1. de Natur. Facult Par. 3. Prima euim actionis ipsius potentia causa est The first cause of an Action saith he is the power And in another place of the same Book he renders himself thus Facultatum quatuor naturalium essentia in partium singularum nutriendarum temperie est that is The Essence of the four Natural Faculties consisteth in the temperament of the parts that are to be nourished which is nothing different then if he had said the Faculties Facultates sunt temperamenta facientia are temperaments actually doing effects Now it is evident that Galen held the Temperament of bodies to be their Forms which if so then questionless his Opinion tended to assert that Powers and their Subjects were really identificated and that all powers were actual Moreover we shall find throughout all his Tomes that his sense touching powers and Faculties doth e Diametro agree with what I have set down in this present Treatise As for Hippocrates I cannot read a word throughout all his works but what tends against Aristotle in every Particular forasmuch as it relate to our Subject In the Conclusion I must remember you to observe that many Terms as Formal Substance Accident and divers others I have somtimes made use of in the same sense as I have proposed them in the Foregoing Chapters other times I have intended them in the same Acception which Philosophers vulgarly receive them in But herein the Sense of the Matter will easily direct you FINIS RELIGIO PHILOSOPHI OR Natural Theology The FIRST PART The fourth Book By Gedeon Harvey Doctor of Physick and Philosophy LONDON Printed by A. M. for Samuel Thomson at the Sign of the Bishops-head in St Paul's Church-yard 1663. TO HIS Most Honoured Mother ELIZABETH HARVEY Dear Mother AMong those serious Admonitions which from your singular Affection and Care you have so oft repeated to me This I remember hath been one of the most earnest of them that above all I should mind things of Eternity such as alone can make me eternally Happy Herein I cannot but acknowledge your greatest Love tending to invest me with the greatest Happinesse returning you all thanks that so great a Benefit is worthy of Moreover to shew my entire Obedience to so important a Command I have here drawn up a few Heads touching the Greatest Happinesse and the Means whereby to procure it which I do with all humility present unto you as a Debt due to your self in regard I have extracted the principal Rules from the Rudiments which your constant Practice and wholesome Precepts had in my younger years infus'd in me The cause and object which alone can afford us this infinite Happinesse is the Summum Bonum whereunto we are to direct all our aim which that we may with successe attain unto are the continual Prayers of Your most affectionate and obedient Sonne Gedeon Harvey RELIGIO PHILOSOPHI OR Natural Theology The FIRST PART The fourth Book CHAP. I. Of the Nature of Natural Theology 1. What Theology is 2. That Theosophy is a fitter name to signifie the same which is here intended by Theology That in knowing God we become Philosophers 3. What a Habit is 4. What it is to live happily That there is a mean or middle way of living which is neither living in happiness or living in misery 5. How Theology is divided 6. What Natural Theology is What Supernatural Theology is The first Doubts of a natural man 7. The Dignity of Theology I. THEOLOGY is a habit of enjoying the greatest Good and living in the greatest Happiness This practick Science might from the eminence and transcendence of its end and object crave a more excellent name for Theology signifieth only a discourse of God and expresseth a Theoretick Science and therefore is too strict to adequate the whole and full concept of what is generally intended by Theology This name is fitter to be imposed upon the Doctrine of God as he is theoretically discoursed of in Pneamatology The parts of which Doctrine might be aptly denoted by Theology Angelology and Psychelogy whereas this noble Science is better expressed by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or wisdome of God because wisdome comprehendeth an universal collection of all practick and theoretick Sciences all which we know by knowing God and we know them to be in and from God For do we not know that all natural Beings are in and from God they are in God because God comprehendeth and conserveth them in and by his Power Is not God the Pattern of our Actions And do we not know that our actions are good or evil from knowing them to have some likeness to his Actions or to be altogether different from them Do we not know our selves in knowing God wherefore without knowing God we know Nothing In knowing God to be the first Cause and Creator of all natural Beings we know Natural Philosophy and become Natural Philosophers In discerning good from evil in our actions by comparing them to the most perfect actions of God we attain to Moral Philosophy In knowing him to be the Being of Beings we reach to the knowledge of supernatural Philosophy or Metaphysicks
that which bendeth to it it argueth that it is good You may reject my definition of Good because according to it it follows that God is conserved by his creatures since he is known to bend to them In no wise for God doth not properly bend to his creatures because he is every where with them But Gods creatures may be properly said to bend to him because bending doth follow a need and want of conservation which need being in all his creatures but not in God they do bend to their Creator IV. To avoid falsities and errors in this nice point it will not be amisse for you to observe a distinction between these two predicates to be good and to do good These are oftentimes confounded by many Divines and so thereby they fall into gross errors To be good denotes a formality of good as it doth concur to the further constitution of a Being by its modality To do good is an action whereby effects are produced from a good Being Now these actions are called good because they proceed from a good Being and not because they are essentially good and constitute an essential difference from its Being So that good actions are signs of goodnesse in a Being and not the goodnesse it self To do good therefore is onely to act from a good principle and to give signs of the goodnesse of a Being This distinction proveth very usefull and expedient to the discussing of the doubts touching Free-will Annex to this observation that in a large sense Moral good is taken for good as it is defined above and extendeth to other creatures than unto man onely for this reason because Moral good as it is synonimous to a mean and inferiour good is become so to all in being changed from the highest good through the deffecting of man from his highest good to a mean or moral good In a strict sense it is taken for the goodnesse of man in his actions or manners onely V. How doth Moral Good turn to Moral Evil This Question may be variously understood First as good importeth a natural good in the second acception and as it denotes a goodnesse in the Being and not in its action in this sense moral good cannot change into moral evil because nothing doth corrupt it self I mean its own Being and Essence If moral good is taken for a moral good action then it is coincident with a true action which is such as God doth require from us and is conformable to that action in which God did create us I say in which for all beings are created to be in action and not through which because that specifieth Creation According to this acception then are morally good actions said to be such as are true or conformable to their Pattern If these actions are false and difformable from their Pattern then they become evil These actions do proceed from a free cause and not necessary for then man could never have committed any evil The freedome of this causality consisteth in an indifferency to Good and Evil. The state of man wheren he is at present is neutral that is natural which is a state neither supernatural or preternatural I prove it A supernatural state is wherein man is most good or consisteth of good in the highest degree A Preternatural state is wherein a man is at the worst or consisteth of evil in the lowest degree But a man in a natural state is neither most good nor worst in evil Therefore he must needs be in a neutral state VI. Man as he is in a natural state is in a middle state between super-natural and preter-natural I prove it is a property of a Middle or Medium to participate of both extreams But man in a natural state participates of both the others Ergo He is in a middle state I confirm the Minor The good which man doth act is not the best good neither is the evil which man acteth the worst evil for the Devils act worse Ergo It participateth somewhat of good in the highest degree and of evil in the worst Or the actions which a natural man performeth are neither the worst or the best Therefore it participates of each Another property of a natural or middle state is to have a disposition or capacity of becoming to be either of its extreams This I prove also to be in man as he is in this present state Many natural men are glorified and many are damned Ergo A natural man hath a disposition to either Moral Evil doth corrupt a man in that it partially destroyeth his perfection Moral Evil is either an Evil of the soul or body or of both CHAP. V. Of Theologick Good and Theologick Evil. 1. An Explanation of the Definition of Theologick Good 2. An Explication of the Definition of Theologick Evil. 3. What honest usefull and pleasant Good is 4. What Natural Sensible and Moral Good is 1. THeologick Good doth perfectionate a man in a supernatural state only For a natural man as long as he doth continue in a natural state cannot be theologically good or do a good act that is theologically good A supernatural state is wherein a man is above his natural state and is at his greatest perfection II. Theologick Evil is directly contrary to Theologick Good Neither is it possible that both these should be in one subject there being no greater contraries than Theologick Good and Theologick Evil. They are most remote from one another so that there is an infinite proportion of distance between them Theologick Evil doth make a man worst he cannot be worse than when he is theologically evil neither is there then any capacity or disposition remaining in him whereby he may be changed into Good So likewise a man who is Theologically Good hath no disposition to Theologick Evil. Theologick Good implieth a triple Good 1. It imports a Theological good cause or which doth make a man perfect in a supernatural state and so God is the only Theologick Good 2. It is taken for a Being which is theologically Good or for a Being which is at its greatest perfection and so may man in his entire state be termed Theologically Good 3. It may be understood for an action which is Theologically Good that is true and conformable to its pattern and of this Good is man also capable in a supernatural state The Theologick Good which is in God is called Good through it self or Bonum per se. This Bonum is otherwise called Summum Bonum objectivum or Beatitudo objectiva But the joy which we receive from that objective happinesse is called Beatitudo formalis The Theologick Good which was in all his creatures is a Derivative Good or Bonum per participationem The Peripateticks divide Good in that which is honest usefull and pleasant Honest Good Bonum bonestum is which is agreeable to Right Reason and therefore they say it is Desirable through it self 2. Useful Good is that which is desired for its
sutable to him he cannot let his desires slide another way The worst actions which men do act are either when they are alone or when they are in other company and absent from their partner When they are in other company they are apt to be drunk to swear and to project base designs which a man seldome or never doth perpetrate in the presence with his mate Or if he did it is an hundred to one if her fear modesty or some other vertue did not prevent him Man could seldome think evil thoughts because his companion is supposed to divert him in proposing pleasant or usefull discourses What woman is there which can be inordinate in any of these fore-instanced actions if she is suted to a mate and adheres to his fellowship onely 'T is true women and men although both joyn'd in a constant adherence have sometimes agreed in wicked designs but this hapneth alwayes in a couple unsutably paired and consequently much given to wandring so that they did not contract that evil habit from themselves but from others Had the first man and the first woman continued constantly together it would have been a far harder task for the Devil to have deluded them but they being separated although but for a few moments and either of them admitting conference with the Devil were soon corrupted What an easie task of Government would it be if most men were paired so as never to be asunder from their fellow They could hardly assent to mischief or if they were bent to it Law might sooner work upon their joint-interest than if it were single But take this only as by way of discourse XII It is necessary among men to give honour to whom it is due and to return it with thanks when they do deserve it Were it only to cause a distinction of persons in respect to civil Government it doth imply a necessity It is proper for us to know what honour is for how could we else acquit our duty in this part to God to the supream Magistrate or to our Parents XIII We are not to be over-scrupulous in taking of an oath provided it tend to the preservation of the Commonwealth and that the supream Magistrate be it the King Prince or plural Magistrate do require it We are obliged to it upon a double consideration 1. Because the Magistrate doth command or imposed it which is obliging among all Nations 2. Because it tends to the preservation of the whole body of the people And this common reason doth convince to be binding CHAP. VIII Of the Subject of Natural Theology 1. Man consisting of Body and Soul is the adequate subject of Natural Theology 2. Reasons proving the Soul to be the original and principal subject of Theology 3. That the Understanding and Will are really and formally one The confutation of the vulgar definition of Will A full explication of the Will and the manner of its acting What speculalative and practical signifie 4. What the Will is in a large sense 5. What the Will is in a strict sense 6. An Explanation upon the first description of Will 7. The Effects of the Will Whether appetibility doth not equally imply volibility and appetibility in a strict sense 8. Whether mans appetite is distinct from his Will I. THe fourth Question proposed is Which is the Subject of Natural Theology By Subject I mean the Subjectum inhaesionis wherein this habit is inherent To answer you in general The whole man as he consisteth of soul and body is the subject of Theology for the effects of it to wit happinesse and joy are as sensibly received by the body as by the soul for the body receiveth its essence conservation and bodily pleasures from it The soul cannot alone be properly said to be the subject because the soul without the body is not man II. The soul is originally and principally the subject of Theology I say originally because the soul is the original cause of the pleasures of the body yea and of its constitution for the body was created for the soul and not the soul for the body The soul is the original cause of the pleasures of the body in that the soul doth make choice of them and applieth them to the body for example meat drink and other pleasures are applyed to the body in that the soul makes choice of them and conceiveth them to be pleasant to the body otherwise the body could not attain to them The soul can enjoy pleasures when the body is in paine but the body cannot when the soul is in paine The soul is the principal subject of Theology because the greatest happinesse and good is enjoyed by it the delights of the body not being comparable to them of the soul The soul receiveth its pleasure by instants of time the body onely by succession III. The operation whereby the soul doth imbrace the greatest good and happinesse is from the understanding as it is speculative and practick and not as it is a two-fold faculty formally distinct through the understanding and the will for these are not really and essentially distinct I prove it if the understanding cannot understand without the will or the will without the understanding then they are not really and essentially distinct because it is proper to beings which are really and essentially distinct to operate without each other But the understanding cannot understand without the will neither can the will will without the understanding Therefore they are not really distinct I prove the Minor The will is primarly a bending of the understanding to an action of the mind but the understanding cannot understand unlesse it bends to that action of the mind So neither can the understanding be bent to action unlesse it understandeth Wherefore the one doth imply the other The most there is between them is a modal distinction You may object that it follows hence that a man may be said to will when he understandeth to understand when he willeth which predications are absurd I answer That it includes no absurdity at all for a man when he understandeth doth will every particular act of the understanding which he understandeth or otherwise how could he understand On the other side a man understandeth when he willeth according to that trite saying Ignoti nulla Cupido That which a man doth not know he cannot desire or will Wherefore I argue again that the one includeth the other the will implyeth the understanding and the understanding the will Possibly you may deny my supposed definition of will which is a bending to an action of the mind If you refuse it propose a better Your opinion it may be is to wander with the multitude and so you commend this The will is through which a man by a fore-going knowledge doth covet a sutable or convenient good and shunneth an inconvenient evil I will first account the absurdities of this definition and afterwards prove them to be so First you
affirm That there fore-goeth a knowledge before a man willeth Secondly That a man doth alwayes covet a convenient good Thirdly That a man shunneth all inconvenient evil Fourthly That the will alwayes either coveteth or shunneth Fifthly The definition containeth superfluous words as inconvenience and convenience Sixthly You assert that two contrary acts proceed from one formal habit Seventhly This definition is a division of a habit into its acts Eighthly You do positively affirm That the will is really and essentially distinct from the understanding Many more I might deduct but these being sufficient I shall now direct my pen to them particularly First You say That there fore-goeth a knowledge before every act of the will Upon this I demand from you How cometh the understanding to know You may answer through her self and what is it else to know through ones self but to know through ones own will Ergo The will is a concomitant of the understanding and the understanding of the will and consequently the one doth not precede the other Or thus Can the understanding know against her will or without her will If so then man is no voluntary creature in that he acteth without a will Secondly You declare That a man doth alwayes covet a convenient good Herein you contradict your self for before you said that the understanding did understand a volible object without or before the will but to understand a volible object is to will to understand it and yet not covet it Therefore according to your own words a man did not always covet through his will 2. A man doth covet evil as evil Wherefore he doth not alwayes covet good The antecedence I have proved above 3. A man doth sometime covet an inconvenientgood for he covets Arsenick to kil himself You will answer to this that he doth covet it as a convenient good for to ease him from some trouble or grief By this solution you confound your self in taking objective good and formal good for the same thing which according to Aristotle are different If so then your answer will not hold for the Question is concerning objective good whereas your answer relates to a formal good The ease which a man findeth through the removal of trouble is the formal good the Arsenick is the objective good this presupposed the Arsenick is good in it self but relatively it is inconvenient to that man for it destroyeth his essence You may reply That a man doth not take it to destroy his essence but to release himself from his misery Notwithstanding I say he knew before he took the Ratsbane that it would kill him wherefore this knowledge of inconvenience fore-going the willing of inconvenience doth according to your own definition infer that he willed it as inconvenient because he fore-knew it to be inconvenient Thirdly I say That a man doth not alwayes shun an inconveent evil because he doth not shun sicknesse when he is diseased neither can he shun all inconveniencies for he falleth into many So likewise in the fore-given instance he cannot shun sicknesse or death although he may wish it remote from him but that is not shunning of it wherefore shunning is an improper term to be used in this definition Fourthly You conceive That the will alwayes doth either covet or shun This is against most Peripateticks who say that the will can suspend its action which suspension is neither coveting or shunning Fifthly Since that good implieth convenience and evil inconvenience what need you to adde convenience and inconvenience Wherefore both must be superfluous Sixthly To shun evil and to covet good are two acts formally contrary If so How can these flow from one habit Possibly you endeavour to escape the force of this Objection in saying that the one may proceed per se and the other per accidens from a formal habit If I should grant this your definition will prove illegal because there must nothing be inserted into a Definition but what agreeth per se with the definitum Seventhly This is rather an Accidental Division of a habit into its acts Wherefore this Division is not so much as Essential because it is not grounded upon the form of the Divisum Eighthly You conclude the will to be really and essentially different from the understanding You make too much haste you should first shew that the will and understanding are Real Beings and how will you do that according to your own received Doctrine of Real Beings which teacheth that they onely are Real Beings which exist or can exist without the understanding if so then the understanding for to be a real being must exist without its self and is not this absurd Having made appear to you the falsity of the common Doctrine of Will I come now to explain how the understanding is made practical and how speculative Wherefore in the first place Mark what the understanding is The understanding is the discerning apprehending or judging faculty of all Objects which are objected from without or from within The understanding judgeth of these objects according to their distinct representation Objects represent themselves in a two-fold manner 1. Essentially when the essence consisting of all its modes united is represented to the understanding 2. Modally which is when one mode or more is or are singularly represented to the understanding You may apprehend this better by an example The essential representation of a Bull is wherein you perceive him by or in all his modes united particularly in perceiving him in that shape of having such a figure of bearing horns of being hairy and cloven-footed of having unity truth and perfection c. But when I conceive onely one of his modes without conceiving any of the others that is a modal representation as in conceiving his horns only or the goodnesse of every mode by it self or the goodness of the whole essence Observe then these several concepts are several actions because they are of several objects Which difference of action is called a material difference Again This action is but one formally and depends from one formal power so that one power can promote but one formal action as in this instance The power which my hand hath of writing fitteth it to write several letters as I. D. c. the writing these several letters are distinct actions because they differ in figure which is a material difference but then again the action of writing is but one formally flowing from one formal power of writing So likewise a knife cutteth paper wood c. the cutting of these are materially distinct actions but again the cutting is also but one formal action for a knife cutteth these through one vertue of sharpnesse and therefore its power is but one formally In the same manner I say doth the soul understand or perceive several objects as in conceiving the entire essence of a Being or its modes in particular as its goodnesse unity c. These are all several actions differing materially one
pleasure or to supply a need for there are many things which are good and yet we do not covet them because we do not judge them necessary for to make up a pleasure or need These two are to no purpose if the apprehension of means be not framed The understanding being now bent and inclined to an object makes an impression upon the animal spirits lodged within the feat of the phansie for how can the understanding otherwise judge of means unlesse it makes an impression of them upon the phansie which is no sooner done but all the members move The Phansie is like unto the spring of a Watch which being moved all the wheeles are moved by it All these acts we see proceed from one agent intellect and are all acts of that faculty and why should they then be counted to be really different from one another IV. 1. The Will is whereby the understanding of man is inclined to action The will as I have shewed is an act of the understanding wherefore I do define it by the understanding faculty Note that Will here is the same with the practick underderstanding V. 2. The Will in a strict sense is an action of the understanding upon an object as farre as it is appetible or inappetible Will in the first definition is supposed to be the inclination or motion of the understanding to action That is to any action in general whether to good or to evil to a single or reflex action to one single or many actions subnected to one another The understanding when it doth understand it first willeth and inclineth to that action before it can be said to understand if then there be any priority imaginable between the understanding and the will as scarce there is the will must precede the understanding But as I said there is none because inclining to action and to be in action are the same thing neverthelesse we may suppose them to be distinguisht ratione and a parte Rei they are distinguisht materially Here may be objected that that whereby the understanding is inclined to action is the object for it is the object which doth incline the understanding to action Wherefore the object is the will which is absurd You have almost rightly apprehended my meaning it is true that through the object the understanding is moved to action for without an object the understanding could not act And from the object is the understanding said to act and receiveth the denomination of acting from it but now it doth not follow that the will is the object yet materially it is in the object formally in the understanding You may furnish your self with another objection which is That it followeth hence that the understanding is alwayes practick and never speculative To this I answer That practick either implieth action and a bending to action whether the object in which that action doth terminate be within or without or the Acting and bending only to an external object which action upon an external object is not single but many besides it must be also related to the goodnesse of an object according to the former implication the understanding is alwayes practick when it doth understand according to the letter it is not VI. The second definition is more strict and limited the will here being determined either to an appetibility which denotech either a convenience primarly or a farther constitution preservation and perfectionation pleasure or goodnesse in the object secundarily and per accidens an evil and imperfectionation whereby the understanding is incited to a second and farther action or inappetibility Scaliger in his Cccviith Exerc. 3. D. defineth the will very consentaneous to what it is set down for here The will saith he is the understanding extended to have or to do that which it apprehendeth By this he consenteth that the will and understanding are the same really That which he intendeth by an extended understanding is before implyed by a farther and second action of the understanding It is a true saying of his That the will is the understanding extended or judgement prolonged for when one doth ask you whether you will go to sleep first you judge what sleep is then you prolong your judgement in judging sleep to be necessary thirdly you extend your concept untill you conclude that you will go to sleep and what is this but the understanding prolonged By a farther Action the will is distinct from speculation whereby an object is conceived only by a first intention without the consequence of any farther action By action I intend effection or doing VII The acts of will in a strict sense are to imbrace or to reject an object The object of the will is a Being as far as it is appetible or unappetible This faceth somewhat against the customary speech of Philosophers who attribute appetite primarly to animals and naturals and secundarily to man if so then appetibility is not the ratio formalis of the object of the will but of the appetite So that volibility if such a word might be suffered is rather the proper object of the will Herein are two questions contained 1. Whether appetibility be not a word equally denoting volibility and appetibility in a restrained sense 2. Whether man's appetite is distinct from his will To the first I answer That appetibility is equally attributed to man and to other creatures I prove it Aristotle defined Good to be that which all beings have an appetite unto if so then appetability is common to man since that man is a Being and hath an appetite unto Good IX The second doubt is somewhat more involved in bryan Scaliger in the same Exerc. alledged in the next fore-going Paragraph states a difference between the appetite of man and his will For appetites saith he are propensities to natural conveniences with which we are born like as with our senses wherefore the appetite is moved either from our sense or fancy or memory from which again that power is moved which we call the will Wherefore the appetite is before the will that is before that act whereby we will a thing Thus farre Scaliger If this be true it is a Paradox that one and the same object through one formal manner of moving should move two formal powers of one Being How can this be One being hath but one formal power whereby it is distinct from all others So man hath but one formal power which is his power of reasoning through which he is distinguisht from all other beings Wherefore the appetite of man is not distinct from his will But Scaliger saith That the appetite is sometime checked by the will Ergo They are different The Antecedence is evident in this instance A man doth frequently long for a thing which his will doth contradict as in coveting for drink when he hath a drowth or in longing for sack in a feaver the will doth not alwayes assent to it Wherefore the will is different from them appetites
because the one can be existent without the other In answer to this I say that these are not properly appetites to which namely appetites a knowledge doth necessarily concur but they are only improperly and analogically termed appetites because they agree with a proper appetite in having an inclination to a thing Wherefore a proper appetite being alwayes concomitated by a knowledge these fore-mentioned instances cannot be denominated appetites but natural inclinations and propensities for if a man is predicated to have an appetite for any thing it is equivalent as if he were predicated to have a will to a thing Wherefore there is only one proper appetite in man as he is man which is his will CHAP. IX Of Free-will by Reason 1. Wherein man doth most differ from Animals or Naturals 2. To what acts the freedom of man's will in reference to its acting doth extend What the freedom of will is quoad exercitium actus and what Libertas contradictionis is 3. What the second kind of freedom of will importeth 4. That the speculative understanding in the act of speculation is practick 5. That the will is not constrained to will a good thing although present but hath a power of rejecting it 6. That the will willeth evil for an evil end That some men are worse than Devils 7. What the will 's freedom is in specifying its acts 8. What free-will is in reference to its faculty 9. Velten rejected for asserting that the will is not indifferent to each contrary That the will is indifferent to each contradictory opposite 10. That the will is free to act or not to act 11. That the will is free to act upon particular objects whether good or evil The state of the controversie 12. That man as he is in a natural and corrupt state hath a free-will of doing a moral good or a moral evil act 13. That man hath not a free-will of doing a theologick good act immediately through himself without an extraordinary concurrence of God with him 14. Man hath a free-will of doing a theologick good act with an extraordinary concurrence of God with him That he hath a free-will of election 15. That man as he is in a natural state hath a free-will through himself and without Gods extraordinary concurrence to procure Gods extraordinary concurrence and assistance to him in his actions That our being and conservation in it and all our actions depend from the ordinary concurrence of God Reasons why God did not conferre upon him an absolute power of acting without his ordinary concourse The cause of man's fall That that which is only morally good will prove theologick evil at last 16. Arguments to prove a free-will in man A reconciliation of the Calvinists with the Arminians That man hath a remnant of theologick good surviving in him The state of the controversie The division of it I. THe chief respect through which a man doth differ from Animals or Naturals is his will which is a free principle through which he acteth freely that is without any irresistable impulse for there is no object whether good or evil pleasant or sorrowfull but it is left to the wils freedom whether it will imbrace it or reject it II. The freedom of man's will in reference to its act is either a determination or assent of man to act or not to act or else it is an assent to act upon a certain object or not to act upon that certain object oâ—to act upon a certain mode of an object or not to act upon that certain mode or to act upon the goodnesse of an object in common or particular or not to act upon the goodnesse of such objects or to act upon the evil of an object in common or particular or not to act upon the evil of rhat object or to act upon good or upon evil These are the particulars whereunto the freedome of man's will doth extend And first A man hath freedom of acting or of not acting through his will A man in willing to sleep he willeth to will no more before he hath refreshed himself by sleep So that herein a man hath a will of acting or not acting indeterminately which sort of willing freedome is termed Libertas quoad exercitium actus Such a freedom of will there is in man for a man in willing to sleep willeth not to will that is not to act through his will A man in willing not to sleep may will to will or to continue in action of willing or understanding This is a plain Libertas contradiction is ad actionem non actionem sive ad agendum non agendum for it is between an ens and a non ens III. The second kind of freedom in the will is to act upon an object I mean a whole essence or object as it doth consist of all its modes united as for instance a man may covet a whole Tree or only a branch of it a whole house or only a room Now in coveting a whole Tree or a whole house he coveteth an entire essence with all its modes or else a man may also reject a whole Tree or house and so rejecteth a whole essence IV. Thirdly The will may choose to act upon a particular mode as the truth or quantity of an essence c. For it makes choice to act that is to apprehend or contemplate upon these modes particularly Neither let it seem strange to you that the understanding or will in contemplation should be termed willing or practick for in that very contemplation the understanding is practick for it doth both act and will that action V. Fourthly The will may act upon the goodnesse of an object in particular or it may refuse it Herein I do thwart some Authours who strive to prove the contrary to wit that the will when it doth act upon a good object it cannot refuse it but doth alwayes covet it Others do with more caution assert That the will of man cannot reject or refuse the most universal good for which purpose they quote Austin 10. B. 20. Chap. of Confes. Were it possible saith he to ask all men at once whether they would be happy they would answer without any further paâ—sing upon it they would But suppose this were granted as really it is disputable there being many in the world so wicked that if they were invited to imbrace the true Summum Bonum either for to bid adieu to their own spurious happinesse or to wave their obstinate opinions they would rather excuse themselves as I once heard a Jesuite cry out in a dispute That he would sooner choose to be damned with St. Austin then go to Heaven with a Protestant Yet they need arguments to prove that a particular good may not be waved although perceived by the understanding How many are there who neglect and revile many good things such as are convenient for their souls and bodies Besides this granted infers a necessity upon man's will whereby
he is cut off from not willing which implyes a contradiction in the will of not to be the will VI. Fifthly The will acteth upon the evil of an object in that it can refuse or imbrace it as it is evil and as it knoweth it to be evil without having an apprehension of any goodnesse in it A man can hang himself or kill another without apprehending any thing good in it and he can also refuse it Since that all beings act for an end and purpose it may be demanded What end and purpose can a man have in coveting an evil object as it is evil I answer an evil end The Devils covet evil as it is evil for none can imagine the least good in Devils if so why may not men covet evil as evil many among them being worse than Devils It is worse to persevere in evil and wickednesse in the midst of the enjoyments of good things than to affect evil without the least enjoyment of good but Atheists persevere in the greatest evil in the midst of good things wherefore they are to be accounted worse than Devils who affect evil without the least enjoyment of good VII Lastly A man may will either a good object or an evil one This is an action of will as it is free to contraries and is called among Philosophers Libertas quoad specificationem actus a freedom of will in specifying an act that is an affecting an object in particular as it is opposite to another appetible object in contrariety which is to will an object as it is good or as it is evil pleasant or sorrowfull c. The preceding distinctions of the acts of will proceed from her as she is free Quoad contradictoria or quoad exercitium actus VIII Hence you may know that free-will Liberum arbitrium in reference to its faculty is an indetermination or indifference in the will of man of acting or not acting and of acting upon good or evil Neverthelesse it is a controversie among Moralists 1. Whether the will be indifferent to each opposite which opposites are either between contradictories as between acting and not acting or between contraries as between acts upon good or evil 2. Whether the will is free in all its acts Vilsten Cent. 1. Dec. 4. q. 6. states two conclusions for the resolving of these doubts 1. Saith he The will is not indifferent to each contrary to wit to good and evil His reason is because the will cannot covet evil as evil but when the will doth covet evil it is rather forced than free because it is an evil disposition doth compell her to it wherfore that being against nature it is rather to be accounted violent than free First He saith The will cannot covet evil as evil Next he affirms That the will can covet evil but then she is forced This is a manifest contradiction that the will can covet evil and cannot covet evil Again That the will should covet evil by coaction from within is to contradict most Philosophers whose tenent is That the will cannot be forced from within Besides to grant this would be to suppose that man did act necessarily like unto naturals Further it would be very severe should God punish us for doing an act when we cannot do otherwise IX His second Conclusion is That the will of man is indifferent to each contradictory opposite because she can act upon a good object in particular and forbear Herein he speaks the truth but this is no more truly concluded but it is as fallaciously opposed by others Their Argument is because souls in Heaven cannot but love God and the damned cannot but hate him both these acting freely it followeth that the will is not indifferent to contradictories This infers nothing to the present dispute of man's will only of souls in Heaven and Devils But I passe to the second Doubt proposed Whether the will of man is free in all her acts Inorder to the clearing of this doubt you are to observe it 1. That the acts of the will are of acting or not acting or of acting upon a particular object so as to covet it or to reject it 2. That the act of the will after its whole assent or conclusion is not the will it self and therefore freedom is not to be attributed to the act but to the power or faculty This premised I poâ—â— X. 1. That the will is free to act or not to act If man is free to think or not to think he is free to will or not to will because a man's thought is alwayes concomitant to his will But a man is free to think or not to think Ergo He is free to will or not to will The Assumtion is confirmed in the second Paragraph XI 2. The will is free to act upon particular objects as they are good or evil By will I mean the will of man as he is in a natural and corrupt state not as he is in a supernatural or preternatural estate for in the first he cannot covet evil in the last he cannot covet good Neither is it to be understood of man as he was in an incorrupt state most granting that he could covet good and evil But the Question is Whether man as he is in a corrupt condition and prone to evil cannot do a good act as much as the first man being prone to good did an evil act Observe also that good is either theologick good or moral good and so is evil The Question here is concerning moral good and evil Lastly you are to understand here the freedom of man's will as he acteth with the ordinary concurrence of God and not as he acteth with an extraordinary concurrence of God with him XII Man as he is in a natural and corrupt state hath a free-will of doing a moral good act or a moral evil act What moral good and evil and theologick good and evil is I have already set down in the 3d 4th and 5th Chapters I prove this position What ever a man doth act with the fore-knowledge of his understanding doth proceed from his free-will But man acteth moral evil and moral good with the fore-knowledge of his understanding Ergo Man doth act moral evil and moral good through his free-will I confirm the Minor There are none that deny that man doth moral evil with the fore-knowledge of his understanding That man doth act a moral good act from himself without an extraordinary concurrence of God with him it appeareth In that he can and doth covet meat and drink in moderation and in that he can and doth help the poor and needy and in that he can moderate his passions all these are moral good acts They are good acts in that they do perfectionate man in his Essence They are moral in that they proceed from man's free-will and foreknowledge XIII Man hath not a free-will of doing a Theologick good act immediately through himself and without an extraordinary concurrence of God with him
A Theologick good act is such as God doth require from us and as he first gave man a power of acting it since then we have not such a power as God first gave unto man of acting good it followeth that we cannot act such good acts through our selves as God doth require from us XIV Man hath a free-will of doing a Theologick good act with an extraordinary concurrence of God with him If God doth concur with man in his actions in an extraordinary manner no doubt but God can and doth make them Theologically good that is good in the highest perfection and such as he himself doth require from us Man being so assisted through the extraordinary assistance of God acteth freely notwithstanding for it is still in his choice whether he will do such a Theologick good act or not When God doth assist us in an extraordinary manner it is not without our free-will for we must first will and desire it with a burning desire before God will assist us which burning desire doth move him to assist us neither will God refuse us because he is most good and most mercifull Now then when this desire ceaseth in us then Gods extraordinary assistance ceaseth with it if then we can forbear this desire and continue it we have still our free-wils Besides we also have a free-will of election that is of making choice of one good object before another XV. 1. Man as he is in a natural state hath a free-will through himself and without an extraordinary concurrence of God with him to procure Gods extraordinary concurrence and assistance with and to him in his actions The means whereby a natural man doth appropriate it is by fervent prayer so that man having a free-will of procuring Gods extraordinary concurrence hath a free-will mediately to act a Theologick good act Before I prove the first branch of this sub-Conclusion you are to mark that we can do no action at all through our selves alone without the ordinary concurrence of God with us for God hath not given us an absolute power of being and acting without the concurrence of his preservating and assisting power if he had he would have given all the power over us out of his hands which is impossible and unsuitable to the King of Kings to give away all his Glory Honour and Dominion Again had he done so we should have returned the thanks due for so great a goodness in envying and reviling of him Wherefore it followeth that God hath reserved a preservating and assisting power to himself without which we cannot continue in our beings or do any action If the first man could have been and acted through himself and that without Gods assistance he could never have died but since that he died and could not maintain himself in his being and in that most perfect Essence wherein he was created without adhering to Gods power therefore he having deserted that power but for a moment and confiding upon his own immediately fell and was almost utterly corrupted and lost if then that the first man in that perfect Essence could not subsist or act through himself alone without Gods aid much less can we in this deflected state and weak nature subsist or act without Gods assistance This assistance is Gods ordinary assistance for were it extraordinary we should then act as perfectly as the first man did before his deficience 2. After the probation of the necessity of Gods ordinary and extraordinary concurrence I come now to prove that man being assisted with Gods ordinary power can and doth procure Gods extraordinary concurrence Man as he is in a natural state may and doth know that he hath still some spark of Theologick good remaining in him for all men can and do know naturally that there is a God that there is a Law enjoyned by God upon men as his subjects that that Law is perfect that his actions are observed and acknowledged by him to be evil and sinfull that through himself without Gods extraordinary aid he cannot act that which God doth require from him that God is Almighty good and mercifull and therefore God will not deny any request of good proceeding from a spark of Theologick good because therein man hath still something in him through which he resembleth God which God will not abolish and hath tyed himself through his bountifull promises not to destroy All these acts and knowledges proceed from a Theologick good principle and therefore man is partly Theologically good to whom if he useth that natural power and means remaining in him God will not deny a supply against his defect The natural power and means which a man doth naturally and ordinarily put in action to procure Gods extraordinary assistance is his power of praying with zeal and earnestness for a man whenever he is in danger great need and intollerable pain doth naturally beg and implore help Therefore a zealous and earnest praying is a natural power which nature doth prompt us to and means to procure Gods extraordinary assistance Lastly From all this it is undoubtedly true and evident that man through himself and with the ordinary concurss of God with him doth and can procure Gods extraordinary assistance Which having procured he hath a free-will of acting theologick good 3. That which is only morally good will prove theologick evil at last A thing may properly be said to be good although at last it changeth into evil and corruption for as a Tree which is a good natural thing changeth to an intire corruption when it dieth so a natural man whilest he liveth is morally good and doth moral good acts but when he dieth he becomes entirely corrupted and altogether evil that is theologically evil XVI 4. To shut up this succinct dispute of free-will I say That man without free-will is no man but a Beast That man might justly be excused for his evil acts for had he no principle whereby he acted freely but did act necessarily and by compulsion or coaction of the Divine power he could not act evil it being impossible to God to act evil or if man did act evil it would be without a will and therefore it could be no sinne that man could not be termed the cause of his moral actions but God Many other inconveniencies and absurdities do ensue in denying this truth which to produce will prove tedious By this we may easily reconcile the Calvinists with the Arminians The Calvinists may rightly say That man through himself cannot act a good act that is cannot act a theological good act with the ordinary concurrence of God only The Arminians may with no lesse confidence assert That man hath a free will of doing good through himself that is hath a means and principle resting in him whereby he may mediately do a theologick good act through himself and by that means may procure God's extraordinary concurrence but the greatest controversie probable to arise between them in my opinion is
Whether a man hath a free-will or a remnant of theologick good in him whereby he may procure God's extraordinary assistance through himself or whether God doth stirre up that spark of Good being moved through his own mercy and not by what can proceed from man for many hold that man hath no spark of Good remaining in him and consequently cannot be thence supposed to have a free-will to beg God's extraordinary assistance but it is God who doth out of his singular goodnesse free-will and pleasure towards singular men cast and infuse a measure of theologick good in them through which they are made capable of having accesse to God and of praying to him and this they say Scripture implies by a new creation regeneration conversion or the becoming of a new man No doubt but this latter tenent is erroneous and absurd First They affirm That man hath no spark of theologick good remaining in him This is false as hath been proved already and shall be demonstrated more at large elsewhere Secondly Hereby they imply that man doth alwayes act evil and consequently acteth evil necessarily without a free-will And wherein doth he then differ from a Beast Thirdly Should God cast his mercy or goodnesse upon that which is altogether evil it followeth that God should love that which is altogether evil but that is repugnant to God's nature that being most good doth necessarily reject that from it which is most evil Fourthly Should God stirre up that spark of Good in man it proveth that that Good is of no efficacy and for no purpose which is repugnant to common reason concluding that all things which are are for to operate and for an end and are not in vain Therefore this spark of Good doth and can operate for an end to save it self and glorifie God especially being accompanied with God's ordinary concurrence it is directly as by a guide led to God's extraordinary concurrence and assistance So then if there be a spark of theologick Good remaining in man as without doubt there is it is of the same Nature with that which was in the first man before his fall who having a free-will to good and evil infers that this spark must necessarily retain the same free-will to good and evil but in an improportionable manner since that man's will is much more habituated to evil which doth much dead that weak remnant of good in him It is certain God doth equally impart his mercy and goodnesse to natural men because they are of an equal state Then again I object If so then all men would become theologically Good which is erroneous Wherefore I say God is no more good or mercifull to one natural man than to another and consequently there must be somewhat in men whereby one doth move God to mercy before another and what is that but that spark of Good Notwithstanding this inference holds good only ordinarily and doth not infer but that God extraordinarily may be pleased out of his free-will and pleasure to conferre bounties and mercies upon those to whom he will be bountifull and mercifull XVI 5. It is a simple Question to demand Whether the will is free at that instant when it acteth which is as much as if you enquired Whether the act of the will were free Certainly there can be no freedom allotted to the act or effect of an efficient for that followeth necessarily Posita causa ponitur effectus The cause being stated the effect is also stated By the act of the will I mean the consent of the will or the last execution of it which is named Actus imperatus But if the Question be understood De actu eliciendo then no doubt but the will is free at the same instant when it acteth for when would it be free else were it not when it acteth This Query may be apprehended thus Whether the will is free that is Whether it doth not act necessarily è suppositione Necessitas è suppositione is through which the will cannot act otherwise than it acteth when it doth act According to this supposition it doth act necessarily Nam impossibile est idem simul esse non esse For it is impossible that a thing should be and not be at the same instant Neverthelesse this doth not clip any whit from the freedom of man's will for freedom of the will is properly in actum eliciendo and in actum imperando but not in actu elicito vel imperato that is before the act is consented unto for the will before she consenteth to any act can determinate it freely to either opposite In short the will is free in its faculty but its acts are necessary CHAP. X. Of Free-will from Scripture 1. Objections from Scripture against man's free-will 2. An Answer to the said Objections 3. Objections proving that moral good is evil 4. The first Objection answered 5. The second Objection removed 6. Some other Texts produced against free-will in man 7. The first Text reconciled 8. The second Objection removed 9. Arguments deduced from faith An answer to the said Arguments 10. The first Argument drawn from Scripture to prove man's free-will to good and evil 11. A second Argument proving the same 12. A third Argument 13. Many other Texts inferring the same 14. Texts proving a remnant of good in man 15. Texts proving that a natural man cannot do a theologick good act through himself and being only assisted with the ordinary concurss of God 16. Scriptures inferring that a supernatural man hath no free-will to direct contraries that is to do theologick good and evil An answer to some Texts produced by Bellarmin 17. Scripture proofs concluding that the means whereby God's extraordinary concurrence is procured is in man and adheres to his free-will 18. Whether man's actions performed with God's extraordinary assistance are to be taken for the actions of God or of man 19. A reconciliation of the ninth to the Romans The unfolding of Predestination or of God's eternal Decree I. THe precedent Dispute touching Free-will is not so much held among natural men as between them who conceive themselves to be gifted As for the first I have already endeavoured to satisfie them And as for these last they alledging sacred Texts for their opinions plead with more force than the former Wherefore it will not be amisse to examine their Arguments and afterwards to produce such others as most orthodox Divines do urge for the proof of their tenents The first Scripture which they seem to produce against us is that in the Prov. 16. 9. A mans heart deviseth his way but the Lord directeth his steps And in Chap. 21. 1. The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord as the Rivers of water he turneth it whither soever he will And in the next fore-going Chapter vers 24. Mans goings are of the Lord how can a man then understand his own way Jer. 10. 23. O Lord I know that the way of man is not in himself it
is not in man that walketh to direct his steps Phil. 2. 13. For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure II. In answer to these I confesse they are most undoubted truths but they are so farre from making against us that they prove part of what I stated in the fore-going Chapter Without God we cannot act will or live that is through our selves alone and without God's ordinary concurrence with us so that Solomon saith well That man may devise his way that is God hath given man a power of Acting But the Lord directeth his steps that is he hath not given man so absolute a power but that he needs God's ordinary concurrence So St Paul God worketh in you both to will and to do that is hath given us a will and an essence through which we do act and God doth conservate us in that will and essence for without his continual influence we cannot abide in our being or actions But that which they ought to prove is that God's concurrence with man in his actions taketh away his free-will III. They may also oppose against the 1. subconclus of the 1. conclus in the ninth Chapter to wit that moral good is absolutely evil Rom. 8. 7. Because the carnal mind is enmity against God c. But moral good is effected by them who are carnally minded Therefore it is enmity against God that is absolutely evil Rom. 14. 23. For whatsoever is not of faith is sin But moral good is not of faith Ergo It is a sin or evil Matth. 15. 9. But in vain do they worship me teaching for Doctrines the commandments of men But moral good acts are onely such as the Doctrine of man teacheth Therefore they are in vain and evil IV. I answer to the first and except against the Major which is What ever proceeds from a carnal mind is absolutely evil I distinguish that evil is two-fold 1. Evil in particular Malum in particulari which is effected from an evil individual or particular man 2. Evil in common Malum in communi or absolute evil which is evil in it self and is evil if performed by any man whether good or evil Take my Solution thus What ever proceeds from a carnal minded man is evil in particular relatively as it proceeds from him because it is from an evil man in particular But this evil in particular doth not make that evil in common that is evil to all For example eating and drinking in an evil man or what ever an evil man doth is evil but because eating and drinking is evil in an evil man it doth not follow that eating and drinking is evil to all so as to extend also to good men now eating and drinking and what ever an evil man doth is evil because he eats and drinks unworthily and ungratefully in not acknowledging God to be the Creator of the food which is set before him and in not returning thanks for it 1 Thes. 5. 18. So that I say whatever an evil man doth is evil because he doth it unworthily Hence I may deny the Minor and say That a moral good act which is effected by an evil man is evil in particular neverthelesse it abides moral good that is good in common Tit. 1. 15. Wherefore this concludes nothing against my assertion viz. That a natural man can do a moral good act that is if he be a good natural or moral man for it is possible to a natural man to be good and evil and yet be natural V. As to the second I deny the Minor Because moral good in a good natural man is of faith yet not of entire faith for he believeth that God gave him his being and power of acting He believeth in God that he will supply him in all defects Of this more elswhere So that the Major is most true for whatever is not of faith is sin All our actions must be good that is such as God doth require from us But if we do not believe God or believe in him we cannot perform such actions as are pleasing to him for in not believing him is to rob God of all his Attributes of his Mercy Goodnesse Power c. therein they make God a liar and no wonder then if men's actions are evil in God's sight when they perform them without faith The last Objection doth require little else for answer than what was made to the first VI. Further there are other Texts offer'd arguing that man hath no free-will to do good or evil That he hath no free-will to do good is proved by the 6th Chapter of Gen. 5. vers And God saw that the wickednesse of man was great in the earth and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was onely evil continually Gen. 8. 21. For the imagination of mans heart is evil from his youth Rom. 7. 18. For I know that in me dwelleth no good thing Job 15. 16. How much more abominable and filthy is man which drinketh iniquity like water 1 Cor. 6. 19. Eccles. 7. 20. Hence they conclude that man doth alwayes act evil and consequently hath no free-will to good VII I answer that these Texts do not imply man in general that is all men but only wicked men or the most part of men I prove it Were all men implyed by these Texts then there never were any good men but there were many good men then as Moses Abraham c. Therefore all men are not implyed by the said Texts 2. And particularly to the first Text I say that there were many men but they were not natural for had they been natural they could not have been so perverse as quite to have forgotten God and to have denied him who were preternaturally evil that is confirmd Atheists who plainly deni'd God's Essence or Existence No doubt these cannot doe a good act or think a good thought because they act and think with an entire and absolute unbelief Wherefore it is a certain moral saying that none can do good without faith Again That man hath no free-will to evil is inferred by that Scripture of the 7th to the Romans For the good that I would do I do not but the evil which I would not that I do Jer. 13. 23. Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the Leopard his spots then may ye also do good that are accustomed to do evil Hence they infer that a man acteth evil necessarily In the first place the Question is not of an evil action but of a free-will to will good and evil Wherefore the first quotation makes for us That a man doth will good although he doth not alwayes act it for saith he The good which I would do I do not Here the Apostle speaks of himself as he is a natural man for as otherwise no question he could will good and do good If as a natural man then a natural man can will good although he doth not act
that good which he willeth the Reason hereof the Apostle doth immediately after expresse in these words I find then a law that when I would do good evil is present with me and a little after But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind c. Which amounts to this that man in a natural state hath a free-will to good and evil yet much more to evil because the will is moved by a two-fold principle 1. By it self when it doth represent a certain object to it self without being moved by the inclination of the body 2. By the inclination of the body which is a strong appetite which men are subjected unto through the forcible propensities of their body's Yea oftentimes this proveth so strong that it easily bendeth the will to its aim Now when the will is moved through it self without being incited by the appetite of the body it doth and can do good and leave it VIII The second Scripture proveth the impossibility of Good in Atheists or in any without the ordinary concurss of God IX There may be farther urged That a natural man naturally hath no faith and consequently cannot do a good act Rom. 10. 17. So then faith cometh by hearing and hearing by the word of God Wherefore a natural man cannot believe because he doth not hear the word of God I answer That the Apostle speaks of the extraordinary means of faith and not of the ordinary A natural man then believeth naturally or by ordinary means Or thus The word of God is either written or imprinted in men's hearts I say then that in the first sense faith doth come by attending and hearkning to the word of God which is imprinted in all men's hearts except in Atheists in whose hearts the Law of God is quite blotted out Phil. 1. 29. For unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ not onely to believe on him c. Ergo Faith is not natural I answer That faith through Christ is given and is supernatural but faith whereby we believe there is a God and that he is mercifull and therefore will find a means to save us is natural Although we cannot actually know or believe the assigned means whereby he will save us Wherefore there is onely a partial faith in natural men and not a compleat and entire faith for they cannot believe naturally in Christ unlesse it be given to them from God as the Text doth evidently expresse Many more are produced as that of Acts 16. 14. Rom. 10. 9. Heb. 12. 2. All which may be easily answered from what hath been explained just now X. It is time that I should prepare to defend my own Positions with the same force as was used by them of the contrary opinion That there is a free-will of doing good and evil in natural men I prove by the 1 Cor. 7. 37. Neverthelesse he that standfast in his heart having no necessity but hath power over his own will and hath decreed so in his heart that he will keep his virgin doth well First the Apostle teacheth that a man doth not act necessarily having no necessity but contingently that is voluntarily Secondly That he hath a free will What is to have a power over his will else but to enjoy a freedom of will and that either in acting or not acting and not only so but in acting good or evil and quoad specificationem actus as expresly in keeping of his virgin which is a good act XI Acts 5. 4. Whiles it remained was it not thine own and after it was sold was it not in thine own power Here is particularly implyed a free-will of doing evil or good Either Ananias might have given the whole price of the possession or part In choosing to give a part under pretext of the whole he chose evil or otherwise he might have chosen to give the whole and so might have chose good for it was in his own power as the Text holds forth XII Deut. 30. 11. For this commandment which I command thee this day is not hidden from thee neither is it farre off It is not in Heaven nor beyond the Seas that thou shouldest say who shall go up for us to Heaven and bring it to us or Who shall go beyond the Seas for us and bring it unto us that we may hear and do it But saith Moses the Word is very nigh unto thee in thy mouth and in thy heart that thou mayest do it What is more plain then that hereby is intended a free-will which a man hath of doing good or evil XIII Prov. 6. 5. Deliver thy self as a Roe from the hand of the hunter and as a bird from the hand of a fowler This holds forth that a man can deliver himself from evil yet not without God's concurss Psal. 94. 8. Understand ye brutish among the people and ye fools when will ye be wise Ergo A natural man hath a power of understanding if he will or else may refuse it Or an ignorant man hath a will of being wiser and knowing or of rejecting wisdome and knowledge Matth. 23. 37. How often would I have gathered thy children together even as a Hen gathereth her chickens under her wings and ye would not Ergo Man had a will of coming to God for other wayes God would have called upon them in vain which is impossible The same may be inferred from Prov. 1. 24. Isa. 1. 19. If ye be willing and obedient ye shall eat the good of the Land but if ye refuse and rebell c. Ergo Man can will and refuse Rev. 3 20. Isa. 65. 12. Eccles. 15. 14. Zech. 1 c. XIV The next thing I come to prove is that man hath a spark or remnant of good in him Rom. 2. 14. For when the Gentiles which have not the Law do by nature the things contained in the Law these having not the Law are a Law to themselves Which sheweth the work of the Law written in their hearts their conscience bearing witnesse c. What is here meant by doing by nature the things contained in the Law but that a man naturally hath a remnant of Good in him for how could he other wayes do the things of the written Law through which he may know the Law and doth what the Law commands and hath a conscience bearing witnesse This Text makes good my distinction that there is a two-fold Law one expressed or written and the other impressed in mens hearts or the Law of nature The same we have also in Ezek. 18. 21. Luc. 13. 5. Rom. 1. 19 20 21. Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them for God hath shewed it unto them What can be more clear XV. I do farther prove That a natural man cannot do a Theologick good act through himself and being onely assisted with the ordinary concurss of God A theologick good act is which doth fully and entirely satisfie and please God There
is also a partial theological good act which differeth from the other in degree and pleaseth or satisfieth God onely partially as for instance Moral good is a partial theologick good because it doth incompleatly and partially agree with the will of God Act. 11. 18. When they heard these things they held their peace and glorified God saying then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life 2 Cor. 7. 10. For godly sorrow worketh repentance to salvation not to be repented of but the sorrow of the world worketh death Phil. 1. 6. Being confident of this very thing that he which hath begun a good work in you will perform it untill the day of Jesus Christ. All which allegations testifie That man with God's ordinary concurss only cannot do a theologick good act For the first Text declares That God granteth repentance unto life to the Gentiles The next confirmeth That God worketh repentance to salvation The last manifestly sheweth That God doth begin and continue a good work in us By good work is understood a compleat and theologick good work If then man cannot do a theologick good act without repentance unto life or salvation which is through God's extraordinary concurrence he cannot do a theologick good act through himself and by God's ordinary assistance only Man being assisted with God's extraordinary concurrence hath a free-will of doing a theologick good act Tit. 3. 8. This is a faithfull saying and these things I will that thou affirm constantly that they which have believed in God might be carefull to maintain good works Here it appeareth that to maintain good works which good is theologick good man must believe in God and what is it else to believe in God but to confide and hope in God's extraordinary assistance and concurss Ephes. 2. 1. Ephes. 1. 5. XVI I remember I asserted in the subconclusion of the first conclusion in the ninth Chapter that man when assisted by God's extraordinary concurss hath still a free-will not to extream contraries but a free-will of election that is a freedom of making choice of one good thing before another That a supernatural man hath no free-will to extream contraries that is to do theologick evil and theologick good I prove it Heb. 6. 16 17 18. 1 John 5. 9 10. John 5. 24. Ephes. 1. 13 14. 2 Cor. 1. 21 22. Rom. 8. 16. John 10. 27 28 29. Matth. 24. 24. 2 Tim. 2. 19. Rom. 11. 29. Esay 42. 3. Rom. 8. 1 38 39. Phillip 1. 6. The Texts which are produced by Bellarmin against this position are Marc. 4. 15. Luc. 8. 13. John 15. 2. Hebr. 6. 4 5 6. Hebr. 10. 26. 2 Pet. 21 22. All these instances prove only that initiates hypocrites and superficial Saints have deflected but not that confirmed and truly profound Saints have fallen off and done the worst evil Besides them sins or backslidings were not theologick evils but moral so that had they been confirmed Saints it would have concluded nothing against us A supernatural man supernatural is when a man can act supernaturally through the extraordinary concurss of God that which a natural man cannot act naturally by the ordinary concurss of God hath a partial free-will to moral evil and moral good but he doth moral evil accidentally and moral good per se and is more inclined to moral good than to moral evil Herein doth a supernatural man differ from a natural man in that the one sinneth with a partial reluctance of his will and accidentally through the forcible and mighty inclination or drawing of his flesh Rom 16. 12. the other commits sin per se with his whole will and also with a pleasure Thus did David Solomon and Peter slide back and committed moral evil yet it was with a partial reluctance of will with a fear and trouble far from doing it with a pleasure or entire will After the same tenour are these Texts to be interpreted Proverbs 24. 1. 1 John 1. 8. expresly Rom. 1. 32. Who knowing the judgement of God that they who commit such things are worthy of death not onely do the same but have a pleasure in them that do them A supernatural man hath an entire free-will of Election of doing a theological good act for a supernatural man may pray with faith praise God with faith help the poor with faith c. All which are theologick good acts in choosing of which a man imployeth his free-will John 8. 31 32 36. Rom. 14. 2 3. XVII After this there remaineth still to prove that the means whereby God's extraordinary concurrence is procured is in man himself and adheres to his free-will Zech. 1. 3. Therefore say unto them thus saith the Lord of Hosts Turn ye unto me saith the Lord of Hosts and I will turn unto you Had man not had a free-will and means in himself of procuring Gods assistance it would have been said in vain Turn ye unto me But that is impossible Ergo A man hath a free-will and means in himself of turning unto God To turn to God is to apply our selves to him and to beg his extraordinary assistance and so I prove that prayer is the first means whereby we turn to God In the first place turning to God cannot be to believe savingly in him or to serve God as he requireth because we of our selves cannot believe savingly before God doth assist us in an extraordinary manner Therefore God by commanding us to turn to him commandeth us to pray to him for his assistance But this is apparent by other Scriptures as Psal. 15. 14 15. Psal. 55. 23. Deut. 4. 29. Matth. 7. 7. Luke 11. 13. James 1. 5. 1 Pet. 5. 7. XVIII Man being thus inabled by God's extraordinary concurss the Question will be Whether the actions which man so performeth are to be taken for the actions of God or of man Divines usually say That such actions are wrought from man but man doth not work them of himself that is man doth them actions from himself but he doth not do them of himself alone but by God's extraordinary assistance to him Wherefore the actions thus effected from man are rather to be called the actions of man than the actions of God because man is the neerest efficient of them actions The sacred Texts appear to hold forth the same Mat. 5. 16. Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works and glorifie your Father which is in Heaven Here you may observe that good works or actions effected from good men are called mans good works and not Gods The like expression you have in 1 John 3. 3 10. Good actions are wrought from man but not of man 2 Cor. 3. 5. Not that we are sufficient of our selves to think any thing as of our selves but our sufficiency is of God The Apostle saith here That our sufficiency is of God that is our power of acting is of God Gal. 2. 20. Rom. 9. 16. So then it is not of
him that willeth nor him that runneth but of God that sheweth mercy Wherefore man cannot will or do a theological good act of himself although he may from himself but of God XIX Before I leave this controversie it is requisite to examine that Scripture of the ninth to the Romans which seemeth to evert most of what hath been posed in this Chapter vers 13 14 15 16. As it is written Jacob have I loved but Esau have I hated What shall we say then is there unrighteousnesse with God God forbid For he saith to Moses I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion So then it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth but of God that sheweth mercy 1. Hence they may argue If God hated Esau then he hated also all his actions and consequently hated his prayers Wherefore there was no means left in Esau whereby to procure God's extraordinary concurss Ergo All men have not the means in them whereby c. This also proveth that Esau had no spark of good in him and therefore God did totally hate him for had he had any good in him God could not have hated that good 2. Jacob have I loved Ergo Jacob had never any evil in him for had he had evil in him God could not have loved him 3. The Scripture makes enquiry Whether it is unrighteousnesse with God to hate Esau and love Jacob. Ergo It is not severe that God should hate one and love another to damn one justly and to save another Gratis velex gratia 4. Moses saith that God will have mercy on whom he will have mercy and whom he will he hardneth Ergo Man hath no free-will to do good In answer to the first inference I deny the sequel For it doth not follow that God because Esau had no good in him or means to procure God's favour hated Esau but God hated Esau for not using the means which was in him Rom. 2. 15. Here may be urged that God hated Esau from all eternity Ergo Esau could never have had the means to salvation I deny the consequence God hated Esau from all eternity because he fore-knew his actions and intents from all eternity Here may be demanded How God can fore-know mans actions since they are contingent were they necessary he might Let the Scripture answer you in this Rom. 9. 20. We are not to dive into God's manner of working farther than he hath revealed to us and nevertheless we must believe that all things are possible to God and that he is Elohim Heb. 1. 3. Luc. 1. 37. Phil. 3. 21. 2 Chron. 20. 5. Matth. 19 26. Esay 9. 6. Jer. 32. 18. Gen. 17. 1. 35. 11. Ruth 1. 20 21. 2 Cor. 6. 18. Revel 1. 8. 4. 8. 1 Tim. 6. 9. Neither is it a legal inference that because God hated Esau therefore Esau had no remnant of good in him he might have had good in him and yet God have hated him not for having that good but for not exercising it God might also have hated Esau from all eternity for his sins and evil actions which God foresaw from all eternity and yet he might have had a principle of Good in him As for the second Argumentation I deny the consequence for it doth not follow that Jacob had never no evil in him because God did love him for God loved David and yet it is apparent enough that David had evil in him Rom. 7. 24. Paul calleth himself wretched yet it is certain that God loved him God pardoneth their sins because they are committed by them not with an entire will but with a reluctancy Romans 7. 20 23. To the third I answer It is no severity in God to love one and hate the other supposing that God can fore-know all man's evil actions and therefore hateth him He may also fore-know his good actions and come to love him from all eternity yet not because his actions are absolutely good in themselves Luc. 17. 10. Rom. 11. 35 36. 1 John 1. 8. Esay 64. 6. Psal. 130. 3. but because God out of his grace and mercy doth impute his actions to him for righteousnesse Rom. 4. 21 22 23 24. Ephes. 2. 8 9. Phil. 3. 9. Col. 3. 24. 2 Tim. 1. 16. But it would be severe should God hate us from all eternity if we should falsly suppose that God did not fore-know our actions so that herein you conclude nothing against me If in the fourth place God sheweth mercy to those onely to whom he will and hardneth their hearts whose he pleaseth to harden it will prove in vain to man to work good works or to will good neither can he will or do good without God's grace and mercy All this I grant to be a certain truth that we can do no good work without God's grace and mercy and no doubt but God hath also a free-will to conferre grace and mercy on whom he pleaseth and harden those whom he pleaseth to harden working all things according to the counsel of his own will Ephes. 1. 5 6 11. Revel 4. 11. Psal. 135. 6. Psal. 33. 9. Matth. 8. 2 3. Neverthelesse this is no ground why we should argue that man hath no free-will because God hath a free-will we rather ought to surmise the contrary That man hath a free-will because God hath a free-will Gen. 1. 26. God doth work in us to will and to do of his good pleasure or will Phil. 2. 13. Ergo God's will doth not abolish our wils but his will is that we should have a will But possibly you do farther urge this argument by subducting Predestination from thence thus If man is predestinated Ergo He hath no free will of doing good for a free-will in him would be in vain This Text doth apparently teach God's eternal Decree Predestination or Ordination to save some and damn others But for what for to manifest his Glory Mercy and Justice Acts 13. 48. And as many as were ordained to eternal life believed Isa. 46. 10. Mal 3. 6. Hereunto I answer that God's Predestination is in no wise coactive for were it so then Predestination and Fate of the Stoicks would not differ What is fate but an irresistable and forced impulse upon man through which he doth necessarily and unavoidably perform all his actions and especially such which concern his life and death his ruine or advancement in politick affairs his marriage or any other extraordinary change of life for in all these fate was most taken notice of and therefore more particularly attributed to them cases Although fate in general denoted an unchangeable and necessary ordination upon all beings Whether this ordination was imposed by Jupiter as the Poets feigned or caused from a necessary bending and disposing of the Heavens and its constellations as the Chaldeans thought doth not much concern us in this Treatise Cicero was not a little puzzeld in expounding how
of God open to men in quickning the print of it in their hearts which was almost deaded and exing them to examine the course of their lives James 1. 23 24 25. 3. The immediate effect of this search is the conviction of a mans conscience Rom. 1. 20. 2. 1. Rom. 11. 32. 4. This conviction of conscience bringeth them to a desperation of their salvation they finding that â—mpâ—â—nesse and unablenesse in themselves Rom. 7. 9 11 13. 5. This begetteth a humiliation in their hearts grieving for their sins fearing the guilt and dreading the punishment and so they are brought to a confession of their sins Mat. 9. 12. All these effects are produced through the insight of man into his own heart where all men contain the moral Law and may through the light of Nature and God's ordinary Grace or ordinary Call unfold it in the same sense which the quoted Texts do expresse CHAP. XI Of the Command of the Will 1. Whether the Will can be forced 2. What elicited and imperated acts are 3. What command the Will exerciseth over the inferiour facultin What a politick and despotick command is 4. That the irascible and appetitive faculty are under a politick obedience to the Will 5. That the locomotive faculty is not alwayes under a servile obedience to the will 6. That the Will doth not command over the practick understanding I. I Have digressed somewhat beyond my bounds in the last Chapter in alledging Scripture to prove many fundamental assertions of this Treatise the which although I ought to have performed by reason onely neverthelesse to gratifie some whose education teacheth them not to give credit to any reason unlesse confirmed by Scripture I contracted the fore-mentioned quotations in one little space And now to keep on my road There remains one Question more relating to the freedome of will which I shall first endeavour to answer and then go on in adding what is requisite The Question is Whethen the will can be forced This is a strange kind of doubt Whether the will when it doth not will for when it is forced it doth act against its will be a will However this seemeth an absurd query if understood in so many plain words yet supposing that act to be forced or against the will which is willed through the will but with a reluctancy and fore-knowledge of inconvenience thereon ensuing the Question may be conceived in a safe meaning The will is termed forced when it doth will through compulsion or impulsion or through a positive or privative violence as others explain it without which it would not have willed that which otherwayes it willed The Question might rather be proposed thus Whether the will when it is forced is free or acteth freely for no doubt the will of man can be forced in all her acts whatever Authors say to the contrary I prove it Man can be forced in his imperated acts Ergo A man can also be forced in his elicited acts because there is no imperated act but it derives from an elicited act for it is the elicited act which commandeth the other act Here may then be enquired Wherein a forced elicited act differeth from an absolute free act I answer That both these acts proceed from the will with a consent but that which the will acteth with an absolute freedom it acteth without any remorse and with an entire consent That which the will acteth when she is forced she acts with a remorse and partial reluctancy for to avoid a greater inconvenience or evil and were it not for that she would not have acted it The will cannot properly be said to be forced through a privative violence because the will doth not act at all when she is hindred II. The acts of the will according to Moralists are either elicited or imperated An elicited act of the will is when she doth act within her self by proposing the goodnesse of an object and consenteth to the covering or rejecting of it The imperated act of the will is whereby she doth execute that which she had concluded and agreed to by the elicited act in commanding the inferiour faculties III. The command which the will exerciseth over the obeying faculties is politick or controlable The obeying faculties are the internal and external senses the locomotive faculty the irascible and appetible faculty I prove it The internal senses obey the will from a politick obedience for a man willeth oft-times not to think or to remember this or that thing which neverthelesse doth force into his mind Besides the phansie worketh in a dream without being commanded by the will Wherefore the wils command is not despotick but politick The external senses do not obey the will from a despotick obedience because the will frequently cannot per se hinder them in their functions as for instance she cannot at all times hinder the hearing from perceiving a noise or the sent from smelling a bad sent c. IV. The irascible and appetitive faculty obey the will politickly because our natures are ofttimes prone to envy anger or revenge when we would not be so So our natures are as oft propense to covet evil objects which our will doth contradict V. The locomotive faculty doth frequently refuse a servil obedience to the will for in wearinesses and convulsions she is rebellious and unable Besides the locomotive faculty being in some cases more obedient to the sensitive appetite she obeyeth it before she obeyeth the will Lastly The locomotive faculty is oftentimes at work in a dream and at other times when the will doth not command her and thence it is evident that the locomotive faculty doth not obey the will from a despotick obedience VI. It is absurd to affirm That the will commandeth the practick understanding for it is the same thing as if you said That the will commanded her self the will and practick understanding being one and the same CHAP. XII Of Voluntary and Involuntary 1. That the Understanding as it is speculative and practick is the internal principle of the ultimate and intermediate actions That God or Angels are improperly said to be external principles That God is the coefficient of man's actions How Angels whether good or evil Wizards and Witches concur to the specification of man's actions 2. What a humane action is 3. That it is absurd to assert man to do a thing ignorantly 4. Whether evils of omission through ignorance are to be termed involuntary 5. How humane actions are divided I. HItherto we have declared the internal principle of man namely the understanding as it is speculative and practick through which he acteth in order to the attaining the Summum Bonum and arriving to his last and ultimate action the immediate fruits of which is the greatest happinesse Furthermore we are not only to state the understanding to be the internal principle of our last and ultimate action but also of all intermediate actions and of such as are called humane
moral or voluntary actions We need not augment the number of internal principles by adding Habits to them these being supposed to alter the forestated principles accidentally only and not essentially How Habits ' are acquired and how intended remitted and corrupted we have set down elswhere Neither are God or Angels properly said to be external principles since all principles strictly are required to be internal But God may be justly termed the coefficient of the actions of man since God worketh in us to will and to do Angels whether good or evil Wizards and Witches cannot concur efficiently to the effecting of humane actions to which an infinite power is onely sufficient whereas they consisting of a limited power are therefore render'd uncapable They may concurre to the specification of an act as persuasive causes in bending man's will to this or that act by changing the phansie in stirring up the humours and spirits of the brain whereby it may represent objects otherwise than they are or by presenting objects through a false image or representation or by changing the external sensories Whence we may observe that it is not in the Devils power to make or force us to doe a thing against our wils but that we may discover resist and refuse his deceitfull motions or otherwise we might be justly thought excusable wherefore if we do at any time commit evil through the perswasion of an evil spirit we must not onely accuse the wicked spirit but our selves also After our discourse upon the will there remains alone to appose a word or two touching humane actions II. Humane actions otherwise called moral and voluntary are such as are effected by man as farre as he is a man or are produced by his will or practick understanding Wherefore whatever man acteth with the fore-knowledge and fore-command of his practick understanding is humane and voluntary A voluntary action may be purely voluntary and free or mixt out of a Voluntas and Noluntas that is willed with a reluctancy The first acception of Voluntary Aristotle terms voluntary strictly so called the latter he denominates involuntary but improperly III. It is absurd to assert man to do a thing ignorantly since it is impossible for a man to do any thing which he doth not fore-know Wherefore it must be an errour in the Peripateticks to affirm that man can act an involuntarium quiddam ex ignorantia because he acteth nothing but what is consented unto partially or totally by his will which cannot will any thing as the Peripatetick definition holds forth without the foreknowledge of the understanding Hence I conclude that nothing is to be termed involuntary or mixtly voluntary unlesse a man is forced to it violently or by a cause acting from without IV. Here may be demanded Whether evils of omission of duties required by a Law committed by man when he is ignorant of the said Law are to be termed involuntary No certainly for they are voluntary in that the omission of an act is as much an act of the will as the effection of it But whether such omissions or commissions which a man doth will are to be termed evil in regard he willed them through ignorance which had he not been ignorant of he would not have willed is to be decided from the circumstances of such actions and not from the imputing such actions not to be the actions of man or not to be voluntary Moreover I answer That no kind of ignorance doth make an action neutral that is neither good or evil and excusable but an invincible ignorance What invincible ignorance and other kinds of ignorances are I do wittingly omit the inserting since they are vulgarly enough known As for such circumstances which are required to render humane actions good or evil I have set down in the latter end of this Book V. The action of the will is accidentally divided in fruition and intention Fruition is the continuated coveting and willing of an object already before coveted and now enjoyed Intention is a mediate coveting of means whereby to covet an object immediately or to arrive to the fruition of it Intention contains in it three inferiour actions 1. Election whereby the practick understanding doth by a preceding deliberation covet one or more objects for a means out of many 2. Consent which is a further coveting of that or them objects which it hath elected so as to be confirmed and pleased in that election 3. Usus or Usance otherwise called execution which is the application of the means now elected and consented unto to a further action CHAP. XIII Of Natural Faith 1. That Faith is the sole means through which we are to attain to our greatest good What Faith is The Definition confirmed by Arguments deduced from reason 2. The two-fold object of Faith A proof from reason that God is the Creator of man That God and Nature are one 3. An enquiry into the end of man's creation 4. That man doth know the summe of God's Law through the light of Nature A summary enumeration of the Law of God as it is imprinted upon every man's heart 5. Moral virtues compared with the moral Law A comprehension of all moral virtues I Have just now finisht my Discourse upon the subject of this Tract that which fals next under our consideration is the means through which we are to attain to our greatest Good and happinesse The sole means is Faith Faith is a certain knowledge of God and the Law and an assurance in and of God's mercy and goodnesse The genus proximum and differentia proxima are signals that their Definitum or thing defined is not an historical or temporary faith or saith of miracles onely but a justifying and glorifying faith necessarily comprehending in it self the three other kinds as degrees by which the soul doth gradually ascend to an exalting faith Among other School-Divines it goeth under the name of an explicite Faith Fides the same with the Definitum deriveth its denomination from fidere a word not in use among the later Latinists whose signification the verb confidere hath since supplied which is to rest contented and fully satisfied Wherefore assurance implying a certain practical knowledge freed from all doubts and causing this rest and satisfaction doth justly and properly deserve the place of the Genus in this Definition The certainty which Faith doth bring with it depends upon the certainty and necessity of its premises which being necessary and certain infers a certain and necessary conclusion If God is mercifull he will save them that beg mercy But God is mercifull and I do beg mercy Therefore God will save me This Conclusion as depending upon unchangeable and certain premises holds forth that Faith is an undoubted assurance of God's mercy and that he will save a zealous believer No wonder then if Faith doth create this quietnesse rest and satisfaction Austin de Civit. Dei lib. 19. cap. 18. tels us no lesse To the Acadamicks all things are
to the owner which is only possible in unfixt and untied matters V. I have briefly enumerated the contents of the Moral Law according as it is engraffed upon all mens hearts This Law is perfect and compleat because there is no moral precept belonging to any moral virtue but is contained herein neither is there any vice but is hereby checked and condemned Wherefore I shall compare them together to wit moral Virtues with the moral Law A virtue is a habit of acting good on the other side vice is a habit of acting evil Virtue or vice may be termed moral or theologick according to the act which it produceth which is either moral good or evil or theologick good or evil So holinesse is a habit of acting according to the Law of God Sin is a habit of acting contrary to the Law of God according it is written in all mens hearts That this Law is known to all men it appears hence because all men are checked by their conscience at one time or another for their sins There are four cardinal or principal Virtues Prudence Justice Temperance and Fortitude Prudence is a habit through which a man is directed in exercising particular virtues It s integrant parts are three 1. The remembrance of things past 2. The knowledge of things present 3. The fore-sight of things to come Thomas Aquinas counteth eight 1. Memory 2. Knowledge 3. Aptnesse to learn 4. Cunningnesse 5. Reason 6. Fore-sight 7. Circumspection 8. Caution The subjected parts of Prudence are four 1. Kingly prudence in governing his Subjects 2. Politick prudence of the People in obeying the Magistrate 3. Oeconomical prudence in governing a family 4. Military prudence in ruling an Army The potential parts of prudence are three 1. Inquiry for means 2. Judgement concerning the means invented 3. Command that them things be effected upon which judgement is past Justice is a virtue of giving every one what is his It s integral parts are three 1. To live honestly 2. To give every one what is his 3. To wrong no man The subjected parts of Justice are two 1. General Justice through which a man deals justly with the Commonwealth 2. Special or particular Justice through which a man deals justly with every particular person Special Justice is two-fold 1. Commutative Justice through which a man is just in his trading with others 2. Distributive Justice which is either recompencing every one for his good deserts or punishing every one for his crimes in which there is observed a Geometrical proportion and in commutative Justice an Arithmetical proportion Right is that which agreeth with the Law or Justice It is either natural or positive humane or divine Ecclesiastick or civil written or not written A Law is a rule command or precept of Justice containing in it what is just and what ought to be done There are three conditions required to the constitution of a Law 1. Equity 2. Authority 3. Promulgation or the publishing of it A Law is either external or participated The participated Law is divided in Natural Humane and Divine The Humane Law is either Civil or Canonical The Divine Law is divided into the old and new Law Temperance is a habit of moderating the senses particularly the senses of feeling and tasting The integral parts are two 1. Bashfulnesse 2. Honesty The potential parts are four Continence Clemency Humility and Modesty The subjected parts are Abstinence Sobriety Chastity and Shamefac'dnesse Fortitude is a virtue in attempting terrible matters Its acts are two 1. To uphold 2. To go on The integral parts of Fortitude are Magnanimity Magnificence Patience and Perseverance A man must not only have a bare knowledge of God's Law or of the moral Virtues but also a practick knowledge that is to know them in himself so as to practise them CHAP. XIV Of Man's Fall and of Atheism 1. A rational enquiry into man's primitive estate The maenner of man's fall 2. Grounds whence a man may rationally collect hopes for his restoration 3. That Atheism is the worst of sins and that an Atheist is unable of performing the least good act Wherein the goodnesse of an action doth consist 4. A Character of an Atheist That confirmed Atheism is the onely sinne against the holy Ghost A full Discovery of an Atheist THe other part of the object of Faith is Gods mercy and goodnesse how a natural man comes to find out God's mercy I shall instantly demonstrate Man having compared the difficulty of the Law with his unablenesse of performing obedience to it cannot rest satisfied or assured unlesse relieved and assisted by these two Attributes of God for he being conscious of his pravity and corrupt state of nature must imagine that he was not so created but good and blessed because the Creator is good and blessed and being left to his free-will knowing what was good and what might be evil he through a wanton curiosity and alurement of an evil spirit which spirits were created before man and whose nature it hath alwayes been to tempt man and draw him into evil as shall be proved by reason elsewhere was overswayed to try evil one act of which had not God through his grace prevented it might have been valid enough to corrupt his nature in such a manner that he would have been rendred uncapable of ever recovering his former state or of acting a good act By reason that the commission of one evil act must needs have effected a privation of that habit which he once had of working good for they being acts proceeding from two contrary habits the latter must have expelled the former which would have remained unrecoverable because à privatione ad habitum non datur regressus After a privation a habit cannot return Put out your sight once and you will never recover it Wherefore it must have followed that man being arrived to this depraved state of nature must have become a meer alien from God in whose former resemblance his happinesse did consist Furthermore the immortal spirit expiring out of the body in that condition abideth eternally in absence and dissemblance from God which two cases makes its state most wofull and dismal Thus you may remark that it is possible to a natural man by way of a Sorites to collect his first beatitude deficience guilt and punishment II. Is it not then a man's greatest concernment to bestir himself in this need and defect for a means of restoration Here may be demanded How can a man hope for restoration if the habit of acting good is quite extirpated and that from a privation to a habit there is no returning 2. Why may not a man have the same hopes of restoration here in this world as well as out of it as the Papists hold To the first I answer That extirpation may be understood in a two-fold representation 1. As it represents a total extinction and annihilation Nihil remanente sui 2. As it doth represent not a total yet almost
a total annihilation there still remaining some part of the thing thus a man saith his eye is out when he can see but a little It is possible for a man to be in either of these conditions if he is in the first questionlesse he is in a lost condition and is uncapable of recovery for the objected reason The continual acting of evil produceth a total habit of evil wherein if a man be habituated that small portion of the remaining good is totally extirpated As in an Atheist who is one wherein the habit of Good is totally extinct which maketh him affectately and perversly ignorant of God and in whom the habit of evil is radicated whereby he becometh a blasphemer against God in denying his being III. An Atheist hath not so much virtue or power in him as thereby to do one good action A good action is which doth resemble its pattern Bona censetur actio quae suae ideae fuerit conformis and therefore must 1. Proceed from a good principle 2. Be imployed about a good object 3. Be intended to a good end A good action here taken in a moral not physical signification whose principle and object is right Reason and moral good Its end is to be agreeing with a good will So that an Atheist cannot work a good work his principle of Good to wit right Reason being totally depraved and corrupted for he in denying God denieth his right Reason when as I have proved in the Doctrine of Souls right Reason cannot but must necessarily retain an impression of God's existence goodnesse and omnipotence from whom she received her production or he in denying God denieth his own being his being consisting in a resemblance to the Image of God the perfect pattern of his once perfect essence which doth argue that his right Reason is totally extinct and that there remaineth a plenar possession of corruption and depravation in his understanding and will through which he judgeth of all things otherwise than they are And this is farther evident because our understanding judgeth of all things in ordination to action all our actions are performed in ordination to our last end which being positively denied by him proveth the truth of the fore-stated Conclusion The second Qualification of a good action is That its object must be good A mans will is carried forth to a triple object whereof two have respect to the body the other to the soul. Of the two respecting the body one is desired for the conservation of the body the other for conservation of the species or kind These as being Physical objects are Physically good to all natural Bodies for Ens bonum convertuntur a Being and Good are convertible Wherefore this maxime Omnia appetunt Bonum All Beings covet good and cannot covet evil is onely to be understood of Physical good objects The third Object relating to the soul is moral good whose objectivenesse is only proper to rational essences The last condition required in a good action is its direction to a good end which is to God's glory and praise to the admiration of his Wisdom Omnipotence and all others of his Attributes If we compare the actions of an Atheist with these three qualifications we shall find them infinitely different and deffective from them they proceeding from the worst of principles and being imployed about improportionate and bruitish objects and directed to a wicked malicious and hellish end namely to Gods greatest dishonour IV. Summarily to give you a Character of an Atheist An Atheist is a most horrid monster once a man now worse than a Brute a Devil in the shape of a man ungratefull beyond the expression of a tongue rigidly injurious to God and man a sinner beyond the worst of sinners a fit object for God's vengeance and the greatest torment that the depth of Hell and envy of Devils are able to spue out Is there a sinne which God although he is infinitely mercifull hath resolved not to pardon it is confirmed Atheisme this is the only treason which man can commit against God The injury which he doeth unto God is in Blaspheming his sacred Name robbing him of his Honour and of all his Attributes and that which doth infinitely augment his sinne is his persistence in it after such an unexpressible indulgence It is impossible that all vices should lodge and center in one man for I could never hear that any natural man was so vicious but he had some good I mean good as the vulgar calleth it quality in him Many have accused such a one for being a Drunkard another for a Robber or a Cheat yet some there will be still who you may hear say although such a one is a Drunkard yet he is honest or kind or civil c. or of another although he is a Robber yet he is no Murderer although a Cheat yet he is no Drunkard so that I say there is no natural man so vicious but there is something in him which people will say is good But an Atheist hath a nest of all vice in him there is not a vice so detestable or deform'd although it be against nature but he dares make tryal of it because he dreads neither God or his Law An Atheist will wrong cheat revile his own parents he will murder his own relations friends or others if it be for his interest or pleasure he will Rob steal defame blaspheme and what not 't is true he doth not alwayes do these acts because he fears the Law of man nevertheless his will is not backward but prone to all manner of wickedness what should hinder him his conscience will not because that is deaded but it quickneth again a little before his death and then beginneth his rage and torment then the Devils come about him each busied in increasing his woe and misery then Hell and Eternity is at hand There are many who seeming to judge charitably of all men cannot be perswaded there are Atheists In these I shall soon correct their tendernesse There was never a subversion of a legall government but there appeared hundreds of Atheists They at such times are called subtil Politicians who finding such successe by making Scripture and Religion or rather hypocrisie a cloak for to cover all their wicked designs imagin thence that Religion and Scripture were invented for that same purpose because it hath so well served their turns Pray what is this but absolute atheism yea more than this if they see it is for their interest to murder an innocent person or persons yea were it a whole Nation they will not stick to do it out of hand if they stand in want of treasures they will steal and rob it from the people and tell them it is for the good of the Commonwealth in general although their intent is to make it good to themselves alone in particular What crime is so great but is committed at such times There is no History that treats of
Rebellion but may be a president of Atheism Here may be questioned Since that an Atheist hath utterly lost his right reason whether God cannot be moved through his goodnesse or mercy to create a new understanding or reason in him The Solution of this question take out of these two subsequent conclusions 1. There is nothing imaginable to be created which exceed Gods absolute omnipotence God as he is infinite in power his acts are also infinite as he is omnipotent he is all-creating Hath he not created Angels men the world and all things therein contained I conclude then that the restitution of an Atheist is possible through God's absolute omnipotence 2. God is infinitely perfect whose perfection is revealed to us through his most perfect attributes which are his omnipotence justice mercy goodnesse c. it is certain these are all perfections in the highest degree The concordance or agreeing of these attributes one with the other is no lesse a perfection for should they disagree it would be an imperfection not to be conceived in the most perfect being This premised I infer That God is omnipotent according to the concordance of his attributes what is there but God can effect it if agreeing with his attributes Possibly you may object God cannot recall a thing which is past as that a man who is now should not have been or that a man who died this day should not have died or that he can not make a Devil an Angle c. I answer That the effecting of these acts is disagreeing with Gods attributes namely with his unchangeable or ordained will His ordained will is that man should die at a certain minute that the Devils should remain damned to all eternity that a thing should passe without being recalled for should God recall his will he would cantradict himself and therefore such is not to be supposed God no question can do greater things and therefore his power is not to be doubted in lesser I conclude hence that it is disagreeing with Gods ordained will and justice to restore an Atheist Gods profest and greatest enemy who therefore deserveth the rigor of Gods justice and although God's mercy is infinite yet it must agree with his justice Can God's mercy extend to an Atheist or can he have compassion with that which is altogether evil and contrary to his nature No certainly for the object of God's mercy must be good be it never so little An Atheist onely is a sinner against the holy Ghost he is such whom to sanctifie is disagreeing with the nature of the holy Ghost What shall or can the holy Ghost cast its beams upon that which is altogether evil Here may be demanded How doth the holy Spirit then manifest it self to any since all men are sinners and all sinners are evil I answer That all men except Atheists have some spark of good lodging in them upon which the holy Spirit doth work and which it doth increase and cherish whereby at last a man weakneth the habit of sinning Object An Atheist may save a man from drowning but in so doing he doth a good act Ergo An Atheist hath still some spark of good resting in him I answer That it is in no wise a good act neither doth it proceed from a good principle or is it directed to a good end The ground upon which he doth it is upon consideration that were he in the same case or the like he would be glad another should do the same to him so that it is for his own ends for otherwise did he imagine that a man's drowning might conduce to his benefit doubtlesse he would never prevent it The second Representation of the extirpation of a habit is when there yet remaineth some spark of good which is inherent in all natural men though in an unequal proportion according to the prevalence of the evil habit What soul is there so rooted in iniquity which doth not sometimes a good act per se through it self and this is a sign that there is a good disposition latent in all men A murtherer soon after he hath committed that hainous crime is immediately checked through the sting and light of his conscience reasoning that God is just and thence dreads his wrath Now to dread God is a good action proceeding from the instinct and remaining light of the soul which is also a good principle and consequently is a mark that he is not totally evil You may reply against the consequence and argue That the Devils dread and fear God but the Devils are unable of effecting a good act and therefore fear in a murtherer is not a good action I answer That the fear of God naked and not cloathed with a repentance and effluence from a good principle doth not imply a good act and therefore the naked fear in Devils a bateth nothing from their evil but as to a murtherer in fearing God's justice wisheth he had not committed the fact Fear brings with it a great unquietnesse of mind but a man naturally wisheth the removal of any unquietnesse of spirit and therefore a murtherer wisheth his crime undone with a resolution questionlesse never to attempt the like again which is a kind of repentance But here you seem to charge me with a second objection That many murtherers after so villanous an enterprise are not possest with any fear of God's justice unquietnesse of mind or any other kind of repentance but persisting in their pravity and wickednesse and affirming untill the last that were it to do again they should not omit the doing of it I answer That these wretches are in no tittle differing from Atheists since they wilfully blot the remembrance of God and his Laws out of their consciences for otherwise â—â— were impossible but they must be surprised with fear CHAP. XV. Of the Means and Manner of Man's escape and Restoration 1. What is requisite for a man to consider in order to his escape and restitution 2. How a man may naturally find out a means tending to his restitution 3. The description of God's mercy 4. The explanation of the precedent description 5. The act through which God's mercy doth succour a natural soul in her contention I. IT is not enough for man to be sensible of the danger wherein he is but it behoveth him further to lay out for a means of escape and recovery wherefore it will be requisite to explain 1. That there is a means for man's recovery 2. How those means are to be procured 3. The disposition of will whereby a man is to procure that means II. Man being awaked through the resentment of his perilous condition makes a search omnibus naturaliter sui salutem molientibus All beings naturally endeavouring their preservation through a spark of that dusky light still glowing in him into all probable means and infers from that ordinary maxime Simile simili conservatur All beings are preserved by their like that the soul being a Spirit she
must also expect her preservation from a spirit hence concludes that the same spirit to whom he acknowledgeth his Creation and existence must be the onely means of his preservation and restitution The soul having now discovered a means she directs her next aim to a further search How and whereby to procure the said means she argues with her self God through his goodnesse hath given me a being Summum Bonum est sui maximè diffusivum And the same attribute which moved him to confer an essence upon me will certainly move him to preserve it from perishing and restore it to its primitive state This produces a hope in the soul which is a middle passion between a certain knowledge and an utter despair partaking somewhat of an assurance and as much of a Despair During this anguish the soul further disputes with her self God is good and therefore will save her on the other side her conscience accuseth her in that she hath put her happinesse at a stake by offending against the goodnesse of God and deflecting from her primitive perfection which no doubt but God's justice will be satisfied for God's justice is an attribute whereby he separateth all those from his presence that are unlike to him The soul now in a tempest surrounded with innumerable waves of doubts and commotions of spirit laboureth with all her strength to come to an anchor or to make for a harbour here she beats against the rock of God's justice ready to founder then beats off again to Gods goodnesse and saves her self from danger of the first stroak yet the same perill being imminent upon her she agreeth with her self to steer another course whereby to consult her safety at last lighteth upon an infallible Pilot God's mercy which brings her clear off to a harbour of assurance and quietness which is a natural faith III. God's mercy is an attribute through which he is moved to succour a perishing soul labouring for its own recovery This attribute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the capacity of humane reason is called compassion and pity Compassion in us is an endeavouring to help a man grappling with his misery The same compassion hath a resemblance to that which is in God although infinitely inferiour to it for we spying the misery wherein a man is involved bearing down and overcoming his happinesse do endeavour from a principle of love through which we incline to what ever is like to us and reject what ever is unlike to support and aid him by adjoyning a force of the same nature to that which is suppressed But when a man is render'd altogether miserable and unsupportable then we reject him and our compassion towards him ceaseth because his misery hath overcome his happinesse or his evil hath totally expelled his good and so he remains in a desperate state for instance A man who is a going to be hanged for sacriledge and he persisting in his crime untill the last is desperate and quite lost as having no good in him now our compassion cannot be moved towards such an one because he is totally evil whom to pitty proveth in vain IV. But to return to the exposition of the definition of mercy First I say it is an Attribute God's Attributes are principles and perfections whereby we conceive him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to effect acts really distinct one from the other They are called Attributes because we attribute them to him thereby to make a distinction in our understandings of the several acts proceeding as it were from distinct powers which really do not for in God there is no distinction to be imagined that supposing a composition and a composition an imperfection so that what ever we attribute to any of God's Attributes is to attribute it to God himself Nihil est in Deo quin sit ipse Deus There is nothing in God but what is God himself V. The Act which floweth from God's mercy doth succour and strengthen the soul in this contention by expelling the cloudinesse which the material species and depravate appetite of the body have cast about it whereby they draw the soul from God and inchant her to sottish pleasures God's mercy is distinguisht from his goodnesse because through his goodnesse he acteth that which is good totâ suâ Naturâ in it self or acteth upon good having no part of evil opposing it as to create man or the world or to preserve man in his innocence His mercy hath a respect to good as it is opposed by evil as to redeem man is an act of God's mercy CHAP. XVI Of the Light and Darknesse of Man's practick understanding 1. That Light and Darknesse are analogal to principles of good and evil 2. Queries concerning Light and Darknesse 3. The two kinds of Light What the first Light is and how it produceth the second Light 4. What the Habit of Light is That the first man acted without habits How a habit is acquired 5. That the first man acted through a natural disposition and not through any habits I. WE have sometimes made mention of Good and Evil Light and Darknesse which being in this Treadse stated the two principles of mans actions whether good or evil it will not be impertinent to unfold the nature of each By the way you are to take notice that Light is analogal to the principle of good and darknesse to the principle of evil which analogy containing a clear and expresse emblem of good and evil we shall therefore the rather retaine its Analogata for to explain II. Concerning Light and Darknesse may be inquired 1. What Light is or what the habit of Light is 2. What Darknesse is and how it is to be taken in this place 4. How it is otherwise called 5. How it got its first footing in man 6. What proportion there is between the remaining Light and this habit of Darknesse 7. How two contrary habits can both inhere in the same subject at the same time 8. Whether the habit of Light is a habitus per se and the habit of Darknesse a habitus per accidens 9 How one contrary habit doth act against the other 10. How the one at last happens to extirpate the other III. Light as you may know further in the second Book part 2. is either primitive or derivative The first is called Lux and through its emanative power is by some said to cause the second otherwise named Lumen or in English the former may be rendred a Light the latter an Enlightning The soul her self is the primitive Light which irradiates or enlighteneth the whole body This illumination is more splendid and of greater lustre in the brain and animal spirits than in any other part because the Lumen is reflexed through a repercussion against the arterial and membranous parts of the brain IV. The habit of Light is nothing else but the facility or easinesse of the first Light in actuating the second which hapneth through a lesse opposition
in it self no contrariety or principle of error Neither could he sinne in the pleasures of his mind they deriving from the contemplation of his Creator VII It is also certain that God as he is Creator and King of and over all his creatures did require obedience from them whereby they should expresse their subjection humility and love to him Wherefore no doubt he imposed some one commandment upon them which would be sufficient to testifie their obedience and subjection This command did not reach to the immediate or pure object of the soul but necessarily to the object of the Body The command upon the object of the body must have been aninterdiction of some one of its pleasures to which it was inclined otherwise had there been but little difficulty in it it would have expressed but an indifferent observance or love The pleasures of the body consists mainly imâ—ating so that it is probable some edible thing was interdicted from which man was to abstain And although this command did immediately extend to the body yet there being that sympathy between the soul and it the one could easily move the other whereby it did also mediately reach the soul also The breach of this commandment must have threatned some punishment for to imprint a fear upon man VIII This punishment was imposed upon that which should be the first inticer which necessarily was the body through its appetitive faculty No question but man sustained also the force of the Devil because we are yet minutely attached by him who wrought upon him in a disguise for had he appeared to man in his own shape man would have shunned him more by cunning and stratagems than as an open enemy By diverting him from thinking upon God in drawing his understanding to a sensual object so that he wrought first upon man's body in proposing some pleasant object to its appetite which did soon entice the soul's will Wherefore Man could not have deflected from God without yeelding to this attraction of the Devil and ceasing for a while from contemplating God to whom had he but returned in time it would soon have recalled him from all the allurements of the evil spirit However man went on in hearkning to the evil spirit And so much the more because it is probable the Devil appeared to him professing an entire friendship in proposing somewhat which might conduce to the amendment of his condition and pleasure of his Body This done the Devils work was the better half finisht Hereupon man yeelding to the Devils persuasion and to please his lust soon after forfeited his happinesse His distinct knowledge of things failed him his fruition of God was lost his bodily appetite was now more increased than ever and thence committed the same sinne a thousand times over All God's creatures disobeyed him beasts grew fierce herbs poisonous The Elements lost their purity the Sun yeelded of his light and brightnesse the starres of their virtues and influences This great alteration immediately hereupon succeeding he soon perceived that he had sinned and at the same instant felt the punishment for sin he needed no trial for his conscience yeelded Now let us collect what man 's punishment was for this alone first sin IX It was not a present unavoidable eternal separation from God for then God would have cast him into hell immediately like he did the Devil whose crime was unpardonable since he aspired to have been God himself and in whom there remained not the least spark of good but being rendred altogether evil there remained nothing in him worth saving Hence by the way I confirm my former proposition that man had a principle of good remaining in him after his fall for otherwise God should have cast him into hell immediately 2. It was a present temporal unavoidable death namely a separation of the soul from the body which he soon concluded from the alteration of his body and disposition to sicknesse through which his body at last must necessarily be brought to a temporal death yet this temporal death did not exclude an eternal one in case he neglected the most gracious means destained for his restitution 3. It consisted in a partial unlikenesse to God for before he knew all things distinctly by one operation of mind now by many then without errour now subject to mistakes and errours 4. The losse of Paradise The seat wherein he was first constituted was before full of all perfections abounding of all things for the good of man all herbs were nourishing flowers fragrant beasts of a soft pleasant and delightfull nature the Elements in their splendour the Earth fruitfull the waters sweet the air clear and wholsome the fire pure Soon after all was changed some herbs became venemous others still reserving some goodnesse in them some flowers changed into a stink others retained yet some sweet odour so some Beasts became wild others remaining tame a part of the earth remained barren and a part fruitfull c. X. Had man then become quite evil through this one act all that which had been subservient to him before would now have become noxious and destructive to him His knowledge of God was not totally blotted out his knowledge of all other things was not quite abolisht for he knew them still although not with the same distinction and evidence Since then it was so that part of mans enjoyments were yet remaining and that part changed into crosses it is probable that a part of the good in man remained and a great part of evil entred for had man not retained some good in him God would have taken all good away from him Now after the shipwrack of man's happinesse and admission of evil let us also examine what remained in him that might still be termed good 1. There remained in man after his fall a knowledge of his Creator 2. A Reasoning faculty 3. His body as yet in health but disposed to sicknesse and death 4. A place wherein to live All these Relicts were much impaired to what they were neverthelesse God left them for some end namely that they might serve man as a means for his restitution I had almost forgot to insert among man's remains his free-will for no question the first man had a free-will to good and evil which it is probable remained also partially in him after his fall CHAP. XVIII Of the manner of the Suppression Extinction Predominance and Triumph of the Habit of Good 1. The repetition of some of the principal principles of this Treatise 2. What it is that hindreth the Habit of Good 3. How the good Habit happens to be deaded and overcome by the evil habit How the good Habit happens to suppresse and vanquish the evil habit 4. That we are apt to incline most to those things that are forbidden 5. A proof inferring darknesse to proceed from the prevalence of the corporeal appetite 6. Why it is that a man must necessarily die The ground detected upon which the
Papists were induced to state a Purgatory Their error rejected 7. That the proportion of these two Habits is various in every individual subject I. BY what hath been proposed in the fore-going Chapter you may now fully comprehend the nature of Darknesse or habit of evil and how man fell into it You may further remember that man had no habit of Good because nothing resisted his natural powers wherefore it is no absurdity to assert That man acteth now good and evil through acquired or infused habits Moreover let me desire you to take notice how man fell into sinne viz. That it was through the inclination and enticement of his corporeal or sensual appetite and that thereby his reason was not drawn aside violentè or coactivè but inclinativè and dispositivè that through this the body as it were got the upperhand of the soul insomuch that after the soul had submitted her self once to the command of the body she thereby forfeited her superiority that the body after the fall being corrupted and grown lesse serviceable to the soul it had stronger influence upon the soul than ever That the habit of the soul is nothing else but an easinesse of working its acts whether good or evil which is attained through frequent repetitions of the same acts and through it at last makes the organs easie and the objects fitted II. Where as all habits presuppose a difficulty through which the former acts have been hindred that which hindreth the good habit is the forcible drawing and prevalence of the sensual appetite whereby it is set on and inclined to sensual acts which for the most part prove to be evil III. Wherefore this good habit is nothing else but the same principle of good somwhat deaded and diverted by the sensual inclinations of the body for as a flaming fire may be deaded and choakt through black smokes whereby it is hindred from flaming and yet continue a fire and may blaze again were the smokes but discussed in fire we see when it begins to blaze a little by degrees it blazes more and more untill at last it gets to a flame which keeps its life the better and expelleth the smoke more vigorously but if it begins to leave flaming and come to blazing and from blazing return to a deadish light then the smoke overcometh it and deads it again Even so it is with the habits of the soul man's light keeps blazing untill it is deaded and choakt through the dark smokes of his inordinate sensual appetite but if it be ventilated and stirred up by frequent repetitions of good acts it is vivified and lasteth This light if it is once come to an intyre flame it can never be totally darkned possibly it may now and then remit somewhat of its lustre but in case this light doth only blaze a little now and then or it may be flame a while yet if it rise not to burn clear quite through neverthelesse it will perish and is to be counted for a flash IV. It is then the inordinate appetite of the body which smothereth up the light of the soul because through it she is led aside by harkning altogether to its motion and suffering the understanding and will to bend to its pleasures and especially to such which are forbden Nitimur in vetitum semper cupimusque negata That which the Law doth most from us require Is most gain-said by our perverse desire Herein is the habit of the soul deaded and overcome by the evil habit of the body The soul may produce good acts although with difficulty because she is opposed by the evil habit of the body But the oftener those acts are repeated the more the soul doth triumph over the body and subdueth it under her command yet not so as to tie up its whole force because the body being once corrupted cannot be redintegrated in this world there remaining a debt to be paid to wit death which was contracted as hath been shewed through guilt of the first transgression You may here enquire Why God through his infinite mercy doth not forgive man this debt of death I answer That God through his justice cannot that requiring plenary satisfaction otherwise God's threatnings and ordinances might be supposed to be in vain V. From all this it appeareth that the darknesse of the soul proceeds from the predominance of the corporeal appetite misleading the soul and consequently that the good habit of man is per se and the evil habit per accidens for the same perfections which the soul of the first man was indued withall are also conferred upon every individual soul because each of these doth immediatly emanate from God and therefore is most perfect Ergo the perfection or good of every soul is inherent in her per se and the evil which doth assault her is per accidens for it is from the body By the way let me tell you in case you doe maintain originall sinne and assert it to be propagated through infection you must agree in this very tenent viz. that it is propagated through the infection of the body which is per accidens to the soul for it cannot be propagated through the infection of the soul for that was created pure and perfect or otherwise you must affirm that the soul is ex traduce which is impious and atheistical VI. The body since it is so corrupted must be purified which cannot be unlesse the soul leaveth it for a while but as for the soul if it deserteth the body with an assurance of and in God's mercy and goodnesse it needeth not to die because it was not essentially corrupted but accidentally and expiring out of the body arrives to God's presence in the same purity and perfection as it was indued with at her first infusion Wherefore the Papists do most heretically mistake in arguing that the soul for to be purified must abide a while in Purgatory Here may be objected If the soul remaineth good per se and the evil be per accidens then the soul of every wretch being dissolved from the body is entirely pure and holy I deny the consequence for as long as God's justice is not satisfied for their sin committed in the flesh both their body and soul must necessarily be damned but as for the soul of a regenerated man the guilt of his sins being taken away and God's justice satisfied in this world the soul when dissolved from the body remaineth essentially and naturally good without any further purification VII The proportion which there is between these two habits is very various and different in most persons for we see that some persons their bodies and appetites are more depraved than others and consequently their good habits more deaded and that some have much more ado to rebuke their sensual inclinations than others CHAP. XIX Of Original Sinne. 1. How it is possible for two contrary Habits to inhere in one subject 2. The absurdities that follow this Assertion viz.
That the evil habit inheres in the soul per se. 3. In what manner the Habit of good is taken to inhere per se in the soul. 4. That God created every man theologically good Several Objections relating to the same assertion answered 5. How the soul partaketh of the guilt of Original Sinne. The opinion of the Synod of Rochel upon this matter I. NOw we may easily explain how two contrary habits can inhere in one and the same subject No question it is impossible two contraries should inhere both per se in one subject for the nature of contraries is to expell one another out of the same subject Yet it is not repugnant but that two contrary habits may inhere both in one subject provided the one exist in it per se and the other per accidens or that they be not inherent in one partial subject although they may in the total for it is possible for a man to be afflicted with two contrary diseases in two parts of his body yet both are sustained by one total subject In like manner may the evil habit be principally and originally inherent in the body and the good habit in the soul yet both these are contained in one man II. Notwithstanding all this there are some who obstinately do affirm that the evil habit inheres in the soul per se but how do they prove it Certainly upon these suppositions 1. That the habits may be altered and the substance remain the same 2. That the first man acted through habits 3. That the good habit being removed the evil habit succeeded in its steed and consequently that an Accident doth migrate è subjecto in subjectum which is against their own maxims These suppositions being all false as hath been proved at large cannot be a firm foundation for any conclusion whatever they have built upon them And therefore I conclude again 1. That in the first man there was a natural disposition of acting good but no habit 2. That there became two habits in man after his fall the one of good and the other of evil III. That the habit of good inheres in man per se Quatenus actionis principium dicatur anima inest ei habitus bonus per se aut prout habitus sit accidens secundum istud potest animae attributi inesse per accidens quia ipse habitus est accidens quae tamen mihi est in usitata locutio And the habit of evil per accidens Non quatenus proficiscatur ab anima tanquam à mali principio sed duntaxat quatenus sit animae instrumentum Here one may object If an evil act proceed per se from the soul than the evil habit is also inherent in her per se. As to this the same I may argue from a good act and thence infer the inherence of the good habit per se. But it is certain that two contrary opposites secundum idem ad idem cannot exist together at the same instant in the same subject so that the one habit must necessarily inesse per se and the other per accidens Before I go farther let me tell you once for all when I say that the good habit is per se in man I do not imply that it is ex se but è Dei gratia è voluntate potentia divina ordinata to deny this is to rob God of his honour and is no lesse than a blasphemy wherefore it ought to be a great caution to all men how they assert good habits per se or good works per se lest they offend IV. God creates every man theologically good that is God infuseth the soul theologically good into the body being good also for otherwise God would be supposed to joyn good to evil How could the body be evil before the advent of the soul If it were evil it must be morally evil for there is no doubt but it was and remaineth physically good but that cannot be admitted because there is no moral evil without a rational will Good and evil is taken in a double sense 1. Good or evil is that which is agreeable or disagreeable with the Law of God 2. Good or evil is which is convenient and sutable or inconvenient and unsutable to a being According to the first acception The soul is infused good into a good body because of the reason fore-mentioned But according to the last it is not Here may be demanded Whether it agreeth with God's goodnesse to infuse a good soul into an unsutable body I answer That it doth not detract one title from God's goodnesse for he hath ordained that man should multiply and increase and therefore hath given man a power of increasing and multiplying The power which man exerciseth to multiply is through propagation of his body only and uniting the soul to it The body being then prepared for the souls reception the soul at that instant is raised out of the body è potentia materiae receptiva not out of it as è materiali principio eductivo like unto material forms but by the divine power which is ever present where God hath ordained his benediction so that God doth not withdraw his power of creating a soul when ever a body is prepared for it although that body is generated by the worst of men because God hath ordained it for God doth create a soul not because a wicked man hath disposed a body for the reception of it but because of his ordained blessing to mans increase V. The soul being united to the body immediately partaketh of the guilt of original sinne What original sinne is me thinks is not distinctly expounded by our ordinary institutionists They say It is a natural disposition to evil naturally descending from Adam to all men it is that which is called The sinne dwelling in man The Law of our members The old man The flesh The body of sinne c. First I demand What sinne is I shall be answered That it is a breach of God's Law Ergo A sinne is an act for to break God's Law is to act against God's Law A disposition say they is whereby an agent can act Ergo A disposition to sinne is no sinne because a disposition is no act but whereby we can or do act So that original sinne is the first act of sinne which the first man acted who comprehending in him whole mankind since all men were to descend from him the sinne which he acted was also acted by whole mankind and consequently the guilt of that sinne is imputed to every man The habit of sinne being entered through one act whereby we are render'd prone to evil and commit actual sinne or do act sinne the same habit and disposition hath also ceased on all mankind So that original is rather the first actual sinne after which followed the habit of sinning and with the original or first sinne of man the habit of sinning is withall communicated to mans posterity This very sense
which doubtlesse must prove painfull Joy which is supposed the best of passions is painfull it rendring a man restlesse and full of anguish not knowing where to bestow himself The like may be attributed to Fear Love Anger Sorrow Hope c. 9. Passions are vain fading away and leaving no real good behind them A man when his passion is over wondreth how he could have been drawn into such a passion One that hath been lately in love with any thing after a while when that love to such an object is ceased in him admireth at himself how he could have loved it and so of all the rest 10. All passions whether good or evil are redoubled with sorrow and melancholly 11. All passions are hurtfull both to soul and body to the soul because she thereby is taken off from her Summum Bonum to the body because passions do dissipate or suppresse the vital and animal spirits whence we may observe that a passionate man is seldom long lived 12. A passion is a great sinne 13. Most men are apt to shun others that are passionate or seem to be so For we commonly say I care not for such a one because he looks like an angry or spitefull man or he looks like a doting fool 14. Atheism is a collection of the habits of all passions in one man Wherefore it is necessary for a man who endeavoureth to live eternally in happinesse with his Creatour to wean himself from all passions whatsoever and shun them as being most detestable VIII Secondly Pleasures of the body are to be waved and contemned as much as possible because by these man's soul was first drawn aside Are we not apt to shun and be a verse from any thing that offended our bodies or caused a sicknesse Much more ought we to shun that which cast our souls into a mortal disease Pleasures of the body consist in the enjoyment of objects coveted by our sensual appetite but these are beyond necessity or more than our bodies require for instance to eat and drink of variety or more than our natures require is counted a pleasure but that is beyond necessity So that all pleasures are beyond necessity Wherefore when we say such an one eats or drinks for pleasure that is he eats or drinks beyond necessity or more than his nature requires We must then also forbear going to see idle showes or playes for they rob our souls of her pleasure and diverts her from contemplating her Summum Bonum Pleasures in the fore-mentioned sense differ from passions only Secundum magis minus more or lesse since that each of them if often repeated may easily turn to a passion how detestable they are hath been shewed already The pleasures of the body destroy both body and soul their natural effects enervate our strength their moral ones damn our souls Bodily pleasures belong only to beasts to those of the soul to men Let us not then be so foolish as to make an exchange Pleasure is the Devils bait whereby he sweetly draweth us to Hell A bodily pleasure is also a great sinne because thereby we do not answer the end of our Creation Had the first man not eaten more than his nature required or had he abstained from variety both which being pleasures he could not have sinned but eating beyond necessity he fell into a pleasure and afterwards into a passion by repeating the same over and over again IX Thirdly You must resist the Devil with all your force who since you are fallen back from his party will prove no mean enemy to you and therefore 1. Consider where he intends to attack you and be sure always to have a Sentinel abroad who may give you a timely alarm when he approaches for to make an assault upon you Then as a prudent Captain you are to know your strength and view your whole Fort first where you are the weakest 2. wherein your greatest strength lies that so you may alwayes be in a readinesse of relieving your Fortresse Besides it will be a piece of prudence in you to know whence to procure assistance if upon occasion you should be fiercely set upon Your greatest weaknesse is in your out-works which are your external senses and some of your in-works as your sensual appetite and internal senses Your greatest strength consisteth in your soul namely in her reasoning faculty and will Your aid and assistance is God whom you are constantly to implore for succour and relief Consider withall your enemies weapons wherewith he intends to encounter you And lastly take notice of his strict discipline and policy in managing of his affairs and therefore how much the more ought you to bestir yourself and look about you Now I will take leisure to unfold your weaknesse to all There is never a sense but it hath its weaknesse attending it 1. The Eyes they are apt to be inchanted with shows and playes and especially such as are obscene Your Ears with immodest discourse Your Taste with gluttony and drunkennesse Your Sent with noxious perfumes And lastly your other Sense with lust All these are great and dangerous weaknesses Are not some people so corrupt and slavishly tied to see shows and playes that there is nâ—â—â—r a day but they must see either a show or a play they dream of playes they do constantly talk of playes and if there was but a fine show or play to be seen the next discourse is what have you not seen such a show such a rare play Now mark the Devils policy there is never a tempting play or show but the Devil sets it off either by casting a lustre upon their eyes or a pleasantnesse upon the gestures a splendour upon the habit and a clangour upon the speech of the Actours You cannot imagine how dead and simple a play would seem without the Devils vernishing of it and this is evident many having seen rare playes upon whose eyes the Devils could not work and to them they appeared as nauseous and simple as it proved admirable and rare to others upon whose eyes this glosse would take The like may be said of painted or patcht faces how strangely are they set off with a glosse upon some mens eyes and how ugly they appear to others whose eyes are uncapable of a glosse To these they seem like a picture or a patcht thing made up by Art like to a hansome doublet with a patch upon the elbow And is not this a pretty stratagem of the Devils What a harmony doth an immodest tale strike upon some mens ears O pray say they tell that once over again it is one of the best that ever I heard Do you not think that the Devil gives a little touch here to to set off this melody To others again it proveth a harsh discord so that while men play thus upon the Organs the Devil he blows the Bellows The Pallat or Taste is as ready to be enticed as any of the others Pray listen to
or two of the Bottle every Morning viz of Aq. vit Matt. hoping thereby to fortifie their heat and so to prolong their years have by that means enflamed their heat soon kindled it up to a corruptive fire to this purpose I remember a notable Instance which some 9 or 10 years ago I observed at Leyden where visiting the Hospital weekly with the publick Professor of Physick I took notice of a Patient being a man of about 40. his Temperature cholerick his habit of body thin and rough his skin changed to a brownish tawny and full of wrinkles his complaint was only of an universal faintness when he went his Urine was overcocted enquiry being made into the Constitution of every particular part they were found to be like affected with an Atonia calida or Intemperature towards heat a further search was made into the cause of so universal a heat his Diet and Course of Life had been very moderate only he confessed that by advice of a Physitian he had accustomed himself to take half an Ounce of Aq. vit Matt. every morning for 6 years together Here the cause was found out namely the over-comforting and augmenting of his vital flame which was now become so potent that it had penetrated all the body and was ready to diminish and decrease every day whence through its dayly progress it had wrought such strange effects in this man that he although but young appeared to be as old as a man of 70. Even almost such another Patient I saw in the Charitè Hospital at Paris Wherefore it is evident that by such means life is not prolonged but shortned neither will the Oximel Squillit of Galen so much commended by him to keep back old Age do any more then the forenamed Aq. vit 1. I conclude then that old Age may be retarded and Life prolonged but by other means then ever hath been derected hitherto by any man however Lactantius writes that Adam used a most excellent and admirable Magistery in his Family through which their years were much prolonged Many describe the length of life of the Patriarchs to the same mysterious Medicine which was successively discovered to them by Adam I have read of Artephius and others in the daies of old who are said to have protracted their daies to a thousand years by help of Art and means of using the Tincture of Gold and sometimes the Tincture of Steel I have also read of a Maid who had lived for many years without eating or drinking she was not any thing sensibly altered in all that time but lay constantly a bed or moved seldom unless it were to turn her As I think you may find the Relation of it in Schenckius his Observ. Here you have a plain Retardation of Age by a Catochization of heat and the other qualities for she being Phlegmatick her radical Moysture was thereby incrassated which incrassation kept her innate heat in the same flame for a long time until that it was loosened by procatartick Causes I shall speak more at large concerning the Catochization of fire in its flame below Through the same Catochization of the Elementary qualities other inanimated bodies were likewise preserved and retarded in their Alteration insomuch that the bodies so catochizated have not undergone the least sensible Alteration or change in hundreds of yeares The AEgyptians had a way of preserving dead bodies three thousand yeares as we read concerning their Mummies in such a manner that the Corps could not suffer any sensible change in an Age or otherwise how could they have lasted so long The search into their manner of Embalming leads us unto the knowledge of such a durability They dipped close woven Linnen into a melted mixture of Gums Rozins Wax and Spices in which they wrapped the Corps rowling it sundry times close about which afterwards they put into a thick Leaden Coffin shut it up in another Oaken Coffin and placed the same in a deep cold and dry Celler or Cave being closely environed with dry Sand and Marble Stones All which caused a greater condensation of the earthy parts incrassation of the Moysture and seisure upon the fiery and ayry parts and a detention of the said parts in the same situation as they were seized upon or it may be they were a little more divided whereby their force was somewhat clipped and stopped in their motion however there remained so much force as to keep the fire safe from being violently expelled by the weighty Elements in such a manner that there passed no opposition between them but they were seized upon and so derained as a man is in a Catoche upon which ground I call it a Catochization Did there pass any remarkable action between them then the light parts must acquire a vent whereby the body must necessarily change and approximate to a dissolution 2. The greater incrossation of Moysture doth keep in the heat and indurates the body for were it thin it would mollifie and open the body and give occasion to the egress of the intrinsick heat 3. The shrowding of the Corps in many Folds of Gummed Linnen doth hinder the ayr from penetrating to it which if it did it would soften the body and make way for the effuge of the light parts 4. The Spices consolidating the body through their drying faculty conduce to the detention of the heat 5. The Coldness and Dryness of the place and of the Coffins do contribute to the same action and preclude the way to the ingredient Ayr. All other inanimate solid bodies are preservated and prolonged in their duration by detaining them in Quicksilver Snow Wax shining Amber Honey Syrrups Gummes Oyles wet and dry Sand. As for a burning Flame it cannot be so rigidly detained as to have its Smoke totally kept in which reverberating upon the heat and joyning with the other weighty Elements would violently expel the heat but as I said before the detention by condensation and incrassation must be no more then that the smoak may pass yet in small flames this is not so much necessary There is another means whereby to prolong life by keeping the heat in a flame and is performed through averting the heavy Elements and attenuating and lightning them by Art for otherwise they would violently extinguish the flame Wherefore by the combination of these two means namely Catochization and aversion by way of detention there may be an infallible Medecine compiled for the prolongation of life and retardation of old Age. But of this more particularly in my Principles of Physick 2. Concl. Production of life to an eval duration is impossible Were it that the necessity of mans dissolution was independent upon an improportionate temperament of the Elements yet Gods Decree and Judgment would necessarily bring it upon him Gen. 2. 17. But of the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat of it for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die Job