to the study thereof it hath given us Opportunity of great Improvement by reducing it to a more distinct and easy method than formerly and we find that the Disciples of the great Plato and of Xenophon also have left behind them curious and excellent Monuments nor have those who succeeded them as Aristotle and the Stoicks come short of handling it more methodically and at large THE First BOOK CONCERNING HAPPINESS CHAP. I. What Happiness is THo' Felicity or Happiness be properly the enjoyment of the Sovereign or Chief Good and therefore the most blessed Estate that can be desired yet because this Estate of Enjoyment comprehends this Sovereign Good it is for that Reason called by this Name It is also termed the Chief or the Ultimate Happiness the End of all Ends or The End for its Excellency because all other things are desired and sought after for it's sake And lastly that it is desired alone for it's own sake To this purpose Aristotle tells us That amongst the things that are desirable there must be something at last which is most desirable that so we might avoid an Infinity But here we may make two considerable Remarks The First is That we don't concern our selves here with that Happiness mentioned by the Sacred Pen-Men when they tell us how happy that Man is who being assisted with the Divine Influences betakes himself entirely to the Service of God and being filled with Faith and Hope and inflamed with Charity spends his Life in Peace and Tranquility Nor shall we Treat of that which may be called Natural Happiness because it may be obtained by the strength of Nature being such as the ancient Philosophers did not doubt but to enjoy here on Earth The Second is That by this Natural Felicity that we here Treat of is not to be understood such a state of Life as we can't imagin a better a more pleasant and more desirable in the which we cannot apprehend any evil nor think of any good thing which we shall not possess nor of any thing that we have a desire to do but we shall be able to accomplish it and that it shall remain fix'd and unchangeable But we understand such a certain state of Life in which we may be as happy as is possible in which there are abundance of good things and very few of any sort of evil and in which consequently we may lead as easie quiet and undisturbed a Life as the Condition of the Country the Society we Converse with the Constitution of our Bodies the manner of our Life our Age and other Circumstances will permit For to propose to our selves more than this or to affect during the Course of our Natural Life the highest Felicity is not to acknowledge but rather forget our selves to be Men that is to say weak and feeble Animals who by the Laws of Nature are subject to an infinite number of Mischiefs and Evils And in this sense it is that we usually say a Wise Man tho' tormented with exquisite Pains may nevertheless be happy not in a perfect and compleat sense but he may attain to that degree that we call Human Happiness which the Wise Man always enjoys in that measure that the Circumstances will permit because he don't increase his Misery either by Impatience or Despair but rather abates it by his Constancy And by this means he is happier or to speak more properly he is less miserable than if he suffered himself to be dejected as others in like Cases who bear not their Misfortunes with the same patience and constancy of Mind and who besides are not supplied with the same Encouragements from Wisdom as he hath such I mean as an innocent Life and a good Conscience void of offence which always afford great quiet and satisfaction to the Mind Wherefore 't is improper to use this kind of Expression That it is the same thing for a Wise Man to be burning in Phalaris 's Bull as to be solacing himself upon a Bed of Roses for it is of such things as Fire and Torments that he desires to be exempt and wishes much rather that they were not or that he might not suffer by them but when they come upon him he considers them as unavoidable Evils and suffers them with Courage so that he may say Vror sed invictus I burn it is true and suffer and sometimes I sigh and weep but for all this I am not vanquish'd nor overcome nor do I suffer my self to be transported with Despair which would render my Condition much more miserable Several Opinions concerning the efficient Cause of Happiness AT our first entring upon this Discourse we may observe that the efficient Causes of Happiness being nothing else but the Goods of the Soul of the Body or of Fortune some of the Philosophers have highly extolled the first some the second and others have included them all Those who chiefly recommend the Riches of the Mind as Anaxagoras propose for the obtaining of Happiness A Contemplative Life together with such a kind of Freedom which proceeds from profound Knowledge Possidonius requires Contemplation with a Dominion over the irrational part of Man Herillus generally and simply Learning or Knowledge Apollodorus and Lycus generally the Pleasures of the Mind Leucinus the Pleasures that proceed from honest things The Stoicks Zenon Cleanthes Aristus and the rest require Vertue Therefore these last proceeded so far as to say That if a Man possess'd Vertue it matter'd not whether he were sick or well All the rest by common Consent maintain'd that to live happily was nothing else but to live a Vertuous Life or as they express it according to Nature As for those who prefer the Riches and advantages of the Body and who chiefly aim at sensual Pleasures they were for that Reason Named the Voluptuous Voluptuarii Philosophi of whom we shall have occasion to discourse hereafter when we shall compare them with Epicurus At present we shall only take notice that they have had Aristippus for their Leader and with him the Cyrenaicks of whom we shall make mention afterwards and that the Annicerians who proceed from the Cyrenaicks aimed at no certain end of Life but at the Pleasure of every particular Action of what kind or Nature soever Lastly amongst such as prefer the Goods of Fortune they are generally the vulgar sort of People who look with a greedy desire some upon Riches some upon Honours some upon other things But amongst the Philosophers none are mention'd but such as joyn to these outward Advantages the perfections also both of the Mind and Body for this hath given occasion to the Poets to make these excellent representations of Happiness which they have borrowed from several Opinions of the Philosophers such as this which requires that good Fortune might accompany Vertue Virtus colenda Sors petenda a Diis bona Haec quippe duo cui suppetunt is vivere Et vir beatus bonus simul potest Another desires
removed the Truth is that they acknowledge no other Liberty but that which we understand commonly by this Word Libentia Nevertheless they bring this reason against them who would make use of this slothful reasoning That there is a very good cause why a Man should endeavour to do Good rather than Evil because tho the Decree is unknown to us nevertheless 't is certain that no Man shall ever be promoted to Glory if he hath not done good Works neither shall he be banished into Torments if he hath never done Evil. They say moreover that it concerns us very much to attain as much as we are able to a certainty of our Election by good Works rather than of Reprobation by Evil that so we may be able to allay the Fears and apprehensions in which we must otherwise spend our Lives and that we may act and proceed on with this assurance that while we do well we have no reason to dread any Evil from God who is most Good and most Just But in the mean while that no Person might glory that he ought to be elected because of his good Works and that none should complain because he was not comprehended in the Election and that it was none of his Fault against him that boasts they make use of this Expression O Man What is it that distinguishes thee If any one happen to complain They tell him Who art thou that darest contend with thy God Shall the Earthen-Vessel say to the Potter Why hast thou made me thus Is it not lawful for the Potter to make one Vessel of Honour and another of Dishonour And to them who are too curious to seek after the Secrets of God they make use of the Words of the Holy Doctor Judge not why he draws this Man and not that Man if thou wilt not err Noli judicare quare hunc trahat c. As for the other Opinion its Defenders seem to be better able to refute him who makes use of the unactive Argument Either I am Predestinated say you and elected for Glory or reprobated and condemned to Torments This is what must be granted but we must at the same time add That now 't is in your Power either to be Predestinated or Reprobated for now you are in that Condition in which God hath foreseen that you should be inabled with a sufficient Grace and this depends upon your Free-will whether he hath foreseen you a good Man or an Evil. So that in consideration of this foresight he hath either Predestinated or Reprobated you Thus you see that it belongs to you and concerns you to do good now and to crave assistance of the Divine Grace that God foreseeing from all Eternity this assistance that you should crave may have Predestinated you for if you act otherwise in consideration of these very wicked Actions God will have reprobated you Pretend not that God knows from all Eternity if you be Predestinated or not and therefore you must needs unavoidably be what you are or ought to 〈◊〉 be seeing that the Divine Knowledge cannot be deceived nor changed for God hath truly known it from all Eternity but consequently to his Decree and he hath not made his Decree but by foreseeing what you would do Therefore this Action of your Will preceeds God's Foresight both the Divine Decree of your Predestination or Reprobation and the Divine Knowledge of your everlasting Happiness or Misery not that these antecedent and consequential Decrees still relate to time but according to our humane way of Speaking we conceive and declare them to be so when we consider the Nature of Free-Will and the Nature of God who is Just and cannot but act justly And although we might hence infer that there is here no antecedent Will which might hinder our Will from being free nor do what it pleaseth nor be able to carry its Hand either to the Fire or Water yet you cannot therefore pretend that 't is in your Power to frustrate the Divine Decree because that Decree was made but upon this Supposition of what you were to do and its unchangeableness proceeds from a necessity of Supposition which does not in the least deprive Man of his Liberty of acting freely But possibly you may say if God in consideration of the good Works that I perform at present hath Predestinated me I shall be beholding to none for my distinction but to my self This dont follow For 't is not of your selves by the power of your own Virtues and Strength that you are thus distinguish'd but the Grace of God without which you cannot do these good Works Thus it will not be difficult to say why this Vessel hath been thus fashioned this a Vessel of Honour that of Dishonour why this Man should be drawn and that Man not seeing that sufficient Grace being allowed to all in general the Resolution and Determination pursuant to that Grace is the Cause I confess this may seem to look a little hard when we consider how God hath made some Men for Honour and others for Dishonour and that all suffer not themselves to be freely and willingly drawn nor Co-operate with the Divine Grace seeing that he might have made them all in such a manner that they might have been all designed for Honour and none for Dishonour and Contempt and that all might have Co-operated with the Grace of God And truly as the Choice of Virtue and Vice that we embrace and that God hath foreseen in Predestinating or Reprobating Men depends upon the Notions and Representations of Things which appear to us we have always a great Cause to cry out as we before did O the Depths c. because it dont depend upon us that such or such Objects appear so to us and consequently that we should be possessed with such or such Notions or Imaginations but from the Series the Concatenation and disposition of Things which God hath established according to the adorable and unsearchable course of his Wisdom 'T is therefore also that tho this Opinion seems to be the easiest it seems nevertheless to leave always some difficulty or doubt behind and we cannot so plainly discover all Things here but we are obliged again to recur to the Saying of the Apostle O Altitudo divitiarum Sapientiae c. But having Travelled through many Nations where People have been strongly possessed with the Opinion of Predestination I shall freely speak my Thoughts as to what I have seen and known That the first Opinion hath strong Consequences and that it appears to me very dangerous and pernicious to publick Society for it is either able to oblige Men to all manner of Vices or to cast them into Despair But not to insist upon the Reasons of Divines nor to listen to that Persian Author who supposing that by destroying Liberty or Free-Will you at the same time destroy all Religion for this is The Spunge as he calls it to blot out all Religions How think ye that a
do they willingly reject any Pleasure that is offered them unless it chance to be accompanied by some Evil that may after procure a Pain and so cause us to repent of its first acceptance And truly as it is the nature of Good to invite and perswade the Appetite to love and embrace it so we can give no Reason why all Pleasure should not be of it self Lovely and to be desired seeing there is none but in it self is pleasing and desirable and which does of it self incline our Appetites So that if we refuse any we refuse them not as Pleasures but because of some inconveniences that are annexed and will infallibly attend them Now to illustrate this more plainly by an Example There is no Person but will allow Hony to be naturally sweet yet if Poyson happens to mixed with it whereby the Poyson it self doth also become sweet we shall then have a real aversion for the sweetness of the Hony but this is by accident for the Hony of it self is naturally sweet and pleasing to our Taste So that if we have any dislike we may say it is not really for the sweetness of the Hony but for the Poison that is mixt with it and for the Mischief that Poyson will bring for if it were separated from the Hony we should then willingly taste of it Now adjust any Pleasure whatsoever to this Example and you will easily perceive it to be never otherwise for we shall always eschew the Evil but not the Pleasure it self when distinct and separated from the Evil For either it is the thing from whence it is taken or the action that is joined to it or the damage that ensue either from the thing or from the action or the pain and grief that will attend it which proceed from the Thing from the Action or from the Damage And to make the matter still appear more obvious and intelligible Suppose that the same Pleasure is to be drawn from a Thing or Action that neither Law nor Custom nor Honesty prohibit suppose that from this Action or thing no damage or prejudice will happen either to our Health Reputation or Estate Suppose in a word that no Punishment will attend it nor Grief nor Repentance neither in this Life nor the next And you will plainly understand that nothing can hinder it to be esteem'd a real Good and real Advantage and if at present it is not so reputed this proceeds not from the nature of the Thing but from the Circumstances that I have mentioned Aristotle also proves the thing by an Argument taken from Pain which is opposite to Pleasure All the World saith he are agreed that Pain is an Evil and to be avoided Now that which is contrary to a thing that is to be avoided and a real Evil is good therefore Pleasure is a real Good Now to inlarge upon this Reason of Aristotle Is it not manifest That all Pain in general is of it self Evil and Hurtful and by consequence every Animal hath naturally an aversion against it So that if at any time it is called Good it is only by accident in regard it hath some good thing that is joined to it which obliges us to love and desire it But if you remove from Pain all hopes or expectation of obtaining any good thing either Honest Profitable or Pleasant there is no Man so foolish as to wish for it or seek after it As this is undeniable so it is apparent that if all Pain be of it self Evil and not good but by accident all Pleasure being contrary to Pain is of it self good and an evil by Accident Some object That a Temperate Man flies from Pleasures and that he that is Wise seeks rather a freedom from Pain That there are some Pleasures which are impediments to Wisdom and the rather because they are Violent and Furious as all Venereal Pleasures generally are That there are others which are not only hurtful because they dull the Understanding beget Diseases and cause Poverty but are also filthy and infamous But First The Temperate and Prudent Man flies not from all Pleasures for it is plain That he seeks after such as are pure and honest and if he avoids some it is not because they are only Pleasures but because inseparable from actions which are certainly attended with Destruction which a Prudent Temperate Man ought not to be guilty of for the enjoyment of a present Pleasure In the same manner as we fly from Poison sweetned not because it is sweet but because it is deadly and brings a Mischief with it which undoubtedly ought not to be bought at so dear a rate Besides it is plain That Pleasures alone are no impediments of Wisdom or Prudence but rather the Actions that accompany them such actions I mean by which the Spirits are too much spent whereby the strength of the Mind is weakned and the Judgment blinded So that when these Mischiefs are charged upon Pleasure it is a Paralogism or deceitful way of Arguing called by Aristotle Non causae ut causae when that which is not the Cause is taken for the Cause as if the Evil which ought to be ascrib'd to the Poison be attributed to the Hony or to the Sweetness Thus by consequence that which may be said in respect of Diseases and Poverty and other inconveniences which commonly succeed is that Pleasure simply consider'd as it is Pleasure is not the cause of these Evils but rather Gluttony or the excess of Wine and Meats prepared with Sawces which tempt us to exceed the Bounds of Moderation whence proceed Fevers and other grievous Distempers So also from the excess of Venery proceed the Disease of the Gout and other shameful Maladies accompanied with a numerous Train of other Mischiefs Thus the same may be said in respect of the Infamy which we commonly ascribe to Pleasures for it rather regards the actions that accompany them which are of themselves contrary to good Manners and therefore are reputed Vicious and Dishonest for this reason for Instance The Laws prohibit not the pleasure in Adultery but the action of Adultery it self which being forbidden and infamous in it self causeth the pleasure that it procures to be esteem'd also filthy and infamous But suppose in this case there were no prohibition as in the Estate of pure Nature Or suppose that it happen'd that the Wife of this Man had been the Wife of the present Adulterer here he had enjoyed the same Pleasure which in that case had not been reckoned of ill Repute because that action which accompanies it had not been then forbidden nor dishonest From whence we may conclude That Pleasure is not blame-worthy in it self but for the Circumstances that accompany it Some answer That tho' Pleasure be no Evil yet it is necessary to place it in the number of the Evils because of the Common People who being inclin'd to Pleasure ought like crooked Trees to be bent a contrary way and by that
means to be made strait But Aristotle answers That it is not convenient to entertain them with these kind of Discourses because when it concerns us as in the case of the Passions and Actions we give not so much credit to the Words as to the Thing it self From whence it happens that when the Words agree not with what the Senses apprehend they are despised and tho' they comprehend something that is good yet they are thereby baffled Therefore Aristotle seems to intimate That it is more reasonable not to place the Pleasures amongst the Evils seeing the Senses are of a contrary persuasion and when they are barely look'd upon as Pleasures they approve of them and judge them good but it is more reasonable to discover and lay open the Evils that frequently accompany such Pleasures which cause a prudent and considering Man to abstain from them lest he being tempted thereby should be drawn into so great Mischiefs If these Answers of Aristotle will not satisfie nothing can hinder us from exclaiming against Pleasure it self supposing those to be Pleasures which cause much more Evil than they procure Good For when it concerns us to persuade it is the same thing to say That Pleasure or the Action that accompanies the Pleasure is Wicked to conclude that we are therefore to shun it by reason of the Evils which infallibly attend and proceed from both Whether the Opinion of the Stoicks in respect of Good and Evil be Justifiable WE might here enter into a large Field of Dispute with the Stoicks who pretend That there is nothing Good but that which is Honest and nothing Evil but that which is Dishonest But hereby we should only trifle away our time in unnecessary Disputes for in short it is manifest that they have rais'd a Dispute about the bare Name when at the same time they have limited and confined the thing it self viz. the Notion of Good according to their own Fancy which all Mankind besides take in a large Sense For whereas other Men place several things besides Vertues in the number of good things as Health Pleasure Glory Riches Friends c. And besides Vices they reckon several other things amongst Evils as Sickness Pain Shame Poverty Enemies c. The Stoicks have rather named these things Indifferent or neither Good nor Evil. But this seems very absurd and contradictory to take Health and Sickness Pleasure and Pain for the same things c. They have endeavoured to feign new Words and call Health Pleasure Glory and other things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Promota Assistants As if they should say that they were not really Good but such things as did approach the nearest to Vertue and lead us to that which is the chief and only Good The same Fancy they have had of Diseases and Pain they have named them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Abducta remota As if they should say that they were things less Noble and separated from Vertue for when it concerns us to make a Choice those are preferred and these are forsaken This is their way of Discourse which I think not worth Answering any otherwise than as Cicero doth when he cries out O the great strength of Mind and the brave Subject to raise a new Doctrin O magnam vim ingenii causamque justam cur nova existeret disciplina The Stoicks argue and with their weak Reasonings would maintain That Pain is no Evil Concludunt ratiunculis Stoici cur dolor non sit malum c. As if Men were only troubled about the Word and not the Thing Wherefore must you Zeno deceive me with your subtil Niceties and new coin'd Words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for when you tell me that what looks grievous is no Evil you put me at a stand I would desire to know how that which seems to me most prejudicial and hurtful is no Evil in it self Nothing is Evil as you pretend but that which is Dishonest and Vicious These are but Words neither can you hereby remove the difficulty I understand very well that Pain and Grief are not criminal Evils You need not trouble your self to tell me that but shew me whether it be an indifferent thing to suffer Pain or to be free from it You say That it is indifferent as to the Happiness of Life seeing that consists in Vertue alone But in the mean while what you call Pain is to be reckoned amongst those things that you are to avoid and by consequence is an Evil. When you pretend that Pain is no real Evil but only something uneasie to be suffered c. It is to speak at large what all the World besides name in one word Evil. And when you say That there is nothing Good but what is Honest and nothing Evil but what is Dishonest it is to vanquish in Words but not in Sense it is to express Desires and prove Nothing Doubtless this is an undeniable Truth All that Nature hates ought to be esteem'd in the number of Evils and all that is grateful to it is to be reckoned on the contrary Whether at any time Pain ought to be preferr'd before Pleasure THE Second thing to be Examin'd before we conclude about Epicurus's Opinion is Whether we should sometimes avoid Pleasure to embrace Pain This Question depends very much upon the former for if any Pleasure offers it self of that sort which Plato calls Pure and disengaged from any mixture of Grief and Trouble that is to say such as is never to be succeeded by any future Pain neither in this Life nor in that which is to come or if any Pain offers it self such as may be stiled Pure and free from any Pleasure that is such as can never be supposed to yield any Satisfaction No Man can give any reason why such a Pleasure ought not to be accepted and such a Pain avoided But if any Pleasure offer it self which might hinder us from obtaining a greater or which will be attended by a Pain that may cause us to repent the suffering our selves to be drawn away to it or if a Pain offers it self which may turn away a greater or which may be followed by a Pleasure very great there is no Reason can persuade us the shunning such a Pleasure and embracing such a Pain Therefore Aristotle observes That Pleasure and Pain are the Criteria or distinguishing Marks by which we ought to judge whether any thing is to be accepted or avoided Now any Wise Man will decline Pleasure and embrace Pain if he sees that Repentance will follow or that by admitting a little Pain he may avoid a greater But Torquatus plainly clears the Doubt And to the end we may easily see from whence the Mistake arises among those who accuse Pleasure and approve of Pain I will briefly tell you how it is and expound unto you what that Author of Truth and Encourager of an happy Life hath said No Man despises hates or shuns Pleasure because it is
Pleasure but because that such as know not how to pursue Pleasure and keep it within its due bounds fall into great Mischiefs Nay there is none that loves and seeks after Pain because it is Pain but because it happens sometimes that by Labour and Pain we procure to our selves some great Pleasure As to instance in some Particulars Does ever any Man undertake any laborious Exercise or Task of the Body unless he expects to reap some Advantage by it Now can any body reasonably blame him who embraces a Pleasure that is not accompanied with any Inconveniency or him that flees from a Pain that can procure no Advantage But we justly blame and condemn those who being enticed by the allurements of present Pleasures blinded by their Passions foresee not the Mischiefs and Inconveniences that will from thence arise And those are in the like Error who are governed by a weakness of Mind that is to say for fear of Labour and Pain abandon their Duty and Station But it is no difficult matter herein to distinguish aright for in a time of liberty when it is in our power to chuse and that nothing hinders us from acting what pleaseth us best all Pleasure is to be embrac'd and all Pain to be avoided But it happens that at some times and upon certain junctures of Affairs that we ought to decline Pleasure and accept of things that are Vneasie The Wise-Man therefore makes a prudent and discreet Determination in this Affair viz. To reject such Pleasures by the absence of which we may enjoy greater and to suffer those Ills by undergoing of which we may avoid more Mischievous Let us add to this the general Consent of Plato Socrates and Aristotle who make use of the same Rule to distinguish by Let us not forget the Opinion of Cicero who would have us proceed as if all the Pleasures and all the Delights present and to come were set before us and poised in a Balance for saith he If you weigh the present Pleasures with the future we are always to chuse the greatest and the most numerous but if we weigh Evils with Evils we are to chuse the least and the fewest But if you weigh the present Pleasures with the future Evils or the present Evils with the future Pleasures in such a case you must chuse the Pleasures if they out ballance but on the contrary if they be Evils Of the first Good that Nature has in it's View THat we may come at last to Epicurus's Opinion That Pleasure is our main End we must consider that the Reason that induc'd him to this Opinion was That he consider'd Pleasure generally and simply in its own Nature or else as it is manag'd and directed by Prudence and Wisdom for it is in this manner also that Alexander observes That we are to distinguish the Matter when he saith That Pleasure according to the Judgment of Epicurus is the first Good that Nature pursues or the first Good unto which we are Naturally bent and inclin'd but afterwards this Pleasure is regulated and directed by Wisdom and Prudence Esse quidem Voluptatem ex mente Epicuri primum familiare primum congenitum bonum primum aptum accomodatumque Naturae verum deinceps quasi in ordinem redigi talem Voluptatem Wherefore as we shall speak hereafter of this last which with Epicurus is nothing else but a freedom from Pain and a Tranquility of Mind let us at present say something of the First and let us examin if this Pleasure understood in a general sense be really this Primum Naturae familiare or the first and chief Good that Nature goes in quest of for it remains a great Question among the Philosophers And it seems as in the order of good things that are desirable there is one thing that is the ultimate and chief so ought there to be one thing first which may be the beginning of all our Desires Some saith Cicero Conceive Pleasure or Delight to be the first Good others an exemption or a freedom from Pain for as soon as any Creature is born it naturally desires and labours after an indolence or freedom from Pain Others place the first good things of Nature amongst those which they call our Being Life Perfection the preservation of all our Members intire and in Health our Senses Strength Beauty and such like Now among these Opinions the first and second is included in that of Epicurus for he places our exemption from Pain among those things we call Pleasure The third Opinion being that of the Stoicks is less probable for tho' we may say that every Creature desires to have its Being Life Health Perfection and Preservation of its several Parts c. Nevertheless we must observe that all these things are desired because it is pleasant to enjoy them And therefore if these things are desirable for being Pleasant doubtless Pleasure is the first good thing or holds the chief place among those things that are desired And this is probably what Aristotle meant when he said That Pleasure is common to all living Creatures and the inseparable Companion of our free and voluntary Actions for we perceive that what is Honest is Pleasurable as well as what is Vseful Besides Pleasure is born and bred up with us from our very Cradle Therefore it is to no purpose to endeavour to wean our selves from this Inclination with which our Natures are naturally tinctured This plainly discovers to us two things First That tho' we commonly reckon three sorts of good things viz. The Honest the Profitable and the Pleasant The Pleasant or Pleasurable which is nothing else but Pleasure it self is so intermixt with the rest that it don't seem to be a distinct Species of it self but part of the common Stock which renders the others Good and Desirable as if that which is Honest and Useful were only to be desired because it is Pleasing and agreeable Secondly That Pleasure being common unto all sensible Creatures and so fixt and setled in our very first Desires that we have not a liberty of refusing it seems verily that this should be the first Good that we wish for or desire Primum expetibile primum familiare for these are the ordinary Terms Primum expetitum accomodatumque Naturae Epicurus therefore seems to have dealt more candidly and sincerely than all the rest when he declared That Pleasure Est primum Naturae accomomodatum and that it is that In quam tandem definimus quatenus Animalia omnia simul ac nata sunt sponte ipsa Natura citra ullum ratiocinium ipsam complectantur dolorem refugiant Let us but hearken to Torquatus in Cicero Epicurus saith he teacheth That every Animal as soon as it is born desires Pleasure as its chief Good and delights in the enjoyment of it but hates Pain as its great Evil shuns it and flees from it as much as it is able this it practiseth while it is not corrupted then Nature
Rash and Proud Man he chose rather to return to Carthage and prefer'd an apparent Danger tho' he thought it not to be so great because of the Carthaginian Prisoners in the hands of the Romans to an undoubted Infamy and to a Life which he saw was Languishing and very short because of the Poison which the Carthaginians had given him However when Regulus had done nothing at Rome but having return'd back to Carthage that he kept his Word doubtless he cannot be too much esteem'd and applauded But when he dissuaded the Senate from what he had promised to persuade them to How can that be judg'd as a commendable thing seeing it was a manifest Perjury If he had contented himself with the plain delivery of his Message without persuading or dissuading any thing his proceeding might then admit of some colourable Excuse But thus openly to violate the Sacred Laws of Oaths how can this be Palliated And when he did it in Secret for fear saith Appian lest the Ambassadors that came along with him might come to understand it that also increaseth the Suspicion and aggravates the Crime Pretend not the Welfare and Glory of his Country to excuse him Truly our Country is to be secured by good Advice by Strength and Courage but not by wicked Artifices and by perfidious Dealing And we ought not to approve our selves Citizens whereby to become good Men. You may perhaps alledge what we find in Euripides That he swore with the Tongue but not with the Heart Illum jurasse Lingua Mentem gessisse injuratam But this is only to seek a Cloak for Perjury for as Cicero saith 'T is not Perjury to Swear falsly but not to perform what the Oath signifies according to the common intention of the Words Truly if it were lawful without wounding the Conscience to mean one thing and speak another it were to permit Lying in reality and to deceive him who hears us speak and with whom we converse This would cause the Faith of every one to be suspected and consequently would introduce a great Confusion in the Transactions and Affairs of Mankind You may also say that this was lawful because the Carthaginians themselves had broke the Faith they had given him But if you be a Wicked Person I ought not therefore to be less Honest otherwise What difference would there be between you and me We ought to deal with perfidious Persons either with a great deal of Precaution or with open Force but it is not lawful upon any account whatever to violate our Faith It is an old Maxim That either we ought not to Promise at all or else to keep it But it seems the Carthaginians put him to grievous Tortures for no other end but because contrary to the Faith he had given them he had dissuaded the Romans from concluding a Peace and the Exchange of the Prisoners It is true as Tubero saith That the Noblest Prisoners were delivered into the hands of Regulus 's Children who put 'em to Death with the same Torments that Regulus suffered But pray consider whether Regulus had any reason to prefer the Destruction of those Prisoners to the Lives of five Hundred Roman Soldiers who had been taken with him and who for the sake of his Vertue cruelly perished in the same manner with him at Carthage But to return to our present purpose in relation to Happiness I would fain be resolved how the Happiness of Regulus was greater than that of Thorius when he was Tortured in the manner that the forementioned Tubero relates They kept him a long time says he in dismal dark Dungeons then they cut off his Eye-lids and when the Sun shone brightest they brought him forth and exposed him to the Sun-beams forcing him to hold his Eyes that way knowing it was not possible for him to shut them Cicero informs us that he was bound in an Engin and that after they had cut off his Eye-lids they destroyed him by Watching Seneca terms this Engin a Tub stuck through with Nails in which he was Inclosed Sylvius presents us with this Description With desp'rate Rows they arm'd the sloping Wood And tor'tring Nails at equal distance stood Thus robb'd of Sleep by never sleeping pain He grows his own Tormentor and in vain Attempts his Limbs by turning to relieve While only varied Wounds the varied Postures give But possibly you 'll say That Thorius embrac'd Pleasure in an Effminate manner whereas Regulus for the good of his Country prefer'd these Tortures and suffer'd them Courageously First Thorius was not so soft and Effeminate but that when the Well-fare of his Country required he did not decline the Wars but at last died fighting in defence of it as Cicero himself testifies And tho' it be a great support in the midst of our Sufferings to preserve our Conscience Pure and Unstained considering that we suffer in an honest Cause and for the Well-fare of many yet it don't thereby appear that we are therefore more Happy than we should be by living Vertuously Wronging no body but endeavouring to do all the good we can and every way discharging the Duty of a good Man and an honest Subject spending our lives in this manner in a great deal of Pleasure and little Pain In short suppose a Man of the greatest Resolution and Courage who would not upon a good account be daunted at the greatest Difficulties or Dangers I say if it were offered to such a one without any prejudice either to his Duty or Reputation to take his choice of the two kinds of Life mentioned by Torquatus Where is the Man I beseech you among all those that thus exclaim against Pleasure and extol Vertue and Sufferings that would give the preference to the latter and willingly embrace it But to confirm what hath been said before That Pain is the greatest Evil for that hath been as the Antecedent from whence we may conclude by the Rule of Contraries That Pleasure is the chief Good By the same Reason by which we have proved That Pleasure is the sovereign Good which Naturally we seek Primum familiare seu accommodatum And consequently the chief Good By the same Reason it hath been proved That Pain is the chief Evil which Naturally we avoid Primum alienum se incommodans And consequently the chief Evil. For Nature hath not only given to all Creatures a natural love for Pleasure but hath also fix'd in 'em a natural hatred of Pain Let us now take notice of two or three Particulars First By the word Pain we are not to understand only those that we call the Pains of the Body but also those which we term the Pains or Inquietudes of the Mind and which are far more anxious and insupportable than those of the Body as we have already said Secondly That as we have before observ'd Vertue and Goodness have something within them which naturally afford Pleasure and Delight so likewise we may now affirm that Vice or that which is
Infamous and Dishonest hath that in it which causes great Pain and Uneasiness From whence it is that as Vertue and Goodness is attended by many and great Advantages so Vice or Wickedness is succeeded by many and great Evils So that in short among the things which are to be desired in order to obtaining our chief Good Vertue is that which we are chiefly to aim at and among the things that we are to shun in order the better to avoid the greatest Evils Vice and Wickedness is that which we are chiefly to fly from Lastly This Doctrin seems to be very conformable to the Sacred Rules of Faith By which as we believe that our chief Good or Happiness consists in enjoying the everlasting Delights and Joys in Heaven So we believe That our greatest Unhappiness or Misery consists in being tormented in Hell with uspeakable Tortures in everlasting Flames CHAP V. That a Wise Man is only capable of enjoying Moral Vertue WE have hitherto treated of Pleasure as it is generally understood We shall now speak of that particular specifick Pleasure unto which a Wise Man confines himself as being in its own Nature not only very easie to be obtain'd but also most lasting and free from Repentance In a word that Pleasure that we before called the Tranquility of the Mind and the exemption of the Body from Pain now we have great Reason to call it most Natural for at this sort of Pleasure Nature seems chiefly to aim as not having regard to other Pleasures which are always shifting and in a constant Motion any otherwise than to make them useful in the obtaining this as for Instance It hath appointed the Pleasure of Tasting to make the action of Eating more grateful and by that means to oblige us to the Act whereby to satisfie our Hunger which is that pain we feel and caused by the cravings of an empty Stomach But in reference to the satisfaction and tranquility of Mind which we enjoy when Hunger is appeas'd This Nature hath reserv'd as her last End and designed it as her chief Good We have great reason to say that it is very easie to be obtain'd because it is in every one's Power to moderate his Desires by supplying himself with things necessary for his Body whereby to free it from Pain and thereby render his Mind calm and easy I say That it is very lasting because other Pleasures pass away in a Moment and free from us whereas this continues the same unless it be interrupted and perish by our own Miscarriages Lastly I describe it to be very free from Repentance for all other Pleasures may be attended by some Evil whereas this is altogether innocent and draws upon us no such Mischief I know that Cicero at first quarrels very much with Epicurus because he gives the Term of Pleasure to this Tranquility and freedom from Pain which he pretends to be proper to nothing but that which consists in Motion or to those things which please the Senses But methinks Cicero should not differ with him about a bare Word for suppose according to common Custom we did not call this Tranquility of Mind and freedom from Bodily Pain Pleasure Why should we hinder Epicurus the giving it that Name and esteeming it so great a Pleasure that among all others that bear that name none is to be compared with it This hath been and always will be allowed in cases of Opinion especially here where Pleasure and that which is Good and Desirable are the same thing Therefore this State or Condition of Life which of all other seems most desirable may be very well esteem'd and called Pleasure Besides we may not only bring Aristotle here to controll him in express words That there is a greater Pleasure in Repose than in Action but also St. Chrysostom who thus expresseth himself For what is Pleasure but to be free from Inquietude Trouble Fear and Despair and generally to be exempt from such kind of Passions Pray which of these two may be said truly to enjoy Pleasure He who is furiously distracted by Passions and so continually overcome with vicious Lusts that he hath no command of himself or He who is free from all these Disturbances and rests in Philosophy as a quiet Haven I may truly call that Pleasure when the Soul is in such a State that it is in no wise disquieted nor disturbed by any bodily Passion That which Cicero objects concerning Children and Brutes which are as the Looking-glasses of uncorrupted Nature and yet desire not that Pleasure which is in Rest of which we have been speaking but only that which is in Motion seems to make most against us But let his Judgment of the Brutes and the Nature of Animals be what it will tho' they came into the World uncorrupted and are well instructed for the obtaining their End after they have satisfied their Pain which is caused by some Want naturally they tend to Rest contrary to several Men who being corrupted in their Imagination constantly cut out and make to themselves Work by provoking the Appetite and never stop at any thing Whatever be the case of the Beasts we shall speak only of Men of whom it is certain whatever is Objected is easily Answer'd by what we have already mentioned For in the first Place Nature hath appointed a fix'd Pleasure for the chief End And tho' Action be design'd as a necessary Means to obtain it it makes use of the Pleasure which is in Motion that the Action might pass with more Delight and Satisfaction From whence it happens That tho' Man or any other Creature seems to be more apparently and expresly stir'd up and inclin'd to active Pleasure nevertheless this hinders not but at the same time he really and secretly tends to that which is stable and that by the Instinct or Bent of Nature who looks upon it as her chief Aim and principal End Besides because Man's Understanding in process of time is corrupted vitiated apt to make divers gross Mistakes and as we commonly say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to make that Principal which is but Accessory he sets up a fleeting moving Pleasure for his principal Mark and by abusing this Pleasure by his Intemperance he draws upon himself a Mischief when he loseth that Pleasure which is more fix'd and solid and which Nature hath made the First and Principal and this is succeeded by Sorrow and Repentance For this cause it is that Epicurus adviseth That Wisdom should interpose which teacheth Man to govern his Pleasure that is to say to consider and look upon the Assistant as Assistant and the Principal as Principal In the mean while we need not concern our selves much about what the Cyrenaicks Object in Cicero That this Pleasure of Epicurus is like the condition of a sleeping Person For he hath declared That his Tranquility and freedom from Pain is not to be Stupified but to be in such a State that all the actions of our Life
Practice of Vertue it inquires wherein consists the chief Good and the chief Evil whither all our Actions ought to tend and what is the Rule of Life we ought to steer by Moreover he who shall have consider'd the strong Revolutions of Things since the beginning of the World the Rise Progress Consistency Declension and Over-throw of Kingdoms Common-wealths Religions Opinions Laws Customs Manners and the present Ways and Methods of Living now in Vogue which our Fore-fathers would have rejected such as our Ancestors seriously followed and which we now laugh at and such possibly as will hereafter please our Posterity yet could we but at present see them we should laugh at and deride These Fashions and Customs tho' they change in some particular things may in general be said to be the same and are only a Sign of the Frailty Lightness and Inconstancy of Mankind And thus it always happens that Men by their Lightness live continually miserable being carried away by Ambition or Covetousness or some other Passion They don't see how much it is their Concern to free themselves from such Cares to be content with little to live within themselves and to spend their Life peaceably without so much noise He I say who shall have employ'd his Mind in such Contemplations will doubtless feel extraordinary Delight and will be very happy in his Thoughts especially if he considers all things as from that high and sacred Tower from whence as we said Vertue looks down upon the several Actions and Affairs of Men their Ambition their Pride their Vanity their sordid Covetousness and the rest before hinted Of Freedom from Pain in particular NOw to speak something concerning Freedom from Pain It seems not so much in our Power to free our selves from Pain in our Bodies as to ease our selves of Troubles in our Minds for tho' it is difficult to stop the Passions in their full Career and check their exorbitant Motions yet if we except such as have a Conjunction with Pain such as are particularly Hunger and Thirst which create a desire of Eating and Drinking it seems in respect of the others as they arise in us from Opinion so they may if we keep our selves from the Influence of that Opinion be check'd and curb'd But in relation to the Pains of the Body tho' we may take care not to draw them upon our selves outwardly nor stir them up inwardly yet it often happens that the Temper which we derive from our Mother's Womb is such that upon that very account we are liable to many Pains during the course of our Lives 'T is not without Reason therefore that Esop feigned that when Prometheus was to temper the Clay with which he was to make Man made use of no Water but of Tears for by that he had a design to teach us that the Nature of our Bodies is such that it is partly subject to outward and partly to inward Mischiefs and seeing it is impossible but some will often befal us of necessity we must suffer some Pain I should be endless to enumerate the Particulars of this kind that may befal us either from Tyrants from Fools from all sorts of Animals from Heat from Cold from Fevers Gout Defluctions c. I shall only observe that such who have been sometimes tormented with them may tell with what earnestness they wished to be freed and how much they would have given to be delivered Certainly there is no Person that labours under an acute Distemper and is grievously tormented with Pain but when he considers such as are in Health esteems them very happy and wonders that they don't acknowledge the greatness of the Advantage they enjoy it being so considerable that no worldly Enjoyments can stand in competition with or be accounted a valuable Exchange for Health Wherefore in all Ages Men have highly extoll'd it But as every Book is full of its own Praises I shall only take notice what an antient Poet saith That the greatest Benefit that can befall frail Man is to enjoy Health Fragili viro optima res bene valere And as another says Nothing can be more advantageous to us than to be free from Pain and Diseases Si ventri bene est si lateri est pedibusque tuis nil Divitiae poterunt Regales addere majus Now what I have here observ'd is to prove that it is not without ground what I have asserted That to be free from Sickness or bodily Pain is part of our Happiness Truly tho' light Pains and such as are of a short continuance may be easily supported and tho' we willingly undergo great ones when they are in order either to avoid greater Evils or for the obtaining of greater Pleasures yet there is no Man so fond of Pain for Pain 's sake but would willingly be quit of it if it were not in order to the obtaining something better which could not be acquir'd without it Men commonly extol Zenon and Anaxarcas for the constancy they express'd against the Tyrants in their greatest Tortures And Calanus also and Peregrinus are much celebrated for freely offering themselves to the Flames But supposing it had been in their Power to have purchased as much Glory by any other Means I refer it to your self whether they would have made this Choice Cicero likewise very much extolleth Possidonius for that being grievously tormented with the Gout when Pompey visited him at Rhodes he told him That he was very sorry that he could not hear him to which Possidonius answer'd You may if you please and I will not suffer so great a Person to come to me in vain He tells us that he began to discourse to him excellently viz. That there is nothing Good but that which is honest And when his Pains assaulted him often during the Interview he as often said Thou wilt never prevail upon me O Pain tho' never so grievous to make me confess thee to be an Evil. But tho' Possidonius patiently endured the Pains that he could not avoid yet you can't but imagine that he would rather have been free from 'em and been able to discourse without ' em We may here add That if as we have already said Pain is the chief Evil it necessarily follows that a freedom from Pain should be the chief Good and the rather because Nature seems to have bestowed upon us an inclination for nothing else but for this freedom For when any Pain happens to us whether by Hunger or by any other Desire we are naturally carried to that Action by which we may remove that Pain and if any Pleasure intervenes we have observed that Nature adds it as an Encouragement to the Action needful to obtain that freedom from Pain And probably we may consequently add by what Means we may obtain so great an Advantage But besides the divers Remedies which may be taken from the convenient Precautions and from the Medicinal Art which relate not to Moral Philosophy we may say That
the Matter hath less difficulty These parts are Confidence Magnanimity or greatness of Courage Magnificence Patience or long Forbearance Constancy or Perseverance The two first are for an Aggress or Assault the two latter for Defence and Support CHAP II. Of Prudence in General NOW to say something to the purpose concerning the four principal Virtues and about some of their chief Species And we will begin with Prudence which Aristotle Epicurus and all the other Philosophers not without Reason call the Head the Fountain the Mistress the Queen of all other Virtues But to lay aside all Equivocation tho' Prudence and Wisdom are often used Promiscuously and to the same Sense nevertheless Aristotle distinguishes them in such a manner that he takes Wisdom for the knowledge of Things honourable and worthy but Prudence for a particular Virtue which respects the Things useful and convenient for the Life of Man From hence it is saith he that Anaxagoras Thales and some others may very well be accounted Wise but not Prudent because we find that they were Ignorant of the Things that were needful and yet they understood several excellent admirable difficult and divine Things but useless for the good and happiness of Life Now 't is certain that we are not to speak of Prudence as it is taken for that high and speculative Wisdom but as it is a moral Virtue which is to rule and govern all the Actions of our Life and which by distinguishing the good from the evil the useful things from such as are hurtful points out that which we are to Embrace and that which we are to Avoid and by that means leads and directs Man to live well and Happily Therefore Cicero gives this definition of Prudence The knowledge of the Things that we are to desire or avoid And Aristotle saith 'T is an habit of Acting according to right Reason in the Things that are good or evil to Mankind Now we must observe in relation to what he saith that it is an Habit of Acting according to right Reason that he don't understand but that a prudent Man may sometimes be impos'd upon by a colourable Reason and which does not exactly answer the event of Things yet he ought to perform nothing but with due Consideration and after he hath well examined every thing and hath had a regard to the Place and Time of his Deliberation he perceives no Reason truer or more probable than that which he resolves to embrace and follow but still at the same time notwithstanding his serious Deliberation if a Reason more likely or probable comes into his Thought he is more ready to embrace it and be led by it This makes Prudence to be a very uncertain Habit full of Conjectures by which it differs from Science as Aristotle understands it for Science hath necessary Things for its Objects Things necessary and which cannot be otherwise but Prudence looks upon Things that are contingent and casual that may happen or not may fall out this way or t'other We must likewise observe That Aristotle understands by good or evil Things chiefly the Means which are said to be good as they are useful and convenient for the purposes of Virtue and evil as they are hurtful and prejudicial to such purposes For tho we deliberate about an End it is not absolutely an End but it is really a Means to obtain another at a distance and which also may be lookt upon as a further Means until we arrive at the last of all which is Happiness about which there is no deliberation for there is no Body but would be Happy and we trouble our selves about nothing else but how to attain to it Therefore we have given this Definition of Prudence in general That it directs a Man to a good and happy Life not but that it respects particular Cases also seeing it is the Duty of Prudence to dictate what we ought and what we ought not to do on every particular occasion But because it appears chiefly in a certain prospect of a general Life that we propose to our selves and which may be such that all our particular Actions mutually agree among themselves and tend all without any opposition to Happiness or as we have said to live Well and Happily for that Reason Prudence is usually term'd the Art of Living and Plato calls it the Knowledge which procures Happiness And Aristotle saith That it is the part of a Prudent Man not only to consult and maturely to deliberate upon particular Matters such as Health c. but generally about all things which may contribute to our living Well and Happily Of the general Offices or Duties of Prudence WE commonly divide the general Offices or Duties of Prudence into these three Parts viz. To Consult or Advise well to Understand and Comprehend aright to Command and Prescribe 'T is what is usually express'd by these Words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which are term'd in the Schools the potential parts of Prudence tho' they are really and rather the acts of Prudence The first then is to advise well the Particle well being here added because this belongs peculiarly to a prudent Man for rash and inconsidering People run headlong without ever examining the Matter But Deliberation which regards Prudence ought to be good as Aristotle saith and tend to a good End So that if any by taking wrong Measures suceeds that cannot be said to be a good Deliberation for tho he obtains what he seeks to obtain yet 't is not by such Means as he ought to make use of Therefore Cunning or Subtilty that cares not what Methods it takes to accomplish its Ends whether Good or Evil is placed as one of the Extremes of Prudence And therefore a subtil and cunning Man having no respect to Honesty is lookt upon by a prudent Man just as a wicked Person is by a good Man For Malice saith Cicero will often imitate Prudence The second Duty is to apprehend well and understand the ways and means that we are to make use of after we have soberly and seriously deliberated and advised Aristotle by this word Vnderstand seems to mean nothing else but an easy Apprehension or an Understanding quick and nimble therefore he opposeth this Understanding to Stupidity or a slowness of Apprehension So that according to his Opinion a prudent Man being between the Subtil and Knavish and the Dull and Stupid may be judged to be placed a Man between the evil Spirit and a Brute they are his own Words The Third is to command or prescribe the performance of the Things that have been formerly judged or resolved on or which is in effect the same to order that the Means that have been thus resolved on may actually be put in Execution For Prudence saith Aristotle is of its own Nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Imperatoria born and designed to Command so that instead of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which according to Aristotle signifies no other thing but a
First That to the two kinds of Monarchy namely Kingly and Tyrannical they commonly add a Third which they name Despotick for the Kingly is when the Monarch Rules his Subjects as a Father his Children and that as his Subjects are Obedient to his Commands and Laws he himself is Obedient to the Laws of Nature suffering his Subjects to enjoy as well their natural Liberty as the propriety of their Goods But the Tyrannical is that where the Monarch commands his Subjects as Slaves or Brutes and trampling under Foot all the Laws of Nature he deprives them of all Liberty and Propriety which he Usurps and claims to himself as his own The Despotical they say is where the Monarch Commands his Subjects which have been overcome by War as a good Master of a Family doth his Slaves Secondly I shall observe That 't is not without Cause that the regal and tyrannical Dominions are said to be contrary for as the Regal aims at the common good of the Society and designs for its End the Security the Tranquility the Plenty and in a Word the publick Happiness So the Tyrannical aims at nothing but its own private Advantage and fills all Places with Fear Trouble Poverty and Calamity And as in the regal Government not only the Subjects are Happy but also and chiefly the Prince because of that Respect and Love which he knows that his Subjects have for him when he shews them that he fears God that he is Obedient to the Laws of Nature and that he looks upon the welfare of his People as his greatest Interest that he is wise in his Deliberations courageous in his Actions moderate in Prosperity constant in Adversity resolved in the Execution of Justice faithful to his Promises mild to good Men severe to the Wicked supporting his Friends terrible to his Enemies in a Word that he is the Father of his Country and a true Shepherd of his People Thus in the tyrannical Government all kind of Mischiefs Griefs and Anxieties oppress not only the Subjects but more particularly the Tyrant himself who is not insensible of the secret Contempt they bear him and the implacable Hatred that his Subjects harbour in their Breasts against him when he makes them sensible and feel by his tyrannical Proceedings that he values neither God Nature nor the safety of his People for every one sees that he acts nothing but by Subtilty and Violence that good Success renders him Insolent and Proud as the Evil causeth him to be Cruel that he is full of Injustice Perfidiousness and Barbarity that he hates good Men that he favours Wicked in short That he is not the Father of his Country but a publick Enemy not a Shepherd but a Wolf to his People Therefore being feared and dreaded by all the World he is himself in continual Fear and Dread which suffer him at no time to be at rest For he fears both Friends and Foes and trembles at the shaking of a Leaf yea at his very Shadow Therefore Cicero and Seneca have very well remarkt according to Epicurus that it must needs be That he whom many fear should stand in fear of many which Seneca brings in Labericus thus expressing Necesse est multos timeat quem multi timent Whether Monarchial Government is the best THe third thing that I have thought fit to observe is That of the several approved sorts of Government the Monarchical seems to be the best For tho' they have all of 'em their Inconveniences and Advantages yet the Advantages of the Monarchical are above the rest and the Inconveniences fewer For as in the Monarchical all Orders proceed from one Person and relate to one the state of Affairs is more settled and constant the necessary Orders upon all occasions more easie to be given the Resolutions more secret the Execution quicker and all opportunities of Factions and Seditions prevented Liberty likewise and Security which other Forms of Government pretend to is greater and larger and so of other Advantages which are very well known This is sufficiently proved by the Government of a Family which requires but one Master or Father of the Family or by that of an Army which ought to have but one General and by the Government of the World that acknowledgeth but one Sovereign Lord. Besides the Annals inform us That when the Affairs of a Common-wealth have been reduced to the last Extremity they have set up a Dictator as the only Remedy And tho' Aristotle in his Politicks seems to prefer Aristocracy before Monarchy he desires that we would consult the Genius of the People for some are more fit and inclinable to one Government than to another nevertheless in his Metaphysicks he concludes without any Exception That Government by many is inconvenient Of the Duties of a Monarch in General BUt as we should be too tedious and it is not convenient to treat here what belongs to the several Forms of Government it shall suffice to mention something of the Monarchical which may be applied to the rest Now as the Duty of a Sovereign hath chiefly respect to two times viz. that of War and that of Peace there are certain things among others which he ought principally to mind First To understand well and to imprint in his Thoughts this Persuasion That the Welfare the Security and Advantage of his People or as Cicero calls it the Happiness of his Subjects should be the great Design and End of his Government That for this purpose he Rules and upon this account it is that he is respected and obeyed For as the Pilate saith Cicero designs a happy and safe Navigation the Physician the Health of the Patient the General of an Army Victory so the Governour of a Common-wealth designs the Happiness of his Subjects which is secured by Riches by Military Forces by Glory Virtue and Honesty Secondly To propose to himself no other Reward of his Cares and Labours but the Glory of Governing well the Gratitude the Respect and Affections of his Subjects How well was Trojan rewarded when he heard the Applauses of all the People who cried out with a loud Voice May the Gods love thee as thou lovest us for who can be happier than we who need not wish that our Prince should love us but only that the Gods should bear us equal Affection as our Prince doth Timoleon also own'd himself sufficiently requited when walking abroad he heard the like Acclamations of the People full of Love and Veneration Therefore Princes act with little wisdom or rather very imprudently who being desirous of Glory endeavour to purchase it by any other Means than by doing good to their People and by deserving their Affections For the Applause gained by other Methods is accompanied with Contempt Hatred and Execrations of the Common People and deserves to be called Infamy Excellent and Admirable was the Speech of Xunus Emperor of China to his Son Yaiis who according to the Relation of Martinius lived Two Thousand
is that we must observe in the second place that there are as it were two general Bulwarks against these sorts of external Evils The first is a good Conscience for as Crantor saith 'T is a great support under Afflictions to be free from Guilt The second is to fore-see and to lay before our Eyes the Mischiefs and Evils that may happen for he who fore-sees the blow and is prepared to receive it is not so easily beaten down as when he is struck unprovided when he is armed with Resolution and Courage as with a kind of Breast-plate he is not so soon wounded as when he is naked and unguarded Therefore a wise Man never trusts so much to his good Fortune but he thinks also upon his Evil for Fortune hath nothing fix'd neither is there any thing certain or of a long continuance in human Affairs He always represents before his Eyes some Examples of the Vicissitudes of good and evil Things and knows that there is no Mischief that happens to any Body but that the same may befal him Therefore he don't wait till the time of War then to furnish himself with Arms to support it nor till a Storm happens then to prepare to resist it If a wise Man begets a Son saith Cicero he knows that he hath begotten a Mortal and brings him up in that Persuasion If he sends him to Troy to defend Greece he knows that he don't send him to a Feast but to a dangerous War This Consideration saith he and this Meditation upon the Evils to come before they happen qualifies and allays the Mischiefs that befal afterwards So that I think Theseus cannot be too much commended for saying in Euripides I thought before upon the Calamities to come upon Death Banishment c. that I might be the better enabled to encounter with adverse Fortune 'T is an undoubted Truth that the Evils that are not fore-seen are much more grievous and that the Fore-sight and Preparation of the Mind hath a great Efficacy to lessen the Pain Let Mankind set always before his Eyes the Casualties of the World for this excellent and divine Wisdom consists in having a long while perfectly known and considered human Affairs and meditated upon them not wondering at any thing that happens nor believe before a thing happens that such a thing cannot come to pass He afterwards commends the Advice of Terence That a Man in Prosperity should think with himself how he should be able to endure Adversity Dangers Losses and Banishment the Miscarriages of a Son the Death of a Wife the Sickness of a Daughter that all these things are common that they may happen so that nothing new ought to surprise us and whatever good befalls us beyond our Expectation it should be look'd upon as so much Profit and pure Gain It was this kind of Meditation and Fore-sight that caused that Constancy of Mind in Socrates appearing always with a serene and pleasant Countenance truly how could his Looks be otherwise seeing his Soul was never moved nor disturbed Agrippinus proceeded yet farther for he was wont to make a Panegyrick of all the Evils that befell him of Diseases when they seis'd upon him of Infamy when Men slander'd him of Banishment when he was driven away And when at a certain time he was going to sit at Table a Message was brought him from Nero to command him immediately to be gone and to depart he answered nothing else but Well we shall then dine at the Town of Aricia Ariciae ergo prandebimus How we ought to support external and publick Evils AS Evils are usually distinguished into publick such as is War Tyranny the Ruin of our Country Plague Famine and such like and into private as Banishment Imprisonment Slavery Ignominy c. It is not needful to speak much of the publick Evils because they don't really concern us so much as they are Publick but as they are Private and come home to us in Particulars 'T is true when Publick Calamities involve a great many Persons this must needs create much Noise and they are reckoned so much the more unsufferable because our common Mother namely our Country is wrong'd and injur'd but if we take more particular notice we may perceive that the Evil concerns every one no otherwise than it strikes at them in particular And to demonstrate that this is no Paradox That the Evil that is common to many on whom we have Compassion is not more uneasie to be born it would be sufficient to instance in that which is in the Mouth of every one and what our Experience sufficiently verifies That it is the comfort of the afflicted to have Fellow-Sufferers But we need take notice but of one thing and consider that when a Neighbour's House is on Fire none but the Neighbours run to extinguish it those who live in the same City at a distance are not at all concered at it for tho' they be all Fellow-Citizens yet the Calamity don't touch them so much as it doth the others So if the War be begun in Persia or if the Plague be hot in India and makes there a great destruction that don't concern us tho' they be Fellow-Citizens of the same World because the Evil is too far off to injure us And tho' it may infect the Borders of our Kingdom either it moves us not or if it doth 't is by accident in that it reaches as far as us and makes us sensible of the Evil. But that I may not stop here If it happens that we are involved in any common Calamity there are two things chiefly to be weighed First That such is the Condition and natural Course of things which we cannot hinder That 't is the Sovereign Lord of the World who hath appointed such Alterations and Changes and he being most Wise his Designs tho' unknown to Men may be and are most excellent That it belongs not to us to quarrel at or alter that Order that he has establish'd but that we ought willingly to yield and follow the Paths that his Providence hath prescribed to us And that seeing 't is not in our power to change Destinies or rather the Decrees of the Divine Providence it would better become us to mitigate the Harshness and Trouble by our own free Consent than to increase the Mischief by fruitless Opposition That Common-wealths have their natural Revolutions and that it is needful that sometimes they should be govern'd by Princes and become Monarchies sometimes by the People and devolve into Democracies and sometimes by the Chieftains and principal Men and be changed into Aristocracies This Cicero tells us which he had taken out of Plato unto which he adds this excellent Passage which shews the Nobility of his Mind and the extraordinary Greatness and Resolution of his Soul when he describes the lamentable State of the Common-wealth I have not hid my self I have not cowardly forsaken neither have I extraordinarily afflicted my self I have not behaved
hurts wilfully that is to say knowing to whom in what manner and how he injures From whence it follows that because 't is one thing to suffer an unjust Act or to receive Damage and another to suffer an injury a Man may willingly suffer an unjust Act but not suffer an injury For that Reason Aristotle observes that we define a Man who doth an injury He who hurts knowing to whom in what manner and how he hurts yet that is not sufficient but we must add this particular Against the Will of him whom he hurts This being supposed in the first place 't is impossible that we should do injury to our selves or that a Man should receive an injury from himself for a Man may do a damage to himself and act against his own advantage but not do an injury because the same Person is both Agent and Patient he acts and suffers willingly But we must nevertheless remember what we have already said and shall have occasion to mention again hereafter That he who wishes Evil to himself as he who desires his own death or kills himself wishes for it not as an Evil he desires not death as it is the destruction of Life but as it is some Advantage that is to say as 't is the end of the Evils from which he desires to be delivered and so he looks upon it as a considerable Benefit It is likewise certain according to that kind of Maxim Volenti non fit injuria that no injury can be done to him who consents and approves of it For as we have already said no man can suffer an injury but against his Will because as the injury is in it self an Evil it cannot be look'd upon as Good or the cause of any Good 'T is true it may be a Crime in him who takes the Goods of another though this other by mistake may seem to be consenting to it as for Example If he be frightned into a Consent under some pretence if he be deluded into it by fair Promises if he be flatter'd into it by Craft if he works upon his Weakness or the easiness of his Temper or if he conceals from him the true Value of the thing without afterward informing him of his Error and so of the rest but as for him who knowingly and willingly gives away his Goods consents that they may be taken this Man cannot be judged to receive an injury but a damage But since both doing and suffering injury is an Evil if you inquire which of the two is the worst Aristotle will readily resolve you that it is in doing an injury for that cannot be done without Injustice Therefore Plato gives us this Advice That we should be more careful to avoid doing an injury than suffering it Besides tho' he who receives any damage tho' he receives it not against his Will he who doth the mischief or wrong if he designs to do an injury is not in such a case excusable because it was not for want of his Will that the damage did not prove an injury Seneca explains this matter very well It may happen saith he that a Man may offer me an injury and that I may not receive it as if any one should put into my House what he had taken out of my Farm he had been guilty of a Theft and yet I may have lost nothing thereby If any one lies with his own Wife and believes her to be the Wife of another he is an Adulterer though the Woman be not Some body hath given me Poison but as it happens to be mixed with other Ingredients it hath lost its Operation he who hath administred the Poison is a Murderer though no mischief is done by it All designed Crimes are in respect of the Sin done and effected before the act is accomplished CHAP. IX Of the Virtues which accompany Justice namely of Religion of Piety of Observance Love Bounty Liberality Gratitude And first of Religion THere are two main Causes or Reasons why God ought to be Worship'd and Ador'd the First is the supreme excellency of his Nature the Second his Bounty to us First they who stile him most Good and most Great Optimum Maximum had doubtless these two Reasons in view because as he is most Good he is the most liberal and sovereign Benefactor and as he is most Great he is supremly Excellent So that we may very well approve of Epicurus's Maxim and say That God ought to be Honoured purely for himself without any further Expectation but only because of his supreme Majesty and of his sovereign Nature for that that is most Excellent deserves to be Reverenced and Honoured But yet with him to acknowledge no other Cause and notwithstanding to disown his Bounty is what cannot be too much blamed for as Seneca tells him very well Thou dost not acknowledge the Favours and Blessings of God but supposest that as it were at a far Distance and out of the noise of the Affairs of the World he enjoys a profound Rest and interrupted Felicity without being concerned for the good Deeds of Men any more than for the evil He who teacheth this Doctrin does not consider the Sighs and ardent Desires of those who pray from all parts of the World and with Hands lifted up towards Heaven make Vows either publick or private which certainly would not easily be nor is it easily to be suppos'd that the generality of Mankind would of their own accord fall into such a stupid Madness as to address themselves to deaf and senseless Divinities to no purpose They ought to have understood that the Gods sometimes deny and sometimes grant our Requests out of their bountiful Goodness and that often they assist us so powerfully and so seasonably that they divert the great Mischiefs and Calamities that threatned us Where is that Man so miserable so forsaken and under such unhappy Circumstances who hath not at some time experienced this great Bounty and Liberality of the Gods If you look upon them who lament and grieve for their ill Fortune and tire themselves in complaining you will meet with none but Heaven hath bestowed upon him some Favours some Drops of that large Fountain of Goodness have fallen upon him Ay but God saith he does us no Good From whence then comes all those things that thou possessest that thou bestowest that thou refusest that thou keepest and that thou receivest From whence proceed that vast number of grateful Objects that delight thine Eyes thine Ears and thy Mind He hath not only provided things needful his Love hath proceeded farther to furnish us with things Pleasant and Delightful with many pleasant Fruits wholesome Herbs and nourishing Meats for Food which succeed one another according to their Seasons The most careless ever and anon stumble upon some of 'em without labour or toil 'T is God who hath created for us all the several sorts of Creatures either upon the Earth or in the Waters or in the Air that
its own accord For as a Stone because it falls sponte or of its own Nature downward cannot of it self rise upwards So because the Appetite is carried of its own Nature to Good it cannot of it self incline nor lean to Evil Besides as the Stone because 't is settled to a Motion downwards hath not an indifferency for such a Motion or for a Motion upwards So the Appetite because 't is fixed on Good is not indifferent to what is Good nor indifferent to what is Evil. Lastly as the Stone for want of that indifferency to either of the Motions is truly said to move sponte of its own accord but not freely or with liberty downward So the Appetite for want of this indifferency to Good or Evil is truly said to move sponte of its own accord but not with liberty to what is Good in General Therefore if you suppose that the Will is in such a manner fixed for Example on the Sovereign Good or Happiness that it cannot by forsaking it be turned aside to follow another Object it will be truly reputed to be inclined to it sponte but not freely because 't is not indifferent to that Good or to another and that 't is not in its Power to incline to another and forsake that 'T is certain that it inclines willingly volens and without Reluctancy and Opposition but this kind of Will which we might name Volentia if it were lawful to make use of this word bespeaks not Liberty but Propensity Complacency libentiam collubescentiam and consequently an exclusion of all Constraint Violence Repugnancy or Opposition So that if the Pursuit or actual Love and Affection for this Good is said to be altogether Voluntary we must not therefore infer that it is altogether free but only that 't is summè libitus if I may be permitted to make use of this Term or libens altogether willing because libentia may be without any indifferency but not libertas Now it behoves us to consider that what is usually spoken among the Divines That 't is impossible that the Will such as is that of the glorified Saints which enjoys fully and knowingly the Sovereign Happiness should forsake that Good to embrace another it concerns us I say to make this Observation because it seems this may discover to us what that indifferency is in which the Nature of the Liberty or Free-will of this mortal Life consists We took notice before that the Understanding bears the Light before the Will and it is certain that this Torch or Light is nothing else but the Judgment that the Understanding makes upon things that are Good or Evil declaring that this is Good and that Evil that of these two Good or Evil things this is the greater that the less So that when the Will is said to be diverted from the one and inclined to the other this happens because the Judgment is sometimes for one and sometimes for th' other and that the Flection of the Will is conformable to that of the Understanding Thus because the Understanding is often unconstant in its Judgment the Will is often unsetled and wavers in its Inclination or Appetite so that as the Understanding judges to day that one thing is Good and to morrow Evil the Will to day loves this thing and to morrow hates it And as it judges to day that we ought to embrace a certain thing because it is Good and to morrow it esteems that we ought rather to embrace another because that other appears to it better thus the Will is inclined to day to one thing and to morrow to another In a word it seems that according to the Notions that the Understanding hath of things or according to the Judgment that it makes of them so the Will either pursues or avoids the same In the same manner because among the Good things as among the Evil some are true and real others seeming or apparent Good is sometimes disguis'd with the Appearance of Evil and Evil with that of Good By this means the Understanding often makes a wrong Judgment for being moved with the Appearance of Good it judges Evil to be Good or being moved with the Appearance of Evil it judges Good to be Evil. In the same manner the Will often mistakes its End because in aiming at Good and pursuing after it it happens upon Evil and in flying from Evil it is disappointed of some Good Thus also the Understanding mistakes the lesser Good for the greater and the greater for the lesser the Will by following after the greatest Good gets the less and in flying from the lesser Evil falls into the greater Seeing then the Will is thus bound to follow the Understanding or its Judgment there is no question but that the indifferency which appears in the Will proceeds meerly and absolutely in the same manner as the indifferency of the Understanding Now the indifferency of the Understanding seems to consist in this That it is not so much tied up to any Judgment that it has made of a thing which hath appeared to it true but that it may leave it and incline to make another Judgment of the same thing if there appears in it a greater likelihood of Truth For the Understanding is not of the number of those Faculties that are fixed to a thing as weight in things without Life the Faculty of Generation in the living Creatures and so of the rest but is naturally so flexible that having nothing else for its Object but Truth it may judge of things now in this manner anon in another and according to the Judgment it makes may sometimes take this sometimes that for Truth Therefore the Understanding may be look'd upon as a Balance for as a Balance is indifferent to incline either of the Scales and bends towards that which is most loaden so that where there is the greater Addition of weight it still inclines that way thus the Understanding is indifferently inclined to one or other of these contrary Opinions but is still overpoised according to the greater or less apparency of Truth This Comparison is borrowed from Cicero where he says That in the same manner as the Scale of a Balance is weighed down by the weight that is put into it thus the Mind yields to things that are plain we cannot approve of a thing that is not plain nor manifest This is designed to make us comprehend that the Understanding being indifferent to follow one Judgment or another it is not nevertheless indifferent to leave a plain manifest Truth to follow after another less manifest or to leave the Judgment that seems the truest to embrace that which hath the less likelihood of Truth because as a Scale weighed down by a greater weight can never be raised by a less weight put into the other Scale but only by a heavier which weighing down this shall cause the other to be lifted up Thus 't is not possible that when some evident and experienc'd
Truth hath prevail'd upon the Understanding to consent that it should alter its Judgment unless upon some more weighty Reason succeeding This chiefly appears in that we sometimes remain in suspence pondering in doubt and in uncertainty for this happens only because on both sides there seems to us as it were an equal weight of Truth the equal Balance of th' one Scale hindring the rising or falling of th' other which causeth that the Understanding leans no more to the one side than the other Thus if it seems to bend sometimes more to one side and sometimes to the other this is caused by the greater Attention that it gives sometimes to one weight and sometimes to the other and that the one draws to it as long time as the other appears not the same but this other nevertheless draws in the same manner when it appears more strong just as when we have pois'd a Balance even with equal weights if you now add to one and anon take away from the other some little weights So if the Understanding leans at last more to one side than the other this must needs be because something hath moved it more of that side than of the other or rather because the Attention alone more constant assisted by impatience may have procured a greater weight 'T is true that sometimes the Understanding leaving the Judgment which of it self is the truest or absolutely true embraces that which of it self is not so true but absolutely false yet that which moves the Understanding is always the Appearance of Truth which it considers in every thing and because this Appearance may be either true or false it happens that what is true in it self is capable of being disguised by the Appearance of Falshood or not so true and that which is false of it self may be covered over with an Appearance of Truth or not so false It happens I say that the Understanding may be also carried to Falshood or to that which is not so true whiles the Falshood is veiled over with an Appearance of Truth or of not so false where the Truth is covered over with an Appearance of Falshood or not so true Therefore as often as the Understanding being tied to a true Judgment leaves this Judgment to follow a false one there must have interven'd something which hath taken from the Truth its true and natural Guise and which hath given to the false a counterfeit Lustre which hath caused the alteration in the Judgment And if it be generally so it is certain that this confirms what hath been particularly spoken of the alteration of our Consent or of our Judgments whether in respect of the Good or in respect of the Evil and consequently that the Judgment that we make that a thing is good or better remains in the Understanding as long as the Appearance either true or false which causeth the thing to be reputed so is in being and admitted and that it is altered as soon as this Appearance is changed 'T is Likewise certain that there being a necessity that the Understanding should precede the Will 't is in vain to endeavour that the Will should change its Inclination unless we first endeavour to oblige the Understanding to alter its Judgment as we labour in vain that the Will should continue in its Inclination or Appetition if we take no care that the Understanding should persist in the same Judgment Also 't is for this cause that he who designs to embrace Virtue and prefer it before all other Excellencies ought to take heed that no Deceit creeps in which imposing upon the Understanding may make him imagin there is something more excellent than Virtue And as he shall have esteemed the highest Virtue to consist in causing his Will to be agreeable with the Divine Will he ought to imprint deeply in his Mind that he cannot desire any thing more excellent than what God will have Saying to himself with Epictetus I have brought my Desires in subjection to the Will of God if he will have me Sick I am content if he will have me undertake any Thing I will undertake it freely if he will have me accomplish any Thing I will effect it accordingly wont he have it so neither will I will he have me to Dye I am willing Finally 't is certain that while we live here below we are very Feeble and very Weak and that we cannot promise to our selves a constancy either of Judgment or of Will and of Resolution because of that Indifferency by which the Understanding and the Will may pass from a Thing that is true to another that may appear more true from a Thing that is good to another that may appear better 'T is certain that only in the Life to come this Indifferency shall have an end because in our future State the highest and most perfect Truth and the sovereign Good are easily known without mistake and because nothing truer will offer it self to the Understanding nor nothing better to the Will towards which it might bend 't is impossible but that we must continue fixed most constantly unchangeably most necessarily and most willingly Summa cum libentia And this is what we have undertaken to explain Now that we may not seem to insist too long upon Things supernatural let us return to our Matter in Hand and say again That Liberty or Free-Will is in Man no longer than this Indifferency that we have mentioned continues in him For he is Free or at Liberty First That when Good or Evil be offered to him he may chuse either the Good by that appearance which inclines him or the Evil if it be disguised and covered over with the appearance of Good which seems more inviting and consequently draws and moves him more powerfully than the appearance of real Good Secondly That when two Advantages are offered to him he may follow the greater if its appearance moves him or the less if its appearance be more attractive and tempting than that of the greater Thirdly When he hath two Evils before his Eyes he may avoid the greater being dissuaded from it by its appearance or the lesser if its appearance seems more troublesome and grievous This being supposed this Passage out of Plato makes very much for our purpose That no Person of his own accord is inclined to Evil and that it is not in the power of Man's Nature to be willing to incline towards that which he judges to be Evil and decline that which he judges Good So that if of two Evils it be needful to chuse one there is no Person when he may chuse the least will take the greatest But because what Ovid makes Medea speak seems to be an Objection viz. I see what is better and approve of it yet I embrace what 's worse Video meliora proboque Deteriora sequor For this Reason we must observe the Question that Aristotle makes when he inquires whether it is possible that he who
knows Things well and hath a just estimate for them such as they may deserve cannot forbear Qui fieri possit ut qui de rebus recte aestimat incontinens sitâ— For 't is not without cause that Socrates said That it is not possible that in him who hath Knowledge any other thing should bear sway contrary to that Knowledge and so it is impossible but that he who knows and values Things as he ought should do that which is best to be done because if he acts otherwise this proceeds from Ignorance From whence it seems that that common Saying is taken and used in answer to the Words of Medea viz. Every Man that Sins is Ignorant Omnis peccans est Ignorans To resolve the Doubt and answer the Question Aristotle makes a good distinction For saith he we may know Things either habitually or actually Habitu aut actu For a Man may have a Knowledge that he makes no use of as when his Mind is employed about other Things than what he knows if he be asleep in a Passion or in Drink and he may have such a Knowledge which he exerciseth as when his Mind is busy about what he understands Now if a Man saith he knows a Thing actually and hath his Mind fixed on the Thing he knows and that his Thoughts are not otherwise at that time diverted it is impossible that he should act any thing contrary to his Knowledge and consequently when he percieves the excellency of Virtue for example and the folly of Vice that he should forsake Virtue and follow Vice But if he knows any Thing only habitually or if he makes no use of his Knowledge in such a case he is in the same Condition as if he had no Knowledge at all or were Ignorant of the Thing and then he may do Things contrary to his Knowledge and thus tho he knows habitually how beautiful Virtue is and how abominable and filthy Vice yet that hinders him not from neglecting Virtue and embracing Vice But you may say Doth it not often happen that he who Sins really sees and considers the beauty of that Virtue which he slights and the filthiness of that Vice which he pursues Aristotle answers That such a Man is like one full of Wine who by a certain Custom repeats some Verses out of Empedocles or like Children that read what they understand not or but very little or like Stage-Players that represent Persons unto whom they are not like for in every one that Sins there ariseth a Passion either of Lust or Anger or Ambition or Covetousness that disturbs and disorders the Mind and Knowledge in such a manner that all the good that there is in Virtue and all the evil that is in Vice is obscured and covered over with a kind of Mist so that 't is hid or scarce appears whereas all that is Evil that is to say Painful in Virtue and all that is Good that is to say Grateful in Vice is discovered and appears clear as at noon Day By this means what is good in Virtue works but feebly upon him who is viciously inclined and the evil which is in Vice does but faintly displease him who is virtuous Thus a Man that Sins may very truly say that he perceives and sees the Things that he quits are better and what he chuses are worse for that at another time according to the Habit which makes him remember but confusedly and lightly yet he was sometimes of another Opinion But yet at that very time that he Sins he cannot say so for then he holds for best what he embraces and that for worse which he leaves So that if he should say that he approves then as best the Things that he had formerly approved of he would tell an apparent untruth and would contradict himself for he certainly approves and allows as best the Things that he then pursues And tho he does this not without some kind of remorse and displeasure yet that proceeds doubtless from a Sense of the loss of some advantage thereby or of drawing upon himself some Evil. But that which nevertheless shews that this displeasure is inconsiderable in comparison of the pleasure that prevails upon him is that he does not seriously but only lightly consider the loss of the Good and the purchase of the Evil. This is so much the more easily to be understood if the Punishment the Pain the Shame and the other Evils which he neither sees nor perceives nor fears but only lightly and confusedly were more seriously and plainly considered not as at a distance or absent or to come or doubtful but ready to fall upon his Head present and certain and as if they were immediately to succeed and follow the wicked Action at the Heels he would certainly then forbear and desist from doing it and would not perish in the Vice Again tho he that Sins and chuses the worst should say that he sees and approves the best nevertheless the want of consideration or his inadvertency which hinders him from seeing or considering all the Circumstances that are in the Thing or from seeing them as they ought to be and should be is Ignorance For this Reason he that Sins is said to be Ignorant for he would not Sin if he were not so and acted in that manner We must nevertheless consider that he ought not therefore to think himself excusable when he acts ignorantly because he follows after that which appears to him Good and because 't is not in his Power to hinder it from appearing in that manner to him under a pretence that we are not the causes of the appearance of Things For tho among the common excuses for Sins Men are wont to reckon Ignorance yet that Ignorance is or ought to be a simple absolute and invincible Ignorance such as was for Example that of Cephalus when he kill'd Procris who was lurking among Brambles and Thorns I say when he kill'd Procris whom he took for a wild Beast and could not imagin that it was his dear Wife Whereas that Ignorance that is here pretended proceeds from neglect and a want of due Care and Consideration as Aristotle tells us Per incuriam negligentiamve paritur and for that reason is named a gross and willful Ignorance Affectata supina For he that Sins is ignorant either because he is himself the real cause of his Ignorance or because he never troubles himself nor endeavours to know more that is to say because he does not take sufficient care to consider every thing as he ought A drunken Man saith Aristotle is Ignorant according to the first Case for he himself is the cause of his Ignorance and of his Drunkenness and 't was in his Power not to be Drunk and so not to be Ignorant of what he doth therefore saith he this Ignorance dont excuse him but on the contrary it deserves a double Punishment First Because he made himself Drunk Secondly For Sinning when he was Drunk The
same Thing may be said of him who from the beginning makes no resistance to a light Passion but suffers it to gather Strength so that it prevails more violently And generally so it is of those who suffer things to come to an Habit which at the beginning they might easily have overcome but afterwards 't is beyond their Power to resist ' em 'T is in this Case saith Aristotle as with him who casts a Stone which he cannot recall nor cause to come back but 't was in his Power not to cast it or as with him who living like a Glutton becomes unavoidably sick yet 't was in his Power also to have lived more abstemiously Again a Man who is hurried and transported by his Passions may also say Video meliora proboque because 't is then likewise in his Power to mind the Evils or to consider seriously what and how great Mischiefs will attend which if he did he would not be guilty of 'em I say that it is in his Power for it often happens that when he is just going to commit an Evil and there comes a Person of Wisdom or Note or one of Authority in whose Power it is to revenge and punish this evil Action upon this he presently forbears nay there are some who stop in the midst of their Passion and have so much Power over themselves as not to suffer themselves to be over-come Besides the use of the Laws of Precepts and Exhortations are not in vain We may take heed and if the Mind be attentive it may over-come the appearances of Things and proceed in such a manner that they will appear really such as they ought to appear Truly every time that we may say Video meliora proboque 't is manifest that the Action is not done without Deliberation and that consequently 't is in our Power for we cannot say so when 't is done rashly and unadvisedly as when at the first moving of Anger we are carried away with Revenge from whence proceeds the ordinary Excuse That the first Motions are not in our Power And we cannot say as the Hegesiacks in Laertius That Sins ought to be pardoned because no Man sins but he is forced thereunto by some Passion which disturbs his Mind Neque enim quemquam volentem sed pertubatione aliqua coactum peccare For at least it is certain that till we give an occasion of the Disturbance there is no constraint nor force Nevertheless because there are certain natural Disturbances and certain Desires which proceed from our selves and arise against our Wills Aristotle holds that they are so much the more pardonable because they are commonly incident to all Men And to shew that there are some Passions that are born in us and that we derive from our Ancestors he cites the Example of him that excused himself for beating his Father For my Father saith he beat his before me and his Father beat his and here is my Son will beat me when he comes to be of Age. He alledgeth again the Example of him who being drag'd by his Son commanded him when he was come to the Door to drag him no farther because said he I never drag'd my Father beyond this place But here I find my self obliged to take notice that whatsoever hath been hitherto said concerning the great Inclination of the Will to follow the direction of the Understanding ought to be understood with some Caution and Circumscriptions For tho' it be certain that we never desire what is unknown ignoti nulla cupido and so the Will never acts until the Understanding inclines it before-hand and as we commonly say holds a Torch before it to enlighten it And tho' it is also no less certain that the Will is so depending upon the Understanding in following it that of two unequal Advantages proposed it usually takes the most beneficial yet nevertheless when 't is just ready to act it may notwithstanding this direction and without the intervention of any other leave that which is more and embrace or follow that which is less profitable It seems also that the Will does sometimes exercise this Power for if we will consult our selves we shall find it true that there are some Moments wherein we mind and take notice of the goodness and excellency of Virtue that we discover it plainly and agree that it is to be preferred before the Pleasures and Delights that Vice can afford us So that if we did really drive at our own Interest we should decline Vice and embrace Virtue Do we not experience I say that sometimes notwithstanding we have these Notions and Considerations yet still we cling to Vice and forsake Virtue forego the greater and make choice of the less good In a word we see what is better but take up with what is worse as Medea saith Video meliora proboque deteriora sequor Now this being so it seems we should give more scope to the Power of the Will and that we ought not to suppose it so bound up or enslaved to the directions of the Understanding but that it may forsake them and that if we will save our Liberty without suffering any scruple to remain we ought not to make it so much to consist in the indifferency of the Understanding that limits the Will as in the indifferency of the Will that limits it self So that when all things needful to act are supposed it may either act or not act follow what is good or not follow it embrace that which appears more or less advantageous So that 't is not with the Will as with a Balance or Beam which is forced to lean on that side where there is the greatest weight but like a Balance that determines and inclines it self by its own Strength sometimes on that side where there is the least weight where there is the least reason and least appearance of advantage Let no Man object that a lesser advantage in comparison of a greater is reputed an Evil and as the Will cannot incline to Evil as Evil it cannot by consequence incline to a less advantage For we may absolutely deny that a less advantage is an Evil in comparison of greater for let it be never so little 't is always an advantage Besides we may answer and say That when the Will leaving a greater Good inclines to a less it inclines not to Evil as Evil because it looks not upon it as Evil but truly as Good tho' by chance it may be found to be a less Good certainly if when two advantages are proposed to the Will it hath Power to refuse 'em both it will doubtless have the same Power to take th' one or th' other and consequently to chuse the less However it is certain that tho' we should appeal to the Judgment of Plato and Aristotle which is what our Author seems to have the greatest esteem for so that we should make Liberty to consist in the first place and originally in the indifferency of the
therefore upon occasion of this Doctrin of the Stoicks that Lucian brings in Cyniscus very pleasantly upbraiding Jupiter That he dreads not his Thunder-bolts if the Destinies have not designed that he should perish in that manner seeing that Jupiter himself and the other Gods are bound and subject to Destiny So that both Gods and Men are but the Servants and Ministers of the Parcae or rather meer Tools or Instruments as an Ax or a Sythe insomuch that Jupiter with his great Power was not able to deliver his own Son from Death his beloved Son Sarpedon Tot nati cecidere Deûm quin occidit unà Sarpedon mea Progenies This Doctrin of the Stoicks made Seneca to say That God truly prescribed the Destinies but that he himself is bound to obey them Ille ipse omnium Conditor Rector scripsit quidem fata sed sequitur semper paret semel jussit That we are carried away by the force of Destiny unto which we must willingly yield That nothing is able to prevail upon the inexorable Lachesis or to make her unwind her Spindle That all that the Mortals do or suffer comes from above That all things proceed in a certain setled and appointed Course and that each Day presses on the former Fatis agimur cedite fatis Non sollicitae possunt curae Mutare rati stamina fusi Quidquid patitur mortale genus Quidquid facimus venit ex alto Servatque suae decreta colus Lachesis dura revoluta manu Omnia certo tramite vadunt Primusque dies dedit extremum Manilius speaks almost the same Things and saith plainly That the Destinies govern the World that we Dye as soon as we are Born and that our End takes its date from our first Beginning Fata regunt orbem certa stant omnia lege Largaque per certos signantur tempora cursus Nascentes morimur finisque ab origine pendet Lastly Those Philosophers who hold that Destiny is a thing altogether natural and that it depends not upon any Decree are divided into two Sects The first have supposed a sequel of natural Causes linked and tied together in such a manner that the last always is depending upon the first and so successively each by th' other so that they cannot but do what they do and from hence follows that Necessity which can by no means be avoided and which is altogether agreeable with that which is deduced from the first Opinion or at least differs not much but only in this that in the first Opinion the sequel of Things runs and proceeds from an eternal Decree of God but according to this latter Opinion they run of themselves and of their own accord The others truly suppose a sequel of natural Causes tied and joined together but yet in such a manner that the last Causes depend not in such a manner upon the First or are not moved by them so much but that they may be hindred from doing that which they would otherwise do I say that they may be interrupted either by Things casual or by Things that act freely Among the First are reckoned Heraclitus Empedocles Parmenides Leucippus Democritus and some others but I shall only mention Democritus because he was the most famous of 'em all This Philosopher maintains That Nature cannot act otherwise than it doth because the first Principles or as he calls 'em Atoms from whence all Things have their Beings and are made have a natural and an unalterable Motion by which they must of necessity be carried and moved The compounded Beings that are all made of Atoms cannot but be moved by the same Motions that move the Atoms And from thence he gathers this supposed Necessity by which he will have all Things done and by which the World it self is made in that manner that it now subsists because the Atoms as he saith which casually have here met together have had such and such Motions that they could not gather together in any other manner nor make any other Form or Shape and that when this Form was once laid they cannot but proceed in that Motion that they are in and by these Motions all Things are accomplished So that this Necessity in his Opinion is nothing else but the motion the percussion and repercussion of the Matter that is to say of Atoms out of which all Things are form'd Thus 't is easy to see what he means when he says The necessity by which all Things are made is the Destiny the Justice the Providence and the Contriver of the World c. For he supposeth that the sequel of Things in which the nature of Destiny consists cannot be otherwise than it is and that it depends upon this sequel that such a thing should be or should be thought Just and another Unjust that the World should be governed in the manner that it is and that in the beginning it was so made c. He refers all Things to the natural Motion of Atoms And upon this Supposition he believed First That the Soul it self which he fancies to consist chiefly of globular Atoms and well polished moves several ways of its own accord because of their differing Motions for Example in the Sad and Mournful in one manner in the Cholerick in another and otherwise in those who have a good and mild Temper Secondly That it is diversly moved and carried by the different movement of these Atoms whereof the Images or sensible and intellectual Shapes are joined and intermingled So that it cannot but be attracted if these Shapes be agreeing and cannot but be repelled if they be disagreeing Thirdly That if at some time it is not drawn by some alluring Shape this proceeds from that there are others on the same side more powerful that resist likewise if it be not driven by some that naturally resist 't is because on the same side there arise and move some more powerful that draw at the same moment towards the same Place Fourthly That consequently he cannot but be inclined to Good or to that which intices and flatters and attracts while he perceives it not mingled with any Evil nor cannot but fly from Evil or that which hurts and begets an Aversion while he sees no Good mingled with it Fifthly That of two Advantages proposed he cannot but be carried to the greater because he is drawn to it more powerfully and of two Evils he cannot but fly from the greater because he is the more strongly driven away Lastly That through the Ignorance and Blindness of the Spirit of Man he sees not often all the Evil that is consequent to the Good nor all the Good is consequent to the Evil he is really deceived and often carried to an Object from which it were to be wished that he were diverted and flies from that which is really to be wished that he should follow after but in the mean while Things happening in this manner and not otherwise he cannot but be carried whither he is carried nor cannot
be condemn'd because he laughed at that too great Credulity and Superstition of the Heathens as well in Relation to Divination as in Relation to the Demons but it is to be blamed in that at least he hath not believed in general the being of Spirits seeing that not only Religion but Reason assures us of their Existence as it did really perswade those Philosophers amongst whom Plutarch reckons principally Thales Pythagoras Plato the Stoicks besides Empedocles and some others who affirmed that there were Demons who are living Substances and there are also Heroes who are Souls either Good or Evil freed from their Bodies For tho' they have erred as well in Relation to their Substance as to the Qualities that they attributed to their Demons yet however they judged aright when they believed that there were such But seeing we are to discourse of Divination perhaps it will not be amiss to speak first something of the Demons unto whom it was commonly ascribed Of Demons or Spirits according to the Opinion of Antiquity LET us suppose that they are those unto whom the Holy Writ gives usually the Titles of Angels and sometimes Demons Devils or Satan when it speaks of the Apostate Angels The Heathens call them not only Demons but also Genii tho' amongst them they were reputed to be of a Divine Nature or of a Nature little lower than the Divine They were also named Gods and Demi-Gods and Sons of Gods but yet Bastards as being born of Nymphs c. Not to insist upon the saying of Aristotle that they were separated Substances because not Corporeal and according to his Disciples Intelligences because they have Understandings Intelligences in Latin signifying the same as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Greek if what Lactantius and Macrobius after Plato have taught us is really true This being premised now that we may the better understand what notion Pythagoras Plato and the rest of 'em had of Demons we must call to Mind what hath been said of the Soul of the World For they who have received this Opinion have fancied that these Demons as well as our Souls were nothing else but Particles or small parcels of the Soul of the World And because they believed also that the Soul of the World was the same as God they imagin'd that the Demons were Particles of the Divine Nature and from them seveveral Heretick have taken occasion to discourse of Angels in the same manner in the infancy of the Christian Church for they fancy them to be taken out of the Divine Substance These Philosophers therefore thought the Soul of the World to be like a vast and bottomless Ocean from whence proceeds Angels and the Souls of Men upon Condition to return back again and reunite at last after a time as so many little Streams that run into the Sea Plotinus seems to compare them to the Body of a Tree whereof Demons and Souls were as the Branches the little Twigs the Leaves the Flowers and the Fruits Thus they fancied that in the same manner as the Water that runs through the Earth carries with it something of the Substance of the Minerals through which it passeth so the Particles of the Soul of the World clothed it often with the Substance of the most subtil Bodies unto which they remained chiefly fixed and tied And as they judged that this Soul though it is diffused through all the World it resided nevertheless more particularly in the upper Region and consequently amongst the Stars and chiefly in the Sun So they believed that when the Celestial Bodies spread abroad their Influences to revive and entertain the earthly Beings that they proceed from Heaven as so many Beams from this Soul that revives all things and that they Incorporate or become Bodies in a differing manner in their Passage clothing themselves with a kind of Airy Habit and remaining afterwards some in the Air and the others proceeding as far as the Earth So that they have believed that these kind of Substances which are thus composed of a thin Body such as is the Air and of a Particle of the Soul of the World are the Demons and the Souls Demons when they continue free from any mixture of the grosser Bodies of this Earth I shall not examin their other Fancy That if the thin Body with which the Particles of the Soul of the World is clothed be found to be of a sweet kind and favourable Composure then in their Opinion they happen to be good Demons or Spirits but evil when it is sharp and malicious Neither shall I take notice of their other Imagination That when our Souls are departed out of our Bodies they become again Demons not immediately nor equally because retaining some Relicks of the Human Body they could not be Demons until they were entirely stript but only Heroes or demi-Gods Let these be mention'd only in reference to the Opinion of those who chiefly follow Hesiod who as Plutarch relates hath made mention of four sorts of Beings that are endowed with Reason the Gods the Demons the Heroes and Men I say those who follow Hesiod for Plato Pythagoras and others who believe these last to be the greatest Protectors of Demons have divided Rational Beings into three sorts namely Gods Demons and Men. Moreover we may shew by several Passages that they fancied these Demons to be of a certain middle Nature between the Gods and Men or as they speak upon the Confines of Immortals and Mortals But no Man better explained this Opinion than Apuleius for after that he had said that 't is by their Means and Mediation that there is a Correspondence between the Gods and Men and as the other Regions of the World have their Beings to inhabit and live there so the Superiour Region hath the Stars the Fire the small Animals mentioned by Aristotle the Sea Fish the Earth all our Terrestrial Animals So the Air ought not to be without its Inhabitants which are the Demons In this manner he explains himself The Bodies of the Demons saith he have very little weight which hinder them from ascending to the highest Regions nor are they so light as to fall down to the lowest They are Creatures of a third Nature suitable to the middle Region where they dwell They are between the Gods and Men being immortal as the Gods but subject to Passions as Men for as they are as we subject to Anger and to Mercy and like us suffer themselves to be overcome by Prayers and Intreaties by Gifts and Honours so they are like us stir'd up to Wrath by Injuries and Contempt In a Word saith he Daemones sunt genere animalia ingenio rationabilia animo passiva corpore aeria tempore aeterna Where you may observe what he saith of Eternity cannot agree with the Opinion of others who make them subject to Generation and Corruption unless we understand a long time for Eternity For as these last say Man is said to be Mortal because of the
lest by shunning of these they might fall into greater From hence we may learn that Debauchery is not to be shunn'd for its own sake nor Sobriety to be desired because it declines some Pleasures but because it procureth greater and more substantial ones We shall find the same Arguments for Fortitude for it is neither Labour nor Pain nor Patience nor Constancy nor Industry nor Courage nor Watchfulness that draw us of themselves but we are perswaded by these actions that we may live without Trouble or Fear and that we might free our selves as much as is possible from that which incommodes either the Mind or the Body for oftentimes the Calm of our Life is disturb'd with the extraordinary fear of Death and it is a miserable thing to be oppress'd with Pain and to bear it with a mean and feeble Courage insomuch that by this weakness of Spirit many have lost their Parents many their Friends and many their Native Country nay have altogether lost themselves But a generous stout and couragious Spirit is free from such Cares and Troubles because it despiseth Death and is so provided to receive Grief and Pain that it knows the greatest are cur'd by Death and the least have divers intervals of Rest and that as for moderate Griefs we are Masters of them Besides a noble Spirit considers that if the Pains be not extraordinary they are easily suffered but if they be very grievous we shall then willingly surrender and quit our Life which in such a case becomes unpleasant to us so that we leave it in the same manner as we go off a Theatre From hence we may conclude that Fear and Cowardise are not in themselves blame-worthy neither do Courage and Patience of themselves merit Praise But the first are slighted because they increase Pain and Sorrow and the other are desired because they procure real Pleasure There remains nothing else to be examin'd but Justice of which we may almost say the same For as I have already demonstrated that Wisdom Temperance and Fortitude are so joyned with Pleasure that they cannot be separated from it we ought to say the same of Justice which is not only inoffensive to all Men but does also constantly bring with it such advantages as by the strength of its own nature does quiet and settle the Thoughts by affording continual hopes of never wanting those things which an honest Mind may desire And as Timerousness Covetousness and Cowardise do perpetually torment the Mind and are continually vexing and disturbing its quiet So where Injustice bears sway in the Soul it begets much Trouble and Vexation and if it hath committed any evil action tho' never so secretly yet it can never be assured that it shall always remain undiscover'd Jealousy and fear of being found out do commonly attend evil Actions and we suppose every one to be our Accuser and ready to Inform against us Nay some out of fear of being Discovered have been their own Accusers If some think their Riches a sufficient shelter and capable of quieting their Conscience yet they have such a dread of the Justice of God in punishing their Crimes that upon a due resentment of this their Thoughts labour under a perpetual Agony and Disturbance Now their wicked Actions can never be able so much to lessen the anxiety of their Life as the gripings of a Wounded Conscience or the Laws of the Country and the hatred of their Acquaintance have to increase it Nevertheless such is the unsatiable desire of some Men after Riches Luxury Honour Dominion c. that in the obtaining of them they will stick at no indirect Means so that nothing but a severe Punishment inflicted on them by the Laws is able to stop their Career True Reason therefore directs all Men of sound Judgment to observe the Rules of Justice Equity and Fidelity which are the best means to procure to our selves the good Esteem and Love of others and which is absolutely necessary to render our Lives Pleasant and Sedate And the rather because hereby we have no temptation to do what is ill because that the desires which proceed from Nature may easily be appeased without doing wrong to any Person and as for other vain Desires we are not to regard them for they prompt us to nothing that is really worthy seeking after and Injustice it self brings a greater damage to us than the recompence it can be able to make us by the seeming good things it brings along with it Therefore we cannot say That Justice is of it self desirable but only because it is attended with a great deal of Pleasure and Content for we are not a little pleased with the esteem and good will of others which renders our Life Comfortable and Pleasant Thus we don't believe that we ought to shun Vice only because of the inconveniencies that fall upon the Wicked but chiefly because it never suffers the Mind to be at rest where it hath once taken possession I might here mention the Objections that are brought against this Opinion but they relate to nothing but sensual and dishonest Pleasures which Epicurus abhors in express words I will only take notice that the Pleasure that is here understood is such true real and natural Pleasure in which our Happiness consists We therefore say That Vertue is inseparably accompanied with it being the real and genuine cause of it for where that is supposed Happiness immediately attends and when that is removed Pleasure it self must needs decay In the same manner as the Sun is said to be inseparable from the Day because it alone is the true and necessary cause thereof for as soon as the Sun appears over our Horizon the Day must needs be and when it withdraws the Day dis-appears Now the reason why Epicurus supposes Vertue to be the efficient cause of Happiness is because he thinks that Prudence doth as it were contain all other Vertues for all the rest proceed from this and have in a great measure a dependence upon her CHAP. III. Wherein an Happy Life doth consist WHat we have already discours'd of tends to little else than to make a plain discovery of Epicurus's Opinion But now we must come closer to the Matter and strictly examin whether he had sufficient ground to say That Pleasure is the main End Here we must weigh two of his chief Maxims First That all Pleasure is of it self and of its own nature a real Good and on the contrary That all Grief and Pain is an Evil. The Second is That notwithstanding sometimes we must prefer some sort of Pains before some sort of Pleasures Whether all Pleasure be good of it self IN respect of the first Maxim It is not without ground that Epicurus asserts That all Pleasure is of it self good tho' by accident it happens sometimes otherwise for all Creatures are of themselves so inclinable to Pleasure and Delight that it is the first and chief thing that they naturally covet nor
with Constancy and Patience Such a one I say thus resolved and prepared if he be ingaged in a busy Life may govern himself that in the midst of the hurry and incumbrance of Affairs he may maintain in himself an inward repose and calmness of Mind 'T is what Claudian so truly relates of Theodosius the Great and which we without Flattery may duly apply to our present Monarch the true Model of a wise Prince Nec Te tot limina rerum Aut tantum turbavit onus sed ut altus Olympi Vertex qui spatio Ventos Hyemesque relinquit Perpetuum nulla temeratus Nube serenum Celsior exsurgit pluviis auditque ruentes Sub pedibus nimbos rauca tonitrua calcat Sic patiens Animus per tanta negotia liber Emergit similisque sui c. Neither the projecting Thoughts of deep Designs nor the heavy Burthen of the Kingdom which he supports can disturb the Peace of his Mind but like the high top of Mount Olympus his Soul is always clear and serene hovering above the misty Clouds and storms of Thunder and always free and undisturb'd like it self Servat inoffensam Divina modestia vocem Temperiem servant oculi nec lumina fervor Asperat aut rabidas diffundit sanguine venas Quinetiam sontes expulsa corrigis ira Et placidus delicta domas nec dentibus unquam Instrepis horrendum fremitu nec verbera poscis A divine Modesty graces his Voice no offensive Words drop from his Lips his Eyes are never seen to sparkle with Anger nor his Veins distended with boyling Blood he knows how to Reprove without being Transported and calmly to correct the Failings of others Nile softly glides along without vaunting of its Strength or breaking its Bounds and yet it is one of the most useful of all the Rivers of the World The Danube which is yet larger and more rapid keeps within its Banks moving without Noise Yea the Ganges that vast River passes along silently rowling its Waves into the Depths of the Ocean Lente fluit Nilus sed cunctis Amnibus extat Vtilior nullas confessus murmure vires Acrior at rapidus tacitas praetermeat ingens Danubius ripas Eadem clementia saevi Gurgitis immensum deducit ad ostia Gangen Let the Torrents roar among the Rocks let them threaten and overturn Bridges and pursuing their Rage let them overwhelm or carry before 'em whole Forests 't is Peace and Tranquility that have a commanding Power and Effect far greater than Violence and Fury to force Obedience Torrentes immane fremant lapsisque minentur Pontibus involvant spumoso vortice Sylvas Pax majora decet peragit tranquilla potestas Quod violenta nequit mandataque fortius urget Imperiosa quies Besides when things are over and accomplish'd a wise Man doth not Vaunt and Applaud himself if they succeed well nor is he disturb'd or dejected if they happen amiss He doth not repent of the Measures he hath taken because every thing being well examined and duly considered it was most probable they should succeed and therefore he would take the same Course if the same Circumstances did again occur The Answer of Photion is remarkable who when he had dissuaded them from a War which nevertheless afterward proved very successful Tho' I am very glad said he that the Event happen'd so Prosperous yet I don 't at all repent of the Advice I have given It comes very near that of Cicero's It becomes a wise Man saith he to do nothing against his Will or what may cause him to Repent to do all things sedately and deliberately with a grave Steddiness and constancy of Mind neither supposing things to happen by an unforeseen Necessity nor to admire any thing as new and unexpected but to abide firm and stedfast in his Judgment A wise Man ought not to despise the Advices of other Men and to trust too rashly to his own Opinion but having well weighed Matters he ought not out of too mean Apprehensions or Diffidence of himself to suffer the Opinion of the Vulgar to sway with him For this Reason that Roman Temporizer deserves to be applauded who preferr'd the Safety of his Country before the Exclamations of the Populace Photion was of the same Temper who because he could not be prevail'd upon to rely on the Strength of his Soldiers and their Courage and head them on to Battle they accused him of Cowardise But he made them this prudent Answer My brave Companions you cannot make me Courageous and I will not make you Cowards it is sufficient that every one should understand his own Business Whether a Contemplative Happiness is to be preferr'd before an Active BUt after all that can be said in Commendation of an Active Felicity Aristotle had Reason to prefer a Speculative For Contemplation exerts the most Excellent and Divine Part of our Selves and besides this sort of Action is the most noble innocent and lasting and the most easily set on Work We shall not here repeat what hath been before said upon the first Part of Vertue to shew wherein the Happiness of a wise Man consists or the Satisfaction he receives in a Contemplative Life it will be sufficient to recite what Cicero very learnedly observes What Pleasures saith he don't a thinking Mind enjoy who is employ'd Night and Day in Contemplation and Study What extraordinary Delight is it to observe the Motions and Circumference of the World the infinite number of Stars that shine in the Heavens those seven Planets which being more or less distant the one from the other according as they are higher or lower wandering and uncertain in their Motions and yet never fail to fulfill their Course in their appointed time The Sight and Consideration of so many excellent Things persuaded the antient Philosophers to proceed to new Inquiries to examine into the cause and beginning of the World from whence all things proceed from whence they are engender'd what differing Qualities are crept into their Composition from whence Life and Death happen how the Alterations and Changes of one thing into another came to pass by what weight the Earth is supported and how ballanc'd into what Concavities the Waters are confin'd and how every thing press'd by its own weight naturally tends to its own Center Thus by discerning and continually meditating on these wonderful Things we at last arrive to that Knowledge which God heretofore recommended to Delphos namely That the pure Soul having shaken off all Vice should know it self and find it self united to the Divine Understanding or Being This procures it an everlasting and unspeakable Delight for the Contemplations upon the Power and Nature of the Gods cause it to have a strong Inclination for Eternity and when it once perceives the necessary Consequence of Causes guided and govern'd by an eternal Wisdom it believes not it self confin'd to the narrow Limits of this Life Therefore it considers human Affairs with a wonderful Tranquility it inclines to the