Species or Images taken from the externe objects but in the glasse of his own Essence not successively and by discourse but intuitively not in time but his own Eternitie Al this wil be evident by what follows First Gods Intellect and its Perfection as for the Intellect of God and its infinite Perfection above al Human or Angelic Intellect we find great notices thereof both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie We find the perfection of the Divine Intellect lively described Psal 139 1-16 which we shal more fully explicate when we come to Gods knowlege of the heart Mic. 6.9 So Micah 6.9 The Lords voice crieth unto the citie and the man of wisdome shal see thy name The last clause is rendred according to the Hebrew by Tarnovius and others For thy name shal see that which is i. e. thy most sacred Majestie and Essence sees althings as they are So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be rendred Plato describes the Perfection of the Divine Intellect in his Parmenides pag. 134. where he assures us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. With God there is the highest and most exquisite Domination and the highest and most exquisite Science for otherwise he could not know human affaires Then he concludes Were it not an insolent and importune discourse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if any one should spoil God of his knowlege The Perfection of Gods Intellect beyond al Human and Angelic Intellect wil appear by a view of its nature object and mode of apprehending The Intellect of God as to its nature has one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence neither is it invested with any abstract Species Formes or Ideas of things either habitual or actual distinct from the Essence of God It 's true mans Intellect is not as I conceive distinct from his human Soul yet it cannot understand any object but by species or ideas actual and habitual distinct from its Essence Mans Intellect as to the Act of Intellection is passive receiving the intelligible species from its object which imperfect mode of Intellection appertains not to God who sees althings in the glasse of his own Essence as anon Gods infinite Science admits not any intelligible species whereby the object is united to the facultie in us such intelligible species belong only to Human and Angelic Intellects which receive impression and causalitie from their objects But the Intellect of God receives no impression or causalitie from its objects it being the cause of althings In human knowlege the thing understood is the measure of our understanding but the divine knowlege is the measure of althings known Again the Divine Intellect understandes things complexe incomplexely but the human Intellect understandes things most simple and incomplexe complexely But of these things more in what follows As for the object of the Divine Knowlege it is most universal The Object of Gods Knowlege 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 althings intelligible But more particularly the object of Divine Science is either primary or secundary The primary object of Divine Science is God himself the Divine Essence Persons 1. God himself 1 Cor. 2.11 and Relations 1 Cor. 2.11 That God is the prime Intelligible is evident because he is the prime immaterial Being For althings are so far intelligible as they are immaterial therefore God being the first immaterial and most simple Being he must necessarily be the first Intelligible And if God be the first Intelligible then there must be an Intellect and Science proportionate to him which can be no other than himself who is both Intelligible Intellect Intellection and intelligible Species Again God being a pure Act of supreme Immaterialitie he cannot but understand himself by himself For God having nothing of potentialitie it is absolutely necessary that the Intellect and intelligible species be in him the same whence he cannot but understand himself by himself For in Creatures the thing understood being brought into the Intellect by its intelligible species or idea hence the perfection of Intellection dependes on these two particulars 1 That the intelligible Species or Idea be perfectly conforme to the thing understood 2 That it be perfectly united to the Intellect which is by so much the more perfectly accomplisht by how much the more efficace the Intellect has in understanding But now the Divine Essence being both Intellect and intelligible Species it cannot but understand it self and althings else in the most perfect manner Hence it is that God perfectly understandes himself so far as he is intelligible he also knows himself to be of infinite Power to have a Wil soverain omnipotent and universally efficacious Whence he knows althings else in himself his infinite Essence and omnipotent Wil. The secundary Object of the Divine Science is althings else besides God 2. God knows althings Althings possible and future complexe and incomplexe althings past and present universal and singular necessary and contingent good and evil with al the Modes Orders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relations which things have among themselves That Gods Science is really omniscient or universally yea infinitely extensive to al objects intelligible is positively affirmed both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie As for sacred Philosophie we find therein illustrious notices of Gods Omniscience as Psal 139 1-16 Heb. 4.13 But to give a more particular demonstration of Gods knowing althings we may argue it 1 from the infinite power of God thus Gods knowlege is as extensive as his power but his power extendes to althings therefore his knowlege Thus Job 42.2 Job 42.2 I know thou canst do every thing and that no thought can be withholden from thee Or as some render the last clause no thought of thine can be hindred Which-ever way we read the words the sense wil be much the same namely that Gods Omnipotence is the ground and argument of his Omniscience He that can do althings Psal 147.5 cannot but understand althings that he can do The same Argument is insisted on Psal 147.5 Great is our Lord and of great power his understanding is infinite The later is a consequent of the former The Power of God being infinite therefore his Understanding is infinite Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of his understanding there is no number This may be understood both extensively and intensively his Understanding is most perfect in it self and most extensive as to al objects 2 The Omniscience of God may be demonstrated from his Immensitie and Omnipresence Gods Science must necessarily extend so far as his Essence Jer. 23.23 24. because his Knowlege is his Essence Thus Jer. 23.23 24. Am I a God at hand saith the Lord and not a God afar off Can any hide himself in secret places that I shal not see him saith the Lord Do not I not fil Heaven and Earth saith the Lord Wherein God demonstrates his Omniscience from his Omnipresence So Heb. 4.13 Heb. 4.13 Neither is there any creature that
which it appears that the proper office of this Syneidesis is self-reflexion whence follows accusation or excusation c. as Rom. 2.15 And because this reflexive Light of Conscience does necessarily suppose inward sense hence 't is oft called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sensation also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Synesis or sensate judgment So Aquinas Synesis or sensate judgment imports a right judgment about particular operables So Plato in his Theaet makes al true Science to be a kind of Sensation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Science is nothing else but Sensation And more particularly in his Timaeus pag. 103. he cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prudence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good Sensation which exactly answers to the Scripture Phraseologie which sets forth this reflexive act of Conscience by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Phil. 1.9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and thence Heb. 5.14 we read of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Phil. 1.9 c. The life of the new Creature as wel as of the old consistes in these self-reflexive Acts of Conscience which spring from inward sense and feeling And Plato in his Alcibiad pag. 133 134. tels us That he that reflectes upon himself his own Soul and Wisdome thereby becomes as it were omniscient whereas they who know not themselves know not what is good or evil for them nor yet what belongs to themselves or to other men such therefore can never make good Politicians or Occonomists c. In brief Self-reflexions or our actions upon our selves are of al the highest and noblest and those by which we live and worke as men and perfect that part of the Soul called Conscience which directs al we do according to right Reason c. 3. As for the Measure or Rule of Moral Prudence 3. The Rule of Prudence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Right Reason we find it expressed in the fore-mentioned Platonic Definition under this notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to right Reason This Platonic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is asserted in like manner by the Stoics and others right Reason is the same with the Light or Law of Nature which is twofold 1 Subjective 2 Objective 1. As for Subjective Right Reason Light or Law of Nature Right Reason is 1. Subjective it is no other than those commun Principes of Moralitie seated in that part of Conscience which they cal Synteresis of which in the foregoing § 6. This Seminarie of engrafted active Notions or moral Principes is stiled by the Stoics 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Commun Law also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason against which say they nothing is to be done as Diog. Laert. in Zeno. 'T is termed by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of Being So Minos pag. 315. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where saies Serranus by this appellation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Plato understands the Eternal Law of Nature which amidst the various Laws of Nations and their vicissitudes continues uniforme and the same and thence is truly termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being therefore he cals it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the right Reason of the Eternal Law and because our actions are to be measured by the Rule of these commun Notions therefore Plato names this Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law So again Serranus in Plato de Legib. 8. The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Delineation of this Eternal Law is this There is in the minds of al as soon as they are borne a certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sacred Law He that consecrates this Law in his mind as a certain sacred is thereby furnished with an excellent remedie against the insolence and impotence of human lusts as it was said of the Tyrant 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These active Principes conteined in this interne Law of Conscience are generally stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 commun Notions they were named by Zeno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Comprehensions because they comprehended the first seeds or principes of knowlege Cicero tels us that Epicurus called them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipations as he translates the word because they supposed a Previous formation of things in the Soul The Stoics used the same terme likewise Chrysippus defined this natural Law or Conservatorie of commun Principes a natural Intelligence of those things which universally are Cicero stiles these commun Notions Inchoate Intelligences of which see Lud. Vives in August Civ lib. 8. cap. 7. The Scripture also stiles these commun Principes fixed in Conscience a Law so Rom. 2.14 15. where the Gentiles are said to be a Law to themselves c. And indeed these commun seeds of natural light are a private Law which God has deeply engraven on mens Consciences and is universally extensive unto al though with a latitude of degrees it being in some more in some lesse but in al in great measure obliterated and defaced since the Fal. It is also by Divines generally termed the Light or Law of Nature because it flows in and with and from human Nature either immediately or mediately 2. As for the Objective 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. The Objective 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Law of Nature Right Reason which Plato seems to have had some traditional notices of it contains those broken Traditions of the Moral Law which were scattered up and down among the Gentiles That Plato had received some fragments of Gods Law and that by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Right Reason he does import the same seems very probable both from that expression in his Minos pag. 315. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Law of Being i. e. of the first Being as he usually stiles God as also from that other expression of his Minos pag. 317. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This right Reason is the Royal Law i. e. Gods Divine Law which is so stiled Jam. 2.8 In this sense right Reason may be said as the Scholes wil have it to give 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse morale or Moralitie to human Acts so Stobaeus de Virtut Ser. 1. fo 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is a conformitie according to right Reason and Sin is a transgression against right Reason Where by right Reason we must understand not the subjective Light or Law of Conscience which is imperfect but the objective Light of Nature comprised in the Moral Law In this sense we must understand that Principe in the Scholes That right Reason gives the esse morale to moral Beings Thus much for the Platonic Definition of Moral Philosophie § 2. Next to the generic Notion of Moral Philosophie The last End its Influence in Morals the first thing that comes under consideration is the last End which is first in intention though last in execution Yea indeed the last End is the first Principe of moral Prudence For what is Prudence but the right disposition and ordination of al means and actions And
〈◊〉 here doth not signifie the mere having of a Talent but the employing using or occupying the same for it is a good Rule among Grammarians That Verbes which primarily signifie to have or possesse oft denote the using of what we have So here Hath notes to use occupie or traffic with what we have To such it shal be given and he shal have more abundance i. e. God wil reward his diligence in using and occupying his Talent be it natural or supernatural with much more in the same kind If his Talent be natural gifts or commun illuminations he shal receive more in that kind if true moral supernatural Virtues his stock shal encrease in its kind Whence it follows But whosoever hath not i. e. employes not by exercice from him shal be taken away even that he hath i. e. his Talent shal be taken from him his commun gifts and seeming virtues shal wither Yea virtuose exercices in the sharpest winter of affliction make Virtue to flourish and prosper Heb. 12.11 12. Thus Heb. 12.11 Every chastisement for the present seems not to be joyous but grievous but afterward it yields the tranquille fruit of righteousnesse to them that are exercised thereby 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 exercised as in the Gymnade whence it follows v. 12. Wherefore lift up the hands that hang down 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies such a remission or dissolution as is opposed to intension firmitude strength It here denotes sloth and remisnesse as to labor whereof the hand is the instrument Thence he addes and the feeble knees 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the paralytic knees such as are as it were struck with a Palsie and therefore unapt for motion This later clause seems to refer to the Race which required the exercice of the knees as labor that of the hands 8. Formal Beatitude in virtuose Exercices A great and main part of moral Libertie consistes in virtuose exercices because herein consistes formal Beatitude Both Plato and Aristotle place formal Beatitude in virtuose operations Thus Plato in his Conviv pag. 211. makes the perfection of human Felicitie to consiste in contemplating 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. the most sincere uniforme divine Beautie c. of which before Chap. 1. The like in his Phaedrus pag. 250. So Aristotle Eth. l. 1. c. 7. defines formal Beatitude the exercice of the rational Soul according to the best and most perfect Virtue in the most perfect life And Cap. 8. he addes That to act wel and live wel makes man happy And the demonstration hereof is most evident For 1 Operation and exercice is the end of al virtuose Habits and Principes and therefore their perfection for every Forme Power or Habit is ordained to its act as to its perfection Whence Basil termes Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 completive or perfective of Nature Which chiefly belongs to gratiose Acts. Thence Aristotle strongly argues that formal Beatitude cannot consiste 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in possession of objective Beatitude and habitual union therewith but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in use and exercice For a man may possesse the chiefest good and have habitual likenesse thereto and yet not formally happy as virtuose men asleep 2 The more Virtue is in exercice the more it ressembles the Divine Libertie and Perfection The Divine Being and Libertie is a pure simple Act without the least habit or passive power either physic or metaphysic and therefore the more actuose Virtue is the more like it is to God 3 Virtuose exercices bring most satisfaction with them Both Plato and Aristotle instruct us That virtuose Acts are of themselves 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-sufficient They inspire sweet satisfaction into the Soul as before Chap. 1. § 6. And this is very commun in sacred Philosophie Yea we are herein assured that by virtuose exercices we may have some prelibations of formal Beatitude even in this life This seems the import of that Exhortation 1 Tim. 6.12 1 Tim. 6.12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exercise thy self in that famose contest of Faith Our Apostle alludes to those famose Olympian Games specially that of the Race wherein they contended for a Crown Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lay hold of eternal life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here as v. 19. is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Cor. 9.24 Phil. 3.12 in which places the Apostle seems to allude to such as ran in the Race who when they came to the end thereof laid hold on the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Crown on the top of the Goal Thus Christians by virtuose exercices lay hold on eternal life as the Crown at the end of their Race Thus he speaks of himself 2 Tim. 4.7 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Tim. 4.7 8. I have exercised my self in that famose contest The double Article addes a great Emphase and shews with what vigor and activitie he had dispatcht his Christian race and therefore now was in expectation of the Crown Such efficacious and soverain influence have virtuose exercices on mans formal Beatitude and moral Libertie CHAP. IV. Of Sin and moral Servitude Sin a Transgression of the Law Sin as to its formal reason privative The causes of Sin 1 Mans defectibilitie 2 The Vitiositie of human Nature 3 Practic Error 4 Self-love Sins are either of Ignorance of Passion or wilful The moral Servitude of Sin as 1 Repugnant to human Nature 2 Repugnant each to other 3 The Disease of the Soul 4 Defilement 5 Shame and Reproche 6 Tyrannie 7 Penurie 8 Captivitie 9 Folie and Madnesse 10 It makes men Brutes The Adjuncts of this Servitude It is 1 Voluntary 2 Necessary 3 Infinite 4 Most penal Sin the worst punishment Other punishments of Sin It brings 1 Fear and shame 2 Instabilitie 3 Anxietie 4 Eternal punishment Al naturally Slaves of Sin No seeds of Virtue in corrupt Nature Natural impotence to what is good No moral Free wil. A sum of the Pelagian Historie § 1. HAving examined the nature of moral Good Virtue and Libertie we now passe on to the discussion of moral Evil and that Servitude which attends it It 's a good Notion of Aristotle Rhet. l. 3. c. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Parallel opposites illustrate each other So in his Ethics l. 5. c. 1. a. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the most part therefore the contrary habit is known by its contrary Which holds true here in as much as the beautiful Idea of moral Good serves greatly to illustrate the deformitie of moral Evil. Sin a Transgression of the moral Law Doth al moral Good consiste in conformitie to the moral divine Law What then is moral evil or sin but a Transgression of the Law as 1 Joh. 3.4 That al moral Evil or Sin is a Transgression of the Law is an Hypothesis frequently inculcated as wel in Platonic as in sacred Philosophie Thence Definit Platon pag. 416. 〈◊〉
is not manifest in his sight because he is present with al. Suppose there were a bodie as they fancied Argus ful of eyes or al eye would it not discerne althings round about it without the least turne or mutation of its posture So God being ful of eyes or al eye and present with al Beings is it possible that any thing should be hid from him Hence Plato held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 althings are ful of God and therefore nothing could he hid from him 3 Gods Omniscience may be argued from the Divine Ideas or Decrees Althings were the object of Gods knowlege before they were in being by reason of his Divine Ideas which were the original Exemplar of althings This Plato much insistes on both in his Timaeus and Parmenides as hereafter 4 Gods Omniscience may be demonstrated from his universal Causalitie in giving Being unto althings So Act. 15.18 Act. 15.18 Known unto God are al his workes from the beginning of the world 5 Gods Omniscience may be argued from his preservation of and providence over althings Plato Leg. 10. pag. 901 c. proves That Gods Providence extendes to the vilest and least of things whereof he has an accurate knowlege being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most wise Opificer and Framer of althings For every intelligent Worke-man must have a ful knowlege of his own worke in as much as the idea or knowlege of the Worke-man gives forme to the worke whence God being the most intelligent Framer and Disposer of althings he cannot but have an accurate knowlege of al. But to descend to the particular objects of Gods Science The Object of Gods Omniscience we may distribute althings intelligible into complexe or incomplexe Complexe Intelligibles are propositions and discourses Incomplexe 1. Complexe Intelligibles real things 1. The Divine Science has a ful comprehension of al complexe Intelligibles or propositions and discourses both divine and human mental oral and scriptural Complexe Intelligibles are either antecedent to the Wil of God or subsequent 1 Complexe Intelligibles antecedent to the Wil of God are such as belong to the Divine Essence as that there is a God That God is eternal immutable c. These God knows by his Essence alone and not by his Wil because antecedent thereto Complexe Intelligibles subsequent to the Divine Wil are al such whose truth is caused by and so dependes on the Divine Wil. These God knows not by his Essence simply considered nor by the things themselves concerning which they are affirmed or denied but by his own Wil. For as Gods Wil gives Being to althings so al propositions that belong to them depend on and are known by the same Divine Wil. In which regard that commun Saying The Reasons of good and evil are eternal if understood as antecedent to the Divine Wil it is most false For there is no natural or moral Veritie belonging to any created object or terme that can be said to be antecedent to the Divine Wil. That al complexe Intelligibles or Propositions subsequent to the Divine Wil are known thereby see Bradwardine de Caus l. 1. c. 18. pag. 200. and Greg. Ariminensis Sent. l. 1. Dist 38. Quaest 2. pag. 135. 2. 2. Incomplexe Intelligibles Create incomplexe Intelligibles are either things possible or future 1 Things merely possible to God are known in his Divine Essence 2 Things future in his Wil which gives futurition to althings Things future as to us are distinguished into necessary and contingent but things contingent as to us are necessary in regard of the Divine Wil and therefore necessarily known by God That things most contingent are necessary in regard of Gods Wil and so certainly known by him is most evident because they are al present to God For what makes a thing contingent uncertain as to us but because it is future When it is present it is certainly known what it is wherefore althings being present to God by reason of his Divine Wil which gives suturition to althings therefore they must be al even things most contingent as to us certainly known by him Even among men those that understand the causes of things and their certain coherence with the effects may have a certain knowlege of an effect long before it is in being so an Astrologer foresees an Eclipse and shal not the omniscient God who gives Being to al Causes and actuates them in al their causalities and causal influxes be allowed a perfect knowlege of al effects Thus Homer Iliad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Who knows things present to come and past There is nothing so vile so inconsiderable but it fals under the omniscient eye of God Prov. 15.3 as Prov. 15.3 The eyes of God are in every place beholding the evil and the good God knows whatever is good by his Divine Wil the productive Cause thereof and whatever is evil by its opposite good as also by the positive Entitie or Act wherein the evil is seated which also fals under the determination of the Divine Wil so far as it is a real positive Being For he that perfectly knows a thing must needs know al the accidents modes and appendents thereof now al Evil being but a privation of what is good it cannot be hid from the divine Omniscience otherwise he should not perfectly know the good whereof it is a privation Again Evil being but a privation cannot exist but in some positive subject neither can it be known but by the forme whereof it is a privation which being known to God thence the evil also must necessarily be known to him The principal object among incomplexe simple Intelligibles is the heart of man if this be known by God Gods Omniscience as to the human Soul then surely nothing can be hid Now that the human Soul and al its Principes Habits Cogitations Inclinations Ends Designes and Acts are al known to God is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophie As for sacred Philosophie it is in nothing more positive and expresse To begin with that great series of Demonstrations Psal 139.1 c. O Lord thou hast searched me and known me Psal 139.1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thou hast searched me narrowly sifted me to the bran thou so knowest me and al that is in me as he who knoweth a thing exactly after the most diligent and accurate inquisition So much 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 importes v. 2. Thou knowest my down-sitting and uprising v. 2. thou understandest my thoughts afar off The sense is there is no part of my life hid from thee whether I sit or rise thou knowest it al mine actions and enterprises are known by thee as 2 Kings 19.27 al my thoughts are present to thee long before they are existent Lyra interprets afar off of Eternitie my thoughts were in thy Eternitie apprehended by thee before they were mine Thence it follows v. 3. Thou compassest my path v. 3. and my lying down and
Inclination to Sociatle Ib. Consociation constitutes a Politic Bodie or Societie 163 Al Consociation by some Law 164 Perfect Politie requires Amitie and Fraternitie 165. Religion the Principal Ligament of Politic Societie 166. The Ends of Politie 1 Gods Glorie 169 2 To render men Virtuose 170. 3 The Good of the whole 171. 4 Mutual Assistences 172. A Politic Bodie or Citie what Ib. Legislation its Origine 176. The Necessitie of Laws 177. Al Laws Originally from God 178. The Qualification of human Legislators 179. Al Laws from the Multitude Ib. Al Laws for public Good 181. Virtue a principal End of Laws 182. The Qualities of good Laws 183. The Law of Equitie its use 184. Conservators of Laws 185. A Law its Equitie and Constitution 186. Three kinds of Politic Administration Monarchie Aristocratie Democratie 187. Monarchie mixed with Democratie 190. Mixed Politie its use Ib. Moderate Empire best 191. Tyrannie Empire its Origine c. 192. The Evils of Tyrannie 193. Civil Magistrates 1. Their End 194. 2. Their Qualifications 1 Wisdome both Natural and Acquired 195. Knowlege of human Laws and Factes 196. Knowlege of Divine Laws 197. 2 Virtue both Natural and Moral 198. 3 A Public Spirit free from Self-interest Ib. A Magistrates Diet and Richesses 199. 4 His Education and Examen Ib. Scriptural Qualifications 200. A Magistrates Facultie and Authoritie Ib. 1 Divine 2 Human. 201. Magistrates Conservators of Laws 202. The Magistrates Exerclce of his Office 1 With Justice without Briberie 204. 2 With Temperance 205. 3 Moderation 4 Clemence 5 Fidelitie 206. The Effects of Polities Good and Bad 207. Things destructive to Republies 1 Atheisme Ib. 2 Lururie and Idlenesse 208. 3 Prosperitie and Povertie Ib. 4 Divisions 5 Injustice 209. BOOK II. Of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophie c. CHAP. I. Of Metaphysic in General ARistotle's Metaphysics 210. Metaphysic Sapience what 211. Metaphysic a Natural Sapience 212. Contemplation its proper Act. 213. Contemplation of God best 214. CHAP. II. Of Atheisme and the Existence of a Deitie THe Origine of Atheisme 215. Atheisme 1 From Polytheisme 216. 2 From Vain Philosophie and Policie 217. 3 From Mans Carnal Mind and Pride 218. Three sorts of Atheisme 220. The Monstrose Nature and Pestiferous Influences of Atheisme 221. The Punishment of Atheisme 222. The Existence of God demonstrated 1 From Vniversal consent 223. 2 From the Subordination of second Causes to a First 224. The World made by a Prime Cause 225. 3 From a Prime Motor 228. 4 From the Order of the Vniverse 230. 5 From the Connate Idea of God in the Soul 231. 6 From Practic Arguments 232. 1 From Conscience its Notions and Exercices 233. 2 From the sense of Religion 234. 3 From the Politic World 235. 4 From the Atheistes Cavils and Enmitie 236. CHAP. III. Of God his Names Nature Attributes Unitie and Simplicitie GODs Name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being 237. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah 239. Jehovah the proper Name of God 240. The explication of Jehovah and Jah 241. Ehjeh Elohim El Shaddai Adonai 242. Elion Zebaoth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 243. The Divine Essence and Attributes Ib. God not Capable of a Definition 244. Gods Essence Absolute and Independent 245. 1. The Divine Unitie demonstrated 249. 2. The Simplicitie of God Explicated 251. The Simplicitie of God demonstrated 254. CHAP. IV. Of Gods Immutabilitie Infinitude Eternitie Immensitie and Incomprehensibilitie 3. THe Immutabilitie of God 257. God Immutable 1 In his Essence 259. 2 In his Immanent Acts. 260. 3 In regard of his Word 263. Gods Immutabilitie demonstrated Ib. 4. Gods Infinitude demonstrated 266. 1 By his Independence 267. 2 From his Vnitie and Simplicitie 268. 3 From his Transcendence 269. 4 From the Idea of Perfection 271. 5 From the infinite Bonitie and Beatitude of God 273. 6 From Gods Infinite Power 274. 5. Gods Eternitie explicated 1 By Scripture 275. 2 By Plato's Philosophemes 276. The Eternitie of God demonstrated 277. What Eternitie is 279. 1 Eternitie not mesurable by time Ib. 2 Eternitie without beginning or end 281. 3 Eternitie most Simple and Vniforme 282. 4 How Eternitie coexistes to the parts of Time 283. 5 Eternitie a fixed Instant 284. 6 Eternitie the same with the Divine Essence 286. 6. Gods Immensitie and Omnipresence 288. The Explication and Demonstration thereof 1 From the Infinitude of the Divine Essence 290. 2 From Gods Simplicitie Ib. 3 From his Infinite Power and Operations 291. 7. Gods Incomprehensibilitie 292. It s Demonstration by 6 Arguments 294. How far we may apprehend God 296. Against Poetic figments of God Ib. Against Curiositie in our Inquiries after God 297. The least Notices of God of great moment 299. Al Notices of God by Divine Revelation Ib. The Grades or Ascents of Knowing God 1 Natural 300. 1 By way of Causalite 301. 2 By way of Eminence 302. 3 By way of Rematiom 303. 2 Supernatural 1 By Christ Ib. 2 By the Scriptures c. 304. CHAP. V. Of Gods Life Knowlege Wil and Power THe Life of God 305. Life in its generie Notion 306. The Life of God 1 most Spirituose 307. 2 Most Actuose 308. 3 Most Self-moving 309. 4 Life it self 310. 5 Eternal Life 311. 6 The first cause of Life Ib. Gods Science and 〈◊〉 most Perfect 312. The Object of Gods knowlege 313. 1 The Divine Essence Ib. 2 Althings cognoscible 114. The Object of Gods Owniscience 1 Complexe Intelligibles 315. 2 Incomplexe Intelligibles 316. 3 The Human soul 317. God knows althings by his Essence 318. How the Divine Ideas represent althings 321. Gods Science 1 most Simple 322. 2 Intuitive not discursive 323. 3 Immutable and Necessary 325. 4 Most Certain 327. 5 Absolute and Independent Ib. 6 Eternal 329. 7 Infinitely perfect Essentially Intensively Extensively 330. Gods Simple Intelligence 331. Gods Science of Vision 332. God knows things future by his Wil. Ib. Against Scientia Media 334. The Wil of God 336. 1 The Object of the Divine Wil. 337. 2 The Divine Wil one pure Act. 338. 3 The Divine Wil Independent 339. God Independent Physically and Morally 340. 4 The Divine Wil Immutable 343. 5 Gods Wil Absolute not Conditionate 344. 6 Gods Wil Antecedent not Consequent 347. 7 The Divine Wil most perfect 348. 1 Intensively 2 Extensively 349. 3 Effectively 350. 8 The Divine Wil most Free 351. What Indifference may be ascribed to the Wil of God 352. 9 Gods Wil Irresistible 353. Gods Wil distributed 1 Into Decretive or Preceptive 355. 2 Into Secret or Reveled 356. 3 Into Complacential Providential and Beneplacite 357. Gods Power Ib. Gods Power his Essence 358. Gods Ordinate Power the same with his Wil. 359. The Object of Gods Power every thing possible 360. What things are Impossible 361. Divine Power Omnipotence 363. CHAP. VI. Of Gods Justice Veracitie and Sanctitie Also of the Trinitie THe Justice of God 365. Gods Absolute Justice as to the afflicting the Innocent and acquitting the Nocent 367. How far Gods Punitive Justice
343. l. 29. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 360. l. 36. l. pro Sect. 4. Chap. 7. p. 361. l. 19. l. Ens possibile p. 381. l. 18. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 382. l. 24. l. Sect. 35. p. 385. l. 29. l. § 9. Item l. 34. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 386. l. 16. l. Cabala p. 398. l. 28. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 416. l. 26. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 421. l. 32. dele 1. p. 424. l. 17. pro and l. is p. 426. l. 3. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 440. l. 3. l. 2. Item l. 5. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 465. l. 28. dele liquors p. 469. l. 27. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 492. l. 8. for as l. is p. 493. l. 27. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 494. l. 14. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Item l. 16. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 514. l. 24. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 THE COURT of the GENTILES PART IV. OF REFORMED PHILOSOPHIE Wherein Plato's Moral and Metaphysic Philosophie is reduced to a useful Forme and Method BOOK I. Of Moral Philosophie CHAP. I. Of Prudence the last End and chiefest Good Use Fruition and Delectation Moral Philosophie 1 Its Genus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which connotes Prudence wherein consider its Objects Offices and Acts which are 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dexteritie 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sagacitie and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 The subject of Moral Prudence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and particularly the Conscience Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Law of Conscience 1 In the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is the seat of Principes 2 In Syneidesis which is a reflexive Light and springs from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sensation 3 The Rule of Moral Prudence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is either subjective or objective 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 2.14 15. James 2.8 The last End its Influence in Morals the chiefest Good its Characters 1 The Idea of Good 2 The first Beautie 3 Most proper Vse its Regulation and Intention Fruition its parts 1 Love 2 Vnion 3 Communion 4 Delectation considered 1 In its Causes a sweet Good Possession and Action 2 In its Adjuncts Realitie Connaturalitie Vniformitie Puritie Force and Infinitude 3 In its Effects Enlargement and Satisfaction § 1. HAving discussed Plato's Natural Philosophie we now descend to his Moral which regards the Morals of single Persons Families The Idea of Moral Philosophie and Cities or Republics We find the Idea of Philosophie as it relates to Morals and Active Sciences in the Platonic Definitions pag. 414. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Philosophie is a prudent or studiose consideration of the Soul according to right reason Wherein we may consider 1 The Genus 2 The Subject 3 The Measure or Rule of Moral Philosophie 1. The Genus 1. It s Genus Moral Prudence in this Platonic Definition of Moral Philosophie is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies a prudent Inspection studiose Consideration and sollicitous Care communly stiled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prudence or Moral Wisdome which we have thus copiosely described in the Platonic Definitions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prudence is a facultie of it self effective of human Happinesse Prudence what Wherein we have 1 The Specific reason whereby it is differenced from contemplative Science expressed by that notion Effective 2 It s Vltimate End which is to make men happie Again Prudence is defined in the same Platonic Definitions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Science of good and evil Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Disposition whereby we judge what is to be done and what is not to be done In al which Definitions laid together we have these Considerables 1. The Vltimate End It s Object and supreme Object of moral Prudence or Philosophie namely human Happinesse which is the measure of al moral Acts and the first thing treated of in moral Philosophie according to that of Aquinas The end of moral Virtues is the chief principe of Prudence as Luke 10.41 Of which Chap. 2. 2. We have here the intermediate Objects of moral Prudence which are in general al Agibles or Practicables 1 Singulars 2 Things present 3 Things in our power 4 Things good or evil 3. Here is also considerable the proper Exercices or Offices of Prudence which are according to Plato in his Charm 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Its Offices To do what belongs unto us 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To understand a mans self 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To use al things wel i. e. with respect to our supreme end 4 Rightly to distinguish 'twixt good and evil 5 To conserve the rectitude of the Wil. 6 To moderate the Affections 7 To governe the whole Life Of which see more fully Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 6. s 3. 4. This moral Prudence may be considered in its Integrals The parts of Prudence which are according to the Platonic account four 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Providence which 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Providence in the Platonic Definitions pag. 414. is thus described 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Providence is a preparation or provision for somewhat future Which implies 1 An universal comprehension of al circumstances means difficulties encouragements which may make for or against our end 2 Serious consultation about and prudent determination of what is to be done 3 Prudent precaution of what may impede c. this is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Caution according to that of the Stoics 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A wise man ought never to fear but always to use caution c. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dexteritie of Judgment 2 Another part of moral Prudence is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Dexteritie in judging things which in the Platonic Desinitions pag. 413. is thus defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Facilitie of judgment is a connate abilitie of reasoning or discerning And Plato de Repub. 4. pag. 428. saies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Facilitie of judgement is certainly some kind of Science c. 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sagacitie or perspicacitie of finding out things 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sagacitie which Plato makes to be an excellent kind of Prudence or a natural Invention which directs the Reason to find out things wrapt up in Nature which he elsewhere cals a Sagacitie of Nature So in his Epino pag. 976. There remains a marvellous facultie whereby we easily and expeditely learne any thing and having learnt it can faithfully commend it to memorie and as occasion serves by an happie celeritie recal it which some cal Wisdome others good Nature but others 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sagacitie of Nature This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or natural Sagacitie Plato makes to be the same with his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good Nature So Plato
Defin. pag. 412. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sagacitie is a natural generositie of mind whereby a person is enabled happily to conjecture what ought to be done Again 't is stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an acumen of judgment This natural Sagacitie Plato Repub. 2. pag. 376. makes very essential to a Magistrate in order to his more exact judging of persons and things and final decision of Controversies Solomon we know was endowed with this natural Sagacitie even to admiration which discovered it self in the decision of that arduous case between the two Harlots 1 Kings 3.23 24 c. as also in resolving the Queen of Sheba's questions 2 Chron. 9.1 which kind of Sagacitie Politicians cal King-Craft This natural Sagacitie is elsewhere stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a facilitie of judgement which in the Platon Defin. pag. 414. is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A good judgement tenacious of what is determined by reason Again this natural Sagacitie passeth sometimes under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is defined Platon Defin. pag. 412. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 An habit elective of what is best One great office of this natural Sagacitie consistes in the knowlege of men their several Humors Inclinations Designes Interests 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Experience and Combinations c. 4 Another part of moral Prudence is Experience which Plato cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and makes very essential to a true Philosopher So Plato Repub. 9. pag. 582. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The experienced person endowed with prudence is the only true Philosopher Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thence in the same Repub. 9. he joyns Prudence and Experience together with Reason which he makes the best Judges of human Affairs 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We rightly judge by Experience joyned with Prudence and Reason And Plato in his Gorgias gives us the reason why Experience is so essential to Prudence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Experience makes our life to passe away according to Rules of Art whereas inexperience makes us live casually Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There are many Arts experimentally found out among men from several Experiments c. And because experimental Prudence is gained by sense and sensible observation thence Plato Timaeus pag. 103. defineth it a subtiltie of sense or good sensation of the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prudence is a good sensation of Soul Expetience is indeed the main Seminarie of human Prudence 1 In that it furnisheth us with the choisest observations of past and present times whereby we are capacitated to make some prudent conjecture of what is likely to succede 2 Experience draws down general Rules and Precepts of Wisdome to particular and proper use 3 Experience gives men a more inward feeling and lively apprehension of themselves and others Thence Plato makes this self-knowlege the highest piece of Prudence which he cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good sensation 4 Experience does much greaten and adde to the quantitie of our knowlege by furnishing the mind with fresh observations whence Plato brings in Solon speaking thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The longer I live the more I know and teach 5 Experience addes not only to the quantitie but also to the qualitie of our knowlege by rendring it more clear and distinct For experience reduceth particular observations in themselves confused unto a regular Series and Order whence general Rules are framed which makes our knowlege more distinct and certain 6 Experience greatly fixeth and confirmeth our Notions of things 2. Having finished the Generic Notion of moral Philosophie 2. The Subject of Moral Prudence the Soul and particularly the Conscience which is moral Prudence we now procede to the Subject thereof expressed in the Platonic Definition by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Soul for indeed moral Prudence moveth and influenceth the whole Soul and therefore it is not unjustly seated therein though the proper seat thereof be the practic Judgment which Divines terme Conscience which is a petty God or God's Vice-gerent and Vicar in the Soul to command or threaten to accuse or excuse to justifie or condemne This Vicarious Divine office of Conscience Plato seems to have had some Traditional Notices of whence he termes Conscience 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Fame and makes it to be a kind of Demon or petty God in men So de Leg. 8 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This Law of Fame partakes of a marvellous facultie seing no one durst to breathe otherwise than according to the Dictates of her Law Serranus here acquaints us Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Conscience's Law That Plato cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his Law of Fame that Imperial power of Conscience wel known to al which comprehends those commun Principes That God is to be feared c. This Law of Conscience he saies is unwritten yet notwithstanding there is in al mens minds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Sacred Law whose force and efficace tames every Soul and compels it by fear to obey positive Laws From the authoritie of this Law it is as the Philosopher teacheth that men come to understand the difference of good and evil Again Serranus addes Our Philosopher cals this Divine Law of Conscience 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of Fame and saies that it is connate in al men it being a Science that teacheth the difference of good and evil and the Conservator and Vindictor of al Laws and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Precursor of that most excellent Chorus of Virtues whose admirable faculties and actions flow from no other Fountain than the sparks of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. This Law or Light of Conscience is twofold 1 Habitual which is called in the Scholes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Synteresis 2 Actual which is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Syneidesis 1 The Synteresis 1. Synteresis the Habit of Principes or habitual Light of Conscience is defined in the Scholes a natural habit of active Principes For as speculative Reason discourseth of Speculatives so practic Reason of Practics as therefore there are naturally implanted in us certain speculative Principes which appertein to Intelligence so also are there certain active Principes which belong to that natural habit of Conscience called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Synteresis as Aquinas Part. 1. Q. 79. And this habitual Light or Law of Conscience is the same with Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law of Fame which is elsewhere by him termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. The Syneidesis self-reflexion Right Reason as anon 2 The actual Light or Law of Conscience called by the Ancients 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is Conscience strictly taken So Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 79. Art 13. Conscience taken properly is not a power but an Act whereby we apply our Science to what we undertake which application is followed by Testification or Ligation or Excusation and Accusation By
that which wants it And what is it in Plato's sense for a Soul to keep its order but to use althings servato ordine finis in subordination to its end This is wel illustrated by Jansenius August Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 19. where he proves out of Augustine That virtue is nothing else but the order of Love For by Love as a Divine Pondus the Soul reduceth althings to its last end namely God This is incomparably wel expressed by Plato in his Philebus pag. 24 25. Whatsoever things seem to have excesse or defect more or lesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 al those ought to be referred to the infinite Being as the only measure This he more openly expresseth Leg. 4. pag. 716. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. God is to us the measure of althings unto which scope and mark al our actions as so many arrows ought to tend So Repub. 1. pag. 331. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I count the possession of things of great use yet not for every man but he who is moderate and temperate i. e. who refers al to his last end Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That riches are most useful for a wise man who can and wil use al in subordination to his last end Whence a thing utile Definit Plat. p. 414. is thus described 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A thing utile is that which renders us capable of suffering wel or doing good in order to our last end So also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 conducible is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which conduceth to good namely our last end These and such like are Plato's Philosophemes about Vse which may be al reduced to these following Propositions 1. The Vtilitie of any created good consistes not in its own goodnesse but in its reference to our last end Herein consistes the good of every inferior good when it subserves and tends to our chiefest good The good and evil of althings is to be judged by their relation to or distance from the last end Things are so far good as they enable us to do good by serving God Al that we have or can do is of God and therefore ought to be for God Nothing is to be loved or enjoyed for it self but the chiefest good Thus Aristotle Eth. l. 4. c. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Those things that come under Vse we may use either wel or il Thus Riches are reckoned among utile goods Now he that is endowed with virtue for the use of any thing doth use that thing in the best manner Therefore he useth riches best which hath attained to that virtue which belongs to the use thereof Thus riches and al other lower goods must be referred to God Hence 2. To use any thing is to refer it to some other thing superior in our estime Herein consistes the formal difference between Use and Fruition Things are enjoyed for themselves their own goodnesse but they are used in order to something else We do not properly enjoy but use the means neither use but enjoy our last end Hence it follows 1 That al Use of God as a means for the obtainment of some other end is inordinate 2 That al Use of the Creature which is not referred to God is also sinful This perversitie and inordination is found in every sin whiles men enjoy what they ought to use and use what they ought to enjoy This Augustine makes to be the perversion of al order fruendis uti velle atque utendis frui When men enjoy the means and use the last end But of this more Prop. 4. 3. Things are then used orderly when they subserve and are subordinate to our last end Herein chiefly consistes the order of Love when it resolves al lower goods and actions into the chiefest Good Al lower goods are to be desired not for enjoyment but use and when we have them we must use them wel This is wel explicated by Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 2. where he tels us This is the Spirit of Philosophie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to keep the force of the mind free from the bodie and brutish affections and to refer the use of al to the chiefest Good Wherefore it doth allow the moderate use and fruit of externe things which are estimed as good so far as they agree with the true or best good but yet so far as they differ therefrom i. e. subserve not the chiefest Good she commands that they be rejected A Philosopheme worthy of a Christian mind This is the import of that Divine Admonition 1 Cor. 7.31 And they that use this world as not abusing it 1 Cor. 7.31 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as not overusing it When ever we overuse any lower good we abuse it i. e. turne it off from its proper use Man has a great libertie to use althings indifferent indifferently yet so as al must conduce to his last end And indeed we are no further master of any thing or free in the use of it than it is brought into subservience unto God Hence 4. Concupiscence To use or enjoy any inferior good for it self is to abuse it This lower Universe and each part thereof was not made for mans Fruition but Vse It 's true Brutes have libertie to enjoy the good things of senses because they are not capable of any higher good but mans libertie lies in the using these inferior goods for an higher end the enjoyment of God and when he perverts this order he fals under miserable cursed bondage Thus Plato Gorg. pag. 507. having laid down this Hypothesis That Temperance consistes in the regular use of althings he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And thus he must act lest giving the rains to lusts and suffering them to wander where they list whiles he thinkes to satisfie them he fal into an infinite evil and live a robbers life Whereby he means that when mens lusts grow irregular in the use of things they soon prove infinite and insatiable This inordinate love to the Creature for it self is usually stiled Concupiscence and Lust which is nothing else but a brutish desire after and fruition of the Creature for it self without reference to God the chiefest Good This tyrannic Concupiscence Plato accurately philosophiseth on Repub. 9. pag. 574. where he describes it as the greatest Tyrant in the world Of which see Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 5. § 2. This perversion of the order of Love and abuse of inferior goods Augustine sadly complains of in that men hereby use what they should enjoy and enjoy what they should use i. e. they use God and what belongs to him as means to promote their inferior goods the object of their fruition and that against the order of true Charitie yea of human Nature which requires that we should use al lower goods in subordination to God the chiefest Good Creatures when they are used in subservience to
Bonitie and Vice But what a vast distance there is between Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason and that maintained by the Jesuites and some other Schole-men we shal when we come to discourse of moral Bonitie sufficiently evince For the present we shal endeavor to determine the true nature of Moralitie so much darkened by scholastic niceties in the following Propositions 1 Prop. Al Moralitie of human Acts speaks some fundamental subjective dependence on the natural Principes of human Acts. For there is nothing in Moralitie but has some relation to yea dependence on human Nature as its subject and fundament Moralitie is but a mode or relation which cannot subsist of it self without a subject and foundation in Nature Can a man know and love God without reason and wil 2 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is not formalised or specified in genere moris by the relation such Acts have to Reason or Wil. For every thing is specified and formalised by its formal reason and what is the formal reason of any thing but the Idea of its Essence And wherein consistes the essence of moral Acts but in their conformitie to if good or difformitie from if bad the perfect measure of Morals and what is the perfect measure of Morals but the moral Law 3 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is a real mode not absolute but relative appendent to those Acts. That Moralitie is not a mere figment of Reason but something real is generally confessed and that on invincible grounds because it has real influences and effects Moreover that Moralitie is not an absolute mode but relative is as evident because the whole of its essence speaks a relation to somewhat else Hence 4 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts speaks some relation to the last end For the last end in Morals hath the force of a first Principe Forme and Measure It 's a great Effate in the Scholes That the End specifies in Morals Althings are defined and measured by their last End but this by nothing The last end as a pregnant universal Principe conteins al Morals in its wombe 5 Prop. The object mater doth also in some degree concur to the formalising of moral Acts. Thence saith Aquinas A moral Act receives its species from the object and end And Petrus à Sancto Joseph Thes 165. addes That an Act is moral from the order it has to its object not considered in its being but morally as subject to the Rules of Moralitie To this of the object we may adde al essential moral circumstances which oft adde much to the being and intension of Moralitie 6 Prop. But yet we must conclude That the adequate exemplar and perfect measure of al Moralitie formally considered is the Law of God This comprehends and gives measure to al other Rules of Moralitie the last end object and circumstances are al measured hereby Thus Scotus and other of the Schole-men determine That the Esse morale or Moralitie of an Act as such is its relation to that Law unto which it is referred And the reason is most evident because al Moralitie speaks a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relation to some Rule And what adequate perfect Rule is there of moral Acts but some moral Law And thus we must understand the ancient Philosophers as also some late Divines who make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason the only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or measure of moral Acts. That by right Reason we are to understand an objective Reason or a divine Law wil be most evident by what follows touching moral Bonitie and its measure § 2. Moral Goodnesse in conformitie to the Divine Law Having inquired into the Moralitie of human Acts in the general we descend to examine their moral Bonitie and Pravitie Every thing is so far good as it answers to its proper measure and rule but evil so far as it comes short thereof And what is the measure or rule of moral Bonitie but the divine Wil and Law Thus Plato Repub. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is most distant from reason which is most remote from Law and Order i. e. Things are so far conformed to reason and good as they are conformed to Law and Order Whence Definit Platon pag. 4.13 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which puts an end to controversies about what is unjust or just Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an obedience of virtuose Laws And on the contrarie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injustice is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit that over looks Laws This Plato more fully explicates Gorg. 504. And truly that wherein the order of the bodie consistes may as it seems to me wel be termed Salubritie whence the bodies health ariseth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but those things wherein the order and ornament or goodnesse of the mind consistes we cal legal and Law whence men become legitime and orderly He compares the Bonitie of the Soul to the sanitie or health of the Bodie which as it consistes in the order and regular temperament of al humors so the goodnesse of the mind doth in like manner consist in its order or conformitie to Law This is wel explicated by his Scholar Aristotle Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 9. art 9. pag. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse truly is a virtue by which al have what is their own and as the Law establisheth But Injustice by which men possesse what is not their own against the precepts of the Law What he here determines of Justice and Injustice in particular holds true of al other Virtue and Bonitie or Vice But to bring Plato's Philosophemes to sacred Philosophie touching the conformitie of al moral Good to the divine Law we shal determine the whole in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al moral Bonitie Moral Bonitie in conformitie to a Law whether objective or subjective and formal denotes a conformitie to some Law The Scholes distinguish moral Bonitie or Honestie into objective and formal The former is that which constitutes a thing morally good as an object but the later that which constitutes an act as an act morally good 1 In the objects of human Acts there is necessarily required a moral goodnesse which agrees thereto as objects as Suarez 1.2 Tract 3. Disp 2. strongly proves And the reasons are demonstrative For 1 If the object or mater be not morally good or lawful the act conversant thereabout can never be good because al moral good requires an integritie of causes an irregularitie in the object wil render the act irregular 2 The object of the Wil is good as good therefore that Bonitie which moves the Wil cannot slow from it but must be supposed as inherent in or appendent to its objects 3 This moral goodnesse of the object doth not only agree to human Acts but also to al other things which may be lawfully loved and embraced
4 This moral objective Bonitie ariseth from the mater as clothed with al its conditions and circumstances whereby it is rendred a meet object for the Soul to close with 5 The moral goodnesse of any object consistes in its conformitie to or agreament with the Divine Law 2 There is also formal Bonitie or Goodnesse which constitutes a man formally good For 1 An object though never so good cannot constitute a man or his act formally good It 's true the Act receives some goodnesse from its object yet only materially and terminatively not formally so as to constitute the Act formally good 2 The Act is so far formally good as virtuose i. e. proceding from right Principes tending to a right end and measured by a perfect Rule Al which presuppose some divine Law as the measure 2. The Measure of Moral Good perfect Prop. That Law which is the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect This Hypothesis is most evident and wil appear to be such if we consider either the nature of a measure or the condition of the thing measured 1 As for the nature of a measure Plato Repub. 6. wel explicates the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A defective measure of such things is no measure for that which is imperfect cannot be the measure of any thing Every Measure or Rule is indivisible and therefore capable neither of addition or substraction Thus Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Canon or Rule is an infallible measure admitting neither addition nor detraction And thus much indeed is formally included in the notion Canon for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Canna whence it is derived primarily denotes a reed of such a just longitude whereby they measured their Lands and thence it was used in the general for an exact measure as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Job 38 5. is rendred by Aquila 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 10.13 Phil. 3.16 Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 10.13 is explicated by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such is its use Gal. 6.16 Phil. 3.16 whereby the perfection of the Divine Law is illustrated 2 That the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect is easily demonstrated from the condition of moral Bonitie for a plenitude of being or integritie of Bonitie is essential to al moral good Moral evil ariseth from the least defect but moral good requireth an integritie of causes and parts If there be the least circumstance misplaced or mistimed it renders the act vitiose Now if al moral good must be thus perfect and entire then it necessarily follows that its measure and rule must be perfect and entire But of this more in what follows 3. The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Prop. The perfection of a Law as it is the measure of moral Bonitie consistes in its comprehension of the most perfect objective mater end and principes The explication and demonstration of this Proposition depends on the explication of moral good as to its constitutive parts and causes It was said before that al moral good requires an integritie of Being and Causes In the Scholes they make four Causes of moral Good proportionable to those in natural productions namely Mater Forme End Efficient We shal not at present think our selves obliged to examine or defend the legalitie of this distribution but endeavor to demonstrate that a perfect measure of moral Bonitie comprehends each of these Causes and Principes 1 It must comprehend the objectmater of al moral Bonitie in its fullest Amplitude Extension and Vniversalitie Thus Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. Truth and Equitie require that they who wil discourse of a divine Republic determine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the Legislator has respect not to one only particle of virtue and that truly the least but rather to al virtue and that he find out Laws according to those several Species of Virtue i. e. The Law of moral Bonitie must extend it self to al the various Species and Offices of Virtue If there be any moral Dutie which the Law of Moralitie extends not to it is no perfect measure And this argues the imperfection of Natures light in us and al human Laws as hereafter 2 As for the Forme of moral Bonitie it consistes in conformitie to the Rule or Law of Moralitie which if perfect exacts the most perfect conformitie Thus Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. Our whole discourse tends to this to shew that this Legislator and al other who wil institute utile Laws 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ought in framing Laws to aim at the highest Virtue i. e. at the highest conformitie to the best Law 3 That a perfect Law of Moralitie comprehends the most perfect End is also most evident because the end is as the Soul and Spirit in Morals al offices of virtue are but as a dead Corps without a spirituose perfect end as Jansenius demonstrates out of Augustine Thence Plato Repub. 5. pag. 444. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good Institutes or Laws make way for Virtue but bad precipitate men into vice Now he elsewhere assures us That the end gives life and perfection to al virtuose Acts. Yea Leg. 1. he openly saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al Laws are to be so constituted as that they may promote the best end 4 The Law of moral Bonitie must be perfect as to the Efficient or Principe of Moralitie i. e. it must extend it self to the qualification of the subject and its virtuose disposition for as the end directs the act so the principes or dispositions of the subject direct the end Arist Eth. lib. 3. c. 10. assures us That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the end of every act is according to the habit i. e. if the mind be not wel-disposed or clothed with virtuose habits it wil never aim at a virtuose end Thence that great Saying of Augustine The intention of the best end makes the worke good and Faith directs the intention So that the Law of Moralitie if perfect extends it self to al virtuose principes and moral habits which the subject ought to be invested with 3. Subjective right Reason not the measure of moral Good Prop. Subjective right Reason or objective human Laws are not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie There are two parts in this Proposition to be examined 1 That subjective right Reason is not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie To explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis we grant 1 That Reason is the Organ of apprehending albeit not the measure of our dutie 2 That practic Reason or Conscience so far as illuminated by the Spirit of God is the regula regulata of our dutie for Conscience is God's Deputie and a Law unto a mans self Yet we denie that there is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or right Reason in nature corrupted which may suffice as a Rule of moral Goodnesse I am not ignorant how much the Light of Nature or as some terme it Right
Principes which are the foundation of al demonstration so in Practics and Morals there is an objective Law or Light of Nature containing certain practic Principes which are the Rule of Conversation Thus also we are to understand the Stoics if we wil make a right use of their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of which Diog. Laâ—rt in Zeno The Stoics say that to live according to nature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to do nothing that the commun Law prohibits which is right Reason diffusing it self throughout althings Where it deserves a remarque That they make the commun Law of Nature the same with right Reason Which cannot rightly be understood of subjective right Reason but of objective it may Again they say This right Reason diffuseth it self throughout althings Which cannot be understood of any subjective reason which is confined to individuals but must be applied to the commun objective Light and Law of Nature which is diffused throughout the whole Creation according to the various conditions of things Thus Hierocles in Pythagor Carm. pag. 106. saith That the vices of the mind are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aversions and Errata from right Reason And pag. 209. he addes This right Reason is the great Legislatrix and Judge of al human affairs c. And Stobaeus de Virt. Serm. 1. pag. 9. also informes us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is a Syntaxe or orderly contexture according to right Reason but Vice a Transgression against right Reason Where by right Reason we must necessarily understand the commun objective Light or Law of Nature not that darke subjective Light in the minds of blind Mankind Thus also we must understand Parker Amyraldus and other Divines who make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason the unic Criterion or Rule of moral Virtue Though I denie not but that the Stoics generally and perhaps Aristotle as many of his Followers among the Schole-men by right Reason understand the subjective Light of Nature in mens minds yet I am very apt to persuade my self that Socrates and Plato who seem to be the first Promulgators of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 meant thereby no other than the objective Light and Law of Nature whereof some more commun Precepts were conveighed down by the posteritie of Noah but those irradiant and bright notices thereof which shone among them they received by oriental Tradition from the sacred Books of Moses wherein Plato was not a little versed and which by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 royal Law he seems to allude unto 5. The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule Prop. That Divine Law which is the adequate perfect Rule and Measure of moral Bonitie is no where to be found but in the sacred Philosophie or Scriptures Here and here only is extant Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This sacred Rule whereof he had great notices he sometimes cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine Word Here also Aristotle's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Commun Law of Nature in its perfection is alone to be found Hence likewise it was that Pythagoras Lycurgus Solon Minos and Plato borrowed the principal heads of their best Laws as we have at large proved Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9. The sum of the Law of Nature and al divine Precepts is conteined in the Decalogue or Moral Law delivered by Moses which is thence stiled by the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the matrices of the Law and its roots And indeed what are the Ten Commandments conteined in the moral Law but a Transumt Compend Abstract or rather extended Copie of the Law of Nature given to man in the beginning from that first original Exemplar the eternal Law Is not the formal reason of al Equitie prescribed and expressed in the moral Law Ought not this then to be the terme measure and scope of al Laws To clear which we are to remember that the Ten Commandments conteined in the moral Law must not be taken literally as ten Words but in a more ample extensive notion as Christian Pandects or commun heads of al moral Duties towards God and man to be explicated and extended accordingly to the Illustrations and Commentaries of the Prophets our great Lord and his Apostles Though the Decalogue doth not mention each particular Dutie in the Gospel yet it doth command obedience to al that are or shal be specified and expresseth every particular Dutie generically or synecdochically and although it were not a Dutie from the general Precept til it was specified in the Gospel yet when it is once a Dutie the neglect of it is a sin against the Decalogue Indeed are there not almost in al the Precepts manifest Synecdoches Is it not then ridiculous for men to restrain the most ample sense of the moral Law to the narrow confines of its words Doth not the great Legislator take the blackest sins as Murder Adultery Theft c. and place them as so many commun Heads in the Decalogue that so by these we may be instructed how black and odiose al those other sins reducible to those heads are Wherefore to penetrate and dive into the nature and contents of the Ten Commandments we must in a particular manner inquire 1 What in every Command is treated of 2 The end for which it was given 3 What therein is displeasing or pleasing to God And after al we shal find that the moral Law is spiritual holy just and good as Rom. 7.12 14. reaching al the motions and dispositions of the heart And indeed how absurd is it to conceit that he who made the heart and knows al the diverticules or turnings and windings of it should make a Law to reach only the outward acts and not the inward principes and motions May we not then conclude that the Decalogue and moral Law of the supreme Legislator extends its Precepts to the whole Soul and al its Principes Powers Inclinations Thoughts Affections and Operations interne and externe directing the same to their right objects and ends affecting them with their inseparable Accidents and Modifications clothing them with their immutable circumstances in such sort that the action good by this Law can never be made evil that which is evil by this Law can never be made good that which is good or evil by this Law can never be made indifferent Hence Plato brings in Pindar speaking thus of the regal Power as I take it of the Law of Nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Law is King over al both mortals and immortals And Aristot. Pol. l. 4. c. 4. affirmes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the Law ought to command al. Which is most proper and peculiar to the moral Law that lively Idea and Image of the Divine Sanctitie and Wil the original and universal Exemplar of moral Bonitie that great bond of union by conformitie whereto mans Wil becomes one with the Divine Wil yea man himself one with God Whence as Tyndal pag. 83. wel observes Mans
imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor lesser neither can it adde to or diminish from the Law of God Gods Commandment is as great as himself Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable universal Rule of moral Bonitie § 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral Bonitie The parts and causes of moral Good we now passe on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof It was before suggested that al moral Bonitie requires a plenitude of Being and integritie of Causes albeit any defect render an action morally evil This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral Bonitie Jansenius in imitation of Augustine makes two essential constitutive parts of al moral Good 1 The Office or Mater of the Act which he makes to be as the Corps and the End which he makes to be as the Forme that specifies 2 Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of it i.e. into Bonum and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater and the bene or wel-doing of it as the forme 3 Others according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes make four causes of al moral Good the Mater Efficient End and Forme Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes as to Naturals every way absurd and that which can never be defended because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole and yet also Causes thereof so that it hence follows the mater and forme are causes of themselves which constitute the whole yet in Morals where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts we may admit this distribution or else we may take the mater and forme as parts and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good This being the commun and received distribution I am not scrupulose in following the same yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions 1. The Mater of moral Good If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good it comprehends al human Acts with the Objects and Circumstances relating thereto whether things necessary or indifferent It 's true as to the Circumstances of moral Good there are some that relate to the forme others to the efficient and end yet some also that regard the mater The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent it is good when commanded by and conforme to the moral Law the measure of objective goodnesse as before it is indifferent when neither good nor evil but as it were in the middle between both Here that which chiefly requires an examen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent which so far as it may concerne moral Good we shal inquire into Plato in his Gorgias Things indifferent cals a thing indifferent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither good nor evil but a middle between these So Diogenes the Cynic taught 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That things between virtue and vice were indifferent And the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of things some were good some bad some neither good nor bad i. e. indifferent These neuters or things indifferent they said were such as neither profited nor did hurt Again they affirmed That things might be termed indifferent two ways 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as pertein not either to felicitie or miserie as Riches Glorie c. 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus nor aversation as the extending the finger or numbering the hairs of the head c. as Laertius in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent we are to consider that things are said in the general to be indifferent which in themselves are neither good nor evil but equally inclined to either Now this indifference of actions or things may be considered physically or morally according to the generic specific or individual nature of Actions and Things 1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere abstracto Physic Indifference in Genere in their generic abstract nature without the supervenient determination of the moral Law so they are in themselves nakedly considered indifferent For althings physically considered without their moral estimation and respect to the Law are neither morally good nor evil Thus al our Thoughts Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered without respect to the moral Law which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil are said to be indifferent 2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie Moral Indifference in Specie when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law For as althings are of God through God and for God so it belongs to his regal Wil to give moral or spiritual determination to them whereby they are made good or evil in specie as to the mater of them Neither can any created limited power make that which is good evil or that which is evil good or that which is indifferent good or evil except on supposition of predetermination from him who being Creator of al has an absolute dominion over al. Every Creature having termes to its Essence has also termes to its dominion and operation a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activitie Except man had being of himself and a World of his own framing he could not be a rule to himself for the determination of his actions but must be determined by the Law of his Maker for the specific nature or qualitie of his acts as good Quando dicimus dari actus indifferentes quoad speciem qui non sunt boni nec mali id intelligendum est negativé Petr. à Sancto Joseph Thes 167. or evil or indifferent Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God and so neither good nor evil for al moral determination ariseth from the Divine Wil expressed in the moral Law Whence it appears evident that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal as some Platonists would fain persuade us but dependent on the divine Wil and Determination for althings are therefore good or evil in specie because so determined by the soverain Wil promulgated in the natural or moral Law Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that commun Notion among some Divines That somethings are good because commanded other things are commanded because good Indeed this Maxime may be of use to expresse the difference between moral and positive Precepts with this limitation that positive Precepts which regard Worship c. are good because commanded but moral Precepts are commanded because good i. e. agreable to human Nature not that they have any moral goodnesse antecedent to the divine Wil and Determination Hence 3. No Action
indifferent in individuo No Action considered in individuo in its individual nature is morally indifferent i.e. every individual action considered as clothed with its Circumstances and in relation to its Principes Manner and End is either good or evil That moral Indifference hath place only in specie in the specific nature of Acts not in individuo in their individual nature is generally avouched by the Orthodoxe yea among the more sober of the Schole-men This was one of John Husse's Articles condemned in the Council of Constance Art 16. Quòd nulla sint opera indifferentia sed haec sit divisio immediata humanorum operum quòd sint virtuosa vel vitiosa That there are no workes in individuo indifferent but this is an immediate division of human workes that they are either virtuose or vitiose This indeed we may argue from Plato's Placites who strongly proves That al our Acts ought to tend to some good end So Gorg. pag. 499. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It seems that althings must be done for good c. So elsewhere he saith That God is the marque and scope unto which al our Acts as so many arrows ought to tend This is wel determined by Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. It happens sometimes that an Act is indifferent as to its Species which yet considered in individuo is either good or evil and that because every moral Act receives its Bonitie not only from its object but also from its circumstances And it 's necessary that every individual Act hath some circumstance by which it is drawen to good or evil at least as to the intention of the end For in as much as it belongs to Reason to order al human Acts if any Act be not ordered to its last end it is so far evil if it be ordered to its last end it is then good c. Thus Gibieuf de Libertat pag. 74. We most evidently gather from the subordination of our Wil to its last end that there are no human Acts indifferent in individuo but al are good or evil for it is not lawful for a rational Creature so long as he is such not to returne that back to God which he received from God Again p. 77. Every thing ought to act according to its nature and he that doth otherwise is deficient because nature is the measure of other things If therefore man puts forth an human Act he ought thereby to be converted towards God Indeed Indifference can no more be found in individual Acts than it can be denied as to some Acts considered in their Species Al Acts of Man in Innocence were good al the Acts of man under the dominion of corrupt Nature are evil al the Acts of man in Glorie shal be good al the Acts of man under Grace are either good or evil not one of al these indifferent Were al our actions regulated by the Divine moral Law they would be al good Yea our very natural and civil Acts as to their manner so far as they are morally good or evil are al regulated and determined by the moral Law For albeit the Divine Law be not as it ought not to be a general sum of Arts and Sciences nor yet a particular Directorie for the Government of States or Politic Acts yet the particular determination of al our Acts fals under the Divine Law so far as they are moral and Christian according to the nature of al Professions and Sciences coincident for the most part in the mater but distinct in the manner of consideration Thus much Petrus à Sancto Joseph that late compilator of Schole-Divinitie Thes 167. acknowledgeth There is not saith he any Act indifferent in individuo but every such Act if it procede from sufficient deliberation is either good or evil although not as to its object yet in regard of its circumstances The scratching of the head or the taking up of a straw is either good or evil This seems a Paradoxe to some that are ignorant and disgustful to Libertines who would be so yet generally granted by Philosophers and Divines yea scarce ever professedly denied by any save some sew who distinguish between Acts proceding from mere Imagination and such as are deliberate That no Acts in individuo are indifferent see the Commentators in Sent. lib. 2. dist 41. and in Thomam 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. 2. A virtuose Wil the Principe of moral Good Having discussed the Mater of moral Good we now procede to its next efficient Cause or Principe which is the Wil or rather Soul clothed with supernatural Habits of Virtue or Grace The moral Law requires that to the constitution of an Act morally good there concur a good Principe now the Wil or Soul as willing being the fountain of al moral efficience and operation its rectitude is necessary to constitute an Act morally or spiritually good Such therefore as the disposition of the Wil is such wil the action prove as to its goodnesse or pravitie The bent of the Wil is as a Pondus that carries the whole Soul either to good or bad when the deliberation and intention of a bended Wil concurs in a good mater for a good end the action is good And what bends the Wil in this manner Actio recta non erit nisi recta fuerit voluntas ab hac enim est actio but virtuose habits So many degrees as there are of a sanctified Wil in any Act so many degrees there are of moral Good therein Moralitie as wel as Divinitie is in a more special manner conversant in ruling the Wil which is the measure of good and evil The bent of the Wil makes a good or bad man as also act Thus Plato Meno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is to wil and to be able to performe good Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If he wil not to do unrightcously this is sufficient he shal not do unrighteously But more particularly Plato Leg. 3. thus philosophiseth This is not to be desired 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that althings follow his Wil but that his Wil follow Reason i.e. that it prosecute what is good This is wel expressed by Simplicius in Epich c. 1. pag. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For when the Wil is free and pure in the power of Reason it self on which our nature dependes then it is carried to things truly eligible yea to truth it self Wherefore the proper good of the Soul is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly desirable and attained by real election Simplicius here in imitation of Plato whom he much follows asserteth 1 That the moral Goodnesse of human Acts dependes on the puritie and goodnesse of the Wil. 2 That moral Good is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue because most eligible Which derivation he borrowed from Plato What Virtue properly is and how it disposeth the Wil to what is morally good wil hereafter § 4. and sect 3. §
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Virtue has for its rule a decorum or that which is most convenient i.e. agreable or conformable to the Law of Nature Hence 3 This Conformitie is stiled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Symmetrie and Symphonie Al these notions Aristotle comprehended under his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mediocritie of which more fully B. 4. C. 1. § 30. and Philos General P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect 4. § 4. Others place the Forme of moral Good in the mode or manner of doing namely that it be done wel How the Forme of Good consistes in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wel doing and we find some foundation for this Hypothesis in Plato's Theaetetus pag. 187. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's better to a little wel than much il Where he seems to make the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wâ—l doing the forme and measure of good So Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 3. pag. 83. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. He therefore shal be a Grammarian who doth what is Grammatic Grammatically i.e. according to Rules of Grammar But yet he addes by way of caution That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of Arts is not the same with that of Virtues for the perfection of Arts is included in themselves without regard to the perfection of the Artificer but the perfection of Virtue requires that the subject be so and so qualified And then he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He is a righteous and temperate man not that doth those things but doth them in such a manner as righteous and sober men do them i.e. rightcously and soberly Hence that vulgar Effate That good workes are to be judged by Adverbes for al must be done with those adverbial conditions of sacred Philosophie Tit. 2.12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 soberly and righteously and piously This is in a peculiar manner true of good actions where the mater is indifferent because such have no goodnesse at al but what is from the Adverb So that it sufficeth not that the Act be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good but it must have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a right manner of being done and herein according to some the Forme of its goodnesse doth consiste even in the manner of it and any defect herein wil render the action evil according to those scholastic Maximes The forme gives being and any omission or defect therein gives millitie as to moral Good So in the Canon Law they tel us That the forme must be precisely and punctually observed And indeed this notion of the forme of moral Good amounts to the same with the former and must be resolved thereinto For a moral Act may be said then to have its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or bene factum wel done when it is in al points exactly conformable to the moral Law for al moral Good is a relation of conformitie with the rule of Morals but the least privation thereof is sin But How far Circumstances formalise moral Good to descend to particulars an human Act is then conformable to the Law and wel done when it is not only good for the mater but also clothed with al those Circumstances which necessarily attend its moral goodnesse The particular forme of moral Good consistes much in the Circumstances that attend it The Circumstances oft formalise and specisie the Act making it good or evil sometimes they only make it better or worse But the Circumstances have the greatest sway in things indifferent where the manner of doing doth chiefly specifie the Act. We find the Circumstances of human Acts wel expressed by Aristotle Eth. l. 2. c. 5. Virtue saith he consistes in the wel doing of things for we may fear trust desire hate despise be angrie pitie rejoice and grieve 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not duely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But truly to be moved with these affections when and in what things and towards whom and for what end and in that manner as we ought this is the golden mean and that which is best wherein Virtue consistes Whence also Aristotle Eth. lib. 3. cap. 10. art 5. pag. 160. assures us That a defect in any one Circumstance renders an Act evil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But sins may be committed some when that is done that ought not others when not as it ought others because not at that time when it ought or the like Thence art 10. he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For a valiant man suffers and acts according to the dignitie of the mater and when and in that manner as reason or the Law of Nature dictates Thus we see how Plato and Aristotle require to the constitution of moral Good not only a right mater but that it be clothed with al due Circumstances whereby it may be rendred conformable to the Law as to manner This Hypothesis has been generally maintained among the more sound Schole-men Thus Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 7. Art 2. A Circumstance is a condition or accident of an human Act which toucheth it extrinsecally And seing human Acts are disposed towards their last end by circumstances the contemplation hereof greatly concernes Theologues For a Theologue considers human Acts as a man is thereby ordained to Beatitnde Now whatever is ordained to an end ought to be proportionate thereto But Acts are rendred proportionable to their end by a certain commensuration which they receive from due circumstances whence the consideration of circumstances chiefly belongs to a Theologue What these circumstances are he addes Art 3. In human Acts Who did it By what aides or instruments What Why How When and Abour what he did it are to be inquired into Some explain these Circumstances thus 1 Quis who must not be taken for the efficient cause but for his condition and qualitie as a private person or public c. 2 Quid what must not be understood of the mater or object but of the qualitie thereof 3 Neither must Quomodo how be taken for the forme or manner but whether it be done openly or secretly c. Greg. Ariminensis 2. Sent. Dist 38. Quaest 1. Art 1. strongly assertes and proves That no moral Act wanting its due Circumstance is morally good By an Act morally good I understand saith he no other according to the Doctors than an Act conforme to right Reason objective i.e. the Divine Law according to al circumstances requisite to this that the Act be truly virtuose When therefore a moral operation is not conforme to right Reason or the Law according to al due circumstances it is vitiose and morally evil This his Hypothesis he proves by two Conclusions 1. Conclus That no moral Act wanting any one due Circumstance is truly virtuose This he proves by shewing that the contrary implies a contradiction For if a moral Act want any one due circumstance it is not as it ought to be therefore it is evil Due circumstances are communly said to be such things as are required to this that
saith That God according to the ancient Tradition I suppose Judaic is the Principe and End of althings And then he addes pag. 716. That he who adheres with a composed mind and sirme purpose to this last end is most blessed and free And in what follows he lays down the manner how the Soul adheres to God namely by conformable Acts of Pietie c. And herein indeed his Philosophemes are consonant to sacred Philosophie which frequently placeth moral Libertie as to exercice in inviolable close Adhesion unto God as our last End Psal 63.8 So Psal 63.8 My Soul adheres closely to thee as the Original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 importes We find the same word in the same sense Deut. 10.20 Ruth 1.14 16. Job 41.17 Psal 119.31 and it primarily denotes that intimate inviolable conjugal Adherence which is or ought be between man and wife who are by Law of Nature one flesh as Gen. 2.24 And that this Adherence to God as our last End and chiefest Good is a main part of moral Libertie Psal 73.28 as to exercice is further evident from Psal 73.28 But it is good for me i. e. it is my chiefest Good that wherein my highest libertie consistes To draw near to God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Appropinquation Accesse Adherence to God Thence the LXX render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To adhere to God to be as it were glued to God So the word in its primary notion signifies Thence it is frequently used to expresse that intimate conjunction that ought to be between man and wife as Mat. 19.5 yea Ephes 5.31 it signifies the conjugal adherence and union between Christ and his Church 1 Cor. 6.17 And we find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 used in the same sense 1 Cor. 6.17 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He that is glued or conjugally united to God as his chiefest Good as the precedent words import And O! what an high piece of moral Libertie is this intimately and inviolably to adhere to God as our last End and chiefest Good Is the heart ever more free than when it doth most strongly by al manner of affectionate exercices adhere to its chiefest Good So many grains as there are of a bended wil for God so much moral Libertie A tenacious resolute invincible adherence unto our last end by acts of love desire and other affections makes the Soul exceding free in al its motions Psal 73.26 Thus Psal 73.26 My flesh and my heart faileth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to consume with desire or to fail with long expectation This poor mans case was thus stated He saw the wicked to flourish and the godly oppressed which brought him under anxious disputes about the chiefest Good but upon inquirie in the Sanctuarie he was resolved to adhere inviolably to God as his chiefest Good So it follows But God is the strength of my heart and my portion for ever Some render it the reck unto which my heart adheres others the firme adhesion of my heart is to God my chiefest Good Whence follows his libertie v. 28. Psal 86.4 Thus Psal 86.4 Rejoice the Soul of thy servant i. e. make me free for and in al moral exercices and why for unto thee O Lord do I lift up my Soul i.e. unto thee as my chiefest Good do I adhere So Psal 25.1 This tenacious adherence of the Soul to its last end is lively illustrated by our Lord Mat. 6 20-24 v. 20. He exhorts them Mat. 6 20-24 To lay up treasures in Heaven i. e. to make God their last End and chiefest Good to cleave to himwith an inviolable intime bent of wil and he gives the reason of it v. 21. For where your treasure is there wil your heart be also the heart and the Treasure are ever together This our Lord illustrates by a lively notion v. 24. He wil hold to the one and despise the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mordicus adhaerebit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies to hold fast a thing in opposition to those that would pluck it from us Thence to be very tenacious in adhering to persons or things So in Plato Xenophon and Isocrates It 's emphatically here as Luk. 16.13 Luk. 16.13 applied to the Souls tenacious adhering to its last End and chiefest Good Whence it 's added and despise the other A Soul that tenaciously adheres to its chiefest Good despiseth al frowns or blandishments that may assault it Thence v. 25. our Lord concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore i. e. If you adhere to God as your chiefest Good you will not be so anxiously concerned about the goods of Time To sum up this Argument Every Creature has an Element to live in and when it s in that Element it is most free The Souls Element is its last End and chiefest Good and every man is more or lesse morally free as he more or lesse adheres thereto For such as a mans last end is such is the motion of his Soul as to moral good or evil and moral libertie or bondage By how much the more we love delight in and enjoy our last end by so much the more free we are in al our ways The libertie of a rational Agent consistes not in having varietie of objects to adhere to and take complacence in but in transmitting al to his last end which is his best good That a Wil actually and strongly bended to adhere to its last End and chiefest Good is most free wil appear by the following Particulars 1 The more the Wil is fortified by true Virtue to adhere to its last End and chiefest Good the more free it is from sin which is the worst servitude He indeed is truly noble and generose who is not a vassal to any base lust Al power to sin is the diminution of libertie Impeccabilitie or an utter impossibilitie of sinning is so far from destroying libertie as that it is perfected hereby The sweetest and highest libertie is to have no power to sin Now the more the Wil actually adheres to its last end the lesse power it has to sin 2 Moral libertie consistes in the Souls being preserved from whatever may damnifie or prejudice it and wherein consistes the preservation of every things but in its Vnitie Doth not division ever bring dissolution And what preserves the Souls unitie so much as actual adherence to God the first Unitie 3 The moral libertie of the Wil consistes chiefly inhaving al inferor things subject to it and when are althings more subject to the dominion of the Wil than when it is by a resolute actual adherence subject to the Wil of God 4 The more harmonious and uniforme the Souls acts are the more morally free they are And whence springs this harmonie but from actual regard and adherence to the last end 5 Where ever the Soul finds rest and satisfaction there it finds moral libetie and doth not the Rest of the Soul arise from its adherence to
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a practice against right reason which must be understood objectively of the Law of Nature as before Whence Plato himself Rep. 9. saith That Sin is most distant from Law and Order Again Leg. 10. he affirmes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Sin is an intemperate excesse of the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and signifies primarily the excesse of any humor in the bodie and thence the inordinate and irregular excesse of the Soul and its Affections For look as Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Concent and Symmetrie of the Soul so sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Asymmetrie and Ataxie Hence also Plato in his Epinom pag. 978. cals Sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. A motion void of reason order decorum measure yea a confused agitation whereby the Soul is depraved and contaminated Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 injustice Definit Platon is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit over-looking or despising Laws Yea Plato Repub. 9. pag. 574. cals sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transgression of the Law as sacred Philosophie 1 Joh. 3.4 Thus also Aristotle 1 Joh. 3.4 both in his Ethics and Rhetoric stiles sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Transgression of the Law But this Hypothesis shines with more illustrious beams in sacred Philosophie whence Plato borrowed his choisest Philosophemes Thence in the O. T. al the notions whereby sin is expressed signifie a Transgression of the Law We find three several notions of sin together Psal 32.1 2. 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 32.1 2. which denotes Defection Rebellion Prevarication against God 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies Aberration and Deviation from the right way of Gods Law 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which importes Perversitie Obliquitie Iniquitie Privation of Rectitude 4 Sin is stiled Psal 101.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 101.3 a mater of Belial i. e. a lawlesse mater such as wil not come under the yoke From 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without a yoke which the LXX translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and whereto Paul seems to allude 2 Cor. 6.14 15. 5 Sin is stiled a Violation or making void the Law Psal 119.126 Zeph. 3.4 Hos 4.2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They break the bounds of the Law An allusion to Inundations and Land-flouds that break down al bounds So great is the violence which sin offers to the Divine Law 6 Sin is said to be a Tortuositie or wresting of the Law Psal 125.5 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obliquations or crooked ways 7 Sin is called a Declination Aberration Deflexion Psal 119 51 67. Psal 101.3 yea v. 4. it is stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perverse 8 It is termed Rebellion Psal 5.10 66.7 Which termes though different in themselves yet they al import Transgression of the Law Thus also in the N. T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with other notions whereby sin is expressed do al import Transgression of the Law Hence the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That al sins are equal because the least deviation from the Law is a Transgression as wel as the greatest Yet hence it follows not but that there are degrees and aggravations of sins according to their various objects and circumstances Hence it follows Sin as to its formal Reason privative that sin as to its formal Idea Reason or Nature is not positive but privative For the clearing whereof we may consider these following Propositions 1 Al moral Evil or Sin is founded in some natural Good For albeit there be pure good which has no mixture of evil either natural or moral as the chiefest Good yet there is no pure Evil which has not for its subject some natural good It 's true there are some Acts that are intrinsecally evil that is so far evil as that they can never be good as the hatred of God and the like Yet these Acts are called intrinsecally evil not as if their evil were intrinsecal to the natural entitie of the acts for it 's possible that the evil may be separated from the acts but because they cannot be put forth towards such an object morally considered without sin 2 Al Sin is an aggregate composite Being composed of positive and privative The material Subject or natural Act is positive but the formal Reason or moral deficience of Rectitude is privative The positive Act of it self abstracted from the privation is not sinful but both together as mater and forme make up one Compositum It 's a Question in the Scholes Whether Sin thus compounded of privative and positive be unum per se or per accidens And Suarez wel solves this difficultie telling us That if we consider sin as a physical real Being it is unum per accidens but if we consider it as a moral Being so it is unum per se because the positive act and privative deficience are so intimately conjoined for the constitution of one moral Evil that they may be looked on under the notion of act and power or mater and forme so that the act cannot be evil without the privation nor the privation without the act 3 Every Privation as such is evil as every Forme or Act good For what is a privation but the want of some due perfection And is not every want of due perfection evil to that subject that wants it Every thing if it want any good that belongs to it is so far evil 4 When we say the formal reason of Sin is privative the terme formal must not be taken strictly but in a laxe notion and morally For the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Obliquitie of sin being that by which it is formalised and yet not formally intended by the Agent hence sin in a strict sense cannot be said to have any formal Cause yet because this obliquitie or privation of Rectitude doth morally constitute the act sinful it may in a more laxe notion be rightly termed the formal Reason or Cause 5 Sin as to its formal reason is not a Physic or Logic privation nor yet pure nothing but a moral privation or deficience as to moral rectitude In this respect some Divines ascribe to sin something positive not absolutely as if it were somewhat subsistent but relatively and morally as it is opposed to pure nothing for say they sin is a privation which makes the act whereto it belongs sinful and therefore it is not mere nothing So Suarez saith that sin is not a real Being yet it is such a Being as may suffice to the truth of a proposition Thus indeed Plato in his Sophist teacheth us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-ens may be considered as pure nothing and so it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unintelligible and ineffable or else it may be considered as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which truly is not yet not simply
〈◊〉 that every one counts his ignorance his wisdome Hence it comes to passe that whiles we know nothing we thinke we know althings And are not those greatly to be pitied who make no other use of their reason but to render themselves more unreasonable and ignorant Is any thing more worthy of compassion than the blindnesse of such as seem most quick-sighted and sage in the World And whence comes this proud affected ignorance but from mens not knowing God and themselves Is it not a strange thing that the Soul which knows althings else should be so ignorant of it self and of its Maker Thence Plato Alcibiad 2. pag. 144. saith It is no wonder that they who are ignorant of God should account that which is worst best Whence he concludes That the ignorance of the best good is the worst evil And as to the ignorance of our selves he openly affirmes Theaecet pag. 176. That those are by so much the more what they thinke they are not i. e. ignorant by how much the lesse they thinke they are so And that this proud affected practic Ignorance of God and our selves is the root of al sin he further demonstrates Alcibiad 1. pag. 117. Thou seest therefore that Sin is appendent to action by reason of that ignorance whereby a man thinkes he knows what indeed he is ignorant of And he subjoins the reason Those are left under error 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who knowing nothing thinke they know every thing Confidence of knowlege is a sure marque of ignorance Whence he concludes pag. 118. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This very ignorance therefore is the cause of Sins and most opprobriose Lastly Leg. 5. pag. 732. he assures us That when we attemt those things whereof we are ignorant we grossely erre Such a venimous maligne efficacious influence has proud conceited practic Error on al sin Indeed the power of sin lies in the power of darknesse or ignorance practic Errors foment and maintain lusts The mind like a silk-worme lies intangled in those errors that came out of its own bowels when lust hath put out Reason it soon takes the Chair men of corrupt minds are men of sinful lives Mind and Wil do reciprocally vitiate each other whiles lust bribes conscience out of office it cooperates with sin Divine light is a burden to a corrupt conscience which delights to spin out of it self sick dreaming errors thereby to create its own chains and fetters a carnal mind vainly puffed up out-reasons al good convictious of dutie surely there is no dutie done by that man whose conscience doth not its dutie for there is nothing in man active for God when conscience is not first active It 's evident then that practic error of conscience opens the door to al sin And as Plato so Aristotle his Scholar hath greatly explicated and demonstrated the pestiferous influence which practic error hath on al sin Thus Eth. l. 3. c. 2. pag. 121. where he makes this difference between Sins of ignorance and ignorant Sins A drunken man that kils another in his drunken fit sins ignorantly and yet his sin is not a Sin of Ignorance because that ignorance was voluntarily contracted Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Therefore every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and from what he ought to abstain and by this they are made unjust and wicked And Eth. l. 3. c. 7. pag. 144. he distributes this practic ignorance into its several kinds 1 There is saith he an ignorance the cause of which is in our selves As when drunken men sin ignorantly which ignorance was contracted by their voluntary drunkennesse 2 There is an Ignorance of Right or Law when men are ignorant of their dutie which they ought to know 3 There is an ignorance from our own neglect which had we been diligent in the use of means we might have avoided 4 There is an ignorance from depraved affections and custome in sinning We may reduce these Philosophemes of Plato and Aristotle to this more formal distribution Man is directed in his action by a twofold knowlege the one universal the other particular a defect in either of these causeth sin Whence it follows that a man may have an universal knowlege that this or that is sinful in general and yet want a particular judgement of its sinfulnesse in this or that case So that particular ignorance is very wel consistent with universal knowlege But now sithat universal knowlege though most certain is not so influential on our actions as particular because actions are about singulars hence it follows that particular ignorance has more force to lead men into sin than universal knowlege has to prevent it This particular ignorance may be again distributed into natural or voluntary and voluntary may be again divided into that which is antecedent or that which is consequent to the act Yea al ignorance which ariseth from the Wil may be looked on as voluntary For what is involuntary if it arise from some precedent voluntary act it may be judged voluntary according to moral estimation As in that instance which Aristotle gives of a Drunkard whose ignorance is voluntary because arising from the act of his own Wil. For it is a good Rule of Aristotle That those Acts whose Principe is in us may be said to be ours and voluntarily undertaken by us Lastly we may with Aristotle distinguish between sins which are per ignorantiam i. e. when ignorance is the cause of the sin and such as are cum ignorantia i. e. when albeit ignorance attends the sin yet the proper cause of that ignorance lies in the sinners wil The former are those which we cal sins of ignorance but the later not because the ignorance is voluntary Men want not so much means of knowing what they ought to do as wil to do what they know Reason may rightly discerne the thing which is good and yet the wil of man not incline it self thereto as oft as sensual passions prejudice or affected ignorance prevail So that some practic error or inconsideration lies at the root of every sin either because men do not practically consider al circumstances or if they do consider them yet they do not practically determine this or that Act to be evil but instead thereof they foist in another false Conclusion That this or that sinful Act is sweet or profitable A corrupt Conscience may assent to good premises and yet dissent from the conclusion yea consent to a bad conclusion Lusts pervert Conscience and sil it with partialitie and prejudice in its inquiries The light of a carnal mind is easily reconciled with lust for a secure Conscience takes up such a Religion as wil not distaste its lusts nor yet its lusts molest it There is a peace between the lust and light of a carnal heart It 's easie for a secure Conscience to cast light into prison and detain the truth of God in unrighteousnesse to believe as
and observe its regular Fluxes and Refluxes c. if we rake into the bowels of the Earth and inquire into the origine of Stones both preciose and commun mineral Juices and Metals Lastly if we destil Plants or anatomise Animals what an incomparable Harmonie Order and Perfection shal we find in each of these both in reference each to other and to the whole Universe This is wel done by Plato in his Timaus pag. 28 c. whence he concludes That there must be an infinitely wise Mind who frames al these things into such an admirable order agreable to his own eternal Ideas Thus also Joan. Damascenus Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that God who in his own nature is invisible is made visible by his operations we know by the admirable constitution and gubernation of the Vniverse Wherein he demonstrates the invisible Essence and Existence of God from his visible operations and workes as Rom. 1.20 § 5. 5. Gods Existence from the connate Idea of God in the Soul Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deitie from the Microcosme or Man specially his Soul and those innate Ideas of a Deitie loged there Thus Leg. 12. pag. 966. Do we not know that there are two things which make us believe that there is a God one which we before mentioned touching the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it is the most ancient and divine of althings made I say of those things whose motion admits generation but so as that it hath obtained an everlasting essence for it self There are two parts in this Argument which demonstrate the existence of a Deitie 1 The divine origine and nature of the Soul 2 Its Immortalitie 1 The divine origine and nature of the human Soul fully evinceth the existence of God Thus Plato Leg. 10. pag. 899. Let him who formerly denied there was a God prove that we speak not truth in giving the Soul the first place or let him believe us and so for the future order his life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he dout not of a Deitie But let us consider whether to those that thinke there is no God we have not abundantly proved there is a God So in his Phaedo p. 81. Doth not the mind thus affected go 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the divine Being whereunto it is like This Platonic Argument may be thus improved Is there not a connate Idea of a Deitie impressed and stamped on the very nature of the Soul Doth not its immaterial spirital impassible nature speak its physic cognation with some supreme Spirit that first conferred that spirital Being on it Has not the Soul a physic Amplitude yea infinite Capacitie albeit only remote and passive of contemplating some first Truth and loving some chiefest good Has not the mind an universal empire and dominion over al objects to compound things most opposite and divide things most intimately conjoined to descend from the highest cause to the lowest effect and then to ascend from the lowest effect to the highest cause Has not the Wil an infinite thirst after good yea is never satisfied without the fruition of some supreme infinite good And do not these infinite capacities albeit only natural remote and passive implie some infinite object adequate thereto Was there ever a facultie or power in Nature without an object suited thereto Cicero tels us de Nat. Deor. lib. 1. That Nature her self has impressed a notion of a Deitie on the minds of al. As if he had said according to Plato's mind Has not God stamped an Idea of himself on human Nature May we not as wel abandon our very Beings our selves as abandon the notices and characters of a Deitie engraven on our Beings Doth not every human Soul carrie the signature and marque of his Creator impressed on it self Is there not an impresse and Idea of a Deitie incorporated and contempered in the very complexion and constitution of the Soul And albeit man by sin runs away as a fugitive from his Lord and Maker yet has he not secured his claim to man by his marque and physic Idea stamped on the Soul of man The Ideas and Characters of a Deitie are more clearly and lively stamped on the Souls of men than upon any part of the sensible World 2 As for the Immortalitie of the Soul doth not this also implie an eternal object answerable thereto Thus Plato in his Symposium pag. 207. informes us That man who is mortal as to his terrene part seekes to be immortal as to his more noble part And if the Soul seekes to be immortal must there not be an immortal eternal infinite good in the fruition of which it seeks immortal Beatitude Of this see more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. lib. 3. cap. 2. sect 10. § 5. § 6. The Existence of God demonstrated by practic Arguments 1. From Conscience Plato has given us some practic and moral Demonstrations of a Deitie As 1 some moral though imperfect notices of good and evil impressed on Conscience with affections of fear and shame on the commission of sin Plato in his Minos pag. 317. makes mention of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a royal Law of Nature some notices whereof remain on degenerate human Nature These notions the Stoics terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Aristotelians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 commun and innate notions Among which they reckon up such as these That there is a God that this God was the Maker and is the Conservator and Rector of the Vniverse that he is infinitely wise just good c. That he is to be worshipped that virtue is to be embraced vice avoided c. These commun notices they make to be connate and engraven on the Soul And indeed sacred Philosophie assures us that there are such commun notices of good and evil naturally engraven on mens consciences as Rom. 2.14 15. which yet are improved by the workes of Providence as Act. 14.17 where rain and fruitful seasons are said to be Gods witnesse Now al Notions of good and evil clearly demonstrate the existence of a Deitie for the distinction of good and evil as to man refers to some principe above him were there no supreme Rector and Judge to reward good and punish evil the very notions of good and evil would vanish into smoke and vapor What can be good if there be not some Being originally and infinitely good to which it refers and by whole Law it is measured Can we imagine how the notions of good and evil should exist in mens minds if there were not a supreme Rector to give Laws for the measure thereof If man had not some supreme Lord to give Laws to him how could he be guilty of any moral transgression Can he that is his own Law be guilty of an offence Who can charge any man with doing il unlesse he break the Law of some Superior What could be just or unjust if there were not a supreme
dependes This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil the Hebrews expressed by the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai which denotes Gods Soverain Dominion over the Creature from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a pillar or basis on which the whole Fabric dependes but it dependes not on the Fabric so althings depend on the Soverain Wil of God but it on nothing Thus Plato Epist p. 312. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 About the King of althings althings are and althings are for his sake 〈◊〉 and he is the cause of althings beautiful Wherein note 1 thâ—â—e stiles God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Soveraign King or Lord of al i. e. according to the origination of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the basis of al answerably to the import of Adonai Lord. 2 He saith althings are for God i. e. to be disposed of according to his Soverain Wil and pleasure And 3 he addes the Reason because he is the cause of althings i. e. God by virtue of his prime causalitie and efficience has an universal Dominion over al things to dispose of them as he pleaseth for his Glorie The light of Nature teacheth that every one ought to be the supreme moderator of his own work Hence what ever God wils is just because he wils it This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil is lively expressed Psal 135.5 Psal 135.5 6. For I know that Jehova is Great and that our Lord is superior to al Gods Jehovah i. e. the first Supreme Being who gives being to althings but receives nothing from any Creature Is Great i. e. Infinite in being and therefore most Soverain and Independent in his Wil and Pleasure Whence it follows and superior to al Gods i. e. infinitely above Angels and Men though never so potent who al depend on his soverain independent Wil. Thence he addes v. 6. Whatsoever the Lord pleased that did he in Heaven and in Earth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whatsoever the Lord willeth which notes the Soveraintie Independence and Omnipotence of his Wil. Jonah 1.14 So Jonah 1.14 For thou O Lord hast done as it pleased thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to thy soverain independent Wil. The greatest Notions or Attributes that our shallow judgements can invent are infinitely too short to expresse the Soveraintie of the Divine Wil. But the more fully to explicate and demonstrate the Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil God independent physically and morally we are to consider that as causes so dependence on those causes is twofold physic or moral Physic Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on a superior Cause for real efficience Moral Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on its superior for moral influence And there is this commun to both as in Naturals inferior causes dependent on superiors in acting have no power to act contrary to the efficace of their superiors so in Morals But now God is neither physically nor morally dependent on any superior cause 1 He has no physic dependence on any superior cause because he is the first in the order of physic Causes Again he is superior to al Gods as Psal 135.5 and therefore cannot be influenced by any So Plato Repub. assurâ—◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That an hypocrite is neither able to hide himself from God nor yet to force him The Divine Wil receives no real efficience or influence from the human Wil but the human Wil is really influenced by the Divine Wil God wils not things because we wil them but we wil things because God wils them 2 Neither is God morally dependent on any other Moral dependence is founded in natural where there is natural independence in an absolute degree there cannot be moral dependence in any degree The rational Creature having a twofold relation to God as a Creature and as rational hence he has a twofold dependence on God one natural the other moral but God being independent as to his Essence must necessarily also be independent as to Morals Moral dependence is either Legal or Final Legal dependence is when an inferior dependes on the Laws Remunerations or Distributions of any Superior Final Dependence is when an inferior dependes on some supreme last end The Divine Wil is in neither regard dependent 1 It is not legally dependent because not subject to the law of any The Divine Wil gives Laws to al Creatures but receives Laws from none yea it hath no legal dependence on any meritorious acts of the Creature God willeth nothing without himself because it is just but it is therefore just because he wils it The reasons of good and evil extrinsec to the Divine Essence are al dependent on the Divine Wil either decernent or legislative 2 The Divine Wil has no final dependence on any superior end because it s own Bonitie is its only end The End is the Cause Reason or Motive of willing althings that conduce to the End but now nothing can move the Wil of God but his own Bonitie which indeed is the same with his Wil and Essence wherefore it cannot be properly said to be the cause of his Wil because nothing is said to be the cause of it self When Theologues affirme That God wils one thing for another they mean not that the other thing is the cause or motive of the Divine Wil but that God wils there should be a causal connexion between the things willed As God willed the Sun Moon and Stars should be for the production of fruits and these for the use of man c. Gods willing one thing for another notes a causal connexion between the things willed but no causal influence on the Divine Wil Deus vult hoc propter hoc non autem propter hoc vult hoc Ephes 1.4 5. God wils this for that yet for this he doth not wil that i. e. God wils effects and causes and that the effects are for the causes yet he doth not wil the effects for the causes as if the causes were the motives of his Wil. Thus we must understand that Text Eph. 1.4 According as he has chosen us in him before the foundation of the world that we should be holy and without blame before him in love How are the Elect chosen in Christ 1 Negatively they are not chosen in Christ as the meritorious Cause of Election nor from a prevision of their Faith in Christ as the motive of Divine Election according to the Pelagian Hypothesis But 2 They are said to be chosen in Christ as their commun Head that by him they might be made new Creatures and so partakers both of Grace and Glorie Christ and Faith have no causal influence on the Divine Wil but the Divine Wil decrees that Christ and Faith should have a causal influence on Salvation Thence it follows v. 5. Having predestinated us unto the Adoption of Children by Jesus Christ unto himself according to the good pleasure of his Wil. Here
Veracitie and indeed no wonder seeing it is the great Spring of the Divine life and consolation both here and hereafter § 3. The last Divine Attribute The Sanctitie of God we are to discourse of is the Sanctitie or Holinesse of God whereof we find great and illustrious Characters in sacred Philosophie 1 We find the Sanctitie of God set forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and distinction from al created Sanctitie Exod. 15.11 So Exod. 15.11 Who is like unto thee O Lord amongst the Gods or mighty men Who is like unto thee gloriose in Holinesse c Where he placeth Gods transcendent Eminence and Elevation above al Creatures as that wherein his essential Sanctitie chiefly consistes And indeed the peerlesse Eminence of Gods sacred Majestie is that wherein his Sanctitie chiefly consistes as we intend anon more fully to demonstrate Thus 1 Sam. 2.2 There is none holy as the Lord 1 Sam. 2.2 for there is none besides thee neither is there any Rock like our God Hannah here as Moses before placeth the Sanctitie of God in his Supereminence above al Creatures 2 Hence God is frequently brought in as an object of Divine Worship with regard to his Holinesse So Psal 30.4 Give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse i. e. of his peerlesse Eminences And Psal 71.22 Vnto thee wil I sing with the harpe O thou holy One of Israel Also Psal 92.12 Psal 92.12 And give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse or celebrate the memorial of his Holinesse i. e. Lift up his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or transcendent Excellences Again Psal 98.1 O sing unto the Lord a new song for he hath done marvellous things his right hand and his holy arme hath gotten him victorie His holy arme or the arme of his Holinesse i. e. of his holy power so much above al other powers The like Psal 99.3 Let them praise thy great and terrible name for it is holy Also v. 9. Exalt the Lord our God and worship at his holy hil for the Lord our God is holy The like v. 5. As God is a transcendent superlative Majestie exalted above al other Gods or Majesties as Exod. 15.11 so in al Acts of Worship we must exalt him by giving him a singular incommunicable peculiar Worship Whence in Scripture those that give that Worship which is due to God to any besides him or in conjunction with him by way of object either mediate or immediate are said to profane his holy Name Ezech. 20.39 43.7 8. because Gods Holinesse consisting in a superlative incommunicable Majestie admits no corrival in point of Worship Hence to sanctifie the holy Name or Majestie of God is 1 to serve and glorifie him because of his transcendent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Eminence and 2 to do it with a peculiar separate incommunicated Worship because he is holy and separate above althings else Not to do the former is Irreligion Profanenesse and Atheisme not to do the later is Idolatrie and Superstition as judicious Mede wel observes Hence 3 God is said to sit on a Throne of Holinesse Psal 47.8 God sitteth upon the Throne of his Holinesse Psal 47.8 Alluding to the Thrones of Princes which were in the midst of the people exalted and lift up that so their Majestie might appear more illustrious God being by reason of his transcendent Eminences exalted infinitely above al Creatures he is therefore said to sit on the Throne of his Holinesse 4 We find Gods Holinesse in a most eminent manner and with emphatic Characters proclaimed by such as have any views of God Thus Esa 6.3 Holy holy holy is the Lord of Hosts So Rev. 4.8 5 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by puritie Hab. 1.13 Hab. 1.13 Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil and canst not look on iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prae videndo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is comparative as if he had said O! how pure are thine eyes how impossible is it for thee to behold sin with the least delight or approbation So 1 Joh. 3.3 As he is pure 6 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by Rectitude Psal 25 8. Good and upright is the Lord. So Psal 92.15 To shew that the Lord is upright We find also in Plato many great notices of the Sanctitie of God conformable to those of sacred Philosophie So Theaetet pag. 176. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evils find no place with God Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God is in no manner unrighteous but as it seems most righteous So Repub. 2. pag. 379. he saith That in Theologie we should use such modules as come nearest to the Nature of God and demonstrate what God is Thus we must constantly ascribe to God things consentaneous to his Nature Whence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must we not determine then that God is indeed good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But no good is noxious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which hurts not doth it do any evil No surely Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good therefore is not the cause of althings but of those things that are good it is the cause but of evils it is not the cause i. e. God is the first Cause and Author of al natural and moral good but as for moral evil he is not the Author or Cause thereof as it is evil because moral evils as such have no efficient cause but only deficient Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of good things we must own no principal cause but God but as for evils we must inquire after some other causes of them for God must not be estimed the cause of them His mind is that God must be owned as the cause of al good both Natural and Moral yea of the materia substrata or the material entitie of sin which is a natural good but as for the proper Moral cause of Sin as Sin is a deordination or difformitie from the Divine Law that is proper to the sinner for God must not be thought to be the Author or Moral cause of sin This he farther explains p. 380. Either we must not at al attribute evils to God or if we do it must be in that manner as before namely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must say that God hath acted wel and justly and has inflicted those punishments on them that thereby he might bring some profit Wherein he informes us that God is the cause of penal evils not as evils but as conducing to good Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That God who is good should be the Author or Moral Cause of Evil to any this we must with al manner of contention refute and not suffer any in the Citie to speak or hear such things Plato strongly assertes that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal cause of al good but not of sin as sin i. e. he neither commands invites
encourageth nor by any other Moral causalitie produceth sin albeit God doth concur to the material act or physic entitie of sin which is naturally good yet he doth not at al concur to the moral production obliquitie or deordination of sin which has indeed no real efficient cause but only deficient according to that of Proclus There is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idea of moral evils But the more distinctly and yet concisely to explicate the sanctitie of God we are to know that his original Essential and Absolute Holiness is nothing else but the incommunicable superlative 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or supereminence of his Divine Majestie as separate from althings else For al Sanctitie and al the notions thereof specially Grecanic and Hebraic implie separation and discretion Whence the Sacred Majestie of God being in regard of its infinite Perfection and Dignitie infinitely exalted above al Beings and Dignities whatsoever it must necessarily be the prime sanctitie Yea Holiness is so far appropriated to the first Being as that the Heathens ascribed a fictitious sanctitie and eminence to al their spurious Deities whereby they generally acknowleged that the prime Holinesse belongs only to the first Being It 's true good Angels and Men are Holy by participation and derivation but they are not Holinesse in the abstract this appertains only to he prime original essential Holinesse who is infinitely separate from al other Dignities and Eminences in whom al Holinesse is in the abstract and essentially from whom also al Holinesse flows as from the source and spring § 4. We find in Plato not only Characters of the Divine Essence and Attributes Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie but also some dark notices of the Trinitie which I no way dout were originally traduced from the Sacred Fountain of Hebraic Philosophie We have Plato's Sentiments about a Trinitie mentioned more expressely in his Sectators Plotinus Porphyrie Iamblichus and Proclus And the whole is wel explicated by Cyril Alexandr Contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit Paris 1638. thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For Porphyrie expounding the Sentiment of Plato saith that the essence of God procedes even to three Hypostases but that the Supreme God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Supreme GOOD and that after him the second is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the prime Opificer or Creator moreover that the third is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the mundane Soul or Universal Spirit For the Divinitie extended it self to the Soul of the Vniverse This Platonic Trinitie Cyril refutes as that which gave Spawn and Seed to Arianisme as hereafter I am not ignorant that Learned Cudworth in his New Book against Atheisme B. 1. C. 4. § 34. p. 590 c. endeavors to apologise for this Platonic Trinitie and reconcile it with the Christian Yet he ingenuously acknowledgeth pag. 580 and 601 c. That the most refined Platonic Trinitie supposeth an Essential Dependence and Subordination of the second Hypostasis to the First and of the Third to the Second Yea he grantes that the Platonists generally held these three Hypostases to be three distinct Gods as in what follows I conceive those endeavors to reconcile the Christians Trinitie with the Platonic to be of most dangerous consequence and that which proved Origen's Peste as Part. 3. B. 2. c. 1. § 8. The chief place I find in Plato wherein he gives us some dark adumbration of a Trinitie is Epist 6. p. 323. Let this Law be constituted by you and confirmed by an Oath not without obtesting 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both God the Imperator of althings both which are and which shal be and the Father of that Imperator and Cause whom indeed if we truely Philosophise we shal al distinctly know so far as that knowledge may fal within the power of blessed men This description of God Clemens Alexandrinus and others interpret of God the Father and God the Son who is indeed the Imperator of althings We find also in Plato's Epinom mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which they attribute to the second person in the Trinitie Whence the Poets make Minerva to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the mind of Jupiter or his Wisdome produced out of his head without Mother as the true Messias was stiled by the Hebrews The wisdome of God without Mother Plotinus Ennead 5 Lib. 1. Philosophiseth copiosely of this Platonic Trinitie the Title of which Book runs thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the Three Principal or Causal Hypostases And he begins Cap. 2. with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mundane Soul its Dignitie and Office and Ennead 5. l. 5. c. 3. speaking of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mind the second Hypostasis in the Platonic Trinitie he saith that he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Second God And En. 5. l. 1. c. 7. p. 489. he saith That this Second God the First Mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Being now begotten by the first God begot also al entities with himself namely the whole pulchritude of Ideas which were al intellectile Gods Furthermore we must conceive that this Begotten Mind is ful of althings begotten by him and doth as it were swallow up althings begotten Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the progenie of this Mind is a certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Hypostasis consisting in cogitation c. Proclus in Plat. Timae p. 93. cals this Platonic Trinitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the tradition of the Three Gods and he makes according to Numenius the First God to be the Grandfather the Second to be the Son the Third to be the Grandson i. e. the Second God to be begotten by the First and the Third by the Second Porphyrie also explicating Plato's mind cals God the Creator of althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Paterne Mind who also makes three subsistences in the essence of the Divinitie the first he cals the Supreme God the second the Creator the third the Soul of the Vniverse The like Iamblichus his Scholar concerning the Egyptian Mysteries The first God the prime being the Father of God whom he begets remaining in his solitarie unitie c. And Plotinus writ a Book of the three Persons or Subsistences whereof the first he makes to be the Supreme Eternal Being who generated the second namely the eternal and perfect Mind as before So in his Book of Providence he saith That althings were framed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the Divine Mind Thus Plato in his Phaedo saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Divine Mind is the framer and cause of althings That these Platonic Philosophemes were the Seminarie of Arianisme we have endeavored to demonstrate Part. 3. l. 2. c. 1. § 9. And this is wel observed by Cyril contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit Paris 1638. where speaking of Plato and his Trinitie he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truely he contemplated not the whole rightly but in
which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
And can the instrument act without the concurrence of the principal Agent What then can we suppose should impede Divine Providence 3 Al providence supposeth an Act of the Wil and are not al Acts of Divine Volition efficacious Bradwardine frequently assertes and demonstrates That God permits nothing but what he wils It 's true man oft permits things that he neither wils nor doth because he cannot hinder them but there is no mere permission with God without some Act of his Wil. This is proved from the infinite Actualitie Efficacitie and Omnipotence of the Divine Wil. Thus Bradwardine l. 1. c. 32. pag. 282 c. spends a whole Chapter to prove That althings fal out and are governed by the Providence of God not only permitting but actually disposing al. And his arguments are demonstrative As 1 Otherwise the Universe should not be disposed and ordered in the best manner 2 The Scripture gives God active names as to al parts of providence c. And then Cap. 33. he demonstrates That where-ever there is any permission of God there also is his actual Volition Hence 2. 2. Immobile and fixed Gods Providence gives to al second Causes and Events a most immobile immutable fixed and certain order things most contingent and free as to second causes are necessary and fixed as to Divine Providence Hence the Stoics as also Plato expressed this fixed order of providence by Fate which they made to be an immutable connexion or series of things determined from eternitie whereby althings are infallibly directed to their ends of which hereafter in the Gubernation of Providence That providence puts into things a fixed immutable order is evident because 1 nothing fals out but what was fore-ordained from al eternitie by infinite Wisdome and an omnipotent Wil. 2 Al particular causes and effects are contained under and subservient to the Universal Cause and therefore subject to his Order Yea this Order must necessarily be most indissoluble and certain because it is founded in the Efficacitie of the Divine Wil Efficience and Gubernation as more fully anon 3. Divine Providence is most Connatural and Agreable to the exigence and condition of the second causes or subjects it workes upon The Necessitie and Immobilitie 3. Connatural and agreable that attendes the Providence of God doth no way infringe or impair the Contingence and Libertie of second Causes but confirme the same Therefore men act freely because the Providence of God determines them so to act So that nothing more conduceth to the natural libertie of the Wil than the necessary Determination of Divine Providence because it determines althings to act according to their Natures it offers not the least force or violence to the Human Wil but sweetly though necessarily moves it to the end appointed Gods manner of ordering and conducting second Causes is without the least prejudice to their proper manner of working he guides them sweetly according to the principes and instincts he has put into them For 1 Doth not Divine Providence furnish every second Cause with its Power Virtue and Efficacitie to worke 2 Doth not the same Providence maintain and conserve that Power and Vigor imparted 3 Is not also the actuation of that Power from Providence 4 Doth not Providence also most wisely and sweetly yet powerfully order the manner of working as also perfect the same Is it not then most sweet and connatural in al its Executions Hence 4. Divine Providence is most Beautiful and Perfect 4. Beautiful and perfect al its executions are in Number Weight and Measure Doth not the Wise Man assure us Eccles 3.11 That every thing is beautiful in its season Is not every execution and particular event of Providence most beautiful and proper at the season allotted it by God What are al the travels and births of time but the Eternal and wise Decrees of Providence brought forth into light Have not al issues and events not only natural and necessary but also the most contingent and voluntary their fixed time and limits constituted by Divine Providence which renders them most beautiful and perfect Are not those very products which in their own nature seem most monstrose and deformed most beautiful in their time and place as they relate to Divine Providence Is not God infinitely wise to order althings in the best manner And is he not also infinitely powerful to execute whatever he ordaines and decrees Is not that which in regard of mans Providence and Execution is most sinful and deformed in regard of Gods Providence and Execution most beautiful as Christs Crucifixion What must we say of al that confusion that seems to be in States and Churches Persons and Things Doth it reach the Providence of God Is it not only in regard of second causes and our mistakes as to the first cause Cannot yea wil not Divine Providence bring a beautiful order out of al this confused chaos It 's true Sacred Philosophie tels us of evil dayes which should come to passe in this last Scene of the World but whence springs the evil of these later days Is it not from the Lusts of Men not the Providence of God Are not the worst of days Naturally good yea Morally also to those who are good and do good Is it not the Moral Evil of Men that makes al Times Evil If Men were better would not the Times soon prove better Yea are not those very Disorders and Confusions that arise from the Lusts of Men ordered by Divine Providence in the best manner for the good of the whole As in Nature varietie addes Beautie so in the Providence of God varietie of changes renders it more beautiful It was a great saying of a Stoic He that wil take upon him to mend things let him first take upon to mend God Certainly nothing is done by God but that which to leave undone were not so good Many things that seem disorderly and confused as to parts are not so if we consider the whole Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 29. having proved that God provides and governes althings according to his most wise Wil he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore God solely is good and wise by nature or Essentially As therefore he is good he provides for he that provides not for such as are under his care is not good but as he is wise he takes care to provide the best things Therefore it becomes us attending to these things to admire al to praise al to receive without curiose inquisition al the workes of Providence albeit they may seem to many injust because incognite and incomprehensible as in what follows That the Providence of God is most perfect see Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 94. Alvarez de Auxil Disput 28. p. 270. 5. Divine Providence is most mysterious and incomprehensible 5. Mysterious The Providences of God are much like his Being very ful of mysteries So Psal 36.6 The Judgements of God are said to
so whiles they violate one Wil and Order of Divine Gubernation they fulfil another If they wil not willingly do Gods Wil of Precept which brings happinesse with it what more just than that they suffer Gods Wil of punishment against their Wils Thus wicked men fulfil Gods providential Wil whiles they break his preceptive Wil. Yea Satan himself is under chains of irresistible Providence He is not an Absolute much lesse a Lawful Monarch but Usurper who has a restraint upon his Power though not upon his Malice He cannot Act as he would And as the persons of the wicked Gods Gubernation about sin both Men and Devils fal under the Providential Gubernation of God so also their Sins And here we are inevitably engaged in that grand Philosophic and Scholastic Question How far Sin fals under the Providential Gubernation of God For the solution whereof we shal first premit some Distinctions and then resolve the whole into certain Propositions As for Distinctions 1 We may consider Sin 1 in regard of its Causes Essicient and Final or 2 in regard of its Essential and Constitutive parts Mater and Forme 2 We may consider the Permission of Sin which is either merely Negative or Positive and both as belonging to a Legislator or to a Rector 3 We may consider the Providence of God as to its Natural Efficience or Judicial Gubernation These Distinctions being premissed we shal resolve our Question in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al Sin as other things has its Origine Causes and Constitutive parts The Causes and parts of Sin The Ethnic as wel as the Christian Scholes have admitted many Debates touching the Origine of Evil or Sin and we have this copiosely ventilated by Simplicius an acute Philosopher in his Commentaric on Epicterus C. 34. p. 175. c. And he seems to state it thus That Sin being a privation has no proper principe or cause though as to its substrate mater it may fal under some causalitie Thus Plato Repub. 2. p. 380. and Proclus on him denie that there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any Cause or Idea of Evils because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is an irregular passion or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Being which must be understood of the formal Reason of Sin for as to is substrate mater Plato and his Followers grant that al good has its Causes Suarez Metaphys Disp 11. Sect. 3. p. 251. proves wel 1 That al Sin must have some Cause 1 Because nothing is Evil of it self therefore from some Cause 2 Because nothing is Evil but as it recedes from some perfection due to it but nothing fails of its due perfection but from some cause either Agent or Impedient Now 2 this being granted That al Sin has some Cause it thence necessarily follows That some Good must be the Cause of Sin For in as much as we may not procede into Infinite nor yet stop at some Sin that has no Cause we must necessarily stop at some Good which is the cause of Evil. Hence 3 to explicate in what kind Sin may be said to have a Cause we must know 1 that Sin formally as Sin requires not a final Cause yet it may admit the same in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent That sin formally as sin requires not a final Cause is evident because consisting in a privation and defect it is not properly and of it self intended in things Thus Simplicius in Epictet C. 34. pag. 174. tels us That al Act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does participate of Good and therefore Evil can have no end And yet that Sin may have a final Cause in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent is as evident because the Agent may intend what is Evil for some end for what is Evil in one kind may be conducible or utile in some other 2 As to the Efficient Cause al Sin has some Efficient Cause yet not per se of it self and properly but by Accident and beside the primary intrinsec intention of the Agent Man is said to be Efficient or rather the Deficient Cause of Sin by producing that Action to which Sin is appendent or annexed God is said to be the Efficient not Deficient Cause of the material Act of Sin by reason of his immediate Universal Efficience to al real Entitie 4 As for the constitutive parts of Sin namely its Mater and Forme 1 Al Sin as sin has a Material Cause or Substrate Mater which is alwayes naturally Good Whence that great Effate in the Scholes Al Evil as Evil has for its fund or subject some good Thence Augustin said That Evil cannot be but in some Good because if there were any pure Evil it would destroy it self And the Reason is manifest because Sin as to its Formal Reason is not a thing purely Positive neither is it a pure Negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject to which such a perfection is due And must not this subject then be something naturally good Is not every real positive Being naturally good because the Effect of Divine Efficience Can any perfection be due to any Subject unlesse that Subject be naturally good 2 As for the Forme of Sin such as it has it consistes in the privation of that moral Rectitude which is due to the Substrate Mater or Subject Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. Lib. 1. Cap. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is the privation of Good or substance So Lib. 2. Cap. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is nothing else but a secession from Good as Darknesse is a secession from Light Of which see more B. 1. C. 4. § 1. and Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Indeed to speak properly Sin hath no Formal Reason or Cause because it is a privation Thus Plato Rep. 2. and Proclus denie that Sin has any Formal Idea as before Yet according to the commun acceptation of a Formal Cause or Reason we make its Deordination or Difformitie from the Law the formal reason thereof Hence 2. God not the Author of Sin Prop. Gods providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin doth no way denominate him the moral cause or Author of sin Thus Plato Repub. 10. saith That God is the principal cause of al good but as to sin he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no cause thereof because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he is properly the cause of sin that chooseth it So Repub. 2. pag. 380. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We must with al manner of contention refute that opinion that God who is most good is the Author or moral cause of sin neither must we concede that any speak or hear any such opinion in the Citie if we desire to have it wel constituted and governed That this Platonic Sophisme cannot be wel understood of Gods natural Efficience to the substrate mater of sin but only of
a moral Causalitie as an Author is evident from the very reason that he gives thereof namely because God is most good which only excludes Gods moral Efficience from sin as sin not his natural Efficience from the substrate mater or entitative act of sin which is in itself good and therefore from God the Cause of al good So that Plato's argument is so far from denying Gods natural Efficience to the entitative act of sin as that it confirmes the same The holy God in al his providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin whether it be permissive or ordinative is gloriosely vindicated from being the Author or moral cause of sin because he doth nothing deficiently as failing from that eternal immutable Law of Righteousnesse This is incomparably wel explicated by Simplicius in Epictetus cap. 1. pag. 24. Our Souls whiles good desire good but when they are sinful sinful objects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And both i.e. good and bad act from their own election not as being compelled by any violent necessitie Wherefore God may not be said to be the Author of sin for he made the Soul which is naturally capable of evil as being good according to the riches of his Bonitie In which he clears God from being the Author or moral cause of sin because al his providential Efficience about sin is only as he is good An Author ' properly as the Civil Law teacheth us is he that gives command Is à quo consilium accepimus Auctor noster translatè dicatur Unde Tutor propriè Auctor pulillo dicitur cui consilium impartit Justin Institut counsel or encouragement to an Act. So a Tutor is said to be the Author of what his Pupil doth by giving him counsel So again he is said to be an Author who doth approve what another doth In Philosophie he is said to be an Author who by suasive or dissuasive reasons doth exhort the principal Agent to or dehort him from any action The same they cal a Moral Cause as opposed to effective Now in no one of these respects can God be said to be the Author or moral Cause of sin for he neither commands nor counsels nor encourageth nor approves sin nor yet dissuades from virtue Neither doth God violently necessitate or compel men to sin but concurs only to the material entitative act of sin as the prime universal Efficient not as a particular deficient moral Cause 3. God the prime Cause of the entitative Act of Sin Prop. Albeit God be not the moral deficient Cause or Author of sin yet he is the efficient and prime cause of the material entitative act of sin This is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophic Thus Amos 3.6 Shal there be evil in the citie and the Lord hath not done it I acknowlege this primarily to be understood of the evil of punishment yet we are to remember that evils of punishment in regard of second causes are evils of doing Gods punishing Israel albeit it were good as from God yet it was usually sinful as to the instruments made use of therein and yet in this very regard God was the prime Efficient of the material entitative act albeit he were not a moral deficient cause of the obliquitie Thus Plato Repub. 10. pag. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must it not then necessarily be conceded that the Soul of the Universe is the cause of althings good both honest and evil and base of althings just and unjust and of al contraries in as much as we assert him to be the cause of althings Wherein observe 1 That he philosophiseth here of God as the universal Soul or Spirit of the Universe influencing and governing althings 2 He saith this universal Spirit or Soul is the prime Efficient of althings good Yea 3 not only of things honest or morally good but also of things evil base and unjust i. e. as to their entitative material act because in this regard they are good 4 He grounds this Hypothesis on the universal Causalitie of God as the prime Cause of althings Thus also Plato in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that whatever is produced be produced by some cause If so then al natural products must be produced by God the first Cause of althings and is not the entitative act of sin a natural product That the substrate mater or material entitative act of sin fals under the providential Efficience of God as the first universal Cause of althings has been universally avouched and maintained in al Ages of Christians both by Fathers and Schole-men Papists and Protestants excepting only Durandus and two or three more of his Sectators Thus Augustin de duab Anim. contra Manich. c. 6. about the end where he proves against the Manichees who held two first Principes one of good and another of evil That whatever really is as it is must procede from one God Thus also Bradward de Caus Dei pag. 739. where he strongly proves That God necessarily concurs to the substance of the act of sin albeit not to its deformitie The like pag. 289 290. Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110 c. gives us potent and invict demonstrations That God is the immediate cause of the entitative material act of sin Not to mention Alvarze de Auxil l. 3. Disp 34. and other late Dominicans who as I conceive are unjustly loaded with prejudices by a Divine of name in this particular Indeed the very Jesuites and those of their Faction concur with us in this Hypothesis Thus Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. pag. 551 c. where he strongly demonstrates That every action both natural and free good and evil as actions are produced immediately by God as the first cause This Hypothesis he maintains stoutly against Durandus and his sectators and as I judge with arguments never to be answered Thus also Ruiz de Voluntate Dei Disput 26 27. Yea Penottus de Libertat l. 8. c. 11. assures us that al Divines accord That God is the cause of the natural Entitie of Sin Among Reformed Divines this Hypothesis is generally maintained I shal mention only Davenant who was not rigid in this way in his Answer to Gods love to Mankind pag. 143 147 174 c. also de Reprobat pag. 113. where he greatly explicates and demonstrates our Hypothesis But to explicate and demonstrate our Proposition by force of reason take notice that we say not that God is the cause of sin Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin demonstrated but that he is the cause of the material entitative act of sin For the clearing of which we are to consider That many things which are true under an Hypothesis and in a limited sense are not so absolutely Thus here we may not say simply and absolutely that God is the cause of sin yet we may not denie but that he is the cause of the substrate mater
or material entitative act of sin This was long ago wel observed by Aquinas who tels us that al locutions in which it is signified that God is the cause of sin or of moral evil ought to be avoided or very cautelously limited because names that implie deformitie conjunct with the act either in general or in particular it cannot be said of them that they are from God Whence it cannot be said of sin absolutely and simply that it is from God but only with this addition or limitation that the Act as it is a real Entitie is from God This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition That God is the prime efficient cause of the material entitative Act of Sin This may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Cause Whatever is produced must have some cause of its production as Plato Tim. 28. and if it have a cause must it not also have a first cause And what can this be but God unlesse we wil with the Manichees asset two first Causes one of good and the other of evil 2 From the Participation and Limitation of every finite Act and Being Must not every participate finite create dependent Being be reduced to some essential infinite increate independent Being as the prime Efficient thereof 3 From the conservation of the material entitative Act of Sin Is not the material entitative act of sin a create Being And can any create Being conserve itself Doth not Durandus and his sectators grant that the conservation of Beings is from God And if Gods providential Efficience be necessary to the conservation of the material entitative act of sin is it not as necessary to its first production What is conservation but continued production as to God This argument is wel improved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110. and by Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 4 From the Determination of the second cause of its particular effect Every second cause being indifferent to varietie of effects cannot be determined to any one individual effect but by the immediate cooperation of the first cause Thus Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 5 From the substrate Mater of al evil which is physically and naturally good There is no moral evil which is not founded and subjectated in some natural good even hatred of God albeit the highest moral evil yet as to its entitative material act it is naturally good which is evident by this that if that act of hatred were put forth against sin it would be morally good 6 From the Ordinabilitie of al evil to some good There is no act so evil but the wise God can turne it to some good the Crucifixion of our Lord which was one of the highest evils what good was by Divine Gubernation brought out of it Doth it not much exalt the skil of a wise Physician so to order poison as to make it medisinal So it exalts Divine Gubernation to bring good out of evil as it aggravates the impietie of wicked men that they bring evil out of good 7 Doth it not take from God the main of his Providence to denie his Concurse to the substrate mater of sin What more conduceth to the Amplitude of Divine Providence than to allow him a Concurse to and Gubernation of al real Acts and Events 8 To denie Gods Concurse to the material entitative Act of Sin doth it not by a paritie of Reason subvert the supernatural concurse of God to what is good For if God can make a Creature that shal be Independent as to any one natural Act why may he not also make a Creature that shal be independent as to good Acts Hence 4. Prop. The substrate mater How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. or material entitie of Sin fals under the Divine Wil. This follows on the former because the whole of Divine concurse or efficience must be resolved into the Wil of God as before once and again But more particularly 1 The Futurition of Sin as to its substrate mater fals under the Eternal Decree of the Divine Wil. Whatever Good or Evil there is under the Sun as to its real Entitie must have its futurition from the Divine Wil. Immo peccatum quatenus à Deo justè permittitur cadit in legem aeternam Augustinus de civitat Dei L. 19. C. 22. sin it self so far as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law of the Divine Wil as Augustin wel observes Sin in its own nature as Antecedent to the Divine Wil was only possible now how could it passe from a condition of mere possibilitie to a state of futurition but by some intervening cause And what can we imagine to be the cause hereof but the Divine Wil May we not then hence conclude that Sin was future because the Divine Wil determined for just ends to permit its futurition 2 The Divine Wil is not only the cause of sins futurition but it has moreover a providential Gubernation and Efficience about the actual existence of sin 1 As for the Natural Entitie of Sin the Divine Wil is the total immediate efficient thereof as Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dist 34. Ar. 3. pag. 110. 2 The Divine Wil also physically permits the moral pravitie and obliquitie of Sin as that which may conduce to the advance of Divine Glorie For this greatly conduceth to the illustration of Divine Providence to permit some defects that may render the whole more beautiful as Aquinas at large demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71. of which hereafter Hence 5. Gods wil about the Obliquitie of Sin permissive Prop. Gods Wil about the formal reason or obliquitie of Sin is not effective or defective but only permissive 1 That Gods wil about the obliquitie of Sin is not effective is evident because Sin as to its obliquitie has no effective cause 2 That the Wil of God is not a defective cause of Sin is as evident because the same act which is defectuose and sinful in regard of the second cause is not such in regard of God Man breakes a Law and therefore sins but God breakes no Law al his Actions are conforme to the Eternal Law Whence 3 Gods Wil about the obliquitie of Sin is only permissive But now to clear up Gods permissive Wil about Sin we are to consider 1 That permission properly as to men is not an action of the Law but a negation of action when any permits another to do what he might hinder but is under no obligation to hinder Hence no man may permit Sin because he is under an obligation to hinder it but God may because he is under to obligation to hinder it as also because he can bring good out of it 2 That Permission is either of a Legislator or Rector Gods permission of Sin is not as he is Legislator but only as Rector and Governer of the World God gives no man
Judicial Gubernation of Sin consistes of these several particulars 1 God suspendes and withdraws the Celestial Influences of Divine Grace and means of restraint Thus Gen. 6.3 My Spirit shal not always strive with man How soon wil the softest heart grow harder than the Adamant if God withdraw his celestial dews of Grace as Zach. 7.12 14.17 18 Hence 2 God leaves men to the plague of their own corrupt hearts which is Plato notes is the worst judgement 3 God leaves Sinners to the heart-betwitching allurements and blandishments of this World Thus Balaam Num. 22 c. 2 Pet. 2.14 15. 4 God delivers Sinners up to the power of Satan 2 Cor. 4.3 4. 2 Tim. 2.26 5 God so orders and disposeth his providences as that al do accidentally by reason of their corrupt hearts tend to their induration Rom. 11.9 10 11. 6 Yea God permits that the very means of life be to them the savor of death 2 Cor. 2.16 Esa 28.12 13 14. 7 Yea the Prince and Mediator of life is to such a strumbling-stone and occasion of death Esa 8.14 15 16. 38.13 8 God leaves them to a spirit of slumber or spiritual occecasion Rom. 11.8 Esa 19 11-14 44.18 19. 60.1 2. 2 Thes 2.10 11. 9. Prop. In the whole of Divine Gubernation about Sin his Wisdome Justice and Sanctitie Gods Attributes illustrious in his Gubernation of Sin with other Attributes are most illustrious and resplendent 1 Gods Wisdome is eminently manifest in his gubernation of Sin in that he brings the greatest good out of the greatest evils those very sins whereby wicked men endeavor to darken the Glorie of God he turnes to the advance of his Glorie We have a good Philosopheme to this purpose in Plato Theaetet pag. 167. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A wise man makes those things which are in themselves evil turne to good and to seem such as a wise Physician turnes poison into a medicament which similitude he useth 2 The Justice of God is most resplendent in the punishing that sin he permits to be 3 Gods Sanctitie is also most conspicuous in that those very acts which are morally evil in regard of God are both morally and naturally good in regard of Divine Gubernation The sin which God governes is not sin in regard of God but of the Creature that comes short of the Divine Law The holy God violates no Law by concurring as an universal Cause with the Sinner that violates his Law The sinful qualitie of a moral effect may not be imputed to the first universal Cause Duo cùm faciunt idem non est idem Proverb but only to the second particular cause Here that commun Proverbe holds true When two do the same it is not the same i. e. the same sinful act whereto God and the Sinner both concur is not the same as to both but morally evil as to the Sinner and yet naturally yea morally good as to Gods concurrence Sin as to God speakes a negation of his concurse not a privation of any thing due neither doth God wil sin simply as sin under that Reduplication but only as good and conducible to his Glorie The reason of Gods willing and governing sin both in the Elect and Reprobate is univocally one and the same namely the advance of Divine Glorie For the greatest evil of sin has something of good mixed with it which God wils and orders for his Glorie There is nothing in the world purely simply and of it self evil if there were God who is the chiefest good could not wil it Lastly man only is the proper and formal cause of sin or moral evil because he alone comes short of the rule of moral good so that Divine Gubernation both as permissive ordinative and judicial about Sin is sufficiently vindicated from the least imputation thereof CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose men and Angels Supernatural Illumination from God The Infusion of Virtues Gods care of virtuose Men. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World The Angels Law Obedience and Disobedience Good Angels their Communion with Saints The Ministration of Angels 1 At the giving of the Law and Christ's Incarnation 2 For the Protection of Saints 3 For their Conduct 4 Their Sympathie with Saints Their Ministration at the final Judgement Divine Gubernation as to evil Angels Satans power to temt and his Limitation § 1. Supernatural Illumination from God HAving discussed Gods Divne Gubernation about Sin we now passe on to his supernatural Efficience and Gubernation of Virtue and virtuose Men. We intend not to treat hereof as it belongs to Christian Theologie but only as it fals under metaphysic or prime Philosophie termed by some Natural Theologie 1. Plato gives us frequent and great notices of Divine Illumination which is the Origine of al supernatural Virtue Thus in his Theages he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If it please God thou shalt profit much and speedily otherwise not So in his Philebus he assures us That the cognition of the supreme infinitie Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the gift of God to men The like Epinom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 How is it that God should be accounted the cause of al other good things and not much more of wisdome which is the best good But to treat more distinctly of Divine Ilumination we are to know that as there is a twofold spiritual Darknesse the one objective in the things to be known the other subjective in the mind that is to know them so proportionably there is a twofold Light the one objective whereby God reveles the things to be known the other subjective whereby God takes off the veil from the mind and thereby inables it to apprehend supernatural Objects Now by this twofold Light Divine Gubernation conductes the Rational Creature to his supernatural end 1 God conductes the Rational Creature by an objective Light or Divine Revelation of his Wil whereby he reveles mans supernatural end and the means conducing thereto Some imperfect fragments or broken notices of this Divine Revelation were gleaned up by the wiser Heathens Pythagoras Solon Socrates Plato which gave them sufficient cause to admire and in some superstitiose manner to imitate the Judaic Institutes and Laws as the Fountain of the best Wisdome as it was foretold by Moses Deut. 4.5 6 7. and as we have sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Parts Whence we find mention in Plato Minos pag. 317. of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Word which if I mistake not refer to Divine Revelations vouchsafed the Church of God for its conduct unto eternal life 2 As God governes and conductes the Rational Creature by an objective so also by a subjective Light which is essentially requisite for the acquirement of its supernatural end Of this also we find some and those not vulgar notices in Plato So in his Repub. 6. pag. 507 508. where he