that meate was corporall yet was it of such vertue and nature that it did confirme man in perfect health not as other meates but by an occult vertue proceeding from aboue And this he confirmeth by two examples the first of Elias his cake the second of the flower and oyle of the widow of Sarepta which without all question were effected by supernaturall power Beda likewise affirmeth that therefore it was called the tree of life because it hath receiued from the diuine power that whosoeuer should eat thereof should be confirmed in perpetuall health Neither ought we to maruaile Bonauenâ—ure 2. lib. sent dist 17 as Bonauenture well noteth that a man might be disposed vnto immortalitie by the fruit of this tree seeing there be many other things as Myrrhe and Balme which doe preserue from corruption for a long time therefore as our Sacraments doe not really concurre vnto grace but the diuine power which alwaies is assistant vnto them so the fruit of that tree did not of his owne nature produce immortality but rather the diuine power did communicate it by the eating of that fruit Here wee may see these so opposite opinions with their reasons and authorities in which it may be free for euery one to follow as he liketh seing there is nothing in this point plainely expressed in the Scripture with me both the authoritie of S. Austin and reason doth sway most for this latter opinion because it seemeth not so probable that a naturall tree or fruit should haue of his owne virtue and substance so supernaturall a virtue and qualitie as to cause immortalitie But to conclude whether the virtue of this tree was naturall or supernaturall all is one in regard of our losse ingratitude and sinne our losse of both liues spirituall and corporall our ingratitude towards God to vs wards so infinitely good our sinne also being the same seeing that though it had beene onely a naturall virtue which was in that fruit of life yet it depriued vs not onely of our owne liues but also of the author of life What therefore remaineth but that now being redeemed from this sinne and raised againe from this death we blesse him perpetually with all the powers of our soules and all the daies of our liues who is the onely giuer of life and sole redeemer of our soules CHAP. XI Of the tree of the knowledge of good and euill to wit whether it was a true and naturall tree like vnto others And why it was so called NOthing can bee so plainely set downe in the holy scripture but there will be some idle braine or other who will so moralize or so wrest it to a spirituall sense though often-times without sense that they will not sticke to deny the truth of the history as it happeneth here in the first point of our question in which some haue not feared that name before but afterwards of the euent so that when God commanded our fore-fathers that they should not eate of that tree either he called it by some other name or he demonstrated it vnto them as it were with his finger Many other reasons do the Rabbins giue of the name of this tree but so farre from reason that they be not worthy the repeating I will onely touch one as most fabulous by which we may coniecture of the rest They say that our first Parents were created as infants in sense and reason though men in body strength and stature Now because this tree had a virtue of ripening mans iudgment witt and discretion of good from euill it was therefore called the tree of knowledge of good and euill because to know good and euill according to the Hebrue and scripture phrase is as much as to haue the vse of reason But this is not onely contrary to the text but also to reason for certaine it is that as man was created perfect in all the parts of his body so was hee no lesse in the powers of his soule Yea how is it likely that he was without reason who was created lord of all vnreasonable creatures who gaue them their names proper to their natures and was to gouerne all things according to their nature by his owne rule of reason yea with whom God the author of nature and chiefe rule of reason had made this couenant most conformable to reason that if he liued according to the law of nature and instinct of reason his reward should be aboue all nature and exceed the capacitie of humane reason wherefore who was both culpable in this pact and punishable for his transgression must in all reason haue then had the vse of reason Iosephus in his first booke of his Antiquities perceiuing well the absurditie of this opinion fell into another which Lyra deemeth not much lesse absurd to wit that this tree was therefore called the tree of knowledge of good and euill because it had virtue to sharpen the wit ripen the iudgment and to giue prudence and vnderstanding to all humane affaires Lyra his refutation is this because the fruit of that tree being corporall how could it saith he haue any spirituall effect wherefore the minde witt and iudgment of man being spirituall how could they be holpen by any corporall cause For though the superior cause and more perfect then his effect may haue influence into the inferiour and imperfect yet neuer the inferiour into the superiour Therefore though the spirituall causes be of such excellent perfection that they haue influence into our bodies yet neuer any corporall creature saith he is so perfect that it can inflow in the spirituall For what is that which any corporall thing may produce in the spirit not any thing corporall seeing that all that is in the spirit is spirituall neither againe can it be spirituall because nothing spirituall can bee contained in the vertue of a materiall or corporall cause It cannot be denied but that this discourse of Lyra might haue some force in those causes which as the Philosophers speake doe worke directè per se by themselues directly yet in those whose causaltie is altogether indirect true philosophy teacheth the contrary wherefore though it be most certaine that the body cannot directly haue any influence into the soule or spirit yet bicause the spirit whiles it is in this life dependeth in her operations of the body and the dispositions thereof according to the generally receiued philosophicall axiome the manner of the working followeth the manner of being it must necessarily follow that accordingly as the dispositions of the body are better or worse so may the operations of the minde be also more or lesse perfect Yea Aristotle teacheth vs in his 7. booke of his Politikes that though those men who are borne and brought vp in the Northerne parts of the world bee stronger then others in corporall forces yet that they bee of a much more slow and duller capacity contrariwise those who are borne in hotter climates of Affrica Spaine and Mauritania
cap. 15. in epistola 3. ad Hillarium quae est 80. in Encherridio cap. 36. seeing that was not ours but Adams not in the habit because this should proceed only from the precedent act and finally neither in the two last because these are rather effects proceeding from our originall iustice then the crime and sinne it selfe This may also seeme the opinion of S. Austine in his 3. booke de libero arbitrio cap. 20. where he saith that we are all inquinati peccato primi parentis defiled with the sinne of our first father the which sinne could neither bee inherent in vs as actually proceeding from him neither as habitually inherent in his soule or priuatiuely adherent to his forme It was therefore in vs by an externe denomination inwardly affecting him but outwardly onely denominating vs. But if it bee so as Austine saith that wee were all originally defiled with the sinne of our first father if wee had also besides this some other inherent originall sinne wee should haue two kindes of originall sinnes the one by imputation the other by inhesion the one inherent in Adam only the other in vs deriued from Adam which is to speake without ground of Scripture which onely maketh mention of one originall sinne by which all bee truly called sinners according to that of the Apostle Omnes peccauerunt in Adamo all haue sinned in Adam in Adam hee saith not in themselues and consequently none such did truly possesse them By this wee may see what colour of truth may be giuen to falsitie yea euen vnto heresie such as this seemeth to be for if originall sinne bee nothing else in our posteritie but the punishment and sinne of our first father Adam for which all his posteritie is punished certainly after the same manner the sonnes also of any other of his posteritie who as the Scripture witnesseth are iustly punished for their fathers offences might rightly be said to haue contracted so many originall sinnes as bee sinnes punishable in them by reason of their fathers transgressions which without all question were most absurd and yet the consequence seemeth most euident For if originall sinne according to this last opinion bee nothing else but the sinne of our first father Adam as it is punishable in vs no question but by the same reason as many sinnes of our fore-fathers as are punishable in vs euen vnto the third or fourth generation may as well bee called originall sinnes in vs though they bee not really inherent in our soules or powers thereof but onely are said to be in vs by an externe denomination or name proceeding from our parents Moreouer if our sinne bee nothing else but the sinne of our first parent as it is imputed vnto vs from him as our head certainly as that is blotted in him by his repentance so it should also bee blotted in vs by the same repentance for if his sinne could be sufficient for the condemnation of all why should not his repentance be sufficient for all especially it being nothing in vs but an externe denomination or bare name taken from his sinne which now being washed away in him should of necessitie be likewise blotted in vs nulla siquidem forma siue interna siue externa potest denominare nisi eo modo quo est for questionlesse no forme being taken away can denominate as when it was present This forme therefore being an externe forme which neuer had any vnion in our soules or powers thereof could neuer euen when it was present denominate our soules inwardly sinful much lesse now when it is altogether blotted out of the first subiect wherein it was really inherent but rather now it should giue no denomination at all and consequently none of the sons of Adam should truly be said to bee borne in originall sinne seeing that forme from which they were said to bee borne in sinne is quite abolished and blotted out euen in the first subiect from whence it should proceed vnto all Finally as Dauid witnesseth wee are all borne in iniquitie and our mother conceiued vs in sinne and S. Paul All haue sinned in Adam but this could not be true if so be that wee were onely to bee tearmed originally sinners in that our first father Adam sinned for his sinne being blotted out the denomination also proceeding from it should be taken away seeing that no forme can any longer denominate then whiles it is present and after the manner that it is so Therefore as it could not really and intrinsecally denominate the posteritie of Adam sinners euen when it was present according to the foresaid doctrine so now when it is altogether taken away in his root and first origine it cannot in any wise denominate vs sinners which is euidently against the Scriptures which repeat so often that all mankinde was conceiued in sinne and to haue sinned in Adam hee onely excepted who as goodnesse it selfe in no wise could bee subiect to this so great euill and as man was hypostatically vnited with the second person of the blessed Trinitie and predestinated to bee the generall redemption of the world from this generall deluge of sinne and therefore could not be defiled with any sinne CHAP. LIIII Whether originall sinne consisteth in any priuation or no. MAny seeing the inconueniences of the former opinions not finding in what positiue act or habit they might constitute the essence of our originall iniustice at length haue beene driuen to say that it was not essentially and formally in any positiue act or habit but that it consisted rather in some priuation The reason of this may bee because the essence of sinne according to his nature common to all sinnes both actuall habituall and originall is as the Fathers doe often insinuate non natura aliqua sed negatio not any nature but a negation of nature and consequently the same must be here in originall sinne So Dionysius 4. cap. de diuinis nominibus speaking of the euill and malice of sinne saith neither this euill of sinne is the appetite it selfe but the declination of the appetite from good to euill and more plainly afterward calleth it a priuation atque vt summatim dicam malum quemadmodum saepe diximus infirmitas imbecillitásque ac priuatio est aut scientiae aut fidei aut appetitus aut actionis bonae Euill or sinne as I haue often said is a certaine infirmitie and imbecillitie and a priuation either of knowledge or of faith or of the appetite or of the doing of that which is good Iustine also in his booke of the questions which were proposed by the Gentiles vnto the Christians amongst other things resolueth this difficultie 46. q. 73. that euill or sinne is nothing else but the corruption of goodnesse so that it is not any positiue entitie or being but rather a priuation of entitie or being or as Basil describeth it Basil hom 9. priuatio boni the priuation of good and Athanasius more plainly saith
because as the schoole Diuines well note the fault as it is a fault deserueth punishment so that the worthinesse or debt of the punishment doth follow the fault as a proper passion thereof as intense heare followeth the fire and light necessarily proceedeth from the Sunne CHAP. LV. In which the last opinion of the precedent Chapter is refuted and the truth set downe in what consisted the sinne of our first father and ours contracted from him WE may easily perceiue by the opinions refuted in the precedent Chapters how easie it is euen for the greatest witts to erre in supernaturall matters without the assistance of Gods supernaturall grace and illumination seeing that those who were accounted the very mirrours of wisdome in their time haue beene so hoodwinked and blinded in the cause and first fountaine of their felicitie insomuch that though they knew that they were conceiued as Dauid saith in iniquitie and sinne yet they were not able to declare sufficiently in what consisted that iniquitie and originall sinne much lesse to demonstrate with any certainety that which S. Austine almost in one word doth declare so euidently libro q o de nuptijs concupiscentijs cap. 23 26. where hee expresly holdeth that our originall sin consisteth in concupiscence which though it remaine in the regenerate yet is it not imputed to them in ijs ergo qui regenerantur in Christo in those therefore who are regenerated in Christ when they receiue the remission of all their sinnes it is necessarie that the guiltinesse of this as yet remaining concupiscence be remitted So that as I haue already said it be not imputed to sin for as the guiltinesse of those sinnes which cannot remaine because they passe when they are committed remaineth neuerthelesse which if it be not remitted will remaine for euer so the guiltinesse of the foresaid concupiscence when it is remitted is quite taken away Calvin lib. 2. Instit c. 1. Melancth in colloqâ—io Wormatien apologia confessionis A gustanae So that here we see auerred and proued that which many learned late writers doe auouch as a matter of faith euidently deducing it out of the 6 7 8. chap. of the Apostle to the Romanes and the 11 to the Hebrues to wit that our originall iniustice consisteth in concupiscence the which though it doth remaine in the regenerate yet is it not imputed vnto them so that as diuers learned men doe declare themselues in this matter tegitur non tollitur raditur non eradicatur it is couered not rooted out it remaineth but is not imputed For proofe of which Rom. 7. verse 14. 15 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. sequentibus I will only ponder the example of Paul who no doubt was regenerate at least after he was called an Apostle and yet he could finde this sinne of concupiscence within himselfe striuing against the spirit yea hee did acknowledge it to be his originall sinne the fountaine of all actuall sinnes and therefore hee addeth Wee know that the law is spirituall but I am carnall sold vnder sinne for I allow not that which I doe for what I would that doe I not but what I hate that doe I now then it is no more I that doth it but sinne that dwelleth in mee Now what sinne is this the Apostle speaketh of but originall or concupiscence remaining as yet euen after his regeneration drawing him vnto that which he would not and therefore afterward in the same chapter opposing it to the right inclination of the minde hee calleth it another law in his members rebelling against the law of his minde and leading him captiue vnto the law of sinne which was in his members and hence he concludeth O wretched man that I am who shall deliuer mee from the body of this death that is from originall sinne the which as it is the death of the soule so likewise it causeth the death of the body CHAP. LVI In which the matter of the precedent chapter is more largely discussed THe first heretickes who after the preaching of the Gospell denied originall sinne were Pelagius and Coelestius as S. Austine writeth lib. de peccatorum meritis remissione cap. 1. 2. 3. 9. 19. whom Iulian the Pelagian followed in his fourth booke which hee wrote against originall sinne yea this is attributed vnto the Armenians to Faber Stapulensis and others The first argument of this heresie is that which Iulian the Pelagian vsed against S. Austine because it is essentiall to all sinnes to be voluntary but nothing can be voluntary vnto infants before the vse of reason seeing that as the Philosophers say and proue nihil concupitum quin praecognitum nothing is willed desired or sought after which is not first knowne infants therefore who haue no vse of reason can haue no abuse of will by consent vnto a foreknowne euill and where there can be no sufficient foreknowledge or distinction of good from euill there questionlesse can be no sinne Yea this seemeth to be confirmed by S. Austine himselfe lib. 3. de libero arbitrio cap. 13. where hee confesseth that sinne is so voluntary an euill that nothing can be sinne which is not voluntary and in another place he auoucheth that neither any of the small number of the learned nor of the multitude of the vnlearned doe hold that a man can sinne without his consent Wherefore Doctor Bishop against M. Perkins out of those words doubteth not to vpbraid the Church of Englands doctrine about this point saying What vnlearned learned men are start vp in our miserable age that make no bones to denie this and greater matters too To this argument of Iulian peraduenture some will say that originall sinne is voluntary in the infants not by their owne proper actuall will as who can haue none such but by the will of their first father Adam which after a sort may be said to be the will of all his posteritie seeing he was the head of them all and therefore that by his voluntary transgression all Adams posteritie may bee said to haue sinned in him But this seemeth not to satisfie for originall sinne if wee will consider well the nature of it and as all the aduerse part doth hold verè auertit à Deo parvuli voluntatem cam conuertit ad bonum mutabile it doth truly auert the will of the infants from God vnto an apparant and mutable good yea euen to the deuill therefore the will of our parent and his sinne is in no wise to cause originall sinne in vs. Secondly as true Philosophie teacheth no cause can produce that which it hath not in it selfe either virtually or formally neither doth any cause produce any thing but after the manner that it containeth the thing which is to bee produced either formally if so bee that it hath the same forme species or kinde which the effect hath or virtually if it containe it in a more perfect degree and measure But certainly neither our first
any thing that hee performeth it actually by some externall operation and worke either actually produced or to be produced The other kinde of will which the Diuines distinguish in God in regard of some obiects which he doth not really produce is called inefficax voluntas a kinde of propension or inclination of his diuine will to the effectuating of any good effect which might redound to the felicitie of man yet for the attaining of the end which out of his vnsearchable wisdome hee hath prefixed hee oftentimes permitteth the contrary to this his diuine inclination and will the which therefore is called Gods permissiue will As for example God would that all men should bee saued according to that of the Apostle Deus vult omnes homines saluos fieri to wit in his vniuersall grace calling and inspirations and other generall meanes offered to all so that out of his infinite goodnesse hee wisheth and willeth in this sort all to bee saued and that hee might the more manifest his infinite mercy by the efficacie of his working will he actually saueth some euen so to manifest his iustice by his other permissiue decree he permitteth others to worke their owne ruine and eternall damnation So that according to this distinction it may truly be said that the transgression of Adam was in some sort contrary to the will of God in some againe agreeable to the same for first in that it was permitted by God it was for the further benefit vnto mankinde and the greater glory of God by which hee wrought that miraculous effect of the hypostaticall vnion betweene the second person of the blessed Trinitie and our nature taking occasion of the greatest euill to worke our greatest good insomuch that it may well bee deemed as Gregory tearmeth it foelix culpa quae talem tantum habere meruit Redemptorem a happy fall in regard of the issue not as it was a sinne but as an occasion of a more perfect abolishing of sinne neither as willed by God but permitted foreseene by Gods wisdome effected by mans wickednesse yea in some sort effected by God to wit by Gods vniuersall concourse but determined by mans depraued will Gods action being indifferent or rather of its owne nature and as Gods ordained to good but by mans depraued will determined to euill which yet againe by the infinite goodnesse of God is made an occasion of our greatest good So that if it bee demanded whether God would that Adam should eat of the forbidden tree or no and if hee would why did hee forbid it if he would not why did he not hinder it The answer is that in some sort hee would it and againe after some sort he would it not hee would it not as a sinne hee would it neuerthelesse as a meane or rather as an occasion of a greater good Wherefore he forbad it as a sinne he concurred with it as vniuersall cause of all things being not as a particular cause or agent in sinne as it was sinne though in some sense hee would it as hath beene said as a meane of an infinite greater good and as the greatest occasion of shewing his infinite wisdome and goodnesse of his wisdome because he knew to produce such an excellent effect of so infinite an euill of his goodnesse likewise in that being moued onely by it and for it he was pleased to effect our greatest good of the greatest euill a worke so excellent and admirable as which could onely proceede and flow from that onely infinite ocean of goodnesse Yea Adams eating of the forbidden fruit was an euident argument that hee remained free to sinne euen after his sinne according to the pleasure and will of God for such was his diuine will that Adam should be endued with free will that it might be in his power to chuse the good and eschew the euill not of himselfe but by grace so that thus sinning he shewed his power and consequently by the same sinne hee shewed in some sort himself to remaine according to Gods diuine will and pleasure with freedome to sinne for seeing that no sinne can be committed without some actuall exercise of free will and that by the same exercise the precedent power is manifested it followeth that by this exercise and action of Adams free will I meane his transgression it was made manifest that hee was created and alwaies preserued according to his diuine will in that he was endued and afterward remained with free will sufficient to sinne though insufficient in it selfe to the actions of grace In this sense then wee see that although Adam sinned yet remained he according to Gods will because hee remained alwaies endued with free will Likewise we may vnderstand in an other sense how Adam remained according to Gods will yea and this euen in regard of his sinne I meane according to his permissiue will for Almighty God as we haue said before out of his incomprehensible wisdome foreseeing the infinite good which might proceed from thence to wit the hypostaticall vnion and being determined by his absolute and secret will to effectuate the same hee permitted this sinne of Adam as a negatiue meanes or rather occasion of so excellent an end But God saith this heretike would haue had man to haue persisted in that blessed estate from which neuerthelesse hee fell how then was not Gods will more then his power seeing hee obtained not that which he would But here we may see both the malice and ignorance of this heretike which both are the rootes and springs of all heresies his malice in that hee presumed against God himselfe his ignorance in that hee taxeth that hee vnderstandeth not for if he had vnderstood either what belongeth to the free will of man or rightly apprehended the power wisdom of the omnipotent he might easily haue perceiued that the fall of our first father did rather demonstrate the wisdome of God then contradict his omnipotence and will for seeing it pleased his diuine maiestie to giue vs free will and to place vs in such estate in which by his grace we might persist and which being rejected we might fall of our selues what can bee more euident but as that our perseuerance should haue beene attributed to God and to the right use of his grace so our fall onely vnto our selues and the want of our concourse with his grace the which in that estate was not onely sufficient but very abundant Seeing therefore it was once in the power of our first father to haue withstood the temptation of Satan and not to haue cast off so easie a yoke as was imposed him with so abundant grace he deserued no doubt to bee depriued of that grace thrust out of Paradise yea finally to bee disrobed of the beautifull robe of immortalitie In the combination of which we may magnifie and admire the omnipotent wisdome and infinite wise power of God in that hee knew and could so excellently combine iustice with mercy the
which two attributes as they are to be found in all his workes so without all question most admirable in this his iustice in not leauing vnpunished so foule a fact as originall sinne his mercy in the mercifull manner of the punishment his iustice againe in that he depriued man of the vesture of immortalitie his mercy euen in the same penalty and depriuation of immortalitie least as Moyses Barsephas doth most excellently answer in this point ne ipsius prauitas foret immortalis qualis est diaboli least his wickednes should become immortall such as the Diuels is following the nature of the subiect to which it is adherent Furthermore God therefore punisheth man with this mercifull punishment of death that thereby hee considering the effect might eschew the cause or lastly because out of this mortalitie of man he would produce a more perfect immortalitie in the same man for God fore-seeing that out of Adams posterity should come an infinite multitude of martyrs the sentence of death was pronounced against Adam to the end that many of his posteritie suffering death for the Redeemers sake might supply the places of falne spirits But that we may returne from whence we digressed if God were therefore to be counted deficient in power because he created Adam with such liberty that he could contradict the commandment of his Creator after the same manner might likewise be inferred that now also he hath the like defect or impotencie seeing that now also man hath the like liberty to transgresse because as hee commanded Adam that he should not touch the tree of the knowledge of good and euill so likewise hath hee commanded vs his posteritie that wee should follow the good and eschew the contrary euill now therefore if we do transgresse this law it must needs bee God either allowing or contradicting this transgression if it be by Gods approbation why doth hee prohibite it if contrary to his will why doth he permit it or if hee permit that which is against his will how can such a God bee called omnipotent or lastly if he can hinder that which is euill and doth not how is he good who consenteth and concurreth so euill To these I answer out of the former principles that euen this permission of sinne doth most manifestly demonstrate the infinite wisdome power and goodnesse of God his wisdome in that out of this in a manner so infinite euill hee did worke such an infinite good as is the manifestation of his glory and the incarnation of his Sonne his power in that he could his goodnesse in that hee would But why saith the aduersarie did God prohibite Adam the eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and euill what else could bee his meaning but least he should be able to iudge betweene good and euill and consequently least hee should eschew the euill and prosecute the good how then is not God enuious or how can hee be God who enuieth and prohibiteth that which is good I answer that God did neither absolutely decree that Adam should eat of this fruit neither that he should not eat though he did command him that hee should not eat but left him to his owne free will to eat or not eat hee did forbid him to eat not because the fruit was morally or of it selfe good or euill but in the issue good if he had abstained euill if hee abstained not good by obedience euill by disobedience where fore God did intend in this prohibition to try his obedience and that only was respected in this commandement so that if Adam had obeyed God accordingly as was in his power by the grace of God hee should for a time haue enioyed that terrene Paradise in which he was created and afterward haue beene partaker of the celestiall eternally with his Creator Hence wee see how impiously God is accused of wickednesse and enuie in the forbidding of our first fathers the eating of the tree of good and euill seeing that the eating of this fruit was indifferent of its owne nature as out of which neither good nor euill could proceed but that which God did regard in this commandment was our obedience or disobedience in respect of which hee was after a manner indifferent neither absolutely decreeing the one neither effectually willing the other onely this wee may adde that God did desire and will our first fathers abstinence and therein required his obedience but as this his diuine will had not his efficacie so did hee and might permit the contrary for other respects worthy his diuine prouidence and infinite wisdome which haue been already touched Not of enuie as some haue blasphemously imagined least Adam become immortall for if this blasphemie were consequent to the fore-said prohibition certainely God who foresaw all future euents either would not haue created man or hauing created him would not haue placed him in Paradise so neere vnto the tree of life or at least way hee might either haue hidden or not haue created the tree of life Wherefore the true reason why he forbad him the tree of life was as Moyses Barsephas well noteth ne perpetuò viueret in peccato least he should liue in perpetuall death of sinne as the Deuill doth euer liuing euer dying Lastly the aduersarie obiecteth against the curse of the Serpent for why saith he did God curse the Serpent if hee cursed him as the author of the euill committed why did he not hinder it least it should be committed but if he cursed him as author of that good which was consequent vnto the euill how is that God called good and not rather enuious and wicked who punisheth yea enuieth the author of such an excellent effect Againe if neither of these was the cause of the Serpents curse how may God bee excused of wilfull maliciousnesse or malicious foolishnes The answer to this blasphemy is patent out of that which hath beene already said out of the former obiections to wit that God did therefore curse the Serpent as author of euill neither did hinder him pretending the euill to the intent that he might out of so infinite an euill as was the transgression of the first Adam worke that infinite good of the incarnation of his Sonne and birth of the second Adam for though it be an argument both of his power and goodnesse ex bono efficere melius of good to make better yet it seemeth much more excellent and conuincing euen our naturall capacitie that hee is infinitely potent and good who can ex nihilo perfectissimum producere effectū vel ex pessimo efficere optimum who can I say produce the most perfect good and most excellent effect yea farre exceeding all other created perfection and excellencie of nothing yea euen of that nothing which is most remote from any goodnesse yea is the very priuation of all goodnesse and excellencie CHAP. LXV In which the obiections of Manes are assoiled MAnes that wicked heretike with the rest of his sect
of opinion that there was neuer any such place as Paradise but rather that the scripture where it maketh mention of Paradise is to be vnderstood Metaphorically Spiritually or Allegorically First because in other places of Scripture where there is mention of Paradise that word cannot be vnderstood of any terrene place therefore if one place of Scripture must bee the interpreter of the other according to the common consent of the Fathers it may not seem improbable but that the like may be admitted in this history of Paradise Secondly because those things which are said to haue beene in Paradise cannot be vnderstood literally as that in the midst of Paradise there was a tree of knowledge of good and euill a property not due vnto nature much lesse agreeable or consequent to the nature of a tree Secondly that Adam heard the voyce of GOD where as spirits of their owne nature haue no voyce or sound much lesse the purest of spirits Thirdly that hee heard God walking towards the South whereas indeed God neither walketh nor moueth but is alwaies replenishing working and filling euery place yea in euery place equally present in essence equall in power equall in all his other infinit attributes equall Againe how can it be vnderstood literally that after the transgression and expulsion of Adam out of Paradise there was placed a Cherub or Angell with a fiery sword as necessary for the custody of the said place as though eyther the commaundement of God had not beene sufficient or his will resistible without the assistance of the Angelicall power or the Angell not sufficiently powerfull for the restraining of Adam without the vse of a fiery sword as though againe God in power were not omnipotent neyther the Angell spirituall but either that the creator had neede of his creature or that which is a pure spirit had need in his operation of an impure imperfect and corruptible bodie Moses Barsephas tractatu de Paradyso Moses Barsephas in his Treatise of Paradise saith that there be two parts of Paradise one corporall another spirituall one created for the pleasure of the body another for to delight the soule so that as man is composed of two parts the one spirituall the other corporall and yet but one onely man so saith hee was Paradise partly corporall and partly spirituall yet one onely Paradise his arguments bee these If Paradise were onely corporall saith hee then the body onely of Adam was delighted there because no corporall thing can delight the soule wherefore if God had not created another part of Paradise spirituall hee might seem to haue dealt fraudulently with man which were blaspheamous who promised a Paradise for the whole man and yet created such a one as could not delight the whole man Againe that Paradise is not onely spirituall he proueth with these arguments For then it could not haue delighted the body but onely the spirit Yea all those things which Moses writeth as touching Paradise might bee deemed false seeing that hee so euidently insinuateth that man was created in Paradise as in some materiall place and that God had planted Paradise in Eden from the beginning that he put man there whom hee had created that he created for him there all trees hearbs beasts and all other things necessary both for the delight and vse of man That our first Fathers fell from Gods grace by eating of the forbidden fruite that they hid themselues amongst the trees of Paradise after their fall and many other things which cannot be vnderstood but of a reall and corporall place Thirdly if Paradise were not a reall and corporall place how could there flow out of it those foure riuers which as the Scripture witnesseth compasse the whole earth How should Enoch and Elias be translated thither and as many writers affirme be conserued there both in body and soule yea otherwise how should Adam and Eue haue liued there Which things though all of them bee not so certaine yet most of them are so euidently expressed in the scripture that they manifestly prooue the Garden of Paradise to haue beene a reall and corporall place Chrysostom hom 13. in genesi◠August in gen l. 8. c. 1. sequenti bus lib. 13. de ciuit dei c. 21. q. 27. in gen Basil hom exameron hom 11. Hier epist ad Pamachiū Epiphanius Damascen Isiderus Nicenus Cyrillus Naz. and therfore S. Chrysostome in his 13. Homily vpon Genesis saith Ideo Mosen descipsisse Paradisum That Moses did therefore so manifestly describe Paradise the riuers the trees the fruites And all other things thereto appertaining that the simple and ignorant should not be deceiued by the fabulous Allegories and doting dreames which some would pretend to diuulge for sole truth hidden in the figuratiue and materiall description of Paradise The like also may be seene in Saint Augustine in his eight booke vpon Genesis cap. 1. seq and the 13. booke de ciuitate dei cap. 21. questione vigesima septima in Gen. Basil Hom. 11. vpon the Exameron Likewise Hierome in his Epistle to Pamachius Epiphanius epist ad Iohannem Hieros Damascenus in his fourth booke de Orthodoxa fide cap. 13. Isodorus libro quarto Etymologiarum cap. 3. Gregorius Nicenus oratione quinta in orationem dominicam Cyrill Naz. Ephren and others Lastly S. Augustine in his 27. Aug. quaest 27. in Gen. question vpon Genesis giueth this reason as an euident demonstration that Paradise was a true corporall place because the land of the Sodomites and Gomorrhae ans before the destruction thereof was compared in the thirteenth chapter of Genesis Genes c. 13. to this pleasant place of Paradise in these words Before the Lord destroyed Sodome and Gomorrah it was as the garden of the Lord like the Land of Aegypt as thou goest vnto Zoar Wherefore saith Saint Augustine in the place aboue alleadged if by the fruitfull trees described in Paradise there were nothing else to bee vnderstood but onely the vertues of the minde as some do hold and if there were no true corporal Paradise beautified with all kinde of trees it would not haue beene said of that place that it was as the Paradise of God Conticescant igitur as Saint Hierome commenteth vpon Daniel Hieronimus in Danielem cap. 10 cap. 10. eorum deliramenta qui vmbras imagines in veritate sequentes ipsam conantur euertere veritatem vt Paradysum flumina arbores putent Allegoriae legibus se debere subruere Because the aforesaid Allegories rather seeme deliramenta dottages and dreames as this Father tearmeth them then expositions of learned Doctors let them therefore in no wise be mentioned or vttered not that there may not bee good vse of these and other the like Allegoricall expositions but that they are not so to be vsed that they be a meanes to ouerthrow the truth or that they be taken for the sole trueth which were no small iniury vnto the word of God
of penance vnto the Gentiles there must not only bee an earthly Paradise but also it seemeth that it must be a place habitable or to which men may haue some accesse in such sort that they may see their patterne of repentance for if either the place be destroyed inaccessible or inuisible how can it bee true that Henoch is there detained as a patterne of repentance therefore if Henoch be as yet preserued aliue as many doe hold it followeth consequently that there is yet a terrene Paradise not as yet destroyed by Noes flood These be the arguments of this opinion and for which many doe not thinke it improbable neuer the lesse all the places of Scriptures and fathers together with their reasons well pondered it seemeth much more probable that Paradise in which Adam was created is not now to bee found but rather that it was destroyed by the generall deluge First because the Scripture Gen. 7. Chap saith that all mountaines were couered with the waters of the flood à fortiori therefore this pleasant Region or Garden was therby ouer-flowne But peraduenture this was a whole Region higher then any Mountaine and consequently though all Mountaines were couered yet this place might be safe as which was the habitation of that blessed man Henoch or peraduenture though it was not so high yet was it reserued for the said reason by Gods particular prouidence I answere that neither not the first because as it is in the same place aboue alledged the waters of the flood ouerflowed the highest mountaines seuen cubits neither the second because such a great miracle was not necessary for the preseruing of Enoch who whether he bee yet aliue or how he is it shall be more at large discussed in an other place But supposing that the contrarie opinion is probable to wit that Paradise is as yet extant not onely according to the place it selfe but also to the beauty and pleasure which the Scripture testifieth it had at the first creation it may well bee inquired what should be the reason why it hath neuer been discouered of any amongst so many as haue compassed the world Some as I haue already touched answere that the reason is because Almightie God offended with Adams transgression hath inuironed it with huge Hills mightie mountaines swelling seas fearefull rockes and great wildernesses full of all kinde of terrible beasts and venemous Serpents so that it is impossible for any mortall man to passe thither Others againe answere that Paradise hath not beene discouered neither sought for by Infidels because they thought it to be but a fable neither by the faithfull or Christians because they know it to be inaccessible But if I may interpose my opinion and freely speake what I iudge in this matter I think that none of these reasons are so concludent and certaine as that the place of Paradise is as yet vnknowne by the particular disposition and prouidence of God as part of our punishment for that sinne for which wee were banished thence as not only vnworthy to inhabite the place it selfe but also of the notice where it was Or secondly because it is not in any wise necessary to bee knowne either as belonging to the furtherance of our felicity in this mortall life or to the obtaining of the eternall happines in the other immortall As in like manner this also was the reason why though our Sauiour knew at least way by supernaturall meanes and as he was the eternall wisedome of God the time of the end of this world and of his second comming to iudgement yet because this was not necessary for man to know therefore hee denied the reuelation thereof euen vnto his Apostles insomuch that our Sauiour said Act. 1. cap. vers 7. vnto his Apostles that it was not for them to know the times or seasons which the Father hath put in his owne power So neither is it for vs too curiously to inquire after this place of Paradise which God hath either destroyed or hidden from vs as part of our punishment for our first and originall offence in that place CHAP. VI. Of the trees of Paradise whether all were fruitfull or rather some only beautifull though vnfruitfull CErtaine it is as we read in the beginning of Genesis that in the beginning of the world God produced omne lignum pulchrum visu ad vescendum suaue Euery tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food the tree of life also in the midst of the Garden and the tree of knowledge of good and euill Now the difficulty is how these words are to be vnderstood whether coniunctiuely or disiunctiuely to wit whether all the trees of Paradise were as well beautifull to the sight as sweete in tast or rather some were only delightfull to the sight some pleasant onely in tast others both as well beautifull in sight as pleasant in tast Many I know answere that all the trees of Paradise had both proprities so that there was no one tree there vnfruitfull neither any fruitfull which was not also beautifull insomuch that those vnfruitfull trees which now after our miserable exile out of Paradise are necessary were not planted in Paradise Because Moses saith that God planted euery tree beautifull in sight and sweete in tast to wit coniunctiuely which could not be true if any tree wanted either sweetnesse or beauty or was not both beautifull and fruitfull Yea which is more God himselfe also commanded Adam that he should eate of euery tree of Paradise Gen. 2.16 excepting the tree of the knowledge of good and euill consequently euery tree of Paradise was fruitfull if fruitfull questionlesse then pleasant both to tast and sight I dare not condemne this opinion because it hath authours of no small authority neuerthelesse to me it is alltogether vnprobable seeing there be many fruitfull trees not very beautifull and many most beautifull though not fruitefull It is therefore more conformable both to reason and the sacred text also that it be vnderstood disiunctiuely to wit that there was trees of both sorts some beautifull some fruitfull some both Yea this is plaine out of Ezekiel 31 the 8. verse where both the Cedar and Firre trees altogether vnfruitfull are named as trees of Paradise to whom the glory of the Assirian was thus compared the Cedars in the Garden of God could not hide him the Firre trees were not like his boughes and the Chesnut trees were not like his branches nor any tree in the garden of God was like vnto him in his beauty I haue made him faire by the multitude of his branches So that all the trees of Eden that were in the Garden of God enuied him CHAP. VII Of the tree of life to wit why it was so called and whether it was corporall as other trees be or rather spirituall and food of the soule not of the body or rather appertaining vnto both SVch was the bounty of God towards man in the happy estate of Paradise
true that which the Poët saith that labour blunteth the arrowes of Cupid so doth it no lesse other darts of the deuill But hence peraduenture some patron of idlenes may inferre that labour was contrary to that blessed state of Paradise as which required all quiet rest and content no rather I say that it was consequent or necessarily pertaining to that blessed state seeing that labour was not any toile or paine but rather a pleasure and a voluntary effect of his well disposed minde as it is now likewise to men not so ill affected quorum otium as Seneca said maximum negotium so as S. Austine saith l. 8. de Gen ad lit cap. 8. non esset laboris afflictio sed voluntatis exhilaratio cùm ea quae Deus creauerat humani generis adiutorium laetius seraciúque provenirent that it should not be a toile or affliction of the body but a recreation and reioycing of the will and minde CHAP. XXIX Whether the precept of not eating of the tree of knowledge of good and euill was giuen aswell to Eue as to Adam and how that was THe difficultie of this question proceedeth of the diuers readings of the precept because some with Greg. l. 35. moral cap. 10. do read it according to the Greeke in the plurall the Hebrue Caldaean with the vulgar Latin and English are in the singular Gen. 21.16 and the Lord God commanded the man saying thou shalt eat freely of euery tree of the garden but of the tree of knowledge of good euill thou shalt not eat of it for in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt dye the death Whereby wee see that this commandement was directed to the man only not to the woman seeing shee as yet was not created as is apparent out of the 18 verse the 21 22 23 where the creation of Eue is described Neuerthelesse it is manifest that the same commandment was extended to Eue also for so shee answered the serpent according to the vulgar edition de ligno quod est in medio paradysi praecepit nobis deus ne comederemus but of the tree which is in the midst of Paradise God commanded vs wee should not eat wherfore though this precept was principally giuen to Adam yet was it also to be obserued of Eue for as they were conioyned in nature so were they not to be separated in regard of their precept and grace But why then may some say was the name onely of Adam expressed I answer with Rupertus lib. 2. de Trinitate operibus eius c. 32. because the precept was principally giuen vnto him as vpon whose obedience or breach his and his posterities happinesse did solely depend not vpon Eues CHAP. XXX Why God commanded Adam that he should not eate of the tree of knowledge of good and euill TErtullian in the beginning of his booke against the Iewes saith that this commandement was giuen to Adam as the first principall foundation and ground from whence all other lawes were deriued and in which all the ten Commandments be virtually included so that as Adam was the first beginning of mankinde so this was the first ground of all other lawes But though this cannot be reiected as an improbable speculation yet certainely it is not so firmely grounded in the sacred text as Tertullian imagined The reasons therefore in my opinion why God so strictly prohibited the eating of the aforesaid fruit was first that thereby as God had declared vnto vs his power ouer vs so wee should shew our obedience towards him not that as S. Austine noteth God hath neede of our seruice Augustin l. 8. de Gen. ad literam cap. 11. but that wee haue neede of his power protection rule and dominion ouer vs according to that of the Psalmist who speaking in the person of God saith constitue super eos legislatorem vt sciant gentes quoniam homines sunt Constitute a ruler ouer them as the vulgare translateth that the heathen may know that they are but men so that as it is a token of vassalage and subiection to receiue lawes so is it of power dominion and authority to command constitute ordaine and set downe lawes to bee obserued Yea secondly God gaue this law vnto man that thereby he might exercise his obedience towards God a vertue as necessary to man as acceptable in the sight of God Aug. lib. 8. de Gen ad literā cap. 8. and therefore as S. Austine well noteth God gaue not this law in any obiect of it selfe otherwise euill or of its owne nature good to the end that the vertue of his obedience might be the more illustrious because it deriueth not his excellencie from the materiall obiect but from the formall the sole subiection to Almighty God It may seeme peraduenture not improbable to some that the law of nature which God had infused into the nature of man might haue sufficed to lay open try and manifest mans obedience towards God to what end then should the second law of abstayning from the tree of the knowledge of good and euill be added as a second tryall of that which otherwise might sufficiently bee manifest by the law of nature and obedience therevnto I answer that the law of nature would not haue beene a sufficient tryall of Adams obedience because it is not altogether manifest by the law of nature that God is sole and supreme Lord ouer all mankinde for some doe imagine that the law of nature is a propertie onely due vnto a reasonable creature as euery species or kinde of liuing creatures hath their particular propertie agreeing to their nature Againe some are of opinion that those things which are contained in the law of nature are to be imbraced or reiected in as much as they agree or disagree with naturall reason not as they are commanded or forbidden by God as supernaturall agent So that although it be prescribed by God vnto all men yet doth it not sufficiently manifest his most ample absolute power ouer all mankinde seeing that by this law there is not any thing commanded or forbidden but onely that which is according to humane reason either good or euill of its owne nature Wherefore Gods absolute dominion and extent of his diuine power were not sufficiently knowne onely by this law of nature but onely as it is agreeable to the instinct of nature the which as it was but onely in things within the spheare of nature could not possible shew the extent of the absolute power of God in things both with in the compasse of nature and aboue nature Hence Gregorie well noteth Lib. 33 moralium cap. 10. that the forbidden fruit was not euill of its owne nature but was forbidden to the end that man being created vpright by nature might increase in righteousnes by the subiection of his nature and perfection of his obedience to the author of nature CHAP. XXXI Why God commanded Adam that he should not touch the tree
of knowledge of good and euill especially seeing he fore-knew his fall THe answer is easie to wit that by the tryall of his obedience in this one commandment hee might subiect the whole man vnto himselfe in all things and that man by the breach or keeping of the said commandement might know by wofull experience as he truely did in his wofull fall the difference betweene good and euill so that whereas before hee knew it onely by contemplation now he should find it by a lamentable experience yea in this his sinne was the greater in that the obiect of his obedience was so facile and the commandement so easie to be kept Aug. li. 14. de ciu Dei cap. 15. For as S. Austine saith like as the obedience of Abraham is highly extolled because the slaying of his sonne with his owne hands was of such difficultie euen so the disobedience of Adam in Paradise was the more hainous by how much the precept which he had imposed was the more facile to haue beene fulfilled Againe as the obedience of the second Adam was so much the more admirable because hee was obedient euen vnto death so the disobedience of the first Adam was the more detestable by which he became disobedient euen vnto death for where the punishment of the disobedience is great and the thing commanded easie who can expresse how great an euill it is not to obey and how great an iniurie to so great a power especially threatning so great punishments Now as touching the second point I answer that therefore God as absolute in his will science and power would create Adam and giue him the aforesaid precept which hee knew neuerthelesse hee would so presently violate to the end that his vnhappy fall might bee an occasion of our most happy Redeemer for as the Schooles commonly hold if Adam had not sinned the Sonne of God had not beene incarnated so that as Gregory saith in regard of this it was a happy fall which deserued or rather required to haue such a Redeemer O foelix culpa quae talem ac tantum habere meruit Redemptorem in which I know not whether I should more admire the goodnesse of God in the creation and restauration of man or the ingratitude of man towards God in and after both his creation redemption and infinite offences and falles but that as it is the nature of that infinite goodnesse to effectuate the greatest good of the greatest euill so is it no lesse consequent to mans naturall propension and of himselfe as it were an infinite of euill of the greatest good to worke the greatest euill a thing not easily beleeued if our daily and wofull experience did not so manifestly proue it for as God by our greatest and originall euill did worke our greatest and originall good and this onely out of his infinite goodnesse the incarnation I meane of his eternall Sonne so man out of his infinite malice did by occasion of this so infinite a benefit worke the most wicked outrage that could bee imagined against his benefactour by seeking his dishonour and death who so abased himselfe to giue him life so that I know not whether I should more admire God shedding his bloud for man or man spilling the bloud of God mans ingratitude towards God or Gods infinite bountie towards man And hence it is that as faith teacheth vs this euill and sinne of Adam was foreseene and permitted of God so is it no lesse a blasphemous heresie to auerre that this or any other sinne is wrought by God wrought I meane by his particular command or concourse not by his vniuersall which is due vnto all entitie and being yet in some sense neither due vnto this of sinne as which in it selfe hath neither entitie nor being but rather if wee speake formally is a priuation of all rectitude goodnesse and being CHAP. XXXII What death that was which God threatned to inflict vpon Adam for his transgression AS it is certaine that the mortalitie of Adam and consequently of all mankinde did proceed of sinne so it hath no small difficultie to declare what instant death that was which God so instantly threatned should follow mans sinne for so saith the text Gen. 2. the 17. verse In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt die the death What day is this what death is this seeing that he neither first sinned the last day of his life nor yet died the first day of his sinne true it is that as death was due at his last day for his first sinne so was it not inflicted in the first houre for his first dayes sinne Was this death peraduenture the priuation of grace by which his soule supernaturally liued for as the body liueth by the soule so Adams soule liued by grace consequently as the body is said to die by the absence of the soule so the soule spiritually by the priuation of grace but yet though this be true yet it cannot bee the sole meaning of the aforesaid words so that then no other death should haue beene due vnto man but only the death of the soule the separation from God who as he had sinned both in body and soule was iustly to be punished in body and soule which the effect afterward shewed that God had before accordingly decreed so that the sentence of his death as it was executed both in body and soule so it is to bee vnderstood to haue beene decreed as well in regard of the body as of the soule because the corporall death is a necessary consequent of the spirituall now then the spirituall being inflicted in the very instant of mans sinne how chanced it that the corporall also did not befall him in the day of his sinne especially seeing that though God threatned not death in the instant of his sinne for the instant of his sinne yet at least God saith that man shall die in the day of his sinne Is it peraduenture threatned and not truly decreed or if really decreed how is it not absolutely performed God threatned his death in the day of his eating Adam eateth and yet liueth long after his eating Could Adam change the decree of God or could God decree that hee meant not to performe Hee performed not therefore he decreed not if he decreed not how then was it said In the day that thou eatest thou shalt die the death not of the soule only for that was instantly but of the body principally seeing that is said to be in tempore in the day not in instanti or momentarily Was it a threat only as wee reade of the Niniuites but they changed their minde they repented their sinne therfore as the sentence was conditionall the condition being changed the sentence of God though eternall is said to be reuoked not changed in act but immuted in obiect the act being immutable the obiect mutable according to the decree of the immutable act But here in this of Adam the cause is altered God
infectious quality was naturally produced in our appetite and thence transfused into our wils or supernaturally the first is impossible because sinne had no such naturall force or power in Adam otherwise it should haue had the same effect likewise in all the posterity of Adam which euen our aduersaries doe deny seeing there is no reason why it should bee so auerred of one more then of all Or peraduenture this quality was not produced by naturall means but by supernaturall not by any naturall power of man but by the supernaturall of Almighty God and as some hath aduentured to pronounce ex sola Dëi voluntate meerly by the will of him to whom nothing is impossible cui non est impossibile omne verbum to whose will all doe obey But certainely if wee waigh this answer either in the naturall principles of true philosophy or supernaturall of grace we shall finde the aforesayd position and solution to bee most dissonant to both seeing that both doe euidently demonstrate vnto vs the repugnance and contradiction of this that hee who is the fountaine of all goodnesse or rather goodnesse it selfe should bee the particular and naturall efficient or morall cause of that which is summum malum the greatest euill nothing more distant then summum bonum and summum malum nothing so vnlike in their being so nothing so improportionate in their causalities and effects Wherfore as it is impossible for goodnesse it selfe not to be good so is it no lesse contradiction to the particular cause of euill and consequently seeing that sinne is summum malum the greatest euill possible and seeing likewise of all sinnes this in some sort is the greatest as which is the originall and fountaine of all other actual sinnes as it doth imply contradiction that God should be the particular cause of other actuall sinnes so it doth à fortiori imply the same that he should be in any wise of this originall yea euen natural reason was a sufficient light of this vnto the very Heathen Philosophers So Plato in his second booke De Republica saith Omnibus modis pugnandum est ne Deus qui bonus est dicatur esse malorum causa alioqui secum Deus pugnaret qui suis legibus contrarium fieri mandauit Wee must by all meanes endeauour saith this diuine Philosopher lest God who is altogether good be said to be the cause of euill otherwise God should bee contrary and repugnant vnto himselfe seeing that hee hath commanded the contrary in his lawes whose eyes as Abacuc saith are so dimme Abacuc 1. that they cannot see euill neither can they behold any iniquity Not that really hee doth not perfectly view and comprehend with his all-knowing science the secretest and most hidden and abhominable action or most inward cogitation and that from all eternity euen before it bee conceiued or thought of by the sinner himselfe but he is said not to see it or not to know it scientia approbationis that is he doth not approoue it but reprooue it not allow it but condemne it and in this sense that is to be vnderstood which the Gospell saith shall be pronounced vnto the vnrepenting sinners nescio vos I know you not not that our Sauiour either according to his humanity much lesse in his diuinity was or is ignorant of any good or bad action according to which hee is to reward in his iudgement but that he did not see or know them so as that hee did deeme them as worthy of the diuine knowledge and approbation or of any reward but onely of eternall fire prepared for the Diuell and his Angels Albertus Pighius Catharinus de originali peccato Albertus Pighius and Catharinus flying the inconueniences of the aforesayd opinions fell into another extreame to wit that there was no other originall sinne in Adams posterity then the sinne of Adam by which he first of all then all his discendence were reputed sinners hee inwardly they outwardly and as the Schooles terme it by an outward denomination to wit by Adams sinne inward to Adam imputed onely to them as though it had been really their own and actually committed by them whereas in very deede they had none proper or inherent but Adams onely by imputation not by reall appropriation Which opinion may fitly bee declared by the example of a man who being adopted by a King as his sonne and heire apparant to the Crowne should haue granted vnto him and to his posterity all the priuiledges annexed vnto his adoption and principality but yet with this condition that if this Prince so adopted should commit any treason against his father both he and his posterity should not onely lose the aforesayd titles and priuiledges but also should be accounted traytours vnto the Crowne In which cause although the posterity of this man had not committed any fault in themselues yet were they to be reputed morally as traytours and to haue committed high treason in their head and pregenitor After the same manner as the Doctors of this opinion auerre was the compact made betweene God and our first father Adam so that if hee had not transgressed the commandement of his Creator eating of the forbidden fruit he and his should haue beene translated out of the terrene Paradise vnto the kingdome of heauen But this compact being broken by our first father both he and wee lost our right vnto the blessednesse for which wee were created he in himselfe and we in him Not that as he had inherent in him the spot and blemish of originall sin wee also should haue it but only by an externe denomination as the Diuines terme it because we had really the effects thereof our first father in whom we were all contained had really both the cause effect the sin I meane of disobedience and the priuatiō of originall iustice together with all other effects therupon ensuing This opinion is gathered out of Paul Rom. 5. In whom to wit in Adam all haue sinned as who would say wee had not sinned originally but onely in Adam wee haue not therefore originally sinned in our selues consequently if wee haue not sinned in our selues but only in Adam our sin only is in Adam as it is only by Adam not in our selues as it was not committed by our selues in so much that it may only bee tearmed ours by imputation from our fore-fathers not by reall inhesion in our selues seeing we neuer gaue any consent by our owne willes vnto the foresaid disobedience but as wee were included in Adam as in our head wee are therefore said to be spotted with originall sinne in as much only as hee who was our head and in whose loines we were contained did really commit the said sinne and consequently as the foresaid Doctors inferre originall sinne in vs neither consisteth in any actuall or habituall transgression neither in concupiscence or in the priuation of originall iustice not in the first Vide Augustinum li. 1. retract
Atha oratione contra idola that it is an ethnicall and hereticall opinion to say that sinne or euill hath any entitie or essence seeing it is rather the priuation of entitie or essence And this is the reason why Nazianzene compareth sinne vnto darknesse Naz. oratione 9. n. 39. not only because darknesse and obscuritie in matters of saluation and the mysteries of our faith is the effect of sin but also or rather because as darknesse is opposite vnto light and is nothing else but the priuation of light so sinne is nothing else but the priuation of goodnesse wherefore in his 40. oration in sanctum baptisma he concludeth that which Nisenus Damascenus and Nizetas tooke from him nullam esse mali essentiam that euill or sinne hath no essence to wit no reall or positiue essence or being Augustin l. 11. de civ Dei or as St. Austin describeth it natura nulla sed boni amissio no positiue nature but the losse of goodnesse which position Fulgentius in his booke of faith the 21. chap. deemeth so certaine that it ought saith he to be holden as a matter of faith because all things that haue reall being or nature are good his words be these Quia omnis natura in quantum natura est bona est sed quia in ea bonum augeri minui potest in tantum mala dicitur in quantum bonum eius minuitur malum enim nihil aliud est nisi boni priuatio vnde geminum constat esse rationalis creaturae malum vnum quo voluntariè ipsa defecit à summo bono creatore suo alterum quo in vita punietur Euill saith this Father is nothing else but the priuation of good and hence it is manifest that the creatures endued with reason are subiect to two kinds of euils one by which they voluntarily fall from their cheefest good the other by which they are punished in this life Likewise St. Austin in his first Treatise vpon St. Iohn giueth this reason why God being the Creator of all things may not bee sayd to bee the author of sinne to wit because sinne in his owne being hath no entitie or being but rather is a priuation of entitie and being Peccatum quidem non per ipsum factum est vt manifestum est quia peccatum nihil est nihil fiunt homines cùm peccant Sinne saith he was not made by God because sin of it selfe is no thing but nothing and men become nothing becomming sinners Now then if the essence of sinne in common or of all sinne whatsoeuer be nothing but that nothing which is the priuation of good Turrianus in epistola ad Iacobâ—m Amiâ—tum episcopum Antisiodorensem Corduba lib. 1. q. 10. opinione 6. quâ—s etiam sequuntur plures recentiores hence it must needs follow that the essence of originall sin must also consist in some particular priuation of some particular good the which wee are now particularly to search out In which poynt Turrian and Corduba are of opinion that this priuation is subiectionis coniunctionis cum Deo in qua nati fuissemus si primus parens non peccasset of the subiection and coniunction with God in which we should haue been borne if our first father Adam had not falne This they prooue by impugning of the other opinions for that as hath beene already prooued it cannot consist in any positiue and reall thing because God otherwise might in some sort haue beene sayd to concurre vnto it and consequently after that maner to be the cause of it which were blasphemous neither can it consist in any other priuation of any other supernaturall gift because all such priuations or depriuations are rather effects consequent as punishment due vnto the sinne it selfe therefore as the heat cannot be sayd to bee the cause of the fire from whence it doth proceede nor the light cause of the Sunne so neither the priuation of originall iustice or of any other vertue or supernaturall gift can be said to be the essence of originall sin for certainely if wee vnderstand aright wee shall finde that all such priuations are rather consequent vnto sinne and so the effects then the sinne it selfe yea rather the punishments inflicted by Almighty God vpon man for his transgression then the transgression it selfe And heereby also wee may easily demonstrate the absurdities of that common opinion of the Papists that the essence of originall sinne in vs consisteth formally in the depriuation of originall iustice which had beene due vnto vs all if wee had not transgressed in our first father which is the common opinion of the schooles and Papists of Aquinas Caietan Conradus Scotus Taperus Sotus Marsilius Ocamus Buderius Alexander Bonaventure Richardus de Medianilla Maior Vasquez Zuares Sumel and almost all other Papists of this age Anselm lib. de conceptu virginali cap. 26. Yea Anselmus saith that hee cannot conceiue that originall sin is any other then that which was committed by the inobedience of Adam to wit the depriuation of the iustice in infants which was otherwise due vnto them ArasicanuÌ„ concilium 2. Can. 2. Finally the Arausican Councell 2. Can. 2. defineth it to be the death of the soule wherefore if death as is plaine out of Philosophy be nothing else but the priuation of the life of the soule seeing nothing else can be vnderstood to be the life of the soule but onely the inward grace of God by which onely the soule did liue that supernaturall life which is possessed in Paradise consequently the priuation of this originall grace or iustice wherewith the soule was adorned and liued in Paradise must needs be the priuation of the same gift As if our naturall life here in this vale of misery doth consist in the presence of our soule or vnion thereof with the body consequently our death must necessarily consist in the absence of the same soule which gaue it life or in the disvnion or separation of these two comparts the soule and the body after the same manner if the supernaturall life of our soule consist in the presence of God dwelling in our soules by his grace then certainely our spirituall death whether it be considered here after our expulsion out of Paradise or in the fall from that first happinesse must necessarily consist in the departing of God from our soules or which is all one in the absence or depriuation of his grace Neither can this want of originall iustice be rightly deemed a punishment of our originall sinne as hath beene before obiected because no defect or want worthy of an other punishment can be inflicted as a punishment wherefore seeing that this maketh our soules worthy to be depriued of eternall blisse which is the greatest punishment imaginable that could be inflicted for originall sinne Aquin. 2. 2. q. 21. it can in no wise be the punishment due vnto the fault but rather it must be the sinne it selfe
saith hee dare not define how great this punishment of fire shall be in regard of them who depart with the guilt onely of originall sinne The like also is not improbably gathered out of Gregory the great in his 9. booke of his morals the 12. chapter vpon those words in turbine conteret me where he seemeth plainly to insinuate the said sensible punishment of the infants by fire ac si apertè humani generis damna considerans dicat as if considering the losses of mankinde he should plainly say with what punishment will that most iust and rigorous Iudge punish those who are condemned for their owne fault if he also eternally smite those whom the guiltinesse of their owne will doth not condemne by which word of smiting he seemeth to insinuate the punishment of sense which is by fire Again he declareth his mind himself touching this sensible punishment vpon those words of the same chap. multiplicabit vulnera mea hee shall multiplie my wounds where speaking of the foresaid infants he saith that perpetua tormenta percipiunt qui nihil ex propria voluntate peecarunt that those who haue sinned in nothing by their owne proper will receiue perpetuall torments which words of perpetuall torments must needs import a sensible punishment Yea this was the opinion of the Bishops of Africa in Fulgentius his time as is plainly out of him aboue alleaged and more plainly in his booke of the incarnation which booke hee wrote not onely by the approbation of all the Bishops of Africa but also in their names as may be euidently seene by the beginning of the first chapter of that booke Finally this seemeth to be the sense of the Scripture Matth. the third chapter verse 12. and Marke also the third chapter verse 14. where S. Iohn Baptist speaking of our Sauiour saith that he will come with his fanne in his hand and will make cleane the floore and gather his wheat into his garner but will burne vp the chaffe with vnquenchable fire where as wee see all mankinde is but onely of two sorts the good and the bad the wheat and the chaffe wherof the wheat only is for the garner that is the good for heauen the chaffe for the fire the bad for those intolerable torments of hell here is no meane all is either good or bad all either for eternall blesse both sensible and spirituall or eternall curse and punishment both sensible and spirituall and consequently there is no other place or manner of punishment for those who die with originall sinne innocent in their owne actions though eternally sequestred from the sight of God for Adams sinne and corruption Secondly it is said in the same chapter that euery tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be hewen downe and cast in the fire Wherefore seeing those that depart out of this world with the guilt only of originall sinne are vnfruitfull trees consequently they are to bee cast into euerlasting fire Thirdly when our blessed Sauiour shall come to giue euery man according to his deeds hee will only separate two sorts of people one of the right hand another of the left the good of the right the bad of the left those for eternall blesse in the kingdome of heauen these for an eternall curse in the vnquenchable fire of hell Matth. 25. chap. vers 31. And when the sonne of man commeth in his glory and all the holy Angels with him then shall he sit vpon the throne of his glory and before him shall be gathered all nations and he shall separate one from another as a shepheard separateth the sheepe from the goats and hee shall set the sheepe on the right hand and the goats on the left Loe here bee two sorts of people signified by those two kindes of beasts the sheepe and the goats the good and the bad the sheepe on the right hand the goats on the left according vnto the two sorts of sentences pronounced vers 34. and 41. Then shall the King say to them on his right hand come yee blessed of my Father possesse the inheritance of the kingdome prepared for you from the foundation of the world Againe to the cursed hee saith vers 41. Depart from me yee cursed vnto euerlasting fire which is prepared for the Deuill and his angels Hence therefore it must needs follow that seeing those who died in originall sinne imputed vnto them as who were not in any wise ingraffed in the body of Christ that these I say must needs according vnto the opinion of the aforesaid Fathers bee condemned vnto vnquenchable fire though certaine it is as God willing shall bee demonstrated in another place that those who are in any wise ingraffed in Christ either by the baptisme of water of bloud or of the holy Ghost by reason of originall sinne only shall neuer taste of those eternall torments prepared for the deuill and his angels CHAP. LXIIII. The obiections of Simon Magus against the aforesaid doctrine of the creation of man and his placing in Paradise AS there is nothing so manifest vnto reason but hath beene oppugned by reason so neither hath there beene any thing so euident in Scripture but hath beene oppugned with Scripture So the Pharisees resisted the Messias and Simon Magus the doctrine of Moses especially about the creation For either saith hee the God which created man was omnipotent or not if omnipotent how is it that hee would that Adam should not fall who neuerthelesse did fall if he was not omnipotent how can he be God To this wee answer that though Adam sinned and by his sinne did contrary to the will of God neuerthelesse hee remained in some sort conformable to the will of God for as hee created him endued with vnderstanding that thereby hee might discerne good from euill so was hee also created with free will whereby hee might embrace the good and eschew the euill obey or disobey his Lord and maker this was the perfection in which he excelled the beasts of the earth paulò minor factus Angelis in this he resembled the purest Angels yea in this hee is said to bee made to the image of God himselfe But God saith Simon Magus would not that Adam should haue eaten of the forbidden fruit who neuerthelesse did eat of that fruit it followeth therefore that hee remained not as his Creator would haue had him to haue remained how then can God be omnipotent or his will alwayes fulfilled It were necessary if we should fully satisfie this argument to intreat more largely of the will of God then were conuenient for this place wherefore that wee may briefly answer this obiection wee must presuppose with the Schoole-Diuines a threefold distinction of the will of God Aquinas 1. n.i. te quaestione 19. Ibidem Molina VasqueZ Suarius Sumel Bannesius alij plures according to the diuersitie of their proper obiects the first they call his efficient effectuall or working will by which God doth so effectually intend
doe most blasphemously accuse the wisdom of God as touching the fore-said commandement of abstaining from the tree of good and euill for saith he doubtles when God did giue this law vnto our first fathers hee thought that they would obey it which seeing they did not God as Manes obiecteth was deceiued Secondly he accuseth God of vniust wrath and indignation in that he condemned man for so small a matter as the eating of an apple Finally he accuseth him of ignorance mutabilitie and contradiction to himselfe in that ignoring his future compassion towards man hee did frustrate the law which hee himselfe had made yea and contradicted the sentence of death as rashly pronounced by himselfe against Adam Here we may see how as Tertullian saith God of his infinite goodnes and mercy suffereth himselfe to bee dishonoured in his other infinite attributes and dietie but that it may bee apparent that these blasphemies haue not any ground euen in naturall reason we answer that though all things and consequently the disobedience of Adam was perfectly fore-knowne by God Almighty yet neuerthelesse it was conformable to reason that Adam being a reasonable creature should haue this law of obedience prescribed vnto him so conformable to reason first for to manifest the absolute power dominion and authoritie of God the Creator ouer his creature and the due subiection of the creature towards his Creator Secondly this law of obedience was most profitable vnto man though foreknowne that it was to be violated by man most profitable I say it was both in regard of the manifestation of Gods iustice and mercy as also for the exercise and tryall of the good and bad righteous and vnrighteous a necessarie obiect of the afore-said attributes Now if this law should therefore haue beene omitted because God fore-knew the transgression thereof by the same reason or rather no reason no other law should haue beene prescribed vnto man seeing there is no law either of nature or grace which God in his fore-knowledge did not foresee would be often-times violated by man Furthermore as touching the blasphemie against the wrath of God I answer that it is not to be attributed to God as signifying any passion or mutation in the immutable or impassible God but that this shadow of change or shew of mutabilitie is attributed vnto him who in his nature is altogether immutable because hee seeing the wickednesse of man he worketh those effects which in vs bee euident tokens and signes of mutabilitie and change Nay secondly I adde that after Adam had transgressed the commandement of God God pronounced against him the afore-said sentence of death more moued by mercy then of any anger or wrath which wee may euidently see in that hee did not die the same day of his transgression according as the sentence which God pronounced against him seemed to threaten so that whether wee respect the sentence giuen before Adams disobedience or the execution of the same after his sinne we may admire the infinite mercy of the Almighty in both both in regard of Adam and his posteritie as also in regard of the sentence threatned to be inflicted so immediatly after their sinne so that euen in his iustice wee may magnifie his mercy and say with the Psalmist misericordia eius super omnia opera eius that his mercy aboundeth in all his workes yea and is aboue all his works because as the Diuines say remunerat vltra condignum punit citra condignum he rewardeth our workes farre beyond their worth which is none at all vnlesse it bee in Christ and punisheth our sinnes much lesse then they deserue To the other blasphemie which Manes vseth against the Almighty God in accusing him of repentance and mutabilitie I answer that we must first suppose what it is to repent or to be sorry for any thing which wee haue done For repentance or sorrow supposeth ignorance in vs of future euents yea of such as are noxious or hurtfull to those who are affected with the afore-said passion both which are farre vnfitting the all-seeing science and omnipotent power of God who did not remit the rigour of this sentence moued by sorrow or repentance as it happeneth in vs but rather as we haue said before by his infinite mercy and clemencie to the end that his infinite goodnesse and mercy might bee the more manifest vnto vs. In like manner wee may say that when any sinner doth turne from his former being in sinne God Almightie in some sort may bee said to remit the rigour of his sentence pronounced against him and this not by reason of any ignorance or mutable repenting himselfe of the former fact or threatning as Manes blasphemously obiecteth but rather hee remitteth out of his infinite clemencie the sentence of damnation which conditionally hee had decreed to wit if the sinner had not repented himselfe of his sinne an example of which wee finde in the commination of doome and vtter destruction threatned not absolutely but conditionally against the Niuiuites Ionae 3. that they should vtterly bee destroied within forty dayes 4. Reg. 20. likewise against Ezechias that hee should die for his sinnes whom neuerthelesse God pardoned vpon their repentance and the like also wee finde in others most hainous offenders against whom God hauing denounced his wrath neuerthelesse pardoned vpon their sorrow contristation and humiliation Now as touching the lie which this hereticke obiecteth against God in that hee threatned death vnto man in the day of his transgression which neuerthelesse was not inflicted I answer that as man is composed of body and spirit so likewise the death threatned against him was both corporall and spirituall which both were in some sort inflicted euen in the very instant of his transgression the spirituall in the separation of his spirit from God and his grace wherein consisted his spirituall and supernaturall life the corporall in the perturbation of his affections and powers both spirituall and corporall which was a kinde of beginning of a neuer dying death beginning in this life and which according to the present iustice of God if it had beene executed was to haue beene consummated in the other life or rather eternall death if so be that this first lapse and fall had not been remitted not of mans merit but by Gods mercy CHAP. LXVI The obiections of Theodorus and Nestorius THeodorus Bishop of Laodicea and Nestorius Patriarke of Constantinople with diuers others of the Greeke Church were of opinion that sinne was not the occasion of death but that man should haue died though hee had not sinned because mortalitie is consequent to nature as immortalitie proceedeth only of grace How then is it possible vnlesse God can contradict and denie himselfe or that one of the diuine decrees can be opposite to another that God should first decree the immortalitie of man then presently vpon his transgression the obiect being changed God also should be changed in his decree for either God fore-knew