Inquiry but Iudgement is the Ballace to Poise and the Steere to guide the course to it s intended End Now the manner of the Iudgements Operation in directing either our Practise or Contemplation is by a discourse of the Mind whereby it â—…educeth them to certaine Grounds and Principles whereunto they ought chiefly to be conformable And from hence is that Reason which Quintilian observes why shallow and floating Wits seeme oftentimes more fluent than men of greater sufficiencies For saith he those other admit of every sudden flash or Conceipt without any Examination but apud Sapientes est â—…lectio Modus They first weigh things before they utter thâ—…m The maine Corruption of Iudgement in this Office is Prejudice and Prepossession The Duty of Iudgement is to discerne between Obliquities and right Actions and to reduce all to the Law of Reason And therefore t is true in this as in the course of publique Iudgements That respect of persons or things blind the Eyes and maketh the Vnderstanding to determine according to Affection and not according to Truth Though indeed some Passions there are which rather hood-winke then distemper or hurt the Iudgement so that the false determination thereof cannot bee well called a Mistake but a Lye Of which kind flattery is the principall when the Affections of Hope and Feare debase a man and cause him to dissemble his owne opinion CHAP. XL. Of the Actions of the Vnderstanding upon the Will with respect to the End and Means The Power of the Vnderstanding over the Will not Commanding but directing the Objects of the Will to bee good and convenient Corrupt Will lookes only at Good present Two Acts of the Vnderstanding Knowledge and Consideration It must also be possible and with respect to happinesse Immortall Ignorance and Weaknesse in the Understanding in proposing the right means to the last End HItherto of the Actions of the Vnderstanding Ad extra in regard of an Object Those Ad Intra in regard of the Will Wherein the Vnderstanding is a Minister oâ—… Counsellor to it are either to furnish it with an End whereon to fasten its desires or to direct it in the means conducible to that end For the Will alone is a blind Faculty and therefore as it cannot see the right Good it ought to affect without the Assistance of an Informing Power So neither can it see the right way it ought to take for procuring that Good without the direction of a Conducting power As it hath not Iudgment to discover an End So neither hath it Discourse to judge of the right Means whereby that may be attained So that all the Acts of the Will necessarily presuppose some precedent guiding Acts in the Vnderstanding whereby they are pro portioned to the Rules of right Reason This Operation of the Vnderstanding is usually by the Schoole-men called Imperium or Mandatum a Mandate or Command because it is a Precept to which the will ought to be obedient For the Rules of Living and Doing well are the Statutes as it were and Dictates of right Reason But yet it may not hence be concluded that the Vnderstanding hath any Superiority in regard of Dominion over the Will though it have Priority in regard of Operation The Power of the Vnderstanding over the Will is onely a Regulating and Directing it is no Constraining or Compulsive Power For the Will alwaies is Domina sâ—…orum actuum The Mistresse of her owne Operation For Intellectus non imperat sed solummâ—…dò significat voluntatem imperantis It doth only intimate unto the Will the Pleasure and Law of God some seeds whereof remaine in the Nature of man The Precepts then of right Reason are not therefore Commands because they are proposed by way of Man date but therfore they are in that manner proposed because they are by Reason apprehended to be the Commands of a Divine Superior Power And therefore in the breach of any such Dictates we are not said properly to offend our Vnderstanding but to sinne against our Law giver As in Civill Policy the offences of men are not against inferiour Officers but against that soveraigne Power which is the Fountaine of Law and under whose Authority all subordinate Magistrates have their proportion of government Besides Ejus est imperare Cujus est punire For Law and Punishment being Relatives and mutually connotating each the other it must necessarily follow that from that power only canbe an imposition of law from which may be an Infliction of Punishment Now the Condition under which the Vnderstanding is both to apprehend and propose any either end or means convenient to the Nature of the Will and of Sufficiency to move it are that they have in them Goodnesse Possibility and in the end if we speak of an utmost one Immortality too Every true Object of any Power is that which beareth such a perfect Relation of convenience fitnes therunto that it is able to accomplish all its desires Now since Malum is Destructâ—…vum all Evill is Destructive It is impossible that by it selfe without a counterfeit and adulterate face it should ever have any Attractive Power over the Desires of the Will And on the other side since Omne bonum is Perfectivum since Good is perfective and apt to bring reall satisfaction along with it most certainly would it be desired by the Will were it not that our Vnderstandings are clouded and carried away with some crooked misapprehensions and the Will it selfe corrupted in its owne Inelinations But yet though all mans Faculties are so depraved that he is not able as he ought to will any Divine and Perfect Good yet so much he retains of his Perfection as that he cannot possibly desire any thing which he apprehends as absolutely disagreeable destructive to his Nature since all Naturall Agents ayme still at their owne Perfection And therefore impossible it is that either Good should be refused without any apprehension of Disconvenience or Evill pursued without any appearance of Congruity or Satisfaction That it may appeare therefore how the Vnderstanding doth alwaies propose those Objects as Good to the Will which are notwithstanding not only in their owne Nature but in the Apprehension of the Vnderstanding it selfe knowne to be evill And on the contrary why it doth propose good Objects contrary to its owne Knowledge as Evill We may distinguish two opposite conditions in Good and Evill For first all Evill of Sin though it have Disconvenience to mans Nature as it is Destructive yet on the other side it hath agreement thereunto as it is crooked and corrupt As continuall drinking is most convenient to the distemper of an Hydropticke Body though most disconvenient to its present welfare Now then as no man possessed with that disease desires drinke for this end because he would dye though he know that this is the next way to bring him to his Death but only to give satisfaction to his present Appetite So neither doth man
devoure the love which they owe unto their Country More noble was the behaviour of Themistocles and Aristides who when they were ever imployed in the publique service of State left all their private enmities in the borders of their own Country and did not resume them til they returned and became private menagaine The last cause which I shall observe of Hatred may bee a setled and permament Intuition of the object a penetrating jealous and interpreting fancy because by this means a redoubled search and review doth generate a kinde of habituall detestation it being the nature of Evill commonly to shew worse at the second or third view And that first because the former Act doth worke a prejudice and thereby the after apprehension comes not naked but with a fore-stalled resolution of finding Evill therein and next because from a serious and fastoned search into the Object the faculty gaineth a greater acquaintance with it and by consequence a more vehement dislike of it the former knowledge being a master and light unto the latter But light and wandring fancies though they may bee more sudden in the apprehensive of Evill and by consequence liable to an oftner Anger yet by reason of the volubility of the minde joyned with an infirmity and unexercise of memory they are for this cause the lesse subject to deepe and rooted hatred Vnto this Head may bee referred that Hatred which ariseth from excessive Melancholy which maketh men sullen morose solitary averse from all society and Haters of the light delighting onely like the Shrieke Owle or the Bitterne in desolate places and monuments of the dead This is that which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when men fancy themselves transformed into Wolves and Dogs and accordingly hate all Humane society Which seemeth to have bin the distemper of Nâ—…buchadnezar when hee was â—…hrust out from men and did eate grasse with the beasts Timon the Athenian was upon this ground branded with the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Man Hater because he kept company with no man but onely with Alcibiades whereof he gave this only account because hee thought that man was borne to doe a great deale of mischiefe And we read even in the Histories of the Church of men so marvelously averse from all converse or correspondence with men that they have for their whole lives long some of sixty others of ninety yeares immured themselves in Cels and silence not affording to looke on the faces of their neerest kindred when they travelled farre to visit them So farre can the opinion of the minde actuated and furthered by the melancholy of the body transport men even ouâ—… of humane disposiâ—…on which the Philosopher telleth us is naturally a lover of Society and therefore he saith that such men are usually given to contention the signe and the fruit of hatred CHAP. XIIII Of the Quality and Quantity of Hatred and how in either respects it is to bee regulated I Proceed now unto the consideration of this Passion in the Quantity and Quality of its Acts which must bee observed according to the Evill of the Object for if that be unchangeable there is required a continual Permanency of the Passion in regard of the disposition of the Mind or if it be Importunaâ—…e and Affaulting there is required a more frequent repetition of the Act. The same likewise is to bee said of the Quality of it for if the Evill be of an Intense and more Invincible nature our Hatred must arme us the more if more Low and remisse the Passion may bee the more negligent Hero then is a fourefould direction of the Quantities and Qualities of our Hatred and it will hold proportion in the other passions First the unalterablenesse of the Evill warrants the continuance of our hatred Secondly the importunity and insinuation of it warrants the Reiteration of our hatred Thirdly and fourthly the greatnesse and the Remission of it requires a proportionable intention and moderation of hatred We may instance for the three former in sinne so much the worst of Evils by how much it is a remotion from the best of Goods First then Sinne is in its owne formall and abstracted nature Vnchangeable though not in respect of the subject in whom it dwelleth for a Creature now bad may by the mercy of God bee repaired and restored againe but this is not by a changing but by a forsaking of Evill by a removing of it not by a new molding it into another frame Sinne then remaineth in its owne Nature unchangeable and alwaies evill and the reason is because it is a Transgression of a perpetuall Law and a Remotion from an unalterable Will Sinne then is to bee hated with a continuall and peremptory hatred But in other things there is according to the nature of their evils required a conditionall and more flexible dislike they being evils that have either some good annexed unto them or such as are of a mutable nature And therefore wee see that in most things the variety of Circumstances doth alter the good or evill of them and so makes the passions thereabout conversant alterable likewise Otherwise men may naturally deprive themselves of those contents and advantages which they might receive by reasonable use of such indifferent things as they formerly for inconveniences now removed did dislike And in Morality likewise much dammage might be inferred both to private persons and to the publique by nourishing such private enmities and being peremptory in continuing those former differences which though happily then entertained upon reasonable grounds may yet afterwards prove so much the more harmefull by how much the more danger is to be feared from the distemper of a growne and strong than of a vanishing and lighter passion Secondly Againe as no evill altogether so unchangeable as Sinne so is there nothing so much to be opposed with a Multiplicity and Reiteration of our hatred in regard of its importunity and insinuation that as there is an impudence in the assault so there may be a proportionable resolution in the withstanding of it Some Evils there may be which require onely a present and not a customary exercise of this passion Present I say when the Object is offensive and not customary because as the Object so the Passion likewise may be unusuall Sinne onely is of all other evils the most urging and active furnished with an infinite number of stâ—…atagems and plausible impostures to insinuate into natures though best armed against such assaults and therefore here onely are necessary such reiterated acts as may keepe us ever on our guard that we be not unprepared for a surprize Thirdly Then for the Quantity of an Evill because that is not in any thing so intense as in Sinne whither wee consider it in its owne Nature as a Rebellion against the highest good or in its effects either in regard of the diffusion of it it being an overspreading pollution or of
great Abilities and vast Hopes meet together to governe them with moderation Private Ends being in that case very apt to engage a mans parts and to take them off from publicke service unto particular advantage And therefore I take it there is no temper of Minde that will with that evennesse and uniformity of proceeding or felicity of successe promote publicke and honourable Ends as Height of Abilities with moderation of Desires because in that case a man can never stand in his own light noâ—… have any mist or obstacle between his Eye and his End Now from this ground I beleeve did arise that Maxime of some of the States of Greece noted by Tully and at large debated by the Philosopher Nemâ—… de nobis unui excellat that they would not have any one man to be notoriously eminent in abilities above the rest and thereupon instituted Ostracisme or an honourable Bannishment as a restraint either to abate the excessive worth of eminent men or to satisfie and asswage the Envy which others might conceive against them who are apt to hate the vertues which they can onely admire or lastly to prevent the dangers which greatnesse of parts taking advantage of popularity and vulgar applause might haply venture to bring upon things Vpon this ground the Ephe sians expelled Hermodorus and the Athenians Aristides because he was too just for the rest of the people As one Voice in a Consort which is loud above the proportion of the rest doth not adorne but disturbe the Harmony and therefore usually mâ—…n of great parts have lien either under Envy or Iealousie Mens minds out of I know not what malignity being apt to suspect that that will not be used unto Good which might be abused unto Evill which Tacitus noteth to have been the quality of Domitian and Ammianus Marcellinus of Constantius towards men of the greatest worth Now according to the difference of this Affection in different men so it worketh two different Effects 1 There is a Happy and Discreeâ—… boldnesse which doth not anticipate but second and attend the mature counsels of the minde and doth first call out and stirre up it selfe by wisedome before it proceed unto Action or Execution like the Boldnesse of the Lyon which is Slow but at last prospers in what it undertakes For after Counsell hath ripened Resolutions Boldnesse is then the best Instrument to accomplish them and in that case quo minus timoris minus fermè perituli as the Historian speaks The lesse feares are the lesse also are their dangers and the greater their Confidence the surer their successe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Greeks by venturing did enjoy Their ten yeares wish and gained Troy 2 There is a hasty and rash Boldnesse which beginning too speedily without Counsell doth usually end too Cowardly without Courage for rash men whom the Philosopher cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 men made up of confidence and feare are bold and boasting before a Danger but in it very timorous or at least inconstant Lyons in peace but Harts in warre as Tertullians Proverb hath it Like those of whom Livy and Florus tell us That they were more than men in the onset and lesse than women in the issue melting away from their Resolutions like Snow And another ill property of the Rashnesse of this Passion is That it will expose a man to more danger than the successe which it aimes at can compensateâ—…as he that fishes for a Gudgeon with a golden hooke or as Vlysses who went backe to the Cyclopâ—… his denne to fetch his cap and girdle which he had left behind him Another is that it makes men Overvalue themselves and so undertake things too hard for them to endure or hold out in Like Menelaus in the Poet who would venture to fight with Hector or Ariâ—…ioxenus in Tully who being a Musitian would needs determine in questions of Philosophy Lastly it hath a property as we say to breake the Ice and to give the first onset upon dangerous Attempts which is a thing of very perillous consequence not only to the Author but many times to the publick Peace too c forward exulcerated and seditious spirits being too ready to follow what they dare not begin CHAP. XXI Of the Passion of Feare the Causes of it Impotency Obnoxiousnesse Suddennesse Neerenesse Newnesse Conscience Ignorance of an Evill THe opposite Passion to this of of Hope is Feare which being an Equivocall Passion and admitting of many different kinds can scaâ—…se have any whole and simple definition to explaine it There is a Vertuous Feare a Feare of Sinne and Shame an Intellectuall Feare of Admiration when the excellency of the Object dazleth our Eye a Feare of Reverence an Astonishing Feare by reason of the Newnesse and an Oppressing Feare by reason of the Neerenesse and Inavoydablenesse of the Evill sea red It is a Griefe Trouble Flight Aversation of some approaching Evill apprehended either as destructive or as burthensome to our nature and not easily resistable by our strength For the qualification of the Object thereof because it is in all circumstances like that of Hope save in the Evill of it I shall therefore forbeare to touch it and shall onely in briefe consider the Dignities and Defects thereof in its Causes and Effects Fear is an humbling debasing Passion which alwaies importeth some manner of servitude and subjection in whom it resideth So then as in the former Passion of Hope I noted the fundamentall cause thereof to be Weaknesse and Wâ—…nt so likewise in this of Feare the Root and first Principle is Weaknessâ—… and Subjection whereof the one implyes a disability in us to resist the other a necessity to undergoe an evill Hence it is that wee feare the displeasure of Great men or the Power of Vnjust men or the Competition of Popular and Plausible men or the Cunning of Close and Malitious men or the Revenge of Provoked men or the Guilt of Injurious men that have wronged us already because in all these cases there is some notice of Weakenesse and Subjection in us so that Feare is of all other a naked Passion For as Nakednesse hath three evill properties to disable for Defence to expose to Injury and from both to work shame in the consciousnesse of our dejected condition So likewise Feare hath three properties to make us Impotent and Obnoxious and from both these to beget Shame For though his speech was true Rubor est virtutis color that Shame and Vertue have the same colour which makes it seeme a companion rather of Perfection than of Weaknesse yet indeed it is rather a signe of a mind vertuously disposed in restifying the quicke apprehensivenesse of its own defects than any Adjunct of Vertue it selfe So then the Roots of this Passion are Weaknesse and Subjection both together so that where either condition is wanting there is not any proper ground of Feare and therefore wee see sundry
Honesty For crooked and reeling Movers necessarily require more Liberty of way more broad courses to exerise themselves in as wee see in naturall Bodies a crooked thing will not bee held within so narrow bounds as that which is strait CHAP. XLI Of the Conscience its Offices of Direction Conviction Comfort Watchfulnesse Memory Impartiality Of Consciences Ignorant Superstitious Licentious Sleeping Frightfull Tempestuous THere remaines yet one higher and diviner Act of the Practicall Vnderstanding of most absolute power in man and that is Conscience Which is not any distinct Faculty of the Soule but onely a Compounded Act of Reason consisting in Argumentation or a practique Syllogisme inferring alwaies some Applicative and Personall Conclusion Accusing or Excusing The Dignities whereof are to bee gathered from the Offices of it and from the Properties of it The maine Offices are three Direction Conviction Consolation whereof the two last alwayes presuppose the first with a contrary Qualification of Breach and Observance The Direction of Conscience consists in a Simple Discourse or as I may so speake in a Direct Ray of Vnderstanding gathering Morall or Divine Conclusions from a presupposed habit of Principles either from the reliques of our Originall Knowledge naturally imprest or by concurrence of Religion and Theologicall Precepts spiritually iuspired into the Practique Iudgement or hearts of men The observance of which Conclusions it imposeth upon all those Executive Powers which each particular Conclusion doth most immediately concerne upon paine of hazarding our owne Inward Peace with that sweet repose and security of Minde which followes it and also as the Heathenâ—… themselves have observed upon feare of iâ—…curring the displeasure of that God concerning whom the very light of Nature hath revealed thus much that as his Penetrating and Sâ—…arching Eye is able to read our most retyred Thoughts so his impartiall and unpreventable Iustice hath thunder and fire in store for the Rebellions against this Faculty which he hath made to be as it were his Officer and Herauld in all mens hearts The two latter of those Offices consist in a Reflection of that former discourse upon mens Actions and according as is discovered in them either an observance or neglect of those imposed Duties the heate of that Reflection is either Comfortable or Scorching Now of these two that of Conviction is nothing else but a performance of that Equivocall killing promise made by the Serpent to our seduced Parents I meane an Opening of their Eyes to know with desperate Sorrow the Good they had irrecoverably foregone and with feare shame and horrour the Evill which they plunged themselves and their whole posterity into This one Act it is which hath so often confuted that Opinion of Aristotlâ—… touching Death that it is of all things most Terrible in that it hath it pursued many so farre as that it hath forced them to leap out of them selve and to preferre the Terrour of Death and Darknesse of the Grave before the grisly Face of a Convicting Conscience The chiefe Dignity hereof consisteth in Consolation whereby it diffuseth into the whole man from a secret assurance of divine favour for nothing can throughly calme the Conscience but 〈◊〉 a sweet Tranquillity silent Peace setled Stayednesse and which is highest of all a ravishing Contemplation and as it were Pre-fruition of Blisse and Immortality The propâ—…rties of the Conscience whereby I understand the Ministeries which it never fayles to execute in man are as I conceive principally three Watchfulnesse Memory Impartiality It keeps alwaies Centinâ—…ll in a mans Souleâ—…and like a Register records all our good and ill actions Though the Darknesse of the Night may hide us from others and the Darknesse of the Mind seem to hide us from our selves yet still hath Conscience an Eye to looke in secret on whatsoever weâ—… doe whether in regard of Ignorance or Hardnesse Though in many men it sleep in regard of Motion yet it never sleeps in regard of Observation and Notice it may be Hard and Seared it can never be Blind That writing in it which seemes Invisible and Illegible like letters written with the juice of Lemmon when it is brought to the fire of Gods Iudgement will be most cleere And for the next if we observe it there is nothing so much fastened in the Memory as that which Conscience writes all her Censures are written with Indelible Charactâ—…rs never to be blotted out All or most of our Knowledge forsakes us in our Deaths Wit Acutenesse variety of Language habits of Sciences our Arts Policies Inventions all have their period and fate onely those things which Conscience imprinteth shall be so far from finding any thing in death to obliterate raze them out that they shall be thereby much more manifest whether they be impressions of Peace or Horrour The Testimoniâ—…s of Comfort if true are fastened in the Heart with such an Hand as will never suffer them finally to bee taken out and if they be Accusatory and Condemning the Heart is so Hard and they so Deep that there is no way to get them out but by breaking or mâ—…lting the Table they are written in that only course can be taken to make Conscience forget Then thirdly it is a most Bribelesse Worker it never knows how to make a false report of any of our wâ—…yes It is if I may so speake Gods Historion that writes not Annals but Iournals the Words Deeds Cogitations of Houres and Moments never was there so absolute a Compiler of Lives as Conscience It never comes with any prejudice or acceptation of persons but dares speake truth as well of a Monarch as of a Slave Nero the Emperour shall feele as great a fire burning in his breast as he dare wrap the poore Christians in to light him to his Lust. There is scarse one part in man but may be seduced save his Conscience Sense oftentimes conceives things which are not Appetite and Imagination can transport the Will and themselves both may be drawne by perswasion contrary to their owne propensions this onely deales faithfully with him whose witnesse it is though it bee to the confusion of it selfe and him in whom it lodgeth It may I know erre sometimes and mistake but it can never by any Insinuation be bribed to contradict its owne Iudgement and register White for Blacke The Corruption of Conscience arises principally from two Extremes the one occasioned by Ignorance the other by Sinne for I oppose these two here as concurring to the Corruption of Conscience after a different manner The oâ—…e is when the want of due Knowledge drawes the Conscience to sinister determinations either in Practise or Forbearance The other when evill Habits and Actions defile the Conscience Now both these containe under them sundry Degrees of Corruption From Ignorance First comes a â—…ettered and Restrained Conscience fearfully binding it selfe to some particular Acts without sufficient grounds Next a Licentious and Indulging Conscience giving Freedome to it's selfe in such course
greatest desires and endeavours are to keep it so alwaies his Secret Will is performed Eveâ—… by the free and Selfe-moving Operations of those who set themselves stubboâ—…nly to oppose it There is not then any Supreame Destiny Extriâ—…sically moving or Necessarily binding any Inferiours to particular Actions but there is only a Divine Providence which can as out of the Concurrence of differing and casuall Causes which we call Fortune so likewise out of the Intrinsicall Operation of all Inferiour Agents which we call Nature produce one maine and Supreame End without strayning or violating the proper Motions of any Lastly many men are apt in this case to father their sinnes upon the motions of Satan as if hee brought the necessity of sinning upon them and as Saint Paul said in Faith Not I but Sinne in me So they in Hipocresie Not I but evill motions cast into me and because the Devill is in a speciall manner called the Tempter such men therefore thinke to perswade themselves that their Evill commeth not from any Willingnesse in themselves but from the violence of the Enemies Power Malice and Policy It is true indeed that the Devill hath a strong Operation on the Wils of Corrupt men 1 First because of the Subtilty of his Substance whereby he can winde himselfe and his suggestions most Inwardly on the Affections and Vnderstanding 2 Secondly because of the Height of his Naturall Vnderstanding and Policy whereby he is able to transfigure himselfe into an Angel of Light and so to method and contrive his devices that they shall not misse of the best advantage to make them speed 3 Thirdly because of the vastnesse of his Experience whereby he is the better inabled to use such plots as have formerly had the best successe 4 Fourthly because of his manner of Working grounded on all these which is Violent and Furious for the Strength and therefore he is called a Strong Man a Roaring Lyon a Red Dragon And Deep for the subtilty of it and therefore his working is called a Mystery of Iniquity and Deceivablenesse of Iniquity Which is seene First in his Accommodating himselfe to our particular Humours and Natures and so following the tyde of our own Affections Secondly by fitting his Temptations according to our Vocations and Personall Imploiments by changing or mixing or suspending or pressing or any other the like qualifying of his Suggestions according as he shall find agreeable to all other Circumstances But yet wee doe not find in any of these any violation of mans Will nor restraint of his Obedience but rather the Arts that are used to the inveagling of it The working then of Evill Angels are all by Imposture and Deceit towards Good men and in respect of Evill men they are but as those of a Prince over his Subjects or of a Lord over his Slaves and Captives which may wâ—…ll stand with the Freedome of mans Will And therefore his temptations are in some place called the Methods in others the Devices in others the Sâ—…ares of Sâ—…tan All words of Circumâ—…ention and presuâ—…pose the working of our own Wiâ—…s Though then Satan have in a notable manner the name of Temptâ—…r belonging to him yet wee are told in another place that Every man is tempted when hee is drawne away of his owne Concâ—…piscence aâ—…d inticâ—…d So that the Devill hath never an 〈◊〉 Temptation such an one as carryes and overcomes the Will but it is alwaies ioyned with an Inward Temptation of our owne proceeding from the deceiâ—…fulnesse of our owne lusts So that in this case every man may say to himselfe as Apollodoruâ—… in Plutarch dreamed of himselfe when he thought he was boyled alive in a vessell and his heart cried out unto him I am the cause of all this misery to my selfe Many more things might be here added touching this Faculty which I wil but name As first for the manner of its Operations In some cases it worketh Naturally and Necessarily as in its Inclination unto Good in the whole latitude and generall apprehension thereof For it cannot will any thing under the generâ—…ll and formall notion of Evill In others Voluntarily from it selfe and with a distinct view and knowledge of an End wheâ—…unto it workâ—…th In others freely with a Liberty to one thing or another with a power to elicite or to suspend and suppresse its owne Operation In all Spontaneously without violence or compulsion For though in some respects the Will be not free from Necessity yet it is in all free from Coaclâ—…on And therfore though Ignorance Eeare may take away the complete 〈◊〉 of an Action proceeding from the Will because without such Feate or Ignorance it would not have been done Aâ—… when a man casteth his goods into the Sea to escape a shâ—…pwracke And when Oedipus slew Laius his Father nor knowing him so to be yet they can never force the Will to doe that out of violence which is not represented under some notion of Good thereunto Secondly for the Motives of the Will They are first Naturall and Internall Amongst which the Vnderstanding is the principall which doth passe Iudgement upon the Goodnesse and Convenience of the Object of the Will and according to the greater or lesser excellency therâ—…of represent it to the Will with either a Mandatory or a Monitory or a permissive Sentence The Will likewise doth move it selfe For by an Antecedent willing of the Eâ—…d she setteth her selfe on work to will the Means requisite unto the obtaining of that End And the Sensitive 〈◊〉 doth Indirectly move it too By suppressing or bewitching and inticing the Iudgment to put some colour and appearance of Good upon sensuall things And then as the Sunne seemeth red through a red glasse so such aâ—… a mans owne Affection is such will the End seeme unto him to be as the Philosopher speaks Next Supernaturally God moveth the Wilâ—… of men Not only in regard of the Matter of the Motion For in him we live and move and have our being but in regard of the Rectitude and Goodnesse of it in Actions Supernaturall both by the Manifestation of Heavenly Light They shall be â—…ll taught of God and by the Infusion and Impression of Spirituall Grace preventing assisting enabling us both to Will and to Doe of his owne good pleasure Lastly for the Acts of the Will They are such as respect either the End or the Means for attâ—…ining of it The Acts respecting the End are these three 1. A Loving and Desiring of it in regard of its Beauty and Goodnesse 2. A serious Intention and purpose to prosecute it in regard of its distance from us 3. A Frâ—…ition or Enjoying of it which standeth in two thingâ—… In Assecâ—…tion or possession whereby we are Actually joyned unto it and in Delectation or Rest whereby we take speciall pleasure in it The Acts of the Will respecting the Means are these 1. An Act of Vsing or Imploying the Practicall Iudgement
either delightfull or disquieting Conclusions Sensitive Passions are those motions of prosecution or flight which are grounded on the Fancie Mentorie and Apprehensions of the common Sense which we see in brute beasts as in the feare of Hares or Sheepe the fiercenesse of Wolves the anger or slatterie of Dogs and the like So Homer describeth the joy of Vlysses his Dog which after his so long absence remembred him at his returne 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For wanton joy to see his Master neare He wav'd his flattering tayle and toss'd each eare Now these motions in brute creatures if we will beleeve Seneca are not affections but certaine characters and impressions ad similitudinem passionum like unto Passions in men which he calleth Impetus the risings forces and impulsions of Nature upon the view of such objects as are apt to strike any impressions upon it I come therefore to those middle Passions which I call'd Rationall not formally as if they were in themselves Acts of Reason or barely immateriall motions of the Soule but by way of participation and dependance by reason of their immediate subordination in man unto the government of the Will and Vnderstanding and not barely of the Fancie as in other creatures And for calling Passion thus govern'd Reasonable I have the warrant of Aristotle who though the sensitive Appetite in man be of it selfe unreasonable and therefore by him contradivided to the Rationall powers of the Soule yet by reason of that obedience which it oweth to the Dictates of the Vnderstanding whereunto Nature hath ordain'd it to be subject and conformable though Corruption have much slackned and unknit that Bond hee justly affirmeth it to be in some sort a Reasonable Facultie not intrinsecally in it selfe but by way of participation and influence from Reason Now Passion thus considered is divided according to the severall references it hath unto its object which is principally the Good and secondarily the Evill of things and either considered after a sundry manner for they may be taken either barely and alone or under the consideration of some difficultie and danger accompanying them And both these againe are to be determin'd with some particular condition of union or distance to the subject for all objects offend or delight the Facultie in vertue of their union thereunto and therefore according as things are united or distant so doe they occasion Passions of a different nature in the Mind The object then may be considered simply in its owne nature as it precisely abstracteth from all other circumstances including onely the naturall conveniencie or disconveniencie which it beareth to the Facultie and so the Passions are in respect of Good Love in respect of Evill Hatred which are the two radicall fundamentall and most transcendent Passions of all the rest and therefore well called Pondera and Impetus animi the weight and force and as I may so speake the first springings and out goings of the Soule Secondly the object may be considered as absent from the subject in regard of reall union though never without that which the Schooles call vnio objectiva union of Apprehension in the Vnderstanding without which there can be no Passion and the object thus considered worketh if it be Good Desire if Evill â—…light and Abomination Thirdly it may be considered as present by a reall contract or union with the Facultie and so it worketh if Good Delight and Pleasure if Evill Griefe and Sorrow Againe as the object beareth with it the circumstances of difficultie and danger it may be considered either as exceeding the naturall strength of the power which implyeth in respect of Good an Impossibilitie to be attained and so it worketh Despaire and in respect of Evill an Improbabilitie of being avoided and so it worketh Feare or secondly as not exceeding the strength of the power or at least those aides which it calleth in in which regard Good is presented as Attainable and so it worketh Hope and Evill is presented either as Avoidable if it be future and it worketh Boldnesse to breake through it or as Requitable if it be past and so it worketh Anger to revenge it Thus have wee the nature and distribution of those severall Passions which wee are to enquire after of all which or at least those which are most naturall and least coincident with one another I shall in the proceeding of my Discourse observe some things wherein they conduce to the honour and prejudice of Mans Nature But first I shall speake something of the generalitie of Passions and what dignities are therein most notable and the most notable defects CHAP. VI. Of Humane Passions in generall their use Naturall Morall Civill their subordination unto or rebellion against right Reason NOW Passions may be the subject of a three-fold discourse Naturall Morall and Civill In their Naturall consideration we should observe in them their essentiall Properties their Ebbes and Flowes their Springings and Decayes the manner of their severall Impressions the Physicall Effects which are wrought by them and the like In their Morall consideration we might likewise search how the indifferencie of them is altered into Good or Evill by vertue of the Dominion of right Reason or of the violence of their owne motions what their Ministry is in Vertuous and what their Power and Independance in Irregular actions how they are raysed suppressed slackned and govern'd according to the particular nature of those things which require their motion In their Civill respects we should also observe how they may be severally wrought upon and impressed and how and on what occasions it is fit to gather and fortifie or to slack and remit them how to discover or suppresse or nourish oâ—… alter or mix them as may be most advantagious what use may be made of each mans particular Age Nature Pâ—…opension how to advance and promote our just ends upon the observation of the Character and dispositions of these whom we are to deale withall And this Civill use of Passion is copiously handled in a learned and excellent discourse of Aristotle in the second Booke of his Rhetoricks unto which profession in this respect it properly belongeth because in matter of Action and of Iâ—…dicature Affection in some sort is an Auditor or Iudge as he speakes But it seemeth strange that a man of so vast sufficiencie and judgement and who had as we may well conjecture an Ambition to knit every Science into an entire Body which in other mens Labours lay broken and seattered should yet in his Bookes De Animâ over-passe the discoverie of their Nature Essence Operatioâ—… aâ—…d Properties and in his Bookes of Morall Philosophie should not remember to acquaint us with the Indifferencie Irregularitie Subordination Rebellion Conspiracie Discords Causes Effects consequences of each particular of them being circumstances of obvious and dayly use in our Life and of necessarie and singular benefit to give light unto the government of right Reason
be in the Will over the Body an Imperium yet in rigour this is not so much to be tearmed Command as Imployment the Body being rather the Instrument than the Servant of the Soule and the power which the Will hath over it is not so much the command of a Master over his Workmen as of the Workman over his Tooles The chiefe subjects to the Will are the Affections in the right governing whereof is manifested its greatest power The strength of every thing is exercised by Opposition We see not the violence of a River till it meet with a Bridge and the force of the Wind sheweth it selfe most when it is most resisted So the power of the Will is most seene in repairing the breaches and setling the mutinies wherewith untamed Affections disquiet the peace of mans nature since excesse and disorder in things otherwise of so great use requireth amendment not extirpation and we make straight a crooked thing we doe not breake it And therefore as he in Tacitus spake well to Otho when he was about to kill himselfe Majore animo tâ—…lerari adversaquam relinqui That it was more valour to beare than put off afflictions with courage so there is more honour in the having Affections subdued than in having none at all the businesse of a wise man is not to be without them but to be above them And therefore our Saviour himselfe sometimes loved sometimes rejoyced sometimes wept sometimes desired sometimes mourned and grieved but these were not Passions that violently and immoderately troubled him but he as he saw fit did with them trouble himselfe His Reason excited directed moderated repressed them according to the rule of perfect cleare and undisturbed judgement In which respect the Passions of Christ are by Divines called rather Propassions that is to say Beginnings of Passions than Passions themselves in as much as they never proceeded beyond their due measure nor transported the Mind to undecencie or excesse but had both their rising and originall from Reason and also their measure bounds continuance limited by Reason The Passions of sinfull men are many times like the tossings of the Sea which bringeth up mire and durt but the Passions of Christ were like the shaking of pure Water in a cleane Vessell which though it be thereby troubled yet is it not fouled at all The Stoicks themselves confessed that wise men might be affected with sudden perturbations of Feare or Sorrow but did not like weak men yeeld unto them nor sinke under them but were still unshaken in their resolutions and judgements like Aeneas in Virgil Mens immotamanâ—…t lacryma volvuntur inanes He wept indeed but in his stable mind You could no shakings or distempers find And therefore indeed this Controversie betweene the Peripateticks and Stoicks was rather a strife of Words than a difference of Iudgements because they did not agree in the Subject of the Question the one making Passions to be Naturall the other Praeternaturall and disorderly motions For the Peripateticks confessed That wise men ought to be fix'd immovable in their vertuous resolutions and not to be at all by hopes or feares deterred or diverted from them but as a Dye to be foure-square and which way ever they be cast to fall upon a sure firme bottome Which is the same with that severe and unmovable constancie of Mind in Vertue in defence whereof the Stoicks banished Affections from wise men not intending thereby to make men like Caeneus in the Poet such as could not be violated with any sorce for they acknowledge subjection to the first motions of Passion but onely to shew that they wisdome of Vertue should so compose consolidate the Mind and settle it in such stabilitie that it should not all be bended from the Right by any sensitive perturbations or impulsions As they then who pull down houses adjoyning unto Temples doe yet suffer that part of them to stand still which are continued to the Temple so in the demolishing of inordinate Passions we must take heed that we offer not violence to so much of them as is contiguous unto Right Reason whereunto so long as they are conformable they are the most vigorous instruments both for the expression and improvement and derivation of Vertue on others of any in Mans Nature Now concerning the Accidents or manner of these Acts which are from Passion it may be considered either in regard of the Quantitie Extension or of the Qualitie Intention of the Act. And both these may be considered two manner of wayes for the Quantitie of Passions we may consider that as the Quantitie of Bodies which is either Continued or Severed by Quantitie Continued I understand the manner of a Passions permanencie and durance by Severed I meane the manner of its multiplicitie and reiteration from both which it hath the denomination of good or bad as the object whereunto it is carryed hath a greater or lesse relation to the Facultie For some objects are simply and without any limitation convenient or noxious and towards these may be allowed both a more durable and a more multiplyed Passion others are good or evill only with some circumstances of Time Place Person Occasion or the like which therfore require both fewer and lesse habituall motions The same maybe said of the Qualitie of them wherein they are sometimes too remisse sometimes againe too excessive and exorbitant according to varietie of conditions Concerning all these I shall observe this one generall Rule the permanencie or vanishing the multiplicitie or rarenesse the excesse or defect of any Passion is to be grounded on and regulated by the nature only of its object as it beares reference to such or such a person but never by the private humour prejudice complexion habit custome or other like qualifications of the Mind it selfe To see a man of a soft and gentle nature over-passe some small indignitie without notice or feeling or to see a man of an hot and eager temper transported with an extreamer and more during Passion upon the sense of some greater injurie more notably touching him in his honestie or good Name is not in either of these any great matter of commendation because though the nature of the object did in both warrant the qualitie of the Passion yet in those persons they both proceeded out of humour and complexion and not out of serious consideration of the injuries themselves by which onely the Passion is to be regulated Of these two extreames the defect is not so commonly seene as that which is in the excesse And therefore we wil here a little observe what course may be taken for the allaying of this vehemencie of our Affections whereby they disturbe the quiet and darken the serenitie of mans Mind And this is done either by opposing contrary Passions to contrary which is Aristotles rule who adviseth in the bringing of Passions from an extreame to a
coactis Quos neque Tydides nec Larissaeus Achilles Non anni domuere decem non mille carinae They are surpriz'd by frauds and forced teares In whom their greatest foes could work no feares Whom ten yeres war not won nor thousand ships Are snar'd and conquer'd by perjurious lips The second manner of Corruption which Passion useth on the Vnderstanding and Will was Alienating or withdrawing of Reason from the serious examination of those Pleasures wherewith it desireth to possesse the Mind without controule that when it cannot so farre prevaile as to blind and seduce Reason getting the allowance and Affirmative Consent thereof it may yet at least so farre inveagle it as to with-hold it from any Negative Determination and to keepe off the Mind from a serious and impartiall consideration of what Appetite desireth for feare lest it should be convinced of sinne and so finde the lesse sweetnesse in it And this is the Reason of that affected and Voluntarie Ignorance which Saint Petâ—… speakes of whereby Minds prepossessed with a love of inordinate courses doe with-hold and divert Reason and forbeare to examine that Truth which indeed they know as fearing lest thereby they should be deterred from those Vices which they resolve to follow Which is the same with that excellent Metaphore in Saint Paul who sayth That the wrath of God was revealed from Heaven on all Vngodlinesse and Vnrighteousnesse of Men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whicâ—… hold or detaine the Truth in Vnrighteousnesse that is which imprison and keepe in that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Apostle interpreteth himselfe in the next Verse all those Notions of Divine Truth touching the Omnipotencie and Iustice of God which were by the singer of Nature written within them to deterre them from or if not to make them inexcusable in those unnaturall pollutions wherein they wallowed Thus Medea in the Poet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I know 't is wicked that I goe about But Passion hath put all my Reason out And therefore that Maxime of the Stoicall Philosopher out of Plato is false 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That all men are unwillingly deprived of Truth since as Aristotle hath observed directly agreeable to the phrase of Saint Peter there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an elected or Voluntarie Ignorance which for their Securities sake men nourish themselves in And that there should be such an Alienation of the Mind from Truth when the Fancie and Heart are hot with Passion cannot be any great wonder For the Soule is of a limited and determined Activitie in the Body insomuch that it cannot with perspiâ—…uitie and diligence give attendance unto diverse Objects And therefore when a Passion in its fulnesse both of a violence and delight doth take it up the more cleare and naked brightnesse of Truth is suspended and changed So that as the Sunne and Moone at their rising and setting seeme farre greater than at other times by reason of thick Vapours which are then interposed so the Mind looking upon things through the Mists and Troubles of Passion cannot possibly judge of them in their owne proper and immediate Truth but according to that magnitude or colour which they are framed into by prejudice and distemper But then thirdly if Reason will neither be deluded nor won over to the patronage of Evill nor diverted from the knowledge and notice of Good then doth Passion strive to confound and distract the Apprehensions thereof that they may not with any firmenesse or efficacie of Discourse interrupt the Current of such irregular and head-strong Motions And this is a most inward and proper Effect of Passion For as things presented to the Mind in the nakednesse and simplicitie of their owne Truth doe gaine a more firme Assent unto them and a more fixed intuition on them so on the contrarie side those things which come mixt and troubled dividing the intention of the Mind between Truth and Passion cannot obtaine any setled or satisfactorie Resolution from the Discourses of Reason And this is the Cause of that Reluctancie betweene the Knowledge and Desires of Incontinent Men and others of the like Nature For as Aristotle observes of them they are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Halfe-Evill as not sinning with that full and plenarie Consent of Will but Pratâ—…r Electionem as he speakes so I may more truly say of them that they have but an Halfe-Knowledge not any distinct and applicative Apprehension of Truth but a confused and broken Conceit of things in their Generalitie Not much unlike unto Nighttalkers who cannot be sayd to be throughly asleepe nor perfectly awaked but to be in a middle kind of inordinate temper betweene both or as Aristotle himselfe gives the similitude it is like a Stage-Player whose Knowledge is expresse and cleare enough but the things which it is conversant about are not personall and particular to those men but belonging unto others whom they personate So the Principles of such men are in the generall Good and True but they are never brought downe so low as if they did concerne a mans owne particular Weale or Woe nor thorowly weighed with an assuming applying concluding Conscience but like the notion of a Drunken or sleeping man are choaked and smothered with the Mists of Passion And this third Corruption is that which Aristotle in the particular of Incontinencie calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the weakenesse and disabilitie of Reason to keepe close to her owne Principles and Resolutions Whereunto exactly agreeth that of the Prophet How weake is thy heart seeing thou doest all things the workes of an imperious Whorish Woman And elsewhere Whoredome and Wine are sayd to take away the Heart So Hector describes lascivious Paris 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thy face hath beautie in 't but in thy brest There doth no strength nor resolution rest The last Effect which I shall but name is that which Aristotle calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rashnesse or Precipitancie which is the most Tyrannicall Violence which Passion useth when in spight of all the Dictates of Reason it furiously over-ruleth the Will to determine and allow of any thing which it pleaseth to put in practise and like a Torrent carryeth all before it or as the Prophet speakes rusheth like an Horse into the Battell So Lust and Anger are sometimes in the Scripture called Madnesse because it transporteth the Soule beyond all bounds of Wisdome or Counsell and by the Dictates of Reason takes occasion to become more outragious Ipsaque praesidia occupat feedes like Wild-fire upon those Remedies which should remove it As she sayd in the Poet Levis est dolor qui capere consilium potest Libâ—… ire contra That 's but light griefe which counsell can abate Mine swells and all advice resolves to hate The corrupt effects which Passion worketh in the last place on the Body are
desired his friend not to censure him for it till hee himselfe was a father of children The last Effect which I shall observe of this Passion is that which we call Liquefaction or Laugnor a melting as it were of the heart to receive the more easie impressions from the thing which it loveth and a decay of the Spirits by reason of that intensive fixing of them thereon and of the painefull and lingring expectation of the heart to enjoy it Love is of all other the inmost and most viscerall affection And therefore called by the Apostle Bowels of Love And we read of the yearning of Iosephs bowels over Benjamin his mothers sonne and of the true Mother over her child Incaluerunt viscera they felt a fervour and agitation of their bowells which the more vehement it is doth worke the more sudden and sensible decay and languishing of Spirits So Ammon out of wanton and incestuous Love is said to grow leane from day to day and to have been sicke with vexation for his sister Thamar And in spirituall love we find the like expression of the Spouse Stay me with flagons comfort me with apples for I am sick of love Wine to exhilerate apples to refresh those Spirits which were as it were melted away and wasted by an extreame out-let of Love And for this reason the Object of our Love is said to Overcome us and to Burne the Heart as with Coales of Iumper and the like expressions of wounding and burning the Poet useth Est mollis slamma medullas Interea tacâ—…um vivit sub pectore vulnus A wellcome soft flame in her bones did rest And a close wound liv'd in her bleeding breast Now the cause of this Languor which love worketh is in Sensitive Objects an earnest desire to enjoy them in Spirituall Objects an earnest desire to increase them In the former want kindleth love but Fruition worketh wearinesse and satiety In the other fruition increaseth love and makes us the more greedy for those things which when we wanted we did not desire In earthly things the desire at a distance promiseth much pleasure but tast and experience disappointeth expectation In heavenly things eating and drinking doth renew the Appetite and the greater the experience the stronger the desire as the more acquaintance Moses had with God the more he did desire to see his glory And so much may suffice for the first of the Passions Love which is the fountaine and foundation of all the rest CHAP. XII Of the Passion of Hatred the Fundamentall Cause or Object thereof Evill how farre forth Evills are willed by God may bee declined by men of Gods secret and revealed Will. THe next in order is Hatred of which the Schoole-men make two kinds an Hatrâ—…d of Abomination or loathing which consists in a pure aversion or flight of the Appetite from something apprehended as Evill arising from a dissonancy and repugnancy betweene their natures and an Hatred of Enmity which is not a flying but rather a pursuing Hatred and hath ever some Love joyned with it namely a Love of any Evill which we desire may befall the person or thing which wee hate I shall not distinctly handle these asunder but shall observe the Dignities and Corruptions of the Passion in generall as it implies a common disconvenience and naturall Vnconformitie between the Object and the Appetite The Object then of all Hatred is Evill and all evill implying an opposition to Good admits of so many severall respects as there are kinds of opposition And there is first an Evill of Contraricty such as is in the qualities of Water unto Fire or a Wolfe unto a Sheepe occasioned by that Destructive Efficiency which one hath upon the other Secondly an Evill of Privation which we hate formally and for it selfe as implying nothing but a Defect and Absence of Good Thirdly an Evill of Contradiction in the not being of any creature oppos'd to its being For Being and Immortality is that which Aristotle makes one of the principle objects of Love Annihilation then or Not being is the chiefest Evill of things and that which Nature most abhorreth Lastly an Evill of Relation for as things in their owne simple natures Evill may have in them a Relative Goodnesse and so to be desired as the killing of beasts for the service and the death of malefactors for the security of men so things in their absolute being Good may have in them a Relative or Comparative Evill and in that sence bee by consequence hated as our Saviour intimates He that hateth not father and mother and his owne life for me is not worthy of me when they prove snares and temptations to draw us from the Love of Christ they are then to bee undervalued in comparison of him And therefore we find in the Law if a mans dearest brother or child or wife or friend should entice him from God unto Idolatry he was not to conceale pitty or spare him but his owne hand was to bee first upon him And thus the Poet hath elegantly expressed the behaviour of Aeneas toward Dido who being inflamed with Love of him would have kept him from the expedition unto which by divine guidance he supposed himselfe to be directed Quanquam lenire dolorem Solandâ—… cupiâ—… dictis avertere curas Multagâ—…ens magnoque animum labefactus amore Iussa tamen Divâ—…m exequitur Though he desir'd with solace to appease And on her pensive soule to breathe some ease Himself with mutuall love made saint yet still His purposes were fixt t' obey God 's will So then we see what qualification is required in the Object of a just Hatred that it be Evill and some way or other offensive either by defiling or destroying nature and the Passion is ever then irregular when it declineth from this rule But here in as much as it is evident that the being of some evill comes under the Will of God Is there any Evill in a City and the Lord hath not done 〈◊〉 and our will is to bee conformable unto his it may seeme that it ought to fall under our Will too and by consequence to bee rather loved than hated by us since wee pray for the fulfilling of Gods Will. For resolution of this wee must first consider that God doth not love those Evils which hee thus willeth as formally and precisely considered in themselves And next wee will observe how farre the Will of God is to bee the rule of our will whence will arise the cleare apprehension of that truth which is now set downe that the unalterable Object of mans Hatred is all manner of Evill not onely that of deformity and sinne but that also of destruction and misery First then for the Will of God we may boldly say what himselfe hath sworne that hee will not the death or destruction of a sinner and by consequence neither any other evill of his Creature as being a thing infinitely remote from
his mercy he is not delighted in the ruine neither doth hee find pleasure or harmony in the groanes of any thing which himselfe created But hee is said to will those Evills as good and just for the manifestation of his glorious Power over all the Creatures and of his glorious Iustice on those who are voluntarily fallen from him But now because it is left onely to the Wisedome of God himselfe to know and ordaine the best meanes for glorifying of himselfe in and by his creatures we are not here hence to assume any warrant for willing evill unto our selves or others but then onely when the honour of the Creator is therein advanced And so the Apostle did conditionally wish evill unto himselfe if thereby the glory of Gods mercy towards his Countrey-men the Iewes might be the more advanced Secondly it is no good Argument God willeth the inflicting of such an evill therefore it is unlawfull for my will to decline it for first the Will of God whereby hee determineth to worke this or that evill on particular Subjects is a part of his secret Counsell Now the Revealed and not the Hidden Will of God is the rule of our Wills and Actions whence it commeth to passe that it is made a part of our necessary obedience unto God in our wishes or aversations to goe a crosse way to his unrevealed purpose Peradventure in my sicke bed it is the purpose of God to cast my body into the earth from whence it was taken yet for me herein to second the Will of God by an execution thereof upon my selfe or by a neglect of those Ordinary meanes of recovery which hee affords were to despise his mercy that I might fulfill his Will Peradventure in my flight a sword will overtake mee yet I have the warrant of my Saviours example and precept to turne my backe rather than my conscience in persecution alwaies reserved that though I will that which God willeth yet my will bee ever subordinated unto his Wee owe submission to the will of Gods purpose and Counsell and wee owe conformity to the will of his Precept and Command we must submit to the will whereby God is pleased to worke himselfe and wee must conforme to the will whereby hee is pleased to command us to worke And therefore Secondly though the Will of God were in this case knowne yet is not our will constrained to a necessary inclination though it bee to an humble submission and patience in bearing that which the Wisedome and purpose of God hath made inevitable for as the promises and decrees of Good things from God doe not warrant our slacknesse in neglecting or our profanenesse in turning from them so neither doth the certainty and unavoidablenesse of a future evill as death intended upon us by God put any necessity on our nature to deny it selfe or to love its owne distresses Of which that we may be the more sure wee may observe it in him who as hee was wholly like us in nature and therefore had the same naturall inclinations and aversations with us so was hee of the same infinite essence with his Father and therefore did will the same things with him yet even in him we may observe in regard of that which the Scripture saith was by the hand and Counsell of God before determined a seeming Reluctancy and withdrawing from the Divine Decree He knew it was not his Fathers Will and yet Father if thou bee willing lâ—…t this cup passe from me he was not ignorant that he was to suffer and that there was an Oporteâ—… a necessity upon it and yet a second and a third time againe Father if it be possible let this Cup passe from me Consider it as the Destruction of his Temple and Anguish of nature which hee could not being in all things like unto us but love and then Transeat Let it passe but consider it as the necessary meanes of procuring pretious blessings for mankind and of fulfilling the eternall Decree of his Fathers Love and then Not as I but as thou wilt The same may be applied in any manner of humane evills notwithstanding we are with an armed patience to sustaine them or with an obedient submission unto Divine pleasure to wait for them yet in regard of that pressure of nature which they bring with them on which the God of Nature hath imprinted a naturall desire of its owne quiet and integrity so farre forth all Evill not onely may but must bee Hated by every Regular will upon paine of violating the Law of its Creation And indeed in all this there is not any deviation from the Will of God intending that which we abhorre for as it stands not with the nature of man to hate himselfe or any good thing of his owne making so neither doth it stand with the goodnesse of God to hate his Creature or to delight barely in the misery or afflictions thereof but onely in that end of manifesting his glory and righteousnesse whereunto hee in the dispensation of his Wisdome and Iustice hath wonderfully directed them And therefore as to murmure at the Wisedome of God in thus ordering evills unto a good end were a presumptuous repining so on the other side not to entertaine those naturall desires of a straightned mind after deliverance from those evills were to be in Solomons phrase too Righteous and out of a purpose to answere the ends of Gods Wisedome to crosse the Law of his Creation So then it is evident that the Object and fundamentall cause of Hatred is all and onely Evill which however in respect of the Existence of it it bee in some cases Good for as it is in the power of God to educe out of confusion order light out of darkenesse his owne honour out of mans shame so is it his providence likewise to turne unto the great good of many men those things which in themselves doe onely hurt them Yet I say this notwithstanding as it worketh the deformity and disquiet of nature it is against the created law and in-bred love which each thing beareth to its owne perfection and therefore cannot but be necessarily hated As on the other side those ordinary and commong goods which we call in respect of God blessings as health peace prosperity good successe and the like notwithstanding they commonly prove unto men unfurnished with those habits of wisedome and sobriety whereby they should bee moderated occasions of much evill and dangers so that their Table is become their snare as the experience of those latter Romane Ages proveth wherein their victories over men hath made them in luxury and vilenesse so prodigious as if they meant to attempt warre with God Notwithstanding I say all this yet for as much as these things are such as doe quiet satisfie and beare convenience unto mans nature they are therefore justly with thankefulnesse by our selves received and out of love desired unto our friends I now proceed from the object or Generall
the vastnesse of it both in Guilt and Punishment In these respects our Hatred of it cannot be too deep or rooted whereas other evils are not so intense in their nature nor so diffusive in their Extension nor so Destructive in their Consequents and therefore do not require an unlimited Passion but one governed according to the Exigence of Circumstances And here I shall take notice of one or two particulars touching the manner of corruption in this particular As first when a man shal apply his Hatred of Prosequution or ill willing against that Evill which is the proper object onely of Aversation for some things there are onely of conditionall evills which hurt not by their own absolute being but by their particular use or presence which being offensive onely in their application requires a particular forbearance not any further violence to their natures Secondly a Corruption in regard of Intension is either when the passion admits not of any admixtion of Love when yet the object admits of an admixtion of good or when the hatred is absolute against onely relative Evills There is not any man betwixt whose naturall faculties and some particular courses or objects there is not some manner of antipathy and disproportion it being the Providence of divine dispensation so variously to frame and order mens fancies as that no man shall have an Independance or selfe sufficiency noâ—… say unto the other members I have no need of you but there should bee such a mutuall Ministry and assistance amongst men as whereby might bee ever upheld those essentiall vertues of humane society Vnity and Charity no mann being able to liue without the aide of others nor to upbraid others with his owne service Now in this case if any man who either out of the narrownesse and incapacity or out of the reluctancy and antipathy of his owne mind is indisposed for some courses of life or study shall presently fall to a professed vilifying of them or to an undervalewing of Persons who with a more particular affection delight in them or to a desire of the not being of them as things utterly unusefull because hee sees not what use himselfe can have of them he doth herein discover as much absurdity in so peremptory a dislike as a blinde man should doe in wishing the Sunne put out not considering that hee himselfe receiveth benefit at the second hand from that very light the beauty whereof hee hath no immediate acquaintance withall For as too excessively to doate on the fancie of any particular thing may prove harmefull as appeareth in the Poeticall fable of Midas whose unsatiable desire to have every thing that he touched turned to gold starved him with hunger and so what hee out of too excessive loue made his Idoll became his ruine as many men need none other enemy to undoe them than their owne desires So on the other side the extreame Hatred of any thing may be equally inconvenient as we see intimated in that other fable of the servants who when they had out of an extreme malice against the poore Cock at whose early crow their covetous master every day roused them unto their labour killed him and so as they thought gotten a good aduantage to their lazinesse were every day by the vigilancy of their master whose Couetousnesse now began to crow earlier than his Cock called from their sleepe sooner than they are before till at length they began to wish for that which the rashnesse and indiscretion of their hatred had made away And therefore when we goe about any thing out of the dictates of Passion it is a great point of Wisedom first to consider whither we our selves may not afterwards be the first men who shall wish it undone againe CHAP. XV. Of the Good and Evill Effects of Hatred Cautelousnesse and Wisedome to profit by that we hate with Confidence Victory Reformation Hatred is Generall against the whole kind Cunning Dissimulation Cruelty running over to Persons Innocent violating Religion Envie Rejoycing at Evill Crooked Suspition Contempt Contumely I Now proceed to the Consequents or Effects of this Passion And first for the usefull and profitable Effects thereof which may be these First a Cautelousnesse and fruit full Wisedome for our own welfare to prevent danger and to reape benefit from that which is at enmitie with us For we shall observe in many evils that no man is brought within the danger who â—…s not first drawne into the love of them All inordinate corruptions then most desperately wound the Soule when they beguile and entangle it But the greatest use of this Caution is to learne how to benefit by the Hatred of others and â—…s learned Physitians doe to make an Antidote of Poyson For as many venemous creatures are by Arte used to cure the wounds and repaire the injuries which themselves had made Naturall Attraction as it were calling home that poyson which injurie and violence had misplaced So the malice and venome of an Enemy may by wisdome be converted into a Medicine and by managing become a benefit which was by him intended for an injury Or to use the excellent similitude of Plutarch As healthy and strong beasts doe eate and concoct Serpents whereas weake stomacks do nauseate at delicates so wise men do exceedingly profit by the hatred of their enemies whereas fooles are corrupted with the love of their friends ond an injury doth one man more good then a courtesie doth another As Wind and Thunder when they trouble the Ayre doe withall purge it whereas a long calme doth dispose it to putrifaction or as the same Whetstone that takes away from a weapon doth likewise sharpen it so a Wise man can make use of the detraction of an enemy to grow the brighter and the better by it And therefore when 〈◊〉 advised that Carthage should be utterly destroyed Scipio Nascica perswaded the contrary upon these reasons that it was needful for Rome to have alwaies some enemies which by a kind of antipe ristasis might strengthen keep alive its vertue which otherwise by security might be in dangeâ—… of languishing and degenerate into luxury Foâ—… as the Israelites when there was no Smith amongst them did sharpen their instruments with the Philistins so indeed an enemy doth serve to quicken and put an edge upon those vertues which by lying unexercised might contract rust and dullnesse and many times when the reasons of the thing it self will not perswade the Feare of giving advantage to an Enemy or of gratifying him will over-rule a man lest hereby he give his soes matter of Insultation Hoc Ithacus velit magno mercentur Atridae This makes our foes rejoyce they would have bought With a great price those crimes we doe for nought Thus as a Sink by an house makes all the house the cleaner because the Sordes are cast into that Or as they observe that Roses and Violets are sweetest which grow neare unto Garlick and other
strong sented Herbes because these draw away unto them any fetid or noxious nourishment so the eye and nearenesse of an enemy serveth by exciting Caution and diligence to make a mans life more fruitfull and orderly then otherwise it would have beene that we may take away occasion from them that would speake reproachfully And thus Hector sharpely reproving the Cowardice of his brother Paris who had beene the onely cause of the Warre and calamity when he fled from Menelaus draweth his rebuke from hence and telleth him that he was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. To Father City People losse and blame Ioy to his foes and to himselfe a shame Secondly Hatred worketh Confidence and some Presumption and good assurance of our owne or some assisting strength against evils Which ariseth first out of the former for Cauâ—…lousnesse or Furniture against the onset of evil cannot but make the mind more resolute in its owne defence than if it were left naked without Assistance Againe of all others this is one of the most confident Passions because it moves not out of sudden perturbations but is usually seconded and backt with Reason as the Philosopher observes and ever the more Counsell the more Confidence Besides being a deepe and severe Passion it proportionably calleth out the more strength to execute its purposes There is no Passion that intendeth so much evil to another as Hatred An-ger would onely bring Trouble but Hatred Mischiefe Anger would onely Punish and Retaliate but Hatred would Destroy for as the Philosopheâ—… notes it seeketh the not being of what it Hates A man may be Angry with his friend but hee hates none but an enemy and no man can will so much hurt to his friend as to his enemy Now the more hurt a passion doth intend the more strength it must call out to execute that intention and ever the more strength the more Confidence Thirdly it worketh some manner of Victory over the evill hated for Odium semper sequitur 〈◊〉 animi elatione as Scaliger out of Aristotle hath observed It ever ariseth out of pride and height of mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injury ever comes from some strength and is a kind of Victory For so farre forth as one is able to hurt another he is above him And this effect holds principally true in morall and practick courses wherein I think it is a generall Rule Hee in some measure loves an evill who is overcome by it for conquest in this nature is on the Will which never chooseth an object till it love it There onely we can have perfect conquest of sinne where will be a perfect hatred of it Here in the best there is but an incompleat restauration of Gods Image the body of nature and the body of finne are borne and must die together Fourthly it hath a good effect in regard of the evill hated in reasonable Creatures namely the Reformation of the person in whom that evill was For as countenance and incouragement is the fosterer so Hatred and contempt serveth sometimes as Phisick to purge out an evill And the reason is because a great part of that goodnesse which is apprehended to be in sinne by those that pursue it is other mens approbation Opinion puts valew upon many uncurrent Coynes which passe rather because they are receiued than because they are warrantable And therefore if a man naturally desirous of credit see his courses generally disliked he can hardly so unnature himselfe as still to to feed on those vanities which hee seeth doe prouoke others unto loathing though I confesse it is not a perswasions of mens but of Gods hatred of sinne which doth worke a genuine and thorow Resormation I now proceed to observe those Effects which are corrupt and hurtfull and here wee may observe First the rule of Aristotle whose maxime it is that Hatred is alwaies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 against the whole kinde of its object so then all the actions and effects of this Passion are corrupt which are not Generall but admit of private Reservations and Indulgences For since tho nature and extent of the passion is ever considered with reference to its object there must needs bee irregularity in that affection when it is conversant about an uniforme nature with a various and differing motion And this is manifestly true in that which I made the principall object of a right hatred Sin In which though there is no man which finds not himselfe more obnoxious and open to one kind than another it being the long experienced policie of the Devill to observe the diverse conditions of mens natures constitutions callings and imployments and from them to proportion the quality of his insinuations upon the will insomuch that a man may here in happily deceive himselfe with an opinion of loathing some evils with which either his other occasions suffer him not to take acquaintance or the difficulty in compassing disgrace in practising or other prejudices perswade to a casuall dislike thereof yet I say it is certaine that if a mans Hatred of Sinne be not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Vniversall and transcendent Hatred against all sinne even those which his personall relations make more proper unto him if hee doth still retaine some privy exceptions some reserved and covered delights be his pretences to others or his perswasions to himselfe what they will this is rather a personated than a true hatred a meteor of the braine than an affection of the Soule For as in the good so in the ill of things notwithstanding there seeme to be many contrarieties and dissimilitudes as Seneca saith Scelera dissident that sinnes do disagree yet indeed there is in that very contrariety such an agreement against God as in Herod and Pilate against Christ as admits not of any in order unto God but a gathered and united passion And hence is that of Saint Iames Hee that offendeth in one is guilty of all because in that one hee contemneth that Originall Authority which forbad all There are no tearmes of consistence betweene love and hatred divided upon the same uniforme Object It is not the materiall and blind performance of some good worke or a servile and constrained obedience to the more bright and convicting parts of the Law that can any more argue either our true love to the Precept or our hatred to the Sinne than a voluntary patience under the hand of a Chirurgion can prove either that we delight in our owne paine oâ—… Abhorre our owne flesh It is not Gods Witnesse within us but his Word without us not the Tyrannie of Conscience but the goodnesse of the Law that doth kindly and genuinely restraine the violence and stop the Eruptions of our defiled nature Or though perhaps Feare may prevent the exercise and sproutings nothing but Love can pluck up the root of sinne A Lacedemonian endeavouring to make a dead carcasse stand upright as formerly it had done while
motions of a wounded Body so the Discourses of a wounded Minde are faint uncertaine and tottering Secondly in the Will it woâ—…keth first Despaire for it being the propertic of griefe to condensate and as it were on all sides besiege the Minde the more violent the Passion is the lesse apparant are the Passages out of it So that in an extremity of anguish where the Passages are in themselves narrow and the reason also blind and weake to finde them out the Minde is constâ—… ned having no Object but it 's owne paiâ—…e to re flect upon to fall into a darke and fearefull contemplation of it's owne sad estate and marvellous high and patheticall aggravations of it as if it were the greatest which any man felt Not considering that it feeles it 's owne sorrow but knowes not the weight of other mens Whereas if all the calamities of mortall men were heaped into one Storehouse and from thence every man were to take an equall portion Sâ—…crates was wont to say that each man would rather choose to goe away with his owne paine And from hence it proceedeth to many other effects fury sinfull wishes and exâ—…rations both against it selfe and any thing that concurred to it's being in misery as we see in Israel in the Wildernesse that mirror of Patience Iob himselfe and thus Homer bringeth in Vlysses in des paire under a sore tempest bewailing himselfe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thrice foure times happy Grecians who did fall To gratifie their friends under Troy wall Oh that I there had rendred my last breath When Trojan darts made me a marke for Death Then glorious Rites my Funerals had attended But now my life will be ignobly ended Another evill effect is to indispose and disable for Dutie both because Griefe doth refrigerate as the Pilosopher telleth us and that is the worst temper for action and also diverts the Minde from any thing but that which feeds it and therefore David in his sorrow forgot to eate his bread because eating and refreshing of Nature is a mittigating of Griefe as Pliny telleth us And lastly because it weakneth distracteth and discourageth the Minde making it soft and timerous apt to bode evils unto it selfe Crudelis ubique luctus ubique paâ—…or Griefe and feare goe usually together And therefore when Aeneas was to encourage his friends unto Patience and action he was forced to dissemble his owne sorrow Curisque ingentibus ager Spem vultu simulat premit altum corde dolorem Although with heavy cares and doubts distrest His looks fain'd hopes and his heart griefes supprest And it is an excellent description in Homer of the fidelity of Antilochus when he was commanded to relate unto Achilles the sad newes of Patroclus death 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. When Menelaus gave him this command Antilochus astonished did stand Smitten with dumbnesse through his griefe and feares His voyce was stopt and his eyes swamme inteares Yet none of all this griefe did duty stay He left his Armes whose weight might cause delay And went and wept and ran with dolefull word That great Patroelus fell by Hectors sword In a tempest saith Seneca that Pilot is to be commended whom the shipwracke swalloweth up at the Sterne with the Ruddâ—…r in his hand And it was the greatest honour of Mary Mag. dalene that when above all other she wept for the losse of Christ yet then of all other she was most diligent to seeke him Lastly in the body there is no other Passion that doth produce stronger or more lasting inconveniences by pressure of heart obstruction of spirit wasting of strength drynesse of bones exhausting of Nature Griefe in the heart is like a Moath in a garment which biteth asunder as it were the strings and the strength thereof stoppeth the voyce looseth the joynts withereth the flesh shrivelleth the skinne dimmeth the eyes cloudeth the countenance defloureth the beauty troubleth the bowels in one word disordereth the whole frame Now this Passion of griefe is distributed into many inferiour kindes as Griefe of Sympathy for the evils and calamities of other men * as if they were our owne considering that they may likewise be fall us or ours which is called mercy griefe of repining at the good of another man as if his happinesse were our misery As that Pillar which was light unto Israel to guide them was darknesse unto the Egyptians to trouble and amaze them which is called Envie Griefe of Fretfulnesse at the prosperity of evill and unworthy men which is called Indignation griefe of Indigence when we finde our selves want those good things which others enjoy which we envie not unto them but desire to enjoy them our selves too which is called Emulation griefe of Guilt for evill committed which is called Repentance and griefe of Feare for evill expected which is called Despaire of which to discourse would be over-tedious and many of them are most learnedly handled by Aristotle in his Rhetoricks And therefore I wall here put an end to this Passion CHAP. XXIII Of the affection of Hope the Object of it Good Future Possible Difficult of Regular and Inordinate Despaire THe next Ranks and Series is of Irascible Passions namely those which respect their Object as annexed unto some degree of Difficulty in the obtaining oâ—… avoiding of it the first of which is Hope whereby I understand an earnest and strong inclination and expectation of some great good apprehended as possible to be obtained though not by our owne strength nor without some intervenient Difficulties I shall not collect those prayses which are commonly bestowed upon it nor examine the contrary extreames of those who declaime against it making it a meanes either of augmenting an unexpected evill before not sufficiently prevented or of deflowring a future good too hastily pre-occupated but shall onely touch that dignity and corruption which I shall observe to arise from it with reference to it's Objects Causes and Effects Concerning the Object or fundamentall cause of Hope It hath these three conditions in it That it be a Future a Possible a Difficult Good First Future for good present is the Object of our sense but Hope is of things not seene for herein is one principall difference betweene divine Faith and divine Hope that Faith being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The substance of things hoped fâ—…r 〈◊〉 ever respect to it's Object as in some manner present and subsisting in the promises and first fruits which we have of it so that the first effect of Faith is a present Interest and Title but the operation of Hope is waiting and expectation but yet it will not from hence follow that the more a man hath of the presence of an Object the lesse he hath of Hope towards it for though Hope be swallowed up in the compleat presence of it's Object yet it is not at all diminished but encreased rather by a partiall presence
circumstance the not timeing or placing our actions right the not accommodating our means to the variety of of occasions the miscarrying in some one complement or ceremony the having of our minds either too light and voluble or too fixed and constant or too spread and wandring or too narrow and contracted or too credulous and facile or too diffident and suspitious or too peremptory resolute or hasty or too slow anxious and discursive or too witty and facetious or too serious and morose with infinite other the like weaknesses some whereof there is not any man quite freed from may often notwithstanding the good store of other ayds endanger and shipwrack the successe of our endeavours so that in the prosecution of a hope there is something alike industry to be used as in the tryall of Mathematicall conclusions the Mediums whereunto are so touched and dependant upon one another that not diligently to observe every one of them is to labour in vaine and have all to doe againe A fourth cause of Hope may be Goodnesse and facility of Nature whereby we finde a disposition in our selves of readinesse to further any mans purposes and desires and to expect the like from others for it is the observation of Aristotle touching young men sud ipsorum innocentiâ cateros metiuntur Their own goodnesse makes them credulous of the like in others For as every mans prejudice loves to find his owne will and opinion so doth his charity to find his owne goodnesse in another man They therefore who are soft and facile to yeeld are likewise to beleeve and dare trust them whom they are willing to pleasure And this indeed is the Rule of Nature which makes a mans selfe the Patterne of what it makes his Neighbour the Object Now from this facility of Nature proceeds a further cause of Hope to wit Faith and Credulity in relying on the promises which are made for the furtherance thereof For promises are obligations and men use to reckon their obligations in the Inventory of their estate so that the promises of an able friend I esteem as part of my substance And this is an immediate Antecedent of Hope which according as the Authority whereon it relles is more or lesse sufficient and constant is likewise more or lesse evident and certaine And in these two the Corruption chiefly is not to let Iudgement come betweene them and our Hopes For as he said of Lovers we may of Hopes too that oftentimes sibi somnia fingâ—…nt they build more upon Imagination than Reality And then if what Tacitus speakes in another sense fingunt creduntque if our facility faine assistances and our credulity rely upon them there will issue no other than Ixious Hope a Cloud for Inno. And therefore Aristotle out of an easinesse to Hope collects in young men an easinesse to be deceived credulity very often mâ—…ets with Impostures And hee elsewhere placeth credulous modest quiet and friendly men amongst those who are obnoxious to injuries and abuses Proud and abusive men making it one of their pleasures to delude and mislead the ingenuity of others and as once Apelles to deceive the expectation of another with a Curtaine for a Picture The last cause which I shall but name of Hope is wise confidence or a happy mixture of boldnesse Constancy and Prudence together the one to put on upon an enterprize the other to keep on when difficulties unexpected do occurre and the third to guide and mannage our selves amidst those difficulties For as he said in studies so wee may in actions likewise when thus swayed and ballanced Altiús â—…unt qui ad sumâ—…a â—…ituntur The further wee set our aimes the more ground wee shall get and then Possunt quia posse videntur When a man thinks this I can doe By thinking he gets power too And unto this doth the Historian attribute all the successe of Alexanders great victories Nihil aliud quaÌ„ benè ausuâ—… vana contemnere his confidence judging them feacible did by that means get through them And though it was vehterous yet as the case might be it was wise counsell which we finde in the same Historian Audeamus quod credi non potest ausuros nos eo ipso quod difficillimum videtur facillimum erit Let us shew our courage in adventuring on some difficult enterprize which it might have been thought wee would not have attempted and then the very difficulty of it will make it the more easie For our enemies will conclude that our strength is more than they discover when they see our attempts greater than they could suspect Thus men teach children to dunce in heavy shooes that they may begin to conquer the difficult in the learning of the Art And therfore the Philosopher telleth us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bold men are men of Hope for boldnesse suffers not a man to be wanting to himselfe and there are two Principles which incourage such men upon adventures the one audentes fortuna invat That resolution is usually favoured with successe or if it misse of that Magnis tamen exidit ausis yet the honour of attempting a difficulty is more than discredit of miscarriage in it CHAP. XXV Of the Effects of Hope Stability of Mind Wearinesse arising not out of Weaknesse Impatience Suspition Curiosity but out of Want Contention and forth-putting of the Mind Patience under the Want Distance and Difficulty of Good desires Waiting upon Ayde expected THe Effects of Hope follow which I will but name The first is to free the Mind from all such Anxieties as arise out of the Floating Instability and Fearefulnesse thereof For as the Philosopher telleth us Fearefull men are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hard of Hope and in this property Hope is well compared unto an Anchor because it keeps the Mind in a firme and constant temper without tottering and instability for though there be but one Hope joyned with Certainty as depending upon an immutable promise all other having ground of Feare in them yet this should be only a Feare of Caution not of Iealousie and Distrust because where there is Distrust in the means there is for the most part Weaknesse in the use of them and hee who suspects the Ayde which he relyes on gives it just reason to faile and to neglect him And therefore Aristotle hath set Hope and Confidence together as was before noted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Good Hope is grounded on a Beleefe and alwaies worketh some measure of Affiance in the means unto it A second Effect of Hope is to worke some kind of Distaste and Wearinesse in our present condition which according as it is good or evill doth qualifie the Hope from whence it ariseth for there is a distaste that ariseth out of Weaknes like that of Iob My Soule is weary of my life I am a burthen unto my selfe Another that ariseth out of Want That which ariseth upon Weaknes is a
fickle and unconstant mutability of the Mind whereby it desireth a continuall change of condition which affection is wrought either out of Impatiency of opposition whence the Mind upon the first difficulty which it meets with is affrighted and discouraged or out of a Sharpnesse of Apprehension discovering Insufficiency in that wherein it desired content or out of an Errour and too high Estimation fore conceived which in the tryall disappointing our Hopes and not answering that Opinion begins to be neglected as weake and deceitfull or lastly out of Curiosity and Search when wee suppose that those things which cannot in their nature may at least in their varieties number yeeld some content and as Sands which are the smallest things asunder yet being united grow great heavy so these pleasures which are alone light and worthlesse may by their multitude bring weight satisfaction with them Although herein the Minde is likely most of all to find Solomons Vanity the Vnion of things subordinate and which have no Cognation each to other which is the property of worldly delights working rather Distraction than Tranquillity in the Mind this Wearinesse then which springeth from the Vnstaydnesse and Impotency of our affections is not that which I make the Effect of a proper Hope as being an opposite rather to true contentment of Mind a vertue established and not overthrowne by Hope the Wearinesse then which is wrought by the forecast and providence of a Minde possessed with Hope is that which is grounded upon the knowledge and feeling of our emptinesse and wants which therefore we long to have removed like that of David Wâ—… is me that I am constrained to dwell in Meseâ—…h wherupon followeth The third Effect of Hope which is an earnest contention of the Minde in the pursuit of that Good which should perfect our Natures and supply our Wants And this desire Saint Paul calleth Gemitus Creatura the Groaning of the Creature which is set downe as a Consequence of the Earnest Expectation of the Creature and indeed there is not any Passion which doth so much imploy and so little violate Reason as this of Hope doth it being an exciting Passion which moveth every Principle to its proper and speedy operation for gaining that perfection which the Mind so earnestly breathes after the want wherof doth work such weaknes in it The last Effect of Hope is a Contented Repose and Patience of the Mind resting it selfe in a quiet Expectation of the things hoped for and yet not exhibited And this Patience is threefold a Patience under the Want a Patience under the Distance and a Patience under the difficulties of our desired Good which holds especially in these Hopes and those are almost all which depend upon the will and disposition of another whose pleasure it behooveth us in matters which are not of debt and necessity rather to attend than by murmuring and discontent to provoke him and disappoint our selves Hasty therefore and running Hopes are as improper in their Nature as they are commonly vaine and empty in their successe Hee that Beleeves and must by Faith depend upon Externall help must not make haste but be content to have his Expectations regulated not by his owne greedinesse but by anothers will CHAP. XXVI Of the Affection of Boldnesse What it is The Causes of it strong Desires strong Hopes Aydes Supplyes Reall or in Opinion Despaire and Extremities Experience Ignorance Religion Innocency Impudencâ—… Shame Immunity from danger Dexterity of Wit strength of Love Pride or greatnesse of Mind and Abilities The Effects of it Execution of things advised Temerity c. SO little in love havâ—… I eâ—…er bin with this affection of 〈◊〉 as I find it mannaged by many who make no other use of it then children do of straw with which they stuffe empty clothes that they may looke like men as that when first I writ this Tractate I passed it over rather as a Vice than an Affection of the Soule and said nothing of it And being no more friends with it now then I was then I should be contented to have left it out still But that I would not have the Treatise defective in such a member whereof there may be so good and so ill use made as experience sheweth us there is of this For as * Plutarch notes of Aegypt that it bringeth forth multa veneâ—…a multa salubria many Good things and many Bad like those Creatures some parts wherof are poyson and others restorative so may wee say of the Men in whom this Affection is predominant that they are usually Instruments either of much Good or of much Evill to the places that nourish them as once Thomistocles his Tutor said of him The best mixture that I can call to mind of this Passion was in Hannibal of whom the Historian tels us That he was marvellous 〈◊〉 to put upon Dangers and yet marvellous Wise in managing of them His courage not working Temerity nor precipitating his resolutions And his counsell not working slownesse nor retarding his courage Boldnesse then or Confidence is as the Philosopher describes it a Hope joyned with fancy and opinion that those things which are safe for us are neer at hand and those which are hurtfull either are not at all or are a farre off and cannot suddenly reach us Or it is an Affection whereby we neglect Danger for the procuring of some difficult and Good thing which wee earnestly desire and hope for in Confidence to overcome and breake through that danger For Confidence of Victory is that which maketh a man boldy to prosecute the Danger which opposeth him in his Hopes of Good So that two things belong unto the formality of this Passion 1. Vehemency of Hope whatsoever strengthneth that causeth this as Power Experience Friends neerenes of Ayds and the like 2. Exclusion of Feare whatsoever removeth that increaseth this As Distance from Danger Freenesse from Enemies Cleernes from Injuries c. The Object of this Passion is twofold The Primary and Principall Object is some difficult worke under the Relation of a needfull Medium to the obtaining of a Good vehemently Desired and hoped for The secondary Object is some Evill and Danger which standing between our Hope and the Good for which we Hope is by the vâ—…hemency of our Hope as it were removed and despised in our Eyes Good earnestly desired and Evill confidently despised are the things about which this Affection is conversant The Causes of this Affection are so many the more because it is apt to be excited by clean contrary Reasons The fundamentall and principall Cause of it is strength of Desire working vehemency of Hope and impatiency of Resistance or Restraint from the thing desired For Lust when it hath once conceived will at last bring forth and finish and rush forward to that after which it longeth which the Philosopher calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Saint Peter 〈◊〉
times strength takes off the yoake of Obedience not only in the civill government of men but in the naturall government of creatures by men to whom by the law of Creation they were all made subject yet the strength of many of them hath taught them to ferget their originall Subjection and in stead of Fearing to terrifie man their lord and when ever we tame any of them and reduce them to their first condition this is not so much an act of our Dominion wherby we awe them as of our Reason whereby we deceive them and we are beholding more therein to the working of our Wit than to the prerogative of our Nature and usually every thing which hath knowledg enough to measure its owne abilities the more it hath of Strength the lesse it hath of Feare that which Solomon makes the strongest the Apostle makes the fittest to expell Peare to wit Love So likewise on the other side Immunity from Subjection in the midst of Weaknesse removes Feare Of this we may give an instance in guilty persons who notwithstanding their Weaknesse yet when once by the priviledge of their Sanctuary or mercy of their Iudge they are freed from the obligation of the Law though not from the Offence their former Feares doe presently turne into Ioy and Gratulations and that is the reason why Good men have such Boldnesse Confidence and Courage that they can bid defiance unto Death because though they be not quite delivered from the Corruption yet they are from the Curse and Condemnation of Sinne though by reason of their Weaknesse they are not delivered from the mouth yet they are from the teeth and stings of Death though not from the Earth of the Grave yet from the Hell of the Grave though not from Sinne yeâ—… from the Strength and Malediction of Sinne the Law ouâ—… Adversary must be strong as well as our selves weake if he looke for Feare The Corruption then of this Passion as it depenâ—…eth upon these Causes is when it ariseth out of too base a conceit of our owne or too high of anothers strength the one proceeding from an errour of Humility in undervaluing our selves the other from an errour of Iudgement or Suspition in mistaking of others There are some men who as the Orâ—…our speaks of despairing Wits De 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…rentur who are too unthankfull unto Nature in a slâ—…ight esteeme of the abilities shee â—…ath given them and deserve that Weakenesse which they unjustly complaine of The sight of whose Iudgment is not unlike that of Perspective Glasses the two ends whereof have a double representation the one fuller and neerer the truth the other smaller and at a farre greater distance So it is with men of this temper they looke on themselves and others with a double prejudice on themselves with a Distrusting and Despairing Iudgement which presents every thing remote and small on Others with on Overvaluing and Admiring Iudgement which contrariwise presents all perfections too perfect And by this means between a selfe-dislike and a too high estimation of others truth ever fals to the ground and for revenge of her selfe leaves the party thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Timorous For as Errour hath a property to produce and nourish any Passion according to the nature of the subject matter which it is conversant about so principally this present Passion because Errour it selfe is a kinde of Formido Intellectus a Feare of the Vnderstanding and it is no great wonder for one Feare to beget another And therefore when Christ would take away the Feare of his Disciples he first removes their prejudice Feare not those that can kill the Body onely and can doe no more Where the overflowing of their Feares seemes to have been grounded on the overiudging of an adverse power Thus much for the Root and Essentiall cause of Feare these which follow are more casuall and upon occasion Whereof the first may be the Suddennesse of aâ—… Evill when it ceiseth upon as it were in the Dark for all Darknesse is comfortlesse and therefore the last terrible Iudgement is described unto us by the Blacknesse and Vnexpectednesse of it by the Darknesse of Night and the Suddennesse of Lightning All Vnacquaintaince then and Igno rance of an approaching Evill must needs worke Amazement and Terrour as contrarily a foresight theâ—… of worketh Patience to undergoe and Boldnesse to encounter it as Tacitus speaks of Caecina Ambiguarum rerum sciens eoque intrepidus that hee was acquainted with difficulties and therefore not fearfull of them And there is good reason for this because in a sudden daunt and onset of an unexpected evill the spirits which were before orderly carried by their severall due motions unto their naturall works are upon this strange appearance and instant Oppression of danger so disordered mixed and stiâ—…lled that there is no power left either in the Soule for Counsell or in the Body for Execution For as it is in the warres of men so of Passions those are more terrible which are by way of Invasion then of Battell which set upon men unarmed and uncomposed then those which find them prepared for resistance and so the Poet describes a lamentable overthrow by the Suddennes of the one side and the Ignorance of the other Invadunt urbeâ—… somno vinâ—…que sepultam They do invade a City all at rest Which ryot had with sleep and Wine opprest And this is one reason why men inclinable to this Passion are commonly more fearfull in the Night than at other times because then the Imagination is presenting of Objects not formerly thought on when the spirits which should strengthen are more retyred and Reason lesse guarded And yet there are Evils too which on the other side more affright with their long expectation and traine than if they were more contracted and speedy Somâ—… set upon us by sleath affrighting us like lightning with a sudden blaze others with a train and pomp like a Comet which is ushered in with a streame of fire and like Thunder which hurts not only with its danger but with its noise and therefore Aristotle reckoneth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the signes of an approaching evill amongst the Objects of Feare Another cause of Feare may be the Neernesse of an Evill when we perceive it to be within the reach of us and now ready to set upon us For aâ—… it is with Objects of Sence in a distance of place so it is with the Objects of Passion in a Distance of Time Remotion in either the greater it is the lesse present it makes the Object and by consequence the weaker is the impression there-from upon the faculty and this reason Aristotle gives why Death which else where he makes the most terrible evill unto Nature doth not yet with the conceit thereof by reason that it is apprehended at an indefinite and remote distance worke such terrour and amazement nor so stiffe Reason and the Spirits as Objects farre lesse in themselves injurious
to Nature but yet presented with a determined Neerenesse And the reason is plaine because no Evill hâ—…ts us by a simple apprehension of its Nature but of its Vnion and all Propinquity is a degrâ—…e of Vnion For although Futurition be a necessary condition required in the Object which must inferre Feare yet all Evill the lesse it hath dâ—… Future the more it hath de Terribili which is the reason why that Carnall Security which is opposed to the Feare of God is described in the Scripture by putting the Evill Day farre from us viewing as in a Landskip and at a great distance the terrour of that Day And if here the Atheists Argument be objected Let us eat and drinke for to-morrow wee shall die Where the propinquity of Ruine is made an Inducement unto Ryot Wee must answer that an Atheist is here in both right and vaine in that he conceiveth Annihilation or never more to be the best close of a wicked life and therefore most earnestly though most vainly desireth that it may be the issue of his Epicurâ—…sme and Sensuality And here briefly the Corruption of Feare in this particular is when it takes advantage by the approach of Evill to swell so high as to sinke Reason and to grow bigger than the Evill which it is afraid of propiusque periclâ—… It Timor major Martis jam apparet imago Their Feare gets closer than the thing it feares Warres Image bigger than it selfe appeares For as it is a signe of distemper in the Body when the unequall distribution of nourishment and humours causeth some parts to exceed their due proportion of greatnesse so is it likewise in the saculties of the Minde when the Inferiour grow high and strong if Reason raise not it selfe to such a proportion as still to maintaine and manage its authority and government over them But this is to be observed only of the Rising and Strength not of the Humility and Descent of Reason For though it be fit for the power of Reason to keep it selfe up above rebellion yet is it not necessary that it should stoup and sinke according to the lownesse or sordidnesse of any Passion As in the Body though we would have all parts increase alike yet if one part by distemper grow weake wee require in the rest a fellow-feeling not a fellow-languishing yea indeed in both cases where the inferiour part is weaker it is the course of Nature and Art to fortifie the higher because in a Superiour there is required as well a power to quicken and raise that which droopeth as to suppresse and keep under that which rebelleth Another cause of Feare may be Newnesse of Evill When it is such wherewith neither the Minde it selfe hath had any preceeding encounter whereby to judge of its owne Strength nor any example of some other mans prosperous issue to confirme its hopes in the like successe For as before I noted out of the Philosopher Experience is in stead of Armour and is a kind of Fortitude enabling both to judge and to beare troubles for there are some things which he elegantly calleth them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Empty Dangers Epictetus calleth them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Scar-crowes and Vizors which children feare only out of Ignorance as soone as they are knowne they cease to be terrible As the log of timber which was cast into the pond did with the first noise exceedingly affright the Frogges which afterwards when it lay quietly they securely swam about And this Ignorance and Inexperience is the cause that a man can set no bounds to his Feare I grieve for so much Evill as hath befallen me but I feare so much as may befall me and the more strong and working my Fancy the greater my Feare because what I cannot measure by Knowledge I measure by Imagination the figments of Fancy do usually exceed Truth And from this Ignorance likewise it is that Timorous men are usually Inquisitive as the Philosopher notes and so the Prophet expresseth the Feare of the Idumeans in the Warre Watchman What of the Night Watchman What of the Night Feare usually doubleth the same questions as Griefe doth the same Complaints Therefore men in a fright and amazement looke one another in the face one mans countenance as it were asking counsell of another and once more from hence grow the Irresolutions of Timorous men because they know not what to doe noâ—… which way to fly the things they feare in which respect they are said to fly from an Enemy seven wayes as ever suspecting they are in the worst Pavidei semper Consilia in incerâ—…o they never can have fixed and composed Counsels and it is the usuall voice of Men in their Feares I know not what to do I know not which way to turne my selfe Trembling of Heart and Fayling of Eyes Blindnesse and Astonishment Ignorance and Feare doe thus usually accompany each other And therefore the Stoicks make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a sluggish Affection of Minde whereby a man shrinketh backe and declineth businesse because of difficulty of danger which hee observeth in it and a Tumultuary and distracted frame of Mind not knowing which way to take to be amongst the kinds of this Passion of Feare The Poet speaking of the Sabine Virgins whom the Romane youth snatched away and tooke to them for Wives hath thus elegantly described this distraction of Feare Vt fugiunt aquilat timidissima turba Columbae Vtque fugit visos agna novella lupos Sic illa simuere viros sine lege mentes Constitit in nulla qui fuit ante Color Nam Timor unus erat facies non una timoris Pars laniat Crines pars fine mente sedet Altera maesta filet frustra vocat altera matrem Haec queritur stupet hac hac fugit illa manet As weake and fearfull Doves the Eagle flie And tender Lambs when they the Woolfe espie So the affrighted Sabine Virgins runne Pale and discolour'd Romane youth to shunne Their Feare was One but Feare had not One look Part here sit reav'd of sense part there doth pluck And teare their haires One silent mourns another With a successelesse Outcry cals her Mother One moanes the fright another doth amaze One flies for Feare for Feare another staies Now the reasons why newnesse of evill doth thus work fear may be many For first all Admiration is â—… kind of feare it being the property of man not only to feare that which is Against but that also which is above our Nature either in regard of naturall and civill dignity which worketh a fear of Reverence as to parents governours masters or in regard of Morall Excellency and Excesses above the strength of the faculty which worketh a Feare of Admiration Now then it is the property of every thing that brings novelty with it to worke more or lesse some manner of admiration which as the Honour of this