brevity and withall perspicuity as possibly I can and to begin with the first it is thss Obj. I. If the Will of Man could wish for annihilation as the more eligible then it would do it either as a natural appetite or as a deliberative faculty but not as the former because a natural appetite is unchangeably and naturally bended to the preservation of its self therefore it cannot wish for annihilation which should necessarily destroy it Neither can it do it as a deliberative faculty because whatever a Man wishes for as soon as he has obtain'd his wish he is in a better condition than before but when a Man has obtain'd his wish of annihilation he is in no better condition than before for by the possession of it he not only acquires no new bonity but likewise loses what he had before Therefore none can reasonably account annihilation more eligible than eternal tormenting punishments Answ In Answer to which I say 1. That the Will as it is a natural faculty or as it is carry'd out towards its object by an innate appetite cannot wish for annihilation for the Reasons specified in the Objection And this is acknowledged by Francis de Mayron in 4 dist 5◠q. 1. Although he be in this matter of an Opinion contrary to Durandus But the Will as a deliberative faculty may very reasonably chuse annihilation and as to what is alledged to the contrary viz. that a Man when annihilated is no better than he was before therefore he cannot deliberately wish for annihilation I Answer that the annihilated may be said to be in a better state than before two ways and that 1. Absolutely and while considering annihilation abstractedly in it self as if by annihilation he acquir'd some positive adventitious good which he had not before and in this sense I confess the state of annihilation cannot be called better than that of damnation because by annihilation the Creature is so far from purchasing to its self any new positive good that it rather loses what it had before 2. Comparatively and in this sense that state is best which is followed with the least evil tho' it procure no new good As I suppose a Man tormented with the evil of exquisite torturing pains if one or two degrees of that evil were detracted the Man would be in a better Condition than formerly not absolutely as if he gain'd any new positive good which he had not before but comparatively his evil being diminished from what it was before So we call a Feather lighter than Iron that is less heavy while in the mean time neither the one nor the other has any absolute positive levity in themselves In like manner we assert that the Creature when annihilated is in a better condition than in the state of damnation not absolutely as if any positive good were superadded by annihilation but comparatively by the removeal of the evil for the annihilated is subject to no evil at all neither can he possibly be Whereas the Damned is afflicted with Punishments in some measure infinite ut suprâ dictum Obj. II. Durandus urges in the second place thus That which destroys the greatest good is the greatest evil but annihilation destroys the greatest good for it destroys both the good of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bene esse and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse whereas the greatest extremity of misery destroys only the good of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bene esse but does not in the least impair the good of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse Ergo c. Besides every thing that bereaves the Creature tho of the least good must be evil and that which destroys the greater good must be the greater evil and consequently it is so in the Superlative Degree likewise That which destroys the greatest good must be the greatest evil but Annihilation destroys the greatest good therefore it is the greatest evil and consequently is not worse than damnation since an evil greater than the greatest is a palpable contradiction Answ This Argument is the only Achillaeum telum that Durandus lays his whole force upon as being an infallible demonstration of his Thesis this he looks upon as his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but though Ajax was stout yet we know he was not endowed with the greatest Wisdom and though Achilles was a man of great magnanimity and courage yet he was not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both the former and the latter were obliged to succumb when their fatal hour was come The same apprehension I have of this Argument viz. That if it were canvass'd to the bottom it would easily be discovered to be but a weak and tottering Foundation for him to build his Opinion upon And that this may more fully appear I answer that that is the greatest evil which destroys the greatest good upon the supposition that the subject be still in being but if the Subject be likewise destroy'd it is so far from being a greater evil that it is none at all An this is very evident and founded upon solid Reason for since all evil is a privation it must necessarily have some Foundation or Subject to which it should be a privation and this must be a positive really existent Subject for good and evil are circa idem Subjectum as all Privatives are with their respective opposites But good cannot be lodg'd any where but in a real entitie it being the inseparable propriety of it Therefore neither can evil be competent to any but a real entitie 2. Every evil is evil to some body or other but when Peter is annihilated there is nothing unto which Annihilation should be evil and consequently it is not evil at all 3. Evil is the privation of some due perfection at that very same time that it is due but at that time that Peter is annihilated there is no perfection due to him therefore at that time no evil can be competent to Peter viz. when annihilated So that I acknowledge that whatever destroys good is evil and whatever destroys the greater good is the greater evil and so forth as long as the Subject remains but not if the Subject it self be destroyed And therefore it is that Capreol in 2. d. 34. p. 1. and Bass ibid assert that the essence of Plato v. gr hath not any evil for its opposite and for this cause annihilation cannot be evil unto him And this I shall further illustrate by an Example or two As to use the Comparison of Ariminensis in 2. dist 34 we know that tardè tardiùs tardissimè do still presuppose a motion which is tardus tardior tardissimus I cannot say that one thing is slower than another unless I suppose them both to be moving no more can I call one evil greater than another unless I presuppose something to which it should be a greater of greatest evil For if I should say that one who takes up a great while in passing over a
the Damned possess And this will seem very plausible if not infallibly true if we consider the folowing Reasons Reason I. That State or Condition must be the better and in conformity to right reason more eligible in which there is no liableness to the Wrath and Anger of God than that which is inevitably followed with the everlasting wrath and displeasure of the Almighty for ever abiding upon those who are plac'd in it But he who is annihilated cannot be the Object of God s wrath since it cannot display it self upon a non entitie Whereas the Divine Wrath doth for ever abide upon those who are eternally tormented Therefore annihilation is preferable to Damnation This Proposition will appear yet more evident if we remember that as God's Love and the enjoyment of him the necessary consequent of the former are the greatest good that a Creature is capable of So the Wrath of God and the want of that fruition are the greatest evil that a Rational Creature can be affected withal Wherefore I form my argument thus If the Wrath of God and the being deprived of the enjoyment of him which necessarily follows on the former be the highest degree of evil that a Creature can be obnoxious unto then it is better to be annihilated than to be lyable to the eternal wrath of God for there is no good that the Creature thus Circumstantiated can possess which should be equivalent to this evil Since the chiefest good which only can counterpoise the greatest evil is incompatible with the highest evil in one and the same subjecâ— Since therefore the damned are in perpetual subjection to the Wrath of God and consequently arriv'd at the highest pitch of misery and since what goâ—d they in this condition enjoy is mixed with so much evil that it cannot be the chiefest good it is better to be annihilated and freed from that greatest evil than to be eteâ—naly damned and endure that extreâ—itâ— oâ— misery though accompanied with a small and far less considâ—rable good Reason II. That State or condition whiâ—h is sinless is more reasonably to be chosen than that in which the Creature is still spitefully blaspheming against God and malitiously hating him But he who is annihilated sinneth not neither indeed can he since he is subject to no Law as being a nâ—n ens for the Law is obligatory upon none but such as are rational Creatures and he who is annihilated is not of that nature Wherefore it is impossible that he should be guilty of sin Whereas the damned who undergo the eternal punishments are still sinning against God in an hideous manner As Aquarius do's expresly prove out of Aquinas in addit ad Capreol in 4. dist 50. Bassol ibid. q. 1. Bonav art 1. q. 1 2. and several others Durandus in 4. dist â—6 q. 5. proves plainly that according to the rules of right Reason it is more eligibâ—e to be annihilated than sin And Anselm lib. â—ur Deus Homo Debemus potius vâ—lle mundum uniâ—ersum annihilari quam aliquid â—â—eri contra voluntatem Dei We should rather wish that the whole universe were annihilated than any thing were done contrary to the will of God Doubt There is only one scruple against this proposition which deserves our consideration and it is this If it be better to be annihilated than to be damned because the annihilated are free from sinning against God and the damned are not then for the same reâ—son it shall be more eligible to be annihilated than live here in this World since the annihilated sin not but the inhabitants of this lower World are daily provoking God with their repeated and hainous trespasses So that it would seem better after this method of reasoning to be annihilated than to live upon Earth But this is absurd Ergo illud ex quo sequitur Answ I shall endeavour to give a satisfactory answer to this Objection in a very few words and 1. I deny that there is any parallel similitude of reason betwixt the antecedent and consequent for although it be most certain that while we live here we are defiled with many sinful spots yet doth it not follow that therefore it is better to be annihilated than to live here The reason is because though in this life we commit many trespasses against God yet sincere repentance for the same which is our duty can procure the the restitution of God's lost favour and countenance and so purge and cleanse us from our polluting transgressions that afterwards we may live a life more innocent and blameless to the Glory of God and the eternal wellfare of our own Souls But the damned who are already at their journeys end are in an unchangeable and lasting condition and their wills are immutably fixed upon evil and that continually For 1. As the Wills of the Glorified are immutably good so those of the damned are unchangeably evil 2. Without the inabling grace of God no Man's Will can be morrally and properly Good but the damned neither have nor hope for Sanctifying Grace in their Hearts each of them outvying one another in spewing out their Venomous and spiteful malice against their Creatour And this the Schoolmen generally approve Aquin. cont Gent. lib. 4. cap. 93. ibid. Ferrariensis And Aquin. in 4. dist 50. q. 2. art 1. Aquar in Addit ad Capre in 4. dist 50. Concl. 1. Upon all which I conclude my last reason to be still firm and valid for the proving my assertion viz. That condition is reasonably more eligible in which there is nor can be no sin than that which in the mind of the Creature is so unchangeably bound up to and steadfastly established in exerting eternal malice against God that it cannot but Sin But the Annihilated neither doth nor can sin and the damned cannot abstain from Sinning therefore the state of the former is more eligible than that of the Latter Reason III. That being or Essence which the damned enjoy is not indulged them for any Good but for a subject and foundation of eternal Torments So that in conformity to right reason it is better to have no being at all than to possess it only in order to be thereby rendred capable subjects of infinite and insupportable Tormnts and fit objects of the eternal vengeance of the Almighty Who would not rather wish to have no Tongue at all than to have it as Dives in the Parable for no other end than to be in everlasting tormenting pains Reason IV. That must be the greatest Evil which destroys the greatest Good for the greatness of the evil must still be esteemed by the value of its opposite Good so blindness is a less evil than infidelity because the good of which infidelity is a privation viz. Faith is a greater good and more valuable than seeing which is the opposite of blindness this being but a natural faculty whereas the othâ—r is a supernatural and divine gift but damnation overthrows a greater good than
annihilation do's for annihilation is only opposed unto the finit and Created good of the Creature which it is only capable to destroy but damnation is a privation of the greatest chiefest and increated good As 1. It deprives the Creature of that Beatifical Vision in which the fruition of God consists 2. It superadds a great evil a malum culpae even that eternal malice which they are perpetually willing against God And Consequently since damnation deprives the Creature of a greater good than annihilation it must be an higher evil of a more intense degree Doubt But peradventure some may reply that the annihilated is deprived of the beatifical Vision of God as well as the damned and therefore since annihilation destroys the good both of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 benè esse the Creature in that state cannot enjoy God no more than the damned and consequently the annihilated are in a worse condition than the damned for the damned enjoy the good of existence while the annihilated are deprived of the same Answ In Answer to which I say that in those that are annihilated there is indeed a want of that Beatifical Vision but no privation it being only a Negative kind of absence and not privative And there is nothing more common in Philosophy than that the want of the Beatifical Vision is not accounted to be evil unless it be a privative want As for example there is a Negative want of the beatifical Vision is a Stone that is the Stone doth not enjoy that Vision but this is not evil in respect of the Stone Because all evil is Carentia boni in subjecto câ—paci the want or defect of Good in a subject that is capable to enjoy the same now a Stone is not a subject capable of this Beatifical Vision So in him that is annihilated there is a Negation or Negative absence and non-fruition of the chiefest Good for he do's not nor cannot positively enjoy God But there is not a privation or privative absence which alone can be invested with the notion of Evil. The Reason of all is clear for the annihilated is a simple non-entity uncapable to be the subject of Good since bonum and ens are convertible terms so that where there is no entity as it is in the case of annihilation it is impossible there should be any good And as for the consequent that the absence of the beatifical Vision in the annihilated is not evil that is clearly deducible from what hath been said since that absence is not privative as all evil is but negative Ergo c. Reason V. To prove yet further that Annihilation is not an evil worse than damnation I argue in the fifth place thus There can be no evil greater than the greatest for it is a contradiction in terminis to say that there can be an evil worse than the worst of Evils since that cannot be in a Superlative degree the worst than which there may be a worser assigned But in the case of the damned there is the greatest evil that can be viz. the privation of the Beatifical Vision and the non-fruition of the chiefest Good for the privation of the chiefest and greatest good must be the greatest evil since the greatness of the evil as I hinted before must be estimated by the value of its opposite object of which it is a privation So that if damnation be followed with the highest and greatest evil then annihilation cannot infer a greater and by consequence annihilation is not an evil worse than damnation quod erat demonstrandum Reason VI. I am now arrived at my sixth and last Argument in managing which I shall observe this order 1. I shall premise some few things necessary and 2. I shall deduce my Argument in Order Wherefore in the first place I say That Evil wherewithal the Eternally Damned are afflicted is in some measure infinite and is of two kinds for there is 1. Malum culpae the evil of sinning against God and 2. Malum poenae the evil of punishment 1. That evil of Sin which the damned undergo or rather commit is perpetual blasphemie against God as some of the Sohool-men prove from Rev. 16.11 And blasphemed the God of Heaven because of their pains and their sores Which place tho' it be not properly applicable to the infernal pains but to the punishments inflicted on the Members of Antichrist yet it may after an analogical and proportional manner be not a little serviceable to the business in hand and I deduce it thus If the pains and sores inflicted on Men in this Life do incite and move their polluted lips to utter blasphemies against God himself how much more shall the pains of Hell and the exquisite torments of the Infernal Lake produce the like effect For if from pains and sores blasphemies do arise as this Text saith they do then the more intense and exquisite these pains and torments be the greater shall that blasphemie be that springeth from thence But the highest pitch of painful misery and the most intense degree of Torment shall be in Hell therefore the blasphemies against God shall there be screwed up to the greatest height This perpetual blasphemie I say accompany'd with eternal despair and an inveterate malicious hatred against God is that in which this malum culpae consists Vid. Aquin. cont Gent. lib. 4. cap. 93. ibid. Ferrar. in 4. dist 50. q. 2. art 1. Aquar in addit ad Capreol in 4. dist 50. concl 1. c. 2. The Malum poenae or evil of punishment which the damned undergo is two-fold Viz. 1. The Evil of Sense and this is the most intense positive degree of torment at least a very great one and is still proportion'd to the nature and heinousness of the sin or sins for which the punishment is inflicted 2. The Evil of loss and this is the non-fruition of the chiefest good viz. the want and privation of the Beatifical vision These premised I assert that each of these Evils is in some measure infinite for 1. The Evil of Sin being committed against an infinite God is denominated infinite from the extrinsecal relation it bears to its infinite object 2. The Evil of punishment viz. of Loss not of Sense is in like manner infinite since it consists in the privation of the Beatifical Vision or the non-fruition of an infinite good 3. The Evil of punishnment viz. of Sense tho' it is not positively infinite in respect of its intensity or degrees since the finite Creature is not a subject capable yet it is the most exquisite intense positive and everlasting extremity of torment that the miserable creature can possibly undergo 4. All these above-mention'd Evils are each of them infinite in duration since they shall never be at an end but endure through all the Ages of Eternity for ever and ever Now if we consider all these Evils as concentred in one and the same subject we
little parcel of Ground moves but slowly and that another who takes up as much time in passing over a less piece of Ground moves more slowly in this the consequence is good But if I should infer that therefore he who passes over no ground at all moves slowest of all the consequence is null for he who passes over no space moves not at all Again if I should say where there is a privation of a degree of light there is a Shadow therefore where there is a privation of a greater degree there is a greater umbrage in this I say right because a Shadow is the privation of light But if I should infer that therefore where there is a privation of all light whatsoever there is the greatest Shadow I should be justly censured with a non-sequitur because where there is no light at all there is no shadow neither nor any thing but thick and perpetual darkness for a shadow presupposes also a secondary kind of light In like manner I say the privation of any good is evil and the privation of any greater good is a greater evil but I cannot say that the privation of all and every good is the greatest evil of all because all evil must be lodged in some good or bonum viz. ens as in its Subject or Foundation So that if the Subject perish it cannot be an evil This is confess'd by Durand ubi supra and is forcibly evinced by Suarez Met. Tom. I. disp 11. Aquin. 1. p. q. 48. Object 3. Durandus objects in the third place Annihilation is no manner of way eligible therefore it cannot be more eligible than misery The reason of the antecedent is because Annihilation has nothing of good in it since all good presupposes a subject to which it should be good and in which it should rest as on a foundation and Annihilation which is the adequate and total destruction of the subject cannot partake of any such thing Answ I Answer first If every good presuppose some subject to which it should be good quod verissimum then by the same Analogy of reason every evil presupposes a subject to which it should be evil so that since Annihilation presupposes no subject but on the contrary destroys it then it cannot be evil and far less the greatest evil which Durandus contends for I Answer secondly A thing may be said to be good two ways 1. Absolutely or Positively 2. Relatively or Comparitively viz. with respect to some other thing As for the first we call that absolutely good which contains in it self some positive bonity and in this sense Annihilation is not good as the Objection says true As to the second we call a thing good which though it include no positive bonity yet in respect of another is a lesser evil so Annihilation though it be not positively and by it self good yet when compared to Damnation which is a greater evil it is good as being the lesser evil In this sense we call the middle Region of the Air the coldest because it is least hot and water is said to be lighter than the Earth or Lead than Gold not as if either the Lead or the Water were absolutely light for they are Bodies positively and in themselves heavy but comparatively that is the Water is less heavy than the Earth and the Lead than the Gold and upon this account only are they said to be lighter After the same manner is Annihilation said to be better than Damnation not absolutely as if there were any positive inherent bonity in Annihilation but only comparatively that is Annihilation when compared to Damnation is a less evil or not evil at all Object 4. It is better to have some bonity or perfection than to have none at all But the Damned have some perfection a substantial and real essence and the annihilated have none at all Therefore it is better to be Miserable or Damn'd than not to be Answ I Answer that the perfection or bonity which is competent to the Damned may be considered two ways viz. 1. Absolutely and in it self as a substantial and real perfection and in this I confess it is better to have that perfection than to have none at all if ye consider it precisely by it self but 2. If it be considered comparatively and with respect to its adjunctum viz. that evil which is conjoyn'd to it as its inseparable Companion then I say it is better to want that goodness than to enjoy it thus qualified with such bitter Ingredients efpecially since this their good viz. existence is only indulged them for this end that it may be a foundation or subject receptive of eternal Torments and inexpressible Misery which shall never have an end But Durandus perhaps may reply that there is a double evil which befals the Damned viz. Malum culpae and malum poenae But the former viz. malum culpae or sinning against God does not properly belong to Damnation but only secundario per accidens as not depending effectively of God nor yet arising from the will of him who damns but intirely owing its original to the obstinate and perverse will of the Damned so that the second only viz. malum poenae or the evil of punishment properly absolutely and per se belongs to the state of Damnation as being justly inflicted by God himself who is the efficient cause Author and original of the same Then Durandus argues thus The misery which the Damned endure as it includes the complication both of malum culpae and poenae is indeed worse than Annihilation But if it be considered properly and as it is in it self viz merely penal without respect to the criminal part of it which is but an occasional accessory then it is better to undergo this misery than to be annihilated 1. In Answer to this I assert 1. That this is truly Durandus's Opinion though every one do not observe it as may easily be collected from himself in 4 dist 16. q. 1. where he proves that it is better to be annihilated than to sin 2. But this seems to me rather a concession of than an impugning the question for the state of the question is this If it be better to be Damn'd that is undergo all the Miseries of that Life and Condition that the Damned are actually possest of than to be annihilated So that since all the Damned must necessarily undergo the malum culpae or poenae it is a very natural consequence that it is better to be Annihilated than to be Damned that is to sin against God which Durandus himself acknowledges since no Creature can be Damn'd and in the mean time be excused from sin 3. In the third place I argue thus and this is Argumentum ad hominem If it be a greater evil to sin than to be annihilated as Durandus says it is then it shall either be such because ef the offence done to God or because of the Wrath of God that has followed
thereupon or because of the punishment of loss or sense inflicted on the sinner for the same or lastly because of the sin it self which considered by it self is a greater evil than Annihilation Now which so ever of these Durandus chooses he will be at a loss For 1. If he says that it is a greater evil to sin than to be Annihilated because of the offence done to God then say I it is better to be Annihilated than to be Damned because God is offended at and continually wroth with the Damned for if the offence done unto God make sin a greater evil than Annihilation then in like manner shall the offence done unto God by the sins of the Damn'd and the displeasure of God hanging perpetually over their Heads for the same make Damnation a greater evil than Annihilation which according to Durandus's Principles is absurd 2. If he say that sin is a greater evil than Annihilation because of the Wrath of God that has followed thereupon then by the same analogy of reason it shall follow that Damnation is a greater evil than Annihilation because of the burning hot Furnace of God's Wrath which has already overtaken the Damned and shall for ever endure against them 3. If he says that sin is a greater evil than Annihilation because of the punishment inflicted on the sinner for the same then Damnation is for the same very reason a greater evil than Annihilation For if any kind of punishment make sin a greater evil than Annihilation shall not that high degree of Torment which the Damned endure for ever much more oblige Damnation to be worse than Annihilation 4. And Lastly If he say that sin in it self is a greater evil than Annihilation I accord unto the same but then I subsume If sin it self be a greater evil than Annihilation then that punishment which the Damned are afflicted with being a greater evil than sin considered precisely in it self must be likewise a greater evil than Annihilation Now I prove that the punishment of the Damned is a greater evil than sin considered in it self because the greatness of the evil is estimated by the value of the opposite good which it destroys but the punishment of the wicked destroys a greater good than sin do's for sin considered formally in it self is nothing else but privatio rectitudinis debitae inesse Creaturae the privation of that rectitude which is due unto the Creature which is but a finite good whereas the punishment of loss inflicted on the Damned not to speak of the punishment of sense deprives the Creature of the chiefest and infinite good viz. the Love of God and the Enjoyment of him for ever and consequently is a greater evil to the Creature than sin considered in it self which is only the privation of a finite good So that after all it evidently appears that if Durandus can make his Assertion good That to be guilty of sinning against God is a greater evil than Annihilation he may easily perceive the truth of my Assertion That to be Damned is a greater evil than to be Annihilated Quod erat demonstrandum And here to satisfie Durandus's fansie we shall abstract from the criminal and sinful part of the eternal Punishments betiding the wicked and shall only fix our thoughts on that malum poenae wherewithal God afflicts them And then the state of the Question shall be this If that malum poenae abstracted from the malum culpae which the wicked are liable unto be so great a punishment that is were better to be Annihilated than endure the same So that the Question hangs upon this If malum poenae be a greater evil than bonum essentiae is a good For if it be then it is better to be Annihilated and by vertue thereof to be freed from the greater evil than to be Damn'd and enjoy the smaller bonum essentiae followed with a greater evil Wherefore I here subjoyn my last Conclusion Concl. 7. It is better and in conformity to right reason more eligible to be Annihilated than to undergo the evil of punishment though separated from the evil of sin that the Damned are Tormented withal I shall in the first place explain my Conclusion and then prove it 1. That evil of punishment which the wicked undergo may be considered two ways 1. As it flows from the Will of God justly ordaining the wicked to undergo eternal Punishment And in this sense it is certain that the Damned person if he regulate his Will according to the Dictates of rectified reason cannot wish rather to be Annihilated because he cannot reasonably wish the contrary of what God justly wills and ordains for if God according to the rules of the most exact Justice will that they should undergo eternal punishment they cannot justly will to be Annihilated and not to undergo this their just retribution as is proved by Bonav in 4. dist 50. q. 2. and Jo. Maj. in 4 As also in dist 50. q. 2. 2. This evil of punishment may be considered precisely as it is in it self without respect to God's appointment and in this sense it is more eligible to be annihilated than to endure such Inexpressible Torments Wherefore to gratifie Durandus's Curiosity we shall make the staâ—e of the question this viz. If the evil of punishment when abstracted both from the malum culpae and the Divinâ— appointment about the undergoing of the same be of it self so intolerable and hideously great that it were better to be Annihilated than undergo the same upon the supposition that God should allow the Creature its free choice I assert That the evil of punishment is so very great that it were better for the person affected with the same to be Annihilated than to continue in the endurance of it And this I prove Reas 1. Because Annihilation is the lesser evil and therefore should be prefer'd I prove the Antecedent because the bonum essentiae which the Damned enjoy is a less good or minus in ratione boni than the evil of punishment is in ratione malâ— The Reason is evident viz. because every evil is estimated by the value of the good of which it is a privation but the evil of eternal punishment is the privation of a greater good than bonum essentiae therefore the evil of eternal punishment is a greater evil than the good of being is a good For the good of being is only a finite and created good whereas the good whereof the malum poenae is a privation is the fruition of God who is goodness in the abstract being the highest infinite and increated good and since there can be no good so high as the highest the good of essential being cannot be so great But if the good destroyed by the evil of punishment be greater than the bonum essentiae then this evil is greater in genere mali than the bonum essentiae is in genere boni and consequently Annihilation is rather to be chosen than undergoing the
may easily apprehend how vastly great and intolerable that punishment will be which shall torment the damned for ever Conclus II. In the second place I premise this Conclusion viz. In the state of annihilation there is no Evil at all but only a simple and bare negation of good And that we may understand this more fully we are to observe all That all Evil is the want of some Good or Perfection but there is a two-fold want of perfection 1. Negative which is only a meer negation or non existence of the perfection In a Lyon there is the want of Reason Faith and Felicity for these are not in the Lyon but this want is not evil because these are no perfections due or requisite unto the Lyon and besides he is not a subject capable of them 2. Privative which is not promiscuously the want of any perfection whatsoever but only of that perfection which is due unto the subject And this want is only the proper evil of the Creature So if a Man want his sight this is a privative want and is evil to the Man since seeing is a perfection belonging to him but tho' a stone want sight likewise yet it is not an evil to the stone since 't is not any due perfection of a stone In like manner in the annihilated Creature there is a want of Good for there is no good in that state neither indeed can be since bonity and entity are reciprocal but this want is only negative not privative and consequently no evil And this will appear more evident if we consider 2dly That every evil necessarily presupposes a subject to which it should be evil according to that axiom of the Schoolmen Omne Malum est in Bono Every Evil resides in Good that is in an entity which enjoys the Metaphysical good of existence This is also solidly demonstrated by Swarez Met. tom 1. disp 11. Aquin. 1. p q. 48. Ariminens Durand Estius and Bassol in 2. dist 34 I shall deduce some few inferences from these evident Premises and 1. If every evil presuppose the existence of a subject to which it should be Evil then annihilation is no evil at all since in the state of annihilation the subject remains not but is actually destroyed Infer II. 2. If the Annihilation of Peter v. gr were evil since every evil must be evil to some subject or other it is either evil to himself or to another But not to himself because Peter when annihilated is a simple non-entity and consequently not a subject capable of evil and not to another for evil which is the privation of good cannot be lodged in any other subject than that in which the good was as sight it having its seat only in the eye blindness its opposite evil cannot be any where else than in the eye so if bonity be an inseparable propriety of Ens then evil cannot be entertain'd any where but there Or the Argument may run thus If the annihilation of Peter were evil to Peter himself then it would eiâ—her be such while he is Peter or while he is not Peter But not while he is Peter because while he is Peter he is not annihilated and therefore it is impossible that annihilation should be evil to Peter while he is Peter since while he is Peter there is no annihilation and consequently he is not subject to the evil of the same And neither can it be evil to him while he is not Peter because Evil as I said before cannot be lodg'd in a non-entity And as for its being evil to another that relates not to the business in hand for if it be not evil to himself I gain my point since the Question is not whether it be better for another that a damned person he annihilated or that he continue in the state of damnation but which of them is better for the damned person himself 3. That which is not at all cannot be in an evil condition for to be miserable necessarily presupposes to be Malè esse necessario praesupponit esse as a Man cannot be in a good condition unless he exist or enjoy that being which is good but Peter when annihilated is a pure nothing therefore he cannot be in an ill condition and consequently annihilation cannot be an evil unto him Or the Reason may be conceived thus That cannot constitute a Man in an ill condition which constitutes him a meer nothing But Annihilation constitutes the Creature a meer nothing Ergo c. And this is confirmed by Aquin. in Quodlib q. 5. art 3. Si omnia annihilarentur nullum esset malum sicut non erat ullum malum ante creationem If all things were annihilated there would be no more evil in the World than there was before the Creation which was none at all Now I come to deduce my sixth Reason and it is this Reason VI. That in which there is no Evil at all is according to right reason more eligible than that in which an infinite number of evils are contain'd But in the state of annihilation there is or can be no evil at all and in the state of damnation there is a combination of evils in some measure infinite both parts of the minor are already demonstrated Therefore annihilation is preferable to damnation and consequently it is more eligible not to be than to be miserable Quod erat demonstrandum There is one thing here to be remarked that while we say it is more eligible not to be than to be miserable this choosing of non-existence or wishing not to be may undergo a two-fold meaning 1. A man may be said to wish for non-existence so that he is ready to effectuate it himself and advance his own annihilation as much as in him lies and in this sense no Man should wish to be annihilated viz. by his own procuring The Reason is because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or self murder is a summum nefas a superlative Crime which as we cannot do so neither should we wish to be the doers of it So that in this no man should wish rather to be annihilated than to be miserable 2. A Man may be said to wish for annihilation not as if he were to be the doer of it himself but supposing God should leave him to his free choice he would consent unto it and be passive while another is performing the action And in this sense we may say it is more eligible not to be than to be miserable if both were considered absolutely in themselves and if God should leave the damned Creature to its own free choice But we do not assert that a man can actually and de facto wish for it Vid Johan Major in 4. Sent. dist 50. q. 2. and Bassol in 4. dist 50. q. 1. The next thing that follows in order is to consider Durandus his Objections to the contrary which I shall 1. set down in their full force and 2. shall answer them with as much