we should not do and not doing that which we should do if we should do a thing it supposeth we can do it otherwise it would seem absurd No dispute but we do and can will evil as evil and consequently the Definition is erroneous 2. The second Solution doth not clear the point in supposing that the evil which we do will we will it not as evil but as apparent good This is futil for what is apparent good but a real evil A thing must either be formally evil or formally good betwixt these there can be no Medium The third is grounded upon a false distinction because good as it is good doth not imply formally honesty usefulnesse or pleasure neither is it universally coveted by all bodies as it is affected with any of these accidents but as it doth perfect them So that a pleasant good is frequently not coveted as a pleasant good but as a pleasant evil and we do know that same pleasant evil to be so before we do will it The same may be said concerning good as it is usefull Neverthelesse may good be also coveted sometime as it is pleasant or usefull or honest but these are only accidental to good III. Diogenes the Stoick defines Good to be that which is perfect in its own nature Herein he confounds perfection with good which are formally different one from the other as I have shewed in my Metaphysicks Besides Good is here considered as it is relative or related to another Being although in Metaphysicks it is treated of as absolute to a Being IV. Good is whose end is to perfect that which doth bend to it all Beings bend to each other because they perfect one another By perfection understand the further constitution and conservation of a Being for all Beings are further constituted and conserved by other Beings This end may prove frustraneous to many bodies but that is not through the default of Good but of that Body to which it proveth frustraneous although bent to it Note that it doth not follow that all which a Being is bent unto is good for it although it followeth that all which doth perfect a Being is good All Beings are essentially bent to what is good but accidentally they bend also to what is evil A depravate will is accidental to man and therefore man doth accidentally covet evil This evil although it is coveted accidentally by man yet by his will it is desired formally and per se. IV. There are several degrees of good which do not differessentially from one another but have a resemblance and proportion one to the other so that one can become the other or change into the nature of the other According to this good is gradually distinguisht into Moral Good and Theologick Good V. Moral Good is whose end is to perfectionate man as he is in a natural state Moral Evil is whose end is to corrupt man as he is in a natural state VI. Theologick Good is which doth perfectionate a man in a supernatural state Theologick Evil is which doth corrupt a man as he is in a preternatural state Of these I purpose to treat of distinctly in the next ensuing Chapter CHAP. IV. Of Moral Good and Moral Evil. 1. An Explanation of the Definition of Moral Good What is understood by a Natural State The ambiguity of the word Natural 2. What Moral Good it is which doth respect the Body What Moral Good it is which respecteth the Soul 3. An Explanation of the Definition of Moral Evil. That God doth not properly bend to his creatures 4. The Distinction between these two predicates to be Good and to do Good 5. How Moral Good turns to Moral Evil. 6. That Man as he is in a neutral state is in a middle state between supernatural and preternatural FIrst It is requisite to unfold the ambiguities of the terms contained in the Definition of Moral Good What it is to perfectionate I have already declared It remains to amplifie how man is understood to be in a Natural State A Natural Being is frequently taken for a Being which is in the same state wherein it was created or produced A man then is said to be Natural when he is in the same state wherein he was created There is a two-fold Creation 1. There is an immediate Creation of man whom God did create immediately through himself no other mediate effect being interposed 2. A mediate Creation of man is whereby he is mediately through his Parents created by God Man being created by an immediate creation as long as he continued in that nature and state wherein he was created was natural but having corrupted that state through his appetite after Evil he became counter-natural in respect to his former state A Natural Being is also understood for that which continueth in the same state wherein it is as it is produced by a mediate creation and in this sense we are to apprehend it here Here may be offered an Objection That a Being cannot be said to be created by a mediate Creation and yet be counter-natural Pray observe me well here in this place I say that man who is created by a mediate Creation is counter-natural but I do not say that God who created him did create him counter-natural for he created him Natural Of this more at large elswhere And to return to my purpose Man as he is natural according to the latter acception doth perfectionate himself by that Moral Good which he doth bend unto and that same moral Good doth conservate and further constitute a man in that nature wherein he was created by a mediate Creation Man is sometimes taken disjunctly for his body and soul or else joyntly and integrally as he doth consist of both united II. According to the first distinction there is moral Good which chiefly concerns the Body of man as meat drink and cloaths There is also a moral Good chiefly respecting the soul as speculative and practick objects are morally good to the soul. You may demand how practick and speculative objects do perfectionate the soul I answer That they by their objectivenesse do conservate the souls action in its goodnesse for had the soul no moral good object to act upon it would be without a moral good action which is repugnant to that Maxim Omne quod est est propter operationem All which is is for to operate In like manner do food and cloaths conservate the Body of man in its natural state III. Moral Evil doth corrupt a man as he is in a Natural state and makâ—â— him counter-natural that is worse than he is in a Natural state I am required here to illustrate two obscurities 1. How Moral Good can be said to be good 2. How Moral Good turneth to Moral Evil. In reference to the first we are to call to mind the definition of Good which is whose end is to perfect that which doth bend to it If then Moral Good obtains a virtue to perfect
else but where we are at present The falshood of this Theorem is evident because that greatest happinesse which we enjoy in this world is like but in an inferious degree to that which we expect in the other Neither is any happinesse to be parallel'd to the greatest but which is a true Theologick happinesse If so then a Theologick happinesse must be our Summum Bonum No wonder therefore if Philosophers being destitute of this Theologick habit were false Philosophers This is the reason why Aristotle and other supposed Philosophers never arrived to the possession of the greatest happinesse because they were ignorant of God And is it not therefore unworthy of a Philosopher to be a slave to their Dictates which affected slavery hath proved an obvious cause of the greatest errours in Church and State How full of Anguish fear jealousle and uncertainties were their souls through their not knowing the true God They could never enjoy any durable happinesse as long as their minds were perplexed with them doubts In what perplexity did Aristotle die even when his languishing soul pressed out these words In doubts have I lived and in more anguish do I die whither I shall go I know not wherefore thou Being of Beings have mercy upon me What did the joys and pleasures of Epicure amount unto when he was tormented with such miserable pains of the strangury as chased his soul out of his body II. The greatest happinesse is which of all things makes a man most happy Happinesse is a concomitant of a joyfull thing or an effect wrought by a joyfull object upon man the reception of which makes him truly happy Here we will first enquire Whether the greatest happinesse is the neerest End of Natural Theology 2. How it is otherwise called 3. What it is 4. Which is the subject of this habit 5. How it is to be procured In answer to the first I say that the greatest happinesse is not the neerest and principal end of Theology I prove it That which doth not chiefly and immediately move a man in Theology is not the neerest and principal end but the greatest happinesse doth not chiefly and immediately move a man in Theology Therefore it is not the neerest and principal end of Theology 2. It is the next end to the neerest and an inseparable concomitant of the neerest end I prove it That which we do enjoy next after the possession of the habit of Natural Theology and of the Summum Bonum is the next end to the neerest But we do chiefly enjoy the greatest happinesse next after the possession of the habit of Theology and of the Summum Bonum Therefore it is the next end to the neerest There is none which ever did possesse the habit of Theology but confirms the truth and assurance of the Minor 4. The greatest happinesse is sometime called Summum Bonum or the greatest good from its causality because it doth through its presence confer the greatest happinesse upon that Subject which it doth irradiate Hence Austin de Civ Dei lib. 8. cap. 3. Finis autem boni appellatur quo quisque cum pervenerit beatus est That is called the end of good which maketh every man happy that doth attain to it Note that the greatest happinesse is only tropically named Summum Bonum from a Metonomia causae pro effectu CHAP. III. Of GOOD 1. What Good is 2. That Aristotle 's Definition of Good is erroneous 3. Diogenes his Definition of Good 4. The Explanation of the Definition of Good How the several kinds of Good differ from one another 5. What Moral Good is what moral evil is 6. What Theologick Good and evil is BOnum Good is that which doth make the subject which doth possesse it perfect Or Good is that which all Beings do incline unto for to perfect themselves The highest and greatest Good must then be that which makes a man most perfect and happy or that which all men need to perfect themselves with the same perfection which man had when he was first created I said need and not desire or incline into because all men do not desire the Summum Bonum for all men do not come to the knowledge of it yet all men need it for to perfect themselves II. There are many definitions of Good spread among Philophers whereof some are false either in not adequating the whole definitum or else in attributing falsities by it to the definitum or subject defined Among these that of Aristotle is counted most authentick* Good is that which all things do incline unto or covet This definition must either agree with Good as it is proper to all Beings and Transcendent or as it is restricted to rationals and animals in which only there is an appetite and coveting or as it is most limited to rationals only If we take it according to the first acception the definition is not formal but only accidental for it is accidental to beings as they are Good to be coveted or be desired from another being Neither doth it hold true in the last acception because we desire many things which are evil and hurtfull to us To this may be answered that a being so far as it is desired is good although it prove accidentally hurtfull This answer is not satisfactory for we do oftentimes desire things knowing them to be evil and therefore we do desire them as evil for the will doth covet things as they are understood if then the understanding doth understand them to be evil the will must consequently will them as evil Possibly some do reply that the understanding doth conceive them very things which a man afterwards doth covet To be good otherwise he could not desire them For Did he desire them as evil then he would desire his own destruction and be inferiour to all other creatures which are onely bent to that which doth perfect their nature or you may return your answer thus that good is either apparent or real and truly good and that the understanding doth understand all beings to be good apparently or really or otherwise you may distinguish good in good which is honest or profitable and usefull or pleasant and state that the understanding doth conceive all things either as they are honest useful or pleasant This doth not remove all objections as to the first The will of man is not restrained to a certain object as Naturals are but is also extended to contrary objects to wit to good and evil Neither is it singly limited to contradictories as to will evil and to leave it because to desist from an action is no action and for that reason we cannot properly say that the actions of the will are free quoad contradicentia tantum only in willing evil and ceasing from it Secondly Should God punish us for doing evil when we cannot act any thing but evil it would appear somewhat severe for punishment is to punish a delict and sinne in doing that which
sutable to him he cannot let his desires slide another way The worst actions which men do act are either when they are alone or when they are in other company and absent from their partner When they are in other company they are apt to be drunk to swear and to project base designs which a man seldome or never doth perpetrate in the presence with his mate Or if he did it is an hundred to one if her fear modesty or some other vertue did not prevent him Man could seldome think evil thoughts because his companion is supposed to divert him in proposing pleasant or usefull discourses What woman is there which can be inordinate in any of these fore-instanced actions if she is suted to a mate and adheres to his fellowship onely 'T is true women and men although both joyn'd in a constant adherence have sometimes agreed in wicked designs but this hapneth alwayes in a couple unsutably paired and consequently much given to wandring so that they did not contract that evil habit from themselves but from others Had the first man and the first woman continued constantly together it would have been a far harder task for the Devil to have deluded them but they being separated although but for a few moments and either of them admitting conference with the Devil were soon corrupted What an easie task of Government would it be if most men were paired so as never to be asunder from their fellow They could hardly assent to mischief or if they were bent to it Law might sooner work upon their joint-interest than if it were single But take this only as by way of discourse XII It is necessary among men to give honour to whom it is due and to return it with thanks when they do deserve it Were it only to cause a distinction of persons in respect to civil Government it doth imply a necessity It is proper for us to know what honour is for how could we else acquit our duty in this part to God to the supream Magistrate or to our Parents XIII We are not to be over-scrupulous in taking of an oath provided it tend to the preservation of the Commonwealth and that the supream Magistrate be it the King Prince or plural Magistrate do require it We are obliged to it upon a double consideration 1. Because the Magistrate doth command or imposed it which is obliging among all Nations 2. Because it tends to the preservation of the whole body of the people And this common reason doth convince to be binding CHAP. VIII Of the Subject of Natural Theology 1. Man consisting of Body and Soul is the adequate subject of Natural Theology 2. Reasons proving the Soul to be the original and principal subject of Theology 3. That the Understanding and Will are really and formally one The confutation of the vulgar definition of Will A full explication of the Will and the manner of its acting What speculalative and practical signifie 4. What the Will is in a large sense 5. What the Will is in a strict sense 6. An Explanation upon the first description of Will 7. The Effects of the Will Whether appetibility doth not equally imply volibility and appetibility in a strict sense 8. Whether mans appetite is distinct from his Will I. THe fourth Question proposed is Which is the Subject of Natural Theology By Subject I mean the Subjectum inhaesionis wherein this habit is inherent To answer you in general The whole man as he consisteth of soul and body is the subject of Theology for the effects of it to wit happinesse and joy are as sensibly received by the body as by the soul for the body receiveth its essence conservation and bodily pleasures from it The soul cannot alone be properly said to be the subject because the soul without the body is not man II. The soul is originally and principally the subject of Theology I say originally because the soul is the original cause of the pleasures of the body yea and of its constitution for the body was created for the soul and not the soul for the body The soul is the original cause of the pleasures of the body in that the soul doth make choice of them and applieth them to the body for example meat drink and other pleasures are applyed to the body in that the soul makes choice of them and conceiveth them to be pleasant to the body otherwise the body could not attain to them The soul can enjoy pleasures when the body is in paine but the body cannot when the soul is in paine The soul is the principal subject of Theology because the greatest happinesse and good is enjoyed by it the delights of the body not being comparable to them of the soul The soul receiveth its pleasure by instants of time the body onely by succession III. The operation whereby the soul doth imbrace the greatest good and happinesse is from the understanding as it is speculative and practick and not as it is a two-fold faculty formally distinct through the understanding and the will for these are not really and essentially distinct I prove it if the understanding cannot understand without the will or the will without the understanding then they are not really and essentially distinct because it is proper to beings which are really and essentially distinct to operate without each other But the understanding cannot understand without the will neither can the will will without the understanding Therefore they are not really distinct I prove the Minor The will is primarly a bending of the understanding to an action of the mind but the understanding cannot understand unlesse it bends to that action of the mind So neither can the understanding be bent to action unlesse it understandeth Wherefore the one doth imply the other The most there is between them is a modal distinction You may object that it follows hence that a man may be said to will when he understandeth to understand when he willeth which predications are absurd I answer That it includes no absurdity at all for a man when he understandeth doth will every particular act of the understanding which he understandeth or otherwise how could he understand On the other side a man understandeth when he willeth according to that trite saying Ignoti nulla Cupido That which a man doth not know he cannot desire or will Wherefore I argue again that the one includeth the other the will implyeth the understanding and the understanding the will Possibly you may deny my supposed definition of will which is a bending to an action of the mind If you refuse it propose a better Your opinion it may be is to wander with the multitude and so you commend this The will is through which a man by a fore-going knowledge doth covet a sutable or convenient good and shunneth an inconvenient evil I will first account the absurdities of this definition and afterwards prove them to be so First you
affirm That there fore-goeth a knowledge before a man willeth Secondly That a man doth alwayes covet a convenient good Thirdly That a man shunneth all inconvenient evil Fourthly That the will alwayes either coveteth or shunneth Fifthly The definition containeth superfluous words as inconvenience and convenience Sixthly You assert that two contrary acts proceed from one formal habit Seventhly This definition is a division of a habit into its acts Eighthly You do positively affirm That the will is really and essentially distinct from the understanding Many more I might deduct but these being sufficient I shall now direct my pen to them particularly First You say That there fore-goeth a knowledge before every act of the will Upon this I demand from you How cometh the understanding to know You may answer through her self and what is it else to know through ones self but to know through ones own will Ergo The will is a concomitant of the understanding and the understanding of the will and consequently the one doth not precede the other Or thus Can the understanding know against her will or without her will If so then man is no voluntary creature in that he acteth without a will Secondly You declare That a man doth alwayes covet a convenient good Herein you contradict your self for before you said that the understanding did understand a volible object without or before the will but to understand a volible object is to will to understand it and yet not covet it Therefore according to your own words a man did not always covet through his will 2. A man doth covet evil as evil Wherefore he doth not alwayes covet good The antecedence I have proved above 3. A man doth sometime covet an inconvenientgood for he covets Arsenick to kil himself You will answer to this that he doth covet it as a convenient good for to ease him from some trouble or grief By this solution you confound your self in taking objective good and formal good for the same thing which according to Aristotle are different If so then your answer will not hold for the Question is concerning objective good whereas your answer relates to a formal good The ease which a man findeth through the removal of trouble is the formal good the Arsenick is the objective good this presupposed the Arsenick is good in it self but relatively it is inconvenient to that man for it destroyeth his essence You may reply That a man doth not take it to destroy his essence but to release himself from his misery Notwithstanding I say he knew before he took the Ratsbane that it would kill him wherefore this knowledge of inconvenience fore-going the willing of inconvenience doth according to your own definition infer that he willed it as inconvenient because he fore-knew it to be inconvenient Thirdly I say That a man doth not alwayes shun an inconveent evil because he doth not shun sicknesse when he is diseased neither can he shun all inconveniencies for he falleth into many So likewise in the fore-given instance he cannot shun sicknesse or death although he may wish it remote from him but that is not shunning of it wherefore shunning is an improper term to be used in this definition Fourthly You conceive That the will alwayes doth either covet or shun This is against most Peripateticks who say that the will can suspend its action which suspension is neither coveting or shunning Fifthly Since that good implieth convenience and evil inconvenience what need you to adde convenience and inconvenience Wherefore both must be superfluous Sixthly To shun evil and to covet good are two acts formally contrary If so How can these flow from one habit Possibly you endeavour to escape the force of this Objection in saying that the one may proceed per se and the other per accidens from a formal habit If I should grant this your definition will prove illegal because there must nothing be inserted into a Definition but what agreeth per se with the definitum Seventhly This is rather an Accidental Division of a habit into its acts Wherefore this Division is not so much as Essential because it is not grounded upon the form of the Divisum Eighthly You conclude the will to be really and essentially different from the understanding You make too much haste you should first shew that the will and understanding are Real Beings and how will you do that according to your own received Doctrine of Real Beings which teacheth that they onely are Real Beings which exist or can exist without the understanding if so then the understanding for to be a real being must exist without its self and is not this absurd Having made appear to you the falsity of the common Doctrine of Will I come now to explain how the understanding is made practical and how speculative Wherefore in the first place Mark what the understanding is The understanding is the discerning apprehending or judging faculty of all Objects which are objected from without or from within The understanding judgeth of these objects according to their distinct representation Objects represent themselves in a two-fold manner 1. Essentially when the essence consisting of all its modes united is represented to the understanding 2. Modally which is when one mode or more is or are singularly represented to the understanding You may apprehend this better by an example The essential representation of a Bull is wherein you perceive him by or in all his modes united particularly in perceiving him in that shape of having such a figure of bearing horns of being hairy and cloven-footed of having unity truth and perfection c. But when I conceive onely one of his modes without conceiving any of the others that is a modal representation as in conceiving his horns only or the goodnesse of every mode by it self or the goodness of the whole essence Observe then these several concepts are several actions because they are of several objects Which difference of action is called a material difference Again This action is but one formally and depends from one formal power so that one power can promote but one formal action as in this instance The power which my hand hath of writing fitteth it to write several letters as I. D. c. the writing these several letters are distinct actions because they differ in figure which is a material difference but then again the action of writing is but one formally flowing from one formal power of writing So likewise a knife cutteth paper wood c. the cutting of these are materially distinct actions but again the cutting is also but one formal action for a knife cutteth these through one vertue of sharpnesse and therefore its power is but one formally In the same manner I say doth the soul understand or perceive several objects as in conceiving the entire essence of a Being or its modes in particular as its goodnesse unity c. These are all several actions differing materially one
he is cut off from not willing which implyes a contradiction in the will of not to be the will VI. Fifthly The will acteth upon the evil of an object in that it can refuse or imbrace it as it is evil and as it knoweth it to be evil without having an apprehension of any goodnesse in it A man can hang himself or kill another without apprehending any thing good in it and he can also refuse it Since that all beings act for an end and purpose it may be demanded What end and purpose can a man have in coveting an evil object as it is evil I answer an evil end The Devils covet evil as it is evil for none can imagine the least good in Devils if so why may not men covet evil as evil many among them being worse than Devils It is worse to persevere in evil and wickednesse in the midst of the enjoyments of good things than to affect evil without the least enjoyment of good but Atheists persevere in the greatest evil in the midst of good things wherefore they are to be accounted worse than Devils who affect evil without the least enjoyment of good VII Lastly A man may will either a good object or an evil one This is an action of will as it is free to contraries and is called among Philosophers Libertas quoad specificationem actus a freedom of will in specifying an act that is an affecting an object in particular as it is opposite to another appetible object in contrariety which is to will an object as it is good or as it is evil pleasant or sorrowfull c. The preceding distinctions of the acts of will proceed from her as she is free Quoad contradictoria or quoad exercitium actus VIII Hence you may know that free-will Liberum arbitrium in reference to its faculty is an indetermination or indifference in the will of man of acting or not acting and of acting upon good or evil Neverthelesse it is a controversie among Moralists 1. Whether the will be indifferent to each opposite which opposites are either between contradictories as between acting and not acting or between contraries as between acts upon good or evil 2. Whether the will is free in all its acts Vilsten Cent. 1. Dec. 4. q. 6. states two conclusions for the resolving of these doubts 1. Saith he The will is not indifferent to each contrary to wit to good and evil His reason is because the will cannot covet evil as evil but when the will doth covet evil it is rather forced than free because it is an evil disposition doth compell her to it wherfore that being against nature it is rather to be accounted violent than free First He saith The will cannot covet evil as evil Next he affirms That the will can covet evil but then she is forced This is a manifest contradiction that the will can covet evil and cannot covet evil Again That the will should covet evil by coaction from within is to contradict most Philosophers whose tenent is That the will cannot be forced from within Besides to grant this would be to suppose that man did act necessarily like unto naturals Further it would be very severe should God punish us for doing an act when we cannot do otherwise IX His second Conclusion is That the will of man is indifferent to each contradictory opposite because she can act upon a good object in particular and forbear Herein he speaks the truth but this is no more truly concluded but it is as fallaciously opposed by others Their Argument is because souls in Heaven cannot but love God and the damned cannot but hate him both these acting freely it followeth that the will is not indifferent to contradictories This infers nothing to the present dispute of man's will only of souls in Heaven and Devils But I passe to the second Doubt proposed Whether the will of man is free in all her acts Inorder to the clearing of this doubt you are to observe it 1. That the acts of the will are of acting or not acting or of acting upon a particular object so as to covet it or to reject it 2. That the act of the will after its whole assent or conclusion is not the will it self and therefore freedom is not to be attributed to the act but to the power or faculty This premised I poâ—â— X. 1. That the will is free to act or not to act If man is free to think or not to think he is free to will or not to will because a man's thought is alwayes concomitant to his will But a man is free to think or not to think Ergo He is free to will or not to will The Assumtion is confirmed in the second Paragraph XI 2. The will is free to act upon particular objects as they are good or evil By will I mean the will of man as he is in a natural and corrupt state not as he is in a supernatural or preternatural estate for in the first he cannot covet evil in the last he cannot covet good Neither is it to be understood of man as he was in an incorrupt state most granting that he could covet good and evil But the Question is Whether man as he is in a corrupt condition and prone to evil cannot do a good act as much as the first man being prone to good did an evil act Observe also that good is either theologick good or moral good and so is evil The Question here is concerning moral good and evil Lastly you are to understand here the freedom of man's will as he acteth with the ordinary concurrence of God and not as he acteth with an extraordinary concurrence of God with him XII Man as he is in a natural and corrupt state hath a free-will of doing a moral good act or a moral evil act What moral good and evil and theologick good and evil is I have already set down in the 3d 4th and 5th Chapters I prove this position What ever a man doth act with the fore-knowledge of his understanding doth proceed from his free-will But man acteth moral evil and moral good with the fore-knowledge of his understanding Ergo Man doth act moral evil and moral good through his free-will I confirm the Minor There are none that deny that man doth moral evil with the fore-knowledge of his understanding That man doth act a moral good act from himself without an extraordinary concurrence of God with him it appeareth In that he can and doth covet meat and drink in moderation and in that he can and doth help the poor and needy and in that he can moderate his passions all these are moral good acts They are good acts in that they do perfectionate man in his Essence They are moral in that they proceed from man's free-will and foreknowledge XIII Man hath not a free-will of doing a Theologick good act immediately through himself and without an extraordinary concurrence of God with him