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A51674 Father Malebranche his treatise concerning the search after truth The whole work complete. To which is added the author's Treatise of nature and grace: being a consequence of the principles contained in the search. Together with his answer to the animadversions upon the first volume: his defence against the accusations of Monsieur De la Ville, &c. relating to the same subject. All translated by T. Taylor, M.A. late of Magdalen College in Oxford. Malebranche, Nicolas, 1638-1715.; Taylor, Thomas, 1669 or 70-1735.; Malebranche, Nicolas, 1638-1715. Traité de la nature et de la grace. English. 1700 (1700) Wing M318; ESTC R3403 829,942 418

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Tediousness Regret Pity Indignation are so many kinds of Sorrow caused by the Consideration of something displeasing But besides those Passions and several others I pass by which particularly relate to some of the Primitive Passions there are yet many others whose Commotion is almost equally compounded either of Desire and Joy as Impudence Anger and Revenge or of Desire and Sorrow as Shame Regret and Vexation or of all Three together when Motives of Joy and Sorrow meet And though these last Passions have no particular Names that I know of they are however the most common because in this Life we scarce ever enjoy any Good without a Mixture of Evil nor suffer any Evil without Hopes of being freed of it and enjoying Good And though Joy be altogether contrary to Sorrow yet it allows of its Company and even admits it an equal Sharer in the Capacity of the Soul as Volent when the Sight of Good and Evil divide its Capacity as Intelligent All the Passions therefore are Species of Desire Joy and Sorrow and the chief difference betwixt those of the same sort must be taken from the different Perceptions or Judgments that cause or accompany them So that to become learned in the Nature of Passions and to make of them the most accurate Enumeration possible it is requisite to enquire into the different Judgments that may be made of Good and Evil. But as we especially intend to find out the Cause of our Errours we need not so much to insist upon the Judgments that precede or cause the Passions as upon those that follow them and which the Soul makes of Things when she is agitated by some Passion because those last Judgments are the most liable to Errour Such Judgments as precede and cause the Passions are almost ever false in something because they are for the most part grounded upon such Perceptions of the Soul as consider Objects in relation to her and not as they are in themselves But the Judgments that follow the Passions are false all manner of ways because such Judgments being only made by the Passions are only grounded upon the Perceptions the Soul has of Objects as relating to her or rather to her own Commotion In the Judgments that precede the Passions Truth and Falshood are join'd together but when the Soul is agitated and judges by every Inspiration of the Passion Truth vanishes and Falshood remains to be the Principle of so many more false Conclusions as the Passion is greater All Passions justifie themselves continually offering to the Soul the moving Object in the fittest way for preserving and increasing her Commotion The Judgment or the Perception that causes it gets still new Forces from the Increase of the Passion and the Passion likewise augments proportionably as the Judgment that produces it in its turn is strengthen'd Thus false Judgments and Passions join in Confederacy for their mutual Preservation And should the Heart never cease sending up Spirits for keeping open the Tracks of the Brain and supplying the Expences which that violent Sensation or Commotion make of the same Spirits Passions would perpetually increase and never allow us to be sensible of our Errours But as all our Passions depend on the Fermentation and Circulation of the Blood and that the Heart can never furnish as many Spirits as are necessary for their Preservation they must needs expire when the Spirits diminish and the Blood grows cool again Though it be an easie matter to discover the ordinary Judgments of Passions yet 't is not a thing to be neglected there being few Subjects that deserve more the Application of an Enquirer after Truth who endeavours to free himself from the Dominion of the Body and will judge of every thing by true Ideas We may instruct our selves in this Matter two ways either by pure Reason or by our inward Consciousness when we are agitated by some Passion For Instance Experience teaches us That we are apt to judge of those we love not to their Disadvantage and to spit all the Venom of our Hatred at the Object of our Passion We also know by Reason that as we cannot hate but what is Evil so 't is necessary for the preservation of Hatred that the Mind should represent to it self the worst part of its Object For 't is sufficient to suppose that all Passions justifie themselves and give such a Disposition first to the Imagination then to the Mind as is fit to preserve their own Commotion directly to conclude what are the Judgments which all the Passions cause us to make Those that are endued with a strong and lively Imagination that are extremely sensible and much subject to the Motions of Passions may perfectly inform themselves of those things by their own inward sense and it often comes to pass that they speak of them in a more pleasing and instructing manner than others whose Reason over-tops their Imagination yet it follows not that those that discover best the Springs of Self-love that penetrate farthest into Man's Heart and more sensibly discover its Recesses are always the greatest Understandings This only proves that they are livelier quicker of Imagination and sometimes more malicious than others But those that without consulting their inward Sense make use only of their Reason to enquire into the Nature and Effects of Passions though they be not always so quick-sighted as others are always more rational and less obnoxious to Errour because they judge of things as they are in themselves They see very near what Men posse●t with Passions can doe as they suppose them more or less agitated but do not rashly judge of the Actions of others by what they would doe themselves in such Occasions for they well know that Men are not equally sensible to the same things nor alike susceptible of involuntary Commotions and therefore 't is not by consulting our Sensations which the Passions create in us but by listening to Reason that we must treat of the Judgments that accompany them lest we should draw our own Picture instead of discovering the Nature of Passions in general CHAP. XI That all the Passions justifie themselves What Judgments they cause us to make in their Vindication WE need no long deduction of Arguments to demonstrate That all Passions justifie themselves That Principle is sufficiently evident both by our internal Consciousness of our selves and the Behaviour of those we see agitated by them and therefore we need only barely propound it to consider it as we should do The Mind is such a Slave to the Imagination that it always obeys when the Imagination is over-heated and dares not answer when the same is incensed because it meets with Abuses when it resists and is always rewarded with some Pleasure when it humours that imperious Faculty Even those whose unruly Imagination persuades them they are transmuted into Beasts find out Reasons to prove they must live as Beasts do walk Four-footed eat Grass and imitate every Action that is purely
Sin found Fruits pleasant to the sight and grateful to the Taste if we rightly consider the words of the Holy Scripture nor shall we come to think that the Oeconomy of the Senses and Passions which is so wonderfully contrived and adapted to the preservation of the Body is a Corruption of Nature instead of its Original Institution Doubtless Nature is at this present corrupted the Body acts too violently upon the Mind and whereas it ought only to make an humble Representation of its wants to the Soul it domineers over her takes her off from God to whom she ought to be inseparably united and continually applies her to the search of such sensible things as tend to its preservation She is grown as it were material and terestrial ever since her Fall the Essential Relation and Union that she had with God being broken that is to say God being withdrawn from her as much as he could be without her destruction and annihilation A thousand disorders have attended the absence or departure of him that preserv'd her in Order and without making a longer Enumeration of our Miseries I freely confess that Man since his Fall is corrupted in all his parts That Fall however has not quite destroyed the Work of God for we can still discover in Man what God at first put in him and his immutable Will that constitutes the Nature of every thing was not changed by the Inconstancy and Fickleness of the Will of Adam Whatever God has once will'd he still wills and because his Will is efficatious brings it to pass The Sin of Man was indeed the Occasion of that Divine Will that makes the Dispensation of Grace but Grace is not contrary to Nature neither do they destroy each other since God is not opposed to himself that he never repents and that his Wisdom being without Limits his Works will be without End And therefore the Will of God that constitutes the Dispensation of Grace is superadded to that which makes the Oeconomy of Nature in order to repair and not to change it There are then in God but these two general Wills and the Laws by which he governs the World depend on one or other of them It will plainly appear by what follows that the Passions are very well order'd if considered only in reference to the Preservation of the Body though they deceive us in some very rare and particular Occasions which the universal Cause did not think fit to remedy Thence I conclude That the Passions belong to the Order of Nature since they cannot be ranked under the Order of Grace 'T is true that seeing the Sin of the first man has deprived us of the Help of an always-present God and always ready to defend us It may be said That Sin is the Cause of our excessive adhesion to sensible things because Sin has estranged us from God by whom alone we can be rid of our Slavery But without insisting longer upon the Enquiry after the first Cause of the Passions let us examine their Extent their particular Nature their End their Use their Defects and whatever they comprehend CHAP. II. Of the Vnion of the Mind with sensible things or of the Force and Extent of the Passions in general IF all those who read this Work would be at the pains to reflect upon what they feel within themselves it would not be necessary to insist upon our Dependency upon all sensible Objects I can say upon this Head but what every one knows as well as I do if he will but think on it and was therefore very much inclined to pass it over But Experience having taught me That Men often forget themselves so far as not to think or be aware of what they feel nor to enquire into the Reason of what passes in their own Mind I thought it fit to propose some Considerations that may help them to reflect upon it And even I hope That those who know such things will not think their Reading ill bestowed for though we do not care to hear simply rehearsed what we very well know yet we use to be affected with Pleasure at the hearing of what we know and feel together The most honourable Sect of Philosophers of whose Opinions many Pretenders boast still now a-days will persuade us That it is in our power to be happy The Stoicks continually say We ought only to depend upon our selves we ought not to be vexed for the Loss of Dignities Estates Friends Relations we ought to be always calm and without the least Disturbance whatever happens Banishment Injuries Affronts Diseases and even Death are no Evils and ought not to be feared and a thousand Paradoxes of that Nature which we are apt enough to believe both because of our Pride that makes us affect Independency as that because Reason teaches us that most part of the Evils which really afflict us would not be able to disturb us if all things remained in good Order But God has given us a Body and by that Body united us to all sensible things Sin has subjected us to our Body and by our Body made us dependent upon all sensible things It is the Order of Nature it is the Will of the Creatour that all the Beings that he has made should hang together And therefore being united to all things and the Sin of the first Man having made us dependent on all Beings to which God had only united us there is now none but he is at once united and subjected to his Body and by his Body to his Relations Friends City Prince Country Cloaths House Estate Horse Dog to all the Earth to the Sun the Stars and the Heavens It 's then ridiculous to tell Men that it is in their power to be happy wise and free It is to jeer them seriously to advise them they ought not to be afflicted for the Loss of their Friends or Estates For as it were absurd to exhort Men not to feel Pain when they are beaten or not to be sensible of Pleasure when they eat with an Appetite so the Stoicks are either unreasonable or not in good earnest when they cry That we ought not to be sorry for the Death of our Father the Loss of our Goods our Banishment Imprisonment and the like nor to be glad of the happy Success of our Affairs since we are united to our Country Goods Friends c. by a Natural Union which at present has no dependence on our Will I grant that Reason teaches us we are to undergo Banishment without Sorrow but the same Reason likewise teaches us we ought to endure the cutting off our Arm without Pain because the Soul is superiour to the Body and that according to the light of Reason her happiness or misery ought not to depend upon it but 't is ridiculous to argue against Experience which in this occasion will convince us that things are not so as our Reason intimates they ought to be The Philosophy of