Nation in point of Strength yet whilst the Tenures are preserv'd such as were formerly in England the Prince had a stricter Tye upon the People than when having relinquish'd them he hath no other Obligation upon them than his Parchment Right of Power and if you please their Oaths of Allegiance both which are cancell'd in a Moment while the Lands remain eternally in the People Trav. I have already told you That publick Right of Government or if you will the Right of publick Government doth not in the least depend upon Tenures for they are only particular Services and Royalties which Princes have sometimes thought good to reserve to themselves more or less according as they alone have thought fit and may be alter'd or relinquish'd without diminishing their Publick Right of Government over the Nation they being such as regard rather the private Person of the King as Lord of a Mannor than his Politick Capacity as Supreme Magistrate or Governour of the State And indeed many of these Services and Tenures were rather very inconvenient and burthensome to the People than beneficial to the Government Many such were anciently known in England and Scotland as well as France Amongst others what was more inhumane than that the Lord should have a Right to lye with his Tenants Wife the first Night they married which in France they call Droit de Jambage Some Services were very ridiculous and some extravagant So I have heard of a Tenure in France by which the Tenant is oblig'd at certain Times to drive a Cart with twelve Oxen round the Court of the Mannor House In which time if any of the Oxen happen to dung in the Court the Cart with the twelve Oxen was forfeited to the Lord of the Mannor but if none of the Oxen should dung untill they were driven out of the Court then the Lord was to receive only one Egg. Now how do these and many other such Services relate to a Right of Government So many Mannors were held of the King to accompany him in his Wars in England or in France or elsewhere some were obliged to carry his Spear some his Sword others his Helmet and such like which are all merely private Obligations and which any private Man might reserve upon consideration of Lands given It is true the King had then a stronger Tye upon particular Persons than since he hath released them But this I say hath no influence upon his Publick Right of Power for the Supreme Magistrate is always notwithstanding any such Release Master both of our Estates and Persons as far as they are necessary for the Preservation of the Government So you see Care is taken that all Lands shall pay their Quotas towards Horses and Footmen which is in use at this day which Forces so paid we call the Militia His Majesty may press Souldiers and by the Consent of his great Council the Parliament charge our Estates and Persons with such Sums as shall be thought expedient for the Occasion And this brings me to the third Point which is That all Sovereign Princes have a Right of Power over the Lands notwithstanding the Property be divided amongst the People And this proceeds from the Dominium Supereminens which is eternally in all Supreme Magistrates or Magistrate whatsoever whose Duty it is to look after and by all means secure the Preservation of the Whole in which every particular is involv'd Nor is it a sufficient Objection to say That Laws or Impositions may lye very heavy upon particular Men if such an Arbitrary Power should rest in any Government for Laws cannot be always made so easie but that Occasions may happen which may make them seem very hard to some Id modò quoeritur si majori parti in summo prosint Hence Grotius from Thucydides remarks an excellent Passage of Pericles to this purpose Sic existimo saith he etiam singulis hominibus plus eam prodesse civitatem quoe tota rectè se habeat quam si privatis floreat utilitatibus ipsa autem universim laboret Qui enim domesticas fortunas bene collocatas habet patria tamen eversa pereat ipse necesse est c. All which Livy thus briefly expresses Respublica incolumis privatas res salvas facile proestat Publica prodendo tua nequicquam serves That whilst the Commonwealth is safe in general our particular Concerns may be also easily secur'd But by deserting the publick Interest of the Nation we do thereby no ways preserve our own Nothing therefore seems more reasonable and indeed necessary than that the Government should have always a Power to compell every particular Subject who standing upon their private Rights and Properties would thereby suffer the Whole to be destroy'd For though naturally every Man hath a Right to maintain what is his own and by consequence might oppose whosoever would endeavour to take his Property from him yet Grotius tells us That Government which is instituted for the publick Tranquillity of the Whole or Tranquillitas publica in qua singulorum continetur acquires thereby a more Sovereign Right even â—ver our Persons as well as Possessions than we our selves can pretend to that is as far as shall be necessary for obtaining that great end of publick Preservation Civili societate ad tuendam Tranquillitatem instituta statim civitati jus quoddam majus in nos nostra nascitur quatenus ad finem illum id necessarium est Whence Seneca observes That the Power of all is ever in the Supreme Magistrate but the Property remains nevertheless in the Hands of particular Subjects Ad Reges Potestas omnium pertinet ad singulos Proprietas And so as hath been said the King in Parliament hath a Right to dispose of our Estates and Persons as shall be thought necessary for our publick Security And where Sovereign Princes act without Parliaments they have in themselves the same Authority I have spoke already of the Power which the Government hath over our Estates and for our Persons Grotius hath furnish'd us with a Case very strong to shew the great Extent of Sovereign Authority He puts a Question Whether an innocent Citizen may be abandoned ad Exitium even to Destruction for the Common Good Without doubt says he such an innocent Citizen may be so abandon'd Dubium non est quin deseri potest And going still on how far such a Citizen is oblig'd to deliver himself he concludes That he may be forc'd to it and sacrific'd too to prevent an imminent Mischief both against his Will and entirely innocent Quare in nostra controversia verius videtur cogi posse civem for saith he Though one Citizen cannot compell another to any thing more than what is strictly just according to Law yet the Superiour hath a lawful Authority as Superiour to force an innocent Man to suffer for the Common Good Par parem cogere non potest nisi ad id quod jure debetur strictè dicto
Soveraign power in the house of Lords either conjunctim or divisim joyntly or separately without the King therefore the Soveraign right of power can be no where but in the King right of council is in the Lords and Commons in Parliament duly assembled but right of command is in the King For he both calls the Parliament and dissolves it One Soveraign power cannot dissolve another Soveraign power could they be supposed together except by force But the Kings of England have ever called and dissolved Parliaments not by force but by right of power and command which belongs to them by inherent birthright and lawful and undoubted Succession A Bill which shall have regularly past both Houses and brought even to the Royal assent is no Act nor hath it any manner of force as such without the Kings will Le Roy le veult doth solely and necessarily transform a Bill into a Statute and is the essential constituent part of it His Will doth alone give life and being to that which is no more than a dead insignificant letter without it Nay though a Bill should pass both Houses with the unanimous consent and approbation of every individual Member yet the King may refuse it and it is indisputably the right of our Kings so to do if they shall so think sitting which prove evidently amongst other things that the Soveraign Power is solely in our Kings Merch. But Sir Plato Red. insinuates very strongly p. 123. that It is a violation of right and infringment of the Kings Coronation Oath to frustrate the counsels of a Parliament by his negative voice and that in his opinion the King is bound confirmare consuetudines or pass such laws as the people shall choose Trav. The Delphick Oracle did never impose Laws more peremptorily to the Greeks than Plato Red. would arrogantly obtrude his private opinions upon us for notwithstanding all the Laws are against him yet he alone would pretend to devest the King of this his undoubted Prerogative But Sir there is a difference between new modelling a Government and maintaining it according to its ancient institution If Plato designs the first he may as well pretend it is inconvenient that the Imperial Crown of England should be Hereditary and Successive and endeavour to make it Elective for the right of a negative voice in Parliament is as certainly the Prerogative of the Kings of England as their right of Inheritance or Succession is But having no design to dâ—…te so much at this time what â—lteration might be convenient for us as â—o maintain what the Kings Right â—â— and ever hath been according to the â—â—cient as well as present Consâ—…tion of the Government I must 〈…〉 do averr That the King enjoyinâ— â—â—reditarily and undeniably this Nâ—…tive voice in Parliament hath himself the Supreme power of England And this the English Gentleman and his Doctor seem to acknowledge p. 105. Besides If the Soveraign power of England were not solely in the King then when there is no Parliament there could be no Soveraign power in England which is ridiculous and absurd For there is no Free and independent Kingdom or Commonwealth upon earth in which there is not at all times a Soveraign power in being If the Soveraign power ceaseth for a moment the power which remains becomes dependent and at the same instant a higher power must appear But the Imperial Crown of England depends upon none but God Omnis sub Rege ipse sub nullo nisi tantum Deo says Bracton an ancient and a Learned Author and again Rex non habet superiorem nisi Deum The King has no Superiour but God Or as it was express'd under H. 4. The Regality of the Crown of England is immediately subject to God and to none other Mer. But since the King can neither make any Laws nor levy any Taxes without the consent of both Houses it shews sure that at least some of the Soveraign power resides in them Trav. I perceive Cousin you have forgot your Grotius for he tells you that you must distinguish between the Empire and the manner of holding the Empire or the Jus ab usu Juris Aliud enim est Imperium aliud habendi modus So that although the Kings of England do generally promise or swear not to alter the Government nor to make Laws or levy impositions but according to the ancient Constitutions of the Kingdom yet nevertheless this takes not from him his Soveraign right of power for that he hath in him by Birthright and Inheritance and according to the Original Institution of the Kingdom and which is antecedent and Superiour also to any Oaths or Obligations I 'll give you Grotius his own words as you will find them l. 1. c. 3. s 16. Non definit summum esse Imperium etiamsi is qui imperaturm est promittat aliqua subditis etiam talia quae ad imperandi rationem pertineant But he confesseth indeed that such a Constitution is a little limitation to the Supreme power Fatendum tamen arctius quodammodo reddi Imperium But it doth not follow from thence that there is any authority Superiour to his own Non inde tamen sequitur ita promittenti Superiorem dari aliquem And he gives you the example of the Persian Monarchs who though they were as absolute as any Kings could be yet when they enter'd upon the Government they sware to observe certain Laws which they could not alter Apud Persas Rex summo cum Imperio erat tamen jurabat cum regnum adiret leges certa quadam forma latas mutare illi nefas erat So also that the Egyptian Kings were bound to the observance of several Customs and Constitutions Aegyptiorum Reges quos tameâ— ut alios Reges Orientis summo imperio usos non est dubium ad multarum rerum observationem oblig abantur Mer. Very well Sir but pray why may not the Soveraign power remain still in the people especially if all be true which our Author boldly affirms p. 119. viz. That our Prince hath no authority of his own but what was first entrusted in him by the Government of which he is head Trav. Here Plato plays the Villain egregiously is a Traitor incognito and carries Treason in a dark lanthorn which he thinks to discover or conceal according to the success of Rebellion which he evidently promotes But we shall unmask this Republican Faux And first our King whom he calls Prince not understanding it may be the difference between Regnum and Principaâ—us hath no authority saith he but what was first intrusted by the Government Here Government is a word of an amphibious nature and can as well subsist under a Monarchy as a Commonwealth For if Rebellion doth not prosper then Government in this place signifies the Law of the Land and indeed the King's authority over us is establish'd by the Law that is to say the consent and acknowledgment of the People in due form That
so necessary to be effected that it was morally impossible to succeed in the former until the latter was actually executed It being then most certain that our Authors intention was to establish a Common wealth I shall now give you my reasons why we ought not upon any terms to admit of it And first I shall not insist much upon those vulgar inconveniences which are visible to all men As for example the inevitable consequences of most bloudy wars For can any rational man believe that all the Royal family should be so insensible of their right and honour as never to push for three Kingdoms which would so justly belong to them or could they be supposed to leave England under their popular usurpation what reason hath Scotland to truckle under the Domination of the English Commonalty What pretence hath the English Subject supposing they were to share in the English Government over the Kingdom of Scotland All the world knows that that Kingdom belongs so particularly to our King that the late Rebells themselves did not scruple to call him King of the Scots Why should Ireland also become a Province to an English Parliament Or should both Kingdoms be willing to shake off the Government of their Natural Lawful and antient Monarchy why should they not set up a Democracy or an Aristocracy or what else they pleas'd amongst themselves Is there never a Statesman in the three Kingdoms but Plato Redivivus Can none teach them to Rebel but he No rules to maintain an usurpt Authority but what we find among his extravagancies I am confident you do not believe it Shall these people notoriously known to have hated one another whilst formerly they were under different Governours become the strictest friends when they shall return unto those circumstances under which they were the greatest enemies Will the French King take no advantage having so good a pretext of our Divisions Or should we unite against him under our popular Governours was it ever known that a Confederate army was able to defend themselves long against an Army of equal strength commanded by one sole absolute Monarch Can we foresee any thing but most desperate wars and can wars be supported but by most heavy taxes Were not our Thimbles and Bodkins converted in the late times into Swords and Mortar pieces and by a prodigious transmutation never before heard of were not our Gold and Ear-rings turn'd into a brazen Idol These consequences Cousin and dismal effects of a Commonwealth besides many other are so obvious that I shall not spend any more time to mind you of them Supposing then that none of those former horrid inconveniences might happen I must mind you by the way that one reason why our Author and the Associators desire a Commonwealth proceeds from the fear of a certain Arbitrary power which they pretend the King would introduce as may be seen pag. 161. 208 and in several other places Now Though nothing be more extravagant than such a groundless imagination our Author having assured us that his Majesty never did one act of Arbitrary power since his happy restoration And moreover pag. 176. That our laws against Arbitrary power are abundantly sufficient Yet that we may no more dispute this point I must produce Plato's own authority against himself in these words That the King fears his power will be so lessened by degrees that at length it will not be able to keep the Crown upon his head pag. 208. Nay farther in pag. 214. he shews us That it is impossible he should ever become an Arbitrary King For his present power as little as it is is yet greater than the condition of property can admit and in a word from his beloved Aphorism and the whole course of his Libel he endeavours to prove that Dominion being founded on the property and the property being in the people the King can have no manner of hopes upon earth of becoming absolute nor introducing an Arbitrary Government but by some Army of Angels from Heaven who must procure him an Authority which he cares not for The next and main reason why our Author would set up a Democracy at least as far as I can collect from the whole scope of his discourse is because the State inclines to popularity Now Sir for this last time I must make use of our Author 's own reasons against his own positions and do affirm that for this very reason were there no other all sober men and true Politicians ought to oppose with their utmost endeavours a Popular Government I will not recount to you the many mischiefs desolations and destructions which a popular power hath brought along with it whereever it goâ—â—he better of the antient Established Government of the place Somewhat hath been already said to this purpose in our discourse and much more may be read in the Histories of most parts of the world to which I refer you and shall only mind you of some inevitable consequences which will follow such an innovation amongst our selves And first if it be true that the King hath no power to make himself absolute then we have no cause to apprehend an Arbitrary power in him and by consequence no reason to change But if the inclination of the people be such that they will take advantage of the King's want of power and introduce their own Government what moderation may we expect from men towards those who are to become their Subjects who shaking off all sense of Justice Law Religion and temper dare usurp the Soveraign authority over their natural Governour Where shall we appeal for mercy when having cut the throat of the most merciful King in Europe we expose our own to our ambitious and unmerciful Tyrants Where shall we expect compassion towards our selves when we shall become Parricides and Regicides to our father and our King Where shall we seek after Eqâ—ity when the House of Lords the supreme Court of Equity are most unjustly turn'd out of doors and what end of our miseries can we ever hope for when our Tyrants by our villanous Authors constitution have not only got all the Wealth and Militia into their hands but have perpetuated their usurpation by annual Parliaments never to end Who being Judges of their own priviledges p. 254. may regulate elections as they shall think fit p. 249. Sit Adjourn Prorogue and Dissolve as they alone shall judge expedient What more barbarous villany was ever propos'd and publish'd under a lawful and peaceable Government besides our own upon earth But suppose our poor Country thus enslav'd and our antient Kingdom turn'd into a Common-wealth what can our new masters do for us more than is already done Can our libâ—rties be greater as to our persons and estates It is impossible to suppose it Will our properties be more secur'd all the Laws that ever were upon earth under any Government cannot make them more inviolable Nothing then can remain but liberty in Religion which we call of
were to protect them not only in all Law Suits but in what other occurrences might happen to them The Plebeians also were styled Clientes or their Clients who besides the Protection of their Patrons received also Lands from them under certain conditions which remained many years inviolable for example in case the Patron should be taken by the Enemy the Client was to contribute towards his Ransome as also towards the advancement of their Daughters in their Marriages they were not to inform or give testimony against their Patrons or if they did they were accursed and condemned as Traitors Diis inferis devovebantur proditionis erant rei besides many other obsequious duties and respects so we read that Appiuâ— Claudius gave Lands to his Clients even in the very Infancy of the Roman Government Nor was this jus tutelare personal only but it was also Gentilitium that is it extended it self into whole families as for instance some of them with their whole Generation were Clients under the protection of the Aemilian some under the Julian and others under the Claudian Families This constitution was of great use to the Common-wealth for the credit which the Patricii had with their Clients was sufficient oftentimes to appease their popular disturbances who yielding either to the Authority or Entreaties of their Patrons were brought to acquiesce though with some little prejudice to their own right and this continued many Ages until the ambition of the Tribunes interrupted this good correspondence between the Princes and the People and so honourable did the name of Client grow that many States and Governments who have voluntarily committed themselves to the fidelity or protection of the Romans did not disdain that Title Thus we see the Lands even within the narrow compass of the first Roman Monarchy divided amongst the Princes and the People which Lands so given to the latter were called Clientela's and accordingly we may observe under Servius Tullius their sixth King a Register of their particular Estates Regis solertia ita est ordinata respublica ut omnia Patrimonii dignitatis aetatis artium officiorumque discrimina in tabulas referrentur Flor. c. 6. So we read of the Confiscation of the particular lands of Tarquinius superbus and yet Romulus and his successors were as absolute Monarchs as any of the Caesars have been and Julius Caesar himself by Will deviseth part of his own private estate to the Romans Thus was property or the possession of Lands divided amongst the people during the first Roman Monarchy thus it continued under the Roman as well as Graecian Empire thus it remains at present in the German Empire and thus it is established in all the most Christian Monarchies upon earth and not to forget our own Country I must observe out of a learned Author that our ancient British Kings who were as absolute as any made distribution also of their Land amongst their Subjects after this manner one paâ—t they gave to the Archflamens to pray for the Kings and their posterity a second part to the Nobility to do them Knights service a third to the Husbandmen to hold of them in Sâ—â—â—age and a fourth to the Mechanicks to hold in Bâ—rgage l. MS. Hâ—st Brit. And yet Plato Red. dares obtrude this proposition upon us p. 40. That in all states if the King had no Companions in the Soveraign Power he had no sharers likewise in the Dominion or possession of the Lands But for further satisfaction let us consider the Government of Gods people or the Kingdom of the Jews I think all will agree that the Hebrews were proprietors of their Lands and held them upon as good a Title as the people of England do theirs even at this day We find in that History a particular account of the distribution of the Lands according to their Tribes who were at that time under a Monarchical Government whether we look upon God Almighty as their King who according to Grotius Hobbs Junius Brutus and all good Authors was Rex peculiaris Israelitarum or as Brutus tells us De jure Mag. p. 226. Ab initio Deus ipse aternus ejus Monarcha fuit non eo tantum nomine quod ipse rerum omnium supremum dominium obtinuit sed singulari quodam modo nempe c. Or whether under their High Priest who was Gods vicegerent except when he raised them up a Judge We hear of no Tenures or services amongst them other than such as all Subjects upon earth are oblig'd to perform for the honour of the King and publick safety It is plain from the story of Ahab in the case of Naboth's vineyard that Naboth had a clear right and property in the possession of his lands and that their Kings had no authority in their private capacities to force any Subject so much as to sell his land upon reasonable conditions Yet nevertheless neither the Kings of Persia nor of Egypt nor of any part of the East were more absolute than the Kings of Israel were and yet none had a less proportion in the possession of the lands Mer. Sir I shall grant you all except this That the Kings of Israel were absolute which I can hardly believe especially since our Author tells us the contrary and instances in the Sanhedrim the Assembly of the Tribes and Congregation of the Lord who all had a share in the Government as they had in the property Trav. I confess several zealous Commonwealths men have asserted this false doctrine and amongst others their old Coryphaeus Junius Brutus But I find no colour of pretence for this their assertion but we will examine the case as fully as this occasion will permit and refer you afterwards to what I have writ more at large concerning this point elsewhere And first it is necessary that we should agree what we mean by an absolute Monarch which is indeed a point rather controverted than clearly decided by any Author that I have yet met withal Sallust thinks it consists in an exemption from all humane jurisdiction Impune quidvis facere hoc est Regem esse Others that to be absolute a Prince ought to govern peremptorily according to his will So Juvenal Sic volo sic jubeo stat pro ratione voluntas A third sort have declar'd that King truly absolute who giving Laws to others is subject to none himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to command without being oblig'd to give a reason why or wherefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Aeschylus saith and again Rex est suo utens jure nulli obnoxius Hobbs will have it consist in the subjection of our wills to that of the Prince Homo ille vel concilium illud cujus voluntati singuli suam voluntatem subjecerunt summam potestatem sive summum imperium sive dominium habere dicitur Grotius whose opinion I must always esteem very much tells us that the most absolute or highest power is of that Prince whose actions are not accountable
away the Kings Prerogative in the Affirmative Yet notwithstanding this and ten times more that may be said to this purpose our King is advised and perswaded nay almost necessitated as our Author would have it not only to quit some One of his Prerogatives but to make short work to release and give them up all at once In the next place let us consider Plato's excellent new model it self and here like a wise Politician he hath made Three co-ordinate powers in being at the same time that is to say King Lords and Commons I confess for the King he says little of him and with great reason for indeed he signifies nothing more than a Cypher which as in Arithmetick is only to make the Commons more valuable But to do our Author right he hath yet a farther use to make of this his otherwise useless Prince that is to say whilest neither his own Right nor his Power nor our Laws can secure himself his Name nevertheless is to preserve these his Masters With that they hope to prevent all opposition and civil wars at home For should they forceably depose him they justly apprehend that his Loyal Subjects in England would endeavour to revenge such an insupportable wrong Nor can they believe that the Kingdoms of Scotland and Ireland would again tamely submit their Necks to the servile yoke of a few ambitious English Commoners or that foreign Princes themselves would even for their own securities sake quietly and unconcern'd countenance this horrid injustice and outrage done to the sacred dignity of Kings But if they can perswade his Majesty willingly to depose himself and at the same time disinherit his Heirs and Successors they imagine that none can pretend to disapprove much less blame or impute to them the volunry act of a King For as Volenti non fit injuria and by consequence no offence in them so they will certainly reserve to themselves the honour of punishing in the King as their master-piece and last act of justice the Treason which he shall have committed against himself To facilitate all this our Author hath taken from his Majesty his Militia and his Revenue that is men and monâ—y which are the strength and sinews of Power and in the Commoners he hath plac'd the Royal authority of Calling Proroguing and Dissolving themselves And left the King in this miserable condition should have yet any hopes left even of securing his own Person he hath taken from him the power of making his own Officers and bestowing those imployments which have always depended upon the Regal authority Nay the Lords themselves are no more to receive their Honours from the Fountain of all Honour but must lick the dust from the shooes of their once obsequious vassals So our poor Master having nothing now to give must lose the hopes even of a grateful friend who in his extremity might at least wish him well and speak a good word for him to his insolent Governours Mer. But Sir our Author leaves most of these things in the disposition of the Parliament by which he tells us that he ever understood the King Lords and Commons so that neither his Militia nor Revenue can be said to be so absolutely taken from himself as granted to the Parliament in general of which he is still to be the head Trav. Ah Cousin there is deadly poison in this his varnished treacherous Cup and you will easily perceive it when you consider Plato cares not so much that the Militia should be in the power of the Commons as out of the King For whilest the King cannot dispose of it without the consent of his Lower House judge you whether they will ever agree to the raising any force which they shall not themselves command If then any difference arise upon that or any other point which unavoidably and designedly will happen then are the Commoners become immediately masters of all For what can the King do though joyn'd with the House of Lords without a right of command or force against a multitude and that so unequal too that if the House of Commons in Parliament represent the whole Nation as they pretend they do then are they at least ten thousand men against one though all the Nobility be included with the King The necessary consequence of all this must be that if on the one hand the King and Lords agree with the Commons in all things then the Commons govern more absolutely than if there were neither the one nor the other because there is no pretence against them On the other hand if they in any thing differ from the Commons then undoubtedly the disagreeing Lords as formerly shall be turned out of doors the King set aside and the Votes made by the House of Commons Jan. 4. 1648 revived and confirmed which being very short but plain I shall here repeat First That the people under God are the original of all just power Secondly That the Commons of England assembled in Parliament being chosen by and representing the people have the Supreme Authority of this Nation Thirdly That whatever is enacted and declared for Law by the Commons of England assembled in Parliament hath the force of a Law Fourthly That all the people of this Nation are included thereby although the consent and concurrence of the King and House of Peers be not had thereunto What think you now Cousin of these four Votes even whilst the King and Lords were yet in being Do they not look as if they designed a Commonwealth or rather to establish an arbitrary Tyrannical power in the House of Commons and yet their propositions all along to the King were the same which Plato hath again offered us that is leaving the Militia the publick revenue nomination of officers and such like to the Parliament by which was always meant King Lords and Commons This is the politick web which our Author pretends to have spun out of his own shallow brains and indeed it is so very wondrous thin that if our present Statesmen could not with half an eye see through it I should be apt to agree with our Author p. 22. that they ought in conscience to excuse themselves from that sublime imployment and betake themselves to callings more suitable to their capacities as Shoomakers Tailors and such other mechanick professions Merch. Sir the Sun at noon day is never more clear than that he designs at best a Commonwealth And indeed where three co-ordinate powers are in being at the same time it is impossible they should continue long in that state but some one or two must certainly in time over balance and get the advantage of the other I think Lucan confirmed this long ago when he said Nulla fides regni sociis omnisque potestas Impatiens consortis erit And the King having neither power strength money nor officers it is ten thousand to one as you observe on the Commons side who are actually possessed of all Pray therefore proceed