Selected quad for the lemma: england_n
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A91220
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The cordiall of Mr. David Ienkins: or His reply to H.P. barrester of Lincolnes-Inne, answered.
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Parker, Henry, 1604-1652.
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1647
(1647)
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Wing P400A; Thomason E393_9; ESTC R201593
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18,740
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33
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THE CORDIALL OF Mr. David Ienkins OR HIS REPLY To H. P. Barrester of Lincolnes-Inne ANSWERED LONDON Printed for Robert Bostock dwelling in Pauls Church-yard at the signe of the Kings Head 1647. Master JENKINS his REPLY Answered IN all the Papers which M J. weekly almost publishes to slander and condemne the Parliament of Rebellion Perjury Oppression Cozenage c. his maine artifice and that which most infects the people is his blending and confounding things together which are in nature different and by all meanes ought to be discriminated In three things especially his want of ingenuity is most obvious and his not distinguishing most advantagious to him For first He puts no difference betwixt that latitude of power which is due to a just just in just things and when he pursues the true interest of his people and that power which consists in doing wrong And yet nothing is more notorious then this that the Kings of England have vast Prerogatives in doing good but none at all to do any man much lesse the whole State harme Secondly He distinguishes not betwixt those actions of the Subject which are done in times of necessity and upon extraordinary extremities and those which are done in ordinary times when there is no speciall emergent cause to inforce them Thirdly He compares not the smaller matters of the Law with the weightier but attributes to both alike nay when both 〈◊〉 consist or take place at the same time he makes the weightier Law give way to that which is of lesse consequence and may be reckoned inter apices juris The Law will admit of a private mischiefe rather then a publike inconvenience as nature will suffer this particular quantity of water contrary to its owne propenfity to be violented and rapt upwards rather then that any vacuity should be in the universe But M. J. sometimes will indure publike mischiefe rather then private inconveniences he will rather allow that Salus Populi shall be opposed then such or such a branch of Prerogative or the propriety of the Subject should be strained Law is not so dull a study as some men would have it nor are its bounds restrained to the ordinary actions and pleas of J. a Nokes and J. a Stiles about a carve of ground c. no the profession is farre more noble and as its basis is reason improved with Logick so its pyramis is policy crowned with History and Philosophy That Lawyer therefore that will argue upon this high subject which M. J. now undertakes ought to roote himself deeper before he begins to build up his argument and to take notice of these premisses 1. That all men who are qualified and exalted to beare rule in a spheare above other men are so dignified and differenced by some Commission which Commission must be granted by man immediately or else by God extraordinarily and immediately 2. That in this age which knowes of no Oracles or miracles remaining God does not immediately and otherwise then by the same providence as rules in other humane affaires either designe the persons or distinguish the Prerogative of any Kings or Potentate God is not said more properly to promote to the Crowne of England Edward the fourth then Henry the sixth nor to make a King of France more unlimitable then a King of England These things are left to men the same providence of God attending them as attends other matters Yea the Scripture is most cleare in this that when God by immediate and extraordinary orders from heaven did interpose in designing Saul to the Throne of Israel yet he did it by lottery and did it so that Saul might be said elected and constituted by the people as well as designed by God And indeed since all Princes whether hereditary or elective whether more absolute or more conditionate whether inthroned by just Title or by tortion and meere force have Commissions equally from Heaven How can we thinke that Heaven acts immediately alike in all since Cyrus is as well Gods anoynted in those Provinces which he wins by the sword as in those which come to him by descent and the French King is as truly Gods Vicegerent now in France as Charles whom he has intruded upon is in England and since the King of Spaine by speciall Law of Heaven can claime no larger supremacy in Castile then in Burgundy in Naples then in Arragon what an unreasonable thing is it to ascribe all these devolutions of rule and variations of power to the immediate hand of God which changes not rather then to the acts of men which are seldome permanent 3. That if we will suppose that Princes Commissions are all immediately drawne and signed by God yet we cannot suppose that Gods Commission ever inabled any man to do injury his charge to all Kings is contrary and does inhibite all insolence in comportment nay even all elation of heart And for man so far as Princes are inaugurated upon earth we see by experience they all almost have their visible Terries and Boundaries set to them and it were most unnaturall if the intendment of all humane Lawes should not referre to the safety of the people 4. That if any obscurity or ambiguity be in other Lawes yet in the Lawes of England there is none at all All our Books proclaime our Nation to be a free Nation and our Kings to be limited from doing any wrong And because there may be dispute about the interpretation of these generalls therefore particulars are deduced out of them and our Lawes do not onely declare us free but wherein our freedome consists nor do they binde the King from wrong but specifie withall what is wrong to the Subject If the King arbitrarily change our Lawes raise Subsidies impose Taxes imprison our bodies deny delay or sell justice to us this is declared to be wrong and inconsistant with our freedome And if any question arise about our Charters the King himself cannot interpret or sit as Judge he is in all cases taken to be a party and so incompetent to sit as Judge His sworne Judges are to do right betwixt him and the Subject out of Parliament and the two Estates are to do right above the Judges if need be in Parliament And in case of any perplexity or doubt the liberty and safety of the people is to be preferred before the Prerogative of the King and all interpretations must rather favour that interest which is generall then that which is particular And for the Military power of England as the King ought not to use any other then the naturall Liege people of England in his Warres so neither can he presse the people of England to serve in his Warres at discretion If the Warre be forraigne or against a forraigne power the Parliament ought to be consulted in it but if force be to be used against Subiects that force is to be meerely sub-servient to Law and whether it be to execute ordinary Judgements or to suppresse
wel that whosoever is the Supreme judge of the Law if not directly yet he is consequentially above all Laws and whosoever is above all Law cannot bee restrained by the safety of the people though the most sublime of all Laws Wherfore if this be admitted true of our King that he is Supreme Judge of Law then it must follow that the Subject of England has no more assurance of Law or safety then what is founded onely in the Kings breast and discretion For the Kings being a prisoner that has been already answered and indeed it is is more truly said that his hands are held and disweapond then that his feet are fetterd or his head undiademnd Then for the Parliaments acting by the Kings writ there ought to bee some mistakes cleered therein also for we doe grant that the writ is the Kings the Great Seale is the Kings that Officer which has the Custodie thereof is the Kings the People are the Kings but we doe not grant that any of these are so the Kings as that they are not the Kingdomes also in a more eminent degree for as the Husband is the Wifes truly but not 〈◊〉 eminently as the Wife is the Husbands so the Kingdome is the Kings and the King is the Kingdomes yet the Kingdomes interest and relation far is more valuable and sublime 8. The last particular now offers it selfe in the close of all and here M. Ienkins does not deny expresly that many things may be good in Law notwithstanding that some formalities or those things which we terme apices Iuris are wanting for doubtlesse where 2 Laws are and both cannot be fulfilled the lesse important Law though it be more particular must give way to the more important Law though more generall ex gr. when the King dies by the common Law in force Parl. cease all judges Sheriffs Officers not absolutely necessary c. return to a private condition and so remaine till new Commissions obtained but if the new King happen to be beyond sea as at the death of Hen. 3. so that new Commissions cannot be immediatly granted and thereupon the greater Law of publick safety is brought into competition with the Law of an inferiour nature a new seal may be made new Judges new Officers may be created and either a former Parl. may be continued or a new one suÌ„mond and all necessary points of complete administration may bee expedited as in probality they were before the arrivall of Ed. 1. God did not make any particular dispensation his shew-bread might be eaten by common persons if in distresse or the golden vessells of his Temple aliend when the City was to be redeemed from the insolence and rapines of a prevailing Enemy the generall Law of necessity was sufficient to warrant both the one and the other but I will presse this no further since M. Ienkins alledges nothing to shew why a Parl. which cannot deliver it selfe by an Act may not use meanes to deliver it selfe by an Ordinance I will not insist further hereupon But instead of disputing M. Ienkins seems to jeere 〈◊〉 for setting up Excise raising Armes Taxing the people imprisoning the King abolishing the Common Prayer Book selling Church-Lands c. and in an irony he concludes that all these are in order to publick justice and safetie M. Ienkins here leaves us upon uncertainties whether he condemnes our Cause because it required such props or onely these props because they assisted us in promoting so bad a cause If he allow of the ends but not of the meanes if he allow we may defend the Lawes and safetie of the State but not by Armes or if he allow of Armes but not of Taxes c. He must renounce rule naturall as well as logicall Qui dat finem dat media conâ—â— centia ad finem If he allow of the meanes but not as conducting to such an end upon presumption that our Lawes and the Scâ—â— were not indanger'd or if he prove that they may not be defended he takes upon him more then is due for his part is to plead not to judge and answers might be given to his pleading but nothing can be said to his judging I conclude therefore with the L. Cookes Sensure of Treason as M. Ienkins does and am of the same opinion that Treason ever produces fatall and finall destruction to the offendor and never attaines to its desired ends and wish that all men for this Cause would serve God honour the King and have no company with the Seditious Yet let me adde this we have neighbours now in the Netherlands that lately have revolted from their Master and yet prosper and flourish beyond all in Europe the justice of their revolt may be questioned by some but I for divers reasons do not question it one amongst the rest is this of the L. Cookes because I think an act meerly treasonable cannot prosper FINIS