maketh them trust to one anothers assistance in time of the most crosse fortunes All these parts incounter and are intertained more easily in a meane then in a great armie 7 Which is often attended vpon by more inconuenienences then the other as by famine plagues contagious mutinies and dissentions There is yet another dangerous inconuenience which is most vsually the companion of a multitude that is that they forme to themselues a confidence of their owne forces greater then they ought of this confidence followeth a contempt of the aduerse power of this contempt a presumption author of infinite mischiefes 8 But how happeneth it then will some say that the Turkes haue euery where gained the victorie by multitude Would you know how Because they haue betimes trained vp and instructed their great armies to keepe so good an order as well in execution iudgement military discipline readinesse as disposition to armes that they are become as tractable and easie to manage as ours though meane and few in number 9 On the other side we haue suffered our armies to slide into such insolencie and libertie as we can hardly rule and conduct them without so many dangers confusions and luggage as it were enough to trouble Captaines of great policie and experience and to say the trueth see wee not that the Turke more easily furnisheth an hundred thousand men with vittailes then we fiftie thousand for besides that his souldiers make not as ours any account of the diuersitie of vittailes of delicacie or of toothsome morsels they drinke no Wine nor Beere which importeth the consideration of almost the one halfe of our munition and charge 10 What need I speake of obedience nurse of the order obserued amongst them since it was neuer seene that the Turkes euer lost battaile through disorder much lesse left off pursuing any attempt for their souldiers mutinies 11 Whereas almost all the battailes we haue bid them had not beene lost but by the meere disorder and disobedience of our men Whereto may we impute the miserable losse of Nicapolie but to the disordinate rashnesse of the French who serued at that time in the armie Sigismond king of Bohemia afterward Emperour seeing that contrary to his will and commandement they aduanced themselues as couragiously as vnaduisedly What shall we speake of the ouerthrowe of the same Sigismond which hapned some few yeeres after came it not to passe by meanes of the disordering of his infantery which being not yet fully set in battaile array were couered with a cloud of arrowes let flie by the enemy so to the purpose as they were all hewen in peeces euen vnder the noses of his horse which seeing themselues destitute of foote were strooke with such a feare as they betooke themselues to flight not without the losse of many good souldiours and worthy Captaines all to the shame and confusion of the Christians Ladislaus King of Polonia was he not ouercome at Varna through the disorders of the Bishops of Strigonia and Varadin who to the end to chace inconsideratly the enemy shaken and flying in one part of his army forsooke their rankes to pursue them so making way for them who laying hold on the occasion came with the rest of their army to charge them there where they lay most open in such sort as they wan the victory most miserably slaughtering the Christians At Buda at Exechium at Gerba and in sundry other places where we haue bene ouercome it proceeded rather of our disorders then of the Turkish forces 12 So as we must acknowledge that the Turke excelleth vs both in number of good Souldiours and in all other military discipline He is followed with such numbers of men as it seemeth he relieth wholy on their multitude but it is in so good a manner as if he respected nought but order military discipline parts to our dishonor far from vs. CHAP. VI. That he hath made no reckning of other forces then his owne 1 The wars are to be maintained by our owne strength neither must we rely vpon forraine powers 2 The good and ill that resulteth of both these 3 Conditions of confederate forces 4 Other inconueniences which arise from assistance of forraine powers 5 Examples of Leagues against the Turkes 6 Their defects hindrances of their successe 7 The Turkes not accustomed to make Leagues with any but vsing their owne forces haue ouerthrowne many armies confederates 8 With whom they might well haue ioyned in league to their aduantage 1 ALl high enterprises either for preseruation of an estate or for denouncing of warre haue beene ill plotted and as ill caried when they haue relied vpon the assistance and fauour of a third power and not of our owne seeing that from hopes and proiects so ill grounded we neuer come to inioy the fruits which such a succour the desseigne of him that enterpriseth his extraordinary preparation promised vs rather they are infallibly attended on by some lamentable accident which vtterly ouerthroweth them 2 Since oftentimes it falleth out that the expectation of such succour promised serueth rather to slacke the course of our endeauours and lessen the preparation of the enterprise then otherwise to forward or better them were it not for the confidence of such succour he that attempteth would prepare his forces proportionable to his proiect and not trust to outward helpes either of friend or confederat Who doubteth when we so repose our selues vpon an others forces and that he is at charge for our loues sake that he doth not make vs more backward to prouide and disburse of oure owne store But this is not all the worst is that while we thus expect time wasteth vnprofitably and occasion which once escaped cannot be laid hold on is let slip and lost without recouery for whilst we so attend our assistants our practises are discouered 3 And who will beleeue that a friend or associat will embrace the desseign of him he assisteth or wish his good fortune with such harty affection as he wil not be ready vpon the least occasion he shall desire to finde to leaue him in the lurch And without question this occasion will offer it selfe at any time whensoeuer he hath a purpose to dissolue the league and couenants agreed vpon betweene them especially if he be the stronger and more mighty and finde not himselfe interessed in the successe of the enterprise for which he tooke armes and became confederate 4 We may also adde another defect and imperfection that is if the succour we attend be to be assembled from diuers places or that the windes if it be by sea or some vnlooked for accident if by land hinder by so many meanes the preparations for the war and intended voiage as that the season fit for execution escapeth him that enterpriseth so as before he begin to march or set forward to the Rendeuous his opportunities of attempting or atchieuing any memorable act vtterly faile him
meanes are many but the Christians most vsually make choise of fortifications as seeming to them most strong bridles to raine in and curbe both the auncient and newly subdued prouinces There they appoint their Magazins for munition and other prouision for the wars there they bestow garisons of souldiers for their defence some places they fortifie vpon the frontiers where they constitute for Gouernors and officers creatures of their owne fashioning the better to containe all vnder the obedience of the victorious 9 Yet is it that which Machiauell reproueth and reiecteth as vnprofitable but because they are reasons or opininions so weake as that like Spyders cobwebs they are easily broken I will not spend time farther to confute them onely I will say thus much that Alfonso king of Naples a most iudicious prince whose authoritie should carrie credit alwaies esteemed this practise of fortification most necessarie and profitable especially in a countrey newly conquered and not to leaue it open and consequently subiect to iniurie and reuolt The proceedings in this kinde of Francis Sforce duke of Milan of the Emperor Charles the 5. and of so many other Princes and Captaines which haue woone reputation and renowne amongst men are such as who well considereth them will laugh at the opinion of Machiauel Without seeking any further haue we not the French for example who made no account of erecting cittadels in the I le of Sicily but after they had conquered it they assoone lost it not without a most lamentable slaughter executed on them by the inhabitants but contrariwise deriuing their wisdome from their owne miserie after they once tooke in hand to make fortresses in sundry places of Italy there was no meanes but by peace to dislodge them The Mamelucks who were in the same error of not trusting to Fortresses found themselues in lesse then two daies depriued by Selim of the most part of their liues estate and powers The Spaniard imbracing the indifferency of this opinion and desirous to gratifie the Flemings whom they thought to appease by this moderation returned into their hands the strong holdes of their Prouinces which they had no sooner done but they were neere-hand expelled the Low-countries 10 And though all these examples are but too sufficient to confute the opinion of Machiauel yet will I bring him once more vpon the stage and sift him a little better See heere the substance of what he saith Either thou art able saith he to bring sufficient store of men into the field in which case fortresses are not any waies necessarie or thou hast not meanes to leauie such forces as are requisite to defend and warrant thy estate and then they are vnprofitable Marke I praie the wrong course he taketh walking as he doth in extreames without keeping the meane most necessarie in these propositions to say the truth he is much mistaken since this matter as others should be distinguished by the portions and qualities thereof the better and more easily to vnderstand it In my opinion then which I deliuer not to exclude others we must say thus Either a Prince hath meanes to leuie men out of hand by an ordinarie continuance of armes or else he must haue time to doe it be it either by leuying a sufficient number of his subiects trained vp to armes and by the assistance of friends and associats or of neighbours which in regard of their particular interest will willingly ioyne with him that he may protect them from the same iniurie he may himselfe receiue In these two first cases Fortresses would prooue more profitable then necessarie or else a Prince is of that power as he is able at once to assemble so manie men as he will keepe or winne the field from the enemie or will be able at least commodiously to succour the place besieged In these two respects Cittadels are necessarie though not much profitable because they by their constant defence stoppe and intertaine the enemie affoord by such temporising meanes and leasure to order matters for as the Venetians say Chi ha tempo ha vita who hath time hath life 11 The third meanes for a Prince to preserue his estate is that which those allow of who not trusting to Fortresses and making no account of Colonies doe ordinarily intertaine strong companies of horse and foote and in such numbers as they may alwaies containe their subiects in naturall obedience hinder rebellions and which most importeth repell and oppose the enemy and as occasion requireth visit him at his owne home In time passed the Mamelucks practised this forme of gouernment and the Turkes at this day obserue it in all points The Visconti sometime Lords of Milan vsed this forme of preseruing their estates and amongst others Azzo-Visconti ordinarily gaue intertainment yea euen in time of peace to 22000. horse and they did him no small seruice 12 A man may yet put one doubt more of this matter the resolution whereof shall fit very well for the course and concluding of the discourse That is which is best either to erect Cittadels or alwaies to maintaine a great army Experience our common Mistres teacheth vs that for the conseruation of great Princes estate sortresses are the best because they doe not so much incumber nor dislike the subiect as doth an army whose troupes dispersed in diuers parts of the country waste and disorder all on the other side souldiours shut vp in a fortresse are not so insolent and licentious as those commonly are which keepe the field yea and that oft-times with more hauocke then if the enemy himselfe had ransaked and ouerrun it The liberty which armies dispersed thorowout an estate challenge and assume to themselues is such as makes them forget all policy and military discipline the example of the Milanois heerein will not be beside the purpose They neuer complained of the Garrison of the Castle but when it came to that that Lewes the 12. would haue lodged his horse within the towne they presently reuolted whereupon ensued the losse of the estate What was it that wrought the reuolt of the Flemings was it not the obstinate mutining of only 1500. Spaniards who crying after their paie ouerran and made spoile of all the country The selfe same Spanish nation disquieted the Estate of Milan vnder the Marques of Guasto and the I le of Sicily vnder Ferdinand Gonzaga The Sorians and the Egyptians no sooner saw Selims standards displaced but they rebelled against the Mamelucks whose armies had maruellously oppressed them they hauing beene constrained to maintaine them at their owne charges 13 Whereto I know may be replied that the Turke neuerthelesse peaceably holdeth his estate after the same manner we speake of his forces being euermore on foote and in a readinesse it is true and so is it that to cleere this two principall reasons may be alledged The one that he hath depriued such his subiects as are Christians and of a different law of all
that before we can reduce them to one consent and body time and opportunities are fled But the Turke hath his powers so limited and ranged not depending but of one only head as he is alwaies in a readines to repell all assaults almost before the threatning of them can be with him In conclusion if all these reasons suffice not to cleare the proposition yet should they teach vs at the least to proue wise resolute aduised hence forward not to enterprise ought so out of season as that we should be driuen to fight with time rather then men they should teach vs to gaine rather then to lose occasions to abound rather then want to seeke to be honoured and to thriue rather then to receiue dishonour and losse but the maine point in all is to haue God on our side as our chiefe strength and most assured conductor CHAP. XVI That he hath neuer diuided his forces 1 Wisdome of the Turkes in vndertaking one not many wars at once 2 Diuision of forces dangerous 3 Those few good Commanders that are found in a confused multitude are not to be farre separated 4 The ouerthrow of one army may breed terror in the rest 5 Prouision cannot be made at once for many expeditions 1 SVch hath beene the wisdome and foresight of the Ottomans as they haue neuer almost had to do with two enemies at once Contrariwise they haue so well ordered their enterprises as the finishing of one hath drawen on the beginning of an other but when they forsooke this beaten and sure way then loe miserie ouertooke them as it hapned to Mahomet the second who would needes warre with three armies at one time sending one for Italy at such time as he tooke Ottranto the other to Rhodes where his Generall and armie were well beaten the third he himselfe went to conduct against the Mammoelucks if by death he had not beene preuented He had in these three armies aboue three hundred thousand men besides his armie at sea consisting of aboue fiue hundred saile The voyages and designes ill digested all these three armies were discomfited for that of Italy though it tooke Ottranto got nothing by it seeing that assoone as the souldiers vnderstood of their masters death they quitted the place vpon composition 2 But me thinkes this proposition whereby I maintaine that it is not good at once to set a foote diuers enterprises may be thus impugned That the successe of the Turkes death and the commotion it wrought amongst his people was cause that those armies miscaried and not the separation of them and their enterprises I confesse as I ought that whatsoeuer betideth vs necessarily hapneth by way of a first or exciting cause But to come to the ground of our principall matter without farther subtiâ—â—tsing this discourse it is easily seene how hard it is for a prince to prouide sufficiently at one time for sundry enterprises at the least vpon a sound foundation thereby to reape honorable fruites since all diuision of forces bringeth with it a debility and becommeth rather a subiect of iniurie then to be able to iniure others to be beaten then to beat to be others pray rather then to pray vpon others for as a body diuided by parcells is not of that weight taking it seuerally as when it is reduced to the first vnitie In like sort the forces of a prince when they are diuided and disunited haue not that vertue and subsistance as they would haue in their vnitie and well-ordered consunction for proofe who considereth that Mahomet had three hundred thousand men will say that the vnitie of such force was inuincible but diuided it proued not so though indeed each of these powers by it self at the least in regard of the Christians was a most mightie army had it had proportion squared to what it would attempt and if this masse of 300000. souldiours had marched in one intire body it had beene easie for them to haue attained their purpose one seconding another as he might haue done with that of Rhodes Patros and Ottranto which he had in this case vndoubtedly conquered 3 An other reason may be yet alledged and that is that it is hard to finde such Captaines as are fit for the conduct of armies that in these great assemblies of forces there are few resolute souldiours and that they which are such being once by their diuision as a man may say diminished it is a kinde of gelding the army of those which may serue by their example to assure and incourage the other confused multitude 4 Moreouer when we vndertake three enterprises at once as Mahomet who serueth to this purpose did if it happen but one of them to faile the newes of their misaduenture maketh the rest vndoubtedly depending the one vpon the other to faile of resolution 5 Again as we haue before deliuered it is necessary that the war be vndertaken in grosse and that assay be made of our forces as soone as may be that we may not be driuen long to entertaine a great army which for delay of execution doth oft times disband breake vp and ouerthrow it selfe with it selfe but especially with answerable prouisions the better to inioy great happinesse with smal charge which will neuer befall him that diuideth his forces and at once attempteth in diuers places We will then conclude that the Ottomans for the most part haue not had but one enterprise in hand at once and that to atchieue it they haue so well prouided for it as the victory hath remained on their side CHAP. XVII That he hath not long held warre with one alone 1 Why the Turkes haue not continued war with one alone 2 A long war addeth courage and experience to the enemy 3 It moueth neighbours out of the feare of their owne like misery to aide the oppressed 4 The Turkes manuer of shifting his wars and making peace at his pleasure 1 WHat more assured testimony can wee haue of a continued wisdome or to say better of a well caried subtilty amongst the Ottomans then in that they haue alwaies come off well in concluding their wars and haue not maintained them long against one and the selfe same enemy The practise of this policy hath beene most aduantageous vnto them such people as they haue not been able at the first to subdue they haue left in peace yet haue not forborn in the meane time to turne their armes elsewhere I haue fashioned to my selfe two especiall causes of this discreet course 2 The first is the feare they haue euer had lest they might make good souldiours of those against whom they should wilfully maintaine a lingering war A thing ill practised by the Spaniards in Flanders and the low-countries for continuing war many yeres together against them they haue acquainted that people before soft and effeminate with the fearfull clashe of their armes they haue so encouraged and imboldened them as at this day there are few nations
vpon the enemie 3 The commoditie of them so concluded 4 Aduise for a generall contribution against priuate gaine 5 That the danger we stande in of the Turke is greater then many suppose and that therefore those that are most remote ought willingly to contribute 6 What should mooue vs to ioyne in league against the Turke 1 NOw then to reape the woorthie and honorable fruits of a holie league association we are to remooue the defects and inconueniences which haue made the former leagues prooue abortiue And the better to effect it it is necessary that their treaties be voluntarie that Princes voluntarily ioyne their powers meanes to one end though by different courses so as growing to capitulations the one doe not aduantage himselfe vpon the straightning of the others affaires This is it which equalling the conditions will cause euery one to partake in the enterprise without all suspect or particular iealousie It is not enough that the defects of these leagues be discouered if they make vs not more wise in the framing of other to come to the end we may with all deuotion and sinceritie builde them on a strong and vnmooueable foundation and thus in my opinion may be the manner of our proceeding 2 It is not required that to establish this league and make it fructifie the confederate forces should assemble in one place but at one time my meaning is that our Princes must bee readie to assaile the enemie at once in diuers places and that euery one bende his forces towards parts which are neerest to him so to begin the warre to some purpose As for example the Spaniards should inuade the parts of Algiers the Venetians and the Pope of Albania the gallies of Sauoy Malta and Florence should continue their ordinarie courses against the Turke vnlesse they would ioyne with the Venetians or the king of Spain the Polonians should set vpon Walachia the Emperour and Princes of Germany vpon Hungary 3 Questionlesse if each of these did in this manner assaile him their courage and force would be the greater as would likewise be their desire to persist in their enterprise without any respect of paines or expence hoping all would redound to their honour profit and particular securitie which they cannot expect from the other leagues and this is that which hath in part made them defectiue The enemie that should be so many waies set vpon would be constrained to diuide his forces which consequently would become lesse able to protect him on all sides whersoeuer he should be assailed First the gallies of Malta assisted with some other and scouring as they might the Leuant seas would keepe in such awe those that guarde Alexandria and Rhodes as they would not dare to peepe out Againe if Spaine would inuade Barbarie the gallies of Algiers would be sure to keepe home so as the strength of Venice ioyned with that of the Church would doe what they list and would meete with no encounter by sea which they should not easily ouermatch especially if at the same time the Emperour and the King of Polonia would warre likewise vpon the Turke We haue an example of the times which verifieth our position When Soliman vndertooke the warre of Hungary against Charles the 5. Andrew Doria Generall of his galleies with a very small armie troubled all the Leuant tooke by maine force Coron and Patras and harrowed all those seas without controule or encounter of the enemies whence followeth that if the Christians would as I haue saide at one instant set vpon the Turke they would force him no doubt into a narrow straight 4 There is one point that would make the enterprise easie more forcible and lasting but it would hardly be disgested and that is to draw all Christian Princes which confine not with the Turke to contribute vnto it All these suppose themselues free from danger and make no reckning of others sufferings in whose behalfe they thinke they should not cōtribute as those that were like to haue but the charge and the other the profit In a word all catholike Princes are so wedded to this particular interest which is euer more differing and vnequall among them as hath beene before alledged as the league would neuer be thorowly concluded or of long continuance this must of necessity be forgotten and the only desire of the exaltation of the Church of God must be that which must range them to the necessarie point whereof they need not trauell to seeke examples out of their owne houses which if they would but imitate all would succeed wel to inuite them to it I wil alledge one The principall aime of the league set on foote by Godfrye of Buillion and of so many Princes and Nobles some greater then himselfe which accompanied him was not placed but vpon the particular honour of the Maiesty of God whereabout euery man emploied himselfe with such zeale and deuotion as without attending the succours or furtherance of any great King or Emperour they drew together an army of an hundred thousand horse and three hundred thousand foote wherewith they subdued almost all the east 5 Leauing apart all these considerations let vs come to the opinion that some haue of their being far from danger and we shall finde peraduenture that they are neerer thereto then they are aware When Amurath came first out of Asia into Europe was not Hungary which is now subiect to the Turke farther off from the confines of the Ottomans Empire then are now the countries of Saxony or of Bauiers then they of Franconia the Swichzers and the French yet we see it now most in his possession 6 Shall we then say because we haue a mountaine before vs or a riuer betweene vs or some estate that seemeth to shelter vs that therefore we should hold our selues happy and in security and not be touched with others danger and misery No surely For if we be Christians we ought not only to haue compassion of others calamities but afforde them also our good and charitable assistance moreouer he that measureth future things but by the consequence of things present findeth himselfe oft times beguiled we are to haue such prouident care of what is present to come that we may leaue to ours the same assurance we wish to our selues to the end to preserue them by this prouidence from such danger as they might incur after vs. And though we should not carry that regard of our children and posterity and that the consequence of our estate did not spur vs on to such an enterprise shall there remaine in vs so little courage and charity loue and deuotion to the glory of God from whom we haue our being and of whom wee hold our powers as that we should all forget to husband his vineyard and expell thence such as intrude themselues into it and pollute it wherefore serue all those heapes of treasure which the Princes of Lombardy amasse one in enuy of an
that all the harmes we haue receiued of the Turke haue come by his horse as at Nicapolis at Salembezza at Varna at the riuer of Moraua at Exechium at Buda and elsewhere 6 And if it euer hapned that the Ianizzars recouered the battaile halle lost it is to be imputed to this that they were reserued for the rierward so as it was easie for fresh men to repell those which were already weakned and tyred But I thinke no man but will grant that if instead of the Ianizzars they had beene as many horse they had performed as much As on the contrarie if the other had kept in store some fresh troupes of horse as the Turkes they had dealt otherwise with them and kept them well enough from bereauing them of the victorie In conclusion the horse are they that defeat the enemie and become masters of the field that prepare the way for the foote to the beseeging of townes and giue them time and leisure to force and take them CHAP. XI Where the Turke might be most easily assailed to ouercome him either by sea or by land 1 Examples of sea victories 2 The goodnesse of our hauens 3 The number of our skilfull mariners 4 The Christians farre beyond the Turkes in maritime matters 5 The Turkes horse fearefull to the Christians vnprofitable at sea 6 That the Turkes are easily to be ouerthrowne at sea 1 THere were much matter for doubt and disputation vpon this question if reason and experience did not cleere it for experience we haue it fresh in many accidents which instruct vs that an attempt by sea would be lesse difficult to vs and more hurtfull to the Turke for the reasons and examples which I will deliuer As often as our forces haue to some purpose put themselues into the Leuant seas they haue beene euermore victorious as at Metelin at Cafalonia at Preuesa at Scorsolari If any one opposing me obiect the ouerthrow of our armie at Gerbes which hapned about the same time let him read the discourse of the Historie as is requisite and he shall finde that that chanced not through the force and valour of the enemy but rather through our owne fault insomuch as our armie could not take their opportunitie to dislodge in due time but suffered themselues to be besieged by the hardnesse of the season and by tempests which so disordred them as it was easie for the enemie to force them Grimani Generall of the Venetians let slippe the occasion of a woorthy victorie when he knew not how to take his time to charge the enemie as he might well haue done at Sapienza But on the contrarie as often as the Emperour Charles the fift set foorth an armie to some purpose the Turke durst neuer looke abroad as when he vndertooke the voyage of Tunis and of Algiers where neuerthelesse he encountred many disasters he brought before Tunis seauen hundred saile and before Algiers fiue hundred onely Thus much for experience 2 Now we must see what reasons we haue in store to prooue that we may more easily assaile the Turke by sea then by land Among others this may passe that our seas are more frequented and our ports more rich and safe then those of the Leuant For first set aside Constantinople there is not thoroughout their obedience any one Porte that may be equalled to those of Venice Lisbone Siuill Antwerp London Amsterdam Lubec or Danske c. and very few also that may be compared with those of Naples Genoua Villa-Franca Nessina Palermo Ragusa Marsseilles Tolon Bourdeaux New-Hauen Rochelle and Rouane c. 3 It is cleere then that we surmount the Turke not only in numbers of Portes and good harbers for the retraict and shelter of our armies but also in Mariners and men accustomed and experienced in both the seas Moreouer there is not perhaps in the world a coast that affoordeth greater plentie of men then that of Genoua Dalmatia Sclauonia Venice Candye Againe there is not a nation to be found of more resolution or better proofe for sea affaires then are those of Marseilles I omit to speake of the Catalonian the Portugal the Biskayan the English the Norman the Hollander and Zelander all people marueilous skilfull in Nauigation 4 I would willingly demaund what it auaileth the Turke to possesse a large and spacious sea bordering country if it remaine vnhabited neither were it enough if it were for the exploits of maritime warre it is requisite they be valiant resolute and such as can endure trauell and paine Alongst all the coast of Africke the Turke hath not one Hauen of account besides Algies In all Egypt hee hath only Alexandria and Dalmatia at the least which are held in any consideration In Soria take away Saffo and Pamphilia those neere Tirus Ephesus Cicize and the rest so celebrated in ancient times remaine at this day namelesse and buried in their owne ruines They haue Gallipoli which is of no great traffike they haue that of Constantinople whereof they steade and vaunt themselues most of all Moreouer all these Ports are not so good or so conuenient as ours either if we consider the forme or the commoditie of situation nor so well stored with artillerie as ours are 5 Againe fighting by sea wee shall not need to feare their horse whose encounter in regard of their multitude cannot be but a terror vnto vs relying as they doe vpon them as the principall nerue of their forces but as for foote we excell them in number and valour 6 For conclusion it is most certaine if we could once depriue the Turke of the vse of the sea he would be soone ouerthrowne by land with a sufficient number of gallies which might be maintained in the Archipelago we should cut him off from all trafficke with Egypt and Soria as also keeping certaine gallies in the Straight and chanell we should hinder the commerce of Asia and Constantinople which he could not be long without so that by continuing this manner of warring vpon him without intermission we should by little and little heaue him out of the whole Empire of Greece where there would be enough to satiate the greedie ambition of the Christians CHAP. XII Of the inward causes whereby the Empire of the Turkes may come to ruine 1 Of inward causes by which an Estate may be ouerthrowne 2 The occasions of the change of the Turkish Empire are a defect that may happen of the Ottoman race 3 The hatred contempt and disobedience of the Turkes officers and seruants 4 The discorde that may arise betweene his children about the succession 5 That it is hard now to stirre vp and maintaine dissention amongst them 6 Another occasion may be the Iannizzers libertie and insolencie towards their master 7 Another the rebellion and reuolt of his countries and their Gouernours 1 AS we haue before deliuered by what outward causes the Empire of the Turks may soonest receiue an alteration so we are now to handle the
vs the marrying of letters with armes Now to come againe to the Turkes rudenesse we shall finde examining some of their Princes that somewhat must be abated Let vs consider what were Mahomet the 2. and Selim and Soliman his sonnes the most valiant Princes of the race of the Ottomans and we shall see that they delighted in reading Histories and in studying the Mathematikes so as though nature dispose a man to hardinesse and magnanimitie it is sure that if he be wholy vnfurnished of artes and learning he will be of a disposition doubtfull vnassured vnresolued and without any true stomacke or valour parts especially required in a Souldier This hath beene seene in those of the Ottomans which wanted the vertues of the three aboue named and amongst others Baiazet the second and Corcas his sonne can witnesse it These indeed had in some measure the knowledge of good letters but these performed no valiant act because they had not hearts and courages borne to the wars 13 Whence it followeth that the study of learning auaileth much to the forming of a wise and discreet Captaine and to helpe him to attaine to the perfection worthy his name nature withall disposing him to valour and generositie As for the priuat Souldier I hold that he needes not know more then to obey it not being necessary he should be instructed in so excellent an vnderstanding of matters as the Commander considering that humaine Sciences and the liberall arts in an vnsetled minde make it embrace ciuility wantonnesse and ease in stead of trauell make vs loue quietnesse feare death flie hunger and thirst with other paines and periles of the wars In sum they imprint in a man rather a desire to husband his life then to lauish it for the glory and good of his country and for his particular honour which is more dangerous in a souldier then in a man of any other profession for this reason such an one neede know no more then to obey goe well armed and valiantly defend himselfe against his enemy CHAP. II. That he hath alwaies sought to make offensiue war 1 Of offensiue and defensiue war 2 The authors opinion thereof 3 Others opinions 4 Reasons in behalfe of the offensiue and inconueniences of the defensiue war 5 Commodities of the offensiue war 6 Spoiles in our enemies or our owne countrie their difference 7 Machiauel confuted 8 The chiefe cause of the Turkish greatnesse hath beene the Christians idlenesse 9 The war vpon the Turke must be offensiue 10 Examples of good successe in that kind 1 IT is a doubt often disputed and not yet resolued whether it be better to assaile the enemy at his own home or to attend till he assaile vs The Lord of Langei Machiauell and others of our times haue discoursed heereof to the full 2 For my part I am of opinion as also the worthiest captaines haue beene that it is alwaies better to assaile then stay till we be assailed Alexander the Great Hannibal Scipio Caesar and many other Romans serue to approue it and all these would haue laughed at such as should haue otherwise counselled them 3 Yet some there are in our times which haue endeuored to proue the contrarie by demonstrations subtill enough but vnsound and to this very purpose of the Turke to wit that it were better to attend him then to seeke him out vpon his owne dunghill These are counsailes more curious then well grounded whereof consequently ensue few effects of moment we may couple such men with those vaunting Ingenours or Artists who discoursing vpon some worke of their inuention promise of it wondrous effects and set foorth some simple module which serueth but for demonstration only but when it commeth as they say to the push and that they must put their instrument to his true triall and vse then is it that they are far to seeke and that they confesse the difference betweene an essentiall effect and a superficiall flourish such as their first module afforded Iust in this manner these contemplatiue state-Philosophers will attend the Turke at their owne home whom they dare scarce looke in the face neither in nor out of his country 4 It is most certaine that hee which assaileth hath alwaies more resolution and courage then he that attendeth For he hath already formed his determination and prouision when the other goeth by heeresaie and likelihoods moreouer in assailing the war is vndertaken with more aduantage and commodity then otherwise it would be and he which mindeth to force a country or prouince may make his vse of all such aduantages and commodities as he findeth may serue his turne in the country he intendeth to conquer As among others if he haue set on foote some practise or hatched some treason in the minds of two or three such of the subiects of the prince he assaileth as he knoweth offended or malecontent Or if he haue plotted some matter of purpose for an vniuersall rebellion All which incountring with the dessignes of the supposed conquerour he makes them serue his turne with more aduantage in going to seeke out the enemy then he should doe in staying for him at his owne home By these meanes Charles the eight King of France found the way open to the conquest of Naples and Lewes the 12. possest himselfe of the estate of Milan by the like occasion also the Empire of the Mamelucks subiected their neckes to the yoake of Selim the first 5 But of all this we may collect a more sure proofe of my proposition then when the enemy is at our doores and that the astonishment surpriseth vs ouerthroweth and confoundeth all counsaile and courage at such a time vnexpected disorders hem vs in on euery side necessitie presseth vs all things become suspected and difficult so as most commonly we know not to what Saint to recommend vs nor what course were best to be taken for since we must haue an eie misdoubt make prouisions in sundry places bestowe garrisons where most need requireth we shall finde that applying remedies on the one side our affaires will grow desperate on the other Moreouer by distributing garrisons in this sort it must needs follow that we so much the more weaken the body of our armie and that through this constraint we quit the field to the more strong which disaduantage commonly drawes with it the ruine of our whole estate If contrariwise we will preserue all our forces in one bodie we leaue to the assailer many passages and places where he may set downe and fortifie himselfe there to hold vs play and traine vs on at his pleasure but if it should so happen that the assailer were encountred by him which attendeth with equall force with as braue a countenance and like courage the retraict and defence rest at his election so he be a Captaine wise and aduised such as was Solyman when he marched into Hungarie and when the Emperour Charles the 5. went couragiously to meet
in a matter which he had before discreetely enough plotted and disposed moreouer he cannot beare swaie as master of the confederate forces insomuch as he which sendeth succours may vnderhand deliuer to his Commanders memorials and instructions more strict and limited then the necessitie of the vndertaken affaire would permit Also the least distaste either of the Prince which assisteth or of the Captaine which conducteth such succours serueth oft-times to dismisse the promised forces deceiue the others expectation and bring all he vndertaketh to nothing So as he remaineth not onely more weake by this disappointment but his owne forces also become vnprofitable and consequently himselfe exposed to all wrong and ruine for as if one only wheele of a clocke be out of temper it sufficeth to disorder the whole motion so where the vndertaker faileth but of one part of his promised troupes the effects which in part depend thereon likewise faile and the course of his warlike designes remaine crossed and peruerted I will not forget also to say that a campe consisting of such borrowed peeces hath necessarily need of many heads to command it and an armie compounded of so manie heads because of the diuersity of opinions and affections will most commonly haue the woorse when it commeth to handie blowes 5 We may illustrate these discommodities with examples that touch vs neere and are familiar vnto vs and were not long since practised for this cause I will more willingly then otherwise I would heere produce them In our time we haue seene two most memorable leagues between the Pope the king of Spaine and the Venetians consenting and vnited to vndertake one warre against the Turke the one was vnder Pope Paul the third and the other in the life time of Pius Quintus The first was caried with an excessiue charge yet without any effect woorthy so great an assembly The cause in my opinion proceeded of the difficulty that was found to ioyn in one body the confederat forces and draw them together at the Rendeuous in due season for they met not till the end of September Although an other inconuenience may be alledged to this purpose which ouerthrew the good successe of such a holy and Christian attempt yet it may appeere that to auoide the shame and dishonour that followed thereof it had beene easie to haue performed somewhat of more memorable consequence then was the taking of Castle-nouo if we had knowen how to husband the times and occasions fit for the imployment of so combined a power Concerning the second which was as I said in the time of Pius Quintus the army of the Venetians very gallant and strong spent all the sommer in attending the Galleis of Spaine which were to conuoy succours into the I le of Cypres then attempted by the Turke so as this slacknesse of assembling the Galleyes was a cause that the army became almost quite vnfurnished of good souldiours drawen together to their great costs by reason of the plague which had made a most pitifull hauocke amonge them Notwithstanding all this they forbeare not to make towards Cypres so late as by the way they receiued the newes of the lamentable taking of Nicosia Which made them imagine that the Turkes had vpon that commodity most strongly manned their Galleys as it was likely enough with land Souldiours and that therefore there was more appearance of danger thē of good successe in assailing them vpon which consideration they held it best to turne their course homeward and refer that businesse to an other time hauing then thus dishonorably behaued themselues returning they incountred so many misfortunes as well weather beaten by reason of the Winter then approching they at length arriued at their home sorely brused and spoiled The yeare following the army of the consederats met notwithstanding all this very late yet vndertooke they to incounter the enemy of whome they got that so renowned victory in the yeare 1571. if God had permitted vs to reape thereby those worthy fruits that we had reason to expect Now for all this Cypres was not recouered but remained to the infidell as the reward and wages of his valour The third yeare of the league the king of Spaine in stead of pursuing his enterprise against the Turke as he had determined caused Don Iohn of Austria Admirall of his fleete to stay at Messina because he then doubted that the French would assaile Flanders with such forces as they had that yeare rather suffered to take breath then wholy cased and dismissed So as the whole season was spent vnprofitably without attempting ought worthy such preparation as the confederates had in due time set forth This was an occasion of excessiue charge and that the armies did not once stirre till it was too late attending what their neighbours would do who as I haue said seemed to threaten the King of Spaine with some attempt vpon his country of Flanders In the meane time the Venetians tired with the charge and trouble they were at to no purpose treated a peace with the Turke 6 Who will make any question now those things well weighed and considered that if the leagues both the first and second had beene well caried without these crossings iealousies and suspitions which accompanied them though vainly and vpon no ground but that they would haue brought foorth some woorthie and honorable fruite to the glory and honour of God the peace of his church the encrease and establishment of the Christian common-wealth This may be enough to prooue that forces compounded of diuers nations depending of many and different heads are in marching more slowe and at a time of need lesse effectuall then others It may appeere to some that I heereby inferre that leagues betweene Princes are vnprofitable and therefore not to be made so farre is it from me to maintaine that opinion as I rather willingly embrace the contrarie but I reserue a time to handle how and in what manner it would be good to make such a league especially against the Turke when I shall arriue at the place appointed for this purpose to the end I may discourse of it at full Now let vs returne to the argument of discourse in handling 7 The Ottomans neuer made league either offensiue or defensiue with any and neuer had helpe of strangers on the contrarie they haue alwaies had to doe with armies compounded of different nations confederate and conducted by sundrie Commanders all which as ill vnited not vnderstanding one another they haue euermore vanquished Moreouer we haue ordinarily seene them more forward and deliuer about their enterprises being alone then accompanied and consequently more vnited in their force more nimble in execution and it must needes follow more renowned and fortunately victorious 8 Yet they had no lacke of whom where with to practise their associations if they had approoued them as good necessarie as among other with the Soldan of Caito with the kings of Carmania
see that the most disloiall amongst them were not the most assured in the forces of their trecheries Amurath the second Mahymeth the second Baiazeth the second Selim the second were held the most subtile Princes of their race but we must grant that if those their wicked procedings thriued for a time it was more through the coldnesse and dissentions of the Christians when they should haue reuenged and repelled their iniuries then that we should therefore beleeue that it is well done to proue periured and disloiall Amurath the second made proofe of it to his cost and hauing receiued an ouerthrow at the handes of Ladislaus King of Polonia he speedily made peace with him and turned his forces against Caramania where whilest he was busied Ladislaus iudging so perswaded and backt by Pope Eugenius that hee should not doe amisse to falsifie his faith with a Barbarous Turke of so insolent a nature and so capital an enimie of Christendome as all breach of peace might seeme as a true performance thereof resolued to make war vpon him on the sodaine which proued so dangerous as Amurath was neere tumbling from the top of an high and glorious fortune to the lowest degree of misery so as his estate was neuer more shaken and endangered if the Christian army which followed their victory had not as I haue said disordered thēselues Whereupon the glory and triumph fell to the Infidels to the great misery and confusion of the Christians Selim the second hauing vnlooked for attempted vpon the Venetians to the preiudice of his vowed faith pulled vpon his necke the forces of the league had too late repented himselfe if God in regard of our sinnes had not in such sort sealed vp the eies of the Christians as they could not see nor make their benefit of the gate his diuine Maiesty had set open to a more high enterprise then the losse they receiued at Lepanto Soliman that was held the most wise Prince of all the Ottomans if wisdome be able to shine where there is no light of true faith and Christian beleefe hauing vnderstood at such time as he caused his army by Sea to fall downe towards Ottranto the yeare 1537. that Mercurin de Gatinaro and the Citizens of Castro were made prisoners after they had surrendred the place contrary to promise hee foorthwith commanded that they should be released saying that disloialtie to violate their faith and word once passed was not the meanes to win the hearts and likings of strange nations CHAP. VIII That he hath beene alwaies serued in his wars by good and valiant Captaines 1 Whether an experienced Commander and rawe Souldiers or experienced Souldiers and an vnskilfull Commander be the better 2 The first best allowed and the reasons 3 Examples heereof 1 IT is ordinarily disputed amongst Souldiers and martiall men which is the better a good Captaine emploied about the conducting of an armie consisting of raw Souldiers or an armie of old Souldiers committed to the command of a raw and vnexperienced Captaine 2 As for me if my opinion may carie credit amongst so many sufficient to decide this question I hold it better that a worthy and valiant Captaine should haue the charge of an armie of vntrained men without experience then that an armie of old Souldiers trained and beaten to the wars should be recommended to a Captaine yet a nouice and vnskild in the profession of armes The reasons proper for the maintaining of this proposition are so plaine to such as without being obstinate or passionate in behalfe of either party will entertaine them as they are not to be gainsaid for is it not much more fit and easie that a good Captaine make and fashion a campe of rawe Souldiers then that good and experienced Souldiers prepare and fashion their Captaine to the conduct of an armie who can without shame denie that an armie doth not rather obey the voice and command of their Captaine then the Captaine of his armie otherwise it were as they say to set the cart before the horse 3 Now we must come to such examples as may instruct and make cleere the truth of my proposition If we will as we ought examine how many times the Christians haue beene ouerthrowne by the Turkes we shall vndoubtedly finde that it hath euermore hapned rather through want of experience courage sufferance concord and authoritie in the Commanders then for any other default So at the battailes of Nicepolis for that such like Captaines did set light by the Turkes forces and tooke not a sufficient suruey of them they receiued a most shamefull ouerthrow a woorthy reward of their weake experience in not knowing how to fight with those barbarous nations whom they might well thinke wanted neither skill nor valour Did not Lewes king of Hungary by meanes of the Bishop of Tomerea who brought him almost to the slaughter indure the like disgrace at the battaile of Mogoria for want of experience in matter of warre and of iudgement sufficiently to discouer the enemies forces and the passages of the countrey where he was to buckle with him In like sort was not the vnskilfulnesse of the Italians cause of that victorie the Turkes gained at Grado who had then for their leader Homarbay Generall of the Turkish armie Also the yeare 1537. at Exechium Mahomet Iahiaoglis being Gouernour vnder Soliman of Belgrad and the frontiers of Hungarie in the time of king Iohn the great Caziauer losing his courage did he not abandone to spoile death and ruine a faire and strong armie which he commanded for the Princes of Germany and Italy some one troupe excepted which dishonorably togither with him saued themselues by flight Also before this heauie losse did not Anthony Grimani Generall of the Venetian armie faile of courage when with great aduantage he might haue charged the Turkes and put them to the woorse The very like want of experience and valour was seene in an other Venetian Generall who shamefully left the I le of Negropont to the spoile of the enemy To conclude haue not the Christians beene so many times put to the woorse neere about Buda for want of valiant and experienced Captaines as it cannot without griefe be related On the contrarie the Ottomans haue neuer suffered misfortune of warre at the least for lacke of authoritie command or wisedome in managing their armies for they themselues haue in person conducted them and beene present at all their high exploits and important enterprises by them atchieued They haue likewise euermore committed the charge of their difficult actions and affaires of warre to the most valiant and experienced Captaines amongst them whom they had formerly well knowen trained vp and exercised to such charges by infinite proofes of their courage and wisdome in most dangerous and difficult occasions In summe experience is that which perfecteth valor The Turkish Emperors haue alwaies giuen to their Captaines ample power commission freely to
his army and artillery as he came vpon the Souldan before he dreampt of him supposing him to be as then rather vpon his way to encounter the Persian then to attempt him 10 This particular dilligence of the Ottomans is not to be limited all only with their land wars they haue performed as much by sea so vigilant and wary haue they shewed themselues in exalting the honour of their names and of their great estate by them maintained euen vnto this day And since they are so incredibly nimble and aduised in maritine exploits I hold it not from the purpose to touch briefly the order they obserue in assembling their forces They reiect the vessels and ships of great burden as ouer-heauy and vnwealdy if the wind faile them rather hindering then furthering him that conducteth them Their Gallies and Galliots are speedy well manned and well appointed 11 Wee on the contrary drag with vs a great number of ships and Gallions as our best strength and choice prouision but they are in proofe the cause of such incombrance to the seruice in hand as we for the most part waste the season vnprofitably and spend our opertunities in rigging and attending them being also oft times enforced to disorder our Gallies to the end these great cartes may keepe with vs. Hence groweth yet another discommodity and that is that hauing placed a kinde of hope in our ships we in forgoing them finde our selues too weake and failing of courage to assaile the enemy who is not to be forced to fight but when he please hauing too open a field to flie and espy his occasion as it hapned at Preueza the yeare 1537. and at the battaile of Lepanto which was the yeare 1571. for then the ships of the league remained behind with a good number of souldiours vnprofitable for that action in regard they could not ariue there time enough The yeare after they encountred the like discommodity since for the very same cause the army of the league goodly and mighty fought not at all neither performed ought worthy so great a preparation And when the Gallies of the Pope and Venetians met and that they attended Don Iohn who aboade still at Missina because of the then beginning troubles of Flanders the army of the Turk being then commanded by Oechially he once presented battaile but because of the aduantage of the winde which without other helpes draue our ships and fearing the incounter of our round vessels he made his escape by meanes of a certaine stratagem which for the strangenesse thereof put the counsailes and iudgments of our army to a plunge In verie deede it is worthy the noting for seeing the whole strength of our ships vnited with such confederat Gallies as were then there make towards him he gaue commandement that in euery one of his Gallies they should put fire to a barrell of powder and row backewards not making for al this any shew of flight the prowes of their gallies still appeering towards them and as soone as the smoake had couered his fleete he halled on a maine and in an instant hoissing vp al his sailes shaped his course to Napolis in Romania our ships not daring to follow him In regarde he had gotten the aduantage of them they bearing but their mizen sailes and knowing how dangerous it was for them being ignorant of his designes to breake company eight daies after we comming neere together there followed some light skirmishes but so soone as they perceiued vs to faint as being depriued of our ships they charged vs with the whole army in like sort as when we had them for succour they retired So as it was then found by experience that the great ships serued but to keepe vs from buckling with the enemy I haue made mention of this incountre in my commentaries of the notable occurrants of these times written in Latine and somewhat more at large then I heere deliuer for I was present in the army during all that voiage vnder the command of the Duke de Mayne CHAP. XIII That he hath gone himselfe in person to the war 1 A question concerning the Princes presence in the wars 2 The first commodity is if the Prince be there in person it ads courage to the souldiour 3 The second is it causeth plenty of all things in his army 4 The third it increaseth the army 5 The fourth it worketh facility and speede in aduice and execution 6 Of the power of Lieutenant Generalls in the wars 7 The fift commodity is the Princes authority and dignity 8 The first discommodity growing from the princes presence is that thereby the enemy proceedes more prouidently 9 The second that his Commanders vse lesse diligence in discharge of their places 10 The third is emulation of the leaders whence groweth contention 11 The fourth the emulation of the Lieutenant generall toward the Prince 12 Examples to this purpose pro and contra 13 The preposition defined by distinction 14 The Ottomans wars in their persons haue succeeded well 15 Exhortation to Christian princes to vndertake wars against the Turke 1 WHether the prince should in person goe to the war or else send his Lieutenant is a question often disputed with such reasons and earnestnesse by sundry graue personages as whatsoeuer may be now deliuered to that purpose would proue but an vnprofitable repetition of what hath bene formerly digested by so many rare spirits This then excusing me I will referre the deciding thereof to men of more experience then my selfe yet will I not forbeare by way of discourse to deliuer my opinion and cite such examples as may helpe for the clearing of these doubts First then we are to recken the commodities the Kings presence affoordeth in his armie and so in order of the other consequences 2 Whereof one of the principall is that it putteth spirit and courage into the souldiers it so neerely presseth them as they must of force as it were make their valour appeare especially when they ioine battell where the Maiestie and life of the Prince yea and their owne too is in hazard Then is it that the honest desire of preseruing their masters life groweth feruent in them and so much the more by how much it is farre more pretious then the life of a captaine or generall either mercenary or subiect which the Prince might haue sent to command them This occasion more then any other moueth them more freely to hazard their liues and meanes for their Princes seruice which they would not so couragiously performe vnder any other that should command in his stead They likewise expect greater and more assured rewards from him then from others 3 Againe the king is alwaies better followed he is attended on with the consequence of farre greater prouisions either of victuals munition money or whatsoeuer may be necessary for the enterprise than his lieutenant who hath his power limited his allowance stinted and cannot dispose but in part of the
credit and authority of his master to whom he remaineth as countable Moreouer the subiect fixeth his eies and affection vpon his Prince and lauisheth his life and meanes according as the businesse is and he is addicted Francis the first King of France being before Pauy powred money foorth as a man may say by bushels yet Odet de Lautrey his lieutenant generall lost the Duchy of Millan for lacke of three hundred thousand crownes that were assigned him for his charges but were neuer deliuered him Whereupon the Switzers failing of their entertainment whom he had till then fed with hopes of pay he was constrained to fight with such disaduantage as hee miscaried and his whole army was put to flight which had not happened if the King had beene there in person for either money had not failed or else the credit and authority that accompanieth the Princes presence had wrought them to patience and contained them in entire deuotion 4 Moreouer the great train of Nobility and men of quality that the Prince bringeth with him is a strengthening to his army and addeth to it life and beauty euery man striuing to appeare more gallant then other which they would not vouchsafe to doe nor to subiect themselues commanded but by an ordinary Generall for there are alwaies about the King by election or necessity many great personages equall in power and dignity and some differing too in rancke and charge either as being Princes of the bloud or for honor and authority woon by desert al which would perhaps doe little for the Generall but would most willingly obey and expose all for their King and master to whom they owe a duty both of nature and benefit These great mens followers serue also to increase the army 5 Beside these considerations the King bringeth euermore with him a resolution of his enterprises wherein a Generall most commonly proceedeth with a restraint and aduise as fearing in his too forward attempting to exceed his commission In the meane while time passeth and occasion escapeth most often to the Princes hinderance and blot to his reputation 6 In this regard if the wisedome and loyalty of the Captaine be approued Princes ought not too strictly to limit their charges but if they doubt of them it is indiscretion to put them into their hands as we may see by these examples Don Emanuel King of Portugal hauing sent the Duke of Braganza General into Africke he fortunately wan and made sure for his Prince the towne of Aza Azamor but that performed hee would not take Marocco as at that time he might haue easily done though he were counselled thereto by the wisest and greatest of his army because that said he it went beyond his Commission Lopez Zoares Generall for the same King lost in like manner the opportunity to take the city of Aden of especiall importance for the affaires of his master for it standeth iust in the mouth of the Red sea though the inhabitants would haue deliuered him the keies Insomuch as hee should haue taken vpon him as he said more then his commission allowed him The thing was of that consequence as hee might well haue forborne the obseruation of his fast to swallow such a morsell Neither had the seruice beene one of the least he could haue performed for his master 7 In conclusion we are to grant that the presence of the king bringeth with it a certaine greatnesse and more aweth the enimy then his Lieutenant as it was seene at the enterprise of Tunise for Barbarossa sharply tooke vp and reproued those who said that the Emperour Charles the fift was himselfe in person in the Christian army inferring heereby that he should then haue his hands fuller then he made account and that nothing could be lacking in the enemies campe when their Prince was there present This is that may be saide of the good redoundeth from the presence of the king in his army Let vs now see what may be alledged on the contrary 8 First it may be said that the King which goeth to the wars in person ministreth greater occasion then he would to his enemy to prouide himselfe of forces meanes and friendes and affordeth him matter also of pretending a more glorious victory with the hopes whereof and of rich spoiles he putteth courage in his men disposing them to attempt valiantly all things be they neuer so hazardous so hartning them to fight 9 It may be said likewise that the presence of the King maketh his Captaines lesse heedefull and diligent at all occurrants and aduantages because they in part relie vpon the vigilant eye of the Prince who is to carry away the whole honour of the enterprise their valour remaining as dimmed and eclipsed This hapned at the battaile of Pauie For the Commanders relying vpon the kings presence and discreet carriage of matters had no regard but of their pleasures in stead of diligently bethinking themselues of the duty of their seuerall charges which in the ende turned to the ruine and dishonor both of their masters and themselues 10 Againe an army where the King is in person is alwaies replenished with Princes and great personages all which promising themselues great matters seeke not but to excel one another in place and command whence grow among them iealosies enuies and sundry differences breeding infinite disorders to the ouerthrow or hinderance of their Masters affaires Who is not without his part of feare to discontent some in contenting others This plague of ambition is such as it will sometimes so wrest the consciences and honours of these great men as they will not sticke to hinder the seruice of their Masters only to oppose the fortune and woorth of such a one as they see out-strippeth them in preferment yea oft times their ambition groweth so extreame as for despitethey wil vtterly forsake their Princes seruice Their vertue and valour being perhaps in the meane time not of the meanest and such as if it were well imploied would gaine honour and victory to the army 11 There is yet another discommodity and that is that the king carying with him the party whō in his absence he intendeth to constitute his Lieutenant he in the mean time repineth at his Masters worthy exploites considering how the honour should haue beene his if alone he had the managing of the army againe knowing that all such misfortunes or discomfitures as may befall it shall be attributed to the insufficiencie of the Prince and not to him he the lesse regardeth it In a word the glory we pretend and the iealousie we haue of our particular honors are two especiall powers to shake and curbe generous spirits The Emperour Charles the fift had sufficient triall of it for some of his Captaines and Lieutenants could oft times with small store of money and few men gaine triumphant victories as well at Milan and Naples as else where which perhaps in presence of the Emperour would not haue beene so fortunately
point of making prouision of things necessary in due season And to say the truth who soeuer disposeth his affaires is euermore attended on rather by shame reproch and repentance then honour glory and contentment That Prince which once loseth his reputation by this default hardly recouereth it but remaineth infamous he is lesse feared of his neighbors and which is more he himselfe entreth into a certaine ill conceit and distrust of himselfe which in such sort accompanieth him as in whatsoeuer he afterward a new vndertaketh he resteth vnassured doubtfull confounded in all his determinations and is vncapable of constant and resolued counsaile carying alwaies the repentance of his former fault with a sorow which tormenteth his verie soule so much the more strangely by how much such a Prince is the greater or is well conceited of himselfe 2 This is an aduertisment which should open the eies of all such not to vndertake any thing but what is well digested and with such order and forecast as there be rather abundance then necessity for when the prouision is small and that it neuer so little miscary it depriueth the Prince not of courage but of confidence and aduice of whose lacke insueth the want of wherwithall to warrant and shelter his reputation vnlesse it be that he will say I had not thought words most dangerous in the wars where he can erre but once and vnwoorthy euer to proceede out of the mouth of one wise and aduised vnlesse he meane that the misse of these two vertuous partes be to be borne withall 3 Prospero Colonna a great Captaine proued this to his cost at such time as he vndertooke to assaile Parma without cannon or other munition of war requisite wherewith to take such to taske as were the French souldiours then in the towne For they sent him away well laden with blowes shame and displeasure vnable to performe ought of what he too vnaduisedly attempted Fredericke of Bossola met with the like at the same place for want of counsaile mony and other meanes which are not borne as Pompers souldiours in striking the ground with our foot Guicciardin was then within the towne and had a command within that garrison And though the Captaine be wise yet if the armie once discouer that their prouisions faile them that they be far from succours farre from places of retrait then is it loe that they become astonished that feare and disobedience seiseth them and that all these meete in one make a foule adoe which the enemie perceiuing as it is vnpossible but he should will if he be wise make his benefite of our necessitie which will serue him as a rampart and bridge at his pleasure to assaile and harme vs but to preserue himselfe safe and vntouched It is that the Turkes taught our men at Exechium 4 The Romans more wary neuer fought but in grosse and answerable to the proportion of the enterprise their armies were either Pretorian or Consulary the Turke hath alwaies sent to the field mighty forces and aduantagioussy furnished neither hath he euer quitted enterprise for lacke of men munition or money What was his prouision of artillery at the siege of Malta but in a manner infinite For not to reckon his other charge he there discharged threescore thousand cannon shot At the siege of Nice where the French were Barbarossa Generall of the Turkish armie brought such store of artillerie as the French that were at their own doores had lacke of powder to continue their portion of batterie which they had vndertaken and were constrained to borrow of the Turkes to whom they should rather haue lent since the enterprise was theirs and they brought the other thither CHAP. XV. He hath neuer fought out of season 1 Especiall wisdome to be vsed in giuing battaile 2 Errors of Charles the 5. and other Christian Princes in their Sea-fights 3 The Turkes wisedome in that kinde 4 Sea actions vnseasonably vndertaken 5 Aduantages that the Turke hath in such cases aboue the Christians 1 EVery man is able to resolue that he wil fight with whatsoeuer force shall present it self with hopes of victory or else to sel his life at a deare rate but to perform it against heauē and time was neuer heard of for in such cases courage wisdome and power become danted so as consequently there followeth a despaire rather then any honorable fruit of a labor indeuor wel imploied In a word who so precipitates his enterprise without attending fit time and season seeketh nought else but to lose his time his pain charge and reputation which is the maine point to his ruine and confusion 2 The Emperour Charles the fifth might make vs wise since hauing obstinatly vndertaken the seege of Metz our of due season and without mature aduice he was constrained to rise from before it with such a disorder shame and losse as he afterwards hardly thriued Not long before that for lacke of applying himselfe to the time when he enterprised vpon Algiers how many ships and men lost he so many as it was a long time ere hee could recouer himselfe learning this lesson to his cost That earth cannot force heauen And though the valour and policy of the Turke can challenge no part in that action yet can he make vse of the Christian losses to his aduantage Now if tempests and inconstancy of weather opposed this prince both at Algiers and Metz they did not lesse at such time as he attempted the voiage of Tripoli in Barbary for the contrariety of windes made him waste much time at Saragossa and after by the like constraint and violence as much at Malta during which time the most part of his souldiours died and in the end vtterly despairing to reach Tripoli in due season the army a boade at Gerbes where it was after ouerthrowne as well by tempest as by the Turkes who knew well enough how to aduantage themselues by this disorder The first yeere of the war of Cypres the armies of the Pope and of the Venetians incountred notable losses by tempest of sea euen in the mouthes of their own hauens and all for too late assembling themselues 3 The Turke neuer fought especially by sea but when the season and opportunity would permit him 4 Some one that may perhaps long to ouerthrow this position will alledge that the Princes of Christendome haue neuerthelesse in the winter attempted voiages by sea It may be but I should thinke it was either in regard of the hope they had not to incounter the Turke as they might in the sommer then for any assurance they had or might haue in the well-speeding of a voiage inconsiderately attemted 5 In breefe if we must aduenture beyond reason it were better we did it fighting against the Turkes then against the windes with the Moores then with stormes and shipwrackes To say the very truth our Princes of Christendome haue their forces and estates so far separated one from the other