garment presenting pride or greatness chiefly in persons lately advanced though no man be thereby interessed or injured doth move in others a certain offence for the nature of man is such as beholdeth the new prosperity of others with an envious eye and wisheth a moderation of fortune nowhere so much as in those we have known in equall degree with our selves In all enterprises of Warr if present necessity doth not otherwise require leisure and deliberation ought to be used for often it sufficeth in lieu of Wisdom â—o take the advantage of other mens folly All men that are to consider of great actions ought to be informed whether that which is undertaken be profitable for the Commonweale honorable to themselves and easy to be effected or at least not greatly difficult Also he that perswadethâ— is to be examined whether besides bare words and Counsel he will joyn his own perill and if fortune favour the attempt to whom the principal glory shall redound The perils which accompanie private enterprises are far unlike to those which he doth enter that aspireth to principality For in private attempts a man may pause or proceed as he will But to him that aspires to Empire there remains no middle course but either by Victory to triumphâ— as a Prince or being vanquished to endure death as a Traytor Let no man in his prosperity give much credit to common applause or service assured by any of whom in meaner fortune he hath had no experience for the base people are learned in no lessonâ— only without difference of truth or falshood to flatter men in Authority and with shouts and words of great rejoycing make shew of great affection As overmuch haste is dangerous so too great delay oftentimes proveth disadvantagious for albeit consultation ought to foregoe action yet to dispute long and in the end reject the advice of either side or take a middle course whith in cases of doubt and danger is worst was ever accompted great discretion There is no course more comely nor any resolution so well beseeming a wise man having made proof of his own vertue and finding in age no fortune due to such effect as to retire himself from the Court and company for so shall he shun the inconveniences of contempt and the discommodity of travell Jucunda senectuti otia yet true it is that whoso hath lived a Prince or governed as a publick person cannot expect security in a private estate Whensoever danger draweth near and terror is at hand all men look about but none willingly adventure For in such cases every man will give Council but few will take parâ— of the peril In Commonwealths where Sects or Partialities he the Leader of any side is able to kindle Civil War yet is he unable to moderate the Victory For to stir up dissentions and troubles the worst man most commonly bears the stroke but peace and quietness are not established but by men of rare gifts and excellent vertue It may seem strange and contrary both to courtesie and Christian profession that men are far more mindful of injuries done unto them then of benefits received by them The reason thereof is that Thankfulness is accompted a burden but Revenge is sweet and reckoned a great gain Of reconciled foes and such as know that our harms were caused by their means we oft-times expect favor as perswaded that new friendship will repair the loss of old displeasure But the matter doth seldom so fall out for the quality of mans nature is ever to hate those whom he hath hurt and love them whom he hath made beholding Quos laeserunt oderunt Tac. To common persons and such as are ignorant in matters of State every Taxation and Imposition seemeth heavy or superfluous yet the wiser sort know that the end of all publick endeavour is to confirm people in Peace and Peace cannot be maintained without arms nor Arms without Pay nor Pay without Impositions As fortunate folk are envied so are the poor contemned which rule reacheth also to Princes The one lives in Plenty with War the other in Poverty with Peace For seldom is it seen that those people are assaulted where nothing is to be gained and whose base Beings afford no other spoils then blood and beggery Wisemen have observed that in matter of State and the managing thereof three things are especially to be looked unto The first is Occasion the second the â—ntentions of other Men the third our own Affection For there is nothing that slippeth away so soon as Occasion nothing so difficult as to judge what an other man intendeth nor any thing more nocent then our own immoderate desires It hath been ever a course observed by wise Princes but much more by Aristocraties and Popular States against Force and Fury of the multitude to defend themselves with Silver and Gold How much more it importeth all Princes to lead a vertuous life and give daily example of Piety and Justice appears apparantly in the proceedings of the Roman Bishops who by the well-doing of some few of them at the first became greatly honored but afterwards they became contemptible For the Reverence which men did bear to the â—anctity of their lives â—ailing it was impossible of so contrary Manners and Examples to look for like effects The success of the War cheifly dependeth on the Reputation of the Prince which declining the vertue also of the Soldiers faileth Likewise the fidelity of the people decayeth and their money to maintain the War ceaseth contrariwise the courage of the enemy is increased they that stood doubtful become resolved and every difficulty augmenteth The Authority which Princes give is chiefly in respect of Wisdom and Valor Yet true it is that for the most part they accompt them the wisest men that can best accommodate themselves to their humor The greatest distress and difficulty which can come to any Army doth proceed of these causes Want of money scarcity of victuals hatred of people discord of Captains disobedience of Soldiers and their flying to the enemy either of necessity or freewil A Prince or great Magistrate having long maintained the reputation of Wisdom and Vertue must take heed that no rash or dangerous resolution do taint the Honorable Fame of his former life For to be tâ—ansported with anger against his own profit is lightness and to esteem small dangers more then great is want of judgment A Prince or Person of great estate must be wary not to inure the conceit of double-dealing For little sincerity and trust is looked in his actions of whom there is an opinion of craft and falshood conceived Experience hath always proved that whatsoever the most part of men desire rarely cometh to pass The reason hereof is that the effects of Humane actions commonly depend on the will of a few and their intentions ever differing from the greater numberâ— the end and success cannot be other then as pleaseth the few that are to direct them There
must pray in aide of others If he can doe the first he needeth not doubt but being driven to the other his greatness cannot long continueâ— for albeit a matter of no difficultie it is to perswade a people yet to make them constant is a work well neer impossible Example Thesâ—us Cyrus Romulus The Second sort of new Princes are such as be aspired by favor or corruption or by the vertue or greatness of fortune or friends A Prince by any or all these means advanced and desirous to hold his Estateâ— must indeavor by his own vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other which may be done by this means First to assure all enemies from offending Secondly to win the love and friendship of so many neighbours as possibly he may Thirdly to compass all designes tending to his honor or profit and bring them to pasâ— either by fraud or force Fourthly to make himself honoured and followed of Captains and Soldiers Fifthly to oppress all those that would or can offend Sixthly to be obsequious liberal to frinds magnanimous terrible to Foes Seventhly to câ—sse all old and unfaithfull bands and entertain new Eighthly to hold such Amitie with Kings and Princes as they ought reasonablie to favor himâ— or else they would offend easily they cannotâ— Example Giovannie Torrigiani Caesar Borgiâ— The Third and last meanes whereby private persons doe aspire to Principalities is not force and violenceâ— but meer good-will and favor of men The cause or occasion thereof is only vertue or fortune or at least a certain fortunate craft and wittiness because he aspireth either by favor of the People or by favor of the Nobilitie for these contrary humors are in all Common wealths to be found And the reason thereof is that the great men do ever endeavor to oppress the people and the people do labor not to be oppressed by them Of these divers appetites one of these three efâ—ects doe proceed viz. Principalitie â—iberty or Licencious life Principality may come either by love of the multitude or of the great men for when any of these factions do find it self oppressed then do they soon consent to make one a Prince hoping by his vertue and valor to be defended Example Francesco Sforzâ— Alessandro de Medici A Prince in this â—ort aspired to maintain his Estate must first consider well by which of these factions aforesaid he is advanced for if by favor of great men he be aspired then must he meet with many difficulties for having about him divers persons of great qualitie and such as were but lately his equals hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth But if the Prince be advanced by the peopleâ— few or none shall hardly disobey him So it appeareth that a Prince made by the multitude is much more secure then he whom the Nobilitie preferreth for common people doe not desire to enjoy more then their own and to be defended from oppression but great men doe studie not only to hold their own but also to command and insult upon inferiors Note that all Monarchies are Pâ—incipalities But all Principalities are not Monarchies CHAP. VII Of Councils and Counsellors in general A Senate or Council is a certain lawful assembly of Counsellors to give advice to him or them that have in the comon Weale Power Soveraign A Counsellor is called in the Latine Senator which word signifieth in effect an old man The Grecians and Romans also most commonly composed theâ—â— Councils of ancient and expert persons for if they or the greater part of them had bin young men then might the Council have more properly bin called a Juvenate then a Senate The chief and most necessary note required in a Counsellor is to have no dependance of any other Prince or Common-weale either Oath Homage Natural obligation Pention or reward In this point the Venetians have bin ever most precise and for that reason doe not admit any Cardinal or other Clergieman to be either of or at their Councils therefore when the Venetian Senaâ—e is assembled the Usher being ready to shut the dore cryeth aloud Fuora Preti Depart Priest Note also that in every state of what quality soever a secret or Cabinet-Council is mainly necessary CHAP. VIII Of Councils in some particular Monarchies Aristocraties and Democraties THe King of Spaine for the government of his Dominions hath seven Councils viz the Council of the Indies the Council of Spaine the Council of Italy and the Low Countries the Council of War the Council of Orders the Council of Inquisition and the Council Royal. In France are three Councils viz the Council Privy the Council of Judges which they call Presidents et Concâ—liers de Parlament and the great Council which they call assemblei dâ— troys estates Of Councils in Aristocraties In Vâ—nice beside the Senate and great Council are four Councils viz the Sages of the Sea the Sages of the Land the Coâ—ncil of Tenn the three presidents of Quarantia and the Senate All which Councils do amount to 120 persons with the Magistrates The great Council of Ragusa consisteth of 60 persons and hath another privie Council of 12. Of Councils in Democraties Genoua hath 3 Councilsâ— the great Council of 200 the Senate which consisteth of 60 and the privie Council which hath 26 Counsellors so it doth appear that in all Commonwealths be they Monarchies Aristocracies or Popular States The Council-privie is most necessarie and often used Also this difference is to be noted between the Councils in Monarchies and the Councils in Aristocracies and States Popular that is to say that all deliberations â—it â—o be published are in a Monarchie consulted and resolved upon in the Council privie and after ratified by Common Council But in Optimacies or popular government the Custom is contrary Here also is to be noted that albeit the use anâ— Authoritâ— of everâ— Senate and Privie Councel is most needful yet hath it no Authority to command but in the name of those in whom the Soveraignty resteth for if Councellors had power to command absolutely then should they be Soveraigns and consequently all execution at their pleasure which may not be without detracting from Majestie which is a thing so soveraign and sacred as no Citizen or Subject of what quality soever may touch or approach thereunto CHAP. IX Of Officers and Commissioners with their respective Distinctions AN Officer is a person publick that hath charge ordinary and limited by Law A Commissioner is also a person publickâ— but his charge is extraordinary and limited by Commission Officers are of two â—orts and so be Commissioners the one hath power to command and are called Magistrates the other hath authority to execute so the one and the other are persons publick yet are not all publick persons either Officers or Commissioners Commissioners are ordained to govern in Provincesâ— in Warr in Justice in disposing the Treasure or some other Function concerning the State but all Commissions
summae râ—rum imperiâ— seipsum reservat Tac. It therefore importeth the Prince sometimes by his own presence sometimes by his deputation to performe that Office but however occasion shall require it ever behoveth that one only commander ought to be for plurality of Cheiftaines doth rarely or never worke any good effect yet with this caution that he be of experience and wise In bâ—â—lica praefectura major aspâ—ctus habendus peritiae quam virtutis aâ—t morumâ— Arist. The qualiâ—ies required in a Cheiftaine are these Skill Vertue Providence Authority and Fortune By skill we meane he should be of great knowledge and long experience or to make a sufficient Captaiâ—e the information of others or his own reading is not enough Qui â—orit quis ordo agminis quae cura exploa ndi quantus urgendo trahendove bello modusâ— Cicâ— Military vertue is a certain vigor or force both of body and minde to exercise Soldiers aswell in fained war as to fight with the Enemy and summarily a Captain ought to be Laboriosus in negotio fortis in periculo industrius in agendo celeriâ— in conficiendo Cic. Next to vertue we placed providence as necessary in great Captains for being of such wisdome they will not hazard nor commit more to fortune then necessity shal inforce yet true it isâ— fools and vulgerâ— folks that commend or discommend actions according to succeess were wont to say Cunctatio servilis statim exequi Regium est But advised and provident Captains do think Temeritas praeterquam quod stulta est etiam infelix Livi. Albeit providence be the best mean of good speed yet some Captains of that quality and in skill excelling have bin in their actions unlucky when others of less sufficiency have marvellously prevailed we may therefore reasonably say with Cic. Quod olim Maxmo Marcello Scipiâ—ni Mariâ— ceteris m gnis Imperatoribus non solum propter virtâ—tâ—m sed etiam propter fortunam saepius imperia mandata atque excercitus esse commissos Cic. Lastly we wished authority to be in Cheiftains for it greatly importeth what opinion or conceipt the Enemy hath of such a Governor and likewise how much his friends and confederates do esteem him but the cheif and only means to maintain Authority is Austerity and Terror Dux Authoritatem maximam â—â—veritate sumat omnes culpas militares legibus vindicet nulli errantium credatur ignoscereâ— Vâ—get Also experience hath proved that such Cheiftains as were affable and kind to their Soldiers were much loved yet did they incur a contempt but on the otherside those that commanded severely and terribly although they gained no good willâ— yet were they ever obeyed Dux facilis inutilis App. CHAP. XXIII Of Councils in War and directions Tactik and Stratagematik with advice how to make an honorable Peace AFter men found and framed fit for the Warr to small or no purpose shall they â—erve unless they be imployed by wisdom or good Council Mon minus est Imperator is consiliâ— quam vi perficere Tac. Council in War is of two sorts direct Council and indirect the fâ—rst sheweth a plain and orderly course for â—roceeding as to lay hold on occasion for as in all other human actions occasion is of great force Occasio in bello solet amplius juvare quam virtus Veget. As occasions presented are means of good success so fame worketh great effects in the Wars therefore it behooveth a Captain to be constant and not apt to beleive the vain rumors and reports of men Malâ— imperatur cum regit vulgus duces suos Sen. Confidence is also to be eschewed for no man is sooner surprised then he who â—eareth leâ—t also contempt of the Enemy hath bin occasion of great discomfitures therefore as a Captain ought not to fear so should he not contemn his Enemy Nimia â—â—ducia semper obnoxia Aemyl As security and overmuch estimation of our own vertue or valor is hurtfull so doth it import every good Captain to be well informed not only of his own forces but also of what strength the Enemy is likewise it behooveth him to know the situation of the Country and the quality of the people with every other circumstance Moreover the Generals honor and capacity ought to be known with the condition and nature of the Enemy Impetus acres câ—nctatione languescunt aut in perfidiam mutantur Tac. Temâ—â—ty in War is also dangerous for wise Captains were wont not to enterprise any thing without deliberation and good opportunity unless they were thereunto by necessity inforced In rebus asperis tenuispe fortissima quaque consilia tutissima sunt Livi. Some wise men not superstitiously but discreetly do think prodigious signes from Heaven or on Earth are not to be neglected neither are dreams in time of War to be contemned Nam amat benignitas numiniâ— seu quod merentâ—r homineâ— seu quod tangitur â—orum affectione his quoque rationibus prodere quae impendent Aemi A wise Captain will also wait oportunities and spy out fit times when the Enemy is wearied or pretending fear draw him into danger which advantages with many other are gained chiefly by observing of time Quia si in occasionis momento cujâ—s praetervolat oâ—pâ—rtunitasâ— cunctatâ—s paulum â—â—eris nequicquam mox omissam querareâ— Livi. Next the observation of Time the Place is to be well considered whether it be for thine advantage or thine enemies Amplius prodest locus â—aepè quà m virtus Vegetâ— Thirdly It importeth much that men be well ordered trained and prepared for the fight for the want of Art is cause of many disadventures and many times a small supply of choice Soldiers on horsback or foot doth seem to the enemy very terrible Likewise a sudden shout or conceit hath amazed a whole Army Milites vâ—nis inanibus magis quam justis formidinis causis moventur Curt. Fourthly It were to good purpose that in ordering of men for fight Soldiers of one Couâ—try or Nations should be ranged together and above all to foresee that the least loss of Blood be among the Natural Subjects and so handle the Matter that the cheif slaughter light upon strangers and Mercenaries Ingens victoriae decâ—s citra domesticum sanguinem â—ellanti Tac. The Generals own courage and lively disposition to fight will greatly animate the multitude of Soldiers as a contrary countenance or appearance of Fear will exceedingly maze and dant Necesse estad â—ugam pâ—rati sint qui ducem suum sentiunt desperare Veget. It were also for thy great advantageâ— that the forces should be ordered for the fight before the enemy be prepared First For that thou maist the better perform what thou thinkest fit to be done Secondly That thereby thine own forces will thereof receive great courage being readiest to assail the enemy and to begin the fight Plus animi est inferenti periculum quam propulsanti Livi. After Victory it is not the best
then they that are Writers of rumors or that take upon them to conjecture of things to come Whensoever a people is induced to commit so great an error as to give reputation to one onely man to the end he should oppress all those great men whom they hate they thereby give him opportunity to become their Prince and so being assisted with their favor and aidâ— he may likewise extinguish all the rest of the Nobility and they being extirpatedâ— he will also endeavor to tyrannize over the people by whâ—se help he aspired So many as are not consenting to the Tyranny rest enemies to the person of the Tyrant who can by no means gain the love of all For impossible it is that the riches of any Tyrant should be so great and the Honors he can give so many as may satisfie all Hereof it cometh that those Tyrants that are favored of the people and disfavored of the Noblesâ— are most secure because their Tyranny is supported with a greater strength having the mulâ—itude their friends then is the Tyrant whom the humor of the Nobles onely hath advanced A dangerous thing it is in all Common-wealths by continual punishing to hold the mindes of Subjects in suspition for men ever fearing their ruine will without respect determine to save themselves and as men desperate attempt innovation All capital executions ought therefore to be executed suddenly and as it were at one instantâ— so to assure the mindes of men from further molestationâ—â— The intent of every wise Prince that maketh War either by election or ambition is to gain and hold what is gotten Also to use the matter so as thereby he may inrich himself and not impoverish his own people or Countrey He that inlargeth his Dominions doth not always increase his power but he that increaseth in force as well as in Dominion shall thereby grow great otherwise he gaineth no more then is shortly to be lost and consequently he ruineth himself For who spends more in the War then he gains by Victory loseth both labor and Cost Every Prince and Commonwealth must above all things take heed that no necessity how great soever do perswade him to bring into his Dominion any Auxiliary Soldiers because the hardest conditions the enemy can offer are more easie then is such a resolution A Prince sheweth his ruine at hand whensoever he beginneth to break the Laws and Customs which are antient and have been long time obeyed by the people of his Dominion That Prince which careth to keep himself secure from conspiracy ought rather to fear those to whom he hath done over-great favors then them whom he hath much injured For these want opportunities the other do not and both their desires are as one because the Appetite of commandingâ— is always as much or more then the desire of revenge Whensoever a Prince discovers a conspiracy he must well consider the quality thereof measuring the force of the Conspirators with his own and finding them many and mighty the knowledge thereof is to be dissembled until the Princes power be prepared to oppose them otherwise he hazardeth his own security It hath been by long experience found better to send one General to an Army though he be of mean sufficiency then to give the same Authority to two or more excellent personages with equal Commission He that coveteth to be over-much loved often times becomes contemptible and he that endeavoreth to be over-much feared is ever hated And to hold the mean between them cannot be exactly done because nature will not so permit Whoso aspireth to any dignity must resolve himself to endure the envy of men and never to be moved for any offence conceived against him though they that be offended be his dear Friends Neither shall he for the first affront or encounter relinquish his hope for he that constantly maketh head against the assault of Fortune shall after with facility arive where he designed In giving Council to a Prince or Commonwealth and therewith desiring to eschue danger and offence no other mean is to be taken then that the Counsellor shall without passion or perswasion pronounce his opinion and never to affirm any thing as a resolution but with modesty to defend that he speaketh so as the Prince which follows his advice may seem to do it voluntarily and not forced by the importunity of him that gave the Council A discreet Captain being in the Field against the enemy of whose vertue he hath had no proof ought first by light skirmishes to feel of what vertue he isâ— and not to enterprise any general adventure to the end that Terror or Fame should not daunt nor discourage his own Soldiers Albeit Fraud be in all actions detested yet is the same in Martial enterprises commendable and glorious For that Captain who compasseth his designs by wit or stratagem is no less commended then he that vanquisheth the Enemy by violence and Force In times of extremity when resolution must be taken for the having or utter losse of the State then no regard is to be had of Justice or Injustice Mercy or Cruelty Honor or Ignominy but rather setting aside all respects that course is to be follow which defended the lives and liberties of men Whoso desireth to know what will be hereafter let him think of that is past for the World hath ever bin in in a circular revolution Whatsoever is now was heretofore and things past or present are no other then such as shall be again redit orbis in orbem A Prince that desireth to obtain any thing at the hand of another must if it be possible urge a suddain answer and lay before him that is moved a necessity to resove presently giving him to understand that denial or delaies may breed a perilous and suddain indignation There is nothing more difficult doubtful and dangerous then to attempt Innovation for he that taketh in hand an enterprize of such quality maketh all those his Enemies which lived well under the old order and findeth them cold defenders that affect his novelties which coldness proceedeth chiefly of incredulity for men are not easily induced to beleeve a new thing till experience hath proved it to be good There is no art nor other knowledg so seemly and necessary for a Prince as the Art Military with the ordinances and discipline thereof for that is the only skill required in him that commandeth and such a vertue as doth not only maintain them that are born Princes but often advanceth private men to that dignity The deep impressions which old injuries make in the minds of great men cannot with new benefits be razed out it is also to be remembred that injuries be done all together For they offend the lesse and wil be forgotten the sooner but benefits should by little and little be bestowed â—o shal the memory of them long continue A small pleasure or displeasure presently done doth move more then a great good turn bestowed in
also compassed honor and profit yet being in possession of both were not therewith so satisfyed as they hoped to be which being believed would happily extinguish the immeasurable ambition wherewith many men are possessed By experience I have learned that great folly it is to account that ours which we have not or spend presently in hope of future gain Therefore Merchants during the adventure of their goods do not increase domesticall expencesâ— but fearing the worst assure what is in hand For such men as have gained unto themselves reputation and are accounted vertuous to maintain that conceipt and eschew envy there is nothing better then a life retired from daily conversation chiefly of the multitude Fugiat sapiens commercia vulgiâ— The end that moveth a Prince to make war is to enrich himself and impoverish the enemy neit her is victory desired for other purpose then thereby to become the more mighty and make the enemy weak consequently wheresoever thy victory doth impoverish thee or thy gain therein doth weaken thee it followeth that either thou passe or undergoe that mark whereunto the intention of war was directed And that Prince is by victory enriched that can oppress the enemies power and become Master of his goods and possessions And that Prince is by victory impoverished when the enemy notwithstanding he be victored can still maintain himself and the spoyls and possessions are not taken to the use of the Prince victorious but imparted unto his Soldiers For then may he be thought in his own loosing infortunate and in victory unhappy for if he be vanquished then must he indure the offence by foes and being victorious shall be forced to abide the wrong offered by Friends which as they be less reasonable so are they also less supportable because he is still by impositions forced to burthen the Subjects whereof mâ—y be inferred that the Prince having in him any generosity cannot justly rejoyce at that victory which causeth the Subjects to lament Who so desireth to obtain any thing hopeth to compass his desire either by intreaty presents or threatning for so shall he to whom the request is made be moved either with compassion profit or fear Nevertheless with covetous and cruel men and such as are in their opinion mighty none of these can prevail And consequently in vain do they labor that go about by suit to stir them to pity by gifts to gain them or by threats to fear them Who so is perswaded that any Common-weal can continue disunited doth greatly deceive himself True it is that some divisions do maintain the Estate but other do indamage the same They which do harm are such as with Sects and Pertakings be accompanied they which help without Sects and Pertakings be maintained A wise Governor therefore albeit he cannot so exactly foresee but some enemies will arise in the State yet may he take order that no Factions may thereby grow It is therefore to be noted that the Citizens of every Estate may aspire to Reputation either by private or publick means Reputation by publick means is gained chiefly in the War either by obtaining victory in some Battel or surprising of some City or else by performing some Ambassage dâ—ligently prosperously but private Reputation is gotten by doing favor to this or that man and protecting them from Magistrates giving them money advancing them unworthily to Honor and Office and by great Feasts entertaining the multitude of which manner of proceeding Seâ—â—s Factions and Partakings do grow And as Reputation thus gained is dangerous so the other without Faction is profitable because the same is founded on Common welfare and no private profit And albeit among Citizens of this sort will oft arise great hate yet wanting followers for their particular profit the State shall not be indangered but rather strengthned for every man endeavoring to deserve well will hold himself within the bounds of Civil life and by Vertuous Merits labor to be advanced To perswade or disswade particular persons is a maâ—ter of no difficulty for if words suffice not yet Authority will prevaile but hard and perillous it is to remove a false opinion conceived by a whole multitude for therein faire speech and no compulsion must be used The best means which wise Captains can use to make their Soldiers resolute is to take from them all hope which resolution may also be increased with the love of our Country and confidence in the Captain for confidence groweth by the valor of men and Discipline in former Victories and trust reposed in the leader The love of our Country is naturall but the affâ—ction we bear to the Captain proceedeth rather from his vertue then the benefits he hath beâ—â—owedâ— Necessity also may do much and chiefly that where no choise is left but either overcome by armes or dye in desperation There is nothing of so great force to hold an Armie united as the reputation of the Captain which proceedeth only from his vertue for neither Dignity nor Authority without Valor can work that effect The first care that a Captain must have is to hold his Soldiers well punished and paied for where payment faileth punishment ought not to be inflicted and consequently no reason it is to punish him for robbery whom want of pay enforceth to shift but where the Soldier is payed and not punished offending then will he without respect become insolent towards his Captainâ— whereof insue Mutinies Discord and utter Ruine It is a custom very honorable not to promise more then thou wilt assuredly performe yet true it is that whosoever is denied though justly doth rest illcontented for men indeed are not governed by reason otherwise it is for him that promiseth and so good promises shall stand in stead of performance besides that he may find excuse enough because the most part of men are so simple that faire words alone have power to abuse them cheifly when they proceed from a person of Reputation and Authority The best way therefore is not to promise precisely but entertain the Suitors with answers general and full of good hope yet not such as shall directly and absolutely bind The greatest and most material displeasures that use to arise between the Nobility and People are caused by the diversity of humors the one laboring to command the other endevoring not to obey so as all troubles and disorders in every Commonweale do thereof receive nutriment The City which is maintained rather by Factions then Lawes so soon as one Faction is become strong and without opposition the same of necessity must be divided in it self for those particular causes which were at the first taken are not of force enough to maintain it It is the nature of men not to indure any discomâ—odity unless necessity do thereunto enforce them which may apparently be perceived by their habitations for as the feare of Warr draweth them to places of strength for their defence so that perill being past they do for
every man particularly within himself considered his own peril all in general determined to obey the Magistrates In the employment of Men for Service neither Age nor Fortune ought so much to be regarded as Vertue for yong men having made tryal of their valor soon become aged and thereby either unapt or unable to serve Therefore well-governed Commonwealths preferred Military Vertue before any other respectâ— Example Valerius Gâ—rvinus with others made Consul the Three and twentieth year of his age and Pompey triumphed in his youth No wise or well advised Prince or other State will undertake without excessive Forces to invade the Dominions of any other Prince unless he assure himself of some Friends there to be a Mean and as it were a Gate to prepare his passage Example The Romans by aid of the Saguâ—tines entred Spain the Aetoli called them into Greece the Hâ—diai into France Likewise the Palaeologi incited the Turk to come into Thrace and Ludovicus Sforza occasioned Charls the French King to come into Italy A Republick desirous to extend the bounds thereof must endeavor to be fully furnished with Inhabitants which may be done both by Love and Force Love is gained by suffering strangers to inhabit the City securely and Force compels people to come thither when other Cities and Towns near at hand be demolished or defaced And impossible it is without this order of proceeding to enlarge any City or make the same of greater power Example The Romans to enlarge their City demolished Alba and many other Towns and therewith also entertained all strangers courteously So as Rome grew to such greatnessâ— that the City onely could arm Six hundred and forty thousand men but Sparta or Athens could never exceed Twenty thousand for that Lycurgus had inhibited the access of strangers A Commonwealth that consumes more Treasure in the War then it profits in Victory seems to have rather hindred then honored or inriched the State A wise Captain therefore in his actions ought as well to profit the Republick as to gain to himself glory Example the Consuls of Rome did seldom desire Triumph unless they returned from the War loaden with Gold Silver and other rich spoils fit to be delivered into the Common Treasury All Foreign Wars with Princes or other States taken in hand be either for Ambition or Desire of glory or else for necessity Examples the Romans for their Ambition conquered many Nations with intent onely to have the obedience of the people yet did they suffer them to hold possession of their Houses and sometimes they were permitted to live onely with their old Laws Likewise Alexander the Great endeavored to suppress many Princes for his glory but did not dispossess the people nor kill them Otherwise it is where a whole Nationâ— inforced by Famine or Fury of War abandon their own dwellings and are forced to inhabit elswhere Example The Gâ—ths and other people of the North invaded the Roman Empire and many other Provinces whereof their alteration of names did ensue as Illyria now called Slavonia England formerly named Britain A common conceit and saying it isâ— That Money makes the War strong and is the force and sinews thereof as though he who hath most Treasure be also most mighty but experience hath apparently shewed the contrary Example After the death of Alexander King of Macedon a mulâ—itude of Galls went into Greece and being there arived sent certain Ambassadors to the King who supposing to make them afraid of his power shewed them his treasure which wrought a contrary effect for the Galls before desirous of Peace resolved then to continue the War in hope to win that mighty mass of Moneyâ— Likewise Darius should have vanquished Alexander and the Greeks might have conquered the Romans if the richer Prince might ever by his Money have prevailed Every League made with a Prince or Republick remote is weak and rather aideth us with Fame then Effect and consequently deceiveth all those that in such Amity repose Confidence Example The Florentines being assaulted by the King of Naples and the Pope prayed aid of the French King who being far distant could not in time succor them and the Cedicini desiring aid of the Capuani against the Samnits a people of no force were deceived A Prince whose people is well armed and trained shall do better to attend his enemy at home then by invasion to assault his Countrey But such Princes whose Subjects are disarmed had need to hold the enemy aloof Example The Romans and in this age the Swisses being well armed may attend the War at home but the Carthaginians and Italians being not so well furnished did ever use to seek the enemy The Plurality of Commanders in equal Authority is for the most part occasion of slow proceeding in the War Example There was at one time in Rome created four Tribuni Militares with authority of Consuls viz. T. Quintuâ— after his Consulship Cajus Furius M. Posthumus and A. Cornelius Cassus amongst whom arose so much diversity and contrariety of opinion as nothing could be done till their authority ceased and M. Aeâ—ylius made Dictator A Victory obtained by any great Captain with the Authority of his Princes Commission Counsel and Directions ought ever to be imputed rather to the wisdom of the Prince then the valor of the Captain Which made the Emperors of Rome to permit no Captains how great soever his victories were to Triumph as before that time the Consuls had done and even in those days a modest refusal of Triumph was commended Example M. Fulvius having gained a great victory against the Tuscans was both by the consent of the Senate and people of Rome admitted to Triumph but the refusal of that Honor proved his greater glory All they that from private estate have aspired to Principality either by Force or Fraud become thereunto unless the same be given or by inheritance descended Yet it is rarely seen that Force alone prevaileth but Fraud without Force oft times sufficeth Example Agathocles by such means became Prince of Syracusa John Galeazzo by abusing his Uncle Barnabas gained the Dominion of Lombardy and Cyrus circumvented Cyaxares his Mothers Brother and by that craft aspired to greatness Sudden Resolutions are always dangerous and no less peril ensueth of slow and doubtful delays Example When Hieron Prince of Syracusa died the War even then being in great heat between the Romans and Carthaginians they of Syracusa consulted whether it were better to follow the Fortune of Rome or Carthage In which doubt they continued until Apollonides a chief Captain of Syracusa laid before themâ— that so long delay would make them hated both of Romans and Carthaginians Likewise the Florentinâ—s being by Lewis the Twelfth required to give his Army passage towards Naples mused so long upon answer that he became their enemy and they forced to recover his favor full dearly To govern a State is nothing else but to take such order as the Subjects may not or
then banisht as also to sack the City promising that so soon as the Army of Spain did come into the Florentine dominion the faction of Medici would be ready armed to receive them But the Spaniards being come found no forces at all to joyn with them and therefore wanting victual offered composition The Florentines finding the Enemy distressed grew insolent and refused peace whereof followed the loss of Prato and many other inconveniencies The like happened to them of Tyre as before The denial or delay of Justice desired in revenge of injuries either publick or privately offered is a thing very dangerous to every Prince or other State for that the party injured doth oft by indirect meanes though with hazard of his country and himself seek satisfaction Example the complaint which the Galli made against the Fabii who sent Ambassadors in favor of the Tossani not being heard nor any punishment inflicted upon them for fighting against the Law of Nations was the cause that the Galli were offended with the States whereof followed the sack of Rome and the delay of Justice in Philip of Macedon for not revenging the incestuous oppression of Attalus to Pausanias was the motive to murther that King Whoso endeavors the alteration of any State must of necessity proceed with all severity and leave some memorable example to those that shall impunge the Ordinance of Government newly settled Example when Junius Brutus had by his great valor banisht the Tarquins and sworn the People that no King should ever raign in Rome within short time after many young Nobles among whom was Brutus son impatient of the equality of the new government conspired to recall the Tarquins but Brutus thereof informed caused his own son not only to be condemned to death but was himself present at the execution As health and soundness of the hands legs and other outward members cannot continue life unless the heart and vital spirits within be strong and firm so fortifications and Frontier-defences do not prevail unless the whole Corps of the Kingdom and People be well armed Example when the Emperor came into â—talâ— and had with some difficulty past the confines of the Venetians welnear without ressistance his army marcht to Venice and might doubtless have possest the City had it not been defended with water Likewise the English in their assault of France excepting a few encounters on the Frontires found no puissant resistance within the Realm And Anno 1513 they forced all that State and the King himself to tremble as oft before they had done but contrariwise the Romans knowing that life lay in the heart ever held the body of their State strongest for the nearer the enemy approacht Rome the better they found the Countrey armed and defended The desire to command soveraignly is of so great force as doth not only work in those that are in expectation of principality but also in them that have no title at all Example this appetite moved the wife of Taâ—quinius Priscus contrary to all natural duty to incite her husband to murder her own Father Servius and possesse his Kingdom as bâ—ing perswaded it were much more honorable to be a Queen then to be the daughter of a King The violation of ancient Laws Orders and Customs under which people have long time lived is the chief anâ— only cause whereby Princes hazard their Estate and Royal Dignity Example albeit the deflowring of Lucrece was the occasion yet was it not the cause that moved the â—omans to take arms against Tarquin for he hâ—ving before that fact of Sexâ—us his Son governed Tyrannically and taken from the Senate all Authority was become odious both to the Senate Nobility and People who finding themselves well governed never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration A Prince that desires to live secure from conspiracy hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over great riches and honors then those whom he hath greatly injured because they want meanes to offend the other have many opportunities to do it Example Perennius the Prime favorite of â—ommodus the Emperor conspired his deathâ—Plantianus did the like to Sâ—verus and Sâ—janus to Tiberius for being advanced to so great honors riches and Offices as nothing remained desirable but the Imperial title they conspired against the persons of their Soveraigns in hope of the dignity but in the end they endured that punishment which to such disloyalty and ingratitude appertaineth An Army which wants Experience albeit the Captain be expert is not greatly to be fearedâ— neither ought an Army of well traind Soldiers to be much esteemed whose Captain is ignorant Example Caesar going into Africa against Afranius and Petraeus whose army was full of old Soldiers said he feared them little Quia ibat ad exercitum sine duce Contrariwise when he went to Pâ—arsalia to encounter Pompey he said Ibo ad duceâ— sine exercitu A Captain-General commanding an Army ought rather to governe with curtesie and mildness then with over-much austerity and severity Example Q. and Appius Claudius being Consuls were appointed to govern the War To Q. was allotted one Army which served very dutifully but Appius commanding the other with great cruelty was by his Soldiers unwillingly obeyed Nevertheless Tacitus seems of contrary opinion saying Plus poena quam obsequium valâ—t Therefore to reconcile these different Conceits I say that a General having power to command men either they are confederates or Subjects If confederates or voluntaries he may not proceed to eâ—tream punishment if Subjects and his power absolute they may be governed otherwiseâ— yet with such respect as the insolence of the General inforce not the Soldiers to hate him Honor may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of victory Every man knoweth glory is due to the Victor and we deny not the same priviledge to the vanquished being able to make proof that the loss proceeded not from his default Neither is it dishonorable to violate those promises whereto the necessity or disadvantage of War inforceth And forced promises which concern a whole State are not binding and rarely or never kept nor is the Breaker thereby to receive disgrace Example Posthumus the Consul having made a dishonorable peace with the Samnits was by them with his whole Army sent home disarmed Being arived at Rome the Consul informed the people they were not bound to perform the base conditions he was compelled to yield unto albeit he and those few that promised were bound to perform them The Senate thereupon concluded to send him prisoner to Samno where he constantly protested the fault to be onely his own wherefore the people by that peace incurred no dishonor at all And Fortune so much favored Posthumus as the Samnites were content presently to return him to Rome where he became more glorious for losing the Victory then was Pontius at Samno for having won the victory Wise men have long observedâ— that who so will
know what shall be must consider what is past for all worldly things hold the same course they had at â—irst The reason is that as long as men are possest with the same Passions with former ages consequently of these doings the same effects ensue Example The Almains and French have ever bin noted for their Avarice Pride Fury and Infidelity and so in divers ages experience hath proved even to this present For perfidious dealing the French have given sufficient proof not onely in ancient times but also in the time of Charls the Eighth who promised to render to the Florentines the Forts of Pisaâ— but having divers timâ—â— received money held them notwithstanding in possession The Florentines found the like in the Almainsâ— for in the Wars of the Visconti Dukes of Milan they prayed aid of the Emperor who promised them great forces in consideration whereofâ— he was to receive of the Florentines One hundred thousand Crowns in hand and as much more when his Army was arived in Italy both which payments were performed but as soon as the Emperor came to Verona he devised cavillations of unkindness whereupon he returned home A Prince desirous to obtain any thing of another must if occasion so permit urge his demand so earnestly and press for so sudden and present answer as he who is prest may not have leisure to consider how to excuse himself in denial Example Pope Julio endeavored to drive out of Bologna all the Bentivoli in which action he thought the aid of the French necessary and that the Venetians should stand neutral and by divers messengers did sollicite them to that effect but not receiving any resolute answer he thought fit with those few forces he had to take his journey to Bolâ—gna whereupon the Venetians advertised him they would remain neutral and the French King forthwith sent him forces as fearing the Popes indignation likewise the Tuscans having formerly desired aid of the Samnites against the Romans took Armes suddenly and obtained their request which the Samintes had before denied When a multitude offendeth all may not be punisht because they are too many to punish part and leave the rest unpunisht were injurie to the sufferers and to those that escape an encouragement to offend again therefore to eschew all extremity mean courses have bin anciently used Example When all the Wives of the Romans conspired to poyson their Husbands a convenient number of them were punisht and the rest suffered to pass Likewise at the conspiracy of the Bacchanals in the time of the Macedonian War wherein many thousands Men and Women had part every tenth person only was put to death by lot although the offence were general by which manner of punishing he that suffered complaind on his fortune and he that escaped was put in feare that offending again the same punishment might light upon himself and therefore would no more offend A Battel or great action in Armes ought not to be enterprised without special Commission or Command from the Prince otherwise the General incurs great danger Example Papyrius the Dictator punisht the General of the horse in the Roman Army for having fought without his consent although he had in battaile slain 20000 Enemies without loss of 200 of his own and Caesar commended his Captain Silanus for having refrained to fight though with great advantage he might Also Count Egmont hazarded the favor of the King his Master for giving battel to Marshall de Thermes albeit he were victorious for upon the success of that action the loss or or safety of all the Low Countries depended To govern without Council is not only dangerous in Aristocracies and Popular States but unto independent Princes an occasâ—on of utter ruine Example Hieron the first King of Sicile in all his proceedings used the advice of Counsels and lived fifty years prosperously in Peace but his grandchild succeding refusing all Counsell lost his Kingdom and was with all his Kinsfolk and Friends cruelly slain In all Monarchies the Senate or privyCouncil is or ought to be composed of persons of great dignity or men of approved wisdom and understanding Example In Polonia no man is Counsellor unless he be a Palatine a Bishop a Câ—stâ—llan a Captain or such a one as hath bin Ambassador and in Turky the title of Counsellor is not given but only to the four Bassaes the two Cadâ—lesquirâ—s the twelve Beglerbegs and Kings son who in his Fathers absence is as it wereâ— a president of the Divano or Senate Many Princes Ancient and Modern have used to select out of their Council two or three or four at most to whom only they did impart their affairs Example The Emperor Augustus had Maecâ—nas and Agrippa Julius Caesar Q â—aedius and Cor. Balbus whom he only trusted with his Cipher and secrets being Counsellors of the Cabinet as we now call them The alteration of old Laws or introduction of new are in all States very dangerous notwithstanding any appearance of profit or publick utility which moved wise Governors to decree that ancient Lawes once established might never be called in question Example The Athenians decreed that no Law should be propounded to the people without the consent of the Senate the like use is observed in Venice where no Petition is prefered to the Senate but by advice of the Sages and among the Locrians the Custom was that whosoever presented any new Law to be confirmed should come with a halter about his Neck and be therewith hanged if his request were rejected also Lycurgus to prevent the alteration of his Lawes did sweare the people of Sparta to observe them untill his return and thereupon retired himself into voluntary exile with intent never to returne When necessity or good reason moves Innovation or Abolition of Laws a course more secure it is to do it rather by degrees then suddenly Example The Romans finding the Laws of the twelve Tables unprofitable suffered them to be observed or neglected at discretion but would not publickly suppress them for fear of calling other Laws into contempt so did they continue 700 years and were then cassed by Ebutius the Tribune But Agis King of Lacedemon desirous to revive the Laws of Lycurgus long discontinued enforced all men to bring in their evidence and writings to be cancelled to the end a new partition of Lands and Goods might be made which suddain and violent proceeding proved so fatal that it moved a dangerous sedition wherein he was deposed and with his Mother and Friends put to death which Example haply moved the Venetians not to attempt any thing against the Authority of Augustino Barberino their Duke but after his death and before the Election of Lovedono the Signiory publisht new Ordinances detractive from the Ducal Anthority Whoso hath won to himself so great Love and Affection as thereby to become master of the forces and at his pleasure commands the Subjects apt for Armes may also without right or title assure himself of the whole