wherein I am consident they do the Count Wrong For we must not believe that so brave an Officer should omit a necessary and exemplary piece of Severity out of a sordid desire of Gain But this Bassa dyed of his Wounds not long after and then they cut off his Head and set it upon a Pole. Which seem'd very idle and foolish 2. Let us now consider the Serasquier's Conduct which surely appears very neat and clean He had Orders from the Grand Signior to relieve Newhausel at any rate and what ever the hazard were And these Orders he must obey whether they were wise or foolish But he saw plainly that to march to that place and fight the whole Christian Army had been certain destruction they so much over-matching him in goodness of Men and the place being so far within the Enemies Country He therefore by way of diversion besieges Gran and Vicegrad which ly on the other side the Danube Upon which one of these three things must follow Either the whole Christian Army must come to relieve these Places and then Newhausel had been at liberty or else they must all continue their Siege and then both Vicegrad and Gran had been his own or part of them must march against him and part must stay at the Siege and then those that staid would carry on the Siege but weakly and those that march'd would be in a fair way to be beaten The Christians took this last Course and divided their Army But they proved so strong that they that staid were enow to take the Town and they that march'd were enow to beat the Serasquier However it must be confess'd that he plaid the utmost of his Game I know it hath been related that he was drawn by a Wile to fight But plainly at that time fighting was his Business for without it Newhausel must be lost and all the Christian Army would then be upon him It was therefore much better to engage part of the Enemies Force thereby to save the Town then sustain their whole Force after the Town was lost Moreover he set upon that part of the Christians which he was to Encounter with all the Force that he could possibly get together And he brought them up bravely to the Charge and tryed to the utmost what every part of them could do But they were beaten every where not being able to stand against the Germans who plainly hewed them down Being thus totally routed he nevertheless got off strangely without extraordinary loss and made his retreat to Buda There he march'd over the Bridge and put on a fresh countenance of fighting Which made the Dukes of Lorrain and Bavaria after some time to come down upon him with the whole Christian Army throughly prepar'd for a second Battel And then the Serasquier slipt back over the River and left his Enemies at gaze for truly he was not in a fighting Condition The Bridge of Buda stood him now in good stead and in it he reaped the fruit of his labours for he had been repairing it all Winter with great diligence it having been ruin'd when the Christians held Pest 3. It may truly be said of the Serasquier that he lost Newhausel gloriously because to preserve it he did all that could be done But it cannot be said that the Duke did so by Vicegrad for it was pitifully lost This Castle stood for it is now demolish'd upon the Danube with a Town under it almost the mid-way between Gran and Buda And it was the farthest Frontier on that side If the French had had this Place how would they have fortified and furnish'd it And what a tearing Garrison would they have had in it The Imperialists had time enough to do what they would to it it being a year in their Possession But it was so miserably unprovided that first a Party out of Buda surprized or seized the Town plunder'd it and burnt it for which the Governour was never question'd And now a Detachment from the Serasquier took the Castle by Surrender in three days in a manner within sight of the Duke and his Army Which I confess was a very sensible disgrace This place and Gran had been threaten'd for a Month before and the Duke might have put into them what Men he pleased they standing on the one side the River and he commanding the other 'T is true he put five hundred Men into Gran when he might and should have put in five thousand but Vicegrad seem'd quite forgotten If he could not or would not defend it why did he not slight it To conclude this Matter the loss of Newhausel was far the greater in point of profit and advantage and importance but in point of honour the loss of Vicegrad was a hundred times worse 4. To the Messages of Peace which were sent by the Serasquier the Duke return'd this Answer That a Victorious Army was not to be amused by such Messages But what doth he do with this Victorious Army What Conquests or even what Attempts doth he make Why first he encamps upon the Danube a little short of Pest And that he might be sure to want Forrage in good time it was just in place where the Turks had lain before Accordingly Forrage is wanting and he must remove But now instead of advancing into the Enemies Country which lay right before him and open to him he Marches quite back into his own and there makes another encamping between the Rivers of Gran and Ipol Which two encampings having taken up two pretious Months and the year being now well spent though as yet no hard weather he sends his Army into their Winter Quarters Was ever Victorious Army so employed Was ever Victory so pursued If Alexander or Caesar or Gustavus Adolphus had been here they would have pursued it after another manner Caesar's Victory at Alexia was one of the greatest that ever was obtain'd by Man. He had driven a brave Army of fourscore thousand Men into that Place and held them there besieged his own Army being much less And two hundred and fifty thousand bold Soldiers came to relieve them They fell upon his Trenches for here was the pattern of all our Circumvallations T they fell upon his Trenches on both sides with the most obstinate Fury But those without were not only repulsed but totally routed leaving fifty thousand dead upon the place and those within were beaten back with great loss and forced to surrender at discretion Of this glorious Victory Caesar had lost the fruit if he had not closely followed his blow keeping his Men upon service for a good part of the next hard Winter All the World condemns Hannibal for that he did not march straight to Rome after the Battel of Cannae And we find him in Livy cursing and banning himself for this fatal Omission when afterwards he left Italy full sore against his Will to rescue his own dear Carthage But though Hannibal did not do that which was
best yet he did something whereas here our Duke does just nothing It was Hannibal's Error that he did march to Capua when he should have marched to Rome But Our Duke doth march neither one way nor other takes no work in hand but trifles away his Time in idle encampings Our Illustrious Duke is justly reputed one of the Greatest Captains of this or any Age. But we have found by former Experience that he is a little too much given to encamping when the Season calls for Action When he march'd with a mighty Imperial Army into his own Lorrain and the French under Crequi were in a manner fled out of the Country in this so inviting so provoking an Occasion he for several Weeks lay encamped upon the Banks of Saar when all Europe expected his progress with impatience I confess this might have done well if he had come only to take the Air but considering the Business he was upon 't is hard to be understood I meddle no further with that unfortunate Campagne which went on as it began To return therefore to Hungary it seems very strange for I cannot yet leave this Matter that the Duke of Lorrain having so great an advantage did not bear in upon the Enemy with all his power and particularly upon the Country between the Danube and the Tibisque or Teys It is a very good Country and was then fresh and untouch'd no Army having lain upon it or so much as march'd through it And it was close at hand and lay as open to him as Kent doth to Surrey Also there was no Enemy to oppose him For the Serasquier and his heartless Rabble were on the other side the River not daring to look towards him and after a while were gone clean away so that now there was no Army in Hungary beside the Duke's These Invitations notwithstanding he could not dispose his mind to move that way though he had nothing else to do As if he had been Enchanted or some Spell had been laid before him which he had not the power to pass over I believe the like Example is no where to be found They that favour the Glory of this High-born Prince are troubled that he should lose the Opportunity to encrease it If Mercy and Heusler are so renowned for the Conquests they made with a Detachment of a Detachment how glorious might the Duke have been by the Atchievements of his whole Army Fifty thousand men may do a great deal of such Work where five thousand can do nothing because an equal Force which is easily had opposing them will frustrate all their Attempts But where five thousand can do any thing fifty thousand will do ten times more if there be so much to do How did Hatwan in particular as it were invite the Duke to besiege it lying close by him Where he was not likely to find greater Resistance than Mercy and Heusler did afterward at Zolnock a more considerable Place By the taking of Hatwan the Duke had been left without blame for not repairing Vacia or Novigrad since he had now a Frontier Town to cover the Country which the Enemy had quitted and to press upon the Country which the Enemy still kept which was the thing wanting in those Parts Also the Communication of Buda and Agria had been cut off Hatwan lying between them I am not ignorant that a wise Reason is given why the Duke of Lorrain laying aside at present the thoughts of these things drew so soon into Winter Quarters It is that he might be the sooner in the Field next year But who knows what may happen before the next year comes Who knows how long the Pope will live or whether another Pope will be so liberal Who knows how long the King of Spain will live Or how long the King of France will continue in this Mind Or how long this League will last between the Germans Poles and Venetians Or how soon there may be some Accident which may disturb the Peace of Christendom and by consequence stop the progress of this War Or whether the Turks will ever be again in so bad a posture to defend themselves The Proverbial Advice To make hay while the Sun shines doth extend to all sorts and conditions of People Nor should we leave any thing to be done to morrow which may be done to day The Duke had now a pretious Opportunity in his hands The neglecting of one such Opportunity may turn the Fortune of Kingdoms and Empires Such an Opportunity ought to be embraced and made use of as if it were never to return again nor any like it The Successes of Mercy and Heusler of which I have said something already and must say more hereafter do make it plainly appear that the Duke of Lorrain had it been his hap to try it might with ease have seized most of the Turkish Places on that side and gone near to have clear'd the whole Country on the North of Danube quite down to Belgrade But admitting he had found all the fortified Places impregnable or at least the attacking them not advisable yet by Marching in amongst them and eating up the open Country as the French did in Flanders he had done great Service thereby maintaining his Army at his Enemies Cost and depriving the Enemies Armies and Garrisons of their Subsistence If an Army be but in the Enemies Country which yet the Christians in this War seem industriously to avoid or they have strange ill luck at it they are sure to be doing one great part of their Work and that is devouring Moreover though it should be supposed that this also could not be done and that no Impression of any kind could be made upon the Enemy yet some are of opinion that the Duke had no need to spend his time in idle Encampings and then run into Winter Quarters before Winter since he might have employed his Army to very good purpose He might have laid a Bridge upon the Danube somewhere near and above Buda and cover'd it at each end with a strong and large Intrenchment where a good part of his Army might have quartered all Winter This Work had been both feasible and profitable To make it the more feasible the Duke had Vessels and a Bridge ready framed which came down the River by him when he marched last against the Enemy Also his Army was twice as strong as it was at the making of his last Bridge And the Serasquier who had not hinder'd That was no way likely to hinder This. He did not so much as Quarter against him or near him within a while he drew off yet further and lay quite below Buda and a little after he marched clear away over the Bridge of Esseck The making of these Intrenchments I confess was a great Work. But there was the whole Army to do it and such things have been frequently done by less Armies As for the Soldiers Lodgings who were here to Quarter they might have made
him he would never leave him off till either he had beaten him to pieces or chas'd him out of Hungary But the Duke of Lorrain it seems entertain'd no such Thoughts and all that little that he did was against Teckely As if a Mastiff having a Bear by the Throat should let go his hold to snap at a Cur. 10. Though Caprara fail'd at Agria yet at Caschaw he had great Success having that strong Fortress yielded to him in a short time But for this he was beholden to Teckely's ill Usage by the Turks Which was a strange Hit to Caprara and made those things smooth and easy to him which might otherwise have been exceeding difficult For surely at the Surrender of Caschaw they were found so well provided at all points that had it not been for Teckely's Imprisonment Caprara might have been as well repuls'd as ever Man was 11. When Caprara had made such quick work at Caschaw it was expected that he would immediately have marched after Mercy and Heusler who were now in the course of their Victories or at least have sent them a good Reinforcement Since the Nail did drive here so well 't was pity there should want hands to strike it These brave Commanders wanted nothing but greater Forces to make greater Conquests those they had with them being hardly sufficient to Man the Places they took It had therefore been well done by Caprara if he had sent a good supply after them But if he had gone himself he had gain'd the Glory of the whole Action as well of the things that had been done before his coming as of those that should be done after all would have been ascribed to the General Caprara But he seemed little to mind these Matters All that he now did was to ly hatching over his new Conquest of Caschaw and to put his Men in Winter Quarters And this last he did sooner then he needed the Season being yet favourable For we find that Mercy and Heusler continued in Action and in the Field for several Weeks after Caschaw was surrender'd 12. It hath been said before that the Surrender of Caschaw and other Places was occasion'd by Teckely's Imprisonment And surely the Imprisonment of Count Teckely by the Turks was a most horrid Act even amongst Infidels He fell by the Fraud of faithless Barbarians to whom himself had been too faithful But the Turks were sufficiently punish'd for it since it caused the Submission of the revolted Hungarians to the Emperour which to the Turks was one of the greatest Blows they have receiv'd in all this War. 13. Among all the Champions engaged in this War of Hungary Mercy and Heusler have born away the prize It must be confess'd they went about their Business like Workmen These are they that with a handful of Men and when the year was almost quite spent fell into the Enemies Country and made very considerable Conquests Which they have bravely maintain'd ever since upon all Occasions and many such Occasions happen'd beating and chasing the Enemy Heusler had made himself famous before the Campagne began and had given great proofs of his diligence and courage in hindering the Relief of Newhausel for the effecting of which important Service the Turks made continual Attempts He was almost all the Winter on Horseback while others were in there Stoves at Vienna and Inspruck And now as Caprara had been detached from Lorrain so Mercy and Heusler were detached from Caprara and with their Party for it may not be called an Army they put themselves upon Action when the great ones were got into their Winter Quarters They took Zolnock first and afterward they took Saravas both which are considerable Passes the last upon the great River of Keroz and the first upon the greater River of Teys And the potent City of Debreczen which before was neutral they made to be wholly Imperial They also took several other Places of less name cleared a large Country and pierced deep into the Enemies Quarters They shewed what the Duke of Lorrain might have done if he had pleased with his whole Army to March that way He might as easily have taken Waradine and Segedine and Temeswar as they took Saravas and Zolnock He might have master'd the whole Country on this side the Danube as easily as They did part And as They Quarter'd their party upon the Enemy all Winter so He might have done by his Army not needing to send them so far as he did some of them to the remotest parts of Germany To make the thing shorter if the Duke of Lorrain after the Battel of Gran had deliver'd his victorious Troops to Mercy and Heusler we may well imagine what work they had made and how like a Torrent they had born down all before them 14. When the Venetians broke with the Turk and joyn'd in the War against him a Judgment might easily be from thence made that he was in a very ill Condition For we might well think that this wary People who also have perfect Intelligence of the State of that Empire would not engage but upon sure terms I believe this is the first time that they have been guilty of taking voluntary Arms against the Turk they not being much given to that sort of fooling which some call Gallantry This is not spoken in derogation of the Serene Republique They deserve great Honour upon several accounts Nor ought we to heed the Character given them by Joseph Scaliger in his Invective Poem Which I think is the bitterest Satyr that ever was written next to that of Catullus against Caesar It seems the Pretensions of this Family to Verona had fill'd the Mans Pen with Gall and Vinegar The Venetians having thus undertaken the War let us see how they prosecute it Their Terra firma or Land upon the Continent lies round the bottom of their Gulf within which upon certain small Islands Venice it self is situate Most of the Land by much doth ly on the Western side and takes up a good part of Lombardy The Eastern Extremity joyns upon Dalmatia some of which Country they also have the Turk possessing the greatest part and this is the only place where they border upon the Turks by land Hither their Armies may march by land or be transported cross the Gulf by a short Cut and at an easy Charge and here they might also be supplied at pleasure Moreover the Country of Dalmatia lies extended upon this Gulf of Venice from Istria to Albania between three and four hundred miles in length and it would be to the Venetians a thing of mighty importance to be sole Masters of it It lies just at their doors It would make their Dominion almost as weighty on this side of the Gulf as on the other and it would establish and secure their Soverainty over that Sea something better then their yearly mâ—rrying their Doge to it Of all the places in the World it lies most convenient for them one foot of ground
weaker then themselves And therefore they had no need to run a Wild goose Chase when they might carry their Business sure before them the plain way It must also be confess'd that it was necessary the Venetians should have a Fleet at Sea. But a much less had been sufficient We find that the Fleet or Squadro which Molino commanded in the Archipelago was more then the Turks could deal with But here it will be objected That the Venetians could not bring this great Army into Dalmatia for want of Men to do it with To this I answer That the Money they spent in equipping and maintaining their great Fleets would have drawn Men to them from all parts of Europe And the fame of so hopeful and glorious an Expedition would have roused up the most effeminate even of their own Subjects It may be objected also That regard must be had to the general Interest of the Confederates And this is best served by giving the greatest diversion to the Turks And the diversion is greater by attacquing Morea which is far from Hungary the chief Scene of Action then by attacquing Dalmatia which is near it To this I answer First that the greatest Force makes the greatest Diversion and therefore since there might be a much greater Force in Dalmatia then in Morea the Diversion would be much greater in Dalmatia Or according to what I said before forty or fifty thousand Men in Dalmatia would give the Turks a greater Diversion then twelve or fifteen thousand in Morea Secondly As I have said upon another occasion that Diversion is as good as Conjunction so I say here and now that Conjunction is as good as Diversion and therefore it cannot be hurtful that the Christian Armies be near one another It is the common Interest of Confederates that they all fall on where they can act with the greatest Strength and Vigour but whether near one another or a great way off is no way material Thirdly It is confess'd that Dalmatia being near to Hungary if those were the places chiefly attacqued the Turkish Armies that defended them might relieve and assist each other as there was occasion And would not the Christian Armies that act in those parts have the same Convenience Fourthly It is confess'd likewise that the Turks that defend Morea are quite divided from the rest but so also are the Christians that attacque it If therefore we distract the Enemies Force by distracting our own where lies the advantage Fifthly Herein the Turks had the advantage that their Forces were found ready in Morea which must have marched as far as Dalmatia if that had been vigorously invaded And so they were saved the labour of some Months which that long March had required Sixthly If the best way of Diversion be to go far off then the farther the better And therefore the Venetians should have sent their Fleet and Army another thousand Miles farther which they might have done Egypt or the Holy Land lay very fitly for their purpose and this had been a rare Diversion But if we will speak seriously no man can think that such a Project had been advisable Thus we see that the common Interest did not oblige the Venetians to go so far as Morea And as for their own Interest it plainly led them to Dalmatia as the most commodious which thing hath been noted before It may now be added that if they could get Dalmatia they might keep it but except the Turk be beaten out of Europe he will find Opportunities to beat the Venetians out of Morea And in the mean time let them do what they can it will be a Charge and a Burden to them whereas Dalmatia would maintain and defend it self 'T is granted that the Conquest of Morea would finely enlarge their Sea Dominion but there is nothing like securing their Gulf which is done by the Conquest of Dalmatia Admitting therefore that the attacquing of Morea were better for the Austrians and Poles and would more facilitate their Conquests yet clearly the Venetians are to do what is best for themselves They are not bound to be beating the Bush while others catch the Hare nor to hold the Man's hands while others rifle him nor to be making Diversions while others are making Conquests They must not think that those others who have chosen the better part will allow them any share in Their Acquisitions nor must they reckon that they shall gain any more by the War then what Themselves get possess'd of The Venetians it is believed have advanced more Money towards this War since the time they engaged in it then the Emperour hath done And they might have had as good Armies at least and have been in a fair probability to make as great Conquests had they not gone the wrong way to work and begun at the wrong end You will say the Emperour was vastly help'd by the Popes Money But the Venetians might have had an equal share with him if they had made their bargain wisely They that would excuse the Venetians Conduct are still of opinion that they were obliged to it by Agreement with their Confederates But we do not know this nor is it to be presumed It being much more usual that Confederates in these cases be left at liberty each to make the best of his own Game But if there were such an Agreement it was their great Error to consent to it It hath been observed of the House of Austria that they have a particular faculty of putting hard Conditions upon their Allies But the Venetians were not now to be imposed upon For they came voluntarily into a War in which the others were engaged before and therefore might have had what terms they pleased So that it was their own great fault if they were not good ones It is the opinion of some Men that the wise State of Venice in this Affair were over swayed by natural Inclination which it is very hard to withstand They are much better provided for a War at Sea then at Land. which might make them apt to turn their Forces that way We see all Creatures by a certain Instinct love to make use of that Part which Nature hath most strongly arm'd them withall And the Venetians did now as naturally make use of their Fleet as Bores use their Tusks or Bulls use their Horns or Horses their Heels I cannot leave the Venetians without one Remark more It was much wonder'd That when they had been victorious in Morea and remain'd Masters of the Field they yet carried their Army thence to their own Neighbouring Islands for Winter Quarters As if they had thought it a breach of good Manners to quarter upon an Enemies Country Or as if they had made Hungary their pattern where all were highly Civil in this kind two rude Fellows Mercy and Heusler excepted But what could the Venetians get by so doing Certainly the Victuals which the Army consumed in their Quarters would have done as well if it
had been brought to them at Morea And why should not the Victuals be carried to the Men as well as the Men to the Victuals Moreover had the Army staid here if they could not have maintain'd themselves wholly they must have got something towards their Maintenance And the Winter in Morea is mild and gentle it being the most Southern part of all the Continent of Europe Also by their stay they had better protected the poor revolted Greeks who contrariwise were in a very hard Condition when they were abandon'd by their new Friends and left to the rage of their old Masters And this as the case here stands is one great Evil of a desultory Sea-War The Greeks are ruin'd by the Christians if they come not in to them and by the Turks if they do Such a War being fit to infest and destroy but not to protect This sending Men so far to Winter Quarters seems to be a new fashion And so doth the proclaiming beforehand the time and place of Rendezvous Caesar was nine years in conquering Gaul but we cannot find that ever he did either of these things If he had drawn back his Army every Winter to Quarter in Italy he might have been nineteen years about this Work and left it undone at last But his way was to Quarter them in the midst of their Business and either upon his Enemies or as near them as he could in several Camps which they strongly intrenched And when Spring came he did not use to make a formal appointment of a Rendezvous but by close Orders and without noise he drew his Men together and fell in among the Enemies where he was least expected as sudden as a Clap of Thunder Commonly the first notice they had of him was by seeing their Country in flames The Prince of Orange hath of late years given us a Pattern of a Rendezvous and it was at the Siege of Bon. To which Place he made his Army march from several Quarters and by several ways none of them knowing or guessing whither they were going or what they were to do till they all met at one and the same time their Marches being so admeasur'd under the Walls of the Town We heard they had invested the Place before we heard that they were marching towards it and we heard they had taken it almost as soon as we heard that they were before it This important Success may justly be accounted the first step of Holland's deliverance from the French. To shew the advantage yet further of keeping an Army close up upon the Enemy all Winter if it may possibly be done I shall here bring a domestique Example though the memory of it I confess is not pleasing Our rebellious Rumpers got their Victory at Dunbar in September after which they took in Edenburg Lieth and some other places with the Countries on this side Sterling and then the Winter came on They now well saw that these new Conquests would not be able to give Winter Quarters to their Army But did they therefore draw them back into England No not a Man of them they kept them all in Scotland And moreover they were sending them Recruits all Winter with the addition of divers new Regiments Then for their Subsistance they sent them by Sea both Victuals for their Men and Hay for their Horses So that against Spring their Army was more then doubled upon the place and ready for Action Here now were Fellows that prosecuted their Business to the utmost And surely without this vigorous Persistance they had not brought that Kingdom so soon under their Yoke nor forced the King to that most Glorious but withal most hazardous and only not fatal March into England To apply this Example I do affirm That the Christian Armies might as easily have been kept all Winter in Hungary or Morea as the Blaspheming Army so the Scots elegantly call'd it was in Scotland 15. The Magnanimous King of Poland is not to be blamed for the slack Proceedings of that Kingdom but all the fault must be laid upon their unhappy Constitution which seems to be meerly a tryal of Skill how far Monarchy and Republique being mixed together may enervate and confound each other And it is from the wretched defects in their Government that so mighty a Country makes so small a figure in the World. This King after the Relief of Vienna and the defeat of the Grand Visier in which glorious Service he had a principal hand and after the taking of Gran and some other Places retired into his own Kingdom the Quarters assign'd him in Upper Hungary being made too uneasy by Teckely's Garrisons Now the Poles consult how to prosecute the War. And since they joyn upon the Turk themselves they resolve to employ their Forces upon their own Frontier Which surely was well consider'd for now they might work for themselves whereas in Hungary they must work for another And as to the Common Interest and Service Diversion and Conjunction are equipollent or to speak more at length It doth as much good to divert the Enemy as to joyn with the Friend The Turks border upon the Poles in Moldavia which is a Christian Country but tributary to the Turks and at their Command being also Govern'd by a Vaivod or Hospodar appointed by the Great Sultan It was formerly dependent upon Poland and it is divided from it by the River Niester Into this fertile Country the Poles resolve to March. where they could meet with little opposition almost all the Turkish Forces being drawn into Hungary And we may be sure the Christian Inhabitants were not unwilling to be freed from their Servitude especially if fair terms were offer'd them But the Polish Levies and Recruits went on so exceeding slowly that it was toward the end of September before they got into the Field And then they were about a Month in laying a Bridge over the Niester So that by that time they were got into Moldavia it was towards the end of October And after they had been there some five or six days without doing or attempting any thing they found the Winter come on so fast that they concluded it their best way to March back into their Winter Quarters And they did March back to their Winter Quarters accordingly Was not this a most famous Expedition We may defy all Places and Ages to shew the like The next year they got sooner into the Field though not with so good an Army But the Turks having now recover'd their Spirits brought such a Force against them and beset them so close that they had much ado to make their Retreat By what hath been here related and observ'd it plainly appears That the Christians have lost the greatest Opportunity that ever they had against the Turks These last by the destruction of their Army at Vienna were brought to such a condition that they were no way able to resist the united Powers of the Germans Poles and Venetians Whose Force also was much increased by the great Sums of Money advanced by the Pope And the whole Turkish Empire was in a strange Consternation and Confusion But in this so favourable a Conjuncture the Germans engaged themselves before Buda against Sense and Reason where they were held in Shackles the Poles were asleep when they should have been most active and the Venetians spent their time and their Money in rigging out a Fleet to no purpose and then in playing at small Game Had the Christians on all sides and with their whole Power press'd briskly and vigorously upon the Enemy it is probably believed That the Duke of Lorrain might the very first year have beaten them out of Hungary the Venetians might have conquered Dalmatia and the adjoyning Countries and the King of Poland might have seized Moldavia together with Valachia which stood upon the same terms and Marched to Constantinople FINIS
of Lorrain Observations 1. I shall not here meddle with the Justice of the Emperour 's or the Hungarians Cause Since is depends much upon the Constitution of that Kingdom which I do not pretend to know That may be just and lawful in Hungary or Poland which would be very unlawful in England or France But surely it is much doubted whether his Imperial Majesty did well in point of Prudence to suffer his Subjects to be thus provoked in such Circumstances of Time and Place It was in a Time when he had an Enemy upon his Arm that was ready to swallow up all Europe and it was in a Place bordering upon the Turks who are both willing to take and able to use such Advantages 2. If the French did secretly incite the Emperour to Severities and his Subjects to Resistance it is no great wonder For they had then a dangerous War with Him and his Confederates and it is thought no Crime to use all ways and means to weaken and distract an Enemy But the wonder is that the Jesuits would be the Instruments of so great Mischief to his Imperial Majesty who had so great a Favour for their Order However this may seem less strange if we consider that the Jesuits are wise and regard their Interest more than their Inclinations or Obligations They know that in great Affairs Gratitude and good Nature look like foolish things And therefore they might think fit to forsake or even to betray a Prince that loved them thereby to gratify a Prince that was useful to them The truth is they wanted the Power of France to defend and support them against their great Enemy the Pope who 't is thought had much rather see the Jesuits rooted out of Christendom than the Protestants out of Hungary So that as things stood we must not blame the Fathers if they could deny nothing to the French King. 3. By the Impaling the Prisoners and the Success of it we may observe that extraordinary Severities are not to be used to Prisoners of War where the Enemy is in a Condition to retaliate Upon the first Revolt of the Hollanders the Duke of Alva caused all those that he took in fight to be executed by the hands of the Hangman But when he saw that the Dutch caused all whom they took to be executed likewise without mercy his dire Soul was forced to submit to the necessity of fair War. as Grotius informs us in his most excellent Belgick History 4. Count Teckeley is severely censur'd for calling in the Turk to his Assistance And surely if the Emperour's proceedings were just and good and Teckeley's Arms unlawful his joyning with the Infidels was a great aggravation of his Crime Nor doth the Necessity he was reduced to in any measure excuse him since it was a Necessity of his own making As he that hath robb'd a Man may find a Necessity to kill him too to prevent pursuit or discovery Or as Catiline says in the Play The Ills that I have done cannot be safe But by attempting greater On the other side if the Imperial Ministers did unjustly persecute and oppress the Necessity was then of their making and the Consequences of it ly at their Doors For where a Necessity brings Mischief the Authors of the Necessity are the Authors of the Mischief And to think it unlawful to joyn with Infidels against Christians in any case whatsoever is a very great Mistake For if Merchants be set upon by Christian Pirates and a Squadron of Algerines come by who can condemn the Merchants if they joyn with those worst of Infidels to preserve themselves and to destroy the Christians that would destroy them Upon which account the English at our first trading into the East-Indies did several times joyn with Mahometans and Pagans against the Portugals 5. The Grand Visier and the Duke of Lorrain are now enter'd the Lists And surely it is a noble Sight when two great Champions are engaged against each other They draw the Eyes of the whole World upon them and are the Subject of all Mens Discourses Many such Pairs have their Names recorded in the Books of Fame But those are most remarkable who have had a Tug of some Continuance whereby they might shew their Play and give the utmost Efforts of their Skill and Courage Such were Hannibal and Marcellus the two elder Scipio's and the two Hasdrubals Michridates and Lucullus Pompey and Sertorius Caesar and Vercingetorix Caesar and Pompey And after them Germanicus and Arminius Cerealis and Civilis Trajan and Decebalus Charlemain and Wittikind who fought twelve Battels may justly claim a room among these famous Combatants So may Francis the First and Charles the Fifth who had almost continual Wars and were brave Captains as well as mighty Princes To whom may be added the Great Gonsalvo and Monsieur Lautrec stiff adversaries in the Wars of Naples and in the Wars of Piemont Dom Ferdinand Gonsaga and the Marshal of Brissac Then follow Henry the Fourth and the Duke of Parma Maurice Prince of Orange and Spinola Gustavus Adolphus and Count Tilly the same Gustavus and Walstein Turenne and Montecuculi Others I omit and hasten back to the Hungarian War. CHAP. II. VIENNA THE Duke of Lorrain being first in the Field sits down before Newhausel but upon the Enemies Advance he raises the Siege And finding himself much over-power'd he encamps near Raab upon a River of that name which there falls into the Danube The Grand Visier comes on and while his Main Body confronts the Duke the Tartars tracing the River towards the head soon find or make their way over For which great blame is laid upon the Hungarians who had the Guard of the passages committed to them But the Duke hereupon draws off to Raab Town where he divides his Army Himself and the Cavalry make their Retreat directly to Vienna being shrewdly ruffled by the Tartars who fell upon them in their March unawares The Foot are ordered to pass the Danube and to march to the same Place there being Men first drawn out of them to make up very strong Garrisons for Raab Comorra and Leopoldstat Vpon the Duke's arrival at Vienna from whence the Emperour and his whole Court were now retired he marches over the Bridge into an Island of the Danube called St. Leopold that lies over against the City This Post he maintains a while but afterwards deserts it for Reasons not known and marches clear away Moreover his Foot arrive also in good time and before the Grand Visier could come up with the Main of his Army Who laid all things aside and overlook'd all Difficulties to attacque this Imperial City The Siege is carried on for two Months with all vigour and violence and with very great loss of Men. Count Staremberg commanded within the Place and did well defend it But however it was brought at last to great Extremities Then come the Christian Forces commanded by the King of Poland the Electors of Saxony and
Bavaria the Duke of Lorrain and Prince Waldeck who rout the Turkish Army and relieve the City And now Count Teckely desires to submit upon fair terms but no terms would be given him whereupon he renews his Alliance with the Turks The Duke of Saxony marcheth home with his Troops The rest of the Christian Army advance into Hungary and take Gran Lewents and other places The Grand Visier having rallied he remains of his broken Army and strangled several Bassa's and other Officers for not doing their Duties is afterward strangled himself to appease the Rage of the Soldiers and People Observations 1. IT must be confess'd that in this beginning of the Campagne the Duke of Lorrain had a hard Game to play as all have that must act upon the defensive against a much over-matching Enemy But the Duke seems to have dangerously mistaken his measures in choosing a Post which he was not able to maintain which brought all things to the utmost hazard How could he expect that the Tartars of whom the Grand Visier had thirty thousand should be stopt by a small short River that make it their practice to swim over the Nieper the Niester and the Danube Nor let the Hungarians be blamed for not defending the Passes for it doth not appear how it was possible to be done Had the Duke strongly encamp'd under the Walls of Raab and not at that distance he did which was seven or eight Miles as he had covered the Country in effect as well so he had secured his Army much better And perhaps he had done best to have posted himself yet more backward What though some Frontier places had been thereby exposed It had been more advisable to sacrifice a part than so greatly to endanger the whole And this seems to have been the Sentiment of the Marshal of Crequi when he managed a defensive War against this Duke in his own Country of Lorrain He posted himself at once upon the Moselle leaving the Saar as good a Stream as the Raab and all the Places upon it with the whole Country between those two Rivers open to the invading Army Which he thought a less Evil than to grasp what he could not hold and thereby put his own Army upon which the Fortune of France depended in danger of a hasty and disgraceful Retreat or perhaps a total Ruine 2. In the Duke's retreat to Vienna some People are unsatisfi'd with two things The One is that as his Troops were marching the Tartars were upon them and among them before they were in the least aware of it Which they think could not be if the Duke had not strangely wanted Intelligence in the Emperour 's own Country and if he had taken care to send out his Scouts in due manner and throughly to discover the ways by which he was to march as cautious and skilful Generals use to do The other thing is that when these Troops were got to Vienna they never turn'd their faces toward the Enemy but lay in that Island of St. Leopold as it were without Life and Soul. I confess they might well be daunted with the disgraces and dangers of their Retreat and the dismal condition of Affairs But then they should have been made to recover their Spirits by some successful Encounters of which there were fair Opportunities by the posture the Turks were in Who came up in scambling Parties their main Body not arriving till several days after 3. If the Duke of Lorrain had now a hard Game sure the Grand Visier had an easy one He commanded a mighty Force which had nothing to withstand or oppose it the Christian Army being broken up and as it were quite vanish'd So that he was now if I may use an odd Expression like a Lord in a Hutch he might turn himself which way he pleased There was only one Caution to be used That whereas the Christians had mainly provided for the defence of four Towns let what will become of the rest he would for the present forbear medling with those Towns. but every where else he might go on conquering and to conquer no other place being capable to make resistance A few Examples of barbarous Cruelty toward those that stood it out to which the Grand Visier's nature would easily have enclin'd him and of good usage to those that readily yielded would in that terror have open'd him the Gates of all those Places And in humane probability he might that Summer have subdu'd all the Austrian Dominions on the South side the Danube the Towns of Raab and Vienna excepted Or if he would be content with destroying the open Country he might have done it so throughly in two or three Months time as not to leave a House standing nor hardly a Man or Beast living And in the like space of time he might have serv'd Bohemia so too and other parts of Germany It would have been such a Destruction as never was since the time of Attila But the Visier's pride and folly and evil Genius made him leave these advantages and these certainties to fall upon a strong and populous City that had a Army in Garrison that was a hundred Miles within the Enemies Country and upon a great River which he was not sure nor likely to command on both sides Nothing could break his Army nor deliver those Countries out of his hands but such a Siege 4. As it was a grand Error in the Visier to undertake this Siege so he committed divers others in the Prosecution of it In the first place he destroy'd all the Country near him with Sword and Fire by which means great quantities of Provisions were destroy'd that should have been preserved for the sustenance of his Army for want of which he was fain to supply himself by Convoys from Hungary Also when the Christians advanced to relieve Vienna he caused his Men to leave the advantage of their Camp in which they were strongly fortified and to meet their Enemies in the open Field When as the Christians could not stay by it having no Provisions wherewith the Turks abounded Moreover when his Army went out to fight he went not out with them but shamefully stay'd behind and kept at a distance And when they were routed and fled he fled with the foremost as fast as his Horse could carry him without any offer to rally or any endeavour to make a Retreat His strangling some of the run away Bassa's afterward did no way purge his own baseness take them at the worst they did but follow his Example He therefore seems to have well deserved his ignominious End going off the stage inglorious and with the Character of a proud and cruel Coward 5. I believe most men conclude that the Emperour did very prudently in retiring from Vienna upon the Enemies Advance thereby securing his own Sacred Person And I confess the safety of the Prince is a matter of highest Importance But yet sometimes wise Princes do lay aside the thoughts of
and Waradine might have held out a week or two But for the other Places they had been nothing in his hands The easy taking of Zolnock and Saravas afterward which are two of the best of them doth plainly make it appear how weak a defence they were like to make So that in all probability he might in a few Months have beaten the Turks out of Upper Hungary And then Teckely's party must have fallen in likewise together with the Prince of Transylvania In this way the War would in a great measure have maintain'd it self and not have exhausted the Emperour in that grievous manner that the Siege of Buda did The Duke's numbers would also have increased by the coming in of the Christian Hungarians and Men flocking from all parts to the conquering Army And all would have been in a flourishing condition These things might have come to pass if the Duke had been pleased after the old Rule to strike the Nail where it would drive and had taken care not to put any thing to hazard when he had so much sure play But nothing would content him but the Siege of Buda which was too heavy for him As if a man should be amongst Ingots of Gold most of them portable and some few not and he should choose rather to break his back at once with one that he could not carry than take away the lesser at ease one after another after which the greater with a little patience might be broken or melted down One would think the fresh Example of the Grand Visier's Fool-hardiness and the fatal Consequences of it should have kept the Duke from committing the like Error And 't is a wonder how he could expect that eighteen thousand Foot for his Army was reckon'd at thirty thousand and twelve thousand of them were Horse and Dragoons could force a City though not very well fortified that had fifteen thousand in Garrison It is confess'd that the Duke had very good Men. But then it was great pity that they should be so used so miserably thrown away Had they been put upon reasonable services they might in all likelihood have crown'd themselves with Victory and Honour and their General with Glory The best Army upon Earth may be baffled by an ordinary Enemy if it attacque him in his strength which therefore good Generals avoid Cambray was the Frontier against the French and stood in their very teeth the best part of two hundred years But withal it was exceeding strong and always very well mann'd and furnish'd and therefore in all that space they never attempted it till now lately the time they took it When the same French marched against Holland Mastricht lay just in their way and they had threaten'd it hard But since it had got a Garrison of ten or twelve thousand Men they fairly past it by as if there had been no such Town Afterwards when the Garrison was less by half they fell close to it and had it upon reasonable terms But if they had fallen upon it at first it might have broke their whole Army The Rhetoricians tell us that in Statu deliberativo there are two principal Questions an utile an possibile and to both these there must be good answers given to make a Design advisable For 't is idle to engage upon things that are easy unless they be profitable withal nor should any prospect of advantage tempt us to an Undertaking if the thing be not possible or as the French and We better express it not feasible 'T is confess'd that Buda was very convenient for the Duke But must he therefore take it whether he can or no Must he therefore throw away his Army upon it to no purpose If a Stone Wall stand in a Mans way must the Man run his head against it The Advice which Quintilian gives his Orator may be applied full well to a General Consulat vires suas I do again confess that Buda is a place of great importance for carrying on the War. But is there no other Place worth the looking after Surely there are many such upon this Frontier beside those farther in There is upon the North side the Danube Waradine and Zolnock and Agria and Newhausel and upon the South side there is Alba Regalis Caniza and Gradisca I will allow that Buda with Pest is more worth than any two of them But the worst two of them is more worth than Buda without Pest which is the present case the Duke having Pest already We can therefore only conclude that the gaining this City is to be mainly intended and endeavour'd in a reasonable way and when ever there is power and opportunity That which is extraordinary in Buda is its situation upon the Danube and that the taking it opens this River to the Christians giving them free passage farther down for their Provisions and other Necessaries Gradisca would do the same upon the Save and Zolnock upon the Teys but the Navigation of the Danube is much more considerable than either of these it being the grand River and coming from the chief Parts of the Emperour's Dominions But I must take notice That since the Christians had Pest already on the opposite bank it seems hardly possible to hinder their passage up and down in so great a Stream near their own side under the favour of dark Nights Which makes the advantage of the Water to be much less to this Town of Buda than was imagin'd Then as for commanding the Land the Towns before named do far excell Buda as it is now without Pest for it now commands but one side of the River And surely it is plain to any that will consider that a Town which stands upon a great River not having a passage over it is half block'd up But the Towns before named command the Countries clear round especially Agria Newhausel and Caniza which three are the farthest advanc'd and which are the three Horns that gore the Imperial Territories And Alba Regalis and Waradine do alse command far and wide But it may be said farther of Buda that here is the lowest Bridge and Pass upon the Danube nor is there any other in Hungary Gran only excepted Which place and Barkan do yoke this River about forty miles higher in the same manner as Pest and Buda do here In the old Maps of these Countries there is the Mark and Picture of a Bridge at Colocza forty miles lower but there is no such Bridge now to be found It appears then that Gran was of the same Consideration last year that Buda is now But the Grand Visier if I may look back on what I have before omitted did not do his part in defending it He had got an Army together after his defeat at Vienna by rallying and recruiting the Christians giving him leisure to do it for they made no great haste to pursue their Victory Part of his Army he lost foolishly by fighting the Christians in their March to no purpose
who thereupon possess'd themselves of Barkan on which side the Fight was Then he let them pass the River to attacque Gran without Opposition And which was worst of all He did not put Men enow into the Town when he might have put in what number he would Had he fill'd Gran as the Serasquier fill'd Buda Gran might have been as well preserv'd And indeed much better and easier because of the Winter then approching But this is a Digression in this place I return to the Siege of Buda 2. It is taken for granted by most Men that when the Duke of Lorrain had with his Cavalry defeated the Serasquier he could do no less than return to Buda and push on the Siege But some are of a contrary opinion They think that having try'd the Strength of that Place and Garrison which was still the same notwithstanding the Serasquier's defeat he had now a fair Occasion given him to leave a Siege upon which he had rashly engaged that he might pursue his Victory in a more effectual manner and march with his whole Army after the slying Enemy Which if he had done in all probability he had broke them to pieces they could never have made head against him If they found it so hard to get an Army again together though the Siege of Buda gave them so great respite and leisure how could they have done it if they had been closely followed But the Duke would have been stop'd by the Bridge of Esseck to which place the Enemy was fled I answer that this Bridge was then in a weak Condition being not well fortified at either End. And the farther End being attacqued by Count Lesley next year we know how easily it was taken Also this Bridge of Esseck is four or five English miles in length partly over several Branches of the Drave and partly over low Grounds Admitting therefore that the Ends were not to be taken yet the middle part could not be defended nor the Christians hindred from passing over to it without great numbers of Foot. and the Serasquier had scarce any Foot left the two defeats and the Manning of Buda having taken away most of them Moreover it did much sacilitate the Enterprize of Esseck that Count Lesley was then in those parts with a good Body of Men. where he had taken Virovitza a strong Town upon or near the Drave between which Town and the Bridge of Esseck there was no Place of Strength And Lesley commanded both sides the River and had laid or was about to lay a Bridge of Boats over it having plenty of Vessels for that purpose And these might have been sent down the Stream to the Duke at Esseck as likewise Provisions and other Necessaries It appears then plainly that the Taking of this Bridge was much more seasible than Buda And by the taking of it Buda must fall in short time and all that the Turks have in Lower Hungary this being their only passage to it But what if the Duke had found this Bridge very strongly guarded and the gaining it very difficult I answer That then he must have let it alone as well as Buda There was other easy work good store ready to his hand and the more strongly this Place had been guarded the more unguarded other Places must be Also the whole Country had lain open to him the Country on this side the Drave and that between the Drave and the Save and beyond the Save also He might have gone which way he pleased there being in effect no Army to oppose him For as for the Serasquier and his fugitive Rabble they would have signified nothing And all had been full of Terror and Confusion Thus the Duke of Lorrain was fairly invited by his Victory to raise his Siege Which also he should have done without any such Invitation He could not but be quickly sensible that he had taken wrong measures in attacquing this City and to persist in an Error wise Men say is the greatest Error Therefore very famous Commanders when they have found themselves engaged in a bad business have esteem'd it their wisest course to get clear of it without delay I shall instance only in two The great Hannibal of old after he had tasted the strength of Placentia made no scruple to leave it And of later times the great Gustavus thought it no dishonour to rise from before Ingolstat when he found it too hot for him Had the Duke of Lorrain done so here he had been glorious and in all probability the Turk had been totally ruin'd As the Siege of Vienna the year before was the thing that preserv'd the German Emperour so nothing could now preserve the Ottoman but the Siege of Buda It may seem by the pains I have taken in this matter that the design upon Buda is as hard to beat down as the Walls of it are But the difficulty is not yet quite over for there remains a grand Objection against all that hath been said They say That for the Duke to have marched on into the Enemies Country leaving Buda behind him with such a Garrison in it might have been of fatal Consequence That Buda must first be taken to open the way to other places And therefore since the attacquing of Buda was necessary it could not be imprudent To this I answer First that where a Frontier carries a breadth of three or four hundred miles and such is the Frontier between the Turk and the Emperour it reaching from the northerly parts of Transylvania to the Gulf of Venice it were very strange if there should be but one way for a mastering Army to break in upon it and that all should be guarded by one Town without the taking of which nothing else could be done I have already named seven Capital Garrisons beside Buda upon this Frontier And there are divers lesser Places besides Particularly there is Novigrad and Hatwan which after that the Duke had got Pest and Vacia seem'd next in course being not far off and on the same side the River But where there is such Choice of Places to fall upon it is the use of skilful Generals to learn the condition of each place and to fall upon those that are worst provided for all Places cannot be provided alike And surely had the Duke been minded to do the easiest things first he might always have been doing the easiest things or to speak plainer he might have found all things easy whereas now by attempting the hardest thing first he hath made all things hard For the Turks do now by the Example of Buda defend their Places after another rate than they did before But had the Duke fallen upon likely things he would in all probability have found no greater resistance any where than he found at Gran which we know was very little There was therefore no necessity for the Duke to fall upon Buda since the Country was wide enough and he might go either to the right
hand or the left as far as he could reasonably desire By going to the Right hand he had gone straight upon the Drave which brings all sorts of Supplies out of the Hereditary Countries down which River he had met with no Turkish place worth naming till he came to Esseck of whose weakness I have spoken before and of its great Importance withal On the other side by going to the left hand he had gone straight upon the River Teys which brings all necessaries out of the Emperour 's Upper Hungary And the Place which the Turks have highest upon this stream is Zolnock which we know was very easily taken next year with divers Places about it all which Places and many more might have been taken as easily now We see therefore that which way soever the Duke had turn'd he might have found it commodious But Secondly if the Matteraright Duke had turn'd no way but had march'd straight on by Buda and left that Place behind him plainly there had been no harm nor danger in it We find the like is frequently done by others Not to run upon new Instances the French as hath been noted past by Mastricht and have often past by Cambray and even in this War the Grand Visier when he march'd to Vienna left behind him Comorra and Raab and Altenburg and Newstat beside other places Newstat was near his Camp and he might have taken it with ease which yet he neglected to do and no harm came of it It must be granted that where the invading Army is opposed by an Army almost as good in that case it were very hazardous to engage too deep in the Enemies Country because the Enemy by the help and favour of his Garrisons might distress them very much and have great advantaces upon them But if the Enemy be quite over match'd and dare not abide within distance which was now the condition of the Turks there is then no such danger And Garrisons without an Army to stand by them cannot hurt much nor hinder the Invaders from going or staying where they please nor from picking and choosing what work they will do But they must take heed of undertaking any long and difficult Siege as the Grand Visier did last year though he furmounted the Incommodities of it by the great Force he had about him But it may be presumed that for the most part their work will be easy in regard the Places that lie farther inward cannot in likelihood be so well fortifi'd and furnish'd as the Frontier Places are I confess the taking of the outmost Frontier Garrisons is a healing Work. since thereby we clear and set at peace such parts of our own Country as those Garrisons did before command and harrass But it must be acknowledg'd on the other side that the Places farther inward do more annoy the Enemy as lying within their Bowels If it be said that these Places though perhaps they may be easily got yet are hard to be kept and hard to be relieved I answer that the Christians may keep and relieve such Places as well as the Turks do Newhausel Agria and Caniza which though it be done with some difficulty yet this is abundantly recompensed by the great Mischief which those Towns do to the Emperour For which reason the Turks do justly set a high value upon those Towns. And surely I think it will not be denied but that it were a very great Service if the Christians could get three or four Places as far advanced as the Towns last named and which might gall and gore the Ottoman Countries as much as the Towns last named do the Austrian They that are the stronger which the Christians are now need not be affraid to scatter the War but should rather desire it Since thereby they do more distract the Enemy and put him upon a stronger Guard and make him yet more unable to keep the Field These Notions are easily conceived by any considering Person they naturally flowing from the things themselves but I have found it a work of some difficulty to digest and express them and make them plain Though perhaps to those that read even this also may seem easy now it is done Moreover I am very sensible that I have been unreasonably prolix upon this Subject But I could not work my Matter aright with fewer words 3. It was a rare felicity to the Duke of Lorrain and such as befals few Generals that when he had lost I may not say destroy'd one Army he could sit still till another was brought to him It calls to mind the Centurion in Tacitus whom the Soldiers call'd Cedo alteram because when he had broken one Cudgel upon them he us'd to cry Cedo alteram give me another But the Duke of Lorrain if he had had an Enemy any thing near his Match and if at this time the Turks had not been strangely weak could not have had this leisure Also he might have stay'd and call'd long enough for a new Army if the Peace of Flanders which happen'd just at this time had not given the Germans liberty to march to him And this Peace was obtain'd beyond all Expectation It was almost miraculous that the French should let go so great an Advantage They that envy their Greatness hope they will never have the like again But to say the truth the advantage was lost the year before Had the French then fallen upon the Towns with all their Force instead of Quartering upon the Country which they might have done with equal Justice and as some conceive with less Insolence they might have carried Flanders that very year or at least put it out of condition to subsist But now such Alliances were form'd to preserve it and so many Mediators had concern'd themselves that perhaps it was not safe to displease them However it may be truly said upon the whole matter that the French did not pursue their Interest in this occasion so closely as they use to do Machiavell tells us of divers Men that sadly miscarried in their Affairs by not being perfectly wicked which he saith is frequently the ruin of great Designs Some may apply this to the French Ministers and may think that they lost their Advantage here mention'd because they had not the Heart nor the Face to prosecute it It seeming a little too horrid while the Turk was destroying and devouring on the one side for Them to do the like on the other But it must be consider'd that it was not altogether so scandalous to fall upon Flanders as it had been to fall upon Germany it self which was engaged in the Turks War. Also the Turks after their defeat at Vienna were not in an invading condition and it was much more tolerable to stop the Emperour's Conquests than to promote the Turkish But moreover the French Ministers are of a stronger temper than to be hinder'd from doing those things that are convenient either by the checks of Conscience or by the rebukes
in Dalmatia is worth two or three elsewhere And since the Enemy had likewise the Germans and Poles upon him against whom his utmost Endeavours were required and probably would be all too little it could not otherwise be but that Dalmatia would be very slenderly guarded And it proved so in the Event the Turks Forces there being inconsiderable It was therefore with reason expected that the Venetians would make it their principal Care to get a good Army in Dalmatia Which if they had done it was hardly possible for them to fail of Success So that in all humane probability they might have made an easy Conquest of that whole Country And then their Forces being increased by the accession of the Christians there and maintain'd in great measure by the Country they had conquer'd they might have carried the War into Albania or Servia or Bosnia which border upon it and would have been found as much unprovided But in stead of this they fall with might and main to Rigging out their Fleet for which there was no occasion and they fill it with their Land Forces As much neglecting Dalmatia out of Choice as the Turks did out of Necessity The Turks could not have a Force there and it seems the Venetians would not And the second Campagne was worse then the first For in the first they had there an Army though it were small and inconsiderable but in the second they had none at all And what did they do with their Fleet in which we see was all their Confidence and which took up all their Care The first Summer was almost all spent in Preparations At last they got to Sea and took a small Island with a Fort near it upon the Main And this was all they did that year which did no way answer the Charge The next year as their Force was greater so also they got out sooner And they carried their Army to the farther part of Morea above a thousand Miles from Venice It cannot be denyed but that they did their Work here very substantially and Soldier like And they had as much Success as could be expected from such an Army Which also was a good Army considering how far they were carried on Shipboard and how great the Charge was of the Fleet that attended them But here lies the Wonder that they should send an Army so far when with the same Expence they might have had one in Dalmatia three or four times as big as it is well known to those that know the Charge of a Fleet. What could they promise to themselves in Morea more than in Dalmatia Did they hope to find them unprovided there and a small Force there to oppose them they could not be worse provided then in Dalmatia where there was no Force at all Also the Places in Morea were as well fortified as in Dalmatia and the Christians were as likely to come into the Conquerors and revolt from the Turks in the one Country as in the other The Matter therefore in short stands thus demonstrable Forty or fifty thousand Men in Dalmatia could do much more then twelve or fifteen thousand in Morea But forty or fifty thousand might as easily be had in Dalmatia as twelve or fifteen thousand in Morea Therefore it had plainly been more advisable to fall upon Dalmatia then Morea For a further Illustration let me make another Instance at home and suppose once more that we had War with Scotland In a time also when they were under great discouragement and disorder had other Enemies upon them and were very weakly provided to defend themselves And We were willing to make the best use of such an Opportunity Would it not now be a rare Contrivance if in stead of pouring a main Army into the South Parts of that Kingdom which border upon us and ly open to us we should send a great Fleet with a small Army round by Sea to the farthest North There to ly Hawking after Ports when we might the while have been Conquering whole Countries The Cases are exactly parallel only with this difference that whereas We should have gone two or three hundred miles out of Our way the Venetians have gone a thousand out of Theirs I might also instance in the French and shew how contrary their Sentiments are to the Venetians in this matter When They are minded to invade the Spanish Kingdoms they never dream of carrying Armies by Sea to Cales or Gibraltore or other places remote but fall directly into Catalonia or Biscay The Dutch 't is true in the great War of the Confederates against the French though they had work enough in Flanders yet they sent a Fleet with some Land-Men in it to the farther parts of France But they did this but once they never thought fit to repeat it Well perceiving that the Money which such a Fleet must cost would be much better bestowed upon increasing their Army in Flanders Beside they did not design to make any great Conquests or carry on a War at Land as the Venetians do but meerly to alarm and infest the Sea Coasts I cannot but observe by the by that the Dutch did manage this Affair in the Execution of it as weakly and awk wardly and unskilfully and unlearnedly as ever did Men. I know this may seem incredible but I could make it plainly and particularly to appear if it were not too long a digression It must be confess'd that a Fleet and Army have notable Advantages by the Swiftness of their Motion especially where a large Sea-Coast lies exposed to them For it is impossible to hinder their Landing as Rawleigh doth well demonstrate And before their Opposers can come up they will for some time be Masters of the Field so as to be able to ravage the open Country and likewise to possess themselves of some Ports which being relievable by Sea will not easily be recover'd By this way he that is Master at Sea may put great hardships upon an Enemy that at Land is much stronger then himself And wise Men are of opinion that the English might shrewdly trouble France this way if a War should happen But the Venetians were now above these things and had a better Game to play A Country of the Enemies lay open to them at their doors and but weakly guarded and joyning to them by Land. I think there cannot be stronger Invitations What greater Advantage can be desired then to have a good Army in the Enemies Country clearly Master of the Field And this they might certainly have had if they had employed their main Force upon Dalmatia To be Master of the Field though but for a time is the End and Aim even of a desultory Sea-War as it hath been already noted And surely if the temporary advantage be so desirable to have it constant and permanent must be so much more The Venetians moreover had not now a stronger Enemy to deal with considering the Circumstances he lay under he was much