thousand unexpected accidents fall in to hasten its destruction CHAP. XVIII Nothing is more honourable in a General than to foresee the Designs of his Enemy IT was the saying of Epaminondas the Theban that no one quality was more useful and necessary in a General than to be able to know the resolutions and designs of his Enemy and discover that by conjecture which he could not do by any certain intelligence Nor is it difficult only to understand his designs but his actions and of those actions not only such as are perform'd privately or at a distance but such as are done as it were before his Face For it many times falls out that when a Battel continues till night he who has the better believes he has the worst and who has lost all supposes he has the Victory Which mistakes has put the Generals many times upon pernicious counsels as it hapned betwixt Brutus and Cassius for Brutus having defeated the Enemy with his Wing Cassius supposing he had been lost and his whole Body dispers'd killed himself in despair In our times at the Battel of S. Cilicia in Lombardy Francis King of France coming to an engagement with the Swizzers the Fight continued till night a body of the Swizzers remaining entire and hearing nothing of the defeat and execution of their Comrades concluded the Victory was theirs which error was the occasion that they marched not off as they might have done but kept their ground till the next morning at which time they were charged again and overthrown The same error had almost ruined the Armies of the Pope and King of Spain who upon a false alarm of the Victory of the Swizzers passed the Po and advanced so far that ere they were aware they had like to have fallen into the mouths of the victorious French The like fell out of old in the Camps of the Romans and Aequi Sempronius the Consul being commanded out with an Army against the enemy and forcing him to a Battel it continued till night without any visible advantage on either side Night coming on and both Armies sufficiently spent neither of them retir'd to their Camps but betook themselves to the neighbouring hills where they believed they should be more safe The Roman Army divided into two parts one went with the Consul and the other with Tempanius the Centurion by whose courage the Roman Army was preserved that day The next morning the Consul hearing no more of the enemy retreated towards Rome the Aequi with their Army did the same for both of them though they had been beaten and marched away without regarding the loss or plunder of their Camps it hapned that Tempanius being behind with his squadron and marching off as the rest he took certain of the wounded Aequi prisoners who inform'd him that their Generals were gone out of the field and had quitted their Camps Upon enquiry finding it to be true he entred into the Roman and secured it but the enemies Camp was given in prey to the Souldier after which he returned with Victory to Rome which Victory consisted only in having the first intelligence of the enemies disorder from whence it is observable that two Armies engaged may be each of them in the same distress and despair and that that Army goes away with the Victory which has first notice of the necessities of the other and of this I shall give a pregnant example of late days and at home In the year 1498 the Florentines had a great Army in the Country of Pisa and had besieged that City very close The Venetian having undertaken its protection and seeing no other way to relieve it to divert the enemy and remove the war they resolved to invade the Territory of the Florentine to which purpose they raised a strong Army marched into their Country by the Val di Lamona possessed themselves of the Town of Marradi and besieged the Castle of Castiglione which stands above upon an hill The Florentines upon the alarm resolved to relieve Maradi and yet not weaken their Army before Pisa whereupon they raised a new Army both Horse and Foot and sent them thither under the Command of Iacopo Quarto Appiano Lord of Piombino and the Count Rinuccio da Marciano The Florentine Army being conducted to the hills the Venetian raised his siege before Castiglione and retreated into the Town the Armies being in this posture and facing one another for several days both of them suffered exceedingly for want of all manner of Provisions at length neither of them being very earnest to come to a Battel and each of them being ignorant of the others distress they resolved the next morning to break up their Camp and each of them to retire the Venetian towards Berzighella and Faenza and the Florentine towards Casaglia and Mugello The morning being come and the Baggage sent away before a poor Woman hapned to come into the Florentine Camp from Marradi to see some of her Relations who were in the service of the Florentine by this Woman the Florentine Generals had notice that the Venetians were gone whereupon reassuming their courage they altered their counsels pursued the enemy and writ Letters to Florence that they had not only beaten the Venetians but made an end of the War Which Victory proceeded from nothing but because they had the first news of the retreat of the Enemy which if it had come to the other side as it did to them the consequence would have been the same and the Florentines have been beaten CHAP. XIX Whether for the Government of the multitude obsequiousness and iâ—dulgence be more necessary than punishment THe Roman Commonwealth was perplexed with the dissentions betwixt the Nobility and the people nevertheless their foreign Wars requiring it they sent forth with their Armies Quintius and Appius Claudius Appius being rough and cruel in his commands was so ill obeyed by his Soldiers that he was defeated and fled out of his Province Quintius being more gentle and benign was better obeyed and carried the Victory where he was from whence it appears more conducing to the well governing of a multitude to be rather obliging than proud and pitiful than cruel However Cornelius Tacitus tells us and many others are of his mind In multitudine regendâ— plus paena quam obsequium valet That to the managing of a multitude severity is more requisite than mildness And I think both may be true to his distinction of Companions and Subjects if those under your command be Companions and fellow Citizens with you you cannot securely use them with that severity of which Tacitus speaks for the people of Rome having equal authority with the Nobility was not to be used ruggedly by any man that was put over them for but a while And it has been many times seen that the Roman Generals who behaved themselves amicably towards their Souldiers and governed them with mildness have done greater things than those who used them with austerity and
Xenophon in the Life of Cyrus tells us that when Cyrus went to invade the King of Armenia assigning several offices and places to the several parts of his Army he told them that Questa non era altro ch'una di quelle caccie le quali molte volte havenano fatte seco That this expedition was no more than one of those Chaces which they had taken frequently with him Those whom he placed as Scouts upon the Mountains he resembled to them who set their nets upon the hills and those who were to make excursions upon the plain were like them who were employed to rouse the Deer and force them into the Toyls And this is said by Xenophon to shew the resemblance and similitude betwixt hunting and war for which cause those kind of exercises are not only honourable but necessary for great persons and the rather because nothing gives a man so true a knowledg of the Country or imprints it more deeply and particularly in the memory and when a man has acquainted himself thorowly with one Country he may arrive more easily at the knowledg of other because all Countries and Coasts have some kind of proportion and conformity betwixt them so that the knowledg of the one contributes much to the understanding of the other But if before you have acquainted your self with your own you seek out new Regions you will hardly without great labour and long time come to the knowledg of either Whereas he that is well vers'd and practised in one shall at the first cast of his eye give you an account how that plain lies how that mountain rises and how far that valley extends and all by his former knowledg in that kind To confirm all this Titus Livius gives us an example in Publius Decius who being a military Tribune in the Army which the Consul Cornelius commanded against the Samnites and finding the said Consul and Army fallen by accident into a Vale where they might have been encompassed by the enemy and cut off Vides tu Aule Corneli said Decius to the Consul cacumâ—n illud supra hostem Arx illa est spei salutisque nostrae si eam quoniam caeci reliquere Samnites impigre capimus Do you see Sir that hill which hangs over the enemies Camp there lies our hope the blind Samnites haue neglected it and our safety depends upon the seizing of it quickly For said Livy before Publius Decius Tribunus militum unum editum in saltu Collem imminentem hostium Castris aditu arduum impedito agmini expeditis hand difficilem Publius Decius the military Tribune observed a hill over the enemies Camp not easily to be ascended by those who were compleatly arm'd but to those who were lightly arm'd accessible enough Whereupon being commanded to possess it by the Consul with 3000 men he obeyed his orders secur'd the Roman Army and designing to march away in the night and save both himself and his party Livy brings him in speaking these words to some of his Comrades Ite mecum ut dum lucis aliquid superest quibus locis hostes praesidia ponant qua pateat hinc exitus exploremus Haec omnia sagulo militari amictus ne Ducem circuire hostes notarent perlustravit Come along with me that whilst we have yet light we may explore where the enemy keeps his Guards and which way we may make our retreat and this he did in the habit of a private Souldier that the enemy might not suspect him for an Officer He then who considers what has been said will find how useful and necessary it is for a General to be acquainted with the nature of the Country for had not Decius understood those things very well he could not so suddenly have discerned the advantage of that hill and of what importance it would be to the preservation of the Roman Army neither could he have judged at that distance whether it was accessible or not and when he had possessed himself of it and was to draw off afterwards and follow the Consul being so environed by the Samnites he could never have found out the best way for his retreat nor have guessed so well where the enemy kept his Guards So that it must necessarily be that Decius had a perfect knowledg of the Country which knowledg made him secure that hill and the securing of that hill was the security of the Army After which by the same knowledg though he was as it were besieged by the enemy he found a way to make his own retreat and bring off his whole party CHAP. XL. How fraud in the management of War is honourable and glorious THough fraud in all other actions is abominable yet in matters of War it is laudable and glorious and he who overcomes his enemies by stratagem is as much to be praised as he who overcomes him by force This is to be seen by the judgment of those who write the Lives of great Persons especially of great Commanders for they command and applaud Hanibal and the rest in all their inventions of that nature There are many examples in them to this purpose which I shall not repeat here only this I must advertize that I do not intend that fraud which consists in betraying a trust or breaking an agreement to be honourable for though by them you may acquire Power and 't is possible a Kingdom yet as I said before it cannot be with honour but by fraud I mean that artifice which is shewn in stratagems and circumventions against an enemy that is not only in hostility but a state of defiance for where he reposes any confidence in you it alters the case and such as I mean was the artifice of Hanibal when he pretended to fly only to possess himself of some passes and so block up the Consul and his Army as also when to clear himself of Fabius Maximus he found out the invention of binding fire-brands and other combustible matter about the horns of the Cattel and turning them out upon the enemy And much of this nature was that of Pontius General for the Samnites which he used to circumvent the Roman Army ad Tureas Caudinas Pontius having disposed his Army privately upon the mountains sent several of his Souldiers habited like Shepherds with several herds of Cattel thorow the plain being all taken and examined by the Romans where the Army of the Samnites was they unanimously concurred in the story which Pontius had put into their mouths that it was gone to besiege Nocera which being credited by the Consul he brake up from his post and marching thorow the plain for the relief of Nocera he ran himself into the trap and was no sooner entred but he was block'd up by the enemy This exploit was fraudulently performed yet it would have been very honourable to Pontius had he followed his Father's advice who would have had him either dismissed the Romans frankly that they might have been obliged by their usage or else have put
what Street and in what quarter he may find his Tent. This must be observable in all times and places and in such manner that it may seem a moving City which where-ever it moves carries with it the same Gates the same Streets the same Houses and the same Figure which is a thing that cannot be practised by those who make choice of places of natural strength for they must frame their Camp according to the variety of the situation But the Romans fortified their Camps with Trenches and Ramparts and Mounts for they left a good space round about their Camp and before it they made a ditch commonly six yards wide and three yards deep They made these spaces greater or less according to the time which they design'd to stay there or according to their apprehension of the Enemy for my own part I would not enclose my Camp with Stoccado's unless I intend to winter in it I would have my Trench and my Parapet not less than theirs but bigger upon occasion Upon every corner and side of the Camp I would raise a kind of half-moon from whence my Artillery might play and flank any Enemy that should attempt the ditch In this exercise to understand how to mark out a Camp your men are to be trained frequently and your other Officers are by practice to be made ready in designing and your Soldiers as dexterous in knowing their own quarters nor is there any great difficulty in it as I shall shew else-where for at present I shall pass to the Guards of the Camp because without them all the other pains and punctilio's would be vain Battista Before you proceed to the Guards I would be informed when you would pitch your Camp near your Enemy what method you would use for I cannot imagine that you should have time enough to do it without manifest danger Fabr. You must know no man incamps near an Enemy but he who is desirous to fight when ever the Enemy will give him opportunity and when the Enemy is disposed to it as well as he the danger is no more than ordinary for two parts of the Army are drawn out to fight and the third orders the Camp In this case the Romans committed the fortification and ordering of their Camp to the Triarii whilst the Principes and Hastaâ—i stood to their Arms. And this they did because the Triarii being to fight last had time if the Enemy advanced to leave their work stand to their Arms and fall every man into his place You if you would imitate the Romans must cause your Camp to be made by the Battalia's in your Rear which are instead of the Triarii but now to the Guards of the Camp CHAP. III. Of the several Watches and Guards about the Camp Fabr. I Do not remember in History to have found that the Ancients for the security of the Camp in the night did ever make use of out Guards or Sentinels without the Ditches as we do now The reason as I take it was because they thought the Army thereby might be easily surprized by the difficulty of discerning their Sentinels and Scouts besides their Sentinels might be over-powred or corrupted by the Enemy so that to rely upon them either in part or in whole they concluded would be dangerous wherefore all their Guards were within their Trenches placed with such diligence and exactness that it was no less than death for any man to desert his post How these Guards were disposed by them I think it unnecessary to relate because if you have not seen it already you may do it when you please only this I shall tell you in short what I would do in the Case I would have every night one third of the Army in Arms and of them a fourth part upon the Guard distributed all along the works and in all convenient places quite thorow the Camp with a main Guard in each of the four quarters of your Camp of which a party should remain constantly upon the Guard and another party should Petrole from one quarter to the other And this order I would use likewise in the day time if my Enemy was near As for giving the word and changing it every night and other things which are observable in the like cases I shall pass them by as notorious and known One thing only I shall mention as being of importance and that which brings much advantage to any man that uses it and as much disadvantage where it is neglected CHAP. IV. To observe who goes and comes to the Camp Fabr. HE who would be secure in his Camp is to require notice with great exactness of all strangers that lodge in his Camp and to have a strict account of all goers and comers and this no hard matter to do if the Tents be but viewed all along as they stand in their orders because every lodgment had its precise and definitive number and when you find them more or less than their proportion let them be examined and punished He who observes this course exactly shall keep the Enemy from practising your Officers at least without great difficulty or from having knowledge of your affairs Had not the Romans been very exact observers of this course Claudius Nero when Hanibal lay so near him could never have stole so privately from his Camp in Lucania and have marched into la Marca and back again before Hanibal had missed him CHAP. V. Of Military Iustice and the methods used by the Ancients in the punishment of Offenders Fabr. BUt it is not enough to contrive good orders unless they be strictly observed for severity is no where so requisite as in an Army wherefore to keep your Soldiers to their duty strict and severe Laws are to be made and they are to be executed as strictly The Romans punished it with death to be absent from the Guard when it was a mans duty to be there It was no less capital to abandon the place assigned him in Battel To carry any thing privately out of his Quarters To boast and appropriate to himself some great exploit which he never did To fight without the General 's order To throw away ones Arms in fear If at any time it happened a whole Troop or Company had offended in that nature they were all put to death but an imbursation was made of their names and drawing them out by lotts every tenth man was executed And this way of Decimation was used that though all were not actually sensible yet all might be affrighted But because where the punishments are great the rewards ought to be proportionable that men may be as well encouraged as deterred they ordain'd recompences for every remarkable exploit As to him who in the fight saved the life of a Citizen He who first scal'd the Walls of an Enemies Town He who first entred into the Enemies Camp He who wounded or killed the Enemies General or dismounted him from his Horse By this means no signal act was
BEsides what has been said already it is of great use and reputation to a General if he knows how to compose mutinies and dissentions in his Army The best way is by punishing the Ringleaders but then it is to be done so neatly that they may have their reward before they have news that it is intended The way to do that is if they be at any distance to summon both nocent and innocent together that they thinking themselves safe and not in danger of any punishment may not be refractory and stand upon their guard but put themselves quietly into your hands to be punished If they be present and at hand the General is to make himself as strong as he can with those who are innocent and others in whom he can confide and then punish as he thinks fit When the quarrel is private and among themselves the best way is to expose them to danger and let them fight if they think good for the fear of that does many times reconcile them But above all things there is nothing that keeps as Army so unanimous as the reputation of the General which proceeds principally from his courage for it is neither birth nor authority can do it without that The chief thing incumbent upon a General is to pay well and punish well for whenever the Soldiers want pay 't is but reasonable that they should want punishment for you cannot in justice chastise any exorbitance in a Soldier when you disappoint him of his pay nor can he forbear stealing unless he be willing to starve but if you pay and do not punish them they are insolent again and you will become despicable in holding a Command that you are not able to manage and by not maintaining your dignity and authority of necessity tumults and disorders must follow which will be the utter ruine of your Army CHAP. XIV How the Ancients relied much upon their auguries and other accidents Fabr. THe Generals of old were subject to one molestation from which in our days we are exempt and that is how to pervert an ill augury and interpret it to their advantage for if an Arrow fell down in an Army if the Sun or the Moon was Eclipsed if there hapned an Earth-quake or it was the General 's fortune to fall down either as he got up on horse-back or dismounted it was look'd upon by the Soldiers as an ill omen and was the occasion of such fear in them that coming afterwards to a Battel they were easily beaten and therefore the Generals in times past when such an accident happened immediately gave some reason for it and referr'd it to some natural cause or else wrested and perverted it to their own profit and advantage Caesar passing over into Africa tumbling down upon the ground as he came out of the Ship grasping the grass in his hands he cryed out Teneo te O Africa Africa you are mine for I have you in my hands And several others have given reasons according to their own interest for the Earth-quakes and Eclipses of the Moon but in our days these artifices cannot pass because our men are not now so superstitious and our Religion explodes such opinions as heathenish and vain but whenever we should be so blind as to reassume those superstitions we must revive the custom of the Ancients CHAP. XV. That we are not to fight with an Enemy reduced to despair and several arts that may be used to surprize him Fabr. WHen famine natural necessity or human passion has brought your Enemy to such despair that impelled by that he marches furiously to fight with you you must keep within your Camp and decline fighting as much as possibly you can The Lacedemonians acted in that manner against the Messeni Caesar did the same against Afranius and Petreius When Fulvius was Consul against the Cimbrians he caused his horse to attack the Enemy for several days together and observing in what numbers they came forth to engage them he placed an ambush one day behind their Camp caused them again to be assaulted and the Cimbrians issuing forth in their old numbers to encounter them Fulvius fell in the mean time upon their Camp entred it and sack'd it Some Generals have made great advantage when they lye near the Enemies Army to send out parties with the Enemies Colours to plunder their own Country for the Enemy supposing them supplies sent to relieve them have issued forth to meet them and assist them to plunder whereby they have been put to disorder and given opportunity to the adversary to overthrow them Alexander of Epirus did the same against the Sclavonians and Leptene the Syracusan against the Carthaginians and both with success many have been too hard for their Enemies by giving them opportunity of eating and drinking too much making a shew of being afraid and leaving their Camp full of wine and provisions with which the Enemy having gorg'd himself without measure the others have fallen upon them with advantage and put them to the sword Tomyris provided such an entertainment for Cyrus and Tiberius Gracchus regall'd the Spaniards in the same manner others have poysoned their meat and their drink to ruine the Enemy that way the more easily I said before that I did not find it in any History that the Romans did ever in the night place any Centinels without their Camp supposing they omitted it to prevent the mischiefs that might ensue for it has been often seen that the Centinels which are placed abroad in the day time to hear and descry the Enemy have been the destruction of those who have sent them for being often times surprized by the Enemy they have been forced to give the signal with which they were to call their own men and they coming immediately according to the sign have been all killed or taken prisoners To over-reach and circumvent an Enemy it is good sometimes to vary your custom that the Enemy depending upon it may be disappointed and ruined Thus it happened with a General who being accustomed to give the signal of the approach of the Enemy in the night by fire and in the day time by smoke commanded that they should make smoke and fire together without intermission and that when the Enemy came they should put them both out the Enemy supposing he was not perceived because he saw no signal given marched on in disorder and gave his Adversary the victory Memnon the Rhodian desiring to draw his Enemy out of his strong hold sent one by the way of a fugitive into their Army with news that Memnon's Army was in a mutiny and that the greatest part of them were gone from him and to confirm it the more he caused disorders and tumults to be pretended in his Camp whereupon the Enemy taking encouragement advanced out of his hold to attack Memnon but was cut off himself Besides the things above-mentioned great care is to be had never to bring your Enemy to despair Caesar was
thence directly towards Anghiari in Battalia Nicolo arrived with his whole Army within two miles when Micheletto Attendulo perceiving a great dust and suspecting it to be the Enemy cryed out to have all People stand to their Arms. The tumult in the Florentine Camp was not small for that Army encamped ordinarily without any Discipline and being negligent besides in presumption the Enemy were further off they were fitter to fly than to fight all of them being disarmâ—d and straggled from their quarters into such places as the shade or their recreations had carried them Nevertheless so much diligence was used by the Commissaries and the General that before the Enemy could get up they were on Horseback and in order to receive them and as Micheletto was the first that discovered them so he was the first that engaged them running with his Troop to secure the Bridge which crossed the way not far from Anghiari Micheletto having posted himself at the Bridge Simomino an Officer of the Popes and his Legate placed themselves on the right hand and the Florentine Commisâ—aries and General on the left having planted the foor as thick as possible upon the banks there was only one way for the Enemy to attack them and that was by the bridge nor had the Florentines any where to defend themselves but there only they ordered their foot that if the Enemies foot should leave the high way and fall upon the flanks of the Horse they should let fly at them with their Crossbows and give their Cavalry a secure passage over the Bridge The first that appeared were gallantly received by Micheletto and repulsed but Astor re and Francesco Piccinino coming in with a commanded party to their relief they charged him so briskly that Micheletto was not only beat back over the Bridge but pursued to the very end of the Town and they which pursued them being charged again in the Flank were repulsed over the Bridge and all things as at first This skirmish continued two hours compleat sometimes Nicolo and sometimes the Florentines being Masters of the Bridge and though the fight upon the Bridge was equal to both yet on this side and the other Nicolo had much the disadvantage For Nicolo's men passing the Bridge were received by a gross of the Enemy which being drawn up with advantage by reason of the ground could charge or wheel or relieve those that were distressed as they saw occasion But when the Florentines passed over Nicolo had no place to relieve his Men for the ditches and banks in the way as it appeared in the conflict for though Nicolo's forces gained the Bridge several times yet by the fresh supplies of the Enemy they were still forced to give back but when the Florentines prevailed and passed over the Bridge Nicolo had not time by reason of the briskness of their charge and the incommodity of the ground to reinforce his Men but those which were behind were forced to mix with those that were before one disordered the other and the whole Army was constrained to fly and every Man got to Bargo as well as he could The Florentines let them go as having more inclination to the plunder which in Horses Arms and other things afforded them a plentiful prey for with Nicolo there escaped not above 1000 Horse most of the rest being taken Prisoners the Citizens of Borgo who had followed Nicolo for prize became prize themselves and were most of them taken with all their carriages and colours this victory was not so much prejudicial to the Duke as it was advantageous to Tuscany for had the Florentines lost the Day that Province had been his but he losing it lost nothing but his Arms and his Horses which a little money would recruit Never was there any War made in an Enemies Country with less execution than in this for in so great a rout and so sharp an engagement which lasted four hours there was but one Man slain and he not by any wound or honorable exploit but falling from his Horse he was trodden to Death with such security did they fight then for all of them being cuirashers on Horseback and compleatly armed they could not presently be killed and if they found there was no likelyhood of getting off themselves or being rescued by their friends they surrendred before they could come at them to slay them this Battel both in it self and consequences was a great instance of the unhappiness of that War for the Enemy being beaten and Nicolo fled to Borgo the Commissioners would have pursued and besieged him in that place to have made there Victory intire But some of the Officers and Souldiers would not obey pretending they would dispose of their plunder and cure themselves of their wounds and which is more remarkable the next day about noon without any regard to or leave from their superior Officers they went to Arezzo deposited their prey and returned to Anghiari when they had done A thing so contrary to all order and military discipline that the reliques and remainder of any well governed Army would easily have rob'd them of their Victory which so undeservedly they had obtained And besides this the Commissioners giving order that all prisoners should be kept to prevent their rallying or getting together again in spight of their Orders they dismiss'd them all A thing most justly to be admir'd that an Army so constituted should be able to get the Victory and that the Enemy should be so poor spirited as to be beaten by them Whilst the Florentines therefore were marching to Arezzo and returning again Nicolo had opportunity to quit Borgo and draw off all his Men towards Romagna and with him the Florentine exiles who seeing their hopes desperate of returning to Florence they dispersed themselves into all parts of Italy and some of them into other Countries as their conveniences prompted them of these Rinaldo chose Ancona for his residence and afterwards to obtain a mansion in Heaven for that which he had lost upon Earth he went to visit the Sepulchre of our Saviour from whence being returned as he was sitting at Table very merry at the Wedding of one of his Daughters he fell down on a sudden and died His fortune being favourable so far as to take him away in one of the most pleasant days of his Life a man truly honorable in all conditions but would have been much more had his Stars brought him forth in a City that had been united for Florence being factious the same things disgusted there which would have been rewarded in another place The Commissaries when their Men were come back from Arezzo and Nicolo departed presented themselves before Borgo whereupon the Townsmen would have surrendred to the Florentines but could not be accepted in this Treaty and negotiation the Commissaries became jealous of the Popes Legate lest he had a design for seizing it for the Church so that they came to ill language and doubtless
apprehended of all those that accused Castruccio with that abominable ambition Opizi was of opinion that the death of Francesco Guinigi head of the adverse party would leave him Master of the Town but he quickly found that the single reputation oâ— Castruccio would be a new impediment to his usurpation so that thinking to rob him of the affections of the people he spread false reports and aspersed him where-ever he came At first these calumniations troubled Castruccio but little but at length they alarm'd him to the purpose for he suspected that Opizi would not fail to set him at odds with the Lieutenant which Robert King of Naples had settled in Lucca and that if that Governor was his enemy he should in a short time be turned out of the Town And against so great danger his provision was this The Town of Pisa was then under the Government of Huguccione de Fagivola originally of the Town of Arrezzo being chosen Captain by the Pisans he had made himself their Soveraign and having given protection to certain Ghibilins who were banished from Lucca Castruccio entred into secret intelligence by the privity of Huguccione and being assured of his assistance he resolved the poor Exiles should be restored To this effect he agreed with his friends in Lucca who were of his Counsel and jealous as himself of the power of the Opizi All necessary measures were taken by the Conspirators Castruccio had the care of fortifying privately a Tower in the City called the Tower of Honour He furnished it with ammunition in case he should be forced to defend it and having appointed the night for the execution of their design Huguccione failed not at the precise hour to be at the Rendezvous betwixt Lucca and the neighbouring Mountains Upon a signal given to Castruccio he advanced towards the Gate of St. Peter and set fire to the Antiport next the â—ields whilst Castruccio broke down another on the other side of the Town In the mean time his associates cryed out To your Arms to excite the people to rise and thereby put all things into confusion Huguccione entred with his Troops and having seized upon the Town he caused all the Opizi to be murdered and all the rest of their party which fell into their hands The Governor for the King of Naples was turned out and the Government of the Town altered as Huguccione directed who to compleat the desolations of Lucca banished no less than a hundred of the best Families that belonged to it The miserable Exiles fled part to Florence and part to Pistoia two Towns of the Faction of the Guelfs and for that reason enemies to Huguccione and the prevailing party in Lucca The Florentines and whole Faction of the Guelfs apprehending this great success would hazard to re-establish the power of the Ghibilins in Tuscany they entred into consultation which way those Exiles might be restored They set out a considerable Army and encamped at Monte Carlo to open themselves a passage to Lucca Huguccione on his side drew the Lucca Troops together and put them under the Command of Castruccio and then joyning them with his own from Pisa and reinforcing them with a Squadron of German Horse which he got out of Lombardy he marched out to encounter the Florentines Whereupon the Florentines quitted their Post at Monte Carlo and entrenching betwixt Monte-Catino and Pescia Huguccione possessed himself of the quarter which they had left Their Armies being within two miles distance one from the other their Horse met daily and skirmished and they had come certainly to a peremptory Battel had not Huguccione fallen ill just in the nick His disposition forcing him from the Camp to look out for better accommodation in Monte-carlo he left the Command of the Army to Castruccio his retirement which discouraged his own men and made them think of protracting the Battel animated the Florentines but brought no great advantage to their affairs In short the Florentines perceiving their Enemies without a General began to despise them and Castruccio observing how much they were elated endeavoured to augment it He pretended great Consternation and to make his fear the more credible he gave Orders that his Troops should be drawn up within the Lines but with positive inhibition for any of them to go forth though not a moment passed but the Florentines provoked them but all to no purpose Besides that this pretended terror in Castruccio redoubled the rashness of the Enemy and perfectly blinded them he drew another advantage from it which was to discover exactly the disposition of their Army and the Order of their March When he had well observed them and tempted their temerity as much as he thought fit he resolved to fight them the next Bravado they made and omitting nothing that might encourage his Soldiers he assured them of Victory if they followed his Commands He had observed that the weakest and worst arm'd of their Soldiers were disposed still in their wings and their best placed in the Body Castruccio drew up in the same Order but distributed his Soldiers quite contrary for the worst and most unserviceable he placed in the Body and his best men in the wings In this posture he drew out of the Trenches and had scarce form'd his Battalia before the Enemy appeared and with his usual insolence Castruccio Commanded that the Body should march slowly but the two wings were to advance as fast as they could so that when they came to engage there was only the wings that could fight for Castruccio's Body having lagged by Command the Florentine Body had too far to march before they could charge them so as they remained idle being neither able to do any thing against the Main Body that was design'd to oppose them nor sustain those who were engaged in the wings so it hapned that the Florentine wings composed of the refuse of their Soldiers were easily broken by Castruccio's which consisted of his best and when the wings of the Enemy which were drawn up before their Body so as the whole Army was ranged in the figure of a half Moon were routed they turn'd tail ran among their own Body which was marching behind them and put all into Confusion The loss was very great to the Florentines they left above 10000 men dead upon the place Their best Officers and the bravest of the Guelfs perished there unfortunately and to make the defeat the more lamentable there were several Reformades which died there of extraodinary quality Among the rest Piero Brother to Robert King of Naples Carlo Nephew to the said King Philip Lord of Tarentum who were all come in Gallantry to make that Compania with the Florentines But that which made all the more wonderful was that Castruccio lost not above 300 men though unhappily one of Hugucciones Sons were of that Number his Name was Francesco who sighting briskly at the head of the Voluntiers for want of good Conduct was slain at the very first
that each of these two Companies should be ranged directly behind the extremity of the three precedent Companies and the space left betwixt them should be 91 yards By these means all the Companies thus disposed should extend themselves in front 161 yards and in depth 20. After this I would extend the Pikes extraordinary along the flanks of all the Companies on the left hand at about twenty yards distance and I would make of them 140 ranks of seven in a rank so that they should secure all the left flank in depth of the ten Battalia's drawn up as I said before and I would reserve forty files of them to guard the Baggage and the unarmed people in the rear distributing their Corporals and other Officers in their respective places The three Constables or Captains I would place one at the head of them another in the midst and a third in the rear who should execute the Office of a Tergiductor who was always placed in the rear of the Army But to return to the front of the Army I say that after the Pikes extraordinary I would place the Velites extraordinary which are 500 and allow them a space of forty yards By the side of these on the left hand I would place my men at Arms with a space of 150 yards after them I would advance my light Horse at the same distance as I allowed to my men at Arms. As to the Velites in ordinary I would leave them about their Battalia's which should take up the space which I left betwixt each Company unless I found it more expedient to put them under the Pikes extraordinary which I would do or not do as I found it more or less for my advantage The Captain General of the Battalion should be placed in the space betwixt the first and second orders of Battalia's or else at the head of them or else in the space betwixt the last of the first five Battalia's and the Pikes extraordinary as I found it most convenient he should have about him 30 or 40 select men all brave and experienc'd and such as understood how to execute their Commission with prudence and how to receive and repel a charge and I would have the Captain General in the midst of the Drums and the Colours This is the order in which I would dispose my Battalion on the left wing which should contain half the Army and take up in breadth 511 yards and in depth as much as I have said before without reckoning the space that was possessed by the Pikes extraordinary which should be as a Shield to the people without Arms and take up a space of about a hundred yards The other Battalion I would dispose on the right side leaving betwixt the two Battalions a distance of about 30 yards having order'd it as the other At the head of that space I would place some pieces of Artillery behind which should stand the Captain General of the whole Army with the Drums the Standard or chief Ensign and two hundred choice men about him most of them on foot and amongst them ten or more fit to execute any command The General himself should be so mounted and so arm'd that he might be on Horseback and on foot as necessity required As to the Artillery ten pieces of Cannon would be enough for the taking of a Town In the Field I would use them more for defence of my Camp than for any Service in Battel My smaller pieces should be of 10 or 15 pound carriage and I would place them in the front of the whole Army unless the Country was such that I could dispose them securely in the flank where the Enemy could not come at them This form and manner of ranging an Army and putting it in order may do the same things in a Battel as was done either in the Macedonian Phalanx or the Legion of the Romans for the Pikes are in the front and all the foot placed in their ranks so that upon any charge or engagement with the Enemy they are able not only to bear and sustain them but according to the custom of the Phalanx to recruit and reinforce their first rank out of those which are behind On the other side if they be over-power'd and attack'd with such violence that they are forced to give ground they may fall back into the intervals of the second Battalia behind them and uniting with them make up their body and charge them briskly again And if the second Battalia is not strong enough to relieve them they may retire to the third and fight all together in conjunction so that by this order as to the business of a Battel we may supply and preserve our selves according to the Grecian and the Roman way both As to the strength of an Army it cannot be ordered more strong because the two wings are exactly well fortified with Officers and Arms nor is there any thing weak but the rear where the people which follow the Camp without Arms are disposed and they are guarded with the Pikes extraordinary so that the Enemy cannot assault them any where but he will find them in very good order neither is the rear in any great danger because an Enemy can be hardly so strong as to assault you equally on all sides if you found he was so strong you would never take the Field against him But if he was three times as many and as well ordered as you if he divides and weakens himself to attack you in several places beat him in one and his whole enterprize is lost As to the Enemies Cavalry though they out-number you you are safe enough for the Pikes which encompass you will defend you from any impression from them though your own Horse be repulsed The chief Officers are moreover plac'd in the flank so as they may commodiously command and as readily obey and the spaces which are left betwixt one Battalia and the other and betwixt one rank and another serve not only to receive those who are distressed but gives room for such persons as are sent forward and backward with orders from the Captain Add as I told you at first as the Romans had in their Army about 24000 men I would have our Army consist of the same number and as the Auxiliaries took their method of Fighting and their manner of drawing up from the Legions so those Soldiers which you would joyn to your two Battalions should take their form and discipline from them These things would be very easie to imitate should you have but one example for by joyning either two other Battalions to your Army or adding as many Auxiliaries you are in no confusion you have no more to do but to double your ranks and whereas before you put ten Battalia's in the left wing put twenty now or else you may contract or extend them as your place and Enemy will give leave Luigi In earnest Sir I am so well possess'd of your Army that
thing wide they disorder themselves and if they run on in a huddle it will be no hard matter for the Enemy to break them And therefore I ordered my Battel so that it might do both the one and the other for having placed 1000 of the Velites in the wings I commanded that as soon as our Artillery had fired they should advance with the light Horse to seize upon their Cannon for which reason our Artillery was shot off but once and that the Enemy might not have time to charge the second time and fire upon us again for we could not take so much time our selves but they would have had as much to do the same wherefore the reason why I fired not my Cannon the second time was that if the Enemy fired once they might not have leisure to fire any more To render therefore the Enemies Artillery unserviceable the best remedy is to attack it with all possible speed for if the Enemy deserts it 't is your own if he undertakes to defend it he must advance before it and then being betwixt it and us they cannot fire but upon their own men I should think these reasons sufficient without farther examples yet having plenty of them from the ancients I will afford you some of them Ventidius being to fight the Parthians whose strength consisted principally in their bows and arrows was so subtil as to let them come up close to his Camp before he would draw out his Army which he did that he might charge them on a sudden before they had leisure to shoot their arrows Caesar tells us that when he was in France being to engage with the enemy he was charged so briskly and so suddenly by them that his men had not time to deliver their darts according to the custom of the Romans You see therefore that to frustrate a thing in the field which is to be discharged at a distance and to prevent its doing you any hurt there is no better way than to march up to it with all speed and possess it if you can Another reason moved me likewise to fire my Artillery no more which may seem trivial to you yet to me it is not so contemptible There is nothing obstructs an Army and puts it into greater confusion than to take away or hinder their sight for several great Armies have been broken and defeated by having their sight obstructed either with the dust or the Sun now there is nothing that causes greater obscurity or is a greater impediment to the sight than the smoke of Artillery and therefore I think it more wisdom to let the Enemy be blind by himself than for you to be blind too and endeavour to find him These things considered I would either not fire my Artillery at all or else because that perhaps would not be approved in respect of the reputation which those great Guns have obtained in the World I would place them in the wings of my Army that when they fire the smoke might not fly in the faces of my front which is the flower and hopes of my Army And to prove that to trouble the sight of an Enemy is a thing of more than ordinary advantage I need bring no more than the example of Epaminondas who to blind the eyes of his Enemy before he advanced to charge them caused his light horse to gallop up and down before their front to raise the dust and hinder their sight which was done so effectually that he got the Victory thereby As to your opinion that I placed the Enemies Cannon and directed their bullets as I pleased causing them to pass over the heads of my Foot I answer that great Guns do without comparison oftner miss the Infantry than hit them because the Foot are so low and the Artillery so hard to be pointed that if they be placed never so little too high they shoot over and never so little too low they graze and never come near them The inequality of the ground does likewise preserve the Foot very much for every little hill or bank betwixt the Artillery and them shelters them exceedingly As to the Horse especially the Men at arms because their order is closer than the order of the light horse and they are to keep firmer in a body they are more obnoxious to the Cannon and are therefore to be kept in the rear of the Army till the Enemy has fir'd 〈…〉 This is most certain your small Field-pieces and your small shot does more execution than your great pieces against which the best remedy is to come to 〈◊〉 blows as soon as you can and though in the first some men fell as be sure there always will yet a good General and a good Army are not to consider a particular loss so much as a General but rather are to imitate the Swissers who never refused a Battel for fear of great Guns but punished them with capital punishment who for fear of them forsook their ranks or gave any other sign or expression of fear I caused my Artillery to be drawn off as soon as I had Fired them that they might leave the Field clear for my Battalions to advance and I made no mention of them afterwards as being quite useless when the Armies were joyned You have said likewise that in respect of the violence and impetuosity of those Guns many do judge the arms and the orders of the ancients to be altogether useless and it seems by that that the people of late have found out arms and orders which are sufficient to secure them if you know any such thing you will oblige me to impart it for as yet I know none nor can I believe that there is any to be found So that I would know of them why the Infantry of our times do carry Corslets of Iron upon their breasts and the horse are arm'd Cap a pied for seeing they condemn the ancient way of arming as useless in respect of the Artillery they may as well condemn what is practised now-a-days I would understand likewise why the Swizzers according to the custom of the ancients make their Battalions to consist of six or eight thousand foot and why other Nations have imitated them seeing that order is exposed to the same danger upon account of the Artillery as others are I think it cannot easily be answered yet if you should propose it to Souldiers of any judgment and experience they would tell you first that they go so arm'd because though their arms will not defend them against great Guns yet they will secure them against small Shot and Pikes and Swords and Stones and all such things They would tell you likewise that they keep that close order like the Swisses that they may more easily engage the Enemies Foot that they may better sustain their Horse and put fairer to break them So that we see Souldiers are afraid of many things besides Artillery against which they are to provide by their arms
them and as it were upbraiding them by their cowardize Lucius Sylla seeing part of his Troops routed and pursued by the forces of Mithridates rode up to the head of them with his sword in his hand and cryed out to them If any body ask you where you have left your General tell him you left him fighting in Boetia Attilius the Consul opposed those who fought bravely against those who ran away telling them that if they did not face about they should be killed by their friends as well as their enemies Philip King of Macedon understanding that his Souldiers were afraid of the Scythians placed behind his Army certain of the faithfullest of his horse with commission to kill any man that fled so that his men choosing to die rather fighting than flying overcame their adversaries Several of the Roman Generals have wrested an Ensign out of the hands of their Souldiers and throwing it among the enemy promised a reward to him who should recover it and this they did not so much to hinder the flight of their own men as to give them occasion of doing some greater exploit upon the enemy CHAP. III. Stratagems after the Fight Fabr. I Do not think it impertinent to add to this discourse such things as happen after the Fight especially seeing they are but short and not to be omitted because they are conformable to the matter which we have in hand But since one of these two things must happen either that we gain the Victory or lose it I say that when we gain it we are to pursue it with the greatest diligence we can and rather imitate Caesar in this case than Hanibal who for not following his Victory and pushing it on after he had defeated the Romans at Cannas lost the whole Empire of the Romans which fortune had almost thrust into his hands Caesar on the other side never rested after a Victory but followed the enemy with greater fury than he attacked them at first But when the day is lost a wise General is to consider the best that he can make of it especially if there be any thing of his Army remaining The advantage that may arise is from the inadvertency of the enemy who many times transported with his success grows negligent and remiss and gives opportunity to the enemy to revenge himself as Martius the Roman did upon the Carthaginian Army who having slain the two Scipio's and routed their forces not valuing those which remained were suddenly assaulted and broken for it is frequently seen nothing is perpetrable so easily as what the enemy fancies you can never attempt for commonly men suffer most where they are most secure A General therefore when he cannot carry the Victory is to endeavour with all possible industry that his loss may be as little as may be and to do this it is necessary to order things so that the enemy may not easily pursue or be in a capacity to retard you As to the way of hindering the pursuit of the Conqueror several Generals as soon as they found their condition and that it was not possible to continue the Fight have ordered their inferior Commanders to separate and fly in several parties and meet again at a place which he assigned and the enemy not daring to divide his Army for fear of a design has let all or the greatest part of the conquered escape Others have thrown the best of their goods in the way that the enemy following might be delayed by the prize and suffer them to get off Titus Dimius used no small art to conceal the loss which he had sustained in the fight for having endured the burnt of the Battel from morning till night with the loss of many of his men when night came he caused most of them to be buried privately the next morning the enemy finding so many of their own men dead and so few of the Romans concluded themselves beaten and fled And now I suppose though confusedly I have in some measure satisfied your demands CHAP. IV. Two other ways of ranging an Army to fight Fabr. 'T Is true as to the form and model of drawing up an Army to fight it remains that I let you know that sometimes some Generals have drawn them up in the figure of a wedge pointing in the front supposing it the properest way to pierce and make an impression upon the enemy In opposition to this the way was for the adversary to draw up in the figure of a pair of shears which being opened were to receive the point of the wedge enclose it and charge it on all sides And about this let me recommend to you this General rule that the best remedy to be used against the design of an enemy is to do that bravely of your self to which you perceive he would endeavour to force you for doing it voluntarily you do it orderly and to your own profit and advantage whereas if you do it by constraint you do it to your ruine I will not repeat any thing that I have said before to confirm my discourse But this is most certain if your adversary thinks to open and as it were cleave your Army with his wedge if you keep your Army open in the figure of the shears and receive them in the middle you cut them to pieces and they can do you no hurt Hanibal placed his Elephants in the front of his Army thinking thereby to have pierced the Army of Scipio with more ease but Scipio ranging his men in the form of a pair of shears and receiving him in an open posture gain'd the Victory and Hanibal was lost Asdrubal placed the best and strongest of his men in the front of his Army to make the better charge upon the Enemy Scipio commanding his middle men in the front to retreat insensibly and give place was so cunningly obeyed that the Enemy was drawn in and defeated so that you see those designs are many times the occasion of his Victory against whom they are designed CHAP. V. Of the constraint and advantage a man may have to Fight Fabr. IF my memory does not fail it remains yet that I say something touching the things which a wise General is to consider before he comes to an engagement And the first thing I shall say upon this subject is that a General is never to come to a Field-fight unless he be constrained or has some more than ordinary advantage His advantage may lye in the nature of the Place in the discipline of his Army or the number or excellence of his Men. And his necessity consists in finding his condition such that without fighting he must be certainly destroyed as where money is wanting where victuals are defective and where the Enemy is in expectation of supplies in these cases a General is always to venture though he fights upon disadvantage for 't is better fighting where fortune may favour you than not to try her at all and be certainly ruined and
in this case it would be as great a fault in a General not to fight as it would be if he had an opportunity of defeating his adversary and was either too ignorant to know it or too cowardly or delatory to make use of it The advantages which occur in the conduct of war do many times proceed from the Enemy and sometimes from your prudence Many have been surprized and routed in their passage over Rivers by the dexterity of the Enemy who having forborn them till half of them were over have fallen suddenly upon them and put them to the rout as Caesar served the Swizzers when he cut off a fourth part of their Army by reason that they were separated by a River Sometimes it happens that your Enemy is tired and weary having followed you with too much haste and inconsideration and in that case finding your own Army vigorous and strong you are not to lose your opportunity Besides if your Enemy presents you Battel in the morning betimes you are not immediately to draw out your Army and fight him but are rather to protract and spin out the time for some hours still offering and pretending to come forth that their impatience of delay or standing so long to their Arms may rebate the fury with which they came and as soon as you find them cool and off of their first ardor then you may come forth and charge them as smartly as you can Scipio and Metellus made use of this way in Spain the one against Asdrubal the other against Sertorius If the Enemy has lessened his power by dividing his Army as Scipio did in Spain or by any other occasion then also a good General may try his fortune with credit The greatest part of the gravest Generals have chosen rather to receive than give the charge because the fury of an Enemy is easily sustained by those who stand firm and close in their station and being once check'd it turns into cowardize Fabius being sent against the Samnites and the Gauls received their fury with that indiscomposedness and tranquillity that he conquered them both but Decius his Colleague not following his example miscarried and was slain Some who have been possessed too much of the courage of their Enemy have chose to begin the Fight in the Evening towards night that their Army being worsted might get off or defend themselves by the benefit of the darkness Others understanding the superstition of the Enemy and that on certain days they devote themselves wholly to Religion and will not endeavour to fight have chosen that time to attack them and have carried the Victory Caesar made use of this way against Ariovistus in France and Vespasian did the same in Syria against the Iews who upon their Sabbath would not so much as defend themselves against the Romans CHAP. VI. Directions for a General Fab. THere is nothing of more importance to the General of an Army than to have about him persons that are faithful experienced in war and prudent in Counsel with whom he may constantly advise and confer both about his own Men and the Enemy as which is the most numerous which the best arm'd which the best mounted which the best exercised which the most patient of labour and distress and whether the Horse or the Foot are to be relied upon most The next thing to be considered is the place where he is whether it be more advantageous for the Enemy than for him which is most easily supplyed with provisions whether it be best to fight presently or protract and what he may gain or suffer thereby for many times the Souldiers disgusted at the tediousness of the war grow lazy and remiss and coming at length to be weary they either grow mutinous or run away But above all things I would advise a General to inform himself of the nature and qualification of his adversary the Enemies General whether he be rash or wary and what counsel he has about him The next thing he is to consider is whether he can confide in his Auxiliaries or not and be sure never to bring his Army to a Battel if he finds them under any apprehension or with the least distrust of the Victory for the greatest sign of miscarriage is despair and when they think it impossible to prevail In this case therefore you are to avoid fighting either by following the example of Fabius Maximus who encamped his Army in places of such advantage that Hanibal durst not attack him or else if you suspect the Enemy will venture upon you in your entrenchments and that you shall not be able to defend them your best way will be to remove divide your Army and dispose them in parties into several Towns that the tediousness of a siege and length of time which will be required may discourage the Enemy Zanobi Is there no other way of avoiding a Battel but to divide your Troops and to dispose them into several Towns CHAP. VII Which way a Battel is to be avoided though pressed never so earnestly by the Enemy Fabr. IF I be not mistaken I have discoursed to some of you before how he that is in the field cannot avoid fighting when pressed by an Enemy who will fight upon any terms and that the best way he can take is to keep himself at fifty miles distance that he may have time to remove when he hears of his advance Fabius Maximus did not refuse fighting with Hanibal but would fight at his own time and advantage and Hanibal was too wise to attack him where he was sure he could do no good for had he believed he could have conquered him Fabius would have been constrained to have fought him or fled Philip King of Macedon Father of Perseus being at war with the Romans posted his Army upon an high mountain that he might not be compelled to fight but the Romans assaulted and defeated him Cingentorix General of the Gauls to avoid fighting with Caesar who had passed a river contrary to his expectation quitted the Country and march'd away with his Army The Venetians in our times if they had had no mind to have fought the French King they should not have staid till his Army had passed the Adda but have removed farther off as Cingentorix did before them but they staid so long that they had time neither to draw up handsomely to fight nor to make their retreat for the French were so near before the Venetians dislodged that the French fell upon them and put them to the rout So then by what I have said it is manifest that a Battel cannot be avoided when the Enemy presses it upon any disadvantage and let not any body tell me of Fabius for Hanibal refused to fight in that case as much as he CHAP. VIII How Souldiers are to be encouraged to fight and how they are to be cooled and asswaged when their courage is too high Fabr. IT many times happens that your Souldiers are impatient to
such things as where it is woody or mountainous for ambuscades are commonly laid behind some hill or under the shelter of some wood and as if you do not discover them in time they are very pernicious so if your care be sufficient they are as easily prevented The birds and the dust have many times discovered the enemy for when ever the enemy approaches in any great number he will be sure to raise the dust which will give you the alarm Several Generals observing the Pigeons to rise in some place where they were to pass or other birds that fly together in flocks and to hover over their heads without falling again have thereby discovered the ambushments of the enemy and either prevented or defeated them As to the second way of being drawn in by the artifices of the enemy you must be cautious of believing any thing easily that is not reasonable to be supposed as it would be if an enemy should leave something for you to pillage on purpose you must suspect there is some design at the bottom and be careful it does not succeed If a great number of the enemy be beaten and pursued by a few of your men if a few of the enemy attacks a greater party of yours if the enemy runs unexpectedly and without any visible occasion in those cases you must always suspect and never fancy your enemy so weak as not to understand his own business on the contrary if you would be less exposed to his stratagems and run your self less into danger the weaker and more careless you observe him to be the more you are to apprehend him In this case you are to comport your self in two different manners you are to fear him in your own thoughts and order your affaris accordingly but in your words and outward behaviour you are to seem to despise him this last way makes your Souldiers more confident of Victory the other makes you more cautious and less apt to be circumvented And you must know that to march thorow an enemies Country is more dangerous than to fight a field Battel CHAP. VII One is to know the Country perfectly well thorow which he is to pass and keep his enterprizes secret Fabr. THe marching thorow an Enemies Country being so extraordinarily dangerous it is necessary that a General doubles his diligence and the first thing he is to do he is to have a Cart made of all the Country by which he is to pass that he may know the Towns their number and distance the roads and mountains the rivers the fens and the nature and qualities of them all and to better his knowledg it is convenient that he discourses and interrogates some body who understands the places objecting and asking them several questions and observing their answers He is likewise to send some parties of his light Horse before under the command of prudent Officers not so much to face the enemy as to speculate the Country and see whether it agrees with his Map and the description which he has received He is also to send out spies and guides with good guards promising them rewards if they tell true and threatning them with punishment if false But above all he is to have a care that his Army knows nothing of his design for in the whole Art of War there is nothing so useful as to conceal the enterprizes that you are about CHAP. IX Of certain things which are requisite upon a march Fabr. THat no sudden attack may be able to disorder your Souldiers you must command them to stand ready with their arms for things that are foreseen and expected are less terrible and hurtful Many persons to avoid confusion in their march have disposed their Carriages and unarm'd people near the Colours with command to follow them close that upon a halt or retreat if there should be occasion they might do it more easily which is a good way and I like it well A General is likewise to have a great care that his men do not straggle in their march or march unequally some too fast others too slow which would weaken his Army and expose it to great disorder It is convenient therefore to place their Officers in the flanks that they may keep them uniform in their motion restraining those who are too hasty and soliciting those who are too slow and that cannot be done better than by the Trumpets and Drums The ways are likewise to be enlarged and repair'd so as one Company at least may always march in order Besides this the custom quality and humour of your enemy is to be considered whether he be like to assault you in the morning at noon or at night Whether he be strongest in horse or in foot and as you are inform'd of that you order your men and provide every thing necessary But to come to some particular accident CHAP. X. How to avoid fighting near a River though pressed by the enemy and in what manner you may pass it Fabr. IT falls out sometimes that you are forced to decline the enemy as thinking your self too weak and are therefore unwilling to engage him the enemy follows you what he can to stop you or cut you off in your passage over the river to which you are marching to that purpose and your passage will take up so much time that in probability the enemy will reach you Some who have been in that dangerous condition have drawn a trench round the rear of their Army fill'd it with faggots and other combustibles and set them on fire whilst in the mean time their Army passed over without any impediment from the enemy by reason the fire that was betwixt them hindred their designs Zanobi I cannot easily believe that such a fire as that could hinder them because I remember I have heard how Hanno the Carthaginian being besieged by an enemy on that side where he designed to escape caused store of wood and faggots to be laid and then set them on fire so that the enemy not observing him so strictly on that side he passed his Troops thorow the flames only by ordering them to hold their Targets before their faces Fabr. You say well but consider a little what I told you and what Hanno did I told you that the Generals I mentioned caused a trench to be digg'd and filled with combustible matter so that when the enemy was to pass he was to encounter with two great difficulties the trench and the fire Hanno made his fires without any ditch and because he designed to pass over them he commanded that they should not be made too violent for without a trench that would have stop'd him Do you not know the story of Nabis the Spartan who being besieged in Sparta by the Romans he set part of the Town on fire to hinder the advance of the Romans who had already entred in some places and by that fire he not only hindred their advance but repulsed them But to
means you will put the Enemy upon some enterprize upon presumption that he knows your designs in which you may easily circumvent and defeat him If you resolve as Claudius Nero did to lessen your Army and send relief to your friend so privately that the Enemy should not perceive it you must not take down your Tents nor diminish the number of your Hutts but keep up your Ensigns and preserve your ranks intire with the same fires and guards as before If any supplies come up suddenly to your Army and you would not have your Enemy perceive you are reinforced you must not augment the number of your Tents for nothing is more useful than to keep such accidents secret Metellus being in Spain with his Army one took the confidence to demand of him what he intended to do the next day He replyed That if he thought his shirt knew he would burn it Marcus Croesus being asked by one when he would discamp answered him Are you the only man think you that will not hear the Trumpets If you design to understand the secrets of your Enemy and to know his order and condition you must do as others have done send Embassadors to him with wise and experienced Soldiers in their Train who may take their opportunity to view his Army and consider his strength and weakness so as may give occasion to overcome him Some have pretended to banish some one of their Confidents and by that means had information of his Enemies designs They are discovered likewise sometimes by the taking of prisoners Marius whilst he was at War with the Cimbrians to feel the fidelity of the Gaâ—ls who at that time inhabited Lombardy and were in League with the Romans sent to them two sorts of Letters one open the other seal'd In the Letters that were open he writ that they should not open those which were sealed till such a time as he directed before which time he sent for them again and finding them open he found he was to repose no confidence there CHAP. XI How to rid ones self of an Army that is pressing upon ones heels Fabr. SEveral Generals have been invaded and not marched their Army immediately against the Enemy but made an inroad into his Country and constrained him to return to defend it and this way has many times succeeded because yours are flesh'd with victory and loaden with plunder whilst the Enemy is terrified and instead of a hopeful victory like to go by the loss so that they who have used this kind of diversion have many times prospered But this is practicable only to those whose Country is stronger than the Enemies Country for if it be otherwise that diversion is pernicious If a General be block'd up in his Camp by the Enemy he cannot do better than to propose an accord or at least a truce with him for some days for that makes your Enemy the more negligent in every thing of which negligence you may take your advantage and give him the slip By this way Silla disintangled himself twice and cleared himself of his Enemies by the same Artifice Asdrubal extricated himself in Spain from the forces of Claudius Nero who had block'd him up it would likewise contribute much to the freeing a man from the power of the Enemy to do something besides what has been said already that may keep him in suspence And this is to be done two ways by assaulting him with part of your forces that whilst he is employed upon them the rest may have time to preserve themselves There is another way likewise and that is by contriving some new thing or other that may amuse or astonish the Enemy and render him uncertain which way he is to stear so Hanibal served Fabius Maximus when he had shut him up on the mountains for causing little wisps of brush-wood to be tied to the horns of several Oxen he set them on fire and Fabius not understanding the depth of the stratagem supposing it worse than it was kept upon his guard within his Camp and suffered him to pass CHAP. XII How a man may make a Princes Favourite suspected and divide his Forces A General above all things is to endeavour to divide the Enemies Forces either by rendering his Confidents suspicious or by giving him occasion to separate his Troops and by consequence weaken himself The first is done by preserving the Estates or Goods of those he has about him as in time of War to spare their Houses or Possessions and returning their Children or Relations safe and without ransom You know when Hanibal burned all about Rome he exempted what belonged to Fabius Maximus You know how Coriolanus coming with a strong Army to besiege Rome preserved the Possessions of the Nobility Metellus being at the head of an Army againts Iugurtha moved it to the Embassadors which the Enemy sent to him to deliver up Iugurtha Prisoner and writing Letters to them afterwards to the same purpose he continued his Correspondence till Iugurtha got the alarm suspected his whole Counsel and made them away after several manners When Hanibal was fled to Antiochus the Roman Embassadors practised so cunningly that Antiochus grew jealous and trusted him no farther As to the way of dividing the Enemy there is not any more certain than to cause an incursion to be made upon his Country that he may be constrained to leave the War and go back to defend himself This was the way which Fabius used when he had an Army against him of French and Tuscans Umbrians and Samnites Titus Didius having a small Army in respect of the Enemy expecting another Legion from Rome which the Enemy was desirous to intercept he gave out in his Army that the next day he would give the Enemy Battel and ordered it so that certain Prisoners which he had in his Camp at that time took their opportunity to escape and gave intelligence to the Enemy that the Consul had given orders to fight upon which news that they might not lessen their Forces they did not march against the other Legion and by that means it was preserved some there have been who to divide or weaken the force of their Enemy have suffered him to enter into their Country and possess himself of several Towns that by putting Garrisons into them he may lessen his Army and give them occasion to attack and defeat him Others designing against one Province have pretended to invade another and used such industry in the business that being entred unexpectedly into that Country they have conquered it before the Enemy had time to relieve it for the Enemy being uncertain whether you will return back and invade the Country which you threatned before is constrained to keep his Post and not to leave one place to secure another and it falls out many times that he is unable to defend either the one or the other CHAP. XIII In what manner seditions and mutinies in an Army are to be appeased Fabr.
who expect with meekness and humility to work upon the proud 349 Chap. 15. Weak States are irresolute and uncertain in their Councils and slow Councils are most commonly pernicious 350 Chap. 16. How much the Souldiers of our times do differ from the Discipline of the Antients 351 Chap. 17. How the Armies of our times are to judge of Artillery and whether the general opinion of it be true 353 Chap. 18. How by the authority of the Romans and the universal Discipline of the Ancients the Foot are more serviceable than the Horse 355 Chap. 19. The Conquests of Commonwealths that are ill governed and contrary to the model of the Romans do conduce more to the ruine than advancement of their affairs 357 Chap. 29. No Prince or Commonwealth without manifest danger can employ foreign Forces either Auxiliary or Mercenary 359 Chap. 21. The first Praetor which the Romans ever sent out of their own City was to Capua and that was 400 years after they began first to make War 360 Chap. 22. How uncertain the judgment of most people are in things of greatest importance 361 Chap. 23. How the Romans upon any accident which necessitated them to give judgment upon their Subjects avoided always the mid-way 362 Chap. 14. That in the generality Castles and Citadels do more mischief than good 364 Chap. 25. To attempt a City full of intestine divisions and to expect to carry it thereby is uncertain and dangerous 367 Chap. 26. He who contemns or reproaches another person incurs his hatred without any advantage to himself ib. Chap. 27. Wise Princes and well govern'd States ought to be contented with victory for many times whilst they think to push things forward they lose all 368 Chap. 28. How much it is for the interest of all Governments that all injury be punished whether against the publick or particular persons 369 Chap. 29. Fortune casts a mist before peoples eyes when she would not have them oppose her designs 370 Chap. 30. Princes and Republicks that are truly magnificent do not make their Leagues and Alliances with mony but by their virtue reputation and force 372 Chap. 31. How dangerous it is to believe Exiles too far 373 Chap. 32. How many several ways the Romans used to conquer their Towns 374 Chap. 33. How the Romans upon any Expedition gave their Generals general Commissions 375 Book III. CHap. 1. That a Sect or Commonwealth be long-liv'd it is necessary to correct it often and reduce it towards its first Principles 377 Chap. 2. 'T is the part of a wise man sometimes to pretend himself a fool 379 Chap. 3. The liberty newly acquired could not have been preserved but by the execution of Brutus his Sons 380 Chap. 4. A Prince is never safe in his new Conquests whilst they are in being whom he dispossessed 381 Chap. 5. How a King may lose his Kingdom though he comes to it by inheritance ib. Chap. 6. Of Conspiracies 382 Chap. 7. How it comes to pass that in the changes of State from liberty to servitude and from servitude to liberty some are very innocent and others very bloody 391 Chap. 8. He who would change the form of a Government is to consider seriously upon what grounds he does it and the disposition of the subject 392 Chap. 9. How he that would succeed must accommodate to the times 393 Chap. 10. A General cannot avoid fighting when the enemy is resolved to engage him upon any terms 394 Chap. 11. One person that has many enemies upon his hands though he be inferior to them yet if he consustain their first impression carries commonly the Victory 396 Chap. 12. A wise General is to put a necessity of fighting upon his own Army but to prevent it to his enemies 397 Chap. 13. Whether we are more safe in a good General with a bad Army or a good Army with a bad General 398 Chap. 14. What strange effects new inventions have sometimes in a Battel and how new noises have the same 399 Chap. 15. One General is best for an Army and that to govern it by Commissioners is not so good 400 Chap. 16. That in times of difficulty virtue is in esteem in times of ease and luxury men of riches and alliance are in greatest request 401 Chap. 17. A man is not to be disobliged and employed afterwards in any matter of importance 402 Chap. 18. Nothing is more honourable in a General thâ—n to foresee the designs of his enemy 403 Chap. 19. Whether for the Government of the multitude obsequiousness and indulgence be more necessary than punishment 404 Chap. 20. One instance of humanity wrought more upon the Falisci than all the force of the Romans 405 Chap. 21. How it came to pass that Hanibal by methods quite contrary to what were practised by Scipio did the same things in Italy that the other did in Spain ib. Chap. 22. How the austerity of Manlius Torquatus and the humanity of Valerius Corvinus gain'd each of them the same honour and reputation 406 Chap. 23. Upon what occasion Camillus was banished from Rome 409 Chap. 24. The prolongation of Commissions brought Rome first into servitude ib. Chap. 25. Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and several other Citizens of Rome 410 Chap. 26. Women are many times the destruction of States 411 Chap. 27 How the civil discords in a City are to be composed and of the falsity of that opinion that the best way to keep a City in subjection is to keep it divided ib. Chap. 28. A strict eye is to be kept upon the Citizens for under pretence of officiousness and piety there is hid a principle of Tyranny 413 Chap. 29. That the transgressions of the people do spring commonly from the Prince ib. Chap. 30. A Citizen who would do any great matter by his own authority must first extinguish all envy In what matter things are to be ordered upon the approach of an enemy and how a City is to be defended 414 Chap. 31. Powerful States and excellent Persons retain the same mind and dignity in all kind of conditions 416 Chap. 32. The ways which some people have taken to prevent a Peace 417 Chap. 33. To the obtaining a Victory it is necessary your Army has a confidence not only in one another but in their General 418 Chap. 34. What vogue fame or opinion disposes the people first to favour some particular Citizen and whether they or a Prince distributes their offices with most prudence and judgment 419 Chap. 35. What dangers they incur who make themselves authors of any enterprize and the more extraordinary the design the greater the danger 420 Chap. 36. The reason why at the first Charge the French have been and still are accounted more than men but afterwards less than women 422 Chap. 37. Whether fighting in small parties or pickeering before a Battel be necessary and how the temper of a new enemy is to be found without them 423 Chap. 38. How a General is
to be qualified that his Army may rely upon him 324 Chap. 39. A General ought to know the Country and how to take his advantage in the ground 425 Chap. 40. How fraud in the management of War is honourable and glorious 426 Chap. 41. That ones Country is to be defended by all means and whether honourable or dishonourable it imports not 't is well defended ib. Chap. 42. That forc'd promises are not binding 427 Chap. 43. Those who are born in the same Country retain almost the same nature thorow all the variety of times ib. Chap. 44. Confidence and boldness does many times obtain that which would never be compassed by ordinary means 428 Chap. 45. Whether in a Battel it is best to give or receive the Charge 429 Chap. 46. How it comes to pass that in a City the same family retains the same manners and customs a long time ib. Chap. 47. A good Citizen is to forget all private injury when in competition with his love to his Country 430 Chap. 48. When any enemy commits any grand fault 't is to be suspected for a fraud ib. Chap. 49. A Commonwealth which desires to preserve it self free has need of new provisions every day and upon what score Fabius was called Maximus 431 A Table of the Art of War CCap I. How the Seigneur Fabritio Colonna being refreshing himself one evening with some other Gentlemen in a beautiful Garden took occasion to enter upon this discourse of War 435 Chap. 2. A person of Honour and Condition is not to make War his profession 438 Chap. 3. How a Commonwealth ought not in prudence to permit any of its Citizens to make War their profession 439 Chap. 4. That a King ought not to permit his Subjects to make Arms their profession for the mischiefs which do frequently ensue 440 Chap. 5. In what Countries the best Souldiers are to be raised 442 Chap. 6. Whether it be best to choose you men out of the Cities or Country 443 Chap. 7. Of the inconvenience and convenience of Trained-Bands or a setled Militia 444 Chap. 8. Of what sort of people an Army is to be composed 445 Chap. 9. How the Romans raised their Legions 446 Chap. 10. Whether it is best for a Militia to consist of a great number or a small 447 Chap. 11. How the inconveniencies which follow great Armies may be prevented 448 Chap. 12. Of the Cavalry 449 Book II. CHap. 1. What Arms were most used by the Ancients in their Wars 450 Chap. 2. Of the Arms which are used at present and of the invention of the Pike 451 Chap. 3. Whether the ancient or modern is the best way of arming ib. Chap. 4. How Foot should be arm'd and of the force and convenience of Men at Arms 453 Chap. 5. The difference betwixt men at arms and foot and upon which we are most to rely 454 Chap. 6. How the Souldiers were exercised 455 Chap. 7. Of what number of men and of what arms a Battalion is to consist and of exercising in Companies to make them ready either to give a charge or receive it 456 Chap. 8. Of three principal ways of drawing up a Company and putting them into a posture to fight 458 Chap. 9. The manner of rallying Souldiers after a rout and to make them face about a whole Company at a time 459 Chap. 10. To range a Company in such order that it may be ready to face the enemy on which side soever he comes 460 Chap. 11. To draw up a Company with two horns or another with a Piazza or vacuity in the middle 461 Chap. 12. Of the Baggage and Train belonging to a Company how necessary it is that they have several Officers and of the usefulness of Drums 462 Chap. 13. A discourse of the Author about military Virtue and how it is become so despicable in our days 463 Chap. 14. What number of horse are to be put into a Battalion and what proportion is to be observed for their baggage 465 Book III. CHap. 1. The order observed by the Roman Legions when a Battel was presented 466 Chap. 2. The form observed in their Battels by the Macedonian Palanx 467 Chap. 3. How the Swisses ordered their Battalions ib. Chap. 4. How the Author would make use of both Greek and Roman Arms for his Battalion and what was the ordinary Army of the Romans 468 Chap. 5. The way of drawing up a Battalion according to the intention of the Author 469 Chap. 6. The description of a Battel 470 Chap. 7. The Author's reasons for the occurrences in the Battel 471 Chap. 8. The Exercises of an Army in general 476 Book IV. CHap. 1. The considerations and subtilties to be used in the drawing up an Army to fight 478 Chap. 2. The Arts which are to be used during the Fight 481 Chap. 3. Stratagems after the Fight 482 Chap. 4. Two other ways of ranging an Army to Fight ib. Chap. 5. Of the constraint and advantage a man may have to Fight 483 Chap. 6 Directions for a General 484 Chap. 7. Which way a Battel is to be avoided though pressed never so earnestly by the Enemy ib. Chap. 8. How Souldiers are to be encouraged to fight and how they are to be cooled and asswaged when their courage is too high 485 Chap. 9. A General ought to be skilful and eloquent to persuade or dissuade as he sees occasion ib. Chap. 10. Certain considerations which encourage Souldiers and make them as virtuous as valiant 486 Book V. CHap. 1. How the Romans marched in an enemies Country and in what manner they are to be imitated 487 Chap. 2. How an Army is to be marshalled to march in an enemies Country 488 Chap. 3. How to put an Army presently into order and draw it up so as if upon a march it should be attack'd it may defend it self on all sides 489 Chap. 4. Of commands derived by word of mouth by Drums and Trumpets and of the nature of Pioneers 491 Chap. 5. Of the Provisions that are necessary for an Army ib. Chap. 6. How the Ancients divided the spoil and of the pay which they gave to their Souldiers 492 Chap. 7. To know the surprizes which are contriving against you upon your march 493 Chap. 8. One is to know the Country perfectly well thorow which he is to pass and keep his enterprizes secret ib. Chap. 9. Of certain things which are requisite upon a march 494 Chap. 10. How to avoid fighting near a River though pressed by the enemy and in what manner you may pass it ib. Chap. 11. How to make your passage thorow a streight though you be pressed by an enemy 495 Book VI. CHap. 1. What kind of places the Greeks and the Romans chose out for their Camps with a short recapitulation of what has been said before 496 Chap. 2. The form of a Camp 497 Chap. 3. Of the several Watches and Guards about the Camp 501 Chap. 4. To observe who goes and comes to the
Camp ib. Chap. 5. Of Military Iustice and the method used by the Ancients in the punishment of offenders ib. Chap. 6. The Ancients had neither Women nor Gaming in their Armies and of the manner how they discamp'd 502 Chap. 7. The safety and health of a Camp is to be regarded and it is by no means to be besieged 503 Chap. 8. Directions as to Provisions ib. Chap. 9. How to lodge more or less than four Battalions and what number of men is sufficient to make Head against an enemy be he as numerous as he may 504 Chap. 10. Certain Artifices and Advertisements of War ib. Chap. 11. How to rid ones self of an Army that is pressing upon ones hâ—els 505 Chap. 12. How a man may make a Princes Favourite suspected and divide his Forces 506 Chap. 13. In what manner seditions and mutinies in an Army are to be appeased 507 Chap. 14. How the Ancientâ—s relyed much upon their auguries and other accidents ib. Chap. 15. That we are not to fight with an enemy reduced to despair and several arts that may be used to surprize him 508 Chap. 16. How a suspected Town or Country is to be secured and how the peoples hearts are to be gained 509 Chap. 17. War is not to be continued in the Winter ib. Book VII CHap. 1. How Towns or Castles are to be fortified 510 Chap. 2. What order is to be observed by him who shuts himself up in a Town with resolution to defend it 513 Chap. 3. Advertisements for such as are distressed for provisions within a Town and for such as besiege them and would reduce them to that necessity 514 Chap. 4. Other advertisements both for the Besiegers and the Besieged ib. Chap. 5. A man is not to depend upon the countenance of the enemy but is rather to suspect what even he sees with his eyes 515 Chap. 6. How to disfurnish a Garison of its men and to bring a terror upon a Town ib. Chap. 7. To corrupt a Garison and take it by treachery 516 Chap. 8. Good Guard is to be kept in all places and times ib. Chap. 9. Ways to write privately to ones friends 517 Chap. 10. How to repair a breach and the way to defend it ib. Chap. 11. Of Mines 518 Chap. 12. Good Guards are always to be kept and your Souldiers not to be divided ib. Chap. 13. That when one sees himself block'd up on every side it is good to expose ones self now and then and of the advantages which have ensued ib. Chap. 14. General Rules to be observed in Military Discipline 519 Chap. 15. The way to have many Horse in your Country 520 Chap. 16. A General is to invent of himself and not follow altogether the practises of his Predecessors 521 Chap. 17. The Author returns and with a short Discourse concludes his Book ib. The Marriage of Belphegor 524 The First Book OF THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE By NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL To His Holiness CLEMENT the VII THE people which live North-ward beyond the Rhine and the Danube being born in a healthful and prolifick Clime do many times increase to such insustainable numbers that part of them are constrained to abandon their Native in quest of new Countries to inhabit When any of those Provinces are overcharged and disposed to disgorge the Order they observe is to divide into three parts so equally that each of the three consists of a just proportion of Noble and Ignoble Rich and Poor After which they cast Lots and that part to whose fortune it falls marches off to new Quarters where they can be found while the other two disburden'd of their supernumeraries remain behind and injoy their own Patrimonies in peace These inundations and redundancies of people were the destruction of the Roman Empire to which the Emperours themselves gave great opportunity for having forsaken Rome the ancient Seat of the Empire and remov'd their Residence to Constantinople they left the Western Empire more weak as being more remote from their inspection and by consequence more obnoxious both to their Governours and Enemies And indeed for the destruction of an Empire founded upon the bloud of so many brave men there could not be less carelesness in the Princes less treachery in the Ministers nor less force and impetuosity in those who invaded for one inundation being unable several conspir'd and at last effected its ruine The first from those Northern Countries who invaded that Empire after the Cimbri which were vanquish'd by Marius a Citizen of Rome were the Visi Goti or Western Goths who after some Skirmishes and Conflicts upon the Consines of the Empire were by concession of the Emperours assigned and for a long time permitted quietly to possess a part of the Countrey along the Danube And although upon several occasions and at sundry times they invaded the Roman Provinces yet by the vigilance and power of the Emperours they were always repell'd The last that overcame them so gloriously was Theodosius who having subdu'd them to his obedience they did not as formerly create themselves a King but contented themselves with his Government and Pay they submitted to both and serv'd him faithfully in his Wars But Theodosius being dead and his two Sons Arcadius and Honorius succeeding not inheriting his Virtue and Fortune as well as his Crown the Empire began to decline and the times as their Emperour to grow worse and worse To the three parts of the Empire Theodosius in his life-time had preferred three Governours Ruffinus to the East Stilico to the West and Gildo to the South who all of them after the death of Theodosius despising the Title of Governours resolv'd to make themselves Kings Gildo and Ruffinus miscarried in their first Enterprise and were ruin'd But Stilico being better at Hypocrisie than his Brethren endeavoured to insinuate and work himself into a confidence with the Emperours yet with design so to perplex and disturb their Affairs that he himself might afterwards with more ease leap up into the Saddle To incense the Visigots and provoke them to mutiny he counsel'd the Emperours to abate and retrench their former allowance and least they should not be sufficient for the molestation of the Empire he contrived that the Burgundi Franchi Vandali and Alani Northern people like the other and in motion for new Quarters should fall likewise upon the Roman Provinces The Visigoti as soon as they found themselves retrench'd that they might be in better order to revenge it created Alaricus their King under whose conduct they assayl'd the Empire and after several Rencounters and accidents they over-ran all Italy and sack'd Rome Not long after Alaricus died and was succeeded by Ataulfus who marrying Placidia the Emperours Sister Articled upon the Match to assist in the Relief of France and Spain which Provinces were at that time much infested by the Vandali Burgundi Alani and Franchi upon the aforesaid occasion Ataulfus undertook only the Vandali
had Conquer'd Africa driven out the Vandals and reduc'd it under that Empire again Having first possessed himself of Sicily and from thence passed his Army into Italy Bellisarius recovered Naples and Rome The Goths foreseeing their destruction kill'd Theodate their King as the occasion of all and elected Vitegetes in his place who after several Skirmishes was at length besieged and taken in Ravenna by Bellisarius who not prosecuting his Victory as was expected was call'd back by Iustinian and his Command given to Iohannes and Vitalis who were much short of him both in Virtue and Conversation so that the Goths took heart and created Ildovado their King who was at that time Governour of Verona and being kill'd shortly after the Kingship fell to Totila who beat the Emperours forces recover'd Tuscany and subdu'd the Governours of all those Provinces which Bellisarius had reduc'd Upon which misfortune Iustinianus thought it necessary to send him again into Italy but returning with small Force he rather lost what he had gained before than acquir'd any new Reputation For Totila whilst Bellisarius lay incamped with his Army at Hostia besieg'd Rome and took it as it were under his Nose and then upon consideration that he could neither well keep nor relinquish it he demolish'd the greatest part of it forcing away the people and carrying the Senators as Prisoners along with him and taking no notice of Bellisarius he advanc'd with his Army into Calabria to encounter and cut off certain supplies which were sent out of Greece to reinforce him Bellisarius seeing Rome abandon'd in this manner addressed himself to a very honourable Enterprise and entring the City repair'd the Walls withall possible Celerity and re-invited the Inhabitants when he had done But Fortune concurr'd not to the nobleness of his design for Iustinianus being at that time invaded by the Parthi Bellisarius was call'd back to repell the Invasion In obedience to his Master he marched his Army out of Italy and left that Province to the discretion of the Enemy who seized again upon Rome but us'd it not so barbarously as before being wrought upon by the prayers of Saint Benedict a person very eminent in those times for his Sanctity he apply'd himself rather to repair than destroy it In the mean time Iustinian had made a Peace with the Parthi and resolving to send new Supplies into Italy he was diverted by a new Alarm from the Sclavi another Northern people who had pass'd the Danube and fallen upon Illyria and Thrace So that Totila had his full swing and was in a manner in possession of all Italy As soon as Iustinian had Conquer'd the Sclavi and setled the Countreys which they had invaded he sent a new Army into Italy under the Conduct of Narsetes an Eunuch a brave Captain and of great experience in the Wars Being arrived in Italy he fought beat and kill'd Totila after whose death the remainder of the Goths retir'd into Pavia and made Teia their King On the other side Narsetes after his Victory took Rome and than marching against Teia he ingaged him about Nocera defeated his Army and slew him among the rest By which disaster the very Name of the Goths was well near extinguish'd in Italy where they had reigned from the time of Theodorick to this Teia full seventy years But Italy was scarce warm in its Liberty when Iustinianus dy'd and left his Son Iustinus to succeed who by the Counsel of his Wife Sophia recall'd Narsetes out of Italy and sent Longinus in his place Longinus according to the Example of his Predecessors kept his Residence at Ravenna in other things he digress'd and particularly by introducing a new form of Government in Italy not constituting Governours in every Province as the Goths had done before but deputing a Captain in every City or other Town of importance with the Title of Duke Nor in this distribution did he show any greater favour to Rome than to the rest for removing the Consuls and Senate Names which to that time had been sacred among them he constituted a Duke which he sent every year from Ravenna and his Government was call'd the Dukedom of Rome But lie that more immediately represented the Emperour at Ravenna and had the Universal Government of Italy was call'd Esarco This division not only facilitated the ruine of Italy but hasten'd it exceedingly by giving the Lombards opportunity to possess it Narsetes was much disgusted with the Emperour for calling him off from the Command of those Provinces which by his own Vertue and effusion of his bloud he had acquir'd And Sophia not thinking it injury sufficient to get him recall'd had given out contumelious words as if she would make him Spin among the rest of the Eunuchs Whereupon in great disdain Narsetes incourag'd Alboino King of the Lombards who at that time Govern'd in Pannonia to invade Italy and possess it As was shown before the Lombards were enter'd and had taken possession of such places upon the Danube as had been deserted by the Eruli and Turingi when Odoacres their King conducted them into Italy They had continued there some time till their Kingdom fell to Alboino for a daring and couragious man under whom passing the Danube they encounter'd with Commodus King of the Zepidi a People planted in Pannonia and overcame him Among the rest Rosmunda one of Commodus Daughters was taken Prisoner whom Alboinus took for his Wife made himself Lord of her Countrey and mov'd by the barbarousness of his nature he caus'd a Cup to be made of her Father's Skull and in memory of that Victory drank out of it very often But being call'd into Italy by Narsetes with whom he had retain'd a Friendship in his Wars with the Goths he left Pannonia to the Hunni who as we said before return'd into their own Countrey after the death of Attila march'd into Italy and finding it so strangly Cantoniz'd and divided he possessed or rather surpriz'd Pavia Milan Verona Vicenza all Tuscany and the great part of Flaminia call'd now Romagnia So that presuming from the greatness and suddenness of his Conquests all Italy was his own he made a solemn Feast at Verona where much drinking having exalted his Spirits and Commodus his Skull being full of Wine he caus'd it to be presented to Rosmunda the Queen who sat over against him at the Table declaring and that so loud she could not but hear that at a time of such hearty and extraordinary Mirth it was fit she should drink one Cup with her Father Which expression touching the Lady to the quick she resolv'd to be reveng'd and knowing that Almachilde a young and valiant Lombard had an intrigue with one of her Maids she prevail'd that she might personate her one night and lie with him her self Accordingly Almachilde being introduc'd upon a time into a very dark place he injoy'd Rosmunda instead of her Maid The Business being done Rosmunda discover'd her self
Virtue as by the Chivalry of his Unkle Pepin and Charles Martel his Father For Charles Martel being Governour of that Kingdom gave that memorable defeat to the Saracens near Torsi upon the River Totra in which above 200000. of them were slain upon the reputation of which Victor'y under the discipline of his Father and his own deportment in it besides Pepin was afterwards made King of that Kingdom to whom when Pope Gregory appli'd himself for Relief against the Lombards Pepin return'd Answer that he would be ready to assist him but he desir'd first to have the honour to see him and pay his personal respects Upon which Invitation Pope Gregory went into France passing thorow the Lombards Quarters without any interruption so great Reverence they bare to Religion in those days Being arriv'd and honourably receiv'd in France he was after some time dismiss'd with an Army into Italy which having besieg'd Pavia and reduc'd the Lombards to distress Aistolfus was constrain'd to certain terms of Agreement with the French which were obtain'd by the intercession of the Pope who desir'd not the death of his Enemy but that he might rather be converted and live Among the rest of the Articles of that Treaty it was agreed That Aistolfus should restore all the Lands he had usurped from the Church But when the French Army was return'd into France Aistolfus forgot his Ingagement which put the Pope upon a second Application to King Pepin who re-suppli'd him again sent a new Army into Italy overcame the Lombards and possessed himself of Ravenna and contrary to the desire of the Grecian Emperour gave it to the Pope with all the Lands under that Exarchat and the Countrey of Urbino and la Marca into the bargain In the interim Aistolfus died and Desiderio a Lombard and Duke of Tuscany taking up Arms to succeed him begg'd Assistance of the Pope with Promise of perpetual Amity for the future which the Pope granted as far as the other Princes would consent At first Desiderio was very punctual and observed his Articles to a hair delivering up the Towns as he took them to the Pope according to his Ingagement to King Pepin nor was there any Exarchus sent afterwards from Constantinople to Ravenna but all was Arbitrary and manag'd according to the pleasure of the Pope Not long after Pepin died and Charles his Son succeeded in the Government who was call'd the Great from the greatness of his Exploits About the same time Theodore the First was advanc'd to the Papacy and falling out with Desiderio was besieg'd by him in Rome In his exigence the Pope had recourse to the King of France as his Predecessor had done before him and Charles not only suppli'd him with an Army but marching over the Alps at the Head of it himself he besieg'd Desiderio in Pavia took him and his Son in it sent them both Prisoners into France and went in person to Rome to visit the Pope where he adjudg'd and determin'd That his Holiness being God's Vicar could not be subject to the Iudgment of Man For which the Pope and people together declar'd him Emperour and Rome began again to have an Emperour of the West and whereas formerly the Popes were confirm'd by the Emperours the Emperour now in his Election was to be beholding to the Pope by which means the power and dignity of the Empire declin'd and the Church began to advance and by these steps to usurp upon the Authority of Temporal Princes The Lombards had been in Italy 222 years so long as to retain nothing of their original Barbarity but their name Charles being desirous to reform Italy in the time of Leo III. was contented they should inhabit and denominate the parts where they were born which since then have been call'd Lombardy and because the name of Rome was venerable among them he appointed that part of Italy which was adjacent and under the Exarchat of Ravenna should be call'd Romagnia Moreover he created his Son Pepin King of Italy extending his Jurisdiction as far as Benevento all the rest was continued under the dominion of the Grecian Emperour with whom Charles had made an Alliance During these Transactions Pascal the First was elected Pope and the Parish Priests in Rome by reason of their propinquity and readiness at every Election to adorn their power with a more illustrious Title began to be call'd Cardinals arrogating so much to themselves especially after they had excluded the Voices of the people that seldom any Pope was created but by them out of their own number Pascal being dead he was succeeded by Eugenius the Second of the Order of Santa Sabina Italy being in this manner under the Authority of the French changed its Form and Oeconomy in some measure for the Pope having incroach'd upon the Temporal Authority created Counts and Marquesses as Longinus Exarchat of Ravenna had made Dukes before After some few Ospurcus a Roman succeeded to the Papacy who not satisfied with the uncomliness of his Name call'd himself Sergius and gave the first occasion for the changing their Names which has since been frequently practis'd at their several Elections About this time Charles the Emperour died and his Son Lodovic succeeded yet not so quietly but that there arose so many and so great differences betwixt his Sons that in the days of his Grand-Children the Empire was wrested from his Family restor'd to the Almans and the next German Emperour was call'd Ainolfus Nor did Charles his Posterity by their dissentions lose only the Empire but their Soveraignty in Italy likewise for the Lombards resuming Courage fell foul upon the Pope and his Romans who not knowing to whose protection to betake himself was constrain'd to make Berengarius Dukeof Friuli King of Italy Incouraged by these Accidents the Hunni who at that time were planted in Pannonia took heart and invaded Italy but coming to a Battel with Berengarius they were overthrown and forc'd back again into Pannonia or rather into Hungaria it being at that time call'd by their Name At that time Romano was Emperour of Greece who being General of his Army had usurp'd upon Constantine and forc'd the Government out of his hand and because during these innovations Puglia and Calabria which as I said before had subjected themselves to that Empire were then in Rebellion inrag'd at their insolence he permitted the Saracens to possess those Countreys if they could gain them who invading them thereupon immediately subdu'd them and attempted upon Rome But the Romans Berengarius being imploy'd against the Hunni made Alberigo Duke of Tuscany their General by whose Valour their City was preserv'd and the Saracens raising their Siege retir'd built a Castle upon the Mountain Gargano and from thence Lorded it over Puglia and Calabria and infested all that part of Italy besides Thus it was that Italy in those times was marvelously afflicted towards the Alps by the Hunni towards Naples by the Saracens
neighbouring places which had been anciently their Subjects And because the Tuscans refus'd to submit they march'd confusedly against them but they being re-inforced by Frederick gave the Roman Army such a blow that since that time Rome could never recover its old Condition either for Populousness or Wealth Upon these Events Pope Alexander was return'd to Rome presuming he might be safe there by reason of the Animosity the Romans retain'd against the Emperour and the Employment his Enemies gave him in Lombardy But Frederick postponing all other respects march'd with his Army to besiege Rome Alexander thought it not convenient to attend him but withdrew into Puglia to William who upon the death of Roger being next Heir was made King Frederick being much molested and weaken'd by a Contagion in his Army rais'd his Siege and went back into Germany The Lombards which were in League against him to restrain their Excursions and streighten the Towns of Pavia and Tortona caus'd a City to be built which they intended for the Seat of the War and call'd it Alexandria in honour to Pope Alexander and defiance to the Emperour Guido the new Anti-Pope died likewise and Iohn of Fermo was chosen in his room who by the favour of the Imperial party was permitted to keep his Residence in Monte Fiascone whilst Alexander was gone into Tuscany invited by that people that by his Authority they might be the better defended against the Romans Being there Embassadors came to him from Henry King of England to clear their Masters innocence in the death of Thomas Becket Arch-Bishop of Canterbury with which he was publickly and most infamously aspersed To inquire into the truth the Pope sent two Cardinals into England who notwithstanding they found not his Majesty in any manifest guilt yet for the scandal of the Fact and that he had not honour'd the said Arch-Bishop with the respect he deserved they prescribed as a Penance That he should call all the Barons of his Kingdom together swear his Innocence before them send 200 Soldiers to Ierusalem to be paid by him for a twelve-month and himself follow in person with as great a Power as he could raise before three years were expir'd that he should disanul all things pass'd in his Kingdom in prejudice to the Ecclesiastick liberty and consent that any of his Subjects whatever should appeal to Rome when and as often as they thought it convenient all which Conditions were readily accepted and that great Prince submitted to a Sentence there is scarce a private person but would scorn at this day But though his Holiness was so formidable to the Princes abroad he was not so terrible in Rome the people in that City would not be â—oaksed nor persuaded to let him live there though he protested he would meddle no farther than Ecclesiastical matters by which it appears things at a distance are more dreadful than near at hand In the mean time Frederick was return'd into Italy with resolution to make a new War upon the Pope but whilst he was busie about his preparations his Barons and Clergy gave him advertisement that they would all forsake him unless he reconcil'd himself to the Church so that changing his design he was forc'd to go and make his submission at Venice and pacification being made the Pope in the Agreement devested the Emperor of all the Authority he pretended over Rome and named William King of Sicily and Puglia his Confederate Frederick being an active Prince and unable to lie still embarqu'd himself in the Enterprize into Asia to spend his Ambition against the Turk which he could not do so effectually against the Pope But being got as far as the River Cidvo allur'd by the clearness and excellence of the Waters he would needs wash himself in it and that washing gave him his death Those Waters being more beneficial to the Turks than all Excommunications to the Christians for whereas these only cool'd and asswag'd his Ambition they wash'd it away and extinguish'd it quite Frederick being dead nothing remain'd now to be suppres'd but the contumacy of the Romans After much argument and dispute about their Creation of Consuls it was concluded the Romans according to ancient Custom should have liberty to choose them but they should not execute their Office till they had sworn fealty to the Church Upon this accord Iohn the Anti-Pope fled to Monte Albano and died presently after In the mean time William King of Naples died also and having left no Sons but Tanacred a Bastard the Pope design'd to have possess'd himself of his Kingdom but by the opposition of the Barons Tanacred was made King Afterwards Celestin III. coming to the Papacy and being desirous to wrest that Kingdom from Tanacred he contriv'd to make Enrico Fredericks Son King promising him the Kingdom of Naples upon Condition he would restore such Lands as belong'd to the Church and to facilitate the business he took Costanza an ancient Maid daughter to King William out of a Monastery and gave her him for his Wife by which means the Kingdom of Naples pass'd from the Normans who had founded it and fell under the dominion of the Germans Henricus the Emperor having first setled his affairs in Germany came into Italy with his Wife Costanza and one of his Sons call'd Frederick about four years of age and without much difficulty possess'd himself of that Kingdom Tanacred being dead and only one Child remaining of his Issue call'd Roger Not long after Enricus died in Sicily he was succeeded in that Kingdom by Frederick and Otto Duke of Saxony chosen Emperour by the assistance of Pope Innocent III. But no sooner had he got the Crown upon his Head but contrary to the opinion of all men he became Enemy to the Pope seiz'd upon Romania and gave out Orders for the assaulting that Kingdom Upon which being Excommunicated by the Pope and deserted by his Friends Frederick King of Naples was chosen Emperour in his place The said Frederick coming to Rome to be Crown'd the Pope scrupl'd it being jealous of his power and endeavoured to persuade him out of Italy as he had done Otto before which Frederick disdaining retir'd into Germany and making War upon Otto overcame him at last In the mean time Innocent died who besides other magnificent Works built the Hospital di Santo Spirito at Rome Honorius III. succeeded him in whose Papacy were instituted the Orders of S. Dominick and S. Francis in the year MCCXVIII Honorius Crown'd Frederick to whom Iohn descended from Baldwin King of Ierusalem who commanded the remainder of the Christians in Asia and retain'd that Title gave one of his Daughters in marriage and the Title of that Kingdom in Dower with her and from that time whoever is King of Naples has that Title annex'd In Italy at that time they liv'd in this manner The Romans had no more the Creation of Consuls but in lieu of it they invested sometimes one
House of Amidei The Lady much dissatisfy'd with her Omission hoping nevertheless her Daughters Beauty might be able to dissolve the Contract seeing him pass one day alone towards her House she took her Daughter along and went down to accost him and opening the Gate as he went by she saluted him and told him she could not but congratulate his Marriage though indeed she had kept her Daughter presenting her to him in hopes she should have been the Bride The young Gentleman beholding the Excellent Beauty of the Damotselle contemplating her Extraction and that her Fortune was not at all Inferiour to the persons he had chosen fell immediately into such a passion and desire to Marry her that not considering the promise he had made the injustice he should commit nor the ill consequences that might follow he reply'd Seeing Madam you have preserv'd her for me being not yet too late it would be ingratitude to refuse her and without more adoe he Married her The notice of his inconstancy was no sooner divulg'd but it was taken in great indignity by the Families of the Amidei and Uberti who at that time were nearly ally'd Having consulted among themselves and several others of their Relations it was concluded the affront was insupportable and not to be expiated but by the death of Messr Buondelmonte and though some remonstrated the evils which might follow Moscha Lamberti repli'd That to consider every thing was to resolve on nothing super-adding an old Adage That a thing once done is not capable of Remedy upon which the Fact being determin'd the perpetration was committed to the said Moscha Stiatta Uberti Lambertuccio Amidei and Oderigo Fifanti Upon Easter-day in the morning they address'd themselves to the work and being privately convey'd to a House belonging to the Amidei between the Old Bridge and St. Stephans Messr Buondelmonte passing the River upon a White Horse as if an injury could as easily have been forgotten as a Marriage have been broken they set upon him at the foot of the Bridge and slew him under a Statue of Mars which was placed thereby This Murder divided the whole City part of it siding with the Buondelmonti and part with the Uberti and both the Families being powerful in Houses Castles and Men the Quarrel continued many years before either could be ejected yet though the animosity could not be extinguish'd by a firm and stable peace yet things were palliated and compos'd sometimes for the present by certain Truces and Cessations by which means according to the variety of accidents they were sometimes at quiet and sometimes together by the Ears In this Condition Florence continued till the Reign of Frederick 11. who being King of Naples and desirous to strengthen himself against the Church to corroborate his interest in Tuscany joyn'd himself to the Uberti and their party by whose assistance the Buondelmonti were driven out of Florence and that City as all Italy had done before began to divide into the Factions of the Guelfs and the Ghibilins Nor will it be amiss to commemorate how each Family was ingag'd The Families therefore which sided with the Guelfs were the Buondelmonti Nerti Rossi Frescobaldi Mozzi Baldi Pulchi Gherardini Foraboschi Bagnesi Guidalotti Sacchetti Manieri Lucardesi Chiaramonti Compiobbesi Cavalcanti Giandonati Gianfiliazzi Scali Guallerotti Importuni Bostichi Tornaquinci Vecchietti Fosinghi Arrigucci Agli Silii Adimari Visdomini Donati Pazzi della Bella Ardinghi Theobaldi Cerchi With the Ghibilines there joyned the Uberti Manelli Ubriachi Fifanti Amidei Infanganti Malespini Scolari Guidi Galli Capprardi Lamberti Soldanieri Cipriani Toschi Amieri Palermini Migliorelli Pigli Barucci Cattani Agolanti Bruneleschi Caponsachi Elisei Abbati Fedaldini Guiocchi Galigai to which Families of the Nobility many of the populacy joyn'd themselves on each side as their interest or affections carried them so that in a manner the whole City was ingag'd either on one side or the other The Guelfs being driven out retir'd into the Vale upon the River Arnus mention'd before and the greatest part of their Garrisons being there they defended them as well as they could against the Attacks of their Enemies But when Frederick dyed those persons who were Neuters retaining great interest and reputation with the people thought it more serviceable to the City of Florence to reconcile their differences and unite them than by fomenting them to destroy it Whereupon endeavouring a Composure they prevail'd at length that the Guelfs should lay aside their indignation and return and the Ghibilines renounce their suspicion and receive them Being united in this manner it was thought seasonable to provide for their liberty and to contrive some Laws for their defence before the new Emperour should get the power into his hands In order thereunto they divided the City into six parts They chose twelve Citizens two for each part which under the title of Antiani they invested with the Government but chang'd them every year To prevent any animosity that might arise from the determination of the matters judicial they constituted two Forreign Judges one of them call'd the Captain of the people and the other the Podesta to decide all Civil and Criminal Causes which should occur And because Laws are but transient and of little duration where there is no power to defend them they establish'd XX Colours in the City and 76 in the Territory under which all the youth was listed and oblig'd to be ready in their Arms under their respective Colours as often and whenever the Captain or Antiani should require them Moreover as their Ensigns were distinct so were their Arms some of them consisted of Cross-bows some of them of Halbards Their Ensigns were chang'd at every Pentecost with great solemnity and dispos'd to new Men and new Captains put over their Companies Besides to add Majesty to their Army and provide a refuge for such as were wounded or disabled in Fight where they might refresh and recruit again to make head against the Enemy they order'd a large Charriot cover'd with Red and drawn by two white Oxen upon which their Standard of White and Red was to be placed Whenever their Army was to be drawn out this Charriot was to be drawn into the Market-place and with great formality consign'd to the Captains of the people For the greater magnificence and ostentation of their Enterprizes they had moreover a great Bell call'd Martinello which Rung cotinually a month before they march'd with their Army that the Enemy might have so much time to provide for his Defence So much Gallantry there was then amongst men and with so much Magnanimity they behav'd themselves that whereas now adays it is reputed policy and wisdom to surprize an Enemy and fall upon him while he is unprovided it was then thought treacherous and ignoble This Bell when they march'd was carried along with the Army and by it the Guards set and relieved and other Military Orders deriv'd By this Discipline in Civil and Martial
with the chief of the Ghibilines and determin'd to take that back again by force from the people which so unadvisedly they had given With which design having assembled the several Companies in their Arms and the XXXVI Reformatori with them causing a suddain Alarm to be brought in the Reformatori being frighted and retiring to their Houses the Ensigns of the several faculties were display'd and several Armed men behind them immediately understanding that Count Guido and his party were at St. Iohns they made a stand at St. Trinita and chose Giovanni Soldanieri for their Captain The Count on the other side hearing where they had posted advanced against them and the people not declining they met in a place which is now call'd Loggia dei Tornaquinci where the Count was worsted and most of his party slain Being off of his mettle and fearful the Enemy would assault him in the night and cut his Throat his Men being cow'd and unable to defend him without considering other remedy he resolv'd to preserve himself by flying rather than by fighting and accordingly contrary to the perswasion of the Heads of the Ghibilines he retired to Prato with what men he had left When he found himself safe and his fear over he became sensible of his Errour and being desirous to have repair'd it next morning at break of day he drew out his Men march'd back to Florence designing to recover that Honourably which he had so Scandalously lost but he found himself mistaken for though it might have cost the people hot water to have expell'd him they found it no hard matter to keep him out when he was gone insomuch that being repuls'd he drew off with great sorrow and shame to Casentino and the Ghibilines return'd to their Houses The people being Conquerours out of affection to all such as had a love for their Countrey they resolv'd to reunite the City once more and call'd home all their Citizens which were abroad as well Ghibilines as Guelfs Hereupon the Guelfs return'd after six years banishment the Ghibilines late attempt was pardoned and they receiv'd back again but yet they continued odious both to the people and Guelfs the last not being able to extinguish the memory of their banishment nor the first to forget their Tyranny and insolence when the Government was in their hand so that their animosity was deposited neither on the one side nor the other Whil'st the affairs of Florence were in this posture a report was spread that Corradine Nephew to Manfredi was coming with Forces out of Germany to Conquer the Kingdom of Naples upon which the Ghibilines conceiv'd fresh hopes of recovering their Authority and the Guelfs being no less solicitous for their security begg'd the assistance of King Charles in case Corradine should come Charles having comply'd and his Forces upon their March the Guelfs became so insolent and the Ghibilines so timorous that two days before the French Army arriv'd the Ghibilines fled out of the City without staying to be expell'd The Ghibilines departed the Florentines new Modell'd their City choosing Twelve principal Magistrates to continue in Authority only for two Months not under the title of Antiani but Ruoni-huomini Next to them they constituted a Councel of 80 Citizens which they call'd La Credenza after which 180 were chosen out of the people which with the Credenza and the 12 Buoni-huomini were call'd the General-Councel besides which they erected another Councel consisting of 120. both Citiziens and Nobles which Councel was to consummate and ratifie whatever was debated or resolv'd in the rest Having setled their Government in this manner and by new Laws and Election of Magistrates of their own party fortifi'd themselves against the Machinations of the Ghibilines the Guelfs confiscated the Ghibilines Estates and having divided them into three parts one was assign'd to publike uses another given to their Magistrates and Captains and the third distributed among the Guelfs to recompense the damage they had receiv'd The Pope to preserve Tuscany to the Faction of the Guelfs made King Charles Imperial Vicar of that Province By this method the Florentines having maintain'd their honour and reputation abroad by their Arms and at home by their Laws they remain'd firm and secure in the mean time the Pope dyed and after a two years vacancy and a tedious dispute Gregory X. was elected who being at the time of his Election and a long while before in Syria and by consequence ignorant of the humours of the Factions he carry'd not himself with that caution towards them as his Predecessors had done But in his way to France being arriv'd at Florence he thought it the Office of a good Pastor to endeavour to compose their differences and prevail'd with them to receive Commissioners from the Ghibilines to negotiate the manner of their return but though their Peace was made and all particulars concluded the Ghibilines were too jealous to accept them and refus'd to come back The Pope imputed the fault to the City and excommunicated it in his passion under which censure it continued whil'st he lived but after his death when Innocent V. was created it was taken off Innocent V. was succeeded by Nicholas III. of the house of the Orsini and because the Popes were alwayes jealous of any great power in Italy though rais'd by the favour of the Church and constantly endeavour'd to depress it great troubles and frequent variations ensued for the fear of a Person grown Potent to any degree was the advancement of another less powerful than he who growing powerful by his preferment as his Predecessor had done became formidable like him and that fear was the occasion of his debasement This was the cause that Kingdom was taken from Manfredi and given to Charles This was the reason that Charles became terrible afterwards and his ruine was conspir'd for Nicholas III. mov'd by the considerations aforesaid prevail'd so that Charles by the Emperours means was remov'd from the Government of Tuscany and Latino the Popes Legat sent thither in his place by Commission from the Emperour Florence at this time was in no very good condition for the Guelfish Nobility being grown insolent and careless of the Magistrates several Murders and other violences were daily committed the Malefactors passing unpunish'd by the favour and protection of the Nobles To restrain these insolencies it was thought good by the Heads of the City to recall those who were banished which gave opportunity to the Legate to reunite the City and to the Ghibilines to return whereupon instead of XII Governours which they had before they were increas'd to XIV VII of each party their Government to be Annual and their Election by the Pope Two years Florence remain'd under this Form till Martino a Frenchman was created Pope who restor'd to King Charles whatever Authority Pope Nicholas had taken from him So that Florence being again in Commotion the Citizens
forced his passage into the Town the Florentines drew off to Librafatta and the Conte march'd out and sat down before Pescia where Pagolo da Diaccetto was Governor and in great fear ran away to Pistoia Had not the Town been better defended by Giovanni Malavolti than by him it had been most dishonourably lost The Conte not able to carry it at the first assault drew off to Buggiano took that and Stilano a Castle not far off and burn'd both of them to the ground The Florentines displeas'd with this devastation apply'd themselves to a remedy which had often preserv'd them and knowing that Souldiers of Fortune are easier corrupted than beaten they caus'd a considerable sum to be proffer'd to the Conte not only to depart but to deliver them the Town The Conte perceiving no Man was to be squeez'd out of that City accepted the proposition in part but not thinking it convenient in point of honor to put them in possession of the Town he articled to draw away his Army upon the payment of 50000 Ducats This agreement being made that the people of Lucca might excuse him to the Duke he seiz'd upon their Governor which they had promis'd to depose Antonio dell Rosso the Siena Embassador was at that time in Lucca as we said before This Antonio by the Authority of the Conte meditated the destruction of Pagolo The heads of the Conspiracy were Pietro Cennami and Giovanni da Chivizano The Conte was quartered out of the Town upon the Banks of the Serchio and with him the Governor's Son The Conspirators about 40 in number went in the night to find out Pagolo who hearing of their intention came forth in great fear to meet them and inquire the occasion To whom Cennami made answer That they had been too long Govern'd by him that the Enemy was now about their walls and they brought into a necessity of dying either by Famine or the Sword That for the future they were resolv'd to take the Government into their own hands and therefore they demanded that the Treasure and the Keys of the City might be delivered to them Pagolo repli'd that the Treasure was consum'd but both the Keys and himself were at their service only he had no request to make to them that as his Government had begun and continued without blood so there might be none spilt at its conclusion Hereupon Pagolo and his Son were deliver'd up to the Conte Francesco who presented them to the Duke and both of them dyed afterwards in prison This departure of the Conte having freed the Lucchesi from the Tyranny of their Governor and the Florentine from the fear of his Army both sides fell again to their preparations the one to beleaguer and the other to defend The Florentines made the Conte Orbino their General who begirt the Town so close the Lucchesi were constrain'd once more to desire the assistance of the Duke who under the same pretence as he had formerly sent the Conte sent Nicolo Piccinino to relieve them Piccinino advancing with his Troops to enter the Town the Florentines opposing his passage over the River the Florentines were defeated after a sharp ingagement and the General with very few of his Forces preserv'd themselves at Pisa. This disaster put the whole City in great consternation and because the enterprize had been undertaken upon the peoples account not knowing where else to direct their complaints they laid the fault upon the Officers and managers seeing they could not fix it upon the contrivers of the war and reviv'd their old articles against Rinaldo But the greatest part of their indignation fell upon Giovanni Guiccardini charging him that it was in his power to have put an end to the war after Conte Francesco was departed but that he had been corrupted by their mony part of which had been remitted to his own house by bills of exchange and part he had received himself and carryed it with him These reports and rumors went so high that the Captain of the people moved by them and the importunity of the contrary party summon'd him before him Giovanni appear'd but full of indignation whereupon his relations interpos'd and to their great honor prevail'd so far with the Captain that the process was laid aside The Lucchesi upon this Victory not only recover'd their own Towns but over-ran and possess'd themselves of the whole Territory of Pisa except Biantina Calcinaia Liccorno and Librafatta and had not a conspiracy been accidently discover'd in Pisa that City had been lost among the rest The Florentines however recruited their Army and sent it out under the command of Micheletto who had been bred up a Soldier under Sforza The Duke having obtain'd the Victory to overlay the Florentines with multitude of Enemies procured a League betwixt the Genouesi Sanisi and the Lord of Piombino for the defence of Lucca and that Piccinino should be their General which thing alone was the discovery of the plot Hereupon the Venetians and Florentines renew there League Open Hostilities are committed both in Lombardy and Tuscany and many Skirmishes and Rencounters happen with various fortune on both sides till at length every Body being tyr'd a General Peace was concluded betwixt all parties in the month of May 1433. by which it was agreed that the Florentines Siennesi Lucchesi and who ever else during that war had taken any Towns or Castles from their Enemies should restore them and all things return to the possession of the owners During the time of this war abroad the malignant and factious humors began to work again and ferment at home and Cosimo de Medici after the Death of his Father began to manage the publick business with greater intention and magnanimity and converse with his Friends with greater freedom than his Father had done Insomuch that those who before were glad at the death of Giovanni were much surpriz'd and confounded to see him so far out-done by his Son Cosimo was a wise and sagacious Gentleman grave but grateful in his presence liberal and courteous to the highest never attempted any thing against any party nor the State but watch'd all opportunities of doing good to every Body and obliging all people with his continual beneficence So that indeed the excellency of his conversation was no little distraction and disadvantage to those who were at the helm However by that way he presum'd he should be lyable to live as freely and with as much Authority in Florence as other people or else being driven to any strait by the malice of his Adversaries it would be in his power to deal with them by the assistance of his friends The great instruments for the propagation of his interest were Averardo de Medici and Puccio Pucci Averardo with his prudence procuring him much favour and reputation This Puccio was a Person so eminent for his judgment and so well known to the people that he denominated the faction which was not call'd
encouraged the Florentines to an expedition against Lucca and gave them great hopes of success in which they carried themselves without either fear or respect seeing the Duke who was the only person they apprehended imployed by the Venetians and the Lucchesi by having as it were received their enemies into their houses and given them cause to invade them had left themselves no grounds to complain In April therefore in the year 1437 the Conte march'd with his Army and before he would fall upon any thing of the enemies he addressed himself to the recovery of what had been lost and accordingly he reduced S. Maria de Castello and what-ever else had been taken by Piccinino Then advancing against the Lucchesi he sate down before Camajore whose Garison and inhabitants though well enough affected to their Lord being more influenced by the terror of an enemy at hand than their fidelity to their friends a far off surrendered immediately after which he took Massa and Serazan with the same dexterity and reputation and then turning his Army towards Lucca in the month of May he destroyed their Corn burn'd their Villages stubb'd up their Vines and their Fruit-trees drove away their Cattel and omitted nothing of outrage and hospitality that is or can be committed by Souldiers The Lucchesi seeing themselves abandoned by the Duke and unable to defend their Country retir'd into the Town where they intrench'd and fortified so well that they did not doubt by reason of their numbers within but to be able to Make it good for some time as they had formerly done Their only fear was of the unconstancy of the people who being weary of the siege would probably consider their own private danger before the liberty of their Country and force them to some ignominious accord Whereupon to encourage them to a vigorous defence they were called together into the Market-place and one of the wisest and gravest of the Citizens spake to them as followeth You have often heard and must needs understand that things done of necessity arâ— neither to be praised nor condemned If therefore you accuse us of having drawn this War upon you by entertaining the Duke's Forces and suffering them to assault you you are highly mistaken You cannot be ignorant of the ancient and inveterate hatred the Florentines bear you so that 't is not any injury in you nor any resentment in them but your weakness and their ambition which has provoked them the first giving them hopes the other impatience to oppress you Do not think that any kindness of yours can divert them from that desire nor any injury of yours provoke them to be worse 'T is their business therefore to rob you of your liberty 't is yours to defend it and what either of you do in pursuance of those ends may be lamented but cannot be wondred at by any body we may be sorry our Country is invaded our City besieged our Houses burned but who of us all is so weak as to admire it Seeing if our power were as great we would do the same to them and if possible worse If they pretend this War was occasioned by our admitting of Nicolo had he not been received they would have pretended another and perhaps had this invasion been deferred it might have proved more fatal and pernicious so that 't is not his coming is to be blamed but our ill fortune and the ambition of their nature for we could not refuse the Duke's Forces and when they were come it was not in our power to keep them from doing acts of Hostility you know very well that without the assistance of some considerable Prince we had not been able to defend our selves nor was any man more proper to relieve us both in respect of his fidelity and power than the Duke He restored us to our liberty and 't was but reasonable he should secure it He was always an enemy to those who would never be our friends if therefore we have provoked the Duke rather than we would disoblige the Florentines we have lost a true friend and made our enemy more able and more ready to offend us so that it is much better for us to have this War with the friendship of the Duke than to have peace with his displeasure and we have reason to hope he will rescue us from these dangers to which he has exposed us if we be not wanting to our selves You cannot forget with what fury the Florentines have many times assaulted us and with what honour and reputation we have repelled them even when we have had no hopes but in God and in time and how both of them have preserved us If we defended our selves then what reason now is there to despair Then we were deserted by all Italy and left as a prey to the Enemy now we have the Duke on our side and 't is not improbable the Venetians will be but slow in their motions against us seeing it can be no pleasure to them to see the power of the Florentines encrease Then the Florentines were more free and unengaged had more hopes of assistance and were stronger of themselves and we every way weaker for then we defended a Tyrant now we fight for our selves then the honour went to other people now it returns upon us then they were united and entire now they are divided and all Italy full of their Rebels But if we had none of these reasons nor none of these hopes to excite us extreme necessity would be sufficient to animate us to our defence Every enemy ought in reason to be apprehended by us because all of them seek their own glory and our destruction but above all the Florentines ought to be most dreadful who are not to be satisfied with our obedience tribute nor the government of our City but they must have our persons and Wealths to satiate their cruelty with our blood and their avarice with our estates so that there is no person nor condition among us so mean but ought justly to fear them Let No-body therefore be dismaid to see our Country wasted our Villages burn'd and our Lands possessed by the enemy if we preserve our City they of course will revert if we lose our City to what purpose will they be kept maintaining our liberty the enemy can hardly enjoy them but losing our liberty what comfort would it be to retain them Take arms therefore with courage and when you are engaged with your enemy remember the reward of your Victory is not only the safety of your Country but the preservation and security of your children and estates These last words were received by the people with such warmth and vigor of mind that unanimously they promised to die rather than to desert their City or entertain any treaty that might intrench upon their liberty so that immediately order was taken for all things necessary for the defence of the City In the mean time the Florentine Army was not
't is impossible old love or inveterate hatred can ever be expung'd let the new injuries or endearments be as many as they will we are and have been assured that in this War we might have stood neuter with great favour from the Duke and no danger to our selves for though by your expulsion he had made himself Master of Lombardy yet there would be enough left in Italy to secure us seeing envy is always concomitant with power one encreases with the other and where envy is War and distraction must follow We were not insensible likewise by declining this War how great charges and danger we should have avoided and how easily by our stirrings we may transplant into Tuscany but all these discouragments have been overrul'd by our affection of the state and we resolved to assist you with the same vigour as we would defend our selves to this end most Noble Lords my Masters judging it necessary above all things to relieve Verona and Brescia and imagining that impossible but by the conduct of the Count they sent me first to him to persuade his passing into Lombardy to which your Lordship knows he would never be oblig'd and to try the same arguments with him as wrought upon us as he is invincible in Arms so he is not to be out done in courtesie and that frankness and Generosity which he saw us practise towards you he has endeavoured to exceed he understood very well how much he should leave Tuscany expos'd by his departure but observing how we postponed our own safety to yours he very generously has promised to do the same and prefers your interest before his own My business here is to proffer you the Count at the head of 7000 Horse and 2000 Foot ready to receive your Orders and seek out the Enemy as you please to direct My request therefore is and it is the request of my Masters and his own that as he has exceeded the number which he was obliged to bring in to your service so you would enlarge your reward that neither he may repent of his enterprize nor we be sorry we persuaded him These words of Neri's were heard with as much attention by the Senate as if they had been delivered from an Oracle and so much was the auditory revived thereby they had not patience to let their Duke reply according to custom but rising all of them upon their feet with their hands lifted up and tears in their eyes they gave the Florentines thanks for the good office they had done them and him for the diligence and dexterity of his dispatch promising that no time should ever obliterate it not only in their own hearts but in the hearts of their posterity and that their Country and themselves would always be at the service of the Florentines But the transport being over they fell into serious debate about the way the Count was to take that bridges and all other conveniences might be provided four ways there were before them One from Ravenna along the shore but that lying most upon the Sea and the Fens was not approved the next was the direct way but obstructed by a Castle called the Ucellino which was garrison'd by the Duke and to be taken before they could pass and that could not be done in a short time without great difficulty and to be long about it would frustrate their relief in another place which required all possible expedition The third way was by the forest of Lugo but the Po being over-flown that was unpassable The fourth was thorow the Country of Bologna over the bridges at Puledrano Cento and Picue and so by Finale and Bondeno to Ferrara from whence partly by water and partly by land they might pass into the Country of Padua and joyn with the Venetian Army this way also had its difficulties and they were liable to be impeded by the Enemies Army yet being chosen as the best notice was given to the Count who departing with all imaginable speed arrived in the Country of Padua on the 20th of Iune the arrival of so great a Captain in Lombardy revived the whole Government of Venice and whereas before they were almost desperate of their safety they began now to take courage and expect new conquests upon the Enemy The first thing the Count attempted was the relief of Verona to prevent which Nicolo marched with his Army to Soave a Castle betwixt the Country of Vicensa and Verona there he entrenched throwing up a ditch from Soave to the marches of Adice The Count finding himself obstructed thorow the plain resolv'd to march over the mountains to Verona presuming that Nicolo would either believe he could not pass that way by reason of its steepness and cragginess or let him pass so before he believed it that it would be too late to interrupt him Wherefore taking eight days provision along with him he march'd his Army over the Mountains and at Soave came down into the plains And though Nicolo had thrown up some works to incommode him yet they were too weak to give him a stop Nicolo finding the Enemy pass'd beyond his imagination and fearing to be forced to an engagement upon some disadvantage he drew off to the other side of the Aldice and the Count without farther obstacle marched into Verona Having overcome the first difficulty and relieved Verona the next thing the Count was to attempt was to succour Brescia That City is seated so near the Lake di Garda that though it was blocked up by land yet the Lake was open and they could supply themselves with provisions Upon that consideration the Duke had put what force he could upon the Lake and in the beginning of his designs had secured all the Towns which were capable of supplying them by the benefit of the Lake The Venetians had Gallies likewise upon the Lake but they were not strong enough to encounter the Dukes The Count thought it necessary with his Army to Land to give the Venetian Gallies some advantage upon the Water and therefore he concluded to attempt some of those Towns which lay conveniently for the famishing of Brescia he clap'd down therefore with his Army before Bandolino a Castle standing upon the Lake hoping if he took that the rest would surrender But in that enterprize his fortune deceived him for most of his Men falling sick he was forced to raise the siege and remove his Army to Zemo a Castle belonging to the Veronesi where the air was more healthful and the Country more plentiful The Count retired Nicolo not to slip the opportunity of making himself Master of the Lake left his Camp at Vegasio and with a select party went to the Lake where joyning with the rest he fell so furiously upon the Venetian Squadron that he broke it quite and took most of them Prisoners Upon this Victory most of the Castles upon the Lake surrender'd to the Duke The Venetians startled at this defeat and fearing left the
Brescians should yield thereupon they solicited the Count very earnestly both by letters and Messages that he would attempt to relieve them The Count perceiving his hopes of doing it by the Lake absolutely defeated and his way by the fields impossible by reason of the Trenches and Bulwarks which were so numerous and strong and an Army to make them good so that to venture among them would be inevitable destruction the way by the Mountains having been succesful to him at Verona he resolved to try it once more for the relief of Brescia Having pitched upon his way the Count departed from Zeno and by the Val d' Acri marching to the Lake of St. Andrea he pass'd to Forboli and Penda upon the Lake di Garda from whence he advanced to Tenna and sate down before it it being necessary that Castle should be taken before he could get into Brescia Nicolo having intelligence of his design marched his Army to Pischiera and from thence joyning with the Marquess of Mantoua and a commanded party of his best-men he proceeded to engage the Count who giving him battle Nicolo was beaten his Army dispersed many of them taken Prisoners and those which escaped many of them fled to their Camp and many of them to the Fleet. Nicolo got off himself into Tenna and night being come concluding if he stayed till morning he could never get farther to avoid a certain danger he exposed himself to a doubtful Of all his retinue Nicolo had only one servant with him a lusty stong German and one that had always been very faithful to him Nicolo persuaded his German that if he would put him into a sack he might carry him off to some secure place upon his shoulders as some luggage of his Masters The Enemy lay round before the Castle but transported and secure upon their Victory the day before without any Order or guards by which means the German found no great difficulty in the business for putting himself into the habit of a freebooter and Mounting his Master upon his shoulders he passed thorow their whole Camp and brought him safe to his party This Victory had it been improved as happily as it was gained might have given more relief to Brescia and more felicity to the Venetians but being ill managed they had little reason to exult and Brescia remaining in the same necessity as before for Nicolo was no sooner returned to the forces which he had left behind but he set all his wits to work which way he might exploit some new thing to attone for his loss and obstruct the relief of the Town he knew himself the situation of the Citadel of Verona and had learned from the Prisoners taken in that War not only that it was ill guarded but the way how it might easily be surprized he believed therefore that fortune had presented him with an opportunity of recovering his honor and converting his Enemies joy into sadness and sorrow Verona is in Lombardy seated at the foot of those Mountains which divide Italy from Germany so that it stands partly upon the Hill and partly upon the plain the River Adice rises in the vally di Trento and running into Italy does not extend himself immediately thorow the plains but banding to the left hand among the Mountains it comes at length to the City and passes thorow the midst of it yet not so as to divide it into equal parts for towards the plain it is much greater then towards the Mountains upon the rising part of the City there are two Castles one of them called San Piero and the other San Felice which appear stronger in their situation than their walls and do by it command the whole Town In the plain on this side the Adice behind the wall of the City there are two Fortresses about a thousand paces distant one from the other of which the one is called the old Citadel and the other the new On the inside of one of them there passes a wall to the other and is in respect of the other walls which fetch a compass as the string to a bow All the space betwixt these two walls is full of Inhabitants and called the Borg of San Zeno. These two Castles and the Burg Nicolo designed to surprize believing it would be no difficult matter both because of the former negligence of the Guards which he presumed after the late Victory would be much greater and of an opinion he had that no enterprize was so feasible as that which the Enemy believed was impossible to be done Having drawn out a party of choice Men in order to his design he joyned with the Marquess of Mantoua and marching in the night to Verona he scaled the new Citadel and tooke it without being perceived and then forcing upon the Port di S. Antoine the signal was given to his Horse and they marched all of them into the Town Those of the old Citadel who were upon the Guard hearing the noise when the Sentinels in the other Citadel were knock'd on the head and when the Gate of S. Antoine was broken up believing it was the Enemy cryed out to the People to Arm and fell a ringing their Bels. The Citizens taking the alarm came together in great Confusion those of them who had most courage got to their Arms and retreated with them to the Palace of the Rettori in the mean time Nicolo's Souldiers had plundered the Borgo di S. Zeno and advancing towards the Town the Citizens perceiving the Dukes forces was entred and no way left to defend themselves advised the Venetian Rettori to retire into the fortresses and preserve themselves and their goods for as they said it would be much better to do so and attend better fortune than by endeavouring to avoid the present danger to be knock'd on the Head and the whole City pillaged hereupon the Rettori and all the Venetians betook themselves to the Castle of S. Felice and several of the principal Citizens went to meat Nicolo and the Marquess of Mantoua to beg of them that they would rather possess that City rich and with honor than poor to their disgrace especially seeing they had not by an obstinate defence deserved preferment from their old Masters or hatred from their new The Marquess and Nicolo having encouraged them what they could they protected them from plunder as much as was possible and because they were confident the Count would immediately address himself to the recovery of the Town they contrived with all imaginable industry to get the Fort into their hands but what they could not take they block'd up with ditches and trenches cut about to obstruct the Enemy from relieving them The Count Francesco was with his Army at Tenna where upon the first report of this surprize he believed it but vain afterwards understanding the truth he resolved by a more than ordinary speed to recompence his former negligence and expiate its disgrace And though all the chief
Officers of his Army advis'd him to give over his enterprize of Brescia and Verona and retire to Vicenza least otherwise the Enemy should encompass him where he was yet he would not consent but resolved to try his fortune for the recovery of Verona and turning about to the Venetian Proveditori and Barnardetto de Medici who assisted as Commissioner for the Florentines he encouraged them in their doubts and assured them he would retake it if any of the castles held out for him Having put all things in order and drawn out his Men he marched towards Verona with all expedition at first sight Nicolo imagined he was marching to Vicenza as he had been counselled by his officers But observing him to march on and direct his forces towards the Castle of S. Felice he thought it time to provide for his defence but all was too late the trenches and embarrasments were not finished the Souldiers separated and plundering and could not be got together time enough to hinder the Count from getting into the Citadel and from thence into the City to the great disparagement of Nicolo and detriment of his party who with the Marquess of Mantoua retreated first into the Citadel which they had taken and from thence escaped to the City of Mantoua where rallying the remainder of their forces they joyned themselves with the Army before Brescia so that in four days time Verona was won and lost by the Duke forces Being Winter time and the weather very cold the Count having after his Victory put in some supplies of victual into Brescia though with very great difficulty he removed his quarters to Verona having given order for the building certain Gallies to Forboli that Winter to be ready against the Spring that then he might be so strong both by land and by Water as to give Brescia an effectual and total relief The Duke seeing the War at a stand for a time and his hopes of being Master of Verona and Brescia at an end all which he attributed to the Counsel and supplies of the Florentines whose affection could not be alienated by all the provocations the Venetians had given them nor gained over to his side by all the promises which he had made them that they might be sensible of their own oversight and feel the inconveniences they had pulled upon themselves he resolved to invade Tuscany to which he was much encouraged by Nicolo and the Florentine exiles Nicolo's design was upon the possessions of Braccio and to drive the Count out of La Marca the other had an itching after their own Country and a mind to be at home so that both parties animated the Duke with such arguments as were most sutable to their particular designs Nicolo told him he might send him with an Army into Tuscany and leave Brescia besieged for he was Master of the Lake was well entrenched about the Town had several strong Castles in the Country and good Officers and Souldiers enough to resist the Count if he should make any attempt in another place which was not to be imagined till he had relieved Brescia and that was impossible so that if he pleased he might make War in Tuscany and not quite his enterprize in Lombardy he remonstrated besides that the Florentines would be constrained as soon as they saw him in Tuscany to call back the Count or be ruined and whichsoever of the two happen his Victory would be certain The exiles inculcated that if Nicolo came near Florence with his Army it was impossible but the People tired out with their Taxes and the insolence of the Grandees would take arms and revolt as to his passage to Florence they promised it should be easie and Casentino open to them by the interest and correspondence which Rinaldo held with that Governor so that the Duke inclinable of himself was much fortified and encouraged by their persuasions the Venetians on the other side though the Winter was very sharp press'd the Count to the relief of Brescia with his whole Army but he refused alledging it was not to be done at that time that better weather was to be expected and that in the interim their Fleet should be got ready and then it might be attempted both by Land and by Water which answer giving no satisfaction the Venetians became slow and remiss in sending them provisions so that in their Army many People died The Florentines having advertisement of all these passages were greatly dismaid seeing the War brought home to them of Tuscany and that in Lombardy not turn'd to account nor were they less fearful of the forces of the Church not that the Pope was their Enemy but that they found that Army at the devotion of the Patriarch who was their implacable adversary Giovanni Vitelleschi Cornetano was first Apostolical Notarie then Bishop of Ricanati after the Patriarch of Alexandria and being at last created Cardinal was called the Cardinal of Florence This Cardinal was a cunning and Couragious Person so capable of business that the Pope had a strong affection for him gave him command of the forces of the Church and in all the Popes enterprizes in Tuscany Romagna Naples and Rome he was constantly his General so that by degrees he gained so great authority both over the Army and the Pope that the Pope began to be afraid to command him and the Army to refuse their obedience to any body but he The Cardinal being at that time in Rome when the news arrived that Nicolo was marching into Tuscany The fear of the Florentines was highly increased because from the time of Rinaldo's expulsion that Cardinal had been an Enemy to their state for the Articles of agreement which were by his mediation procured in Florence were not made good but rather managed to the prejudice of Rinaldo he having been the occasion of his laying down his Arms that the occasion of his banishment so that the Government of Florence began to fear the time was come for the restauration of Rinaldo if he joyned with Nicolo in his expedition into Tuscany and their apprehensions were augmented by the sudden departure of Nicolo who seemed to them to leaven enterprize which he had almost compleated to embark himself in another ther that was more dangerous and doubtful which they presumed he would never have done without some private intelligence or unknown invitation these their apprehensions they had infused into the Pope who was grown sensible of his error in having transferred so much Authority upon other People But whilst the Florentines were in this suspence fortune presented them a way to secure themselves of the Patriarch that State had scouts abroad to intercept and peruse all letters to see if they could meet with any correspondence to the prejudice of the State at Monte Pulciano it happened a pacquet was taken which the Patriarch had written to Nicolo Piccinino without the knowledg or consent of the Pope Though the Character was
strange and the sence so implicite and abstruse that nothing could be made out of it yet that obscurity considered with its directions to an Enemy alarmed his Holiness so as he resolved to secure him The care of his apprehension he committed to Antonio Rido da Padoua whom he had made Governor of the Castle of Rome Antonio as soon as he had his orders was ready to execute them and expected an opportunity The Patriarch had resolved to pass into Tuscany and having fixed upon the next day for his departure from Rome he sent to the Governor that he would be upon the bridge next morning at a precise hour for he had something to discourse with him Antonio thought now his opportunity was come ordered his People as he thought convenient and at the time appointed was ready expecting the Patriarch upon the Bridge which was to be drawn up or let down as occasion required The Patriarch was punctual and came exactly at his time and Antonio entertaining him a while upon the bridge gave a sign and on a sudden the bridge was pulled up and the Patriarch in the Castle so that of the General of an Army he became a Prisoner in a moment The People which were with him began to swagger at first but understanding afterwards it was his Holinesses direction they were pacified and quiet and the Governor of the Castle comforting him with fair words and giving him hopes of a better condition the Patriarch replyed that great Persons were not secured to be discharged again that those who deserved to be seized did not deserve to be dismissed and it was his own case for he died in Prison not long after and Lodovico Patriarch of Aquileia was made General of the Pope's Army in his place who though before he could not be engaged in the Wars betwixt the Duke and the League yet then he was persuaded and promised to be ready for the defence of Tuscany with 4000 Horse and 2000 Foot Being delivered from this danger there was another of no less importance and that was their fear of Nicolo upon the confusion of affairs in Lombardy and the differences betwixt the Venetians and the Count for better information the Florentines sent Neri the Son of Gino Capponi and Guiliano d' Anazenti to Venice as also to settle the prosecution of the War for the next year commanding Neri upon the resolution of the Venetians to repair to the Count to found his and exhort him to such courses as should be necessary for the security of the League these Embassadors were scarce got onward on their way as far as Ferrara before they had the news that Piccinino had passed the Po with 6000 Horse Thereupon they made what haste was possible and being come to Venice they found that Senate very positive to have Brescia relieved at that very time not being as they said able to attend any better nor their state to put out any Fleet so that without present supply they would be forced to surrender which would compleat the Dukes successes and be the loss of all their Territories by Land finding them so perverse Neri went to Verona to hear what arguments the Count could produce to the Contrary who with good reasons made it out to him that to endeavour the relief of Brescia in that juncture would be not only ineffectual at present but much to their prejudice afterwards for considering the season of the year and situation of the Town nothing could be done he should only harrass and disorder his Men so as when a proper time for action should come he should be forced to draw of to Verona to supply himself with what the Winter had consumed and what was necessary for their future support so that all the time that was fit for action would be spent in marching backward and forward To adjust these things Orsalto Iustiniani and Giovan Pisani were sent to Verona to the Count by whom it was concluded after much dispute that the Venetians for the ensuing year should give the Count 80000. Ducats and 40. a piece to the rest of his Army That he should march forth with his whole Army and fall upon the Duke endeavouring by some smart impression upon his Country to make him recal Nicolo out of Lombardy After which conclusion they returned to Venice but the Venetians the sum being thought very great went on but slowly with their preparations Nicolo Piccinino proceeded however was got already into the Country of Romagna and tampered so successfully with the Sons of Pandolfo Malatesta that they deserted the Venetians and took up Arms under the Duke this news was unpleasing at Venice but at Florence much more because that way they thought to have given Nicolo a stop But the Malatesti being in Rebellion the Florentines were not a little dismaid especially fearing that their General Piero Giampagolo Orsino who was then in the territories of the Malatesti might be defeated and they by consequence disarmed these tidings were also no small trouble to the Count who began to apprehend if Nicolo passed into Tuscany he might be in danger of losing La Marca and disposed to secure his own Country if he could he came to Venice and being introduced to the Duke he declared to him that his passage into Tuscany would be convenient for the League for the War was to be carried on where the General and Army of the Enemy was and not among their private and particular Towns and Garisons because their Army once beat there is an end of the War but though their Garrisons be taken and their Towns reduced if their Army be intire they should be never the nearer but the War as it does many times happen would break out more severely Assuring them that La Marca and all Tuscany would be lost if Nicolo was not briskly opposed which being lost no remedy could be expected in Lombardy but if it might he did not understand how he could with any excuse abondon his own Subjects and friends for coming into Lombardy a Prince he should be loth to leave it as a private Captain To this the Duke of Venice replyed that it was manifest and nothing more certain that if he left Lombardy and passed the Po with his Army all their territories upon Land would be lost and that it would be to no purpose to consume more mony in defending it For he can be no wise Man who endeavours to defend that which he is sure to lose and he no fool who chuses to lose his Country alone rather than his Country and Mony too and if the loss of their affairs should follow it would then be clear enough how much it imported the reputation of the Venetians to protect Romagna and Tuscany But the whole Senate was against his opinion believing if he succeeded in Lombardy he should be sure every where else and that could be no hard task that State upon Nicolo's departure being left weak and infirm
so that that might be ruined before Nicolo could be called back or any other sufficient remedy provided That if things were curiously examined it would be found that Nicolo was sent into Tuscany upon no other errand but to divert the Count from his enterprize in Lomberdy and remove the War from his own Country by carrying it into another so that if the Count should pursue him without irresistable necessity he would rather accomplish his desâ—gns and do as he would have him but if they continued their Army in Lombardy 〈◊〉 shifted in Tuscany as well as they could they would be sensible of their ill resolution when it was too late and find that they had lost all in Lombardy irrecoverably without any equivalence or reprisal in Tuscany 〈◊〉 manner every Man having spoken and replyed as his judgment directed him it was concluded to be quiet for some days to see what the agrement betwixt Nicolo and the Malatesti would produce whether the Florentines might rely upon Piero Giam Pagolo and whether the Pope proceeded fairly with the League as he had promised he would This â—â—â—â—lution bâ—ing taken not long after they had intelligence that Piero Giam Pagolo was 〈◊〉 towards Tuscany with his Army and that the Pope was better inclined to the 〈◊〉 at that time than before with which advertisements the Count being confirmed he was content to remain in Lombardy himself that Neri should be dispatched thither with a 1000 of his Horse and five hundred others and if things should proceed so as that his presence should be necessary in Tuscany upon the left summons from Neri the Count engaged to repair to him without any delay Accordingly Neri marched away arrived with his forces at Florence in April and the same day Giam Pagolo arrived there also in the mean time Nicolo Piccinino having settled the affairs of Romagna was designing for Tuscany and being inclined to have marched by the way of the Alps of S. Benedetto and the vale of Montone he found that passage so well defended by the conduct of Nicolo da Pisa that he believed his whole Army would not be able to force it and because of the suddenness of this irruption the Florentines were but indifferently provided either with Souldiers or Officers they committed the passes of the other Alps to the guard of certain of their Citizens with some new raised Companies of Foot among which Citizens Bartholomeo Orlandini had the command and more particularly the keeping of the Castle of Marradi and the pass that was by it Nicolo Piccinino supposing the pass of S. Benedetto insuperable by reason of the courage and vigilance of the Commander chose rather to attempt the other way where the cowardice and inexperience of the chief Officer was not like to give him so great opposition Marradi is a Castle built at the foot of those Alps which divide Tuscany and Romagna but on the side of Romagna at the entrance into the Vale di Lamona though it has no Walls yet the River the Mountains and the inhabitants make it strong For the Men are martial and faithful and the River has worn away the bancks and made such Grotes and hollows therein that it is impossible from the valley to approach it if a little Bridge which lies over the River be defended and on the mountain side the Rocks and the Cliffs are so steep it is almost impregnable but the pusillanimity of Bartolomeo debas'd the courage of his Men and rendered the situation of his Castle of no importance for no sooner did he hear the report of the Enemies approach but leaving all in confusion away he ran with his Party and never stoped til he came at Borgo a San. Lorenzo Nicolo having posses'd himself of that pass strangely surprized to consider how poorly it had been defended and as much pleased that now it was his own marched down into Mugello and having taken several Castles he staid at Puliciano to refresh from whence he made his excursions as far as Monte Fiesole and was so bold to pass the River Arno scouring forraging and plâ—undering the Country within three miles of Florence The Florentines however were not at all dismaid but the first thing they did was to secure the Government of which they were not much afraid both for the intrest which Cosimo had with the people and the method they had taken to reduce the chief Officers of the City into the hands of a few of the most potent Citizens who with their vigilance and severity kept under all such as were discontented or studious of new things besides they had news of the resolutions in Lombardy of Neri's approach with the number of his forces and that the Pope had promised to supply them with more which hopes were sufficient to support them till Neri's arrival But Neri finding the City in some disorders resolved to take the field and restrain Nicolo from foraging so freely and therefore drawing together what Infantry he could out of the People he joyned them with his Horse marched into the field and took Remole which the Enemy had possess'd After the taking of that Town he encamped his Army there obstructed the excursions of Nicolo and gave the City great hopes of sending him farther off Nicolo observing though the Florentines had lost many of their Men it procured no commotion and understanding they were all quiet and secure in the Town he concluded it vain to lose time any longer wherefore he changed his designs and resolved to do something which might cause the Florentines to provoke him to a Battle in which he doubted not to overcome and then all things would follow as he expected of course there was at that time in Nicolo's Army Francesco Conte di Poppi who when the Enemy was in Mugello revolted from the Florentines with whom he was in League the Florentines had a jealousie of him before and endeâ—voured to continue him their friend by enlarging his pay and making him there Deputy over all the Towns which were near him but nothing could do so strongly did his affection incline him to the other party that no fear nor act of kindness what ever was sufficient to divide him from Rinaldo and the rest of the Brethren who had had the Government formerly so that he no sooner heard of Nicolo's approach but he went in to him immediately and solicited him with all imaginable importunity to advance towards the City and march into Casentino discovering to him the whole strength of the Country and with what ease and security he might straiten the Enemy Nicolo took his Counsel and marching into Casentino he possess'd himself of Romena and Bibiena and afterwards encamped before Castle San Nicolo That Castle is placed at the foot of those Alps which divide Casentino from the vale of Arno and by reason it stood high and had a strong Garison in it it was no easie matter to take it though Nicolo ply'd it continually
conquered had time to recruit and the Conqueror had none to pursue This disorder and perversness in the Souldier was the reason that Nicolo was recruited and on Horse back again before his defeat was known thorow Italy and sharper war he made upon his Enemies afterwards than he had â—ver done before This it was that after his rout before Brescia enabled him to surprize Verona this it was that after he was worsted at Verona gave him opportunity to invade Tuscany this it was that after his loss at Anghiari recruited him again and made him stronger in the field ere he got to Romagna than he was before which gave the Duke new hopes of defending Lombardy though by means of his absence he had looked upon it as lost for whilst Nicolo was giving the Enemy an alarm at Tuscany the Duke of Milan was reduced to a condition of hazarding all and therefore apprehending he might be undone before Nicolo who was sent for would come to his rescue to stop the Career of the Count and temper his fortune by industry which he could not do by force he had recourse to those remedies which in the like case he had many times used and sent Nicolo da Esti Prince of Ferrara to Peschiera to the Count to persuade him in his name to a Peace and to remonstrate to him that the prosecution of the War could not turn to his advantage for if the Duke should be distressed and unable to maintain his â—eputation the Count would be the first which would suffer by it by reason the Venetians and Florentines would have no farther occasion and by consequence no farther esteem for him and as a testimony of the sincerity of his proposal the Duke offered to coâ—â—mmate his Marriage and send his Daughter to Ferrara to be delivered to him as soon as the peace was concluded to which the Count replied that if the Duke did truly desire peace he might easily have it for the Venetians and Florentines were as much inclined to it as he but the difficulty would be to persuade them he was in earnest as knowing he would never have proposed any such thing had not some necessity constrained him and as soon as that should be removed he would make War upon them again As to the business of his Marriage he could not repose any confidence in his promise having been so often baffled by him before nevertheless if every thing else were agreed he should proceed in it as his friends should advise The Venetians who are jealous of their Souldiers where they have no reason to be so had reason enough to be suspicious here which the Count being desirous to remove prosecuted the War with all diligence imaginable but his mind was so inflamed with ambition and the Venetians so slack and intepidated with jealousie little more was done that Summer so that when Nicolo Piccinino returned into Lombardy Winter came on and the Armies were sent to their Winter quarters The Count to Verona the Duke to Cremona the Florentines into Tuscany and the Popes Army to Romagna which after the Battle of Anghiari assaulted Furli and Bologna in hopes to have taken them from Francesco Piccinino who kept them from his Father and defended them so well they could not get them out of his hands nevertheless their coming into those parts so terrified the people of Ravenna that to avoid the domination of the Church by consent of Osâ—asio di Potenta their Lord they submitted to the Venetian who in recompence of his kindness that he might never recover by force what he had given them with so little discretion sent Ostasio with his only Son to spend their days in Candia where they died in which expedition his Holiness wanting Mony notwithstanding the Victory at Anghiari he was glad to sell the Castle of Borgâ— a San Sepulcro to the Florentines for 25000 Ducats Things being in this posture and all sides thinking themselves safe as long as it was Winter all thoughts of peace were laid aside especially by the Duke who thought himself doubly safe both in the season of the year and the arrival of Nicolo had therefore broke of his Treaty with the Count a little abruptly and in great haste rigged out Nicolo again with all provisions and accoutrements that were necessary for the War the Count having notice of his preparations went to Venice to consult the Senate how affairs were to be ordered the next Summer When Nicolo was ready perceiving the Enemy out of order he never staid for the spring but in the coldest of the Winter he passed the Adda and Acri surprized 2000 Horse and took most of them prisoners but that which touched the Count nearest and startled the Venetians was the defection of Ciarpellone one of his principal officers who went over to the Duke the Count had no sooner the news but he left Venice and coming with all possible speed to Brescia he found Nicolo retired and gone back to his former station the Count had no mind finding the Enemy gone to follow him at that time but chose rather to defer till some advantage should tempt him and give him opportunity to revenge himself he prevailed therefore with the Venetians to recal the forces they had in the Florentine service in Tuscany and to confer the command of them upon Micheletto Attendulo Gattamelata being dead The spring being come Nicolo Piccinino was first in the field and beseiged Cignano a Castle some twelve miles distant from Brescia to the relief of which the Count addressed himself and betwixt these two Generals the War was managed as formerly The Count being fearful of Bergamo went with his Army and encamped before Martinengo a Castle which if taken lay very convenient for the succouring of Bergaino which City was by Nicolo greatly distressed who finding he could not easily be disturbed but by the way of Martinengo had supplied it plentifully with all things so as the Count was forced to besiege it with all his Army whereupon Nicolo marched with his forces where he might most conveniently incommode him and intrenched himself so strangely the Count could not without manifest danger assail him so that thereby he brought things to that pass that the besieger was in more distress than the besieged and the Count than the Castle For the Count could neither keep the siege for want of provisions nor rise for fear of Nicolo's Army and every body expected victory for the Duke and destruction for his Enemy but fortune which never wants ways of favoring her friends and disobliging her Enemies brought it about that Nicolo in confidence of his Victory was grown so insolent haughty that without respect to the Duke or himself he sent him word that he had served him a long time and as yet not gained so much ground as would bury him when he died he desired therefore to know what recompence he was to expect for all his dangers and fatigues for it being
not content to make War against him in Romagna only designed to deprive him of Cremona and Pontremoli but Pontrâ—moli was defended for him by the Florentines and Cremona by the Venetians so that the War was received again in Lombardy and many troubles ensued in the Country of Cremona among which the Dukes General Francesco Piccinino was overthrown at Casale by Micheletto and the Venetian Army and the Venetians conceiving hopes thereupon of deposing the Duke sent their Commissary to Cremona assaulted Ghiaradadda and took all that Country except Cremona it self and then passing the Adda they made their excursions to the very walls of Milan the Duke not satisfied with his condition applied himself to Alfonso King of Aragon for succour representing the ill consequences which would follow upon his Dominions in Naples if Lombardy should fall into the hands of the Venetians Alfonso promised to send him supplies but their passage would be difficult without the permission of the Count upon which consideration Duke Philip addressed himself to the Count and begged of him that he would not abandon the Father-in-Law who was both aged and blind The Count was much offended with the Duke for having pulled those Wars upon him and on the other side the greatness of the Venetians did not please him at all besides his mony was gone and the League supplied him but coldly for the Florentines were now freed from their apprehensions of the Duke which was the great cause of their caressing the Count and the Venetians desired his ruine as the only person capable of carrying the whole state of Lombardy from them Nevertheless whilst Philip was seducing him to his side and promised him the Command of all his forces upon a condition he would leave the Venetians and restore La Marca to the Pope they sent Embassadors to him promising him Milan when it was taken and the Generalship of their Army in perpetuum so he would prosecute the War in La Marca and obstruct the supplies which were sending by Alfonso into Lombardy The Venetian proffers were great and his obligations to them considerable they having made that War on purpose to secure Cremona to the Count again the Dukes injuries were fresh and his promises not to be trusted Yet the Count remained doubtful which he should accept his obligation to the League his Faith given the late good offices which they had done him and their many promises for the future were great arguments on one side yet he was loth on the other side to deny the importunities of his Father-in-Law but that which swayed with him most of all was the poison which he suspected was hid under the promises of the Venetians to whose discretion he must leave himself if he succeeded in their Wars both for their performance and his own preservation which no wise Prince would ever do till necessity compelled him But this suspence and difficulty of resolution in the Count was taken away by the Venetians who having a design by some practices and intelligences in the Town to get it for themselves upon some other pretence they caused their forces to march into those parts but their plot was discovered by him that governed there for the Count and in stead of gaining Cremona they lost the Count who laid aside all respects and joyned with the Duke Pope Eugenius was dead Niolo V. created his successor and the Count advanced with his whole Army to Cotegnola in order to his passage in Lombardy when news was brought to him that Duke Philip was dead which happened in the year 1447. on the last of August These tidings much troubled the Count whose Army could not be in good order because they had not had their full pay The Venetians he feared as being in arms and his professed Enemies now upon his revolt to the Duke Alfonso had been always his Enemy and he was fearful of him he could have no confidence in either the Pope or the Florentines for the Florentines were in League with the Venetians and he was in possession of several Towns which he had taken from the Pope however he resolved to bear up bravely look his fortune in the face and comport himself according to the accidents which should occur for many times secrets are discovered in action which dejection and despondency would have concealed for ever It was no little support to him to believe that if the Milanesi were oppressed or that jealous of the ambition of the Venetian no Man was so proper for them to apply to for protection as himself So that taking courage thereupon he marched into the Country of Bologna and from thence passing by Modena and Reggio he encamped upon the Lenza and sent to the Milanesi to offer them his service the Milanesi after the Dukes death were divided into factions part of them had a mind to be free and part of them to live under a Prince and of those which were for a Prince part were for the Count and part for Alfonso but they which were for a Commonwealth being more unanimous prevailed and erected a republick according to their own model to which many of the Cities in that Dukedom refused to conform supposing they might make themselves free as well as Milan if they pleased and those who were not inclined to that Government would not submit to it in them Lodi and Piacenza therefore surrendered to the Venetian Pavia and Parma made themselves free upon which confusions the Count removed to Cremona where certain deputies of his to that purpose met with certain Commissioners from Milan and came to an agreement by which it was agreed that he should be General of their forces and all conditions performed to him which were concluded in his last treaty with the Duke to which was superadded that Brescia should be put into the Counts hands till he should be posses'd of Verona and that then keeping the last the first should be restored Before the death of the Duke Pope Nicolo upon his assumption to that Chair endeavoured to make a general peace betwixt all the Princes of Italy and to that purpose he negotiated with the Florentine Embassadors which were sent to his creation for a Diet to beheld at Ferrara to treat either of a long cessation or a firm peace and accordingly the Popes Legate was met there by Commissioners from the Venetians the Duke and the Florentines Alfonso sent none for he was at Tiboli with a great Army in favour of the Duke and believed as soon as the Count could be debauched from them he should have a fair opportunity to fall upon both the Venetian and Florentine In the mean time the Count lay still in Lombardy attending the consummation of the Peace to which Alfonso would not send but promised to ratifie what should be agreed by the Duke This peace was a long time in debate but at length it was concluded it should either be a cessation for five years or a
to any which demanded it and although he ende avoured by all means to conceal his preparation for War yet the Embassadors found him a juggler and peceived several of his practices against their State With the Duke therefore they renewed their League procured an amity with the Genoeses compos'd the differences about the reprisal and many other things which had formerly obstructed it they tryed all ways to frustrate or break the Treaty and they went so far as to supplicate the great Turk to banish all Florentines out of his Country but that Emperour would not hearken The Florentine Embassadors were prohibited entrance into the Dominions of the Venetian because forsooth they were in League with the King of Aragon and could not send any Embssâ—â—aes without his participation The Siennesi received their Embassadors treated them well lest they should be overrun before the League could relieve them and therefore they thought it best to collogue and lull those Arms a sleep which they were not able to resist It was conjectured then that the Venetian and King both sent Embassadors to justifie the War but the Venetian Embassador being refus'd likewise to be admitted into the territories of Florence the King 's denied to do that office alone and the whole Embassie came to nothing by which the Venetians found themselves us'd with the same rudeness and contempt which not many months before they had exercis'd upon the Florentines In the midst of these apprehensions the Emperour Federigo 3. pass'd into Italy to be crown'd and on the 30th of Ianuary 1451 enter'd into Florence with an equipage of 1400 Horse He was honorably entertain'd there by the Senate and continued with them to the 6th of February upon which day he departed for Rome in order to his coronation where having performed that ceremony and celebrated his nuptials with the Empress which was come thither by Sea he departed again for Germany returned by Florence where all the old honors were retreated and having been oblig'd in his passage by the Marquess of Ferrara he gave him a grant of Modena and Reggio as a reward But the Florentines were not by all those solemnities diverted from their preparations for their own reputation and the terror of their Enemies the Duke and they had enter'd into a League with France which with great joy and ostentation they publish'd all over Italy In the month of May 1452 the Venetians not thinking it fit to dissemble any longer invaded the territories of the Duke of Milan by the way of Lodi with 16000 Horse and 6000 Foot whilst at the same time the Marquess of Monferrat upon some designs of his own or the stimulation of the Venetians assaulted him on the other side by the way of Alexandria The Duke had got an Army together of 18000 Horse and 3000 Foot with which after he had furnish'd Alexandria and Lodi with strong Garisons and fortified all places where the Enemy might offend him he fell into the Country of Brescia where he did great mischief to the Venetians both parties plundring the Countries and burning such Towns as were not able to defend themselves but the Marquess of Monferrat being defeated not long after by the Garison at Alexandria the Duke was at more leisure to infest and make his inroads into the Countries of the Venetian Whilst the War was carried on in Lombardy in this manner with various but inconsiderable accidents the Wars in Tuscany was commenced betwixt the King of Aragon and the Florentines and manag'd with as little ardour and success as the other Ferrando a natural Son of Alfonso's march'd into Tuscany with 12000 Men under the command of Federigo Lord of Urbin His first enterprize was to assault Faiano in Valdisciana for the Siennesi being their friends they enter'd that way into the Florentine dominions the Castle was weak the walls but indifferent the Garison but small yet those they had within it were valiant and faithful the whole number which were sent for the security of that place not exceeding 200. Before this Castle Ferrando encamped and either their courage was so little without or theirs so great within that it took him up 36 days before he could master it Which time gave the Florentines great convenience of providing other places of higher importance and drawing their force together and disposing them into better order than otherwise they could have done This Castle being taken the Enemy march'd into Chianti where they attempted two little Towns which were held by a few private Citizens and were repuls'd Leaving them they remov'd to Castellina a little Castle upon the confines of Chianti and sate down before it This Castle was about ten miles from Sienna weak in its works but weaker in its situation yet in neither so weak as the courage of the assailants for after 44 days seige and all the art and force they could use they were glad to draw off and leave the Castle as they found it So little formidable were the Armies in those days and so inconsiderable the Wars that those places which are now deserted as impossible to be kept were then defended as if they had been impossible to have been taken Whilst Ferrando was with his Army in Chianti he made many incursion into the Country of Florence running up with his parties within six miles of the Town to the great terror and detriment of their subjects who having got together about 8000 Souldiers under the Command of Astorre de Faenza and Gismondo Malatesta held off from the Enemy towards the Castle of Colle being unwilling to come to a Battel because they knew if they lost not their Army there was no danger of the War for the little Castles which should be taken would be restored upon the peace and the great Towns were secure the King had likewise a Fleet of about twenty Vessels Gallies and Foists in the Sea of Pisa which Fleet whilst La Castellina was assaulted by Land was imploy'd by the King to batter the Castle of Vada that stood upon the Sea and they did it so effectually that in a short time by the inadvertency of the Governor they got it into their hands from whence afterwards they ran over the whole Country thereabouts but those excursions were presently restrain'd by certain Florentine Souldiers which were sent to Campiglia The Pope in the mean time concerned himself no farther than to mediate an accord But though he was so tender in engaging abroad in any action of War he found himself at home in no little danger There was at that time in Rome a person call'd Stephano Porcari a Citizen born of good extraction and learning but most eminent for the Generosity of his mind This Stephano was ambitious as most are which are desirous of Glory to perform or at least attempt some thing that might make him memorable to posterity And nothing occur'd so honourably to his thoughts as to deliver his Country from the insolence of the
Prelats and reduce it to its primitive liberty hoping if he effected it he should be call'd either the Father or the Restorer of his Country His great hopes and encouragement in this enterpâ—ize was deduc'd from the iniquity and ill lives of the Prelates which were highly displeasing both to the Barons and People of Rome But his greatest confidence was grounded upon certain verses of Petrarch's in that Canto which begins Spirito Gentile c. The verses are these Sopra ill monte Tarpeio Canzon vedrai Un Cavalier ch' Italia tutta honora Pensoso piu d' altrui che di se stesso Stephano was of opinion that Poets were many times inspir'd and had perfect and divine inflations from above So that he concluded what Petrarch had prophesied in that Canto would certainly come to pass and he did not know any man fitter than himself to accomplish it in respect of his eloquence and learning and favour and friends Having taken up this fancy he could not contain himself but his words gesture and manner of living discover'd him and render'd him suspicious to the Pope who to secure himself against his plots confin'd him to Bologna and sent instructions to the Governor to have an eye over him every day But Stephano was not to be discouraged by one disaster it rather animated him in his design in so much that with the greatest caution he could he continued his practices with his friends and now and then would steal to Rome and back again with such expedition as he would be sure to present himself before the Governor at that time he was to appear But afterwards having drawn in as many as he thought necessary for his work he resolved to proceed to action without farther delay and sent to his correspondents in Rome that at a prefix'd time a splendid supper should be prepar'd all the conspirators to be invited to it and each of them have private orders to bring his Confident along with him and he promised to be there himself precisely at the time All things were ordered exactly to his directions and he himself was punctually with them for as soon as supper was ready and serv'd up to the Table he presented himself amongst them in a Robe of cloth of Gold his collar and other ornaments about him to give him Majesty and reputation and having embrac'd all the Conspirators in a long oration he exhorted them to be couragious and dispose themselves chearfully in so glorious an enterprize Then he appointed the way ordering one of them to seize the Popes Palace the next morning and the other to run about the streets and excite the People to Arm. But his Conspiracy coming to the ear of the Pope some say by the treachery of his confederats others by his being seen in the Town which way soever it was the Pope caus'd him and the greatest part of his Comerads to be apprehended the very same night after supper and put to death as they deserved This was the end of that enterprize and though among some People perhaps his intention might be commended yet his judgment must necessarily be blam'd for such attempts may have some shadow of glory in the contrivance but their execution is certain destruction The War in Tuscany had continued about a year and in the spring 1453 both Armies had taken the field when in relief of the Florentines Alexandro Sforza the Dukes Brother arriv'd with a supply of 2000 Horse by which the Florentine Army being much encreas'd and the Kings Army become inferior in number the Florentines thought fit to recover what they had lost and with little labour took some of their Towns again after which they encamped at Foiano which by the carlesness of the Commissaries was sack'd so that the inhabitants being dispers'd they were hardly got to inhabite there again and when they did come it was not without great exemptions and reward The Castle of Vada also was retaken for the Enemy perceiving they could not hold it they set it on fire and departed Whilst the Florentine Army was imploy'd in this manner the King of Aragons Army not having the courage to come near them were retreated towards Sienna from whence they made frequent excursions into the Country about Florence where they made great hububs committed many outrages and brought great terror upon the People Nor was the King defective in contriving other ways of assaulting his Enemies dividing their forces or detracting from their reputation Gherardo Gambatorti was at that time Lord of Valdibagno This Gherardo and his Ancestors had always been in the Florentine service either as hired or recommended Alfonso was tampering with this Gherardo to deliver up his territory to him and he promis'd to give him an equivalence in the Kingdom of Naples This transaction was not so private but they had news of it in Florence and an Embassador was dispatch'd to remember him of his own and his predecessors obligations to that State and to admonish him to presevere in his amity with them as they had constantly done Gherardo pretended to be surpriz'd at what the Embassador told him swore a thousand oaths that never any such wickedness enter'd into his thoughts proffer'd to have gone in person to Florence and resided there to secure them of his fidelity but being unhappily indispos'd himself his Son should go a long with him and remain there as a perpetual Hostage His proffers and his imprecations together made the Florentines believe that Gherardo was honest and his accuser the Knave in which opinion they acquiesced But Gherardo went on with the King and rather with more eagerness than before and when all was agreed Alfonso sent Fryer Puccio a Knight of Ierusalem to take possession of the Castles and Towns which belong'd to Gherardo But Bagno retaining its affection to Florence promis'd obedience to the Kings Commissary with no little regret Puccio was in possession of almost all that State only the Castle of Corzano was behind which was likewise to be deliver'd When Gherardo made this surrender among the rest of his own creatures about him there was one Antonio Gualandi a Pisan a young Gentleman and brave and one that highly detested this treachery in Gherardo Pondering with himself the situation of the place the number of the Garison the dissatisfaction he observed both in their gestures and looks and finding Gherardo at the Gate ready to introduce the Enemy he convey'd himself betwixt the Castle and Gherardo and taking his opportunity with both his hands thrust him away and then causing the wicket to be shut he exhorted the guards to stand faithfully to the Florentines against so false and so flagitious a Man the report of this action arriving at Bagno and the Towns which were about it they unanimously took Arms against their new Masters and setting up the Florentine colours upon the walls they drove them all out of that Country this news coming to Florence they immediately clap'd
their young Hostage into Prison and dispatch'd supplies to Bagno and those parts to secure them and made that Country dependant upon themselves Gherardo a Traitor in the mean time both to his friends and his Son had much ado to escape leaving his Wife Family and fortune in the hands of his Enemies This accident was lookt upon as a great deliverance in Florence for had the King made himself Master of those parts he might with little expenso have overrun all as far as Valdi Tevere and Casentino and brought such distraction upon their affairs that the Florentines must have divided their Army and been disabled thereby from attending the Aragonian forces about Sienna with their Army entire Besides the provisions which the Florentines had made in Italy to oppose the confederacy of their Enemies they sent Agriolo Acciaivoli their Embassador into France to negotiate with that King for the sending King Rinato d' Angio into Italy in the behalf of the Duke and themselves and to represent to him that coming thither for the defence of his friends when he was once entred and had settled them he might set up his own claim to the Kingdom of Naples and they would be engag'd to assist him and so whilst in Lombardy and Tuscany the War was carried on as we have related in France the Treaty was concluded and Rinato oblig'd in Iune to come into Italy with 2400 Horse and the League on the other side obliged at his arrival at Alexandria to pay him 30000 Florens and 10000 per men afterwards whilst the War should continue but being ready upon this stipulation to pass into Italy he was obstructed by the Duke of Savoy and the Marquess of Monferrat who were friends to the Venetians and would not suffer him to pass Hereupon Rinato was desired by the Florentine Embassador to march with his Forces into Provence and for the encouragement and reputation of his friends to pass himself and part of them into Italy by Sea leaving the rest in Provence till the King of France should prevail with the duke of Savoy that they might march through his Country and as the Embassador advised it was done for Rinato went by Sea and the rest at the King of France's mediation were permitted to pass into Italy through the Dominions of the Duke of Savoy King Rinato was received by the Duke of Milan with all the demonstrations of Kindness imaginable and having joyned their Forces they assaulted the Venetians with such terror that in a little time all the Towns they had taken about Cremona were recovered and not contented with them they took almost all the Country of Brescia for the Venetian Army not thinking it self secure in the field was retreated under the very walls of that City Winter coming on and the Duke at Verona he thought fit for the refreshment of his men to put them into quarters and consigned Piazenza for the quarters of Rinato where having remained all that Winter in the year 1453 without any action considerable when the spring was come and the Duke resolved to draw into the field and drive the Venetians out of all they had upon the terra firma Rinato signified to the Duke that of necessity he must return into France This resolution of Rinato's was unexpected to the Duke and gave him no little anxiety He went to him immediately himself and endeavoured with all possible importunity to dissuade him but neither prayers nor promises could prevail with him any farther than to leave part of his forces with them and to engage himself to send his Son Giovanni who in his room should continue in the service of the League How unwelcome so ever it was to the Duke Rinato's departure was not at all displeasing to the Florentines for having recover'd what they had lost themselves and being grown fearless of Alfonso they had no maw that the Duke should get more than his own Towns in Lombardy Rinato continuing his resolution departed for France and as he had promis'd sent his Son Giovanni into Italy who staid not in Lombardy but remov'd presently to Florence where he was honorably entertain'd This departure of Rinato dispos'd Duke Francesco to peace the Venetians the Florentines and Alfonso were all weary of the War and ready to embrace it and the Pope desir'd it above all by reason that that very year Mahomet the great Turk had taken Constantinople and made himself Master of all Greece which alarm'd all Christendom but especially the Venetians and the Pope who imagined already they felt his Talons in Italy The Pope therefore desired all the Potentates of Italy that they would send their several Plenipotentiaries to him to negotiate a general peace His motion being accepted and the Embassadors met when they came to the matter so much difficulty arose as there was but small hopes of accommodation Alfonso required that the Florentines should reinburse him for all the charges he had been at in the War and the Florentines expected the same The Venetians demanded Cremona of the Duke and the Duke Bergamo Brescia and Crema of them So that these difficulties seem'd impossible to be remov'd Nevertheless what was so desperate at Rome among so many was easily concluded betwixt two of them at Milan and Venice for whilst the peace was negotiating at Rome and proceeded thus slowly on the ninth of April 1454 it was determined betwixt the Duke and the Venetians that each of them should be restor'd to what they were possess'd of before the War That the Duke should have liberty to recover what the Marquess of Monferrat and the Duke of Savoy had taken from him and that three months time should be allow'd to the rest of the Princes of Italy to come in The Pope the Florentines the Siennesi and other little Potentates came in within the time prefix'd and ratifi'd it and the Venetians Florentines and Duke made a peace betwixt them three for 25 years Alfonso was the only Prince of Italy who seem'd to be refractory conceiving he could not concur without diminution in respect he was to be admitted rather as an auxiliary than a principal upon which score he continued irresolute a good while and would not declare at length upon several Embassies from the Pope and other Princes he suffered himself to be prevailed upon and he and his Son entred into the League for 30 years After which the King and the Duke made several alliances and cross-matches together marrying their Sons and Daughters reciprocally into one another families Yet that Italy might not be left without feed or foundation for a new War Alfonso would not enter into the League till he had leave by consent of the colleagues to make War upon the Genoeses and Gismondo Malatesta and Astorre Prince of Faenza Peace being concluded upon those terms Ferrando Alfonso's Son who had been at Sienna returned into Naples having done nothing considerable in Tuscany but lost many of his Men. This Peace
was at that time Duke of Genoa This Piero finding himself unable to bear up against so powerful a King upon consideration of his own weakness resolv'd at lest to surrender that State to one that should be able to defend it and perhaps sometime or other give him a reasonable reward he sent Embassadors therefore to Charles 7 of France to desire his protection and tender him the Government Charles accepted the offer and to take possession of the City he sent Giovanni d' Angio King Rinato's Son who not long before was returned from Florence into France for Charles was persuaded that Giovanni being acquainted with the humors and customs of the Italians was properer for that Government than any Man he could send besides from thence he believ'd he might prosecute his designs against Naples with more ease and covenience his Father Rinato having been expel'd that Kingdom by Alfonso of Aragon Hereupon Giovanni departed for Genoa was receiv'd honorably by the Town and invested with the whole power both of the City and State This accident was not at all pleasing to Alfonso he found now he had pull'd an old house over his head however he carried it bravely went on with his enterprize and was advanc'd with his Fleet under Villa Marina at Porto Fino when surpriz'd with a sudden distemper he died The death of Alfonso put an end to the Wars against Giovanni and the Genoeses and Ferrando succeeded his Father Alfonso in the Kingdom was in no little trouble having an Enemy upon his hands of such reputation in Italy and a jealousie of several of his Barons who being inclin'd to new changes he was afraid might side with the French besides he was acquainted with the ambition of the Pope and being scarce setled in his Kingdom was fearful lest he should attempt something to supplant him his only hopes were in the Duke of Milan who was no less solicitous for the affairs of that Kingdom than himself apprehending that if ever the French came to be Masters of Naples their next enterprize of course would be against him for he knew they might pretend to Milan as an appendix to that Crown For these reasons as soon as Alfonso was dead Francesco sent letters and Men to Ferrando the first to keep up his heart the other his reputation Upon the death of Alfonso the Pope designed to give his Nephew Piero Lodovico Borgia the Government of that Kingdom and to gloss over the business and make it more plausible to the Princes of Italy he gave out that that Kingdom belonging formerly to the Church his intention was only to reduce it to that condition and therefore he desired the Duke of Milan would not give any assistance to Ferrando and offer'd him such Towns as he had possess'd formerly in that Kingdom But in the midst of his contrivances Calisto died and Pius 2. succeeded him who was a Siâ—nnesi of the Family of the Piccol Huomini and his Name Aeneas This Pope imploying his thoughts wholly for the benefit of Christendom and the Honour of the Church and laying aside all private passion and advantage at the intreaty of the Duke of Milan crown'd Ferrando King of Naples judging it a readier and safer way to compose the differences of Italy by confirming him that was already in possession than by assisting the pretences of the French or setting up as Calisto did for himself However Ferrando took it for a favour and to requite it he made Antonio the Popes Nephew Prince of Malfi married him to his natural Daughter and besides this restor'd Benevento and Ferracina to the Church And now all the Arms in Italy were visibly laid down and Pius as Calisto had begun before was moving all Christendom against the Turk when a new quarrel sprung up betwixt the Fregosi and Giovanni the Lord of Genoa which produc'd a greater and more important War than the last Petrino Fregosi was retir'd to a Castle of his in Riveria much discontented that Giovanni d' Angio having been prefer'd to his dignity in Genoa by him and his Family had not gratified them as they deserved so that by degrees it was come to a feud Ferrando was very well pleas'd with the difference as being the only way to secure him in his Kingdom and therefore he sent Pietrino supplies both of men and mony hoping thereby Giovanni might be expuls'd out of the State of Genoa Giovanni having notice of their intelligence sent for relief into France which having received he march'd out against Pietrino but Pietrino by the access of more supplies from sundry places being grown too strong Giovanni retreated and applyed himself to securing the City which he did not do so carefully but Pietrino in one night surprized several Posts in it but was beaten the next morning himself and most of his Men slain this victory elevated Giovanni so far that he resolv'd to attempt upon Ferrando departing from Genoa in October 1459 with a great Fleet he sail'd to Baia and from thence to Sessa where he was honorably received by that Duke There had joyn'd themselves with Giovanni the Prince of Taranto and the Citizens of Aquila besides several other Princes and Cities so that already that Kingdom was more than half lost Upon which Ferrando desir'd aid of the Pope and the Duke of Milan and to lessen the number of his Enemies made peace with Gismondo Malatesti which peace disgusted Giacopo Piccinino so highly Gismondo being his natural Enemy that he deserted Ferrando and took up Arms under Giovanni Ferrando sent mony likewise to Federigo Lord of Urbin and as soon as could be expected got together a considerable Army according to those times with which he march'd against the Enemy and finding them upon the River Sarni he engaged them but was defeated and his most considerable officers taken after this victory most of the Towns and Castles surrendred to Giovanni only Naples some few neighbouring Towns and Princes adher'd still to Ferrando Giacopo Piccinino advis'd to march directly for Naples and make himself Master of the chief City but Giovanni replyed he would first ruine the Country and then the City would come with more ease but his rejecting the Counsel of Piccinino was the loss of that design for he did not know that the members follow the head more naturally than the head the members Ferrando was fled into Naples and there resorted to him diverse of his Subjects who were driven from their homes whom he receiv'd and having with all possible gentleness gained some monies of the Citizens he got a small body of an Army together he sent new Embassies to the Pope and Duke for supplies and was reliev'd with more plenty and speed than before for they were both of them afraid that the loss of that Kingdom would turn to their prejudice Much strengthened by their supplies Ferrando march'd out of Naples and having recover'd his reputation in part he recover'd some
your Father resenting the injury done to him above any danger of my own I lost my Country and escaped narrowly with my life In Cosimo's days I refused no opportunity of honoring your family and since he died I have entertained none to offend it True it is the weakness of your complexion aud the minority of your Sons gave some kind of disquiet and I was willing our Country might be put in such a posture as to subsist after your Death what ever I have done was only to that end not against you so much as for the benefit of my Country if that was an errour I am sorry for it and do hope the innocence of my intention and the service of my former actions may attone it nor can I fear but I shall find mercy in a Family which has had so long experience of my fidelity or that one single fault will be able to extinguish so many obligations Piero having received this Letter by the same hand returned him this answer Your smiling at that distance is the reason I weep not where I am were you so merry in Florence I should be more melancholy at Naples I grant you have been a well wisher to my Father and you confess he gratified you for it so that if there be obligation on any side 't is on yours because deeds are more valuable than words and if you have been already rewarded for your good actions it 's but reasonable you should be punished for your evil your pretence of love to your Country cannot excuse you for no body but will believe the Medici as great lovers and propagators of their Country as the Acciaivoli Live therefore where you are in dishonor since you had not the discretion to live honorably here Agnolo upon the receipt of this letter desparing of Pardon removed his quarters to Rome wher associating with the Archbishop and the rest of the exiles they consulted what was the best way of lessening the reputation of the Medici which at that time was tottering in Rome and gave Piero no small trouble to sustain it but by the assistance of his friends they failed of their design Diotisalvi and Nicolo Soderini on the other side used all possible diligence to provoke the Venetian Senate against their Country supposing its Government being new and ungrateful to many People the first invasion would shake it and that it would not be able to stand There was at that time in Ferrara Giovan Francesco the Son Palla Strozzi who in the revolutions in 34 was banished with his Father out of Florence this Giovanni was a Man of great credit and reputed as rich a Merchant as any in the City These new Rebels insinuating with him persuaded him how easie it would be to recover their Country when ever the Venetians would undertake it and they doubted not but they would undertake it if part of the charge could be defrayed otherwise it was not to be expected Giovanni was willing to revenge the injuries he had received believed what they said and promised to assist with all the Mony he could make upon which Diotisalvi and Soderini addressed themselves to the Doge Complained to him of their Banishment which they pretended was for no other cause but that they were desirous their Country might be governed by the Laws and the Magistrats not a few of their Grandees have the poweâ— to put them in execution Upon this account it was that Piero de Medici and his followers having been used to a tyrannical way had taken arms by an artifice disarmed them by a cheat and banished them by a fallacy and as if this were not enough God Almighty must be brought in and made an accessary to their cruelty whilst in a solemn Procession and the sacred exercise of their devotion many Citizens who upon faith given that they should be safe had remained behind were seized secured tortured and executed a thing of most execrable and nefarious example To revenge the inhumanity of those actions and avert the judgments which they would otherwise pull down upon their Country they knew not where to apply themselves with more hopes then to that illustrious Senate which having done so much for the preservation of their own liberty must need have some compassion for such as lost have theirs They beseeched them therefore as free-men to assist them against their Tyrants as merciful against the merciless and remember them how the Family of the Medici had defeated them of Lombardy when Cosimo contrary to the inclinations of all the rest of the City assisted Francesco against them so that if the equity of their cause did not move them the justice of their own indignation might provoke them These last words prevailed so far upon the Senate that thy resolved Bartolomeo Coligni their General should fall upon the Dominion of the Florentines and to that purpose their Army being drawn together with all possible speed and Hercules da Esti being sent by Borso Duke of Ferrara joyned himself with them Their first enterprize was upon the Town of Doadola which the Florentines being in no order they burned and did some mischeif in the Country about it But the Florentines as soon as Piero had banished the adverse party had entred into a new League with Galezzo Duke of Milan and Ferrando King of Naples and entertained Federigo Count of Urbin for their General so that being fortified by such friends they did not much value their Enemies for Ferrando sent his Son Alfonso and Galeazzo came in person both of them with considerable forces to their relief and all of them together made a head at Castracaro a Castle belonging to the Florentines at the bottom of the Alps which descend out of Tuscany into Romagna In the mean time the Enemy was retired towards Imola so that betwixt the one and the other according to the custom of those times there happened several light skirmishes but no besieging nor storming of Towns nor no provocation to a battle on either side both parties keeping their tents and staring one upon another with extraordinary cowardize This manner of proceeding was not at all pleasing to the Florentines who found themselves engaged in a War which was like to be expensive and no profit to be expected insomuch that the Magistrats complained of it to those Citizens which they had deputed as commissaries for that expedition who replyed That Galeazzo was wholly in the fault and that having more Authority than experience he knew not how to make any advantagious resolution nor would he believe them which were able to instruct him and that therefore it was impossible whilst he was in the Army that any great action should be atchieved Hereupon the Florentines addressed themselves to the Duke and let him know That he had done a great honor and it had been much for their advantage in coming personally to their assistance for his very name and reputation had made their Enemies retire
all Italy be involved in a War For this they can have no excuse if any Man have offended them they might have offended him again and not blended and confounded private injury with publick revenge This is it which revives our calamities though the Authors are extinct That is it which has brought the Pope and King of Naples upon us with their Armies though their declaration be only against me and my family I wish to God it were true and that their design was no farther the remedy would be easie and your deliverance at hand I should not be so ill a Citizen as to postpone the publick to my private security no I would willingly quench your flames though with my own blood and destruction but because the injuries of great persons are alway cloathed with some plausible pretence they have chosen this to exasperate you against me if you think I deserve it I am now in your hands to be continued or rejected as you please you are my Fathers you are my Patrons what ever you command I will endeavour to do and not refuse with my own blood to finish this War which is begun with my Brothers The Citizens could not contain from tears whilst Lorenzo was speaking and with the same pity as they had heard him he was answered by one deputed by the rest That the whole City did acknowledge the merits both of his ancestors and himself That he should be of good cheer for with the same readiness and devotion as they had revenged his Brothers death and prevented his they would preserve his person and reputation and expose their whole Country rather than desert him That their actions might be commensurate they appointed him a guard to secure him against domestick designs and payed them out of the publick treasure after which they addressed themselves to the War and raised what Men and mony they were able They sent for aid to the Duke of Milan and the Venetians according to the league and the Pope more like a Wolf than a Shepherd being ready to devour them they tried all ways to justifie themselves that they could think of possess'd all Italy with his treachery against their state remonstrated his impieties to all the World and that he exercised his Papacy with as much injustice as he gained it for he had sent those whom he had advanced to the highest degree of Prelacy in the company of Traitors and Murderers to commit treason in the Church in the time of divine service and the Celebration of the Sacrament and after that having been unable to kill all the Citizens alter the Government and sack the City he interdicted it with his Pontifical maledictions and threatned to destroy it But if God were just and the violences of Men offensive to him he must needs be displeased at the proceeding of his Vicar and permit that Men having no other refuge might resort unto him For which reason the Florentines not only refuse his interdiction but forced their Priests to celebrate divine service as before They called a Council in Florence of all the Tuscan Prelats within their jurisdiction and appealed to them concerning their differences with the Pope against which in justification of his cause it was alledged that it belonged properly to the Pope to supplant Tyrants to suppress ill Men and to advance good all which he was to remedy as opportunity was offered But that secular Princes had not right to imprison Cardinals to execute Bishops to kill or dismember or drag about the streets the bodies of the Priests and to use the innocent and the nocent without any difference or distinction Nevertheless the Florentines not at all refusing his quarrels and complaints dismissed the Cardinal which was in their power and sent him back to the Pope yet the Pope without any regard to that civility caused them to be invaded with all his forces and the Kings both their Armies under the Command of Alfonso Duke of Calabria Ferrando's eldest Son and Federigo Conted ' Urbino entred Chianti and by means of the Siennesi who were of the Enemies party â—took Radda several other Castles and plundered the whole Country Next they encamped before Castellina the Florentines seeing themselves thus fiercely attacked were in great fear as having but few men of their own and the assistance of their friends coming in very slowly for though the Duke indeed had sent them supplies yet the Venetians refused it as not thinking themselves obliged to relieve them in their particular quarrels for as they pretended private animosities were not in reason to be defended at a publick expence So that the Florentines to dispose the Venetian to better things sent Tomaso Soderini Embassador to that State whilst in the mean time they raised what Men they could and made Hercules Marquess of Ferrara their General Whilst in this manner they were employed in their preparations the Enemy had brought Castellina to such distress that despairing of relief the Garison surrendered after forty days siege From hence the Enemy advanced towards Arezzo and sat down before Monte S. Senino The Florentine Army was by this time drawn out and being marched towards the Enemy had posted it self within three miles of them and incommoded them so that Federigo sent to Urbino to desire a truce for some few days which was granted but with so much disadvantage to the Florentines that those who requested it were amazed when they had obtained it for without it they must have drawn off with disgrace But having those days allowed to recollect themselves when the time was expired they went on with their siege and took the Town under the very nose of our Army By this time Winter being come to provide themselves good quarters the Enemy drew his Army into the Country of Sienna the Florentines where they thought most convenient and the Marquess of Farrara having done little good to himself or other People returned from whence he came About this time Genoa was in rebellion against the State of Milan and upon this occasion Galeazzo being dead and his Son Giovan Galeazzo a minor and unfit for the Government difference arose betwixt Sforza Lodovico Ottaniano Ascanio his Unckles and Medona Bona his Mother each of them pretending to the tuition of the Child In which competition Madona Bona the Dutchess Dowager prevailed by the Counsels of Tomaso Soderini the Florentine Embassador in that Court at that time and Cecco Simonetto who had been secretary to the late Galeazzo whereupon Sforzi flying from Milan Ottaniano was drawn as he was passing the Adda and the rest dispersed into several places Roberto de san Severino ran the same fortune and fled having forsaken the Dutchess in those disputes and joyned himself with the Unckles The troubles falling out not long after in Tuscany those princes hoping from new accidents or new success every one of them attempted what he thought likely to restore him to his Country King Ferrando observing the only
refuge the Florentines had in their necessities was to the State of Milan determined to give the Dutchess so much imployment of her own that she should not be at leasure to send them any relief and by means of Prospero Adorno the Signore Roberto and the Sforzi which were banished he wrought so that Genoa rebelled nevertheless the little Castle remained firm to the young Duke and the Dutchess sent forces to them to recover the Town but they were overthrown whereupon considering with her self the danger which might accrew both to her Son and her self if the War should be continued all Tuscany being imbroiled and the Florentines in distress she resolved seeing she could not retain Genoa as a Subject that she would have it as a Friend and agreed with Battistino Fregosi a great Enemy to Prospero Adorno to deliver him the Castle and make him Prince of Genoa upon condition he would drive out Prospero and give the Sforzi no assistance nor protection After all was concluded betwixt them the Castle was surrendered and by the help of that and his party Battistino reducing Genoa and according to their custom made himself Dogue the Sforzi and Signore Roberto being forced out of the Town they passed with their followers into Lunigiana The Pope and the King seeing the troubles in Lombardy composed took occasion to infest Tuscany on that side towards Pisa with those Persons which were driven out of Genoa supposing by dividing and diverting their forces to weaken the Florentines whereupon the Summer approaching they prevailed with the Signore Roberto to march with his Squadron from Lunigiana into the Country of Pisa Roberto put the whole Country into confusion took several Castles from the Pisans and plundered them and made his excursions to the very walls of Pisa it self About this time Embassadors arrived at Florence from the Emperour the King of France and the King of Hungary who from their several Princes being sent to the Pope persuaded the Florentines to send Embassadors also and promised their utmost endeavour with him to conclude all their differences with an honorable peace The Florentines consented as well to excuse themselves to the World as that they were really desirous of it Having sent therefore their Embassadors they returned as they went without any accommodation and the Florentines finding themselves abused or abandoned by the Italians resolved to try if they could gain themselves any reputation by an alliance with France to which purpose they sent as their Embassador Donato Acciaivoli a person well skill'd both in the Greek and Latine tongues whose Ancestors had always born great office in that State but being arrived at Milan in his journey he died and Florence in honor to his memory and remuneration to his Children buried him magnificently at the publick charge gave his Sons considerable exemptions and his Daughters such portions as would marry them like themselves and sent Giud ' Antonio Vespucci a Man well versed in the imperial and Pontifical Laws to the King of France in his place The inroad Signore Roberto had made into the Country of Pisa as all sudden and unexpected things do gave the Florentines no little distraction For the War lying heavy upon them in the Country of Siena they could not see how they should be able to defend themselves on the other side however they sent officers and all other provisions to reinforce the City of Pisa and that they might keep the Lucchesi from assisting the Enemy with mony or any thing else they sent Gino Capponi as their Embassador to them but he was received so ill out of an ancient Enmity to the People of Florence upon former injuries received and a constant apprehension to them that he was many times in danger of being killed by the multitude So that his journey produced new quarrels rather than new quiet and thereupon the Florentines called back the Marquess of Ferrara entertained the Marquess of Mantoua into their pay and with great importunity desired of the Venetians Count Carlo the Son of Braccio and Deifebo the Son of Count Giacopo who after several scruples and demurs were sent to them for having made peace with the Turk aud no pretence left to excuse themselves they were ashamed to braek faith with the League Carlo therefore and Deifebo being come with a considerable number of Horse and joyned to what forces they could conveniently draw out of the Marquess of Ferrara's Army which attended the Duke of Calabria they marched towards Pisa in quest of Signore Roberto who was posted with his ARmy near the river Serchio and thought at first he made a show of expecting our Army yet upon second thoughts he removed and retired into the Country of Lunigiana to the same quarters where he lay before his expedition to Pisa. Upon his departure Count Carlo repossess'd himself of all the Enemy had taken in that Country and the Florentines being clear on that side drew all their forces into one body betwixt Colle and Santo Giminiano but upon Carlo's conjunction there being several of the Sforzeschi and the Bracceschi in the Army the old feud began to revive and it was believed had they stayed longer together they had fallen together by the ears to prevent these inconveniences it was resolved to divide the Army that Count Carlo should march with his forces into the Country of Perugia and the rest fortifie and intrench themselves at Poggibonzi to obstruct the Enemy from entring into the Country of Florence By this division they supposed likewise the Enemy would be forced to divide for they thought that either Count Carlo would take Perugia where he had a great party as they believed or that the Pope would be constrained to send a good body of Men to defend it and to drive his Holiness into greater necessity they ordered Nicolo Vitelli who had left Castello where Lorenzo his Enemy was predominant with what force he could make to approach the Town to drive out his adversary if he could and keep it against the Pope At first fortune seemed to encline to the Florentines Count Carlo advanced strangely in the Country of Perugia Nicolo Vitelli though he could not get into the Town of Castello yet he was Master of the field and plundered round about it without any contradiction and those forces which were encamped at Poggibonzi made their excursions to the very walls of Sienna But at last all their hopes came to nothing for first Count Carlo died in the very height of their expectations whose death had nevertheless much bettered the condition of the Florentines had they known how to have improved the victory which it produced for no sooner was the death of Count Carlo known but the Popes Army being all together in Perugia conceiving great hopes of overpowering the Florentines took the field and encamped upon the Lake within three miles of the Enemy on the other side Giacopo Guicciardini at that time Commissary of the Army by the advice
of Roberto da Rimino who since the death of Count Carlo was the chief and best reputed officer among them knowing what it was that set the Enemy agog they resolved to attend him and coming to a Battel not far from the Lake in the very place where Hannibal gave the Romans that memorable defeat the Popes Army was routed The news of this victory was extreamly welcome in Florence both to the Magistrates and People and it would have been great honor and advantage to that enterprize had not disorders in the Army at Poggibonzi spoiled all and the victory over the one Camp been interrupted by a mutiny in the other for that Army having got much plunder in the Country of Sienna when they came to divide there fell out great difference betwixt the Marquess of Ferrara and the Marquess of Mantoâ—a so that they came to blows and did one another what mischief they were able The Florentines finding no good was to be expected from them together consented that the Marquess of Ferrara with his forces might march home by which means the Army being weakned without a head and very disorderly the Duke of Calabria being with his Army not far from Sienna took a resolution of falling upon them but the Florentines hearing of his advance not trusting to their Arms their numbers which was much greater than the Enemy nor the situation of their Camp which were very strong without expecting their coming or seeing so much as the face of their Enemy as soon as they preceived the dust they fled and left their Amunition and Carriages and Artillery behind them and so cowardly and poor spirited that Army was become that the turning of a horses head or tail gave either victory or defeat This Rout filled the King's Souldiers with prize and the Florentines with fear for that City was not only afflicted with War but with so violent a pestilence that most of the inhabitants were forced to leave the Town and betake themselves to the Country This overthrow was rendred more terrible by sickness for those Citizens who had Estates in the Val di Pisa and the Val Delsa being driven thither and secure were forced upon this rout to hurry back again to Florence as well as they could and that not only with their goods and their Children but with all their families and dependants for every hour they were afraid the Enemy would have presented himself before the Town They who had the administration of the War being sensible of these disorders commanded their Army which was victorious in Perugia that leaving their designs there they should march into the Val Delsa and oppose themselves against the Enemy who since their last victory over-run that whole Country And though that Army had so straitned Perugia it was every hour expected to surrender yet the Florentines chose rather to defend themselves than to gain upon any body else and raising their siege they were conducted to S. Cassiano a Castle about eight miles from Florence as the only place where they might lie secure till the other Army was rallied and brought to them The Enemy on the other side being at liberty in Perugia upon the withdrawing of the Florentines took heart and made their inroads daily into the countries of Arezzo and Cortona and the other Army which under the command of the Duke of Calabria had routed them at Poggibonzi took Poggibonzi and Vico pillaged Certaldo made great spoil and got great prize in that Country after they sat down before Colle which in those times was looked upon as extraordinary strong and being well man'd and provided with all things it was hoped it might entertain the Enemy till their Armies could be united The Florentines having joyned all their forces at S Cassiano and the Enemy proceeding very fiercely in their leaguer they resolved to march towards them and post themselves as near them as they could supposing they should thereby not only encourage the Garison to defend themselves but make the Enemy more cautious in all his attacks Hereupon they removed from S. Cassiano and encamped at S. Giminiano about five miles from Colle from whence with their Horse and the lightest of their foot they daily molested the Dukes Camp but this was not enough for the Garison in Colle for wanting all things that were necessary they surrendered the 13 of November to the great displeasure of the Florentines but the great joy of the Enemy especially the Siennesi who besides their common hatred to Florence had a particular quarrel against this Town Winter was now at the height the season unfit for War and the Pope and King to give them hopes of peace or to enjoy their victory quietly themselves offered a truce for three Months to the Florentines and allowed them ten days for an answer which proffer was accepted but as a wound is more painful when cold than when 't is first given this small repose gave the Florentines greater sence of the miseries which they had endured insomuch as they began to talk freely and upbraid one another by the miscarriages in the War charging one another with the greatness of the expence and the inequality of their taxes and these exprobrations were not only in the streets and among the ordinary sort of People but even in their conventions and publick counsels in which one of them took the confidence to tell Lorenzo to his face that the City was weary and would have no more War and that therefore he should bethink himself of peace upon which Lorenzo discerning the necessity advised with such of his friends as he judged most faithful and able and it was concluded by all that seeing the Venetians were cold and uncertain the Duke young and imbroiled in new troubles at home their best way would be to seek out for new alliance and try what that would contribute to their success Their great scruple was into whose arms they should cast themselves whether into the Popes or the King 's of Naples and upon serious debate it was resolved into the King's as a person of more stability and likely to yield them better protection in regard of the shortness of the Popes lives and the changes upon their successions For the small fear the Church has of any Prince and the small regard it has of any body else in all its resolutions causes that no secular Prince can repose any intire confidence or communicate freely in his affairs with any of the Popes for the that associats with him in war and in dangers may perhaps have a companion and a sharer in his Victories but in his distress he shall be sure to be alone his holiness being still brought off by his speritual influence and authority It being therefore determined more profitable to reconcile with the King there could be no way thought of so likely as by Lorenzo himself for by how much the more that King had tasted of his liberality by so much the more
their differences with the Pope Siena being free they delivered from their apprehensions of the King by the Duke of Calabria drawing away with his Army out of Tuscany and the War continuing with the Turks they pressed the King so hard to the restitution of such places as the Duke of Calabria at his departure had committed to the keeping of the Sanesi that he began to fear the Florentines might desert him and by making War upon the Sanesi hinder the assistance which he expected from the Pope and the rest of the Princes of Italy whereupon he caused them all to be delivered and by several new favours reobliged the Florentines to him from whence we may observe that it is interest and necessity not their hands or their words which make Princes keep their promises These Castles being restored and the new League confirmed Lorenzo de Medici gained greater reputation than the War first and after the peace when they were jealous of the King had taken from him For at that time there wanted not those who calumniated him openly as one who to preserve himself had sold his Country and as by the War they had lost their Towns by the peace they should lose their liberty But when the Towns were restored and honorable peace concluded with the King and the City returned to its ancient reputation the People who are generally greedy to talk and judge of things more by the success than the Counsel changed their note presently and cryed up Lorenzo to the skies as one who had gained more by his management in that peace than their ill fortune had got them by the War and that his prudence and judgment had done what all the Armies and power of their Enemies could not This descent of the Turks defer'd the War which the Pope and the Venetians upon provocation of that peace had designed against them but as the beginning of the Turkish invasion was unexpected and produced much good so the end of it was unlooked for and the occasion of much mischief for Mahomet the Grand Signore died suddenly and difference arising betwixt his Sons those who were landed in Puglia being abandoned by their Lord came to an agreement with the King of Naples and delivered up Otranto into his hands This fear therefore being removed which kept the Pope and the Venetians quiet every one began to be apprehensive of new troubles On the one side the Pope and the Venetian were in League and with them Genoesi Sanesi and other lesser Potentates On the other side were the Florentines the King of Naples the Duke of Milan and with them the Bolognesi and several other little States The Venetian had a design upon Ferrara they thought they had reason enough to attempt it and hopes enough to carry it The reason was because the Marquess had declared himself obliged no longer to receive either their Visdomine or their falt for by compact after 70 years that City was to be exempt both from the one and the other to which the Venetians replyed that so long as he retained the Polesine so long he was to receive the Visdomine and the Salt but the Marquess refusing they thought they had just occasion to take Arms and their opportunity was convenient seeing the Pope in such indignation both against the Florentines and King to oblige him the more Count Girolamo being by accident at Venice was honorably treated made a Gentleman of that City and had all the priviledges and immunities of a Citizen conferred upon him which is a particular favour and shows always the great esteem they bear to the Person which receives it In preparation for this War they laid new taxes upon their subjects and for their General they had chosen Roberto da San Severino who upon some difference betwixt him and Lodovick Duke of Milan fled to Tortona and having made some tumults there he got off to Genoa from whence he was invited by the Venetians and made General of their Army The news of these preparations coming to the ears of the League they prepared themselves accordingly The Duke of Milan chose Federigo Lord of Urbin for his General The Florentines Costanzo di Pesaro and to sound the Pope and discover whether these proceedings of the Venetians were by his consent King Ferrando sent the Duke of Calabria with his Army to quarter upon the Tronto and desired leave of his Holiness that they might pass thorow his territories from thence into Lombardy to the relief of the Marquess which being absolutely denied the Florentines and King thinking that a sufficient declaration of his mind resolved to attempt it by force and try if that they could make him their friend or at least give him such impediments as should hinder his supplying of the Venetians who had already taken the field invaded the Marquess overrun most of the Country and clap'd down with their Army before Figarolo a Castle of great importance to the affairs of that Prince The King and the Florentines having in the mean time concluded to fall upon the Pope Alfonso Duke of Calabria marched his Army towards Rome and by the help of the Collennesi who were joyned with him in opposition to the Orsini who sided with the Pope he committed great spoils all over that Country On the other side the Florentines under the command of Nicolo Vitelli assaulted the City of Castello took it turned out Lorenzo who had kept it for the Pope and gave it to Nicolo as Prince the Pope was at this time in very great anxiety Rome was full of factions within and the Enemy in the Country without Nevertheless like a couragious Prince resolved to overcome not to yield to his Enemies he entertained for his General Roberto da Rimino and inviting him to Rome where he had assembled all the forces he could make he represented how great an honor it would be to him if he could rescue the Church from the calamities which were upon it and that not only himself and his successors but God Almighty would reward him Roberto having taken a view of his Army and all the Magazines he persuaded the Pope to raise him what foot he could more which was done with great diligence and expedition The Duke of Calabria was all this while forraging about that Country and making his inroads to the very walls of the City which netled and provoked the Citizens so as many of them came freely and offered their service to remove them which Roberto with many thanks and great expressions of kindness accepted The Duke understanding their preparations thought fit to draw farther off from the City supposing that Roberto would not venture to follow him at any distance from the Town besides he had some expectation of his Brother Federigo who was to come to him with fresh supplies from his Father Roberto finding himself equal in Horse and superior in foot drew his Army out of the Town and directing towards the Enemy he encamped within two
miles of him The Duke finding the Enemy upon his back quite contrary to his expectation perceived there was no remedy but he must fight or run away so that forced and constrained lest otherwise he should do a thing unworthy of a King's Son he resolved to fight turned upon the Enemy and each of them having put their Army into order according to the discipline of those times they fell to it and the battle continued from morning to noon and was fought with more courage than any in Italy for fifty years before there dying on the one side and the other above a thousand Men the end of which fight was very honorable for the Church for their infantry being numerous so galled the Dukes Horse that they were forced to turn tail and the Duke had been taken had he not been rescued by some Turks which upon the delivery of Otronto took pay under him Roberto having gained so absolute a Victory returned triumphantly to Rome but he enjoyed the pleasure of it but little for in the heat of the battle having drunk a great quantity of cold water he put himself into a flux and died not many days after his body being interred by his Holiness with all imaginable ceremony The Pope having gained this Victory he sent the Count towards Castello to try if he could recover it for Lorenzo and what he could do upon Rimina for after the death of Robert there being only one Child left in the tuition of his Lady he thought it might be no hard matter to get into that Town and doubtless he had succeeded had not that Lady been assisted by the Florentines who opposed him so happily that he could do nothing against Rimino nor Castello Whilst these things were in agitation in Romagna and Rome the Venetians had taken Figarolo and passed the Po with their Army the Duke of Milan's and the Marquess his Army being in no small disorder upon the death of the Count d' Urbino who falling ill was removed to Bologna and died there so that the Marquesses affairs began to decline and the Venetians had great hopes of becoming Masters of Ferrara On the other side the Florentines and King of Naples used all possible art to bring the Pope over to their party but not being able to do it by force they threatned him with a Counsel which the Emperour had pronounced already should be held at Basil. Whereupon by persuasion of his Embassadors at Rome and the chief of the Cardinals who were very desirous of peace the Pope was constrained and began to hearken to the peace and tranquillity of Italy and for fear the Grandeur of the Venetians should be the ruine of that Country he became inclinable to the League and sent his Nuncii to Naples where a peace was concluded for five years betwixt the Pope King of Naples and Florentines reserving a certain time for the Venetians if they pleased to come in Which being done the Pope sent to the Venetians to desist in their War against Ferrara but the Venetians were so far from complying they reinforced their Army and pursued it with more cagerness than before for having defeated the Dukes forces and the Marquesses at Argenta they had advanced in such manner against the City that their Army was encamped in the Marquesses Park So that the League thinking it no dallying any longer resolved to assault them with all the forces they could make and accordingly the Duke of Calabria had orders to march thither with their Army The Florentines likewise sent what Men they could spare and for the better administration of the War a Diet was appointed to be held at Cremona where there met the Popes Legat Count Girolamo the Duke of Calabria the Signore Lodovico and Lorenzo de Medici with many other Princes of Italy in which Council the Method of the future War was debated and having concluded that Ferrara could not any way be relieved more effectually than by a brisk diversion they desired Lodovico's permission to attack the Venetians thorow the Country of Milan but Lodovico would not be persuaded as fearing to pull a War upon his back which he could not be rid off when he pleased whereupon it was determined that they should march with their whole strength for Ferrara and having mustered 4000 Horse and 8000 Foot they advanced against the Venetians who were 2200 Horse and 6000 Foot But the first thing the League thought fit to attempt was a Fleet which the Venetians had upon the Po and they assaulted it so smartly that they broke it at Rondino destroyed 200 of their Vessels and took Antonio Iustiniano the Proveditor of their Navy Prisoner The Venetians seeing all Italy combined against them to give themselves greater reputation they entertained the Duke of Reno into their pay with 200 good Horse and upon news of the defeat of their Fleet they sent him with part of the Army to face the enemy whilst Roberto da San Severino passed the Adda with the rest and approaching to Milan proclaimed the Duke and Madam Bona his Mother hoping that Lodovico and his Government had been so odious in that City that the very name of the other would have begot some commotion This inroad at first produced some kind of terror but the conclusion was quite contrary to what the Venetians had designed for this compelled Lodovico to do what he could not be brought to before and therefore leaving the Marquess of Ferrara to the defence of his own Country with 4000 Horse and 2000 Foot the Duke of Calabria with 12000 Horse and 5000 Foot marched into the Countries of Bergona Brescia and Verona plundering and spoiling all about them before the Venetians could send them any relief for Roberto and his Army had much ado to secure that City on the other side the Marquess of Ferrara had recovered a great part of his losses for the Duke of Reno who was sent to confront him having but 2000 Horse and 1000 Foot was not able to oppose him so that all that year 1483 things went on prosperously for the League The next Spring the Winter having passed without any considerable action both Armies took the field The League for greater expedition in their designs against the Venetians had drawn their whole Army together and had the War been managed as wisely as the year before had easily carried what ever the Venetians were possess'd of in Lombardy for they were reduced to 6000 Horse and 5000 Foot whilst the Enemy consisted of 13000 Horse and 6000 Foot for the Duke of Reno being entertained only for a year when his time was out was retired But as it many times happens where many are in equal authority diffention among the Grandees gives the Victory to the Enemy for Federigo Gonzagua Marquess of Mantona being dead who whilst he was living kept the Duke of Calabria and Signore Lodovico in good correspondence there grew exceptions betwixt them and jealousies by degrees for Giovan
advanced against the Castle and having planted their Guns they battered it exceedingly This attack was new and unexpected to the Florentines insomuch that they drew what force they were able together under the command of Urginio Ursino at Pisa and made their complaints to the Pope that whilst he was in treaty with them for peace the Genoeses had invaded them after which they sent Piero Corsini to Lucca to preserve that City in its allegiance they sent likewise Pagocantonio Soderini their Embassador to Venice to try the minds of that Commonwealth They desired aid likewise of the King of Naples and Signor Lodovico but neither of them supplied them the King pretending apprehension of the Turkish fleet and Lodovico with other shifts delaied to relieve them so that the Florentines as they usually are were left alone in their necessity finding no body so well disposed to assist them as they were to assist other People Nevertheless being not strange to them they were not at all discouraged but raising a great Army under the Command of Giacopo Guicciardini and Pietro Vettori they sent them against the Enemy who had lodged himself upon the River Magra In the mean time Serazanello was closely besiged and what with mines and batteries brought to great danger of being taken Whereupon a Counsel being called it was resolved to leave it and the Enemy not at all declining they came to an engagement in which the Genoesi were defeated Lodovico dal Fiesco and several of their principal officers taken Prisoners yet this Victory could not encline the Serezanesi to surrender they rather prepared more obstinately for their defence and the Florentine Commissaries being as diligent on their side it was couragiously both assaulted and defended This Leaguer proving longer than was expected Lorenzs de Medici thought it expedient to go himself to the Camp where his arrival animated his own Souldiers and discouraged the adversary for upon observation of the vigour of the Florentines and the coldness of their supplies from Genoa freely without any capitulation they threw themselves into the arms of Lorenzo and except some few who were more eminently active in the Rebellion they were all courteously treated by the Florentines During this siege Signor Lodovico had sent his Horse to Pontremoli in appearance in our favour but holding a correspondence in Genoa a party mutinied against the Government and by the help of those forces secured the Town for the Duke of Milan About this time the Germans made War upon the Venetians and Boccelino d' Osimo Nella Marca had caused Osimo to revolt from the Pope and made himself Lord of it This Boccelino after many accidents was contented upon the persuasion of Lorenzo di Medici to deliver up that Town again to the Pope which he did and coming to Florance he lived there under Lorenzo's protection very honorable a considerable time but afterwards removing to Milan and not finding the same faith as he had done at Florance he ws put to death by Lodovico's command The Venetians being set upon by the Germans near the City of Trento were utterly defeated and Signor Roberto da San Severino their General was slain After the loss of this Victory according to their usual fortune the Venetians made a peace with the Germans but upon terms as exceedingly honorable as if they had been the Conquerors About the same time great troubles arose likewise in Romagna Francesco d' Orso of Furli was a Man of great authority in that City and falling under the suspicion of the Count Girolamo he was many times threatned by him so that Francesco living in perpetual fear he was advised by his friends and relations to be before hand with the Count and seeing his intention was manifestly to take away his life he should strike the first blow and make sure of the Count and so by the death of another Person secure himself This Counsel begin given and as resolutely undertaken they appointed the time to be at the Fair at Furli for several of their friends in the Country coming to the Town on course that day they thought they should have enough of them present without the danger of inviting them It was in the month of May in which the greatest part of the Italians have a custom of supping by day light The Conspirators thought their best time to kill him would be after he had supped when the servants were gone down to their own and left him as it were alone in his Chamber Having agreed upon the time Francesco went to the Counts Palace and having left his accomplices below and told one of his Servants that he desired to speak with the Count he was admitted and finding him alone after some previous and pretended discourse he took his opportunity and killed him then calling up his Companions the Servant was slain likewise and then the Captain of the Castle coming in by accident with some few in his company to speak with the Count they fell upon him and murdered him with the rest Having finished their work and raised a great hubub in the House the Count's body was thrown out of the window a great cry made of liberty and the Church and the people exhorted to Arm who abominating the cruelty and the avarice of the Count fell upon his Houses plundered them and made the Countess Catherina his Lady and her Family Prisoners and this was done with so little opposition that there was nothing but the Castle which hindered the accomplishment of their designs but that Captain being obstinate and not to be wrought upon by them to surrender they desired the Countess to try if she could persuade him which she promised to endeavour if they would let her go to him into the Castle and as Hostage for her fidelity she would leave them her Children The Conspirators believed her and gave her leave to go to him but she was no sooner in the Castle but she began to swagger and threaten them with death in revenge of her husband's and when they told her they would kill all her Children she bid them do their worst for she knew how to have more The Conspirators were not a little dismaid at this accident they saw the Pope sent them no succours and hearing that Lodovico the Countesses Unckle was sending forces to her relief they pack'd up what they could and away they went to Castello so that the Countess being restored she revenged the death of her husband with all possible cruelty The Florentines had news of what happened to the Count and immediatly took occasion to attempt the Castle of Piancaldoli which had been formerly taken from them by the said Count and accordingly sending their forces thither they retook it but with the death of Ciecco a most excellent Architect About the same time that this tumult happened in the City another of no less importance fell out in the Country of Romagna Galeotto Lord of Faenza was married to
difficulties consist in Governments lately acquired especially if not absolutely new but as members annexed to the territories of the Usurper in which case such a Government is called mixed The tumults and revolutions in such Monarchies proceed from a natural crosness and difficulty in all new conquests for Men do easily part with their Prince upon hopes of bettering their condition and that hope provokes them to rebel bâ—t most commonly they are mistaken and experience tells them their condition is much worse This proceeds from another natural and ordinary cause necessitating the new Prince to overlay or disgust his new subjects by quartring his Army upon them Taxes or a thousand other inconveniences which are the perpetual consequents of conquest So that you make them your Enemies who suffer and are injured by your usurpation but cannot preserve their friendship who introduced you because you are neither able to satisfy their expectation or imploy strong remedies against them by reason of your obligations wherefore though an usurper be never so strong and his Army never so numerous he must have intelligence with the natives if he means to conquer a Province For these reasons Lewis XII of France quickly subdued Milan and lost it as quickly for the same People which open'd him their gates finding themselves deceived in their hopes and disappointed in the future benefits which they expected could not brook nor comport with the haughtiness of their new Soveraign 't is very true Countries that have rebelled and are conquered the second time are recovered with more difficulty for the defection of the People having taken off all obligation or respect from the Usurper he takes more liberty to secure himself by punishing offenders exposing the suspected and fortifying where ever he finds himself weak so that Count Lodovick having been able to rescue Milan out of the hands of the French the first time only by harrasing and infesting its borders the second time he recovered it it was necessary for him to arm and confederate the whole World against the said King and that his Army should be beaten and driven out of Italy and this happened from the foresaid occasions Nevertheless the French were twice dispossess'd The general reasons of the first we have already discoursed it remains now that we take a prospect of the second and declare what remedies the said King Lewis had or what another may have in his condition to preserve himself better in his new conquests than the King of France did before him I say then that Provinces newly acquir'd and joyn'd to the ancient territory of him who conquer'd them are either of the same Country or Language or otherwise In the first case they are easily kept especially if the People have not been too much accustomed to liberty and to secure the possession there needs no more than to extirpate the Family of the Prince which governed before for in other things maintaining to them their old condition there being no discrepancy in their customs Men do acquiesce and live quietly as has been seen in the cases of Burgundy Bretagne Gascogne and Normandy which have continued so long under the Goverment of France for though there be some difference in their language nevertheless their Laws and customs being alike they do easily consist He therefore who acquires any thing and desires to preserve it is obliged to have a care of two things more particulary one is that the Family of the former Prince be extinguished the other that no new Laws or Taxes be imposed whereby it will come to pass that in a short time it may be annexed and consolidated with his old Principality But where Conquest is made in a Country differing in Language Customs and Laws there is the great difficulty their good fortune and great industry is requisit to keep it and one of the best and most efficacious expedients to do it would be for the Usurper to live there himself which would render his possession more secure and durable as the great Turk has done in Greece who in despight of all his practices and policies to keep it in subjection had he not fixed his Imperial residence there would never have been able to have effected it For being present in Person disorders are discovered in the bud and prevented but being at a distance in some remote part they come only by hear-say and that when they are got to a head and commonly incurable Besides the Province is not subject to be pillaged by officers by reason of the nearness and accessibleness of their Prince which disposes those to love him who are good and those to dread him who are otherwise and if any foreigner attacks it he must do it with more care and circumspection in respect that the Princes residence being there it will be harder for him to lose it There is another Remedy rather better than worse and that is to plant Colonies in one or two places which may be as it were the Keys of that State and either that must be done of necessity or an Army of Horse and Foot be maintained in those parts which is much worse for Colonies are of no great expence The Prince sends and maintains them at very little charge and intrenches only upon such as he is constrain'd to dispossess of their Houses and Land for the subsistance and accommodation of the new Inhabitants who are but few and a small part of the State they also who are injur'd and offended living dispers'd and in poverty cannot do any mischief and the rest being quiet and undisturb'd will not stir lest they should mistake and run themselves into the same condition with their Neighbours I conclude likewise That those Colonies which are least chargeable are most faithful and inoffensive and those few who are offended are too poor and dispers'd to do any hurt as I said before And it is to be observ'd Men are either to be flatter'd and indulged or utterly destroy'd because for small offences they do usually revenge themselves but for great ones they cannot so that injury is to be done in such a manner as not to fear any revenge But if in stead of Colonies an Army be kept on foot it will be much more expensive and the whole revenue of that Province being consum'd in the keeping it the acquisition will be a loss and rather a prejudice than otherwise by removing the Camp up and down the Country and changing their quarters which is an inconvenience every man will resent and be ready to revenge and they are the most dangerous and implacable Enemies who are provok'd by insolences committed against them in their own houses In all respects therefore this kind of guard is unprofitable whereas on the other side Colonies are useful Moreover he who is in a Province of a different constitution as is said before ought to make himself head and Protector of his inferior Neighbours and endeavour with all diligence to weaken and debilitate such
the minds of the Commons is above all things to endeavour to ingratiate with the People which will be as the other if he undertakes their protection And Men receiving good Offices where they expected ill are indear'd by the surprize and become better affected to their Benefactor than perhaps they would have been had he been made Prince by their immediate favour There are many ways of insinuating with the People of which no certain rule can be given because they vary according to the diversity of the subject and therefore I shall pass them at this time concluding with this assertion that it is necessary above all things that a Prince preserves the affections of his people otherwise in any Exigence he has no refuge nor remedy Nabides Prince of the Spartans sustained all Greece and a Victorious Army of the Romans and defended the Government and Country against them all and to do that great action it was sufficient for him to secure himself against the Machinations of a few whereas if the People had been his Enemy that would not have done it Let no man impugn my opinion with that old saying he that builds upon the People builds upon the sand That is true indeed when a Citizen of private Condition relies upon the people and persuades himself that when the Magistrate or his Adversary goes about to oppress him they will bring him off in which case many presidents may be produced and particularly the Gracchi in Rome and Georgio Scali in Florence But if the Prince that builds upon them knows how to command and be a man of Courage not dejected in adversity nor deficient in his other preparations but keeps up the spirits of his people by his own Valour and Conduct he shall never be deserted by them nor find his foundations laid in a wrong place These kind of Governments are most tottering and uncertain when the Prince strains of a sudden and passes as at one leap from a Civil to an absolute power and the reason is because they either command and act by themselves or by the Ministry and Mediation of the Magistrate In this last case their authority is weaker and more ticklish because it depends much upon the pleasure and concurrence of the Chief Officers who in time of adversity especially can remove them easily either by neglecting or resisting their Commands nor is there any way for such a Prince in the perplexity of his affairs to establish a Tyranny because those Citizens and Subjects who used to exercise the Magistracy retain still such power and influence upon the people that they will not infringe the Laws to obey his and in time of danger he shall always want such as he can trust So that a Prince is not to take his measures according to what he sees in times of peace when of the Subjects having nothing to do but to be governed every one runs every one promises and every one dyes for him when death is at a distance but when times are tempestuous and the ship of the State has need of the help and assistance of the Subject there are but few will expose themselves And this experiment is the more dangerous because it can be practised but once So then a Prince who is provident and wise ought to carry himself so that in all place times and occasions the People may have need of his administration and Regiment an ever after they shall be faithful and true CHAP. X. How the strength of all principalities is to be computed TO any man that examines the nature of principalities it is worthy his consideration whether a Prince has power and territory enough to subsist by himself or whether he needs the assistance and protection of other People To clear the point a little better I think those Princes capable of ruling who are able either by the numbers of their men or the greatness of their wealth to raise a compleat Army and bid Battel to any that shall invade them and those I think depend upon others who of themselves dare not meet their Enemy in the field but are forced to keep within their bounds and defend them as well as they can Of the first we have spoken already and shall say more as occasion is presented Of the second no more can be said but to advise such Princes to strengthen and fortifie the Capital Town in their Dominions and not to trouble himself with the whole Country and whoever shall do that and in other things manage himself with the Subjects as I have described and perhaps shall do hereafter shall with great caution be invaded for men are generally wary and tender of enterprizing any thing that is difficult and no great easiness is to be found in attacking a Town well fortified and provided where the Prince is not hated by the People The Towns in Germany are many of them free though their Country and district be but small yet they obey the Emperor but when they please and are in no awe either of him or any other Prince of the Empire because they are all so well fortified every one looks upon the taking of any one of them as a work of great difficulty and time their Wals being so strong their Ditches so deep their works so regular and well provided with Cannon and their stores and Magazines always furnish'd for a Twelvemonth Besides which for the aliment and sustenance of the People and that they may be no burthen to the publick they have work-houses where for a year together the poor may be employed in such things as are the Nerves and life of that City and sustain themselves by their labour Military Discipline and Exercises are likewise much request there and many Laws and good Customs they have to maintain them A Prince then who has a City well fortified and the affections of his people is not easily to be molested and he that does molest him is like to repent it for the affairs of this world are so various it is almost impossible for any Army to lie quietly a whole year before a Town without interruption If any objects that the people having houses and possessions out of the Town will not have patience to see them plundered and burned and that Charity to themselves will make them forget their Prince I answer that a wise and dexterous Prince will easily evade those difficulties by encouraging his Subjects and persuading them sometimes their troubles will not be long sometimes inculcating and possessing them with the cruelty of the Enemy and sometimes by correcting and securing himself nimbly of such as appear too turbulent and audacious Moreover the usual practice is for the Enemy to plunder and set the Country on fire at their first coming whil'st every man's spirits is high and fixed upon defence so that the Prince needs not concern himself nor be fearful of that for those mischiefs are pass'd and inconveniencies received and when the People in three or
the head of his Army and has a multitude of Soldiers to govern then it is absolutely necessary not to value the Epithet of cruel for without that no Army can be kept in unity nor in disposition for any great act Among the several instances of Hannibal's great Conduct it is one That having a vast Army constituted out of several Nations and conducted to make War in an Enemies Country there never hapned any Sedition among them or any Mutiny against their General either in his adversity or prosperity Which can proceed from nothing so probably as his great cruelty which added to his infinite Virtues rendered him both aweful and terrible to his Soldiers and without that all his Virtues would have signified nothing Some Writers there are but of little consideration who admire his great Exploits and condemn the true causes of them But to prove that his other Virtues would never have carried him thorow let us reflect upon Scipio a person Honorable not only in his own time but in all History whatever nevertheless his Army mutined in Spain and the true cause of it was his too much gentleness and lenity which gave his Soldiers more liberty than was sutable or consistant with Military Discipline Fabius Maximus upbraided him by it in the Senate and call'd him Corrupter of the Roman Militia The inhabitants of Locrus having been plundered and destroyed by one of Scipio's Lieutenants they were never redressed nor the Legat's insolence corrected all proceeding from the mildness of Scipio's Nature which was so eminent in him that a person undertaking to excuse him in the Senate declared that there were many who knew better how to avoid doing ill themselves than to punish it in other people Which temper would doubtless in time have eclipsed the glory and reputation of Scipio had that authority been continued in him but receiving Orders and living under the direction of the Senate that ill quality was not only not discovered in him but turned to his renown I conclude therefore according to what I have said about being feared or beloved That forasmuch as men do love at their own discretion but fear at their Princes a wise Prince is obliged to lay his foundation upon that which is in his own power not what which depends on other people but as I said before with great caution that he does not make himself odious CHAP. XVIII How far a Prince is obliged by his promise HOw Honorable it is for a Prince to keep his word and act rather with integrity than collusion I suppose every body understands Nevertheless Experience has shown in out times That those Princes who have not pinn'd themselves up to that punctuality and preciseness have done great things and by their cunning and subtilty not only circumvented and darted the brains of those with whom they had to deal but have overcome and been too hard for those who have been so superstitiously exact For further explanation you must understand there are two ways of contending by Law and by force The first is proper to Men the second to Beasts but because many times the first is insufficient recourse must be had to the second It belongs therefore to a Prince to understand both when to make use of the rational and when of the brutal way and this is recommended to Princes though abstrusely by ancient Writers who tell them how Achilles and several other Princes were committed to the Education of Chiron the Centaur who was to keep them under his Discipline choosing them a Master half Man and half Beast for no other reason but to show how necessary it is for a Prince to be acquainted with both for that one without the other will be of little duration Seeing therefore it is of such importance to a Prince to take upon him the Nature and disposition of a Beast of all the whole flock he ought to imitate the Lyon and the Fox for the Lyon is in danger of toils and snares and the Fox of the Wolf So that he must be a Fox to find out the snares and a Lyon to fright away the Wolves but they who keep wholly to the Lyon have no true notion of themselves A Prince therefore that is wise and prudent cannot nor ought not to keep his pâ—â—ole when the keeping of it is to his prejudice and the causes for which he promised removed Were men all good this Doctrine was not to be taught but because they are wicked and not likely to be punctual with you you are not obliged to any such strictness with them Nor was their ever any Prince that wanted lawful pretence to justifie his breach of promise I might instance in many modern Examples and shew how many Confederations and Peaces and Promises have been broken by the infidelity of Princes and how he that best personated the Fox had the better success Nevertheless it is of great consequence to disguise your inclination and to play the Hypocrite well and men are so simple in their temper and so submissive to their present necessities that he that is neat and cleanly in his collusions shall never want people to practise them upon I cannot forbear one Example which is still fresh in our memory Alexander VI. never did nor thought of any thing but cheating and never wanted matter to work upon though no man promised a thing with greater asseveration nor confirmed it with more oaths and imprecations and observ'd them less yet understanding the world well he never miscarried A Prince therefore is not obliged to have all the forementioned good qualities in reality but it is necessary he have them in appearance nay I will be bold to affirm that having them actually and employing them upon all occasions they are extreamly prejudicial whereas having then only in appearance they turn to better accompt it is honorable to seem mild and merciful and courteous and religious and sincere and indeed to be so provided your mind be so rectified and prepared that you can act quite contrary upon occasion And this must be premised that a Prince especially if come but lately to the throne cannot observe all those things exactly which make men be esteemed virtuous being oftentimes necessitated for the preservation of his State to do things in humane uncharitable and irreligious and therefore it is convenient his mind be at his command and flexible to all the puffs and variations of his fortune Not forbearing to be good whil'st it is in his choice but knowing how to be evil when there is a necessity A Prince then is to have particular care that nothing falls from his mouth but what is full of the five qualities aforesaid and that to see and to hear him he appears all goodness integrity humanity and religion which last he ought to pretend to more than ordinarily because more men do judge by the eye then by the touch for every body sees but few understand every body sees how you appear
The one was in Asia where Niger General of the Asiatick Army had proclaimed himself Emperor The other in the west where Albinus the General aspired to the same and thinking it hazardous to declare against both he resolved to oppose himself against Niger and cajole and wheedle Albinus to whom he writ word That being chosen Emperor by the Senate he was willing to receive him to a participation of that dignity gave him the title of Caesar and by consent of the Senate admitted him his Collegue which Albinus embraced very willingly and thought him in earnest but when Severus had overcome Niger put him to death and setled the affairs of the East being returned to Rome he complained in the Senate against Albinus as a person who contrary to his obligations for the benefits received from him had endeavoured treacherously to murther him told them that he was obliged to march against him to punish his ingratitude and afterwards following him into France he executed his design deprived him of his Command and put him to death He then who strictly examines the Actions of this Prince will find him fierce as a Lyon subtile as a Fox feared and reverenced by every body and no way odious to his Army Nor will it seem strange that he though newly advanced to the Empire was able to defend it seeing his great reputation protected him against the hatred which his people might have conceived against him by reason of his Rapine But his Son Antoninus was an excellent person likewise endued with transcendant parts which rendered him admirable to the people and grateful to the Soldiers for he was Martial in his Nature patient of labour and hardship and a great despiser of all sensuality and softness which recommended him highly to his Armies Nevertheless his fury and cruelty was so immoderately great having upon several private and particular occasions put a great part of the people of Rome and all the inhabitants of Alexandria to death that he fell into the hatred of the whole world and began to be feared by his Confidents that were about him so that he was killed by one of his Captains in the middle of his Camp From whence it may be observed That these kind of Assassinations which follow upon a deliberate and obstinate resolution cannot be prevented by a Prince for he who values not his own life can commit them when he pleases but they are to be feared the less because they happen but seldom he is only to have a care of doing any great injury to those that are about him of which error Antoninus was too guilty having put the Brother of the said Captain to an ignominious death threatned the Captain daily and yet continued him in his Guards which was a rash and pernicious act and prov'd so in the end But to come to Commodus who had no hard task to preserve his Empire succeeding to it by way of inheritance as Son to Marcus for that to satisfie the people and oblige the Soldiers he had no more to do but to follow the footsteps of his Father But being of a brutish and cruel disposition to exercise his rapacity upon the people he indulged his Army and allowed them in all manner of licentiousness Besides prostituting his Dignity by descending many times upon the Theater to fight with the Gladiators and committing many other acts which were vile and unworthy the Majesty of an Emperor he became contemptible to the Souldiers and growing odious to one party and despicable to the other they conspired and murthered him Maximinus was likewise a Martial Prince and addicted to the Wars and the Army being weary of the Effeminacy of Alexander whom I have mentioned before having slain him they made Maximinus Emperor but he possessed it not long for two things contributed to make him odious and despised One was the meanness of his extraction having kept sheep formerly in Thrace which was known to all the world and made him universally contemptable The other was that at his first coming to the Empire by not repairing immediately to Rome and putting himself into possession of his Imperial seat he had contracted the imputation of being cruel having exercised more than ordinary severity by his Prefects in Rome and his Lieutenants in all the rest of the Empire so that the whole world being provoked by the vileness of his birth and detestation of his cruelty in apprehension of his fury Africa the Senate and all the people both in Italy and Rome conspired against him and his own Army joyning themselves with them in their Leaguer before Aquileia finding it difficult to be taken weary of his cruelties and encouraged by the multitude of his Enemies they set upon him and slew him I will not trouble my self with Heliogabalus Macrinus nor Iulian who being all effeminate and contemptible were quickly extinguished But I shall conclude this discourse and say that the Princes of our times are not obliged to satisfie the Soldiers in their respective Governments by such extraordinary ways for though they are not altogether to be neglected yet the remedy and resolution is easie because none of these Princes have entire Armies brought up and inveterated in their several Governments and Provinces as the Armies under the Roman Empire were If therefore at that time it was necessary to satisfie the Soldiers rather than the people it was because the Soldiers were more potent At present it is more the interest of all Princes except the great Turk and the Soldan to comply with the people because they are more considerable than the Soldiers I except the Turk because he has in his Guards 12000 Foot and 15000 Horse constantly about him upon whom the strength and security of his Empire depends and it is necessary postponing all other respect to the people they be continued his freinds It is the same case with the Soldan who being wholly in the power of the Soldiers it is convenient that he also wave the people and insinuate with the Army And here it is to be noted that this Government of the Soldans is different from all other Monarchies for it is not unlike the Papacy in Christendom which can neither be called a new nor an hereditary Principality because the Children of the deceased Prince are neither Heirs to his Estate nor Lords of his Empire but he who is chosen to succeed by those who have the faculty of Election which Custom being of old the Government cannot be called new and by consequence is not subject to any of the difficulties wherewith a new one is infested because though the person of the Prince be new and perhaps the Title yet the Laws and Orders of State are old and disposed to receive him as if he were hereditary Lord. But to return to our business I say That whoever considers the aforesaid discourse shall find either hatred or contempt the perpetual cause of the ruine of those Emperors and be able to judge how it
his Troops to joyn with Bastiano at one Gate he with the rest advanced the common Road towards Iacopo At both Gates they were admitted as Friends but no sooner were they entered but upon a signal given Bastiano was killed on one side with all his chief friends and Iacopo and his friends scaped no better on the other the rest of their parties betaking to their heels the whole Town was left at Castruccio's devotion He came in person to reassure the Magistrates and brought them out of the Palace whither they had fled to secure themselves Having called the people together the promised to cancel all the old debts did many acts of Grace lessened their imposts and prevailed upon them to be obedient by the force of his caresses and new priviledges which he gave them This profuseness of kindness had coax'd likewise the Inhabitants of the Country they came in great throngs to salute and recognize their new Prince who sent them all home again in peace all mightily taken with his Virtues and possessed with hopes of his extraordinary benefits There was about this time some Mutinies in Rome by reason of the dearness of provisions The scarcity that was suffered proceeded from the absence of the Popes who kept then their Pontifical residence at Avignon and it added much to the revolt that the Romans could not endure to be governed by a German This National animosity was the occasion of frequent Murthers and perpetual disorder Errico the Emperor's Lieutenant General found himself too weak to apply any remedy and apprehended not without cause that the Romans had private intelligence with the King of Naples that if their Forces should joyn he should be forced out of Rome and the Pope be restored He concluded therefore his safest recourse would be to Castruccio so that he sent to him for supplies and begg'd of him that he would come along with them in person Castruccio made no scruple of the Voyage being equally transported to be able to do a meritorious piece of service to the Emperor and put himself in a condition to be regarded at Rome and look'd upon as the Moderator of their affairs whenever the Emperor should be absent Leaving therefore the care of Lucca to the charge of Pagolo Guinigi and contenting himself only with a Convoy of two hundred Horse he came to Rome and was received by Errico with all possible honour His presence having received the Authority of the Emperor he took a gentle way to pacifie the people The first thing he did was to provide plenty of all things causing store of Corn to be brought thither from Pisa to take off the pretence of their revolt After which mingling very discreetly his favours and his chastisements he reduced all the chief Citizens to their obedience to Errico In acknowledgment of which Castruccio was made Senator of Rome and several Honours conferred upon him with more than ordinary Ceremony The day of his promotion he came forth in a Habit sutable to his Dignity but enriched with a delicate Embroidery with two devices wrought in artificially one before and the other behind The first was before and in these words as devout as common HE IS AS IT PLEASES GOD and behind in these AND SHALL BE WHAT GOD WILL HAVE HIM Whilst these things were in Transaction the Florentines incensed that to the prejudice of their Truce Castruccio had surprised the Town of Pistoia resolved to recover it by force and thought it not likely to be difficult if they took the opportunity of his absence Among the Fugitives from Pistoia who had saved themselves in Florence there were two principally considerable Cecchi and Baldini They were Men in Action and had always retain'd a private correspondence with their Friends in Pistoia and they managed all things so dexterously for a revolt that they caused a good party of Florentines to enter one night into the Town who restored them their liberty with the destruction of all Castruccio's party This news being brought to Rome touched Castruccio to the quick who taking leave of Errico with large Journeys came directly to Lucca The Florentines had notice of his return and resolved stoutly to begin the War upon him that he might not have leisure to prepare wherefore having obliged all that like themselves were favourers of the Guelfish Faction to put themselves forward in some extraordinary manner they raised a strong Army and marched with all diligence to possess themselves first of the Valley of Nievole to facilitate their Communication with Pistoia Castruccio on his side with what Forces he could get together marched directly for Monte-Carlo and having intelligence where the Enemy was encamped and how numerous their Army he judged the danger would be as great should he go and confront them in the plain of Pistoia as to attend them in the Valley of Pescia He concluded therefore to draw them if he could into the streights of Seravalle for narrow passes and rough and difficult ways were convenient for a small Army as his was which consisted of not above 12000 Men and would be a disadvantage to the Florentines who were 40000 compleat Wherefore though he was well enough satisfied of the Courage of his Army and understood the worth of every common Soldier yet he thought good to withdraw out of that Champagn Country lest he should suffer himself to be overwhelmed with the multitudes of his Enemies Seravalle is a Castle betwixt Pescia and Pistoia situate upon a hill which on that side puts a stop to the Valley of Nievole This Castle stands not upon the Road but is about two flight shot higher and the passage down into the Valley is rather strait than sleep for the declension is very gradual to the place where the waters divide and pass to discharge themselves into the Lake of Tucechio and that passage is so streight that twenty Men in Front take up the whole breadth There it was that Castruccio designed to engage the Enemy as well to give the advantage of the streight to the smallness of his own Army as to keep them from being sensible of the vast numbers of the Florentines and prevent the terror which they might inspire The Castle of Seravalle belong'd to the Signor Manfredi a German who had made himself Lord of it long before Castruccio had seized upon Pistoia and kept it by common consent both of the Inhabitants of Pistoia and Lucca Either because he kept his Neutrality very strictly with both or because the Castle was so strong of it self it needed to fear neither Castruccio knowing the importance of that place from the beginning found a way to gain intelligence with a person who lived in the Castle The night before the day of the Battel by the ministry of this Man Castruccio caused Four hundred of his Soldiers to enter who cut the Throat of Manfredi and seized on the Castle Having secured so considerable a Post without noise he endeavoured to persuade the Enemy
that he would not stir from Monte-Carlo thereby to draw them into his Clutches and make them hast with all speed to gain the avenues to the Val de Nievole and this plot of his jump'd exactly with the Florentine design For they having no mind that Pistoia should be the Theatre of the War and being willing to remove it into the Vale they encamped above Seravalle with intention to have passed the Streights the next day not imagining in the least that the Castle was surprized Castruccio having notice of their motion about midnight drew his Army out of their quarters and stole privately before break of day to the foot of Seravalle The accident was odd for as he marched up the Hill on one side the Enemy marched up on the other caused his Foot to advance by the way of the common Road but he drew out a party of Four hundred Horse and commanded them towards the left on that side towards the Castle There were Four hundred of the Enemies Horse that were a Forlorn to their Army and the whole Infantry followed them but their Scouts were no sooner upon the top of the Hill when on a sudden they fell foul upon the Troops of Castruccio They were strangely surprized for knowing nothing of the taking of the Castle they could not imagine the Enemy would come to meet them Insomuch that before they had leisure to put themselves into a posture they were constrained to engage tumultuosly with those Troops which were drawn up in good Order but they in confusion Not but some of the Florentine Cavaliers behaved themselves gallantly but the noise of so unexpected an Encounter put them presently to a stand and being defused in the Army it put all into great disorder and fear The Horse and the Foot fell foul upon one another and both upon the baggage Want of ground rendered the Experience of the Officers of no use and the streightness of the pass confounded all their Military cunning The first Troops that Castruccio charged upon the top of the Hill were immediately routed and the small resistance they made was not so much the defect of their courage as the effect of the place with the incommodity of which and the strangeness of the surprize they were constrained to give ground There was no way left for them to run on their Flanks the Mountains were inaccessable their Enemies were in the Front and their own Army in the reer In the mean time as this first charge of Castruccio was not sufficient to stagger the enemies Battel he drew out a party of Foot and sent them to joyn with the Horse in the Castle of Seravalle this body in reserve having possession of the Hills and falling upon the flank of the Florentines forced them to give ground and yield to the wild incommodity of the place and the violence and fierceness of the enemy The Reer-guard ran and having got into the plain that looks towards Pistoia every man shifted as well as he could This defeat was bloody and great among the multitude of prisoners there were many of the principal Officers among the rest three Noble Florentines Bandino di Rossi Francesco Brunilleschi and Giovanni della Tosa without mentioning several considerable Tuscans and many of the King of Naples his Subjects who by their Princes order were in the service of the Florentine Upon the first tidings of their defeat the Pistoians turned the Guelfs Faction out of Town and came with their keys and presented them to Castruccio who pursuing his Victory carried Prato and all the Town in that plain as well beyond as on this side the Arno after which he encamped with his Army in the plain of Peretola two miles from Florence where he continued braving the City and passed several days in the enjoyment of his good fortune parting the spoil and coining of mony thereby exercising with great ostentation a kind of Soveraign right over their Territory and releasing something of the rigour of his discipline he gave his Soldiers liberty to insult as they pleased over the conquered and to make his triumph the more remarkable nothing could serve the turn but naked women must run Courses on horse-back under the very walls of the City But this gallantry and ostentation entertained him but lightly or rather served but as a colour to hide his greater designs for in the mean time he found a way to corrupt Lupacci Frescobaldi and some certain other Gentlemen in the Town who were to have delivered him a Gate and brought him into Florence in the night had not their Conspiracy been discovered and defeated afterward by the punishment of the accomplices This great Town being so streightned and so long block'd up that the Inhabitants seeing no other way of preserving their liberty than by engagiâ—g it to the King of Naples sent Embassadors to that Prince and offered to throw themselves into his arms It was not only for his honour to accept of their proffer but for the general interest of the whole Faction of the Guelfs which without that could subsist no longer in Tuscany The terms being agreed the treaty concluded and the Florentines to pay him annually two hundred thousand Florens he sent them four thousand Horse under the Command of Prince Carlo his Son During this negotiation an unexpected accident hapned which put Castruccio into a cooler temper and made him give the Florentines breath in spight of his teeth there was a new Conspiracy against him at Pisa not to be suppressed by his presence Benedetto Lanfranchi one of the chief Citizens in the Town was the author of it Benedetto troubled to see his Country subject to the tyranny of a Lucchese undertook to surprize the Citadel force out the Garison and cut the throats of all that were friends to Castruccio But as in those kind of conjurations if a small number be able to keep things secret it is not sufficient to put them in execution and therefore whilst Lanfranchi was endeavouring to hook in more associates he met with those who were false and discovered all to Castruccio Two Noble Florentines Cecchi and Guidi who were fled to Pisa were suspected to be the Traitors and the suspicion of that perfidy left an ill stain upon their reputation which way soever it was Castruccio put Lanfranchi to death banished his whole Family and several of the chief Pisans were left shorter by the head This plot discovering to Castruccio that the fidelity of the Towns of Pistoia and Pisa would be always easily shaken he put all things in practice that cunning or open force could suggest to keep them in their duties but whilst his thoughts were upon the tenters about so important a care the Florentines had some respite to recover their Senses and expect the Neapolitan Succours which being at length arrived under the Conduct of Prince Carlo a general Counsel was held of the whole Faction of the Guelfs Upon the resolution taken there an Army was
raised the strongest that ever had been set out by that party for it amounted to 30000 Foot and 10000 Horse When their Forces were ready it was debated in the Counsel of War whether they should begin with the Siege of Pistoia or Pisa. The latter carried it for it was fancied the Conspiracy of the Pisans was so recent that in probability it had left some seeds for a second revolt besides the Conquest of Pisa would bring Pistoia along with it This great Army opened their Campagn in the beginning of May 1328. Lastra Signia Monte Lugo and Empoli were taken immediately and it advanced afterwards to besige San-Miniato But Castruccio without discomposure either by the greatness of their force or the swiftness of their progress believed rather that the favourable instant was arrived in which fortune was to put into his hands the supreme authority of Tuscany and therefore judging this effort of the enemy at Pisa would succeed no better than their designs at Seravalle he came and entrenched at Fucechio with 20000 Foot and 4000 Horse having put 5000 Foot into Pisa under the Command of Pagolo Guinigi Fucechio is a Castle seated so advantagiously that there is not a better Post in all the plain of Pisa for it stands upon a little eminence equally distant from the two Rivers Arno and Gusciana The place of their encampment could have been no where better chosen for unless the enemy divided and came upon them in two Bodies which must needs weaken them much they could not cut off the provisions which came to Castruccio both from Lucca and Pisa. To come and face them in their trenches would be rashly to engage themselves betwixt his Army and Pagolo's To turn towards Pisa they must pass the River Arno and leave the enemy upon their backs which was an attempt as dangerous as the other Castruccio's design was to make them pitch upon the last and to invite them the better to pass over the River instead of bringing down his Line to the bank as he might very well have done he turned it off short towards the walls of Fucechio not so much to shelter himself under the said walls but cunningly to leave the enemy such a space free as might tempt them to pass the River And in the whole art of War there is nothing so subtil as the election of Posts and Encampments and that was Castruccio's master-piece The enemy having taken San. Miniato consulted for some time whether they should fall upon Pisa or Castruccio in his Camp at length all things well considered it was concluded to march straight toward him The River Arno was at that time so low it was fordable but with trouble for the Horse pass'd up to the saddle and the Foot with proportion At last on the 10th of Iune in the morning the Florentines put themselves into Battalia and began to pass the River with a party of their Horse and a body of 10000 Foot Castruccio having deliberated all things and provided for more than one Event commanded a thousand Foot along the River above the passage where the enemy appeared and sent a thousand more to post themselves below it and then advancing himself at the head of five thousand Foot and three thousand Horse he came on couragiously against the enemy as half of them were passed The Florentine Foot tired with the incommodity of their passage and the weight of their Arms advanced but faintly against him and for their Horse they that passed first had made the bottom so loose and so slipperry that there was no passage for those who were to follow on the contrary their Horses either stuck fast in the mud or their legs came up and they threw their Riders into the water where many of them were drowned So that the Florentines perceiving their attempt there was not like to succeed recovered the bank and marching a little higher they searched for a better place but where-ever they made their point and endeavoured to go over Castruccio opposed them with the Infantry he had drawn out which being arm'd lightly with Targets and Darts were every where immediately charged the enemy both in the Front and the Flank and setting up at the same time most hideous shouts the Florentine Horse being frighted with noise and wounded with Darts either run back or threw their Riders under their feet As to the Florentines who had passed first they maintained their ground with a great deal of Gallantry and till then the loss was equal on both sides for if Castruccio doubled his endeavours to force back the enemy into the River the enemy was no less zealous to gain as much ground as might serve for drawing up their Army when it should get over Both Generals were very busie in the encouragement of their Souldiers both with exhortation and example Castruccio to vilifie the enemy remonstrated to his Army that they were the same people they had beat before at Seravalle the Florentines represented to their Troops how infamous it would be for so numerous an Army as theirs to be worsted by a handful of men But Castruccio observing the Battel grew tedious and his own men began to be as weary as the enemy and that there were as many wounded and dead on the one side as the other he caused another Body of five thousand Foot to advance as soon as they were got up to reer of their companions those who had been fighting all the while and were then in the front were commanded to open to the right and left and wheel off into the reer whilst the other advanced into the ground they had forsaken but whilst this was in agitation the Florentines gained something upon them but they enjoyed it not long for being to deal with fresh men they were quickly disordered and followed with that vigour they threw themselves into the River As to the Horse both of the one side and the other no advantage was to be observed Castruccio being sensible that in number his was much inferior to the enemy had commanded his Troops to entertain their Horse with slight skirmishing only to gain time for believing his Foot able to beat the enemies he intended afterwards to joyn them with his Horse and fall both together upon the Cavalry of the Florentines The Florentines tried another passage above the first thinking thereby to have flanck'd Castruccio afterwards but the bank on the other side being bad and defended by the enemies Foot they were repulsed again and in as great disorder as before Then Castruccio came up to them and charged them so smartly in all parts that they were totally defeated so that of so vast an Army scarce a third part were saved and several of their chief Officers taken Prince Carlo saved himself at Empoli with Michael Falconi and Thadeo Albizi Commissaries General of the Florentine Army one may easily imagine the plunder was great and the slaughter no less In short according to the exactest computation
his design to Eight of his principal intimates amongst whom Don Michael and Monsignor d' Euna were two and appointed that when Vitellozzo Pagolo Ursini the Duke de Gravina and Oliverotto should come to meet him two of his Favourites should be sure to order it so as to get one of the Ursini betwixt them assigning every couple his man and entertain them till they came to Sinigaglia with express injunction not to part with them upon any terms till they were brought to the Dukes Lodgings and taken into Custody After this he ordered his whole Army Horse and Foot which consisted of 2000 of the first and 10000 of the latter to be ready drawn up upon the banks of the Metauro about five miles distant from Fano and to expect his arrival Being come up to them upon the Metauro he commanded out two hundred Horse as a Forlorn and then causing the Foot to march he brought up the Reer himself with the remainder Fano and Sinigaglia are two Cities in la Marca seated upon the bank of the Adriatick Sea distant one from the other about 15 miles so that travelling up towards Sinigaglia the bottom of the Mountains on the right hand are so near the Sea they are almost wash'd by the water at the greatest distance they are not above two miles The City of Sinigaglia from these Mountains is not above a flight shot and the Tide comes up within less than a Mile By the side of this Town there is a little River which runs close by the wall next Fano and is in sight of the Road So that he who comes to Sinigaglia passes a long way under the Mountains and being come to the River which runs by Sinigaglia turns on the left hand upon the bank which within a bow shot brings him to a Bridge over the said River almost right against the Gate before the Gate there is a little Bourg with a Market-place one side of which is shouldred up by the bank of the River The Vitelli and Ursini having concluded to attend the Duke themselves and to pay their personal respects to make room for his Men had drawn off their own and disposed them into certain Castles at the distance of six miles only they had left in Sinigaglia Oliveretto with a party of about 1000 Foot and 150 Horse which were quartered in the said Bourg Things being in this order Duke Valentine approached but when his Horse in the Van came up to the Bridge they did not pass but opening to the right and left and wheeling away they made room for the Foot who marched immediately into the Town Vitellozzo Pagolo and the Duke de Gravina advanced upon their Mules to wait upon Duke Valentine Vitellozzo was unarm'd in a Cap lin'd with green very sad and melancholy as if he had had some foresight of his destiny which considering his former courage and exploits was admired by every body And it is said that when he came from his house in order to meeting Duke Valentine at Sinigaglia he took his last leave very solemnly of every body He recommended his Family and its fortunes to the chief of his Officers and admonished his Grand-children not so much to commemorate the fortune as the magnanimity of their Ancestors These three Princes being arrived in the presence of Duke Valentine saluted him with great civility and were as civilly received and each of them as soon as they were well observed by the persons appointed to secure them were singled and disposed betwixt two of them But the Duke perceiving that Oliveretto was wanting who was left behind with his Regiment and had drawn it up in the Market-place for the greater formality he wink'd upon Don Michael to whom the care of Oliveretto was assign'd that he should be sure to provide he might not escape Upon this intimation Don Michael clap'd spurs to his Horse and rid before and being come up to Oliveretto he told him it was inconvenient to keep his Men to their Arms for unless they were sent presently to their quarters they would be taken up for the Dukes wherefore he persuaded him to dismiss them and go with him to the Duke Oliveretto following his Counsel went along with him to the Duke who no sooner saw him but he call'd him to him and Oliveretto having paid his Ceremony fell in with the rest Being come into the Town and come up to the Duke's Quarters they all dismounted and attended him up where being carried by him into a private Chamber they were instantly Arrested and made Prisoners The Duke immediately mounted and commanded their Soldiers should be all of them disarmed Oliveretto's Regiment being so near at hand were plundered into the bargain The Brigades which belong'd to Vitelli and Ursini being at greater distance and having notice of what had hapned to their Generals had time to unite and remembring the Discipline and Courage of their Masters they kept close together and marched away in spight both of the Country people and their Enemies But Duke Valentine's Soldiers not content with the pillage of Oliveretto's Soldiers fell foul upon the Town and had not the Duke by the death of several of them repressed their insolence Sinigaglia had been ruined The night coming on and the tumults appeased the Duke began to think of his Prisoners resolved Vitellozzo and Oliveretto should die and having caused them to be guarded into a convenient place he commanded they should be strangled but they said nothing at their deaths that was answerable to their lives for Vitellozzo begged only that the Pope might be supplicated in his behalf for a plenary indulgence Oliveretto impeached Vitellozzo and lay'd all upon his back Pagolo and the Duke de Gravina were continued alive till the Duke had information that his Holiness at Rome had seized upon the Cardinal Orsino the Arch-bishop of Florence and Messer Iacopo da Santa Croce upon which News on the 18th of Ianuary they also were both strangled in the Castle of Piene after the same manner THE STATE OF FRANCE IN An Abridgment written by Nicolo Machiavelli Secretary of FLORENCE THE Kings and Kingdom of France are at this time more rich and more powerful than ever and for these following Reasons First The Crown passing by succession of Blood is become rich because in case where the King has no Sons to succeed him in his paternal Estate it falls all to the Crown and this having many times hapned has been a great corroboration as particularly in the Dutchy of Anjou and at present the same is like to fall out to this King who having no Sons the Dutchy of Orleans and State of Milan his hereditary Countries are like to devolve upon the Crown So that at this day most of the good Towns in France are in the Crown and few remaining to particular persons A second great Reason of the strength of that King is That whereas heretofore France was not entire but subject to
them their friends confirm'd the ill opinion which they had of their adversaries before Several examples might be produced to this purpose but I shall only instance in one The Florentine Army was encamped before Lucca under the Command of Giovanni Guiccardini their Commissary By his ill fortune or conduct the Town was not taken which of the two soever it was Giovanni was aspersed as having been brib'd by the Luccheses which calumny being propagated by his enemies netled Giovanni and almost brought him to despair and though in order to his justification he offered to put himself into the hands of the Captain yet all was to no purpose for in that Commonwealth there was no body qualified to clear him from hence arose great contentions betwixt Guiccardin's friends who were the greatest part of the Grandees in that City and those who studied novelty which contentions and others of the like nature encreasing daily upon their hands brought that poor Commonwealth into a most deplorable condition Manlius therefore spreading these false reports of the Senators about Rome was a calumniator not an accuser and the Romans in his case gave manifest instruction how such people are to be punished that is that they be obliged publickly to accuse and when their charge is made good that they be rewarded or encouraged but when it cannot be proved that they be punished like Manlius CHAP. IX How much a single person is necessary for the establishment of a new common-wealth or the reformation of an old IT may seem to some that I have run too far into the Roman History having made no mention of the Founders of that Commonwealth nor of the Orders which they observed either in matters of Religion or War To ease them therefore of their suspence who are desirous to hear something to that purpose I say that many perhaps may think it of ill example for the Founder of a State as Romulus was to kill his own Brother and afterwards consent to the death of Titus Tatius Sabinus who was chosen his companion in the Government supposing that according to that president any of his Citizens that were ambitious of Command might make away their adversaries or competitors and remove any obstucle that opposed them and it were reasonable enough were it not to be considered to what end and upon what motives that murder was committed This is to be taken for a maxim and general rule that it is impossible for any Government either to be well founded at first or will reformed afterwards unless by a single person by whose direction all Orders all Laws are to be made and promulged He therefore who is the founder of a Common-wealth if he be an honest man and aims not at his own interest and the raising of his Family more than the advancement of his Country must endeavour to get the power into his single hands nor will any wise man ever accuse him for any action extraordinary that he shall do in order thereunto or if the fact be to be blamed the effect will excuse it especially if be good as it was in Romulus his case for it is destructive and pernicious violence that is to be reprehended not that which tends to settlement and reformation He is also to be so prudent and vertuous as not to leave the authority which he assumed in inheritance to another because men being more prone to evil than good his success or may employ that power to the prejudice of the State which he in his wisdom made use of to its benefit and advantage Moreover though one be fittest to make Laws yet when once made they cannot hold long if left upon the shoulders of a single person but when the care and execution of them is transfer'd upon many and many are concerned to maintain them it is much better for though many be not so proper in laying the foundations of a Government because their diversity of opinions keeps them from discerning what is absolutely for its good yet when things are once setled and they have found it that very diversity will be a means to preserve it And that Romulus was excusable for what he did to his Brother and Companion and that what he did was more for the common good than his own private ambition or revenge appears by this that he had no sooner made them away but he constituted a Senate by whose advice he acted in every thing reserving to himself only the power of calling them together and commanding the Armies when they should resolve of a War and of this we cannot have better evidence than that which followed after the expulsion of the Tarquins there being nothing innovated or altered by the Romans only in stead of one perpetual King they created two annual Consuls which shews that Romulus in his first Institutions aimed rather at the election of a civil and a free than an absolute and tyrannical State Many more examples might be produced to fortifie what is said as those of Moses Lycurgus Solon and other Founders of Kingdoms and Commonwealths who by assuming a Monarchical authority were able to frame and impose such Laws as were for the benefit of the publick but being so well known it would be superfluous I shall add only one not so famous perhaps yet worthy to be considered by those who are desirous to be good Legislators and it is this Agls King of Sparta observing his Citizens had lost much of their ancient virtue and by consequence were decayed both in their power and Empire imputing it in part to their deviation from the Laws of Lycurgus desired very earnestly to reduce them again but before he could bring it to perfection he was slain by the Spartan Ephori as one who designed to make himself absolute but Cleomenes succeeding him in the Government having the same inclination and perceiving by some Records and Writings which Agis had left behind what was his intention he found that he could not do his Country that service any way but by making himself absolute for by the ambition of some persons he found that he could not do the good which he designed to the generality by reason of the malevolence of a few wherefore he caused the Ephori and who-ever else he thought likely to obstruct him to be killed and revived the Laws of Lycurgus which noble act might have recovered that State and have made Cleomenes as venerable as Lycurgus himself had it not been for the power of Macedon and the weakness of other Commonwealths for not long after that reformation being invaded by the Macedonians it proved unable to defend it self and having no body to sustain it was overcome and that just and honourable design was unhappily laid aside Considering therefore what has been said I conclude that a single person is best for the institution or regulating of any sort of Government and that for the death of Remus and Tatius Romulus was not to be blamed CHAP. X. As they are
to be praised who lay the foundations of any Republick or Kingdom so they are to be condemn'd who set up a Tyranny AMong all Excellent and Illustrious men they are most praise worthy who have been the chief establishers of Religion and Divine Worship In the second place are they who have laid the foundations of any Kingdom or Commonwealth In the third those who having the Command of great Armies have enlarged their own or the Dominion of their Country In the next Learned Men of all Sciences according to their several studies and degrees and last of all as being infinitely the greatest number come the Artificers and Mechanicks all to be commended as they are ingenious or skilful in their Professions On the other side they are infamous and detestable who are contemners of Religion subverters of Governments Enemies of Virtue of Learning of Art and in short of every thing that is useful and honourable to mankind and of this sort are the prophane the seditious the ignorant the idle the debauched and the vile And although Nature has so ordered it that their is neither wise man nor fool nor good man nor bad who if it were proposed to him which he would choose of these two sorts of people would not prefer that which was to be preferred and condemn the other yet the generality of Mankind deluded by a false impression of good and a vain notion of glory leaving those ways which are excellent and commendable either wilfully or ignorantly wander into those paths which will lead them to dishonour and whereas to their immortal honour they might establish a Commonwealth or Kingdom as they please they run head-long into a Tyranny not considering what fame what glory what affection what security what quiet and satisfaction of mind they part with nor what reproach scandal hatred danger and disquiet they incur It is impossible but all people whether of private condition in the Commonwealth or such as by their Fortune or Virtue have arrived to be Princes if they have any knowledge in History and the passages of old would rather choose if private persons to be Scipio's than Caesar's and if Princes to be Agesilaus Timolion and Dion than Nabis Phalaris or Dionysius because they must find the one highly celebrated and admired and the other as much abhor'd and condemn'd they must find Timoleon and the rest to have as much interest and authority in their Countries as Dionysius or Phalaris had in theirs and much more security Nor let any man deceive himself with Caesar's reputation finding him so exceedingly eminent in History for those who have cryed him up were either corrupted by his fortune or terrified by his power for whil'st the Empire continued it was never permitted that any man should speak any thing against him and doubtless had Writers had their liberty they could have said as much of him as of Cataline and Caesar is so much the worst of the two by how much it is worse to effect and perpetrate an ill thing than to designe it and this they might judge by what is said of his adversary Brutus for not daring to speak downright of Caesar by reason of his power by kind of reverse they magnified his Enemy After Rome also was grown to be an Empire and the Government in the hands of a single person it may be observed how much more happy and secure those Emperors were who lived like good Princes according to the dictate of the Laws than those who lived otherwise for Titus Nerva Trajanus Adrianus Antoninus and Marcus had no need of Praetorian bands nor multitude of Legions to defend them their own excellent deportment the benevolence of the people and the affection of the Senate saved them that charge It will appear likewise how to Caligula Nero Vitellius and several other Tyrannical Emperors their Eastern and Western Armies were not sufficient to secure them against the Enemies which their irregularity and ill manners had contracted The History of which persons if well considered would enable any Prince to distinguish betwixt the ways of Honour and Infamy of Security and Fear For of XXVI Emperors betwixt Caesar and Maximinus XVI were murdered and but X died in their beds and though some of those who were slain might possibly be good as Pertinax and Galba yet they were murdered by reason of the corruption and ill discipline which their Predecessors had left in the Army and if among those who died naturally there were any Tyrannical as Severus it is to be imputed to his great Courage and Fortune which are two things very seldom Concomitant in one man it is legible likewise in the same History upon what Basis and foundation a Monarchy must be built to make it solid and permanent for all those Emperors who succeeded by hereditary right were ill men except Titus only and those who came in by Election were good as Nerva and the four which succeeded him but when the Empire became wholly Hereditary it ran furiously to destruction Let the times therefore from Nerva to Marcus be displayed before your Prince and let him compare them which went before with those which came after and then make his choice when they would have been born or when he would have been Soveraign He will find when good men were at the Helm the Prince safe in the security of his Subjects Peace and Justice flourishing in the world The Senate in Authority The Magistrates in Esteem Rich men enjoying their Estates Nobility and Virtue Exalted and all things quiet and well No rancour No licentiousness No corruption No ambition to be found the times were golden Every man enjoyed his opinion and defended it as he pleased In a word He will find the world triumphing in felicity The Prince happy in the reverence and affection of the people and the people safe in the generosity of their Prince If then the Reigns of the other Emperors be contemplated they will appear full of commotion discord and sedition assassinations in Peace Cruelty in War Many Princes murther'd many Foreign many domestick embroilments All Italy afflicted and all its Cities destroyed Rome burnt The Capitol by its own Inhabitants demolished The ancient Temples desolate Religious Ceremonies prophaned and the whole Citie full of Adulteries The Sea covered with Exiles and the Rocks with blood Infinite Cruelties and Barbarisâ—â—s committed daily in the City And Nobility Riches Honour and especially Virtue grown to be Capital offences Informers and Calumniators will be found to be rewarded Servants instigated against their Masters Children against their Parents and those few who were so unhappy as to have no Enemies to be destroyed by their Friends Then it will appear what mighty obligations Rome and Italy and the whole world had to Caesar and doubtless if the Prince be endued with the lest spark of humanity or good nature he will detest the imitation of the bad and be inflamed with an ardent propensity to the good All which things
Nevertheless when reason told them their Enterprizes were practicable they went roundly about them though perhaps their Auspices were averse but acted with great nicety and cunning that it might not seem done in defiance of Religion This was practised by Papirius the Consul before his Battel with the Samnites after which they never recovered For being drawn up with his Army against the Samnites with all visible advantage and being willing to fall on he commanded the Pullarii to try their Experiment the Chickens refusing to peck was a great trouble to the chief of the Pullarii who observed the great alacrity of the Soldiers and the great confidence of the General that an occasion therefore of so signal a Victory might not be taken from the Army he return'd answer to the Consul that the Omen was good Papirius put his Men immediately into Battalia and advanced against the Enemy but some of the Pullarii having told it up and down among the Soldiers that the Pullets did not eat it came to the ears of Spurius Papirius Nephew to the Consul who in great hast advertising his Unckle received this answer Spurius be you diligent and observe your Orders to my self and my Army the Auspicia are good if the Pullarius has told me false the misfortune will be to him and that the event night correspond to his Prognostick he commanded the Pullarii to be placed in the front of the Battel His Commands being executed it hapned by accident as they were advancing to the fight the chief of the Pullaru was killed by a dart from one of the Roman Soldiers which being told to the Consul Now said he all will be well the Gods are appeased and the blood of the Author has atton'd for his lye and so by a discreet accommodation of his designs to the Auspices he went on to the Combat his Army taking no notice that he had violated their Religion Had Appius Pulcher been so ingenious in Sicily in the first Punick War it had fared better with him when he came home but being to fight the Carthaginian Army he consulted the Pullarii who informing him that the Pullen would not eat We will see then said he if they will drink and caused them to be thrown into the Sea and coming afterwards to an Engagement his Army was defeated himself condemn'd at his return and Papirius advanced not so much because one had prevailed and the the other was beaten as because one had prudently evaded the Omen and the other rashly defyed it and these Auguries were invented for no other end but that the Soldiers might go to the fight with more confidence and alacrity for their alacrity was observed to contribute much to their success and this practice was so fortunate to the Romans that foreign Governments began to make use of it as I shall show by one Example in the following Chapter CHAP. XV. How the Samnites in the extremity of their affairs as their last refuge had recourse to Religion THe Samnites had long War with the Romans fought several Battels with them and in the last fight in Tuscany were so utterly broken that their Army was destroyed their chief Officers slain and the Tuscans Gauls and Umbri their allies uncapable of giving them any further assistance so that Livy tells us Nec suis nec externis viribus jam stare poterant tamen bello non abstinebant adeo ne infeliciter quidem defensae libertatis taoedebat vinci quam non tent are victoriam Malebant That though they were reduced to such a condition That they could neither support themselves by their own strength nor the supplies of their Friends yet they continued the War so that the unhappiness of their defence could not discourage them but they chose rather to be conquered than not to try for the Victory Hereupon knowing that no Victory is to be expected where the Soldier is diffident and that nothing enhanses them like a Religious opinion as their last effort they concluded by the Ministery of Ovius Paccius their Priest to revive an old Ceremony which they did in this manner Altars being erected and solemn Sacrifice made betwixt the flaming Altar and the bones of the Victims the Officers having first sworn never upon any distress whatsoever to abandon the fight the Soldiers were called over one by one and in the same place before several Centurions with their naked Swords in their hands appointed to that purpose required to swear first that they would not deride any thing that they should either hear or see after which with execrable words and Verses full of horror they caused them to take their Oaths to be ready at the Command of their Generals never to fly and to kill any of their fellows that offer'd to turn his back and if ever they broke them they imprecated a judgment upon themselves and their race Some of them being scrupulous and unwilling to swear were killed upon the place which struck such terror into the rest that none of them refused And that this Ceremony might be performed with more magnificence there being 40000 Men in the field half of them were clothed in white with Plumes of feathers upon their Helmets in which posture they encamped not far from Aquilonia Papirius was sent against them and in his Speech to his Soldiers he had this Expression Non enim Crist as vulnera facere picta at aurata scuta transire Romanum pilum For their feathers made no wounds nor could the paint or glittering of their Shields protect them against the darts of the Romans And to take off the opinion from his Soldiers that the solemnity and Nature of their Oath might make the Enemy desperate he told them That that would be rather a terror than an encouragement to them when they came to consider that by their own folly they had brought themselves in danger of the Gods the Romans and their Comerades In short the Samnites wear beaten the Roman virtue and the memory of their own frequent misfortunes prevailing against all the forc'd courage which either their Oath or their Religion could give them Nevertheless their sence of it was visible seeing they made use of it as their last remedy when they had no other hopes to recover their spirits This might possibly have been better brought in among my forein discourses but depending upon one of the ancientest and most important Ceremonies of the Roman Common-wealth lest I should divide my matter and give too much occasion to look back I thought it not improper to insert it in this place CHAP. XVI A people accustomed to the dominion of a Prince though by accident they may acquire their liberty yet it is with great difficulty if they maintain it IF the Records of ancient History will serve our turn it is manifest by many examples that a people born and bred up in subjection to a Prince cannot without great difficulty preserve its liberty if by any accident it attains
but in the carelesness or defect of the Magistrate of which we have a fresh and memorable example There is scarce any body ignorant that of late years the English invaded France and entertained no Souldiers but their own and yet though England had had no wars of thirty years before and had neither Officer nor Souldier who had ever seen a Battel they ventured to attack a Kingdom where the Officers were excellent the Souldiers very good having been trained up for several years together in the Italian wars This proceeded from the prudence of the Prince and the excellence of that Government in which though in times of peace the exercise of Arms is not intermitted Pelopidas and Epaminondas having relieved Thebes and rescued it from the tyranny of the Spartans finding themselves in the middle of a servile and effeminate people they so ordered it by their virtue and discipline that they brought them to the use of Arms took the field with them against the Spartans and overthrew them From whence that Historian infers that there are Souldiers not only in Lacedemon but where-ever there are men if there be any body to exercise and train them which Tullus performed most exquisitely among the Romans and is most excellently expressed by Virgil in these words Desidesque movebit Tullus in arma viros No soft unactive people Tullus knows But trains up all promiscuously to blows CHAP. XXII What is to be observed from the Combat betwixt the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii BY Articles betwixt Tullus King of Rome and Metius King of Alba it was agreed that whichsoever of the two sides should overcome that King should have the dominion of the other The Curiatii were all killed but one of the Horatii being left Metius and his Albans fell into subjection to the Romans Horatius returning in great triumph into the City and meeting a Sister of his who was married to one of the Curiatii lamenting the loss of her Husband in a great passion he killed her for which inhumanity being brought to his trial he was after many arguments discharged but more upon his Fathers intercession than his own merits In which accident there were three things considerable that we are never to venture our whole fortune upon the success of a Party another is that offences and deserts are not equally rewarded a well-ordered City the third that no compact is well made where the performance is or ought to be suspected For to become servile and in subjection to another City is a thing of such moment and importance that it is not to be believed that any Prince or State whatsoever should be content that their liberty should be exposed to the success or courage of three of their Citizens and this was evident in Metius for though upon the Victory of the Romans he seemed to acquiesce and promised obedience as by Articles was agreed yet in the first Expedition the Romans undertook against the Veientes 't is manifest he would have deceived Tullus as one who repented of the covenants which he had made but because of the third we have spoken largely already in the next two Chapters we shall speak only of the other two CHAP. XXIII That our whole fortune is not to be ventured upon part of our force and that for that reason the keeping of passes is many times dangerous IT was never thought discretion to put your whole fortune in danger unless your whole force was ready to defend it This error is committed several ways one is when like Tullus and Metius they commit the fortune and virtue of so many men as either of them had in their Army to the fortune and virtue of three particular persons which was but a pitiful part of either of their strength not considering how by that agreement all the pains which their Predecessors had taken to establish their liberty and enable their fellow Citizens to defend it was rendred vain and ineffectual by putting it into the power of three persons to destroy it than which in my judgment those two Kings could not have done worse Another great error is when upon the approach of an enemy we trust all to the keeping of an avenue or the defence of a pass unless it may be done with our whole force in that case indeed the resolution is good but if the passage be narrow and not room enough for your whole power it is uncertain and dangerous and that which persuades me to be of that opinion is the example of such as having been invaded by a potent Enemy though their Country was environed with Mountains and Rocks yet they would not attend and engage the Enemy upon the passes or Mountains but marched out of their holds to encounter him or else which is as bad they forsook their advantages and expected him in some plain or convenient place within And the reason is as aforesaid because many men cannot be brought to defend such places as are Rocky for want of subsistance and the passage being streight it can receive but few people and by consequence is not able to sustain the insult of a very great Army and the Enemy may bring as may as he pleases to attack it because his business is not to fix there but to pass thorow and be gone whereas he who is to defend it cannot be in any considerable Body being by reason of the uncertainty of the Enemies approach to lie there continually though as I said before the places are both barren and streight Having lost therefore that pass which you imagined to keep and upon which your Army and People did wholly rely the remainder of your Army and Subjects are possessed with such a fear that you can have no farther trial of their courage but all goes to wrack and your whole fortune lost but with part of your Army With what difficulty Hannibal passed the Alps betwixt France and Lombardy and betwixt Lombardy and Tuscany there is no body ignorant nevertheless the Romans chose rather to attend him upon the Tesin and afterwards in the plain of Arezzo where the danger was equal both to the Enemy and them than to carry their Army up into the clouds upon the Rocks and the Snow to be consumed by the incommodity of the place before the Enemy came at them And whosoever shall read History deliberately shall find few great Captains that would coop themselves up in such passes and streights not only for the reasons abovesaid but because all of them cannot be stop'd the Mountains in that respect being like the fields having not only their Roads and High-ways but by-paths and passages which though not observed by Strangers are well enough known to the Inhabitants who will be always ready to conduct the Enemy to remove them farther off who lie constantly upon them Of this a late Example may be brought in the year 1515 when Francis King of France design'd to pass into Italy for the recovery of
ultio in quaestu habetur 'T is more natural to return an injury than a courtesie because courtesies are burthensom but revenge is sweet But if this ingratitude either in Prince or People proceeds not so much from avarice as suspicion in that case it is somewhat excusable and of that kind we read of good store as when a General has conquered a Province or Empire for his Master when he has exterminated his Enemies enriched his Army and gain'd himself a great Name 't is impossible but he must be so acceptable to his own Soldiers and so dreadful to his Enemies as must beget a jealousie in the Prince for the Nature of man being jealous and ambitious and not to be confined within the bounds of his fortune it cannot be but if the Prince has taken a fancy that the glory of his General is a diminution to his the General must by some vain-glorious or discontented action establish and confirm it and then what has the Prince to do but to secure himself either by causing him to be murthered by taking away his Command lessening his reputation with the Soldiers and People and by all ways of industry possessing them that the Victory was not obtained by any Conduct of his but by the kindness of Fortune vileness of the Enemy or prudence and good management of the rest of the Officers After Vespasian being in Iudea was declared Emperor by his Army Antonius Primus being at the same time in Illyria with another Army declared for the Emperor and marched into Italy against Vitellius who was then Paramount in Rome and having beaten him in two pitch'd Battels he enter'd the City in the Name of Vespasian So that Mutianus being sent against Vitellius by Vespasian he found the Enemy broken the Town taken and all things done by Antonius to his hand And how was he requited Why Mutianus took away his Commission removed him from the Army and by degrees so lessened his Authority in Rome that Antonius going into Asia to make his Complaints to Vespasian was received so coldly that in a short time he was stript of all kind of authority and died very miserable and of this Nature examples are very frequent in History every body knows how in our times Gonsalvo Ferrante being the King of Arragon's General in the Kingdom of Naples against the French behaved himself so well that by his singular Conduct he conquered it and put it wholly under the obedience of his Master who coming afterwards to Naples himself took from him the Command of his Army dispossessed him of many strong places which he held in that Country and carried him with him into Spain where not long after he died in obscurity But there is no remedy these kind of jealousies are so natural to Princes that it is almost impossible for them to be grateful to any man who has performed any great thing for them And if it be so with Kings no wonder if it be so with the people for in a free State they have always two principal ends one is to enlarge their Dominions the other to keep what they have got and their eagerness to both these makes them so often guilty of ingratitude As to the first point we shall speak elsewhere the errors in preserving their liberty to disgust such persons as ought to be rewarded and to suspect such as ought to be trusted and though such practices are the occasion of great mischiefs in a corrupt Commonwealth and Tyranny does many times ensue as in Rome by Caesar who took that by force which the ingratitude of the people denied to his merits yet in a Town that is entire and incorrupt they do very well and add much to the duration of their liberty to enforce great and ambitious men for fear of punishment to comport themselves better In my judgment of all the Commonwealths that ever had Empire Rome was the least ingratful for the reasons abovesaid there being never an Example of its ingratitude but in the case of Scipio For Coriolanus and Camillus were banished for their injuries to the people and though one of them remaining obstinate was never recalled yet the other was not only recalled but so restored to the affections of the people that all his life after they adored him as a Prince But their jealousie of Scipio was of such a sort as had never been known before proceeding from the Ornaments of his body and the endowments of his mind His youth his wisdom his excellent qualifications had render'd him too admirable the powerfulness of his Enemy the danger and tediousness of the War which he had concluded in a very short time his deliberation in resolving and his quickness in Execution had gained him a greater reputation than was ever got by any General before him insomuch as the Senators Pretors and all the chief Magistrates in the City began to fear and respect him This was no pleasing sight to the graver sort because it had not been formerly the Custom in Rome whereupon Cato a man of great esteem for his piety and justice took up the Cudgels against him and complained publickly that the City could not be called free whil'st the Magistrates were in awe of any particular Citizen if then in a thing so nearly importing their liberty the people followed the opinion of Cato in my judgment they were in some measure to be excused In short my opinion is as I said before that it is avarice and suspicion which makes men ingrateful To the first of which the people are not naturally addicted and to the last with much less propensity than Princes as having less occasion which shall be proved hereafter CHAP. XXX What rules are to be observed by a Prince or Commonwealth to avoid this Vice of ingratitude and how a General or great Citizen is to demean himself to elude it TO avoid the necessity of living always in suspicion and being ingrateful to his Ministers a Prince ought to go personally with his Armies as was done at first by the Emperors of Rome as the great Turk does now and as all they do and have done that are valiant and couragious for in so doing the honor and profit of their Victories accrews to themselves but where they are not present at their Conquests themselves the honor redounds upon their Officers and they have not any compleat enjoyment of their successes till they have eclipsed if not extinguished that glory in other people which they durst not venture for themselves so that their ingratitude and injustice to their Officers does them more mischief than their Conquests do them good But when out of negligence or imprudence they lie at home idle themselves and send their Generals in their stead know no better precept to give them than what they know already themselves As to the General if he finds that jealousie inevitable he has his choice of two things As soon as the War is ended he is voluntarily to lay
of the Nobility for most of them having more Land than was allowed by this Law their fortunes by it were to be confiscated and half of them taken away and then by the distribution of what they should take from the Enemy they should lose all opportunity of enriching themselves for the future which being certainly true and this Law so perfectly pernicious to the interest of the Nobility it was never mentioned by the Tribunes but the Patricii opposed it and with all the eagerness imaginable yet not always by force but sometimes by evasion either commanding out their Armies upon some pretended design or by setting up another Tribune in opposition to him who proposed the Law that thereby they might dissolve it or else by sending new Colonies And so it hapned when the Colony was sent to Antium at the time when the difference was so high betwixt the Patricii and the Agrarians that no other expedient could be found to keep them from blood Livy tells us That there were very few that would list themselves upon that accompt to fill up the number of that Colony so much more did the people prefer an alotment about Rome than in any other place But afterwards the quarrel grew higher and to appease their Seditions the Romans were glad to send their Armies sometimes to the extreamest parts of Italy and sometimes beyond them But afterwards it falling out that the Lands which they took from the Enemy were remote at great distance from Rome and not to be cultivated with any convenience the people grew weary and insisted not so fiercely on their Agrarian Law They began also to be more moderate in those kind of confiscations but when any Country was seized they sent Colonies to plant them With these Arts they skin'd over their animosities till the time of the Gracchi who reviving them again gave occasion to the ruine of their Government for the Nobility having encreased their strength the quarrel advanced so far that they came to blows and the Magistrate being unable to restrain them thâ— fury of the Faction encreasing each party began to look out for a head The people chose Marius and made him four times Consul with some little interval which authority he managed so well to his own advantage that by the power and interest which he had got in that time he made himself thrice Consul afterwards The Nobility having no other remedy against so growing a Plague applyed themselves to Sylla and having made him their chief they fell to down right Wars which were carried on with much blood and variety of fortune till at last the Nobility prevailed The same faction revived again in the days of Caesar and Pompey and was attended by the destruction of the State For Caesar espousing the Marian party and Pompey the Syllan Caesar overcame and was the first that set up a Tyranny in Rome after whose time that City could never recover its liberty This was the beginning and this was the end of the Agrarian Law which may seem to contradict what we have said elsewhere That the discords and enmity betwixt the people and Senate of Rome conduced to the enlargement of their Empire and the conservation of their liberty by giving opportunity for the making of such Laws as were great corroboration to their liberties and freedom but I answer That the effects of the Agrarian Law does not hinder but that what we have said may be true for so great was the ambition of the Nobility that had it not been curb'd and check'd several ways it would have usurped upon the City and got the whole power into its hands And if we observe that the Agrarian dispute was three hundred years together in Rome before it could subvert it we may easily imagine the ambition of the Patricii would have done it much sooner had it not been ballanced and depressed by the people with their Agrarian Laws and some other inventions From whence likewise we may observe that wealth is more estimable among men than honor for when the Patricii were in controversie with the people about Titles and Honor they never went so high as to give them any extraordinary disgust But when their Estates and Fortunes were at stake they defended them with such zeal that they chose rather to put the whole Commonwealth into a flame than to part with them quickly The great authors of that Conflagration were the Gracchi whose good will and intentions towards the people was much more to be commended than their wisdom For to remove an inveterated inconvenience and to that purpose to make a Law with too much retrospection is ill Counsel as I said before and hastens that ruine which it was designed to prevent but with Patience and Compliance the mischief is either delayed or spends it self in time before it does any great hurt CHAP. XXXVIII Weak Commonwealths are generally irresolute and ill advised taking their measures more from Necessity than Election THe Volsci and the Equi understanding that Rome was sadly visited with a Contagion concluded it a fair opportunity to conquer it and having betwixt them raised a powerful Army they invaded the Latini and Hernici over-ran most of their Country and forced them to send to Rome for assistance The Romans returned answer that they should put themselves in Arms and make as good defence as they could for the Sickness was so raging they could give them no relief which shows the generosity and wisdom of that Senate That in all conditions and under the greatest of their Calamities never receded from its Majesty and Grandeur but at all times would have the disposal of the affairs of its Subjects and when necessity required made no scruple to command things contrary to their old ways of proceeding This I say because formerly the Senate had forbidden them to arm upon any occasion whatever and perhaps another Council would have thought it derogatory to their Grandeur to permit them to defend themselves But this Senate was endued with admirable prudence understood how things were to be taken and rejected and of two evils how to make choice of the least It troubled them much that they were not in condition to protect them and it troubled them no less That they would be forced to defend themselves upon their own score without succours from Rome yet finding there was a necessity of it the enemy being at their Gates and threatning them with death they retained their authority and with great gravity sent them word to defend themselves and raise what forces they could This may seem but a common resolution and what any other Commonwealths would have taken as well as that but weak and ill ordered Commonwealths cannot come off with so much honour Duke Valentine having taken Faenza and overrun most part of Bologna demanded passage of the Florentines to march his Army to Rome The Florentine Council met and consulted and there was not one man who thought it convenient to
extraction and brought up with all possible advantage suffered themselves to be corrupted by their preferments became favourers of tyranny and perfer'd their own licentiousness before the liberty of their Country Quintus Fabius did the same who though an excellent person at first and one of the Decem-viri of the second creation blinded with ambition and enveigled by the cunning of Appius changed his good humour into bad and grew as intolerable as he which things if seriously considered should make all Legislators either in Commonwealths or Kingdom the more careful and diligent to restrain the ambition of mankind and take from them all hopes of impunity when they offend in that kind CHAP. XLIII Those Souldiers which fight for their own honour are the best and most to be trusted FRom the same History it may be observed how much it imports the prosperity or adversity of affairs to have the minds of the Souldiers quiet and ready to engage upon a principle of honour rather than to have them turbulent and disposed to fight upon every mans ambition for whereas the Roman Armies were always Victorious under the conduct of the Consuls under the Decem-viri they were always unfortunate from hence likewise it may be collected how unsafe it is to commit the defence of our affairs to a mercenary Army who have nothing to encourage or oblige them but their pitiful pay which is not considerable enough to make them so faithful as to lay down their lives in your quarrel For in an Army where the Souldier is not bound to the person for whom he fights by some particular obligation or the expectation of more than ordinary advantage by the Victory if the enemy be strong they will make but little resistance and this kindness and affection of the Souldiers to the General cannot be but where they are subjects fighting under a good Prince or a lawful Magistrate in defence of their Posterity and Religion so that it is necessary for every King or Commonwealth who desires to defend himself well to train up his own Subjects in Military Discipline that he may safely depend upon them in time of distress and it has been the practice of all those who have done any great things The Roman Armies under the Decem-viri had doubtless the same courage as under the Consuls but not being so well affected towards the one as the other they would not put it forth nor give such testimonies as formerly but when the tyranny of the Decem-virat extinguished and their liberty was recovered having then the same tenderness and affection to their Country they fought as well as before and their enterprizes had the same happy success CHAP. XLIV A multitude without an head is altogether unserviceable nor is any man to threaten that has any thing to desire UPon the accident of Virginius the people having taken Arms and retir'd to the holy-Mount the Senate sent to them to know upon what account they had abandoned their Officers and betaken themselves to that Mount and the authority of the Senate was so venerable among the people that having no head among them there was no body durst return an answer Titus Livius tells us Non defuit quid responderetur deerat qui responsum daret They wanted not what to say but who to deliver it For having no certain Commander every private person was unwilling to expose himself to their displeasure From whence we may understand how useless a thing the multitude is without a head which being observed by Virginius he caused twenty Military Tribunes to be made with power to treat and expostulate with the Senate instead of a Head The people insisting to have Valerius and Horatius sent to them to whom they would communicate their grievances Valerius and Horatius refused to go till the Decemviri had laid down their authority which being at length obtained with much concertation Valerius and Horatius repaired to the people and understood that they would have new Tribunes to be chosen they would have appeals from every Magistrate to the people and they would have the Decem-viri to be delivered up into their hands that they might burn them alive the Embassadors liked the first of their demands but refused to consent to the last as impious telling them Crudelitatem damnatis in crudelitatem ruitis You condemn cruelty and practise it your selves and before you will be free you will tyrannize over your adversaries advising them to lay that Article by and mention the Decemviri no farther but to address themselves to the reassumption of their power and authority after which they would not want ways of receiving satisfaction for then every man's life and fortune would be at their disposing Hence we may learn how weak and imprudent it is to desire a thing and before we receive it declare to what ill use we intend it especially if we mean to do mischief 't is just as you should say pray give me your Sword that I may run you thorow 'T is sufficient to borrow the Sword and when you have it you may do as you please CHAP. XLV 'T is a thing of ill Example to break a new Law especially for the Maker and 't is no less dangerous to the Governor of a State to multiply injuries and repeat them every day THe Commotions about the Tyranny of the Decem-viri being composed and Rome restored to its old form of Government again Virginius cited Appius before the the people to answer what he had attempted upon his Daughter Appius appeared with his Nobility about him Virginius commanded him to Prison Appius cryed out he appealed to the people Virginius replyed That he who had taken away those appeals from the people ought not to have any benefit by them nor be permitted to implore their protection whose Laws and Liberties could receive no protection from him Appius insisted that they ought not to violate a thing which they had urged with that eagerness and ordained with that zeal And though indeed the life of Appius was wicked enough and there was no punishment that he did not deserve yet it was inhospitable and contrary to all civil Society to violate their own Laws which were but newly made and passed with so much importunity for in my judgment there is nothing so indecorous nor of so ill example in a Commonwealth as the infraction of a new Law by the Legislator himself When in the year 1494. the State of Florence was restored by the assistance of a Frier called Hieronimo Savonarolo whose writings give sufficient testimony of his Learning and integrity having among other things for the security of the Citizens obtained a Law for appeals to the people in matters of State both from the Senate and the Council of Eight which Law he had a long time solicited and got with much difficulty at last It hapned that not long after there were five persons condemned to death by the Senate which persons endeavouring very earnestly to appeal to the
dispatched in a short time And whoever considers their Wars from the beginning of Rome to the Siege of the Veientes will find that they were determined in a very short time some in six some in ten and some in twenty days For their Custom was upon the first appearance of a War immediately to draw out their Army and seeking out the Enemy they did what they could to bring him to a Battel having beaten him by reason of the surprize The Enemy that his Country might not wholly be harrassed for the most part proposed an agreement in which the Romans were sure to insist upon some part of their Territory which either they converted to their particular profit or consigned to some Colony which was to be placed there for the security of their Frontiers by which means the wars being ended in a short time their Conquests were kept without any considerable expence for the Colony had that Country for their pay and the Romans had their Colonies for their security Nor could there be any way more advantagious and safe for whilst there was no enemy in the field those guards were sufficient and when any Army was set out to disturb them the Romans were always ready with another in their defence and having fought them they commonly prevailed forced them to harder conditions and returned when they had done by which means they gained daily upon the enemy and grew more powerful at home and in this manner they proceeded till their Leaguer before Veii where they altred their method and allowed pay to their Souldiers for the better continuation of the war whereas before that their wars being short there was no necessity of paying their Armies Nevertheless though they paid their Souldiers from that time and maintained war at greater distance whereby they were obliged to continue longer in the field yet they left not their old custom of dispatching it as soon as they could with respect to the circumstances of place and time for which reason they continued their Colonies and besides their old custom of shortning their wars as much as they were able the ambition of their Consuls contributed exceedingly for their Consulships being but for a year and six months of that to be spent in their employments at home they were as diligent and vigorous as possible because they were not capable of triumphing till the war was concluded and then for continuing their Colonies the great advantage and convenience that resulted from them was sufficient to prevail This practice therefore was observed perpetually among the Romans in the management of their wars only they varied something about the distribution of the prey in which formerly they were more liberal than in after-times either because they thought it not so necessary when the Souldiers were paid or else because their spoils being greater than before they thought convenient that the publick should have its share that upon any new enterprize they might not be constrained to lay new taxes upon the people and by this way their Coffers were filled in a short time So that by these two ways by the distribution of their prey and the setling of Colonies Rome grew rich by its wars whereas other Princes and States without great discretion grow poor and so great was every mans ambition of enriching the Aerarium that by degrees it came to that pass no Consul was permitted to triumph unless he returned with a vast quantity of silver or gold or some other inestimable commodity and put it into the treasury So that the designs of the Romans tended wholly to this to finish the war quickly by forcing the enemy to a Battel or else to harrass and tire them with frequent excursions that thereby compelling them to dishonourable conditions they might make their advantage and become more powerful and rich CHAP. VII What proportion of Land the Romans allowed to every man in their Colonies I Think it no easie matter to set down the exact proportion of Land which the Romans assigned to every single person in their Colonies for I believe they gave more or less according to the barrenness or fertility of the soil and that in all places they were sparing enough And the first reason that induces me is that thereby they might send more men and by consequence their frontiers be better guarded another is because living at home indigent themselves it is not to be supposed they would suffer those whom they sent abroad to grow too opulent and rich and in this I'am much confirm'd by Livy where he tells us that upon the taking of Veii the Romans sent a Colony thither and in the distribution of the Land allotted every man no more than three acres and a little more according to our measure They might consider likewise that their wants would not be supplyed by the quantity so much as the improvement and cultivation of their Land Yet I do not doubt but they had publick Pastures and Woods to sustain their Cattel and supply themselves with firing without which a Colony could hardly subsist CHAP. VIII What it is that disposes some people to leave their native Countries to dispossess other people SEeing I have spoken already of the Military Discipline of the Romans and how the Tuscans were invaded by the French it follows properly enough that we say something of their several kinds of War which are two one sort of commenced upon the ambition of some Prince or commonwealth in hopes to extend and enlarge his Empire as those wars which were made by Alexander the Great by the Romans and by one Prince against another which wars though dangerous are not yet so pernicious as to supplant the inhabitants and drive them out of their Country for the Conqueror contents himself with his Victory and the submission of the people allows them their own Laws and many times their Estates The other kind of war is much more dangerous and destructive and that is when an entire Nation with their Wives and their Children compelled either by hunger or war leaves its own Country to fix themselves somewhere else not to extend their dominion or exercise any authority as in the other but to kill or expel all the Natives and possess themselves of their Estates This war indeed is most bloody and dreadful as Salust shews very well in the end of his Bellum Iugurthinum where after Iugurtha was beaten speaking of the invasion of the Gauls he tells us Cum caeteris Gentibus a populo Romano de imperio tantum fuisse dimicatum cum Gallis de singulorum hominum salute With other Nations the Romans fought only for Empire and Dominion with the Gauls they fought for their Country and Lives For when a Prince or Commonwealth invades a Country according to the first way it is sufficient if those who are at the Helm be removed or destroyed in this every mans life is in danger for when a whole Nation transplants and invades a new Province not
refuse to defend them they should discourage all others that had an inclination to do the like which would have been contrary to the great design of the Romans to propagate their Glory and Empire The same accidental cause gave occasion to their first War with the Carthaginians upon the Romans protecting the Massinenses in Sicily But their second war with the Carthaginians was designed for Hanibal the Carthaginian General fell upon the Saguntins in Spain who were in alliance with the Romans not so much out of malice to the Saguntins but that the Romans being provoked to their defence should give the Carthaginians occasion to transport the war into Italy This way of provoking and hedging in a War has been always practised among Potentates especially where they had any faith or respect for other people for that the peace which has been a long time betwixt them upon articles of alliance may seem firm and inviolate they will not meddle with him against whom they do principally design but turn their arms upon some of his friends and confederates that he is most particularly obliged to receive into his protection knowing that if he appears in their defence they must have occasion to fight him if he does not but disowns his allies they publish his weakness and infidelity to the World and by either of those ways they do their business This example of the Campani is of singular importance as well to those who would make war upon any body as those that are in distress for when you are unable to defend your self and unwilling to fall into their hands that invade you the best and most safe way is to put your self in subjection to some neighbouring Prince as the Campani did then and the Florentines afterward when they found themselves too weak to support against the power of Castruccio of Lucca for finding that Robert King of Naples would not protect them as friends they threw themselves into his arms to be defended as his subjects CHAP. X. That according to the common opinion mony is not the sinews of War BEcause it is easie to begin war as a man pleases but harder to end it every Prince before he undertakes an enterprize is obliged to consider his own strength well and to regulate by it But then he must be so wise too as not to make a wrong judgment and that he will certainly do as oft as he computes it by his Bags by the situation of his Towns or the affection of his Friends rather than by his own proper Power and Arms. Mony and Towns and Friends are all good when in conjunction with a strong Army of your own but without it they do nothing without Men to what purpose is either Mony or Towns and the affection of your subjects will hold no longer than you are able to defend them There is no mountain no lake no streight inaccessible where there is no force to defend it Vast sums of mony are not only incapable of protecting you but they expose you to more danger nor can any thing be more false than that old and common saying That mony is the sinews of the war Quintus Curtius was the first author of it in the war betwixt Antipater of Macedon and the King of Sparta where he tells us that for want of monies the Spartans were forced to fight and were beaten whereas could they have protracted but some few days they had had the news of Alexander's death and got the victory without fighting a blow but wanting mony and apprehending their Army would moulder they were constrained to come to a Battel and were defeated which was the occasion of that Apophthegm That mony is the sinews of war which saying is now a-days in every Princes mouth but improperly in my judgment for relying wholly upon that Maxim they think their treasure is sufficient to defend them not considering that if that would have done it Darius would have conquered Alexander the Grecians the Romans Duke Charles the Swizzers and of late the Pope and Florentines united would not have found it so hard to have mastered Francesco Maria Nephew to Iulius 2d at the Battel of Urbin But these whom I have mentioned presuming more upon the multitude of their bags than the goodness of their men were all beaten and overcome Craesus the King of Lydia carrying Solon into his Treasury and shewing him an immense quantity of riches ask'd him what he thought of his power to which Solon replyed I think it never the greater for this for War is carried on and Battels are fought more with iron than gold and it might happen for ought he knew that some body might come with his iron and take it all from him Again when after the death of Alexander the Great a great Army of Gauls transplanted into Greece from whence they passed afterwards into Asia before they began their march the Gauls sent Embassadors to the King of Macedon to treat an accord which being almost concluded to make the Embassadors more plyable the said King shews them his treasure which consisted of a vast quantity of silver and gold which the Embassadors had no sooner seen but longing impatiently to be at it they broke of the treaty and brought their Army into his Country so that that very thing in which he had reposed his great confidence and security proved his ruine and destruction The Venetians not long since had their Coffers well stor'd yet they lost all and their wealth was not able to defend them So that I do affirm 't is not mony as the common opinion will have it but good Souldiers that is the sinews of war for mony cannot find good Souldiers but good Souldiers will be sure to find mony had not the Romans done more in their wars with their iron than their gold the treasure of the whole World would not have been sufficient for them considering their great enterprizes abroad and their no less difficulties at home but fighting with iron they had no want of gold for those who were afraid of their Armies supplyed them And if the King of Sparta was forced to run the hazard of a Battel and was beaten for want of monies it was no more than what has hapned to others and might have hapned to him upon other occasions for it falls out of many times that for want of provisions an Army is forc'd either to fight or to starve in which case there is no General so weak but he will choose that which is most honourable where fortune has some power to befriend him Again a General having news of supplies that are coming to the enemy considers with himself whether he had not better engage them as they are than attend till their recruits come up and then fight them with more disadvantage sometimes likewise it falls out as it did to Asdrubal in the Country of the Piseni when he was surprized by Claudius Nero and the other Roman Consul that a
General is either forc'd to fight or to fly in which case it is incomparably more safe to hazard all in a Battel than to lose all in a Flight Which being so we see there are many causes that constrain a General to fight upon disadvantage among which if want of mony be one there is no more reason we should therefore call that the sinews of war than any of the rest which do the same thing so that mony is not so much the snews of war as good souldiers 't is true mony is requisite for the carrying on of a war but not principally and in the first place for good souldiers have many times been contented without it though it is but seldom they want it for 't is as impossible for good souldiers to want mony as it is for mony alone to make good souldiers And this is clear by the testimony of Historians in a thousand places Pericles persuaded the Athenians to a war with all Peloponnesus and assured them of success upon consideration of their industry and riches the Athenians undertook the War and for some time prospered with their industry but at last it appeared that the conduct and discipline of the Spartans was too hard for the Athenians industry and treasure Livy desides this controversie the best of any man where in his comparison of Commanders enquiring what would have been the event if Alexander the Great had turn'd his Arms against the Romans he declares that in war there are three things fundamentally necessary good Souldiers good Officers and good fortune and then arguing whether Alexander or the Romans were more considerable in those three points he concludes without the least mention of mony It is not improbable but the Campani of whom we have spoken in the former Chapter when they undertook the assistance of the Sidicins against the Samnites measured their power more by their mony than their men from whence it hapned that ' being defeated in two Battels they were forced to submit and become tributary to the Romans CHAP. XI 'T is not discretion to enter into strict amity with a Prince whose reputation is greater than his strength THe Sidicins were in a great error to desire the assistance of the Campani against the Samnites as being by reason of their luxury unable to assist them but the error of the Capuans was greater in not knowing their own weakness and incapacity to defend them both their errors Livy has very well described in these words Campani magis nomen in auxilium Sidicinorum quam vires ad praesidium attulerunt The Capuans made a great noise but they brought no force to the relief of the Sidicins And here it is not unseasonable to consider that the leagues which are made with Princes whose distance is too great or power too little to relieve one are more honourable than safe and give more reputation than security to the person that desires them This was experienced by the Florentines in the year 1489 when the Pope and King of Naples invaded them for they were at that time confederate with the King of France yet they had more reputation than assistance thereby The same would happen likewise to such of the Italian Princes as should confederate with Maximilian the Emperor and in confidence of his alliance undertake any great enterprize because that alliance would be one of those that bring more reputation than relief So then as it was a great error in the Capuans when they were unable to defend themselves to undertake the protection of the Sidicins so it is and will be the same in whoever follows their example It was the same case with the Tarentini who would needs interpose betwixt the Samnites and the Romans to mediate a peace for when both Romans and Samnites were in the field and their Armies preparing for an engagement the Tarentini sent Embassadors to the Consul to let him know from the Senate of the Tarentini that they would have peace betwixt them and the Samnites and that they were resolved to take Arms against them which refused it But the Consul smiling at their imprudence in the presence of the said Embassadors caused a charge to be sounded and immediately marching his Army against the enemy he let them see by his proceedings what answer they deserved Thus you have seen to what errors Princes are subject who undertake the protection of other States I shall now in the next Chapter remonstrate what ways are most convenient for their own proper defence CHAP. XII Vpon an apprehension of being invaded whether it be better to make war or expect it AMong wise men and very good Souldiers I have heard it often disputed whether when two Princes are of equal strength and one of them designing war visibly against the other it be better for that Prince which is like to be invaded to sit still and expect him at home or to begin with him and make the first inroad himself There are arguments on both sides and they who think it best to be the aggressor and fall upon the Enemy first may alledge the Counsel which Craesus gave to Cyrus when being with his Army upon the Frontiers of the Massageti Thamyris Queen of that Country sent to him to take his choice whether she should fight him within her Country or upon the Frontiers if he desired to advance she would stand still and expect him if he had rather fight where he was she would be with him immediately when it came to be debated in Counsel Craesus contrary to the opinion of the rest was for marching to her and the reason he gave was because if she should be beaten at any distance Cyrus would get but little of her Country for she would have time to recruit whereas if she were beaten at home he would be able to sit so close upon her skirts that she being never capable of rallying or bringing another Army into the field must of necessity lose her whole Kingdom Hanibal gave the same Counsel to Antiochus assuring him that if the Romans were any way to be conquered it was by carrying the war into Italy for by so doing he might have the benefit of their Arms their Wealth and their Allies but whilst the war was abroad and Italy undisturbed he would leave the man inexhaustible magazine that would supply them with what and wheresoever they had occasion and at last Hanibal concluded that Rome was to be taken more easily than the Empire and Italy it self than any of its Provinces Agathocles being unable to resist the Carthaginians at home invaded their borders and forc'd them to a peace and Scipio in the same manner to remove the war out of Italy transported it into Africk Those who are on the other side do argue as stifly that there can be nothing more dangerous than to hazard an Army in an enemies Country at a great distance from their own and they produce the Athenians for an instance who whilst
they kept themselves upon the defensive part and expected their enemies at home were always victorious but when they began to make war at a distance and send Armies into Sicily they lost their liberty and everything else They produce also the Fable of Antius King of Lybia who being invaded by Hercules the Egyptian was invincible whilst he kept himself within his own borders but being inveigled out by the subtility of his enemy he lost both his Kingdom and Life upon which occasion that story was raised of Antius that being born of the earth as they pretended so oft as he touch'd it so oft he received new vigour from his Mother which Hercules perceiving got him up in his arms crush'd him to death They produce likewise more modern examples Every body knows that Ferrand King of Naples was esteemed a wise Prince in his time and hearing two years before his death that King Charles viii of France was preparing to invade him he let him alone but falling sick afterwards as he lay upon his death-bed he called his Son Alphonso to him and among other things charged him that he should expect the King of France upon his Frontiers and fight him there but that by no means he should be tempted beyond them and it had been better for Alphonso to have follow'd his Counsel for neglecting it afterwards and sending an Army into Romagna he lost both Army and Kingdom without striking a blow But besides these arguments on both sides it is urged in behalf of the Aggressor that he invades with more confidence and courage than his Adversary receives him which is a great advantage and enhancement to his Army That he brings many inconveniences upon the person whom he invades to which he would not be liable if he expected him at home For when the enemies Country is wasted and their Houses plunder'd his Subjects are not much to be trusted nor can any more Taxes be laid upon them without great difficulty by which means as Hanibal said their Magazines will be spent and their fountain dryed up that was to supply them with all Provisions for War Besides if your Army be in the Enemies Country it will be under a greater necessity of fighting and by consequence will fight more desperately than at home But to this it is answered on the other side That it is more for your advantage to attend your enemy in your own Country than to seek him abroad for thereby you may furnish your self with Victuals and Amunition and all other necessaries without any inconvenience and distress him by driving the Country You may likewise with much more ease incommode and frustrate his designs by your better knowledge of the Country and what places are more proper to attack him in as also you may attack him with your whole force at once or give him battel as you please which out of your own Confines is not to be done Moreover if Fortune should be adverse and it be your chance to be beaten more of your Men will escape where their refuge is so near and you will sooner rally them again In short if you fight at home you venture your whole force and not your whole fortune but if you fight abroad you venture your whole fortune with but part of your force Others there have been who with design to weaken the Enemy and fighting him afterwards with more ease and advantage have suffered him quietly to march several days Journey into their Country and possess himself of several Towns but whether they did well or not I will not determine only I think this distinction is to be considered whether my Country be strong in Fortresses and Men as the Romans were of old and as the Swizzers at this day or whether it be weak and unfortified as the Territory of the Carthaginians formerly and France and Italy now In this case the Enemy is by all means to be kept at a distance because your chief strength lying in your Mony and not in your Men whenever you are interrupted in raising or receiving of that your business is done and nothing interrupts you so fatally as an Enemy in your Country And of this the Carthaginians may be an example who whilst they were free at home were able by their Revenue and Taxes to wage War with the Romans themselves whereas afterwards when they were assaulted they were not able to contend with Agathocles The Florentines when Castruccio of Lucca brought his Arms into their Country could not support against him but were forced to put themselves under the Dominion of the King of Naples to procure his protection but Castruccio was no sooner dead but they were agog again and had the confidence to invade the Duke of Milan and to attempt the beating him out of that Province so couragious were they in their foreign War and so abject at home But when Countries are in a posture of defence and people Martial and well disciplin'd as the Romans of old and the Swizzers at this day 't is better to keep off for the nearer they are to their own Country they are the harder to overcome because they can raise more force to defend themselves than to invade another people Nor does the opinion of Hanibal affect me at all for though he persuaded Antiochus to pass into Italy he did it as a thing that would have been more for his own and the Carthaginian than for Antiochus his advantage for had the Romans received those three great defeats which they received of Hanibal in Italy in the same space of time in France or any where else they had been ruined irrecoverably for they could neither have rallyed nor recruited so soon I do not remember any foreign Expedition by the Romans for the Conquest of any Province in which their Army exceeded the number of 50000. But upon the invasion of the Gauls after the first Punick war they brought 118000 Men into the Field for their defence Nor could they beat them afterwards in Lombardy as they did at first in Tuscany because it was more remote and they could not fight them with so much convenience nor with so many men The Cimbri repulsed the Romans in Germany but following them into Italy they were defeated and driven out again themselves and the reason was because the Romans could bring more forces against them The Swizzers may without much difficulty be over-powered abroad because they seldom march above 30 or 40000 strong but to attack and beat them at home is much more difficult where they can bring into the field 100000 and more I conclude therefore that that Prince whose people are in a posture and provided for War does wisely if he expects a Potent and dangerous Enemy at home rather than to invade him in his own Country But that Prince whose Country is ill provided and whose Subjects are ill disciplined does better if he keeps the War as far off as he can and by so doing each of
their liberty with it and turn'd Subjects to the Latins Livy tells us the same thing for says he the Latin Army was in nothing inferiour to the Romans their courage the same their constancy the same and their numbers the same if the Romans had any advantage it was in their Generals which indeed were better than the Latins and it is expressed by several both Latins and Romans who have left an account of that Battel to posterity that where-ever Manlius had been that side would certainly have conquered In this Battel there were two things very exemplary and remarkable One of the Consuls to keep his Souldiers firm in their obedience and preserve their Military Discipline caused his own Son to be slain for transgressing his Orders though he gain'd the Victory by the means The other devoted himself freely to death for the good of his Country for the dispute was like to be very hard fighting against the Latins who as Livy tells us had the same Language the same Customs the same Arms the same Discipline with the Romans the Soldiers the Captains the Tribunes both in one Army and the other had been Comerades and served formerly together not only in the same Army or Garison but in the same Company and Band. It was necessary therefore being equal in their numbers and equal in their courage that something extraordinary should be done that might render the Soldiers fiercer and more obstinate to overcome upon which fierceness and obstinacy the whole hopes of the victory did depend for whilst there is any such in the breasts of the Soldiers they never think of running but press still on for victory and prize and because there was more of this constancy and fortitude in the breasts of the Romans than in the breasts of the Latins partly the destiny and partly the bravery of the Consuls effected that for the good success of their Army and the preservation of their Discipline Torquatus killed his Son and Decius himself Titus Livius in his description of the equality of their force gives us an exact account of the Orders which they observed in their Armies and Fights and he has done it so largely I need not repeat it all but shall only select what I think most particularly remarkable and what if observed by the Generals of our days might have prevented very great disorders I say then that according to Livy's description their Armies were divided into three principal Schieri or Squadrons The first consisted of their Hastati which were most of them young men in the flower of their age digested into Manipuli or small parties and disposed at a certain distance with Pikes or Darts in their hands from whence they were called Hastati The second Squadron was as numerous as the first and divided into as many Manipuli but their distance was something greater and it consisted of choice men from whence they were called Principes The third and last Squadron was the biggest of the three and had almost as many in it as both the other and this was made up of the ancientest and most experienced Soldiers whom they called Triarii They too had their certain distances but something greater than in either of the other In their Battels the Hastati were in the Van the Principes behind them and the Triarii in the Rear To every one of these Squadrons there was a body of Horse which being drawn up in two divisions and disposed one of the right and the other on the left hand of the Army represented two wings and were therefore called Ala. These three Squadrons preceded and followed one another exactly but the Hastati in the first Squadron were drawn up closer That being to receive the first impetus of the Enemy they might endure it the better The Principes that followed them was not in such close order but were disposed at more distance to the end that if the Hastati should be forced to retire they might be received into that Squadron without disorder or confusion But the Triarii were drawn up with greater spaces and intervals than both the other and for the same reason that if they were repulsed that might fall back among them and make an entire Body together Being drawn up in this order the Hastati began the sight if they were over-powred by the Enemy and forced to give ground they fell back to the Principes and uniting with them renewed the fight in one body if they were both of them too weak and unable to bear up against the Enemy they retreated gradually into the spaces betwixt the Triarii and then all the three Squadrons being joyned the whole Army charged in a body and if they were beaten farewel there was no more reserves but the Battel was lost and because whenever the Triarii was engaged the whole Army was in â—â—nger this Proverb grew very frequent Res reducta est ad Triarios Things are now at the Extremity The Generals of our times having laid aside all the old discipline of the Romans have neglected this among the rest to their no little prejudice For he that draws up his Army in a posture with two such reserves must be beaten three times before he can be utterly defeated whereas once beating will do the Enemies business But he that trusts only to the first shock as the Christian Armies do generally now may easily be broken the least disorder or relaxation of courage puting all to the rout And that which is the reason why our Armies are so quickly defeated is because they have lost the old way of falling back one body into another and rallying three times For whoever draws up his Army according to Modern Custom does it with one of these two inconveniences He either draws up his several Squadrons shoulder to shoulder and by enlarging his Ranks makes his Files very thin which weakens his Army very much by leaving the distance so small betwixt the Front and the Rear or else he draws them up deeper according to the manner of the Romans but then their Files are so close that if the Front be beaten there being no spaces in the Battel to receive them they entangle and confound one another so as the Front being repulsed falls foul upon the middle Squadron and both of them upon the third whereby they are embarrassed and hindred from advancing or receiving the Enemy in any order and the whole Battel is lost The Spanish and French Armies at the Battel of Ravenna where Monsieur de Foix the French General was slain fought very well being drawn up according to the mode of our times with their Fronts so extended that their Battalions were much more in wideness than depth and his was done in respect of the ground which in that place was very spacious and large for being sensible that retreats are more difficult where the Files are too deep they drew them up large in the Front to prevent it as much as possible But when they
are straightned for room they are forced to be contented and draw up as well as they can for there is no remedy They are subject likewise to the same disorders in their Marches and Incursions into the Enemies Country whether to forrage or upon some other design In the War betwixt the Florentines and Pisans upon their Rebellion after the King of France's passage into Italy coming to a Battel at Santo Regolo the Florentines were defeated by their own Horse which being drawn up in the Front of the Army and charged smartly by the Enemy were put into disorder and forced to fall foul upon their Foot which broke the whole Army And I have been many times assured by Monsieur Griacus de Burgo an old Officer of Foot in the Florentine Army that their Foot had not fled that day but for the disorder of their own Horse The Swizzers the best Soldiers of our times when they are drawn up with the French will be sure to be drawn up in the Flanks that if their Horse should be beaten they may not be driven in among them And though these things seem easie to be understood and more easie to practise yet there has not been one of our late Generals that has found the way of imitating this old method or correcting the new for though they also have their Armies divided into three Squadrons which they call the Van-guard the Body and the Rear yet they use them only in their Marches and Incampments but when they come to a Battel it is seldom seen but they are drawn up as abovesaid and altogether run the risk of one shock and no more And because some people to excuse their ignorance pretend the Execution of the Cannon will not suffer them to make use of the old order I shall examine in the next Chapter whether that can be a just impediment or not CHAP. XVII How the Armies of our times are to judge of Artillery and whether the general opinion of it be true WHen I consider with my self how many Field Battels were fought by the Romans in several times it falls into my thoughts to examine what many people have believed that had there been great Guns in those days as there are now the Romans could never have over-run Provinces nor made them tributary so easily nor have done so many great things as they did for by reason of these fire-arms Granadoes and such kind of Engines people are sooner terrified and cannot show their valour so freely as heretofore To which it is added that Armies come with more difficulty to a Battel and that their Orders and Ranks are not so easily kept so that in time the whole business of War will be dispatched by the Cannon Not thinking it improper to enquire into these opinions to examine whether Artillery have added or substracted from the strength of our Armies and taken away or given more occasion to our Captains of doing brave things I shall begin with their first opinion that the Romans would not have made those vast Conquests had there been Artillery in those days In answer I say that War is twofold defensive or offensive and it is first to be considered which of these two Wars it does most mischief or good and though it may be said it does great mischief in both yet I am of opinion it is much more prejudicial to him that is upon the defensive than him that is upon the offensive part The reason is because he who defends himself is either blocked up in some Town or straightned in his Camp If in a Town it is either small like your Citadels or large In the first case the besieged is lost for the force of those Guns is such that no wall is so thick but in a few days they will beat it down So that if he has no retreat nor time to stop up the breaches or throw up new works within the Enemy enters pell mell at the breach and the Cannon of the Town does the Garison very little good for this is a Maxim where people can fall on in a crowd and run headlong in their fury to a storm great Guns do never repel them Wherefore the fierce assaults of the Tramontani are not so easily sustained as the attacks of the Italians who fall not on with that fury and impatience as the other but march up cooly and quietly to the Battel and do rather skirmish than storm Those who enter a breach in this gravity and state are sure to go to pot for the Artillery does certain execution upon them But those who fall on briskly and crowd one another into the breach if there be no new works or retrenchments thrown up within enter as they please without any great prejudice by the Cannon for though some of them may be killed yet they cannot be so many as to hinder the taking of the Town That this is true we find by many instances in Italy and among the rest in the Siege of Brescia the Town revolted to the Venetians only the Castle stood firm for the French That the Town might receive no prejudice from the Castle the Venetians fortified the great Street that comes down from the Castle with great Guns in the Front Flanks and every where so that they thought themselves secure not only from sallies within but from relief without But Monsieur de Foix made no reckoning of them for marching thither with a Body of Horse he alighted and charging boldly thorow the said Street relieved the Castle without any considerable loss So that he who is shut up in a small place his walls battered down and has nothing left but his Artillery to defend him is in very great danger and can hardly escape If the place you defend be a large Town where you have room enough to retire and throw up new works yet your disadvantage is great and the Enemies great Guns shall do more mischief upon you than yours upon him For first you must be forced to advance your Cannon and raise them to some higher place for whilst they are level with the ground every blind or small work that the Enemy throws up is sufficient to secure him and being forced to plant them higher either upon the top of some Wall or Church or Mount erected on purpose you fall under two inconveniences One is that you cannot bring such large Guns upon those places as he can bring without because in those little places great Guns are not to be managed The other is that if you could get them up they cannot be so easily secur'd because they cannot have the convenience of works or baskets to defend them as the Enemy has whose Guns are planted as he pleases So that it is almost impossible for him that is besieged to keep his Cannon long upon a high place without being dismounted if the Enemy without has any store of Artillery and to keep them upon the ground is to have little or no use of
when-ever overlaid by the Horse or any thing else they were received into their Legions and if there be any way of making advantage of Artillery in a field fight it is this He that uses it otherwise understands not very well and puts his confidence in that which may easily deceive him The Turk indeed by the help of his great Guns-obtained two or three Victories against the Sophy and the Soldan but if produced more from the novelty of the noise and the terror it brought upon their Horse than any great execution they did I conclude therefore that Artillery may be good in an Army that is stout but where they are used in an Army that is raw and inexperienced they are of little advantage if the Enemy be either couragious or strong CHAP. XVIII How by the authority of the Romans and the universal Discipline of the Ancients the Foot are more serviceable than the Horse BY many Arguments and Examples it may be proved that the Romans in their Military exploits had greater estimation for their Infantry than their Horse and how all their principal designs were executed by their Foot This appeared in their Wars with the Latins when the Roman Army being over-powered and giving ground in that great Battel near the Lake of Regillum the Roman General caused his Cavalry to dismount and fight on foot and by so doing they recovered their ground and got the Victory by which it is manifest the Romans thought them more serviceable on foot than on horse-back and in that posture placed more confidence in them The same thing they practised in many other fights and always with good success nor can the raillery of Hanibal be objected against this who when news was brought him at the Battel of Cannas that the Consuls had caused all their Horse to dismount resolving to fight it out on foot cryed out in derision Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent Equites They might as will have bound them and delivered them to me Which expression though coming out of the mouth of an excellent person yet his single authority is not to be put in the ballance against the judgment of the whole Roman Commonwealth and the experience of so many brave Captains as had been educated under it and if it were there are reasons to defend it The Foot can get into several places where the Horse cannot get The Foot keep their ranks better than the Horse and in any disorder are sooner rallyed and in a posture again whereas the Horse are more unmanageable and when once out of order with great difficulty to be rallyed Besides as it is among men so it is among Horses some are high spirited and couragious others are untoward and dull and it frequently happens that a mettled Horse has a cowardly Rider or a mettled Rider a dull Horse be it which it will the disparity is inconvenient A body of Foot well order'd and drawn up will easily be too hard for the same number of Horse but the same number of Horse will have hard service to break a Body of Foot if there be any thing of proportion betwixt them and this opinion is confirmed not only by ancient and modern examples but by the relations and constitutions of Legislators and whoever else have left any rules and directions for the Government of an Army for though they tell us indeed That at first Horse were in greatest reputation because the way of ordering of Foot was not known but as soon as the way of managing them was found out and their usefulness was discovered they were preferred to the Horse Not but that Horse are very necessary in an Army to scout abroad make incursions into the Enemies Country pursue the Enemy when he runs and confront their Horse when they come to a Battel yet the hopes and strength of an Army lies more especially in the Foot and if any one error in the Conduct of our Italian Princes has contributed to the enslaving of their Country it is their neglecting to improve themselves in the management of Foot and addressing themselves wholly to the Horse And this fault proceeded from the malignity of the Officers or the ignorance of those who govern'd the State For this last 25 years the Commands of the Italian Militia being in the hands of Reformades and Soldiers of fortune who had no setled Estates they made it their design to preserve their Commands by all possible means though with never so much prejudice to their Masters And because a great Body of Foot was not like to be long paid nor would there always be occasion to use them and a little one would not turn to account they applyed themselves wholly to the Discipline of Horse for 200 or 300 Horse was a fair Command and maintained the Officers in a good reputation nor was the charge so great but their Governors could pay them For the better insurance therefore of their places they began to undervalue and decry the Foot service in such manner that by degrees they were almost wholly laid aside so that in the greatest of their Armies there were very few Foot the unhappiness of which practice with other irregularities in our days has made the Italian Militia so weak it has not been able to defend it self against the insults and depredations of foreigners So then the Foot is with more confidence to be rely'd upon than the Horse and that this was the judgment of the Romans appears by another example The Romans were encamped before Sora and a party of Horse sallying out of the Town to beat them from some post was met by a Roman Captain at the Head of his Troop who charging his adversary it was their fortune both of them to be slain However their Troops continued the fight though their Officers were dead and the Romans to facilitate their Victory dismounted in the middle of the fight and forced the Enemy to do the same if they had a mind to defend themselves so that the nature of the fight was changed the Foot service was preferred and the Samnites were routed Nothing can be more plain that the Foot were preferred than this case for though upon other occasions the Consuls many times dismounted their Troops yet it was to reinforce and bring off the Foot that were overlaid by the Enemy but here they dismounted not to relieve their own Foot or to engage with the Enemies but fighting Horse against Horse and finding their Victory doubtful they thought though they could not master them on Horse-back they might do it on foot and accordingly they alighted I conclude therefore that a Body of well ordered Foot is very hardly to be broken but by another Body of the same Crassus and Marcus Antonius with a small Body of Horse but a good Army of Foot over-run and harrassed the whole Country of the Parthians for several days together though the Parthians had a vast Army of Horse to defend it Crassus 't is true
and retaken and following the fate of their Cities and that with no more difficulty or variety of fortune than when there are none at all as has been visible in Lombardy Romagna the Kingdom of Naples and all other quarters of Italy And as to those Citadels which are built in your new Conquests to defend you from your Enemies abroad they also are absolutely unnecessary where you have an Army in the field and where you have none they are of no use A good Army without any such Forts is sufficient to defend you And this has been found by experience by all those who have been thought excellent in the Arts of War or of Peace and particularly by the Romans and Spartans The Romans never erected any new Castles and the Spartans never suffered any old but what Cities soever they conquered down went their Walls nay even in their own Cities they would not permit any fortification as believing nothing so proper to defend them as the virtue and courage of their Citizens A Spartan being demanded by an Athenian Whether the Walls of Athens were not very beautiful Yes says the Spartan if it was but inhabited by Women A Prince therefore who has a good Army in the field may have some benefit by his Castles if they be upon the Frontiers of his Country or in some places upon the Coast where they may â—etard and entertain an Enemy for some time till the Army can come up But if the Prince has no Army on foot let his Castles be where they will upon the Frontiers or elsewhere they are either unserviceable or dangerous dangerous because they are easily lost and made use of by the Enemy against you or if they be too strong to be taken yet the Enemy marches on and leaves them unserviceable behind him For an Army that has no Enemy in the field to confront it takes no notice of Cities or Castles but passing by as it pleases rambles up and down and ravages the whole Country as may be observed both in ancient History and new Francesco Maria not many years since invaded the Dutchy of Urbin nor concern'd himself at all though he left ten of his Enemies Cities behind him Wherefore that Prince who has a good Army need not stand upon Castles and he that has no Castles need not trouble himself to build any all that he is to do is to fortifie the Town of his own residence as well as he can and accustom the Citizens to Arms that he may be able to sustain an Enemy at least for a while till he can make his conditions or procure relief All other designs are expensive in times of Peace and unprofitable in time of War so that he who considers what has been said must acknowledge that as the Romans were wise in every thing else so more particularly in their affairs with the Latins and Privernates in not thinking of Castles and Fortresses but of more noble and generous ways of securing their allegiance CHAP. XXV To attempt a City full of intestine divisions and to expect to carry it thereby is uncertain and dangerous THe divisions in the Commonwealth of Rome were so great betwixt the People and the Nobility that the Veientes and Hetrusci taking the opportunity conspired its destruction and having raised an Army and harrassed their whole Country the Senate sent out G. Manlius and M. Fabius against them whose Army encamping near the Enemy were so provoked by the insolence of their language that the Romans laid aside their private animosities and coming to a Battel overthrew them by which we may observe how easily we erre in our Counsels and how we lose things many times the same way by which we intended to gain them The Veientes thought by assaulting the Romans whilst they were embroil'd in their intestine divisions they should certainly overcome them and their invading them at that time united the Enemy and ruined themselves and not without reason for the occasion of discord and faction in a Commonwealth is idleness and peace and there is nothing unites like apprehension and War So that had the Veientes been wise as they should have been they should have forborn making War upon them at that time and have tryed other artificial ways to have destroyed them The surest way is to insinuate and make your self a Mediator betwixt them and to take upon your self the arbitration rather than they should come to blows When it is come to that you are privately and gently to supply the weaker side to foment and continue the War till they consume one another but be sure your supplies be not too great lest both parties begin to suspect you and believe your design is to ruine them both and make your self Prince If this way be well managed it will certainly bring you to the end which you desired for when both sides are weary they will commit themselves to your arbitration By these Arts the City of Pistoia returned to its dependance upon Florence for labouring under intestine divisions the Florentines favouring first one side and then the other but so slily that no occasion of jealousie was given to either brought them both in a short time to be weary of their distractions and throw themselves unanimously into their arms The Government of the City of Siena had never been changed by their own domestick dissentions had not the Florentines supplied both parties under-hand and fomented them that way whereas had they appeared openly and above board it would have been a means to have united them I shall add one example more Philip Visconti Duke of Milan made War many times upon the Florentines hoping by the dissentions of the City to have conquered them the more easily but he never succeeded So that complaining one time of his misfortunes he had this Expression The follies of the Florentines have cost me two millions of Mony to no purpose In short as the Veientes and Tuscans found themselves in an error when they thought by help of the differences in Rome to have mastered the Romans and were ruined themselves for their pains So it will fare with whoever takes that way to oppress or subvert any other Government CHAP. XXVI He who contemns or reproaches another person incurs his hatred without any advantage to himself I Look upon it as one of the greatest points of discretion in a man to forbear injury and threatning especially in words neither of them weakens the Enemy but threatning makes him more cautious and injury the more inveterate and industrious to revenge it This is manifest by the example of the Veienti of which I discoursed in the foregoing Chapter for not contenting themselves with the mischiefs that they brought upon them by the War they added contumely and opprobrious language which so provoked and enflamed the Roman Army that whereas before they were irresolute and seemed to decline it they now fell upon them unanimously and over-threw them So that it ought to be
the principal care in an Officer that neither himself nor his Soldiers do incense and exasperate his Enemy by ill language for that makes him but the more so does not at all hinder him from revenging himself but does the Author more mischief than the Enemy And of this we have a notable example in Asia Gabades the Persian General having besieged Amida a long time without any considerable progress weary of the tediousness of the Leaguer and hopeless of success he resolved to draw off and be gone but as he was raising his Camp the Garison perceiving it got all upon the Walls and with the basest and most provoking circumstances imaginable upbraided them with Cowardize which nettled Gabedes in such manner that he changed his Counsels sate down again and ply'd it with that industry and indignation that he took it in few days and gave it up to the fury of the Soldier The same thing hapned to the Veienti as I said before who not coâ—tenting themselves to make War upon the Romans went up under their very Noses to reproach them and what followed they irritated them so that they settled the courage and united the animosities of the Roman Army and put them into so high a sit of impatience that they forced the Consul to a Battel in which the Veientes received the reward of their contumacy He therefore who is General of an Army or Governour of a Commonwealth and commands or governs discreetly â—hkes particular care that such ill language be not used either in the City or Army to one another nor to the Enemy For to an Enemy they make him but worse unless such remedies be applyed as are practised by wise men The Romans having left two of their Legions at Capoua they conspired against the Capouans as shall be described more largely hereafter which occasioned a great sedition but it was afterwards appeased by Valerius Corvinus and among other things necessary in that juncture an Act of Oblivion was passed with great penalty to any man that should upbraid any of the Soldiers by their Sedition Tiberius Grachus having the command of a certain number of Servants in the time of Hanibal's Wars which the scarcity of men had forced the Romans to Arm made it no less than death for any man to reproach them by their servitude So mindful were the Roman Officers always of preventing such exprobration as knowing that nothing provokes and incenses a man so highly as to have his imperfections rip'd up whether in earnest or in jest 't is the same thing Nam facetiae asperae quando nimium ex vero traxere acrem sui memoriam relinquunt for biting raillery especially with a tincture of truth leaves an ill impression upon the Memory CHAP. XXVII Wise Princes and well governed States ought to be contented with victory for many times whilst they think to push things forward they lose all THat we use our Enemy with rude and dishonorable language proceeds either from insolence upon some victory past or extraordinary confidence of obtaining it which being false perplexes our understanding and makes us err not only in our words but our actions For from the time that error seizes upon our judgments it makes us many times lose the occasion of a certain good in hopes of a better that is but uncertain which is a point not unworthy our consideration seeing thereby our reason is disturbed and our State many times brought in danger of ruine and this I shall demonstrate by examples both ancient and modern because arguments cannot do it so distinctly Hanibal after he had defeated the Romans at Cannas sent Messengers to Carthage with the news of his Victory and to desire Supplies The Senate was a long time in Counsel what was to be done Annon a grave and solid Citizen being present advised them to make wise use of their Victory and think of making Peace with the Romans which they might do upon better conditions now they were Conquerors than they were in reason to expect upon any disaster That the Carthaginians had satisfied the whole world that they were able to balance the Romans for they had fought with them and beaten them and having gone so far with honour and success they ought not at least in his judgment expose what they had got and by hoping for more run a hazard of losing all But this Counsel was not followed though afterwards when too late it was found to be the better Alexander the great had conquered all the East when the Commonwealth of Tyre a great Town situate like Venice in the water amazed at the grandeur of Alexander sent Embassadors to him to offer him their obedience and subjection upon what terms he pleased only they were unwilling either himself or any of his Army should come into their Town Alexander disdaining to be excluded by a private City to whom the whole world had opened their Gates rejected their offers sent their Embassadors back and went immediately to besiege it The Town stood in the Sea and was well provided both with Victual and Ammunition insomuch as at four months end Alexander began to consider that that single Town had deprived his glory of more time than many other of his Conquests of much greater importance Whereupon he resolved to come to an agreement with them and to grant them the conditions which they demanded at first but the Tyrians transported with pride not only refused his proffers but put his Messengers to death upon which in a rage Alexander caused it to be assaulted immediately and it was done with that fury that the Town was taken and sack'd and part of the people put to the Sword and the rest made slaves In the year 1512. a Spanish Army came into the Dominions of the Florentines to restore the Medici in Florence and tax the City and they were called in and conducted by the Citizens themselves who had promised that as soon as they appeared in those parts they would take Arms and declare for them being entered in the plain and finding no body to joyn with them or supply them scarcity of provisions prevailed with the Spaniard to think of a Treaty and propose it to the Enemy but the Florentines were too high and reâ—used it which was the loss of Prato and the ruine of their State So then a Prince that is attack'd by another Prince more potent than himself cannot be guilty of a greater error than to refuse an agreement especially when it is offered for it can never be so bad but it shall have in it something of advantage for him who accepts it and perhaps contribute to his Victory It ought therefore to have satisfied the people of Tyre that Alexander accepted of the conditions which he had formerly denyed them and it had been Victory enough for them that with Arms in their hands they had forced so great a Conqueror to condescend It was the same case with the Florentines they ought to have
Province but when he was come into Italy instead of assisting him they conspir'd against him and slew him upon promise of indempnity and restitution of their Estates From whence we may learn what faith is to be given to such as are banished out of their own Country for as to their engagements they are nothing it is not to be doubted but when ever they can return by any other means they will leave you and betake themselves to any body else notwithstanding any promise or engagement to you and that which makes their promises and confidence the less to be trusted is because their extreme passion and desire to come home make them believe many things that are impossible and pretend many things that they do not believe so that betwixt what they believe and what they pretend they feed you with fair hopes but if you depend upon them you are undone your expence is all lost and your whole enterprize miscarries I shall only give you an instance in the aforesaid Alexander and Themistocles the Athenian Themistocles being in rebellion against the Athenians fled into Asia to Darius whom he solicited with large promises to an expedition into Greece Darius was persuaded and passed into Greece but Themistocles being unable to make his promises good either for shame of what he had done or fear of punishment for what he had not he poisoned himself and if Themistocles a man of that Excellence and Virtue could delude the King and promise more than he could perform how little are they to be trusted who having no such thing to restrain them give themselves up wholly to their passion and desires Princes therefore and States ought to be very tender of undertaking any enterprize upon the encouragement of an Exile for they seldom succeed And because it seldom happens that Towns are taken by intelligence within I shall discourse of it in my next Chapter and add what variety of ways the Romans used to come by their Conquests CHAP. XXXII How many several ways the Romans used to Conquer their Towns THe Romans being a martial people and given wholly to war they considered every thing very diligently that might any ways conduce to the facilitating their designs whether it was matter of charge or any thing else for this reason they seldom attempted any Town by the way of siege because they thought the expence and incommodity of that way would be more than could be recompenced by the taking it so as they never tried that whilst there was any other hopes and in all their great Wars there are but very few examples of any long Leaguers by them The ways which they took were commonly either by storm or surrender when they took a Town by storm it was either by open force or stratagem Open force was when they made their attaque without battering the walls which they called Aggredi urbem cum Corona To begirt a Town because they drew their whole Army round the Town and fell on in all quarters and in this manner it happened sometimes that they carried very considerable places at one Storm as when Scipio took new Carthage in Spain If this way was ineffectual they battered down the walls with their Rams and other engines of War Sometimes they min'd and entred the Towns under ground as they did at Veii sometimes that they might fight with the Enemy upon equal terms they built wooden Towers or raised Mounts to the height of the walls from whence they might plague and molest them within their Works The besieged were in most danger in the first case upon a general assault for their walls were to be made good in all places at once and it fell out many times that there were not men enough to supply and relieve all parts or if they had men enough to do that they were not all of an equal courage and when any gave ground the whole Town was like to be lost and by this means that way was often succesful When this way miscarried they seldom sate down before a Town or went formally to beleaguer it because it could not be done but with greater hazard to their Army for their quarters being to be extended and their guards round about the Town they must of necessity be thinner and weaker in some places and unable to make any considerable opposition if the Enemy should make any considerable eruption so that the sudden and brisk way was prefer'd when their walls were battered with their Engines those who were in the Town defended themselves much as we do now against great Guns by repairing their breaches as well as they could Their way of defeating their mines was by countermining and opposing themselves personally against the Enemy or disturbing them with their inventions as particularly putting of feathers and oyls and other stinking stuff into barrels of wood they set them on fire and then tumbled them among the Enemy that what with the fire the smoak and the stench they might not be able to endure them their Towers of wood they destroyed commonly by throwing fire into them and then for the mounts which were raised against the walls their way was to dig under the walls and steal away their earth or by loosening the foundations of the mount till it all fell to the ground But these ways of taking a Town are not long to be tried if they carried it not quickly they raised their siege and sought out some other way of prosecuting the War as Scipio did when he went over into Africk for having assaulted Utica without any success he altred his Counsels raised his Siege and addressed himself wholly to the bringing the Carthaginian Army to an engagement yet sometimes they continued their Siege as they did at Veii Carthage and Ierusalem as to their way of taking of Towns by fraud and intelligence as they took Paloepolis the Romans and others attempted many places after that manner but they seldom succeeded for those secret correspondencies are easily discovered and the least discovery spoils the whole design because the conspiracy is commonly discovered before it comes to execution it either being unpracticable in it self or betrayed by the infidelity of some of the Conspirators there being a necessity of meeting and discoursing with such persons as it is not lawful to discourse with but upon some specious occasion But suppose it be not discovered in the management there are so many difficulties in putting it into action that it is almost impossible to overcome them for if you come too soon or too late all is spoiled if any noise be made as by the geese in the Capitol the least disorder the least error or mistake destroys the whole enterprize Besides these things being executed in the night the darkness strikes a terror into the instruments and the more because they are commonly unacquainted with the place or people which they are to attaque and therefore every little noise or accident is sufficient to confound
them and every trifling imagination will make them turn their backs but no body was so daring and succesful in these fraudulent and nocturnal designs as Aratus Sicionius though in the day-time he was but like other men which was rather from some secret virtue in him than any excellence in the way And as to the taking of Towns by surrender they either surrender freely or by force When they do it freely it is done out of some extrinsick necessity as when Capua surrendred to the Romans for fear of falling into the hands of the Samnites or else out of desire to be well governed as being taken with the administration of that Prince to whom they surrender and thus it was with the Rhodians the Massillians and other Cities which gave themselves up to the Romans upon no other inducement but that they might live more happily under the Roman Laws and be under a better Constitution But there are many Cities which surrender by force which force proceeds either from the fatigues and calamities of a tedious Siege or from continual excursions and depredations to which they are subject and against which they have no other way to secure themselves And then all the ways we have mentioned the Romans made more use of this carrying on their wars with their neighbours 450 years together in this manner for the most part for though they tried all the other they found this the more profitable and safe In Sieges there is delay and loss of time in storms hazard and danger and uncertainty in conspiracies but in bringing things to a Battel it has been seen that by beating the enemies Army they have got a whole Kingdom in a day whereas an obstinate Town has cost them several years CHAP. XXXIII How the Romans upon any Expedition gave their Generals general Commissions I Am of opinion that to read the History of Livy with any profit and advantage we must consider not only the actions but the whole means and process both of the People and Senate of Rome Among other things it is very remarkable with what authority they invested their Consuls Dictators and Generals of their Armies and it was so great that the Senate reserved to it self only the power of making Peace or new Wars as they saw occasion all the rest was left to the discretion of the Consul who might fight or not fight assault this Town or that Town as he pleased without any contradiction This may be proved by many examples by more especially by what hapned in an Expedition against the Tuscans for Fabius the Consul having defeated the Enemy at Sutri resolving to pass the Forrest of Gimina with his Army and invade Tuscany he was so far from receiving Orders from the Senate or consulting them in the business that he gave them not the least notice though the War was to be removed into another Country and like to be very dangerous which appeared by the resolution of the Senate in that very case for having heard of his Victory at Sutri and apprehending that he might fall upon such counsels and pass his Army into Tuscany thorow that dangerous Forrest they sent two Embassadors to him to advise him from that Expedition but they came too late for he was gone before and having over-run the whole Country and routed the Enemy instead of hindering his design the Embassadors went back with the news of his Victory This custom of the Romans if it be seriously considered will be found to be very solid and wise For should the Senate have been consulted by their Generals upon every particular occasion and have expected all their Orders from them it would have made their Generals less circumspect and vigorous because the honour of the Victory would not accrew totally to them but they must participate with the Senate Besides the Senate understood very well that Fortune is various and that many accidents and advantages happen which cannot be known or improved by any but those who are present so that if they should desire to be consulted in things of which they can have no knowledge they must of necessity err though they were persons of never so much experience and wisdom Wherefore they gave their General absolute power of disposing all things at his own will and the whole honour of the Expedition was to be his that it might be a spur to prick on his diligence and a bridle to regulate his rashness And this I have thought fit to insert that I might shew how much the famous Commonwealths in our times do differ from the Romans particularly the Venetians and Florentines who are so strict with their General that if a great Gun be but to be planted against a Town the Senate must be advised and give order how and from whence it is to play But this custom deserves commendation as much as the rest which all together have brought their affairs into that sad condition in which they are at present THE DISCOURSES OF Nicholas Machiavel CITIZEN and SECRETARY OF FLORENCE Upon the First Decade of TITVS LIVIVS LIBER III. CHAP. I. That a Sect or Commonwealth be long-liv'd it is necessary to correct it often and reduce it towards its first Principles 'T IS a certain truth that the things of this World are determined and a set time appointed for their duration but those run thorow the whole course which is assigned them by their Stars who keep their body in such order that it may not alter at all or if it does it is for the better I speak now of mixt bodies as Commonwealths and Sects and I say that those alterations are salutiferous which reduce them towards their first principles and therefore the best ordered and longest liv'd are they who by their own orders may be often renewed or else by some accident without the help of the said orders may tend to renovation 't is as clear as the day that no bodies of men are of long duration unless they be renewed and the way to renew them as is said before is to reduce them to their principles For the Fundamentals of all Sects Commonwealths and Kingdoms have always something of good in them by means of which they recover their first reputation and grandeur And because in process of time that goodness corrupts that body must of necessity die unless something intervenes that reduces it to its first principles The Physitian speaking of the body of man tell us Quod quotidie aggregatur aliquid quod quandoque indiget curatione That there is not a day passes but it contracts something which afterwards will require to be cured 'T is the same with the Body Politick and as to them I say that they are to be cured by being renewed and they are renewed partly by external accident and partly by internal prudence The first happens as it were by destiny or fate as that Rome should be taken by the French that thereby it might reassume its old customs and
by the Examples of good Men or good Laws that may reduce it towards its first principles Manlius then had been a great and memorable person had he been born in a corrupt City for whoever designs any innovation in a State whether it be for the restitution of liberty or the erection of Tyranny is particularly to regard the manners of the people and to consider how far they are disposed to submit to his ambition and by so doing he may be able to judge of the success of his Enterprize For to endeavour to make a people free that are servile in their Nature is as hard a matter as to keep them in servitude who are disposed to be free And because we have said before That in all their operations men are to consider and proceed according to the quality of the times we shall speak of it at large in the following Chapter CHAP. IX How he that would succeed must accommodate to the times I Have many times considered with my self that the occasion of every mans good or bad fortune consists in his correspondence and accommodation with the times We see some people acting furiously and with an impetus others with more slowness and caution and because both in the one and the other they are immoderate and do not observe their just terms therefore both of them do err but their error and misfortune is least whose customs suit and correspond with the times and who comports himself in his designs according to the impulse of his own Nature Every one can tell how Fabius Maximus conducted his Army and with what carefulness and caution he proceeded contrary to the ancient heat and boldness of the Romans and it hapned that grave way was more conformable to those times for Hanibal coming young and brisk into Italy and being elated with his good fortune as having twice defeated the Armies of the Romans that Commonwealth having lost most of her best Soldiers and remaining in great fear and confusion nothing could have happen'd more seasonably to them than to have such a General who by his caution and cunctation could keep the Enemy at a Bay Nor could any times have been more fortunate to his way of proceeding for that that slow and deliberate way was natural in Fabius and not affected appeared afterwards when Scipio being desirous to pass his Army into Africk to give the finishing blow to the War Fabius opposed it most earnestly as one who could not force or dissemble his Nature which was rather to support wisely against the difficulties that were upon him than to search out for new So that had Fabius directed Hanibal had continued in Italy and the reason was because he did not consider the times were altered and the method of the War was to be changed with them And if Fabius at that time had been King of Rome he might well have been worsted in the War as not knowing how to frame his Counsels according to the variation of the times But there being in that Commonwealth so many brave men and excellent Commanders of all sorts of tempers and humours fortune would have it That as Fabius was ready in hard and difficult times to sustain the Enemy and continue the War so afterwards when affairs were in a better posture Scipio was presented to finish and conclude it And hence it is that an Aristocracy or free State is longer lived and generally more fortunate than a Principality because in the first they are more flexible and can frame themselves better to the diversity of the times For a Prince being accustomed to one way is hardly to be got out of it though perhaps the variation of the times require it very much Piero Soderini whom I have mentioned before proceeded with great gentleness and humanity in all his actions and he and his Country prospered whilst the times were according but when the times changed and there was a necessity of laying aside that meekness and humility Piâ—â— was at a loss and he and his Country were both ruined Pope Iulius XI during the whole time of his Papacy carried himself with great vigour and vehemence and because the times were agreeable he prospered in every thing but had the times altered and required other Counsels he had certainly been ruined because he could never have complyed And the reason why we cannot change so easily with the times is twofold first because we cannot readily oppose our selves against what we naturally desire and next because when we have often tryed one way and have always been prosperous we can never persuade our selves that we can do so well any other and this is the true cause why a Princes fortune varies so strangely because she varies the times but he does not alter the way of his administrations And it is the same in a Commonwealth if the variation of the times be not observed and their Laws and Customs altered accordingly many mischiefs must follow and the Government be ruined as we have largely demonstrated before but those alterations of their Laws are more slow in a Common-wealth because they are not so easily changed and there is a necessity of such times as may shake the whole State to which one man will not be sufficient let him change his proceedings and take new measures as he pleases But because we have mentioned Fabius Maximus and how he kept Hanibal at a Bay I think it not amiss to enquire in the next Chapter whether a General who is resolved upon any terms to engage can be obstructed by the Enemy CHAP. X. A General cannot avoid fighting when the Enemy is resolved to Engage him upon any terms CNeus Sulpitius Dictator says Livy adversus Gallos bellum trahebat nolens se fortunae committere adversus hostem quem tempus deteriorem indies locus alienus faceret Cneus Sulpitius the Dictator declined fighting with the French because he would not expose himself unnecessarily against an Enemy who by the incommodity of the season and inconvenience of his Station was every day in danger to be undone When such a fault happens as deceives all or the greatest part of Mankind I think it not improper to reprehend it over and over again and therefore though I have formerly in several places shown how much our actions in great things are different from those in ancient times yet I think it not superfluous to say something of it here If in any thing we deviate from the practice of the Ancients it is in our Military Discipline in which we are so absolutely new that there is scarce any thing used that was preferred by our Ancestors and the reason is because Commonwealths and Princes being unwilling to expose themselves to danger have shifted off that study and charge upon other people And when in our times any Prince goes in person into the field no extraordinary matter is to be expected for he takes the command upon him to show his grandeur and magnificence more
than for any thing else Yet they commit fewer faults by reviewing their Armies sometimes and keeping that command in their own hands than Republicks are wont to do especially in Italy where trusting all to other people they understand nothing of War themselves and on the other side in their Counsels and determinations which to show their superiority they reserve to themselves they commit a thousand times more errors than in the field some of which I have mentioned elsewhere but I shall speak here of one of them and that of more than ordinary importance when these unactive Princes or effeminate Commonwealths send out an Army the wisest thing which they think they can give in command to their General is to enjoyn him from fighting and above all things to have a care of a Battel supposing that therein they imitate the wisdom of Fabius Maximus who preserved the State by deferring the combat but they are mistaken and do not consider that most commonly that injunction is either idle or dangerous for this is most certain a General who desires to keep the Field cannot avoid fight when the Enemy presses and makes it his business to engage him So that to command a General in that Nature in as much as to bid him fight when the Enemy pleases and not when he sees occasion himself For to keep the field and avoid fighting is to be done no way so securely as by keeping 50 miles off and sending out store of Spies and Scouts that may give you notice of the Enemies approach and opportunity to retreat There is another way likewise to secure your self aâ—d that is to shut your self up in some strong Town but both the one and the other are dangerous In the first case The Country is exposed to the depredations of the Enemy and a generous Prince will sooner run the hazard of a Battel than spin out a War with so much detriment to his Subjects In the second your ruine is evident for cooping up your Army in a City the Enemy will block you up or besiege you and then the multitude of your men will quickly bring a scarcity of provisions and supplies being cut off you will be forced to surrender so that to avoid fighting either of these two ways is very pernicious Fabius his way of standing upon his guard and keeping his Army in places of advantage is laudable and good when your Army is so strong that the Enemy dares not attack you Nor can it be said that Fabius declined fighting but that he deferred till he could do it with advantage for had Hanibal advanced against him Fabius would have kept his ground and engaged him but Hanibal was too cunning for that so that Hanibal as well as Fabius avoided fighting but if either of them would have fought upon disadvantage the other had only three remedies that is the two foresaid and flying That this which I say is true is manifest by a thousand examples but more particularly by the War which the Romans made upon Philip of Macedon Philip being invaded by the Romans resolved not to come to a Battel and to avoid it he as Fabius did in Italy encamped his Army upon the top of a Mountain and entrenched himself so strongly that he believed the Romans durst not have ventured to come at him But they not only adventured but removed him from the Mountain forced him to fly with the greatest part of his Army and had it not been for the unpassableness of the Country which hindered the pursuit the Macedonians had all been cut off Philip then being unwilling to fight and having as I said before encamped upon the Mountains not far from the Romans durst not trust himself to his advantages and having found by experience that he was not secure there he would not pin himself up in a Town but made choice of the other way and kept himself at a distance so as when the Romans came into one Province he would remove into another and what place soever the Romans left he would be sure to come to At length finding this protraction of the War made his affairs but worse and that his Subjects were harrassed by both Armies he resolved to try his fortune and bring all to the decision of a Battel But it is convenient to avoid fighting when your Army is in the same condition as those of Fabius and Sulpitius that is when it is so considerable that the Enemy fears to attack you in your entrenchments and though he has got some footing in your Country yet not so much as is able to supply him with provisions in this case 't is best to decline fighting and follow the example of Sulpitius Nolens se fortunae committere c. But in all other cases it is not to be done but with dishonour and danger for to fly as Philip did is as bad as to be routed and more dishonorable because he gave no proof of his courage and though he escaped by the difficulty of the Country yet whoever follows his example without that convenience may chance to be ruin'd No man will deny but Hanibal was a great Soldier and of more than ordinary experience when he went into Africa against Scipio if he had seen it for his advantage to have protracted the War he would have done it and perchance being a great Captain and having as good an Army he would have done it the same way as Fabius did in Italy but seeing he did not do it it is probable he was diverted by some extraordinary occasion For that Prince who has got an Army together if he perceives that for want of pay or supplies he is not likely to keep them long is stark mad if he tries not his fortune before his Army disbands for by delaying he is certainly lost by fighting he may possibly overcome And above all things whether we are victorious or beaten we are to behave ourselves honourably and 't is more honourable to be overcome by force than by some error to run your self into incommodities that ruine you afterwards 'T is not unlikely but Hanibal might be impelled by some such necessity and on the other side Scipio if Hanibal should have deferred fighting might have chose whether he would have attacked him in his Trenches because he had already conquered Syphax and got such footing in Africk that he was as safe and with as much commodity as in Italy but it was otherwise with Hanibal when he had to do with Fabius and with the French when they had to do with Sulpitius And he who invades an Enemies Country avoids fighting with more difficulty as being obliged when ever the Enemy appears to obstruct him to give him Battel and if he sets down before any Town he is obliged so much the more as in our times it happen'd to Charles Duke of Burgundy who was beaten up in his Leaguer before Morat by the Swizzers and defeated And the same thing fell out to the
French at the Seige of Novarra where they were attacht and beaten by the Swizzers CHAP. XI One person that has many Enemies upon his hands though he be inferiour to them yet if he can sustain their first impression carries commonly the Victory THe power of the Tribunes of the people was great and necessary in the City of Rome to correct the ambition of the Nobility who otherwise would have debauch'd the said City much sooner than they did But as it happens in other things so it happened in this in the best and most beneficial thing to the Commonwealth there was an occult and remote evil that lay snug which required new Laws and new methods to suppress For the insolence of the Tribunitial authority grew so great that it became terrible both to the Senate and people and had doubtlesly produced some great mischief to the Commonwealth had not Appius Claudius by his great wisdom found out a way to temper and ballance their fury by the intercession of their Colleagues and the way was by choosing out some person among the Tribunes whom either out of fear or corruption or love to his Country they could dispose to withstand the designs of his Brethren and oppose himself against them whenever their resolutions were tending to the diminution of the Nobility or prejudice of the State Which way of restraining the petulancy of the Tribunes was for a long time of great advantage to the Romans and may give us occasion to consider whether a combination of several great persons against one less powerful than they whilst united is like to be successful against him that is alone or whether the single person has the advantage against the Confederacy I answer That those whose Forces are united are many times stronger but their performances are seldom so great as the single persons though he be nothing so strong for committing an infinite number of other things in which the single person has the advantage he will be able with a little industry to break and divide and enfeeble them To this purpose there is no need of going to antiquity for examples where there is plenty enough the passages of our own times will furnish us sufficiently In the year 1484 all Italy confederated against the Venetian who when they were so over-powr'd and distress'd that they were unable to keep the field found a way to work off Count Lodavic Governor of Milan from their League by which means they not only obtained a Peace and restitution of what they had lost but they got a good part of the Dutchy of Ferrara so that they whose Forces were too weak to appear before the Enemy when they came to treat were the greatest gainers by the War Not many years since the whole Christian world seemed to conspire against France yet before the end of the War the Spaniard fell off from the League made his Peace with the French and forced the rest of the Confederates one after one to do the same And from hence we may easily collect that as often as many Princes or States are confederated together against any single Prince or Commonwealth if the single Prince and Commonwealth be strong enough to withstand their first impression and spin out the War he will certainly prevail but if his force be not sufficient to do that he is in extraordinary danger as it happen'd to the Venetians for had they been able to have sustained their first shock and protracted the War till they had debauched some of the Confederates the French had never done them so much mischief and they had preserv'd themselves from ruine But their Army being too weak to confront them and their time too little to divide them they were undone and this is evident by what happen'd afterward for as soon as the Pope had recovered what he had lost he reconciled himself and became their friend the Spaniard did the same and both of them would have been glad to have continued Lombardy to the Venetians rather than the French should have got it and made himself so considerable in Italy The Venetians at that time might have prevented a great part of their calamities had they given some small part of their Territory to the Enemy and thereby have secured the rest but then they must have given it in time and so as it might not have appeared to have been done by necessity as they might well have done before the War was commenced when that was begun it would have been dishonourable and perhaps ineffectual But before those troubles there were few of the Venetian Citizens that could foresee a danger fewer that could remedy it and none at all that could advise To conclude therefore this Chapter I do pronounce that as the Roman remedy against the ambition of their Tribunes was the multitude of them out of which they always found some or other that they could make for the interest of the Publick so it is a ready remedy for any Prince that is engaged against a confederate Enemy when he can break their League and work any of the Confederates to a separation CHAP. XII A wise General is to put a necessity of fighting upon his own Army but to prevent it to his Enemies WE have formerly discoursed of what use and importance necessity is in humane Exploits and shown how many men compelled by necessity have done glorious things and made their memories immortal Moral Philosophers have told us That the Tongue and the Hands are noble Instruments of themselves yet they had never brought things to that exactness and perfection had not necessity impelled them The Generals therefore of old understanding well the virtue of this necessity and how much more desperate and obstinate their Soldiers were rendered thereby made it their care to bring their Soldiers into a necessity of fighting and to keep it from their Enemies to which end they many times opened a passage for the Enemies Army which they might easily have obstructed and precluded it to their own when they might as easily have passed Whoever therefore desires to make his Garrison stout and couragious and obstinate for the defence of a Town or to render his Army pertinacious in the Field is above all things to reduce them into such a necessity or at least to make them believe it So that a wise General who designs the besieging of a Town judges of the easiness or difficulty of the expugnation from the necessity which lies upon the Citizens to defend themselves If the necessity of their defence be great his enterprize is the more difficult because the courage and obstinacy of the besieged is like to be the greater but where there is no such necessity there is no such danger Hence it is that revolted Towns are much harder to be recovered than they were to be taken at first for at first having committed no fault they were in fear of no punishment and therefore surrendered more easily But in the other case
having the guilt of their defect up their Spirits they are fearful of revenge and so become more obstinate in their defence These are not unusual and yet there are other causes which render the minds of people obstinate in their defence and one of them is the natural hatred and animosity which is frequently betwixt neighbouring Princes and States which proceeds from an infatiable desire of Dominion in Princes and as zealous an inclination to liberty in Commonwealths especially if they be constituted as in Tuscany where that emulation and jealousie has made them refractory both on the one side and the other Hence it is though that the Florentines have been at greater charges than the Venetians yet their acquests are not so much because the Towns in Tuscany were most of them free by consequence more difficult to be brought to subjection whereas the Towns which the Venetians conquered having been most of them under Princes and accustomed to servitude it was indifferent to them under whose dominion they were and they are so far from resisting a change that they do many times desire it So that though the Cities upon the Frontiers of the Venetian were generally stronger than those upon the Frontiers of the Florentine yet they were reduced with more ease because being not so free they were less obstinate in their defence when therefore a wise General resolves upon a Siege he is with all diligence to take away that necessity from the Citizens which may make them inflexible either by promising indemnity if they have deserved to be punished or if it be only their liberty of which they are fearful by assuring them that his designs are not against that but only against the ambition and exorbitancy of some particular persons which kind of promises had strange effects in the facilitating of Enterprizes and the taking of Towns for though wise men will easily discover the fraud yet the multitude are commonly so impatient of War and so mad to be at quiet that they shut their Eyes against any thing of mischief that comes to them under propositions of peace by which means many Cities have lost their liberty as it happened to Florence not long since and to M. Crassus and his Army heretofore who though he was sensible that the promises of the Parthians were fraudulent and made only to keep his Soldiers from that necessity of defending themselves yet he could not convince them nor prevail with them to stand bravely upon their Guard but being blinded with their overtures of Peace both Army and General were cut off as may be seen by the History The Samnites put on by the ambition of some of their Citizens brake their Peace with the Romans and invaded their Country but being afterwards sensible of what they had done they sent Embassadors to Rome offering restitution of what they had taken and to deliver up the Authors of that Counsel into their hands â—o be punished as they pleas'd but being rejected and their Embassadors sent home without any hopes of agreement Pontius their General used it as an argument to encourage his men to fight more obstinately that the Romans having refused their fair overtures of Peace were resolved upon War and therefore there was no other course but of necessity they must fight And says he Iustum est bellum quibus est necessarium pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis spes est That Wur is just that is necessary and Arms are piously taken up by him who has no other hopes to secure himself Upon which necessity he founded the hopes of his Victory C. Manlius was at the head of an Army against the Vejentes and part of the Army of the Vejentes being got into his Camp Manlius to cut of their retreat doubled his Guards at the gates and fortified all the Passes by which they were to return but the Vejentes perceiving they were desperate fought with so much courage and fury that they killed the Consul and had cut off his whole Army had not one of the Tribunes very wisely opened them a way to be gone In which action we may observe that whilst the Vejentes were under a necessity of fighting there was no resisting of their courage but when a way was opened for their retreat they chose rather to fly The Volsci and the Equi were entered upon the confines of the Romans who sent their Consuls against them with an Army and coming to a Battel it happened that in the heat of it the Volsci were inclosed by the Romans and as it were shut up in their own Camp Vettius Mescins their General finding their exigence and that there was a necessity of being killed or making their way by the Sword Ite mecum says he to his Soldiers Non murus nonvallum armati armatis obstant virtute pares quae ultimum maximum telum est necessitate superiores estis Follow me then couragiously you have no Wall no Rampart nothing but armed men to withstand you you are equal to them in valour and being under necessity have the same advantage of the Weapon For Livy calls it in this place the highest and heaviest of weapons Camillus one of the wisest of all the Roman Generals having stormed and entred Veii with some part of his Army to facilitate his Victory and take away from the Enemy that last necessity of fighting gave Orders and so loud that the Vejentes might be sure to hear that no Soldier should dare to touch any man who had thrown down his Army by which Proclamation every man was encouraged to throw down his Arms and the City was taken with so little loss that since that time that Stratagem has been used by several Commanders CHAP. XIII Whether we are more safe in a good General with a bad Army or a good Army with a bad General MArtius Coriolanus being banished from Rome retired to the Volsci where having got an Army together he returned to Rome to revenge himself for the injury his fellow Citizens had done him and he had done it effectually had not the Prayers and Piety of his Mother prevailed more upon him than all the power of the Romans From which passage Titus Livius observes that the Roman Commonwealth encreased more by the virtue of their Commanders than by the excellence of their Soldiers because though the Volsci had been always beaten before yet when they got a Roman General they were too hard for the Romans But though Livy was of that opinion in that place yet in many parts of his History there are instances where the private Soldiers have done great things and sometimes fought better and in better order after their Consuls were killed than they had done whilst they were living Thus it happened in the Army which the Romans had in Spain under the Command of the two Scipio's which when both their Commanders were slain behaved it self so well that it not only defended it self but defeated the Enemy and
preserved that Province to the Romans So that in the whole there are examples on both sides where the Soldiers have done bravely and got the Victory by their valour and where the Conduct of the General has done as much as a whole Army from whence it may be concluded that they are mutually useful and that the Soldier is as much advantaged by the excellence of his General as the General by the courage of his Army However this I think will not be unworthy our consideration whether is most formidable a good Army under a bad Commander or a good Commander with a bad Army In the opinion of Caesar neither of them was considerable for when he went into Spain against Afranius and Petreius who had a good Army under their command he went with much confidence because as he said himself Ibat ad exercitum sine duce He went against an Army without a head reflecting thereby upon the insufficiency of their Generals Again when he went into Thessaly against Pompey his expression was Vado an ducem fine Exercitu I go now against a General without an Army It remains now that we consider whether it be most easie for a good Captain to make a good Army or a good Army to make a good Captain But to this in my opinion it is easily answered for many good men in an Army can sooner select one out of their number and instruct him so as that he may be fit to command the rest than the best General in the world can make an Army expert and ready Lucullus when he was sent against Mithridates was utterly unexperienced in matters of War yet being in a good Army where his inferior Officers were good he quickly became a good General The Romans for want of men were forced to arm their Servants and having referred them to be disciplin'd by Sempronius Graccâ—us in a short time he made them excellent Soldiers Pelopidas and Epominandas after they had rescued their Country from the Tyranny of the Spartans in a short time made their Country-men so good Soldiers that they were not only able to contend but to conquer the Spartans So that the case is equal and which soever is good may make the other so too Nevertheless a good Army without a good Commander grows insolent and dangerous as it hapned in the Macedonian Army after Alexander was dead and as it is in civil Wars among all old Soldiers so that I think if there be more confidence to be reposed in the one than in the other it is to be rather in the General than the Army especially if he has time to instruct and discipline his Men for an Army without a head is insolent and mutinous Those Captains therefore are worthy of double honour who have not only the Enemy to overcome but are to instruct and prepare their Forces before they bring them to engage And in doing so they do highly recommend the Conduct of their General which is so rare a thing that if the trouble were laid upon many they would be much less esteemed and respected than they are now CHAP. XIV What strange effects new inventions have sometimes in a Battle and how new Noises have the same WHat strange consequences have succeeded from sudden and unexpected accidents that have been seen or heard in the heat of the Battel appears by several examples in History but especially in the conflict betwixt the Romans and the Volsci where Quintius observing one of the wings of his Army to stagger and give ground cry'd out to them to stand firm for that in the other wing the Victory was theirs with which words he not only reincouraged his own men but put such a terror upon the Enemy that they fled in good earnest And if in a well ordered Army those unexpected vociferations have such wonderful effect in a tumultuous and ill governed Army they have much more where everything is more subject to the agitation of such winds and of this we have a memorable example of our times The City of Perugia not many years since was divided into two parts the Oddi and the Baglioni The Baglioni prevailing the Oddi were banished But the Oddi having got an Army together and brought them privatly to a place not far from Perugia by the favour of their friends they were let one night into the Town and possessed themselves as far as the Piazza And because the Streets were chained up from one side to other to hinder the passage of the Horse the Oddesche had a man who went before them with a great engine of Iron wherewith he brake the chains and he had done his work so effectually that he had broke all the chains but what opened into the Piazza the alarm being taken and every body crying out Arm Arm he who broke down the chains being pressed so close by the throng that was behind him that he had not room for his blow cryed out to those that were next Back Back intending only to have made more room for his arm But they who were next him calling back to those who were behind them by degress the word went through the whole Army and they who were in the Rear not knowing the reason began to run and being followed by those who were next the whole Army retreated by little and little till at last they brake out into an absolute flight by which inconsiderable accident the Oddi were defeated of their design So that it is to be considered that in a Battel order is not only to be taken that the Army be well drawn up and put in a good posture to fight but that no such trifling accident be able to discompose it For if for any thing the popular multitude be unfit for the Wars it is because every noise rumour or alarm distracts them and puts them to the rout Wherefore it ought to be a principal care in a good General to appoint such persons as are to receive all orders and words of command and derive them to the rest that by so doing the Soldiers being accustomed to their Officers may not receive any such orders but from such persons as are commissioned thereunto the want of which custom has many times produc'd very great confusion As to apparitions and such things as are many times seen it is the part of a good General to contrive and exhibit in the very height of the Battel such sights as may incourage his own men and discourage the Enemy for among many accidents which conduce to your victory this may be especially effectual To this purpose is that invention of which Sulpitius made use against the French being drawn up and ready to engage the Enemy he caused all the Servants and refuse of his Army to be armed and mounted upon the Mules and Horses belonging to the Baggage and having furnished them so formally with Colours and Trumpets that they appeared a compleat body of Horse he disposed them behind a hill where
and says Operae pretium est audire qui omnia prae divitiis humana spernunt neque honori magno locum â—â—que virtuti putant esse nisi effuse affluant opes It is pleasant to hear some people talk of râ—ches as if nothing in this world were comparable to them as if all honour and virtue depended only upon the Estate Cincinnatus as I said before was at Plough in his Farm which consisted only of four acres of ground when the Embassadors came to him from the Senate to salute him Dictator and to remonstrate their distress Having received their message he made no delay but call'd immediately for his Robe came directly for Rome rais'd his Army and marched away for the relief of Minutius having defeated at the Enemy and pillaged their Camp he would not suffer the Army of Minutius to participate in the prize telling him I do not think it reasonable that you should have share in the prey who was so near being a prey your self After which he degraded Minutius of his Consulship and made him only a Legate with this expression You shall continue here in this Station till you learn to behave your self more like a Consul The same Dictator in the same expedition made L. Tarquinius his Master of his Horse though he had none to be Master of his own for his poverty was such he was forced to serve on foot 'T is remarkable how in those days poverty and honour were not so inconsistant as now and that to an excellent and worthy person as Cincinnatus was four acres of Land was a sufficient Estate In the days of Aâ—tilius Regulus poverty was in the same reputation for being at the head of an Army in Africa and having conquered the Carthaginians he made it his request to the Senate that he might be permitted to come home and husband his own Farm which his Servants had neglected And this frugallty of the Romans is exceedingly wonderful for looking for nothing but praise and honour from their Victories they brought all their prize into the publick Treasury and doubtless had Regulus proposed any thing of advantage to himself by that War he would never have been concerned to have had his four acres neglected by his Servants Nor was the modesty and magnanimity of the Romans less remarkable who being put into command and placed at the head of an Army thought themselves above any Prince no King no Commonwealth was able to dismay them But when their Commissions expired and they were returned privately to their houses no body so frugal no body so humble no body so laborious so obedient to the Magistrates or respectful to their superiors as they insomuch that one would have thought it impossible the same minds should have been capable of such strange alterations And this poverty continued till the time of Paulus Emilius which was the last age of that Commonwealths happiness for though he by his Triumph enriched the whole City yet not regarding his own fortunes he continued poor himself and poverty was in that esteem that Paulus to gratifie and encourage one of his Sons-in-Law who had behaved himself bravely in those Wars gave him a silver Cup which was the first piece of Plate that was ever seen in his family And here I have a fair occasion to enlarge upon poverty and show how much more useful it is to Mankind than riches and how many excellent Arts it has produced and improved which riches and luxury have destroyed But this having been treated of so amply by other people before I shall mention it no farther at this time CHAP. XXVI Women are many times the destruction of States IN the City of Ardea there was a great controversie betwixt the Patricii and the People about the Marriage of a young Lady who being a great Fortune had a great many Servants but more especially two one of them a Patrician the other a Plebean Her Father being dead her Guardian would needs bestow her upon the Plebean her Mother was for the Nobleman not agreeing among themselves it came to a tumult and by degrees to blows insomuch as the whole Nobility appeared in Arms for the one and all the people for the other The result was the people being beaten out of the Town and sending to the Volsci for aid the Nobles sent to Rome The Volsci were readiest and coming first to the assistance of the Plebeans they clap'd down before the Town They had not entrench'd themselves long but the Roman Army came upon their backs and shut them up betwixt the Town and them insomuch that they were quickly distressed and forced to surrender at discretion The Romans entred the Town killed all that were accessary to the sedition and setled their affairs In which passage there are many observable things First we see Women have been the occasion of much desolation prejudice and dissention The Rape of Lucrece lost the Tarquins their Government the attempt upon Virginia was the ruine of the Decem-viri And Aristotle in his Politicks imputes the abomination of Tyranny to the injuries they do to people upon the account of Women by their Debauchments their Violences or Adulteries as we have show'd at large in our Chapter about Conspiracies So that in the Government of any Kingdom or Commonwealth those things are not to be reckon'd as trifles but as the occasions of much mischief and are by all means to be prevented before the rancour has taken too deep root and is not to be cured but by the destruction of the State as it hapned to the Ardeates who let it go so long among their fellow Citizens that at last they came to an absolute division not to be composed nor setled but by foreign assistance which is always the forerunner of servitude and slavery CHAP. XXVII How the civil discords in a City are to be composed and of the falsity of that opinion That the best way to keep a City in subjection is to keep it divided IN the reconciliation of a City that is labouring under civil dissentions we are to follow the example of the Roman Consuls and observe their method in composing the distractions among the Ardeates which was by cutting off the chief Actors and confiscating their Estates And to compose the distractions of a City there are three ways either by cutting off the chief actors as the Romans did by banishing them the City or by forcing them to an accommadation upon such penalties as they shall be afraid to incur of these three ways the last is most dangerous uncertain and unprofitable because it is impossible where much blood has been shed or much injury done that that peace should last long which was made by compulsion for seeing and hearing and conversing with one another daily their animosities must of necessity revive and provoke them to new outrage by presenting them with new occasions of indignation and revenge and of this we cannot have an apter example than in the City of
but told them Quod Romani si vincuntur non minuuntur animis nec si vincunt insolescere solent That 〈◊〉 mans were never dejected by ill forâ—une nor elated by good The Venetians acted quite the other way who having got a little good fortune ascribing it to a wrong cause as if it had proceeded from their own power and virtue had the insolence to call the King of France Son of St. Mark and taking a fancy that they should bring their Commonwealth to as great a condition of grandeur and power as the Romans they despis'd the Church and all the Princes of Italy besides Afterwards when their fortune began to change and they received a small defeat at Vaila by the French they lost their whole Empire in a day part revolted and part they gave up themselves to the Pope and King of Spain and so much had they abandoned themselves to fear and consternation that they sent Embassadors to the Emperor to make themselves his Tributaries and writ poor and mean Letters to the Pope to move him to compassion and to this extremity of dejection they were brought in four days time by the loss but of one half of their Army for the other of their Proveditory retreated and came off safe to Verona with more than 25000 horse and foot so that had there been any courage either in the Citizens or Senate they might quickly have recruited and shewn their force again and if they could not have conquered they might at least have lost all with more reputation or possibly have brought the enemy to some honourable accord but the poorness of their spirit and the illness of their military discipline took from them at one time both their courage and state and so it will be with whosoever follows the example of the Venetians for this insolence in good fortune and dejection in bad proceeds from their manner of education which if vain and idle will make you so too whereas if it be otherwise it will give you a better notion of the World and teach you in both fortunes to behave your self with more moderation and as this is true in single persons so it is in Commonwealths which are good or bad according to their manner of living We have often said it before and think it not amiss to repeat it again that the foundation of all Governments consists in their Military discipline and that where that is defective neither their Laws nor any thing else can be good for thorow the whole tract of this History it appears that there is a necessity your Militia should be good and that cannot be good but by continual exercise which you cannot be sure of unless it consists of your own Subjects and because you are not always in War and it is impossible you shall be therefore it is necessary that they be exercised in times of Peace which is not to be done by any but your own Subjects in respect of the charge Camillus as is said before marched out with his Army against the Tuscans but his Soldiers having had a sight of the Enemy found their Army so great that they were discouraged and dismay'd and thought themselves so much inferior that they were not able to fight theâ— Camillus understanding this terror in his Camp went up and down among the Soldiers and having reprehended their fear and said many things to encourage them and drive that fancy out of their heads at last without further directions Come said he Courage Quod quisque didicit aut consuevit faciat Do what you have been taught and accustomed I desire no more From whence it may be collected that he would not have used those words had not his Army been exercised before and that in times of Peace as well as War For no good is to be expected nor no General to trust himself to an unexperienced or undisciplined Army which will certainly be his ruine though he were as good a Commander as Hanibal himself And the reason is because when an Army is engaged the General cannot be present in all places to supply all defects and remedy all errors so that he must necessarily miscarry unless he has such persons disposed up and down in the Army as are capable of understanding his mind and executing his Orders Which being so the Roman discipline is to be followed and the Citizens of every City are to be inured to their Arms in times of Peace as well as war that when they are brought to fight they may not be at a loss or meet with any thing new or unaccustomed to them by which means it will come to pass that they will not be surprized or terrified in any condition but retain still the same courage and sence of their dignity But where the Citizens are undisciplin'd and rely more upon their fortune than experience their hearts will change with their fortune and they will give the same testimony of themselves as the Venetians have done CHAP. XXXII The ways which some people have taken to prevent a Peace THe Circei and the Velitrae two of the Roman Colonies revolted in hopes the Latine would have been able to defend them The Latines being defeated and they frustrated of their hopes it was the advice of several Citizens that they should send Embassadors to Rome to reconcile themselves to the Senate But those who had been ring-leaders in the defection apprehending the punishment would fall heavy upon their heads perverted that design and to run things beyond all possibility of Terms they incited the people to arm and invade the Frontiers of the Romans And doubtless when Prince or Commonwealth are desirous to prevent an agreement there is no safer nor surer way than by running the people into some unpardonable offence that the fear of being punish'd may keep them averse from all overtures of Peace After the first War betwixt the Carthaginians and Romans those Soldiers which had been employed by the Carthaginians in Sicily and Sardigna as soon as the Peace was concluded went over into Africa where being denyed or delayed in the demands of their pay they took Arms and putting themselves under the command of two of their Officers Matho and Spendio they plundered several of the Carthaginian Towns and possessed themselves of others The Carthaginians to try all ways before they came to extremity sent Asdrubal on of their Principal Citizens Embassador to them who having been formerly their General it was probable might have some Authority among them Asdrubal being arrived and Matho and Spendio desirous to put the Soldiers beyond all possibility of pardon persuaded them that the best and most secure way would be for them to kill all the Carthaginians that were Prisoners with them and Asdrubal among the rest Whereupon they killed them all with a thousand circumstances of cruelty and torture to which piece of wickedness they added another by publishing an Edict importing That all the Carthaginians which should be taken for the
future should be treated the same way And thus they prevented all propositions of Peace and rendered their Soldiers obstinate and implacable to the Carthaginians CHAP. XXXIII To the obtaining a Victory it is necessary your Army has a confidence not only in one another but in their General TO win a Battel and overcome an Enemy it is necessary to give your Army such a confidence as may make them believe that nothing is able to withstanâ— them and the way of infusing this confidence is by Arming and exercising them well and giving them a knowledge and acquaintance one with the other which confidence and acquaintance is not to be expected but where your Soldiers are your own Subjects and have been brought up together The General is to be so qualified that the Soldiers may have confidence in his Wisdom and Conduct and they will always have such a confidence if they see him careful and regular and couragious and one who preserves the majesty of his command with discretion and reputation which he will do if he punishes strictly and put his Soldiers upon no over-hard and impertinent duty keeps his promises represent victory easie either by concealing or extenuating the dangers or by encouraging them bravely against them and these things rightly observed are of great consequence both to the Authority of the General and the obtaining the Victory The way which the Romans took to give this assurance to their Armies was by pretence of Religion for which cause before the creation of their Consuls the raising or marching or engaging of their Armies their Augures and Auspices were consulted and without some of these no wise General would undertake any great Enterprize believing they should certainly miscarry unless the Soldiers were thorowly convinced that the Gods were on their side And when any of their Consuls or other Commanders fought in defiance of these Auspices he was punished as Claudius Pulcher for despising the Omen of the Chickens And although this is obvious in every part of the Roman History yet it is better prov'd by the complaint of Appius Claudius to the people against the insolence of their Tribunes where he tells them that by their means the Auspices and other religious Customs were neglected or corrupted His words are these Eludant nunc licet Religionem quid enim interest si pulli non pascentur si ex cavea tardirts exierint succinuerit avis Parvasunt haec sed parvaista non contemnendo Majores nostri maximam hanc Rempublicam fecerunt Let them laugh at Religion as they please and cry what are we concerned if the Pullets won't eat if they come lazily out of their Penns or if a bird be disposed to sing 'T is true they are but trifles yet by not dispising those trifles our Ancestors brought this Commonwealth to the Grandeur it is at And it was true for those little things were sufficient to keep the Soldiers confident and united which are two things go very far in a Victory though without virture and valour they are not always successful The Prenestini being in the Field with their Army against the Romans they went and lodged themselves upon the River Allia in a place where the Romans had been beaten by the French that the consideration of the place might be an encouragement to their own men and a terror to the Romans And though this design was not improbable for the reason abovesaid yet it apeared by the success that true courage is not disturbed by every little accident as was well expressed by the Dictator to his Master of the House Vides tu fortuna illos fretos ad Alliam consedisse at tu fretus armis animisque invade mediam acien You see by their posting themselves upon the Allia they rely wholly upon Fortune do you trust to your Arms end your courage and attack their main Battel And he was in the right for true courage good discipline and a confidence arising from so many Victories cannot be discomposed by such frivolous stratagems light things will not dismay them nor every disorder distract them For even in the absence of their Officers Soldiers that are expert and accustomed to Arms are not easily beaten As appeared by the two Manlii both Consuls and making War upon the Volsci who having indiscreetly sent part of their Army to forrage it fell out that both the commanded party and those which were left behind were encompassed by the Enemy and as it were besieged both at a time out of which danger the Soldiers were delivered more by their own courage than any conduct in the Consuls whereupon Livy tells us Militum etiam sine Rectore stabilis virtus tutata est The stedfast courage of the Soldiers defended them without any help from their General Fabius had likewise an excellent way to confirm his Soldiers and possess them with a confidence which I cannot omit Having invaded Tuscany with a new Army supposing the novelty of the Country and their inexperience of that Enemy might have some influence among them to give them a confidence he called them together before the Battel and having in a grave Oration given several reasons why they might hope for the Victory he told them That he had another reason behind more certain than all of them but in that he must be private for to discover it would be to defeat it A wise way and deserves well to be imitated CHAP. XXXIV What vogue fame or opinion disposes the people first to favour some particular Citizen and whether they or a Prince distributes their Offices with most prudence and judgment WE have shown before how Titus Manlius called afterwards Torquatus preserved his Father L. Manlius from an accusation which Pomponius the Tribune had exhibited against him to the people And although the way which he took to preserve him was violent and irregular yet his filial affection to his Father was so grateful to the people that they not only not reprehended him for what he had done but advanced him to honour for being not long after to choose Tribunes for their Legions T. Manlius was the second that was made And here I think it not amiss to consider the way which the the people of Rome took in the distribution of their honours and election of Magistrates and to inquire into the truth of what I asserted before That the distributions of the people are better and more exact than the distributions of a Prince for the people follow the common and publick character of every man unless by some particular notion of his actions they presume or believe otherwise There are three ways by which a man may gain esteem and reputation with the people The first is by extraction when the Parents having been great men and serviceable to the Commonwealth the people take a fancy that their Children must of necessity be the same until by some ill act they convince them of the contrary The second way is to associate with grave
the goodness of their order giving new life and courage to their men makes them confident of Victory and that confidence never suffers them to give ground till their whole order be broken There is another sort of Armies which are acted more by fury than discipline as in the Armies of the French and there it is quite otherwise because not succeeding in their first charge and not being sustained by a well ordered courage that fury upon which they wholly rely'd growing cold and remiss they are quickly overthrown Whereas the Romans fearing nothing of danger by reason of their good order and discipline without the least diffidence or question of the Victory fought on still obstinately being animated with the same courage and agitated by the same ardor at last as at first and the more they were press'd the better they resisted The third sort of Armies is where their is neither natural courage nor discipline and order as in our Italian Armies now adays which are so useless and unserviceable that â—â—â—ess they light upon an Enemy who runs by some accident they are never like to have a Victory and this is so obvious every day it needs no example to prove it But because by the testimony of Livy every one may know what is the right discipline and what is the wrong I will give you the words of Papirius Gursor in his reprimande to Fabius the Master of his Horse His words are these Nemo hominum nemo Deorum verecundiam hebeat Non edicta Imperatorum non auspicia observentur Sine Commeatu vagimilites in pacato in hostico errent immemores Sacramenti se ubi valent exauctorentur infrequentia deserantur signa neque conveniatur ad edictum nec discernatur interdiu noctu aequo iniquo loco jussu injussu Imperatoris pugnetur Non signa non ordines serventur latrocinii modo caeca fortuita pro solenni sacrata Militia sit Let them bare no respect or reverence either to God or man Let neither the orders of the General nor the directions of the Auspices be observed Let the loose and vagabond Soldier infest his own Country as much as the Enemies Let them forget their Oaths and disband as they please Let them run from their Colours as they think good and not come back when they are required Let them fight hand over head without consideration of time or place or order of their Officers Let their ranks be confused and their Colours deserted In a word Let their whole Conduct be blind and fortuito like thieves rather than the solemn and sacred Militia of the Romans By this we may easily see whether the Militia of our times be blind and fortuitous or whether it be solemn and sacred how far is it short of the old discipline of the Romans which consisting in exact order produced courage and constancy in the Souldiers and how far behind the French among whom though their is not that just order and constancy yet there is courage enough CHAP. XXXVII Whether fighting in small parties or pickeering before a Battel be necessary and how the temper of a new Enemy is to be found without them IN humane affairs as we have said before there is not only a perpetual and unavoidable difficulty in carrying them to their perfection but there is always some concomitant mischief so inseparable from it that it is impossible to arrive at the one without the other This is visible in all the actions of mankind so that that perfection is acquir'd with much difficulty unless you be so favoured by fortune that by her force she overcomes that common and natural inconvenience and of this and duel betwixt Manlius Torquatus and the French-man put me in mind where as Livy tell us Tantiea dimicatio ad universi belli eventum momenti fuit ut Gallorum exercitus relictis trepidè Castris in Tiburtem agrum mox in Campaniam transierit The success of that duel was of so much importance to the success of the War that thereupon the French Army drew off in a great fear into the Tiburtine Country and afterwards march'd away into Campania From whence I infer on the one side that a good General is to avoid any thing that carrying but small advantage with it may have an ill influence upon his Army to fight therefore in parties and venture your whole fortune upon less than your whole Army is rash and imprudent as I have said before where I dissuaded the keeping of passes On the other side I observe when an experienced General comes against a new enemy that has the reputation of being stout before he brings him to a Battel he is obliged to try him by slight skirmishes and pickeerings that by so doing he may bring his Souldiers acquainted with their discipline and way of sighting and remove that terror which the fame and reputation of their courage had given them And this in a General is of very great importance and so absolutely necessary that he who engages an unknown enemy with his whole Army before he has made an essay of his courage runs himself and his Army into manifest danger Valerius Corvinus was sent by the Romans with an Army against the Samnites a new enemy with whom they had never had any conflict before and Livy tells us he sent small parties abroad and caused them to entertain light skirmishes with the enemy Ne eos novum bellum ne novus hostis terreret Lest his Souldiers should be terrified with a new war and a new enemy But then the danger is that your men being overcome their terror should be encreased and that which you intended to animate should discourage and dismay them and this is one of those good things which have so near a conjunction with evil that 't is no hard matter to take one for the other My advice therefore is that a wise General abstains from any thing that may strike a terror into his Army for then the Souldiers begin to apprehend when they see their Comrades kill'd before their face For which reason those pickeerings and slight skirmishes are to be avoided by all means unless upon great advantage or some more than ordinary hopes of success Again it is not his interest certainly to defend any pass where he cannot upon occasion bring his whole Army to engage neither are any Towns to be made good but such as are of importance to the subsistance of his Army and without which both that and himself must be ruined and no such Towns are to be fortified but where not only a good Garison may be disposed and supplyed but where in case of a Siege your whole Army may be brought to relieve it other Towns are rather to be quitted than kept for to abandon a Town whilst your Army is in the field is no disrepute to you nor discouragement to your Souldiers but when you lose a place that you undertook and every body expected you would defend that
abates much of your credit and is a great prejudice to you so that it will be with you as it was then with the French a trifling loss will endanger the whole war Philip of Macedon the Father of Perseus a martial Prince and of great reputation in his time being invaded by the Romans quitted and destroyed a great part of his Country which he supposed he should be unable to defend as judging it better and more consistent with his honour to suffer it to be possessed by the enemy as waste and neglected than to undertake and not be able to defend it The affairs of the Romans being in a very ill condition after the battel at Cannas they refused their assistance to several of their friends and allies giving them leave to defend themselves if they could which resolutions are much better than to attempt to defend that which is not in our power for in the first case we lose only our friends but in the last both our friends and our selves To return therefore to our skirmishes I say that when ever for the discovery of the enemy or acquainting his Souldiers with the way of their sighting a General is constrained to make use of them he is to do it with that art and advantage that he may run no hazard of being worsted or else to follow the example of Marius which is the better way of the two who marching against the Cimbri a fierce and numerous people which had invaded Italy for prey and beaten one Roman Army already observing his Army to be afraid he thought it would be necessary before he came to a general engagement to contrive some way or other to dispossess them of their fear whereupon as a wise Officer he disposed his Army more than once or twice in some secure place upon the road by which the Cimbrian Army was to pass from whence his men might have a view of their march and accustom themselves to the sight of them to the end that seeing them to be nothing but a confused and disorderly multitude incommoded with baggage and either very ill accoutred or utterly unarm'd they might recover their spirits and grow impatient to be at them and this prudent invention of Marius ought to be diligently imitated by other people lest they fall into the dangers aforesaid and come off like the French Qui obrem parvi ponderis in Tiburtem agrum in Campaniam transierunt Who upon a trifling accident desponded and retired And because I have mentioned Valerius Corvinus in this Chapter I shall make use of his words in the next to shew how a General should be qualified CHAP. XXXVIII How a Generalis to be qualified that his Army may rely upon him AS we have said before Valerius Corvinus was gone with his Army against the Samnites a new enemy with whom the Romans had had no contest before To encourage his Souldiers and acquaint them with the discipline of the Samnites he inured his men to them by several small skirmishes but lest that should not do he made a speech to them before the Battel remonstrating with all possible efficacy of words how little they were to value the enemy and how much they might expect from their own valour and his conduct Livy brings him in with these words in his mouth which gives us an exact character of a General in whom his Army may confide Tum etiam intueri cujus ductu auspicioque ineunda pugna sit utrum qui audiendus duntaxat magnificus adhortator sit verbis tantum ferox operum militarium expers aut qui ipse tela tractare procedere ante signa versari media in mole pugnae sciat Facta mâ—a non dicta vos milites sequi volo nec disciplinam modo sed exemplum etiam ame petere qui hac dextra mihi tres Consulatus summamque laudem peperi Then you may see under whose Conduct you fight whether he that speaks to you be only a magnificent boaster valiant in words but ignorant in whatever belongs to a Souldier or whether he be one that knows how to manage his Arms lead up his Men charge in the head of them and behave himself manfully in the very heat of the Battel I would not fellow Souldiers that you should follow my words more than my deeds or take only my precepts and not my example who with this hand have gained three Consulships and immortal reputation Which words if well considered are sufficient to instruct any man what course he is to take to make himself reputed a great General he who acts otherwise will find in time that that command however he came by it whether by ambition or fortune will rather abstract than add to his honour for it is not titles that make men honourable but men their titles and it is to be observed likewise that if great Captains have been forced to such unusual language to confirm the hearts of an old veteran Army when it is to fight with a new enemy how much more care and art is to be used in a new inexperienced Army that never saw an enemy before For if a strange enemy be terrible to an old Army well may he be so to an Army that is new raised and was never engaged nevertheless all these difficulties have been overcome by the prudence of several Captains as by Gracchus the Roman and Epaminondas the Theban who with new raised men defeated old veteran Troops that had been long experienced in matters of war and their way was to prepare them for some months by continual exercise and counterfeit battels by using them to their ranks and holding them to strict discipline and obedience after which they advanced against the enemy engaged with great confidence and performed very well Let no man therefore that is any thing of a Souldier despair of making his Army good if he has but men enough for that Prince who abounds with men and wants Souldiers is rather to complain of his own laziness and imprudence than of their incapacity and dulness CHAP. XXXIX A General ought to know the Country and how to take his advantage in the ground AMong the many things that are necessary in a General of an Army the knowledg of Coasts and Countries is one and that not only in a Generall but in an exquisite and more particular way without which he shall not be able to do any great thing and because all knowledge requires use and exercise to bring it to perfection so is it in this knowledg of places and if it be enquired what use and what exercise is required in this case I answer Hunting and Hawking and such like recreations and therefore it is that the Heroes which anciently govern'd the World were said to be brought up in woods and forests and accustomed to those kind of exercises for hunting besides the acquaintance which it gives you of the Country instructs you in many things that are necessary in war
ever read and considered the ancient customs of those Nations they would never have been so often over-reached seeing they have been always alike and used the same practices in all places with all people Thus they served the Tuscans of old who having been many times over-power'd and routed and dispersed by the Romans and finding their own force unable to defend them they articled with the French on this side of the Alps to give them a Sum of Money for which the French were to joyn their forces with the Tuscaps and march with them against the Romans But when the French had got their Money they refused to perform the conditions on their part alledging that they received it not to make War upon the Romans but to forbear infesting them themselves by which infidelity and avarice in the French the poor Tuscans were at once defeated both of their Money and assistance From whence we may conclude that the Tuscans were formerly of the same nature as now and especially the Florentines and the French and other foreign Nations had always the same inclination to deceive them CHAP. XLIV Confidence and boldness does many times obtain that which would never be compassed by ordinary means THe Samnites were invaded by the Romans and their Army so weak it durst not meet them in the field whereupon it was resolved That all their Garisons should be reinforced and with the rest of their Troops they should pass into Tuscany which was then at peace with the Romans and try if they could tempt them to take up Arms and break their Peace and in the Harangue which was made by the Samnites to the Tuscans to remonstrate upon what occasion they had taken up Arms themselves they had this expression Rebellasse quod pax servientibus gravior quam liberis bellum They had rebelled because Peace was more insupportable in servitude than War to men that are free And so partly by persuasions and partly by the presence of their Army they prevailed with them to take Arms against the Romans which they had refused to their Embassadors before From whence it is to be observed that when a Prince desires to obtain any thing of another if occasion permits he ought not to give him time to consider but is to act so as he may see a necessity upon him of resolving immediately and this is done when the person to whom the demand is made sees that in either denying it absolutely or delaying his answer he runs a manifest danger This way was used very handsomely in our days by Pope Iulius with the French and Monsieur de Foix the King of France's General against the Marquess of Mantoua Pope Iulius resolving to drive the Family of the Bentivogli out of Bolonia and judging that to do it he should have need of the assistance of the French and that it would be convenient the Venetians should stand Neuter To this purpose he sent Embassadors to them both but could get nothing but uncertain and ambiguous answers wherefore to surprize them and bring them that way to his lure whether they would or no he got what Forces he could together and marching directly to Bolonia sent to the Venetians to let them know he expected they should stand Neuter and to the French to send him Supplies Both of them finding themselves under a necessity of answering immediately and that there was no time allowed to consider fearing the displeasure and indignation of his Holiness they both of them complyed the Venetian did not meddle and the French sent him assistance Monsieur de Foix being another time with his Army in Bolonia and understanding the defection of Brescia he resolved to go immediately and endeavour to reduce it There were but two ways that he could possibly pass one was thorow the Dominions of his Master but that was tedious and about the other was a shorter cut thorow the Territories of the Marquess of Mantoua but then he was not only to force his way thorow that Country but he was to pass certain Sluces betwixt Fens and Lakes with which that Country abounds and that was not to be done without great difficulty in respect of several Forts which were upon them and all well guarded by the Marquess However de Foiz resolved upon the shortest in spite of the difficulty and that the Marquess might have no time to deliberate he marched with his Army and at the same moment sent a Messenger to the Marquess for the Keys of such Castles as stood in his passage and the Marquess surprized with the suddenness and confidence of the demand sent them immediately which he would never have done had they been more modestly desired the Marquess being in League with the Venetian and Pope in whose hands he had likewise a Son at that time all which had he had time to have considered would have been very laudable reasons to have denyed it But being press'd of a sudden he sent them as is said before Just so it was betwixt the Tuscans and the Samnites the presence of the Samnian Army having forced them to take Arms which they had refused before and had scarcely done then had they had liberty to have advis'd CHAP. XLV Whether in a Battel it is best to give or receive the Charge DEvius and Fabius two Roman Consuls were in the field with two Armies against the Samnites and Tuscans and being come to a Battel it is observable that they took two several ways in the manner of their fighting and it is worth our enquiry which of them was the best Decius charged the Enemy with all imaginable fury and engaged his whole Army at once Fabius received the charge and judging that way the most safe reserved his effort till the last when as we say the Enemy had spent their fire and the heat of their fury was over By the success of the Battel it appeared that the design of Fabius was better than that of Decius who tired with the vehemence of his first charge and seeing his men engaged farther among the Enemy than otherwise they would have been to gain that honour by his death which he could not hope for by the Victory in imitation of his Father he sacrificed himself for the Roman Legions Which when Fabius understood that he might not gain less honour by living than his colleague should do by his death he advanced with his Reserves and charg'd the Enemy so briskly that he overthrew them and gained a happy and most memorable Victory By which it appears that the way of Fabius was more imitable and secure CHAP. XLVI How it comes to pass that in a City the same Family retains the same manners and customs a long time IT appears that not only one City has its manners and institutions different and produces men more austere or effeminate than the rest but in the same City Families are frequently found to have the same difference Of this there are multitude of Examples and particularly
is resolved every man's chief business is to put himself into a condition of giving the Enemy Battel and fighting him fairly in the field To enable himself for this it is necessary to raise an Army to raise an Army there is a necessity of men of arming them disciplining them exercising them and that in great as well as small bodies of teaching them to encamp and acquainting them with the Enemy by degrees either by frequent facing or confronting him or by encamping somewhere near his march where they may have the prospect of his Army as he passes by In this the whole address and industry of a Campania or field War consists which doubtless is more necessary and honorable than any other and he who understands well how to draw up an Army and present his Enemy Battel may be excused for all his other errors in the management of the War but if he be ignorant or defective in that though in other things he be sufficient enough yet he shall never bring his War to any honourable conclusion For win a Battel and you cancel all your former miscarriages lose one and all that ever you did well before evaporates and comes to nothing It being so necessary then to find men the first thing to be done is to know how to make our choice which the ancients called Delectus and we Levies of which I shall give you some light They who have given us rules of the management of War have recommended to us to make our Levies in temperate regions that our Soldiers may be both valiant and cunning For hot Countries are observed to produce wise and subtle people but not couragious cold Countries on the other side do afford stout men and hardy but then they are seldom discreet This Rule was proper enough for a Prince that was Monarch of the whole world and might make his Levies where he pleas'd But to give a rule that all may follow I must needs say that all Commonwealths or Kingdoms are to make their Levies in their own Countries whether hot or cold or temperate it 's the same thing because by ancient experience we find that in any Country Exercise and Discipline makes good Soldiers for where Nature is defective industry will supply and in this case it 's the better of the two And indeed to raise men in other Countries cannot be call'd properly a delectus for delectum habere is to pick and cull the best men in a Province and to have power to choose those who are unwilling as well as those who are willing to the War which kind of delectus cannot be made exactly but in your own dominion for in Countries belonging to another Prince you must be contented with such as are willing it being not to be expected that you should have liberty to choose as you please Cosimo Yet among those who are willing you may pick and choose take and leave what you think good and therefore it is not so improper to call that a delectus Fabritio You are in the right as to one way but if you consider the secret defects of such an Election you will find that in strictness it is not an Election and that for these following reasons First those who are not your Subjects but are willing to the Wars are none of the best but generally the lewdest and most dissolute persons in the Province for if any be scandalous idle incorrigible irreligious disobedient to their Parents Blasphemers Cheats and altogether ill bred they are those who are most likely to list themselves for the War and there is nothing so contrary to good and true discipline as such kind of humors When of such kind of Cattle you have more offer themselves than the number you design to entertain you may take your choice indeed but the whole mass being bad your choice can never be good But many times it falls out that there being not so many of them as you have occasion to employ you are glad to take all and in that case you cannot not be said habere delectum so properly as milites conscribere And of such kind of disorderly people the Armies of Italy and most other places do consist at this day only in Germany it is otherwise because there no man is press'd or listed barely upon the Emperor's command but as he stands willing and disposed to the Wars himself you may judge then what part of the ancient discipline of the Romans can be introduced into an Army made up of such a medly of wickedness Cosimo What way is to be taken Fabritio That which I recommended before which is to choose out of your own Subjects and to exercise your authority in your choice Cosimo If your election be made in that manner can any ancient form be introduced Fabritio You know it may if it be in a Kingdom and he who command be their Prince or lawful Soveraign and if in a Commonwealth it is the same so he be a great Citizen and made General for that time otherwise it is no easie matter to do any thing that shall succeed Cosimo Why Sir Fabritio I shall tell you that hereafter at present this may suffice that no good is to be done any other way Cosimo Well then these Levies being to be made in your own Territory is it best to make them in the Cities or Country CHAP. VI. Whether it be best to choose you men out of the Cities or Country Fabritio THose Authors who have writ any thing of this Nature do agree unanimously that the best choice is in the Country where they are inur'd to difficulty and labour acquainted more with the Sun than the shade accustomed to the Spade and the Plough and to carry burdens without any shifting or mutiny But Because our Armies do consist of Horse as well as Foot my advice is that the Horse be raised in the Cities and the Foot in the Country Cosimo Of what age would you choose them Fabritio Were I to raise a new Army I would choose them betwixt seventeen and forty were I only to recruit an old one I would have them always of seventeen Cosimo I do not well understand your distinction Fabritio I will tell you were I to raise an Army or settle a Militia where there was none before it would be necessary to make choice of the most apt and experienced that I could find provided their age was sutable to the War to instruct them as I shall direct But if I were to raise men to recruit and reinforce an Army that was grown weak I would take none above seventeen because those who are there already will be able to teach them Cosimo You would order your Militia then as ours is ordered with us Fabritio You say well but I would Arm and Officer and exercise and Order them in a way I know not whether you be acquainted with in your Country Cosimo Then you are for Train'd Souldiers Fabritio Why would
continually upon them they would become grievous to the Subject and give them occasion to complain of you Cosimo What numbers would you have and how would you Arm them Fab. You are too quick and pass from one thing to another I 'll answer you to that in another place when I have told you how the Foot are to be Armed and prepared for a field Battel THE SECOND BOOK CHAP. I. What arms were most used by the Ancients in their Wars Fabr. WHen you have raised your men the next thing is to furnish them with Arms and before you do that I think it not amiss to examine what Arms were most used by the Ancients and choose the best The Romans divided their Infantry into those who were compleatly and those who were slightly armed Those who were lightly armed were called Velites under which name all were comprehended who carried Bows and Slings and Darts the greatest part of them had Casques upon their heads for their defence and a kind of Buckler upon their arm They fought in no order and at distance from those who were arm'd compleatly Their Arms consisted of a Head-piece or Morrion which came down to the Shoulders a Brigandine down to their knees their legs and arms were covered with Greeves and Gauntlets a Buckler covered with Iron about two yards long and one broad an Iron ring about it without to keep off the blows and another within to keep it from the dirt when it was lay'd upon the ground Their offensive Weapons were a Sword at their left thigh about a yard and half long with a Dagger on their right side They carried a Dart in their hand which they called Pilum which upon a a Charge they darted at the Enemy These were the Arms with which the Romans conquered the whole world And though some of their ancient Writers do give them a Spear in form of a Spit I do not see how such a Weapon could be handled by one that carried such a Buckler for it was too heavy to be managed with one hand besides unless it were in the Front where they had room to make use of them it was impossible to use them in their ranks for the nature of Battels is such as I shall show hereafter that they do always contract and keep close as being in much less danger than when they are drawn up looser and at a distance So that in that close order all Arms that are above two yards long are not to be used for having a Spear that is to be managed with both hands if your Buckler were no hinderance it could not hurt your Enemy when he was near If you take it in one hand and manage your Buckler with the other you must take it in the middle and then there will be so much of it behind that they who come after you will hinder you from handling it So that it is true either the Romans had no such Hastae or if they had they made but little use of them For if you read the History of Titus Livius in the description of all his Battels you will scarce ever find he mentions those Hastae but tells you all along that having darâ—ed their Pila they fell to the Sword My opinion therefore is that this Hasta be lay'd aside and that in imitation of the Romans we make use of their Sword and Buckler and other Arms without troubling our selves with that The Grecians for their defence did not arm so heavily as the Romans but for offence they relyed more upon the Spear than the Sword especially the Macedonian Phalanx who carried of those Javelins which they called Sarissae with which they brake the Enemies Battels and kept their own firm and entire And though some Writers say that they also had their Bucklers yet I know not for the reasons abovesaid how they could consist Besides in the Battel betwixt Paulus Emilius and Perseus King of Macedon I do not remember that any mention was made of any-Bucklers but only of their Sarissae and yet the Romans had much ado to overcome them So that my opinion is the Macedonian Phalanx was just such a Body as the Swizzers Battalion whose whole force lyes in their 〈◊〉 The Romans were likewise accustomed to adorn their Soldiers with Plumes of Feathers in their Caps which renders an Army beautiful to their Friends and terrible to their Enemies In the first beginning of the Roman Wars their Horse used a round Shield a Helmet upon their Heads and all the rest of their body naked their offensive Arms were a Sword and Javelin with a long thin spike at the end of it and so being incumbered with Shield and Javelin they could use neither of them well and being unarmed they were more exposed to the Enemy Afterwards they came to arm themselves like their Foot only their Shield was a little shorter and squarer their Launce or Javelin thicker with pikes at each end that if by accident one of them should miscarry the other might be serviceable With these Arms both for Horse and Foot my Country-men the Romans went thorow the whole world and by the greatness of their successes 't is likely they were as well accounted as any Army ever was And Titus Livius in many places of his History makes it credible where comparing the Armies of the Enemies says But the Romans for courage fashion of their Arms and discipline were before them all And for that reason I have chosen to speak particularly rather of the Conqueror's Arms than the Arms of the Conquered It follows now that I say something of the way of Arming at present CHAP. II. Of the Arms which are used at present and of the invention of the Pike Fabritio THe Soldiers of our times do wear for defensive Arms Back and Breast and for offensive a Launce nine yards long which they call a Pike with a Sword by their side rather round than sharp These are generally the Arms which they wear at this day few wear Greaves and Gantlets and none at all Head-pieces Those few who have no Pikes do carry Halbards the staff three yards long and the head like an Axe They have among them Musquetiers who with their Fire Arms do the same Service which was done formerly by the Bows and Slings This manner of arming with Pikes was found out by the Germans and particularly by the Swizzers who being poor and desirous to preserve their liberty were and are still necessitated to contend against the ambition of the Princes of Germany who are rich and able to entertain Horse which the Swizzers are not able to do So that their Force consisting principally in Foot being to defend themselves against the Enemies Horse they were obliged to revive the old way of drawing up and find out Arms that might defend them against them This necessity put them upon continuing or reviving the old Orders without which as every wise-man knows the Foot would be useless for which cause they
the Swisses Everyone knows how many of the Swisses foot were cut off at the battel of Ravenna and all upon the same account the Spanish foot having got to them with their swords and had cut them certainly in pieces had they not been rescued by the French horse and yet the Spaniards drawing themselves into a close Order secured themselves I conclude therefore a good Infantry ought to be able not only to sustain the horse but to encounter the foot which as I have said many times before is to be done by being well arm'd and well ordered Cosimo Tell me therefore I beseech you how you would have them arm'd CHAP. IV. How foot should be arm'd and of the force and convenience of men at Arms. Fabritio I Would take both of the Roman and German arms and half my men should be arm'd with the one and half with the other for if in 6000 foot as I shall explain to you hereafter I should have 3000 with bucklers like the Romans 2000 pikes and 1000 muskets like the Swiss I think I should do well enough for I would place my pikes either in my front or where-ever I suspected the Enemies horse might make any impression my bucklers and swords should second my pikes and be very conducing to the Victory as I shall demonstrate So that I think an Infantry thus ordered would be too hard for any other Cosimo What you have said about the Foot is sufficient I pray let us now hear what you judge of the horse and which way of equipping them is the best the ancient or modern Fabr. I think the present way is the best in respect of the great saddles and stirrups which were not in use among the ancients and make men sit stronger and firmer upon their horse I think our way of arming now is more secure and a body of our horse will make a greater impression than a body of the old Yet I am of opinion that Cavalry are not to be more esteemed now than of old because as I have said they have in our days been oft worsted by the foot and so they always will be if the foot be arm'd and ordered as abovesaid Tigranes King of Armenia came into the field against the Roman Army under the command of Lucullus with 150000 horse many of them arm'd like our men at arms which they called Catafracti the Romans consisting only of 6000 horse and 15000 foot Whereupon in contempt of their number when Tigranes saw them he said That they were liker the Train of an Embassador than an Army Nevertheless when they came to fight he was beaten and he who writes the story blames the Catafracti and declares them unserviceable for says he having Beavers over their faces they cannot so well see how to offend the Enemy and being laden with arms if by accident their horse be killed or throws them upon the ground they cannot get up again nor help themselves in any manner I say then that Nation or Kingdom which prefers their horse to their foot shall always be weak and in danger of ruine as Italy has experimented in our time having been exposed to ruine and depredation by strangers for want of foot which has been very much neglected and all the Souldiers set on horse-back Not but it is good to have horse too yet not to make them the strength of their Army but sufficient to second the foot for they are of great use for scouting making inroads into the Enemies Country raising Contributions infesting the Enemy and cutting off Convoys and supplies of Provisions nevertheless when they come to a Field-fight which is the main importance of a War and the very end for which Armies are raised they are not so serviceable as foot though indeed in a rout they are better to pursue Cosimo I cannot concur with you in this for two reasons one is the Parthians used nothing but horse and yet they had their share of the World as well as the Romans and the other is because I cannot see which way the Cavalry can be sustained by the Foot and from whence proceeds the strength of the one and the weakness of the other Fabr. I think I have told you or else I will tell you now that my discourse of military affairs shall extend no farther than Europe Being intended no farther I do not think my self obliged to give a reason for their customs in Asia yet this I may say that the Parthian discipline was quite contrary to the Roman for the Parthians fought always on horse-back in confusion and disorder which is a way of fighting very uncertain The Romans fought generally on foot in close and firm order and they overcame one another variously as the place where they fought was open or streight in streight places the Romans had the better in champian the Parthians who were able to do great things in respect of the Country which they were to defend it being very large a thousand miles from the Sea not a River sometimes within two or three days march and Towns and Inhabitants very thin So that an Army like the Roman pestered and incumbred with their arms and their order could not pass thorow the Country without great loss by reason the strength of the Enemy consisted in horse which were nimble here to day and to morrow fifty miles off And this may be a reason why the Parthians prevailed with their horse ruined the Army of Crassus and put Marc Anthony into so much danger But as I said before my intention is not to speak any thing of the Armies out of Europe and therefore I shall insist only upon the Romans the Grecians and the Germans CHAP. V. The difference betwixt men at Arms and foot and upon which we are most to rely Fabr. WE come now to your other demand in which you desire to understand what order or what natural virtue it is that makes the foot better than the horse I say in the first place horse cannot march in all Countries as foot can they are not so ready to obey orders when there is any sudden occasion to change them for when they are upon their march if there be occasion to wheel or face about to advance or stop or retreat they cannot do it with that dexterity as the foot Upon any rout or disorder horse cannot rally so well though perhaps they are not pursued which is not so with the foot Again it is frequently seen a brave and a daring man may be upon a bad horse and a coward upon a good and that inequality is the occasion of many disorders Nor let any one think strange that a body of foot can sustain the fury of the horse because an horse is a sensible creature and being apprehensive of danger is not easily brought into it And if it be considered what forces them on and what forces them off it will be found that that which keeps them off is greater than that which
you the way of ordering a Battel or Army you may not find your self confounded I say therefore that a King or Commonwealth is to order his subjects which he designs for the wars with these arms and into these divisions and raise as many Battalions as his Country will afford And when he has disposed them so being to exercise them in order he is to exercise them in their several divisions And although the number of each of them cannot bear the form of a just Army yet thereby every man may learn what belongs to his own duty because in Armies there are two orders observed one what men are to do in every battel or division distinctly and the other what they are to do when united with the rest and those men who know the first well will easily learn the other but without knowledg of the first they will never arrive at the discipline of the second Every one then of these Companies may learn by it self to keep the order of their ranks in all motions and places to open and close and understand the direction of their Drums by which all things are commanded in a battel for by beating of that as by the whistle in the Gallies every man knows what he is to do whether to stand firm to his ground to advance or fall back and which way they are to turn their faces and arms So that understanding the order of their files in that exactness that no motion nor no place can disorder them understanding the commands of their Officer derived to them by his Drum and how to advance fall back into their places these Companies as I have said before as soon as joyned may easily be taught what an united body of all the Battalions is obliged to do when they are drawn together into an Army And because this universal practice is of no slight importance in time of peace it would be convenient once or twice in a year to bring them to a general Rendezvous and give them the form of an Army exercising them for some days as if they were to fight a battel with an enemy drawing them up and disposing them into front flank and reserve And because a General orders his Army for a battel either upon the sight or apprehension of an enemy he is to exercise his Army accordingly and teach them how to behave themselves upon a march and how in a battel and how upon a charge either upon one side or other When they are exercised as if an enemy was before them they are to be taught how they are to begin the fight how they are to retreat upon a repulse who are to succeed in their places what Colours what Drums what words of commands they are to obey and so to train them up and accustom them to these false alarms and counterfeit battels that at length they become impatient to be at it in earnest For an Army is not made valiant and couragious for having brave and valiant men in it but for the good order which is observed for if I be in the forlorn and know being beaten whither I am to retire and who are to succeed in my place I shall fight boldly because my relief is at hand If I be of the second body that is to engage the distress or repulse of the first will not fright me because I considered it might happen before and perhaps desired it that I might have the honour of the Victory and not they Where an Army is new this way of exercising is absolutely necessary and where it is old it is convenient for we see the Roman Captains before they brought them to fight continually exercised their men after this manner though they had been brought up to their Arms. Iosephus tells us in his History that this continual exercising in the Roman Army was the cause that all the multitude of idle people which followed the Camp either for Traffick or gain were made useful and serviceable because they understood their orders and ranks and how to preserve them in time of Battel But if you have raised an Army of young men never in the Wars before whether you intend them for present Service or to establish them as Militia and engage them afterwards without this way of exercising by single Companies and sometimes a conjunction of them all you do nothing For order being perfectly necessary it is convenient with double industry and labour to teach such as are not skilful already and practise such as are as we have seen several excellent Commanders to practise and instruct their Soldiers take extraordinary pains without any respect to their dignities Cosimo It seems to me that this discourse has a little transported you for before you have told us the way of exercising by Companies you have treated of entire Armies and the managing of a Battel Fabritio You say right and the true reason is the affection I bear to those orders and the trouble I am under that they are no more used yet do not think but I will recollect my self and return As I told you before in the exercising of a Company the first thing of importance is to know how to keep your ranks to do this it is necessary to exercise them in that order which they call Chiocciole or the Snail order And because I have said that one of these Battalias or Companies is to consist of four hundred Foot compleatly armed I will keep to that number These four hundred men then are to be reduced into 80 files five in a file after which they are to be carried forward upon a quick march or a slow wheeling and doubling charging or retreating which indeed is more demonstrable to the eye than the understanding But this Snail way of exercising a Company is not so necessary because every one that knows any thing of an Army knows how 't is to be done and indeed it is not considerable in any respect but to teach Soldiers how to move their files but let us now draw up one of these Companies and dispose them into their ranks CHAP. VIII Of three principal ways of drawing up a Company and putting them into a posture to fight I Say that there are three principal forms of drawing up men the first and most useful is to draw them up close in the figure of two Squares The second is to draw them up in a square with two wings The third is to draw them up with a vacuity in the middle which they call Piazza To draw them up in the first figure there are two ways One is to double their files that is the second file entring into the first the fourth into the third the sixt into the fift and so successively so that whereas they were 80 files of five in a file they may become forty files of 10 ih a file After this you are to double them again in the same manner thrusting one file into another and then they will be
Companies and be appointed to make charges and counterfeit skirmishes with them rather to bring them acquainted than for any thing else What we have said already is sufficient for this part let us now come to marshal our Army and draw it up in a posture to fight and with hopes of success which is the great end of all kind of military discipline in which men employ so much study and diligence THE THIRD BOOK CHAP. I. The Order observed by the Roman Legions when a Battel was presented Cosimo SEeing we change our subject I shall yield my place of expostulating to another man for presumption being a thing which I condemn in other people I would not be too much guilty of it my self therefore I dismiss my self of that office and will transfer it to which of our friends will vouchsafe to accept it Zanobi It would have been very grateful to us all had you pleased to have continued but seeing 't is not your pleasure tell us at least which of us it is you will depute to succeed you Cosimo I shall leave that to the election of Signor Fabritio Fabr. I am content to undertake it and do desire that we may follow the Venetian custom by which the youngest of the company has the liberty to speak first and in this case not without reason for this being the proper exercise of young men I persuade my self young Gentlemen are the fittest to discourse of it as being most ready to follow it Cosimo 'T is then your province Luigi and as I do much please my self in my successor so you may be as well satisfied with his interrogation But that we lose no time let us return to our business Fabritio I am certain that to demonstrate how well an Army is to be marshall'd and prepared for a Battel it would be necessary to declare how the Greeks and Romans ordered The Troops in their Armies but because these things are sufficiently obvious in History I shall pass by several particulars and address my self only to such as I think most useful for our imitation and fittest to give perfection to the discipline of our times which will be the occasion that at once I give you a prospect how an Army is to be ranged in order to a Battel how they are to confront and charge one another in a real Engagement and how they may be exercised in a counterfeit The greatest disorders committed in the drawing up an Army for a Battel is to give it only a front because they leave them and their fortune to the success of one charge and this error proceeds from nothing but from having lost the old way of closing their ranks and thrusting one into another Without that way there is no relieving of the front no defending them nor no supplying their places in the heat of their Engagement which among the Romans was most accurately observed To the end therefore that you may comprehend this way I say that the Romans divided each Legion into three Bodies The first were Hastati the second Principes the third Triarii The Hastati were in the front of the Army in thick and firm ranks The Principes behind them but their ranks not altogether so close and after them the Triarii in so loose an order that they could receive both Principes and Hastati into their body upon any distress Besides these they had their Slingers their Bow-men and their Velites not drawn up in this order but placed at the head of the Army betwixt the Cavalry and the Foot These light arm'd Souldiers began the Fight and if they prevailed which was very seldom they followed the Victory if they were repulsed they fell back by the â—â—nks of the Army or thorow certain spaces appointed on purpose and retired among those who had no arms When they were retir'd the Hastati advanced against the enemy and finding themselves overpowred they retir'd softly to the Principes and fell into their ranks and together with them renewed the Fight but if they also were too weak to sustain the fury of the Battel they retreated all into the spaces of the Triarii and all together being consolidated into a firm mass they made another effort more impetuous than before if this miscarried all was lost for there was no farther reserves The Horse were plac'd at the corners of the Army like two wings to a body and fought sometimes on Horseback and sometimes on foot as occasion was offered This way of reinforcing three times is almost impossible to be master'd because fortune must fail you three times before you can be beaten and the Enemy must be so valiant as to conquer you as often CHAP. II. The form observed in their Battels by the Macedonian Phalanx THe Grecians ordered not their Phalanx as the Romans did their Legions and though they had many Officers among them and several ranks yet they made but one body or rather one front The way which they observed to relieve one another was not to retire one rank into another like the Romans but to put one man into the place of another which was done in this manner Their Phalanx being reduced into Files and let us suppose each File to consist of fifty men being afterwards with the front towards the Enemy of all the Files only the six first could charge because their Launces which they called Sarissae were so long that the sixt rank charged with the point of his Launce thorow the first ranst In the Fight therefore if any of the first rank was either killed or disabled he who was behind in the second rank supplyed his place and the vacuity in the second rank was filled up out of the third and so successively and on a sudden the ranks behind supplyed what was defective before so as their ranks remained always entire and no place left void but the last rank which was not reinforced because there was no body behind to supply them So that the loss in the first rank exhausted the latter and yet it self was continued entire So that these Phalanxes were sooner consumed and annihilated than broken because the closeness and grosseness of the body made them impenetrable The Romans at first used these Phalanxes and instructed their Legions in that way Afterwards they grew weary of that order and parted their Legions into several divisions viz. into Cohortes and Manipuli judging as I said before that body to be most vigorous and fullest of life that consisted of most members so constituted as that they could subsist and govern themselves CHAP. III. How the Swisses ordered their Battalions Fab. THe Swisses at present do use the same method with their Battalions as the Macedonians did anciently with their Phalanxes both enranging them entire and in gross and in relieving one another When they came to a Battel they disposed their Squadrons one in the Flank of another and not behind They have not the way of receiving the first into the second upon a
repulse but to relieve one another they observe this order they put their Battalions one in the flank of another but somewhat behind it towards the right hand so that if the first be in any distress the second advances to relieve it The third Battalion they place behind the other two but at the distance of the shot of a Harquebuss that if the two Battalions should be worsted the third might advance in their rescue and that which advances and the other which retire may have space to pass by one another without any clashing or collision for gross bodies cannot be received so commodiously as little and therefore small bodies disposed at a distance as they were in the Roman Legions might better receive and relieve one another upon occasion And that this order of the Swisses is not so good as the ancient order of the Romans is demonstrated by many examples of their Legions when they were engaged with the Macedonian Phalanxes for these were still worsted by the other The fashion of their Arms and their way of Reserves being more effectual than the closeness and solidity of a Phalanx CHAP. IV. How the Author would make use of both Greek and Roman Arms for his Battalion and what was the ordinary Army of the Romans BEing therefore according to these Models to range and marshal an Army I think it best to retain something of the Arms and Orders both of the Phalanx and Legion For this reason I have said in a Battalion I would have 2000 Pikes which were the Arms of the Macedonian Phalanx and 3000 Scudi or Shields and Swords which are the Arms of the Romans I have divided a Battalion into ten Battalia's or Companies as the Romans divided their Legions into ten Cohorts I have ordered the Velites or light-arm'd to begin the fight as they did formerly And because as the Arms are mix'd they participate of the one Nation and the other that they may participate likewise in their orders I have appointed that every Company may have five files of Pikes in the front and the rest of Bucklers that the front may be enabled to keep out the Horse and break more easily into the Foot having Pikes in the first charge as well as the Enemy by which they may be fortified to sustain it bravely till the Bucklers come up and perfect the Victory And if you consider the strength and vertue of this Order you will find how all these Arms perform their office exactly For Pikes are very useful against Horse and against Foot too before the Battels be joyned but after they are joyned they are utterly useless For this reason behind every third rank of Pikes the Swissers put a rank of Halbards which was to make room for their Pikes though indeed it was not enough Placing therefore our Pikes before and our Bucklers behind them they are enabled to sustain the Horse and when they come to charge they do open and press hard upon the Foot but when the fight is begun and the Battels are joyned the Bucklers succeed with their Swords as being manageable more easily in the crowd Luigi We desire now to understand how with these Arms and Orders you would manage your Army to give the Enemy Battel Fabritio I shall show you nothing at present but this You must know that in an ordinary Army of the Romans which they called a Consular Army there were no more but two Legions of Citizens consisting in all of 600 Horse and about 11000 Foot They had besides these as many more Horse and Foot sent them in by their Friends and Confederates These Auxiliaries were divided into two parts the right wing and the left for they would never suffer them to exceed the number of the Foot of their Legions though their Horse indeed they permitted to be more With this Army consisting of 22000 Foot and about 2000 Horse a Roman Consul did all his business and attempted any thing Yet when they were to oppose a greater power they joyned two Consuls together and their two Armies You must know likewise that in the three great Actions of an Army their march their encampment and engagement they placed the Legions in the middle because the force in which they reposed their greatest confidence they thought fit should be more united and compact as I shall show you more at large when I come to treat of those things These Auxiliary Foot by vertue of their conversation with the Legionary Foot grew to be as Serviceable as they because they were train'd and disciplin'd with them and upon occasion of Battel drawn up in the same figure and order He therefore who knows how the Romans marshalled one single Legion in the day of Battel knows how they disposed of them all When I have told you therefore how they divided a Legion into three Squadrons and how one Squadron received another I shall have told you how a whole and entire Army is to be ordered when it is to be drawn up for Battel CHAP. V. The way of drawing up a Battalion according to the intention of the Author BEing to prepare for a Battel according to the method of the Romans as they had two Legions so I would take two Battalions and by the ordering of them you may guess how to order a compleat Army For to add more men is only to multiply their ranks I think it unnecessary to repeat what foot there are in a Legion what Companies what Officers what Arms what Velites in ordinary what in extraordinary what Pikes and what other things For it is not long since I told you distinctly and press'd it upon your memories as a thing very necessary for the understanding all other Orders wherefore I shall pass on without farther reflection It seems to me best that one of the ten Battalions or Companies of a Battalion be placed in the left flank and the other ten of the other Battalion on the right Those on the left are to be ordered in this manner Put five Battalia's one on the side of the other in the front so as there may remain a space of four yards betwixt each draw them up so as they may possess in breadth 140 yards of ground and in depth forty behind these five Battalia's I would place three others distant in a right line from the first about forty yards of these three I would have two follow directly the Companies which are upon the two extremities or corners of the five first and the third should be disposed in the midst by which means these three Companies should take up as much ground both in breadth and depth as the other five which have only five yards distance betwixt the one and the other whereas the three last should have thirty three This being done I would cause the two Companies remaining to advance and place themselves behind the three former in a right line and at the distance of forty yards but it should be in such a sort
I fancy I see it drawn up before my eyes which gives me an ardent desire to see it engaged I would not for any thing in the world that you should prove a Fabius Maximus and endeavour no more than to avoid Fighting and keep the Enemy in suspence for I should blame you more than the Romans did him CHAP. VI. The description of a Battel Fabr. DO not question it Hark do not you hear the Artillery Ours have fired already but done little execution upon the Enemy the Velites extraordinary together with the light Horse advance to the charge in Troops with the greatest shout and fury imaginable The Enemies Artillery has fired once and the shot passed over the head of our Foot without any prejudice at all That it might not have time for a second Volley our Velites and our Cavalry have marched up in great haste to possess it and the Enemy advancing in its defence they are come so close that neither the Artillery of one side or the other can do any mischief See with what courage and bravery our Souldiers charge with what discipline and dexterity they demean themselves thanks to the exercise to which they have been used and the confidence that they have in our Army See our Battalions marching up with their Drums beating Colours flying and men at Arms in their wings in great order to the charge Observe our Artillery which to give place and make room for our men is drawn off by that ground which was left by the Velites See how the General encourages his men and assures them of Victory See how our Velites and light Horse are extended and returned to the flanks of our Army to see if there they can find any advantage to make an impression upon the Enemy Now now they are met See with what firmness our Battalions have received the charge without the least noise or confusion Observe the General how he commands his men at Arms to make good their ground not to advance upon the Enemy nor desert the Foot upon any occasion whatever See our light Horse marching to charge a Body of the Enemies Harquebussiers that was firing upon our flank and how the Enemies Horse come in to their rescue so that being enclosed betwixt the Cavalry of one side and the other they cannot fire but are forced to retreat behind their Battalia's See with what fury our Pikes addresâ— themselves to the Fight and our Foot advanced already so near that the Pikes are become unserviceable so that according to our Discipline the Pikes retire by little and little among the Shields See in the mean time how a Body of the Enemies men at Arms has disordered our men at Arms in the left wing and how according to our Discipline retiring under the protection of our Pikes extraordinary by their assistance they have repulsed the pursuers and killed most of them upon the place See the Pikes in ordinary of the first Battalia's how they have sheltred themselves under the Scudati and left them to make good the fight See with what courage with what security with what leisure they put the Enemy to the Sword Behold how they close their ranks in the Fight and are come up so near they have scarce room left to manage their Swords See with what fury the Enemy slyes because being armed only with Pike and with Sword both of them are become unserviceable one because of its length the other because the Enemy is too well armed See how they throw down their Arms how they are wounded killed or dispersed See how they run in the right wing see how they fly in the left So now we are safe and the Victory our own CHAP. VII The Authors reasons for the occurrences in the Battel Fabr. WHat do you think now have we not got the Victory very fortunately but we would have had it with more advantage had I been permitted to have put all things in execution You see there is no necessity of making use either of the second or third order because our Van was sufficient to overcome the Enemy so that I am enclined to speak no farther upon this Subject unless it be to resolve any doubt that may arise in your mind Luigi You have gain'd this Victory with so much courage and gallantry that I fear my transport will not give me leave to explain my self whether I have any scruple or not Nevertheless presuming upon your quickness I shall take the boldness to tell you what I think First therefore let me desire you to inform me why you made use of your Artillery but once why you caused them to be drawn off into your Army and made no mention of them afterward It seems to me that you placed the Enemies too high and ordered them as you fancied which might possibly be true but if their Cannon should be so placed as I do not question but many times they are as that they should play among your Troops I would fain understand what remedy you would prescribe and since I have begun to speak of the Artillery I shall propose all my scruples in this place that I may have no occasion to mention them hereafter I have heard many persons find fault with the Arms and orders of the ancients as things of little or no use in our days in respect of the fury of our Cannon because they break all ranks and pierce all Arms at such a rate that it seems to them no less than madness to oppose any ranks or orders of men against them and to tire your Souldiers with the carriage of Arms that will not be able to defend them Fabr. Your demand consisting of many heads requires a large answer 'T is true I caused my Artillery to play but once and I was in doubt whether they should do that and the reason is because it concerns a man more to keep himself from being hurt than to mischief his Enemy You must understand that to provide against the fury of great Guns it is necessary to keep where they cannot reach you or to place your self behind some wall or bank that may shelter you for there is nothing else that can secure you and then you must be sure that either the one oâ— the other are able to protect you Those Generals who put themselves into a posture to give battel cannot place their Armies behind a wall or a bank or at a distance where the Enemies Cannon cannot reach them and therefore seeing they have no way to defend themselves absolutely the best course is to secure themselves as well as they can and that is by possessing their Cannon with as much speed as is possible The way to possess themselves of it is to march up to it suddenly and in as wide an order as is convehient suddenly that they may fire but once and wide that the execution may be the less This is not to be done by a band of Souldiers in order for if they march any
and their orders from whence it follows that the better an Army is 〈◊〉 and the closer and stronger it is drawn up the safer it is So that whoâ—â—◠〈…〉 opinion is indiscreet or inconsiderate for if we see that a small part of the 〈◊〉 the ancients which is used at this day as the Pike and a small part of their orâ—â—◠〈◊〉 are the Battalions of the Swissers have been so serviceable and contributed 〈…〉 to our Armies why may we not believe that the other Arms and orders which 〈…〉 might have been as beneficial and useful Again had we no regard to the 〈◊〉 in placing our selves in that straight close order like the Swissers what other orâ—â—â—â—â—uld make us more fearful No order certainly can make us more fearful of the Artillery than that which keeps men firm and close together Besides if I be not frighted by the Artillery of the enemy when I encamp before a Town where they can fire upon me with more security because I cannot come at them by reason of the wall nor hinder them buâ—â—by my own Cannon which will be a business of time if I be not afraid I say whore they can multiply their Shot upon me as they please why should I fear them in the Field where I can run upon them and possess them immediately So that I conclude Artillery in my opinion is no sufficient impediment why we should not use the methods of our ancestors and practise their virtue and courage And had I not discoursed formerly with you about this subject I should have enlarged more but I shall refer my self to what I said then Luigi We have heard or at least it is our own faults if we have not what you have discoursed about the Artillery and that the best course that can be taken against it is to make our selves masters of it with as much expedition as we can if our Army be in the Field and drawing up ready to engage Upon which I have one scruple because to me it seems possible that the Enemy may place his Artillery in the flanks of his Army so as that it might offend you more and yet be more capable of being defended You have made if you remember in the ranging of your Army for a Battel a space of four yards from Company to Company and another space of twenty yards from the Battalia's to the Pikes extraordinary if the Enemy should draw up his Army in your own way and place his Cannon in those intervals I believe from those places they might gaul you exceedingly and with great difficulty because you could not enter into the Enemies body to possess them Fabr. Your scruple is rational and I will endeavour to discuss it or apply a remedy I have told you that those Battalia's are in continual motion either for a battel or a march and do naturally so straighten and close themselves that if you make your intervals narrower where you place your Artillery they will be closed up in a short time so as they will not be able to do any execution If you make your distances large to avoid one danger you incur a greater by giving the Enemy opportunity not only to possess himself of your Cannon but to rout your whole Army But you must understand it is impossible to keep your Artillery among your Squadrons especially those which are upon Carriages because being drawn one way and their mouths lying the other it is necessary to turn them before you can fire upon the Enemy and to turn them takes up so much space that fifty of those Carriages are enough to disorder a whole Army So that it is necessary the Artillery be placed without their Squadrons and being so they may be attacked as is said before But let us suppose it might be placed within the squadrons and that a way might be found out of retaining it in the middle and that it should not hinder the closing of their bodies nor leave a way open to the Enemy I say that even in that case the remedy is easie and that is by making spaces and intervals in your Army for the bullets to pass by which means the fury of their Artillery will become vain and it will be no hard matter to do this because the Enemy being desirous that it may be secure will place it behind in the farthest part of the intervals so that to prevent their shot from doing mischief among their own men it is necessary that it pass always in a right line so that by giving place on your side it is easily avoided For this is a general rule we must give place to any thing that we are not able to resist as the Ancients did to the Elephants and forked Chariots I believe and am assured that you think I have ranged the Armies and won the day yet let me tell you if what I have told you already be insufficient it would be impossible for an Army so armed and ordered not to beat in the very first encounter any other Army that should be arm'd and ordered according to the method of our times which many times affords but one front without any bucklers and so ill arm'd that they are not able to defend themselves against any Enemy that is near them And for their way of drawing up they do it in such manner that if they place their Battalia's in the flank one of another they make their Army too thin if they place them behind one another not having the way of receiving them into one another they are all in confusion and their ranks easily broken And though they give three names to their Armies and divide them into three Bodies the Van-guard Battaile and Rear-guard yet they serve only upon a march and for distinction of quarters but in a Fight they are all at the mercy of fortune and one small charge defeats the whole Army Luigi I have observed by the description of the Battel that your horse were repulsed by the Enemies Horse and retired to your Pikes extraordinary by whose assistance they not only sustained the enemy but beat him back again I believe as you say the Pikes may keep off the Horse in a close and gross body like that of the Swizzers but in your Army you have but five ranks of Pikes in the front and seven in the flank so that I cannot see how your Foot should be able to sustain them Fabr. Though I told you formerly that in the Macedonian Phalanx six ranks of Pikes could charge at one time yet you must understand that if a Battalion of Swizzers should consist of a thousand ranks there could charge at once not above four or five at the most because their Pikes being nine yards long a yard and an half is taken up betwixt their hands so that in the first ranks they have free seven yards and an half In the second rank besides what is taken up betwixt their hands a yard and half is consumed betwixt
one rank and the other so as there remains but six yards that can be used In the third rank for the same reasons there remains but four yards and an half in the fourth three yards and in the fift but one and an half The other ranks therefore are not able to reach the Enemy yet they serve to recruit the first ranks as we have said before and are as a rampart and bulwark to the other five If then five of their ranks are sufficient to sustain the Enemies horse why may not five of ours do as much having other ranks behind to reinforce them and give them the same support though their Pikes be not so long And if the ranks of extraordinary Pikes which are placed in the flanks should be thought too thin they may be put into a square and disposed in the flank by the two Battalia's which I place in the last squadron of the Army from whence they may with ease relieve both the front or the rear and give assistance to the horse as occasion requires Luigi Would you always use this order when-ever you were to give the Enemy Battel Fabr. No by no means for the form of your Army is to be changed according to the situation of the place and the strength or number of the Enemy as I shall shew by example before I finish my discourse But this form or model is recommended to you not as the best though in effect it is so but as a rule from whence you may take your other orders and by which you may understand the other ways of drawing up an Army for every Science has its Generalities upon which it is most commonly founded Only one thing I would press upon you to remember and that is That you never draw your Army up so as that your front cannot be relieved by your rear for whoever is guilty of that error renders the greatest part of his Army unserviceable and can never overcome if he meets with the least opposition and courage Luigi I have a new scruple that is risen in my mind I have observed that in the disposing of your Battalia's you make your front of five Battalia's drawn up by the sides one of another your middle of three and your rear of two and I should think it would have been better to have done quite contrary because in my opinion an Army is broken with more difficulty when the Enemy which charges it finds more firmness and resistance the further he enters it whereas it seems to me that according to your order the farther he enters it the weaker he finds it Fabr. If you remembred how the Triarii which were the third order of the Roman Legions consisted only of 600 men you would be better satisfied when you understood they were placed always in the rear for you would see that I according to that example have placed two Battalia's in the rear which consist of 900 men so that I choose rather in my imitation of the Romans to erre in taking more men than fewer And though this example might be sufficient to content you yet I shall give you the reason and it is this The front of the Army is made thick and solid because it is that which is to endure the first shock and insult of the Enemy and being not to receive any recruits from elsewhere it is convenient that it be well man'd for a few would leave it too weak and the ranks too thin But the second Squadron being to receive its friends into it before it is to engage with the Enemy it is necessary that it has two great intervals and by consequence must consist of a less number than the first For should it consist of a greater number or be but equal to the first either there must be no spaces or intervals at all which would occasion disorder or by leaving of spaces they would exceed the proportion of the first Squadron which would make your Army look very imperfect As to what you say touching the impression of the Enemy That the farther he enters your Army the weaker he finds it it is clearly a mistake for the Enemy cannot engage the second body before the first is fallen into it so that he finds the middle Battalion rather stronger than weaker being to fight both with the first and second together And it is the same thing when the Enemy advances to the last Squadron for there he has to encounter not only two fresh Battalia's but with all the Battalions united and entire And because this last Battalion is to receive more men it is necessary the distances be greater and by consequence that their number be less Luigi I am very well satisfied with what you have said but pray answer me this If the five first Battalia's retire into the three Battalia's which are in the middle and then those eight into the two Battalia's in the rear I cannot conceive it possible that the eight Battalia's first and afterwards the ten can be comprehended when eight or ten in the same space as when they were but five Fabr. The first thing I answer is this That the space is not the same for the five Battalia's in the front were drawn up with four spaces in the middle which were closed up when they fell in with the three Battalia's in the midst or the two in the rear Besides there remains the space betwixt the Battalions and that also which is betwixt the Battalia's and the Pikes extraordinary which space altogether do give them room enough To this it may be added That the Battalia's take up another place when they are drawn up in order before their retreat than they do after they are pressed for in their retreat they either contract or extend their Orders They open their orders when they fly they contract them when they retreat so that in this case it would be best to contract Besides the five ranks of Pikes in the Van having received the first charge are to fall back thorow the Battalia's into the rear of the Army and give way to the Scudati or Shields to advance and those Pikes falling into the rear of the Army may be ready for any Service in which their Captain shall think fit to employ them whereas did they not retire after the Battel was joyned they would be altogether useless And by this means the spaces which were left to that purpose are made big enough to receive all forces that are remaining And yet if those spaces were not sufficient the flanks on both sides are men and not walls which opening and enlarging their ranks can make such distances as will be able to receive them Luigi The ranks of Pikes extraordinary which you place in the flank of your Army when the Battalia's in the front fall back into the Battalia's in the middle would you have them stand firm and continue as two wings to the Army or would you have them retire with the Battalia's If you
of the one Nation and the other I would have therefore the Trumpets placed by the Lieutenant-General as Instruments not only proper to excite and enflame your Army but fitter to be heard and by consequence apter to derive your Commands than any of the other The rest of those kind of Instruments I would have placed about the Captains and Colonels of the Battalions I would have also a smaller sort of Drums and Flutes which should be beaten and played upon not as we do now in our fights but as our Tabours and Flagelets do in our Feasts The General with his Trumpets should signifie when his Army is to make a stand when to advance when to wheel when to retire when to make use of the Artillery when the Velites extraordinary are to move and by the variation of the sounds to direct his Army in all the Marches and Counter-marches that are generally used and I would have the Trumpets followed afterwards by the Drums And because this exercise is of great consequence in an Army it imports very much that it be frequently taught As to the Horse they should have Trumpets too but of a lesser and different sound from those about the Lieutenant-General And this is all that has occurred to my memory in the ordering and exercising of an Army Luigi I beseech you Sir let me not trouble you too much if I desire to be satisfied in one thing more and that is for what reason you caused your light Horse and Velites extraordinary to advance against the Enemy with great shouts and clamours and cries and when afterwards the Body and remainder of the Army came to charge they did it with extraordinary silence I confess I cannot comprehend the reason and therefore I beg your explanation Fabr. The opinions of the Ancient Generals have been different in that point whether an Enemy was to be charged silently and without noise or with all the clamour could be made The silent way is best to keep your men firm in their orders and to signifie the Commands of the General but the obstreperous way is best to excite the courage of your Soldiers and dismay the Enemy and because I thought in both cases there was something of advantage I made use of them both and caused those to advance with clamour and these with silence for I cannot think that an universal and perpetual noise can be any advantage because it hinders orders from being derived which is a most pernicious thing nor is it likely that the Romans used those shouts after the first shock for History tells us that many times by the exhortation and encouragement of their Officers the Souldiers which were flying were stopped and rallyed and disposed immediately into new Orders which could not be where the Officers could not have been heard THE FOURTH BOOK CHAP. I. The considerations and subtleties to be used in the drawing up an Army to fight Luigi SEeing the Victory has been so honourably obtained under my Conduct I think it discretion to tempt fortune no farther knowing how much she is variable and inconstant Wherefore my desire is to resign my Authority and that Zanobi may take it upon him according to the Order proposed of transferring it to the youngest and I know he will not refuse that honour or rather trouble both in complacency to me and as being naturally the more couragious of the two for he fears not to engage in these kind of conflicts though there be as much likelihood of his miscarriage as conquest Zanobi I shall refuse no Office into which you shall put me though I must needs say I could more willingly have been an auditor for your scruples and demands have hitherto given me more satisfaction than any thing I could have objected my self But I think Seignor Fabritio it would be better if you proceed provided your patience will serve and that we do not tire you with our Ceremonies Fabritio You rather oblige me Sir for this variety of Interrogators gives me to understand the vanity of your judgments and appetites But is there any thing behind that you would have added to what has been spoken before Zanobi There are two things of which I would willingly be satisfied before we pass any farther One is whether you have any other way of drawing up an Army The other is what reflections or considerations a General is to have before he comes to a Battel and when any accident intervenes how it is to be avoided Fabr. I shall endeavour to satisfie you but not by answering distinctly to your demands for whilst I answer to one it happens many times that I seem to answer to the other I have told you how I would have my Army drawn up that according to that model any other figure may be taken as the number of the Enemy and the nature of your ground does require for in that case one is to act according to the condition both of the one and the other But take notice of this That there is no way more dangerous than to extend the front of your Army too much unless it be very numerous and strong Otherwise you are to draw it up close and thick rather than wide and thin For when your Forces are few in respect of the Enemy you must look out for other remedies as by drawing your Army up so as it may be fortified by some River or Fen that may secure you behind or fortified in the flanks by some Ditch or Entrenchment as Caesar's was in France and this ought to be a general rule to you that you extend or contract your front according both to your own number and the number of your Enemy If the Enemy be not so numerous and your men as well disciplin'd as they you are to make choice of an open place where you may not only encompass the Enemy but distend your own ranks For in streight and narrow places not being able to make use of your orders you cannot make use of your advantage For this reason the Romans did most commonly make choice of open and clear places and avoided such as were difficult and close But if your Army be small or your men inexperienced you must do quite contrary as I said before and must find out some place where your few men may defend themselves or where their inexperience may do you no hurt In that case you are to choose some hill or eminence from whence you may come down upon the Enemy with more force yet must you have this caution not to draw up your Army upon any Strand or Sea-coast nor under the command of any Hill of which the Enemy may possess himself because you will be exposed thereby to the Enemies Cannon without remedy and be unable to do them mischief with any convenience In the drawing up an Army for Battel great regard is likewise to be had to the Sun and the Wind that neither the one nor the other be in your face for
they are great impediments to your sight one with its beams and the other by raising the dust and carrying the powder into your eyes besides the wind being contrary is a great disadvantage in rendring the blows which they give the Enemy more languid and weak and as to the Sun your must not only take care that it be not in your face nor does you no prejudice in the beginning of the Fight but that it does you no injury when it gets up wherefore the best way is when you draw up your men to have it if possible on their backs that many hours may pass before it can come about into their faces Hanibal knew this advantage very well and made use of it in the Battel of Cannas and Marius did the same against the Cimbrians If you be weaker in Horse it is your best way to draw up among the Vines or the Woods and such other impediments as in our times the Spaniards did when they beat the French in the Kingdom of Naples near Cirignuola And it has been many times seen that the same Soldiers which have been worsted and bastled before by only changing their order and shifting their ground have recovered the Victory Thus it was with the Cartbaginians who having been many times worsted by Marcus Regulus were afterwards Victorious by the Conduct of Kantippus the Lacedemonian who caused them to come down into the plain where they might have room for their Horse and their Elephants and by so doing they were too hard for the Romans According to the practice of the Ancients I have observed That all great Generals when they have known which quarter of the Enemy was the strongest and where they have fortified most they have not opposed the strongest part of their Army against it but have chose rather to confront it with the weakest of their divisions and with their strongest attack the weakest of the Enemies When afterwards they came to engage they commanded the strongest of their Squadrons that they should not only stand firm and receive the charge without making any advance whilst the weaker parts had orders to suffer themselves to be overcome and by giving ground gradually to fall behind the rear of the Army The Artifice procures two great disorders to the Enemy The first is that the strongest part of his Army is environ'd insensibly the other is that imagining their Victory certain by the retreat of their Enemy they fall frequently into disorder which many times robs them of that Victory of which they thought themselves so certain Cornelius Scipio being in Spain against the Carthaginians under the command of Asdrubal and knowing that Asdrubal understood very well that in the drawing up his Army he put the Roman Legions which were the strength and flower of his Army in the midst and that Asdrubal in probability would do the like When they came afterwards to Fight he changed his order put his Legions in the Wings and his light arm'd men in the Body When the Battel was joyned he commanded his Body to slacken their march on a sudden and the Wings to double their pace so that only the Wings on both sides engaged and the Bodies on both sides being at a distance one from the other came not up to one another and the strongest part of Scipio's Army fighting better than the weakest of Asdrubal's he overcame them In those days that stratagem was well enough but in our days by reason of our Artillery it is unpracticable for the space which would be left betwixt the two Bodies would give opportunity to the Artillery to play which as we said before would be very dangerous So then that way is to be laid aside and the way which I recommended before is to be used which is to charge with your whole Army and let your weakest Squadrons retire When a General finds his Army stronger than his Enemies if he would encompass it insensibly and that the Enemy may not prevent him let him draw up his Army to an equal front with the Adversary afterwards in the heat of the Fight let him order by little and little to retire in the front and let the Wings advance as gradually and it will always happen that the Enemy shall be encompassed before he is aware When a General would fight and be sure not to be routed let him draw up his Army near some place of retreat or security as either Fens Mountains or some strong inexpugnable Town for in that case he may pursue the Enemy but the Enemy cannot pursue him Hanibal made use of this cunning when his fortune began to decline and he began to apprehend the Conduct of Marcellus Some Generals to disturb the orders of the Enemy have commanded their light armed men to begin the Battel and when it is once joyned to retire among the ranks When afterwards it grows hotter and both sides are thorowly engaged they have had orders to draw forth out of the flanks of the Army and having flanked the Enemy unexpectedly they have disordered and broke him If any one finds himself weaker in Horse besides the ways proposed before he may place a Battalia of Pikes behind them and draw them up in such manner that in the heat of the Battel they may open and give way for the Pikes to pass thorow them and by so doing he shall be sure to prevail Several have accustomed their light armed men to fight among their Horse and they have been found to give the Horse very good assistance Of all those who are famous for drawing up Battels Hanibal and Scipio are the most renowned for the great skill that both of them expressed in their conflict in Africa but because Hanibals Army was composed of Carthaginians and Auxiliaries of several Nations he placed 80 Elephants in his front behind them he placed his Auxiliaries next them his Carthaginians and last of all his Italians in whom he could not safely conside and the reason why he ordered them so was because the Auxiliaries having the Enemy in their faces and finding themselves closed up with Carthaginians at their backs should not think of flying but being under a necessity to fight he did hope they might either overcome or so harrass the Enemy that when he came up with his fresh men he might the more easily overthrow them Against this order Scipio placed his Hastati Principes and Triarii in his accustomed manner so as upon occasion they might be received one into the other The front of his Army he made up with great spaces but that it might appear close and united to the Enemy he filled them up with his Velites with order that as soon as the Elephants come upon them they should retire and entring among the Legions by the ordinary spaces leave a way open for the Elephants to pass by which means the fury and execution of the Elephants being evaded they came presently to handy-blows and the Carthaginians were overcome Zanobi
In your description of the Fight you have caused me to remember how Scipio in the Engagement caused not his Hastati to retire into the ranks of the Principes but divided them and caused them to retire into the Wings of the Army to give place to the Principes when they were to advance against the Enemy I would know therefore for what reason he differed from the ordinary custom Fabritio I will tell you Hanibal had placed the strength of his Army in the second division so that Scipio to oppose them with equal courage united the Principes and the Triarii together insomuch as the intervals of the Principes being filled up by the Triarii there was no spaces left for the reception of the Hastati wherefore he caused the Hastati to open to the right and left and fall in with the Wings of the Army But you must observe that this way of dividing the first Squadron is not to be used but when the other is Superior for then you may do it conveniently as Scipio did but being inferior or under any repulse it is not to be done without manifest danger and therefore it is necessary that you have spaces behind in your other Squadrons that may be ready to receive you But to return to our discourse The ancient Asians among other contrivances to mischief their Enemy made use of certain Chariots with Sythes fastned to the Sides of them which served not only to open the Squadrons of the Enemy with their force but to cut and kill them with their Sythes Against these Chariots they had three ways to defend themselves either by the closeness of their ranks or by receiving them into their ranks as they did the Elephants or by some other vigorous resistance as Silla the Roman did against Archelaus who had store of those Chariots to repel them Silla caused several stakes to be pitched into the ground before his first Squadron which putting a stop to the carreer of the said Chariots prevented the execution which they would otherwise have done And it is observable the new method that Silla used in ranging his Army for placing his Velites and light Horse behind and all his compleat arm'd Soldiers before he left intervals sufficient to receive them which were behind when they had occasion to march up so that the Fight being begun by the assistance of the Horse who had room to pass thorow the first Squadron to the charge he obtained the Victory CHAP. II. The Arts which are to be used during the Fight Fabr. TO disturb the Army of the enemy when the Battel is joyned it is necessary to invent some way or other to affright them either by spreading a report of supplies that are hard by or counterfeiting some representation of them that may dismay the enemy and facilitate their defeat Minutius Ruffus and Acillus Glabrio two of the Roman Consuls were skilful in this art Caius Sulpitius caused all the boys and refuse of his Army to mount upon mules and other beasts that were unserviceable in fight and placed them at a distance upon a hill and drawn up in such order that they appeared like a compleat body of horse when he was engaged with the French and the enemies apprehension of that body got Sulpitius the Victory Marius made use of the same stratagem when he fought against the Germans if then these false alarms and representations are of such use and advantage in time of Battel true ones must needs be more efficacious especially if they fall upon the enemies flank or rear whilst the battel is joyned which indeed is not easy to be done unless the nature of the Country contributes for if it be open and plain you cannot conceal any part of your Forces as is necessary to be done in those cases but in woody or mountainous Countries you may conceal some of your Troops in such manner as they may fall suddenly and unexpectedly upon the enemy which will give you a certain Victory It is many times of great importance to spread a rumour abroad during the Fight that the enemies General is slain or that he is beaten in another part of the Army which as the other has many times been the cause of a Victory The enemies horse are often disordered by the representation of strange figures or the making of some unusual noise as Croesus did who opposed camels against horse and Pyrrhus when he confronted their Cavalry with his Elephants the strangeness of which sight affrighted them so that nothing was strong enough to keep them from disorder In our days the Turk defeated the Sophi of Persia and the Soldan of Syria only with the noise of this Guns which being unusual to their horse disordered them in such manner that the Turk got the Victory without any great trouble The Spaniards to distract the Army of Amilcar placed in the front of their Army certain Chariots filled with flax and drawn by oxen to which flax when the enemy came up to charge they put fire and the oxen running from the fire rush'd furiously into the Army of Arailcar and put it to the rout It is an unusual practice as we have said before to surprize and disturb the enemy with ambuscades where the Country is convenient but where it is open and large many have made great holes in the ground and covered them with straw and earth lightly leaving certain spaces solid and firm for their own retreat over which having retired cunningly in the heat of the fight the enemy pursuing has fallen in and been ruined If during the fight any ill accident happens that may discourage your Souldiers 't is prudence to dissemble it and turn it to advantage as Tullus Hostilius did and Lucius Sylla who observing in the heat of the Battel a party of his Troops go over to the enemy to the great disheartening of the rest caused it to be published quite thorow his Army that it was done by his order which not only dispelled the apprehension that was among them but encouraged them in such manner that it got him the Victory Sylla having commanded out a party upon some enterprize and all of them being killed in fight of his Army that the rest might not be terrified told them he sent them on purpose because he had found them unfaithful Sertorius fighting a battel in Spain flew one of his own men who brought him news that one of his great Officers was killed and the reason was lest telling it to the rest it might possibly have discouraged them It is no easy matter to detain and Army if it be once tottering and inclining to run and to bring it to fight again but you must consider it with this distinction either it is wholly disordered and then it is impossible to recover it or else it is disordered but in part and there is some remedy Many of the Roman Generals have stop'd the flight of their Armies by putting themselves at the head of
be fighting but if you do not find it convenient in respect of the number of your Army the disadvantage of the place or some other consideration you would do well to turn them from that inclination It happens again that necessity or occasion constrains you to fight when your Souldiers are diffident or adverse in one case it is necessary that you affright them in the other that you excite them In the first case when remonstrances and exhortations will do not good the best way is to suffer some of them to be cut off by the enemy that those who have fought and those who have not may believe you another time What Fabius Maximus did by accident may be done on purpose and by art You know the Army of Fabius was very fierce to be fighting with Hanibal and his Master of the Horse was of the same mind with the Army Fabius was of another opinion and thought it better to protract and this diversity of opinions occasioned the dividing of the Army Fabius kept his division in his trenches the Master of the Horse went out fought was worsted and had certainly been cut off had not Fabius relieved him by which example the Master of the Horse and the whole Army were convinced that their wisest way was to have obeyed the orders of Fabius As to the other point of animating your Souldiers and raising their courages to a pitch it is good to incense them by possessing them of the contumacy and insolence of the enemy by pretending intelligence among them and that you have corrupted a considerable party by posting your Army so near them that they may see one another and skirmish with them slightly every day for things which are done daily we easily despise by counterfeiting your self angry and in a solemn and grave oration reprehending and upbraiding their backwardness and telling them that if they leave you you will charge the enemy alone But to make your Souldiers bold and couragious you are by no means to permit any of them to send any thing to their own houses or to deposit it any where else till the war be done that they may know that though in running home they may save their lives yet it must be with the loss of their prize the love of which renders people commonly as valiant as the love of their lives Zanobi You say that Souldiers may be encouraged and disposed to fight by a speech or oration do you intend it should be delivered to the whole Army or only to the Officers CHAP. IX A General ought to be skilful and eloquent to persuade or dissuade as he sees occasion Fabr. IT is an easie matter to persuade or dissuade any thing with a small number of persons because if words will not do you have force and authority to back them but the difficulty is to remove an opinion out of the heads of the multitude when it is contrary to your own judgment or the interest of the publick for there you can use nothing but words which must be heard and understood by every body if you would have every body convinced For this reason it is requisite an excellent General should be a good Orator to inflame or asswage the courage of his Souldiers as he has occasion for unless they can tell how to speak to a whole Army there is little good to be expected and yet in our times this way of haranguing them is quite laid aside Look over the Life of Alexander the Great and see how often he was put to it to speak in publick to his Army and had he not done it he would never have been able to have conducted it when laden with so much riches and prey thorow the deserts of Arabia and in India where it endured so much misery and distress for there is scarce a day but something or other happens that causes confusion and ruine to an Army where the General is either ignorant or careless of speaking to them The way of making speeches to them takes away their fear quickens their courage augments their confidence discovers their cheats secures their rewards remonstrates their dangers and the ways to avoid them In short by those kind of Orations a General reprehends entreats threatens encourages commâ—nds reproaches and does every thing that may either enhance or depress the passions of his men wherefore that Prince or that Commonwealth that should design to establish a new Militia and give it a reputation is to accustom his Souldiers to the harangues of their chief Officers and to chuse such Officers as know how to accost them CHAP. X. Certain considerations which encourage Souldiers and make them as virtuous as valiant Fabritio THe worship which the ancients paid to their Gods though they were false Religion and the Oath which was taken before they were listed in the Army was in those days sufficient to keep their Souldiers to their duty for upon every misdemeanor they were threatned not only with such punishments as they were to expect from their Officers but such as could be inflicted as they thought by nothing but their Gods which opinion being tempered with other religious ceremonies and superstitions made all enterprises easie to the Generals of those times and would do so still were we as careful and observant of our Religion as they were of theirs Sertorious knew how to make his advantage that way pretending conference with a white Hart which as he gave out among his Souldiers came from Heaven to assure him of Victory Sylla to make his designs the more credible pretended to discourse with an Image that he had taken out of the Temple of Apollo which directed him how he was to steer Others have pretended dreams and visions that have commanded them to fight in the days of our Fathers Charles the Seventh of France during his wars with the English pretended to be advised by a maid that was sent from Heaven to give him instructions which maid was called the Pucelle d' Orleans and gained him many a Victory There are other ways of making an Enemy contemptible Agesilaus the Spartan having taken several Persians strip'd them naked and shew'd them to his men to the end that seeing the delicacy and tenderness of their contexture they might have less occasion to fear them Some have by design brought their men into extremity that they might be necessitated to fight as having taken from them all hopes of preservation but in Victory which indeed is the surest and best way to make your Souldiers fight and to infuse courage into them and then this courage and obstinacy is highly encreased by their confidence in their General and their love to their Country Their love to their Country is natural their confidence in their Captain is more from his experience and conduct than from any thing else There may be many other obligations but none so strong as that which binds you either to conquer or dye THE FIFTH BOOK CHAP. I. How
the Romans marched in an Enemies Country and in what manner they are to be imitated Fabr. I Have shown you how an Army is drawn up and marshalled in order to a Battel I have told you how an Enemy is overcome and several circumstances which occur therein So that it is time now to inform you how an Army is to be ordered which has not an Enemy in view but is in continual probability of an assault This may happen when an Army marches in an Enemies Country or at least a Country that is suspected And first you must understand the Roman Armies had always some Troops of Horse which were scouting abroad in order to the discovery of the Roads After which followed the right Wing and after them the Carriages which belonged to that Squadron Then followed a Legion and after them their Carriages Then another Legion and their Carriages and after them the left Wing and the remainder of the Cavalry after them This in short was the manner in which the Romans marched most commonly and if it hapned in their march that their Army was assaulted either in the front or the rear they caused all their Carriages to withdraw to the right wing or the left as they found it convenient and most agreeable with the nature of the place and then when they were cleared of their Baggage and disincumber'd all of them unanimously make head against the Enemy If they were assaulted in the flank they drew their Carriages on that side where they were like to be most safe and then addressed themselves against the Enemy This way being good and well govern'd ought in my judgment to be imitated by sending your light Horse to scout about the Country and having four Battalions of Foot they are to follow one the other successively each of them with its Carriages in the rear And because Carriages are of two sorts one belonging to particular persons and others for the common use of the Camp I would divide the publick Carriages into four parts and assign one to every Battalion I would likewise divide the Artillery and the followers of the Camp into four parts that each Battalion should have equal share in their impediments and Carriages Bnt because it happens many times that you march thorow a Country not only suspected but so openly your Enemy that you expect every hour to be assaulted it will be necessary that to secure your self you change the form of your march and put your self into such a posture as that neither the Paisants nor the Enemies Army may be able to offend you though they come upon you never so suddenly In these cases your Generals of old were wont to march in a square order which they called a square not that it was exactly of that figure but because it was ordered so as it was able to fight in four places at once and by that means they were always ready either to march or to fight I shall follow this model for ordering my two Battalions which I have chosen to that purpose in stead of a compleat Army CHAP. II How an Army is to be Marshalled to march in an Enemies Country Fabr. TO march therefore securely in an Enemies Country and to be able to make good every part when surprized and assaulted by the Enemy I am to reduce my Army into a square according to the model of the ancients I would have a square whose area or vacuity within should consist of 212 yards in this manner I would first place my flanks distant one from the other 212 yards I would have five Battalia's in each flank marching length ways in files and at three yards distance the one Battalia from the other so that each Company taking up forty yards all of them together with the spaces betwixt them shall take up 212 yards Between the front and the rear of these two flanks I would dispose the other ten Companies in each of them five ordering them so that four of them should be placed in the front of the right flank and four in the rear of the left flank leaving a space of four yards betwixt each Company and of the two Companies that are left I would have one placed at the head of the left flank and the other in the rear of the right And because the space betwixt one flank and the other consists of 212 yards and these Battalia's drawn sideways in breadth rather than length will take up intervals and all 134 yards there will remain a space of 78 yards betwixt the four Companies in the front of the right flank and the same space will be possessed by the four Companies in the rear nor will there be any difference but that one space will be behind towards the right wing and the other before towards the left In the space of 78 yards before I would put my ordinary Velites in the space behind my Velites extraordinary which would not amount to a thousand for each space But to contrive it so that the great space within should consist of 212 yards square it would be convenient that the five Companies which are placed in the front and the five Companies in the rear should take up none of that space which belongs to the flanks wherefore it is necessary that the five Companies behind should with their front touch the rear of the flanks and those five Companies in the Van with their rear should touch the front of the flanks so that there should remain on each side of the Army a distance sufficient to receive another Company And because there are four spaces I would take four Ensigns of the Pikes extraordinary and place one in each of them and the two Ensigns which would remain I would place in the midst of the space of my whole Army in a square Battalion at the head of which the General of the Army should stand with his Officers about him But because these Battalia's thus ordered do march all of them one way at once but do not so when they fight when they are drawn up those sides are to be put into a fighting posture which are not guarded by other Battalia's And therefore it is to be considered that the five Battalions in the front are defended on all sides but just in the front so that they are to be drawn up in great order with the Pikes before them The five Companies behind are guarded on all sides but behind so as they are likewise to be ordered with Pikes in their rear as we shall show in its place The five Companies in the right flank are guarded on every side but only on the right flank The five in the left flank are the same only on the left flank they are open and therefore in the managing your Army you must observe to place your Pikes so as they may turn about to that flank which is naked and exposed and your Corporals are to be in the front and in the rear that being to
fight the whole Army and every Member of it may be in their proper places and the manner of doing it we have declared before when we discoursed of putting the Companies in order I would divide my Artillery and place part of it without my right flank and the other without my left My light Horse I would send before to scour the Country my men at Arms I would dispose part behind my right wing and part behind my left at about forty yards distance from the Battalia's And this general rule you are to observe by all means in the drawing up your Army that your Horse are to be placed either in the rear or upon the flanks for to place them before at the head of the Army would occasion one of these two things either they must be placed at such distance that upon a repulse they may have space and time enough to wheel of without falling foul upon the foot or else draw up the foot with such intervals that the Horse may pass thorow without putting them into disorder Certainly no body ought to look upon this as a thing of small importance for many have been ruined and routed by their own men for want of timely consideration But to return to our business the Carriages and the people unarmed are placed in the void place of the Army and so disposed that there is passage left for any to pass from one part of the Army to another These Companies without the Horse and Artillery do take up a space of 282 yards And because this square consists of two Battalions it is convenient to let you know what part of them makes one Battalion and what the other Now because Battalions are denominated from the number and each of them as you know consists of ten Battalia's or Companies and a Colonel I would have the first Battalion place five of first Companies in the front the other five in the left flank and the Colonel in the left angle of the front The second Battalion should place its five first Battalia's upon the right flank and the other five in the rear with the Colonel in the right corner to secure the rear and perform the office of him whom the Romans called by the name of Tergiductor CHAP. III. How to put an Army presently into order and draw it up so as if upon a march it should be attack'd it may defend it self on all sides Fabr. HAving put your Army into this posture you are to cause it to march and in its march observe the same order for without doubt it is safe enough against the tumults and incursions of the Peasants against which it is sufficient if the Colonel commands out parties of Horse or certain Companies of his Velites to repel them Nor is there any danger that those kind of people will ever come to handy strokes with you for men without order are always fearful of men in order and ' it s the practice of such people to alarm you with great shouts and crys but never to come near like little Curs that bark at a Mastiff but keep far enough off When Hanibal invaded Italy with so much detriment to the Romans he passed thorow France was frequently infested by the Bores but he valued them not But it is not sufficient to have your Army in this order but if you intend to march you must have Pioneers and such kind of people to plain the ways make your intrenchments c. and these Pioneers are to be secured by the Horse which you send up and down the Country In this order an Army may march ten miles a day and be time enough at their journeys end to Sup and take up their Quarters by day-light for many times an Army will march in one day twenty miles But if it happens to be attacked by a formed Army it cannot be so sudden but you will have time to put your self into a posture of defence because an orderly Army marches slowly and you will have leisure to draw your self up in Battalia and put your Army either into the same figures I have prescribed or into such another If you be assaulted in the Van you have no more to do but to bring your Artillery thither out of the flanks and bringing your Horse out of the rear into the Van to put them into the same place and distance as I have directed The 1000 Velites which are before may advance divide themselves into two parties of five hundred a piece and enter into their own place betwixt the Horse and the wings of the Army and then into their place are to succeed the two Companies of Pikes extraordinary which I placed before in the great vacuity of the Army The 1000 Velites in the rear are to remove from their post and dividing themselves repair to the two flanks and fortifie them and by the space and chasm which they leave at their departure the Carriages may march out and all those who are unarmed and put themselves behind in the rear The space in the middle being now void and every man in his place the five Battalia's which I ordered behind the Army may advance by the void space betwixt the two flanks and march towards those in the Van. Three of them may march up within 40 yards with equal intervals betwixt the one and the other and the other two may remain behind at the same distance of forty yards This is a form that may be ordered on a sudden and has some resemblance with the first model of an Army which we recommended before for thought it be streighter in the front it is firmer in the flanks and by consequence stronger But because the five Battalia's in the rear have Pikes with them for the reasons abovesaid it is necessary to cause them to advance to fortifie the front of the Army and therefore either you must cause your Companies to turn Company by Company as they were solid bodies or else pass them into the front thorow the files of the Bucklers which way is a better way and less disorderly than to cause them to wheel in whole Companies like a solid body and the same thing is to be done with those in the rear upon any assault as I have shown before If the Enemy presents himself in the rear you have no more to do but to face about with your whole Army and immediately the figure is altered the rear becomes the front and the front the rear after which you are to observe all the ways of fortifying your front as I have directed before If the Enemy appears upon your flank your Army is to face about to that side and do the same things to strengthen your front so that your Horse your Velites your Artillery may be in such places as are convenient for the making up that front and if there be any difference in this variation of fronts it is only this that some of those who are to remove have farther to
advance than others Nevertheless in making a front of your right flank your Velites are to enter into the intervals betwixt the wings of the Army and the horse should approach to the left flank into whose place the two Companies of Pikes extraordinary which were placed in the middle should succeed but the carriages should remove and the unarm'd people by the great space and overture that is made and retire behind the left flank which is now become the rear of the whole Army and the other Velites who were placed in the rear at first are not to budge in this case because that place should not remain open being of the rear become the flanks all other things are to be done as in my first directions for the making of a front What is said before of making a front of the right flank will serve for making a front of the left flank for the same order is to be used if the Enemy comes upon you so strong that he is able to attack you on both sides you must fortify the places where you suspect he will charge by doubling your ranks from the place where he does not appear to fall on by dividing your Artillery your Velites and your Horse distributing them equally in both places If he assaults you in three or four sides at once you or he must be very imprudent for had you been wise you would never have put your self into a place where an enemy could have come at you on so many sides especially with a form'd and well ordered Army For to ruine you securely it is necessary the Enemy be strong enough to attack you on all sides and with as many men in every place almost as in your whole Army and if you be so indiscreet to march into his Country or put your self into the power of an enemy whose men are three times as many and as well experienced as yours if you miscarry you can blame no body but your self but if misfortune happens not by your fault but by accident of war no body will condemn you and it will fair with you as it did with Scipio in Spain and Asdrubal in Italy But if the Enemy be not much stronger than you and yet ventures to assault you in several places the rashness will be on his side and the success in all probability on yours for of necessity he must so weaken himself that you may receive him in one place and charge him briskly in another and then you will easily ruine him This way of ordering an Army against an enemy that is not in sight but is hourly expected is very necessary and it is very useful to accustom your Souldiers to close and change and march in this order and in their march to shew them how to fight according to my first front and then falling into their march again upon a new alarm in the rear to turn that into a front and then each of the flanks and so in their first posture again and these exercises are very necessary if you would have your Army ready and well disciplin'd For which cause I would recommend it to all Princes and great Captains to restore these practices of the ancients for what is military discipline but to know how to command and execute these things well what is a well disciplin'd Army but an Army train'd up well in these kind of exercises and he who in our times would but frame his discipline to this I am confident could never be worsted But to continue our discourse if this square figure be difficult it is not to be laid aside for that for that difficulty is necessary nevertheless exercise will make it easy for having learn'd how to draw your self up and preserve your figure you will easily understand afterwards how to maintain other figures in which there is not so much difficulty Zanobi I am of your mind that those orders are necessary and cannot tell as to my self what can be added or substracted Yet I would willingly be satisfied in two things One is when you would make a front of your rear or one of your flanks and would have your men face about how you do signify your commands whether by word of mouth or sound of trumpet The other is whether those you send before to plain the ways and make them passable for your Army are to be Souldiers drawn out of your Battalia's or other Country people designed on purpose for that work CHAP. IV. Of Commands derived by word of mouth by Drums and Trumpets and of the nature of Pioneers Fabr. YOur first demand is of very great importance for many Armies have been ruined when the Captain 's orders have been mistaken or not heard for which reason the words of Command in such great dangers ought to be clear and intelligible and if you would signify your commands by the sound of your Trumpets or Drums great care is to be taken that the sounds be so different and distinguishable one from the other that they cannot be mistaken If your commands are by word of mouth you must use particular and be sure to avoid general terms and in your particular words you must be cautious to use none that may be liable to an ill interpretation Many times the crying back back has been the loss of an Army wherefore that word is to be avoided and instead of it you are to say retreat If you would change your front and make it either in the flank or the rear you must not say turn but face about to the right or the left to the front or the rear and in like manner all the words of command are to be plain and intelligible as march on stand firm advance retreat and what ever may be done by word of mouth clearly and distinctly is to be signified that way what cannot be done that way is to be done by the Trumpet and Drum As to the Pioneers which is your second demand I would have that office performed by my own Souldiers as well because it was the practice of ancient times as because thereby I should have fewer idle persons in my Army and by consequence fewer impediments I would command out of every Battalia what number I thought necessary I would furnish them with Pickaxes and Spades and cause them to leave their arms with their next ranks who should carry them for them so that when the enemy appeared they should have no more to do but to fall back to their ranks and take them again Zanobi But who should carry their Pickaxes and Spades Fabr. There should be Waggons on purpose Zanobi I fear you would never prevail with your Souldiers to work Fabr. We will talk of that in its proper place at present I shall lay it aside and discourse of the way how they are to be supplyed with provisions for having tired them thus long 't is but reasonable to refresh them with victuals CHAP. V. Of the Provisions that are
necessary for an Army Fabr YOU must know a Prince is to keep his Army as free and as fit for expedition as possible and to rid it of all encumbrances that may make his enterprizes difficult The first difficulty to be removed is want of provisions and therefore he is to take particular care that they be furnished with bread and wine The ancients did not think of providing of wine for when they wanted wine they made use of water with a little vinegar to give it a taste so that among the provisions for the Army vinegar was provided but not wine Their bread was not baked ready to their hands as in the Towns but every Souldier had his proportion of meal which he ordered as he pleased with a certain quantity of Bacon and Seam which gave their bread a gust and rendred them strong So that the provision for the Souldiers was meal vinegar bacon and suet or seam and barley for the horses They had commonly heards of Cattel great and small which followed the Armies which being driven and not carried were no great encumbrance By reason of this order of old an Army marched many days journey thorow difficult and solitary places without want of provisions because they lived upon such things as might easily be carried with them But in our Armies now a-days we find it quite contrary for the Souldiers cannot subsist without wine and bisket as when they are at home of which provision cannot be made for any considerable time insomuch as they are many times famished or if provision be made it is with much trouble and vast expence I would endeavour therefore that my Army might not be supplyed at that rate nor would I have them have any bread but what they make themselves As to wine I would not hinder their drinking it nor prohibit that any should come into the Army but I would take no pains nor use no industry to supply them and for other provisions I would follow exactly the model of the ancients which way if rightly considered will shew what difficulties are removed what wants and distresses are prevented to an Army and General and what convenience is added to any enterprize that shall be undertaken Zanob Since we have routed the enemy and marched afterwards into his Country 't is but reasonable to believe that we have made our depredations tax'd his Towns taken several Prisoners I would know therefore how the ancients proceeded in these cases CHAP. VI. How the ancients divided the spoil and of the pay which they gave to their Souldiers Fabr. I Will satisfy you as to that I do not question but you have considered because I have discoursed it formerly with some of you how our present wars do impoverish not only those Princes which are overcome but those two are Conquerors for as one looses his Country so the other looses his Mony which was otherwise in ancient times be cause the Conqueror enriched himself by the war The reason of this difference is because in our times no publick account is taken of the prizes as formerly but all is left to the discretion of the Souldier which occasions two very great disorders the first is as before the other it renders the Souldier more desirous of plunder and less observant of order and military discipline And we have heard of many instances where their impatience to be pillaging has wrested the Victory out of their hands who had almost perfectly obtained it Whilst the Romans had the command of their own Armies they provided very well against both these inconveniencies appointing all the prizes to be delivered in and appropriated to the publick and that afterwards the publick should distribute as it pleased To this purpose they had their Questores which were like our Chamberlains in whose hands all their prizes and taxes deposited of which the Consul or General of their Army disposed as he thought good for the payment of his Souldiers the curing of the wounded or sick and discharging the other necessities of the Army 'T is true the Consul had power to give the plunder of a Town to his Souldiers and he frequently did it but that liberty never bred any disorder for when a Town was taken or an Army defeated all the prize was brought into a publick place and distributed man by man according to every ones merit This custom made the Souldiers more intent upon victory than plunder the practice of the Roman Legions was to break and disorder an enemy but not to pursue for they never went out of their ranks upon any occasion whatever Only the horse the light arm'd men and what other Souldiers were not of the Legions followed the chase whereas if the plunder of the field had belonged to any man that could catch it it would have been neither reasonable nor possible to have kept the Legions to their ranks or to have exposed them to so many dangers Hence it was that upon a Victory the publick was always enriched for when a Consul entred in triumph he brought with him great riches into the Treasury of Rome and they consisted of Taxes Contributions Ransoms and Plunder The ancients had likewise another custom that was very well contrived and that was out of every Souldiers pay to cause a third part to be deposited with the Ensign of their respective Companies who never restored it before the War was ended This they did for two reasons first that every Souldier might have a stock of his own for most of them being young and profuse the more they had the more they would have squandred The other reason was that knowing their stocks were in their Ensigns hands they should have the more care of him and defend him with the more courage and this custom contributed much to their valour and is necessary to be observed by any man who would reduce his Souldiers to the discipline of the Romans Zanobi I believe it impossible for an Army not to meet with several ill accidents whilst it marches from one place to another and that it requires great industry in the General and great courage in the Souldiers to prevent or avert them you would oblige me much if you would tell me what has occur'd to your knowledg in the case CHAP. VII To know the surprizes which are contriving against you upon your march Fabr. I Shall satisfy you willingly as being particularly necessary to any man who is desirous to give a perfect scheme of this discipline Whilst an Army is matching the Generals are above all things to be vigilant that they fall not into any ambushments which may be done two ways one when you fall into it bluntly of your self the other when you are drill'd and wheedled into it by the enemy before you perceive it To prevent the first way it is convenient to send out strong parties to discover the Country who are to be the more diligent by how much the Country is more apt and proper for
return to our business Quintus Lutatius the Roman having the Cimbri upon his heels and being arrived at a river that the enemy might give him time to pass he pretended a resolution to fight them pitch'd his Camp entrench'd himself set up his Standard and sent out parties of horse to provide forrage The Cimbrians conceiving he would encamp there came and encamped by him and divided themselves into several parties to supply them with provisions of which Lutatius having notice slip'd over the river before they could have time to disturb him Some have turned the course of a river and by a cut carrying the water on the back-side of the Army have made the river fordable and passed it with ease When the waters are rapid and the stream strong to facilitate the passage of the Foot they put the strongest of their Horse betwixt the stream and the Foot to keep of the torrent and another party below to bear up the Foot if the water should be too strong for any of them Rivers that are unfordable are likewise to be passed with Bridges and Boats so that it is good to carry in your Army materials for all these things It happens sometimes that when you would pass a River the Enemy is got on the other side and opposes To remove this difficulty I know nothing you can do better than to follow the example of Caesar who having brought his Army to the side of a River in France with design to have passed it but finding Vercingetrix with his Army on the other side ready to obstruct him he marched down the River several days journey on one side whilst Vercingetrix did the like on the other But Caesar having made a place in a Wood convenient for the concealing of some of his men drew out three Companies out of each Legion caused them to stay behind there and when he was gone commanded that they should set up a Bridge over the River and fortify it and in the mean time he followed his march Vercingetrix observing the same number of Legions not suspecting that any part of them were left behind followed him on the other side but Caesar when he judged the Bridge finished faced about on a sudden and finding every thing as he expected he passed the River without any difficulty Zanob Have you any rules whereby you may discover a ford Fabr. Yes we have whereever in a River you see the water tremble and carry certain streaks betwixt the place where it stagnats and the current you may be sure the bottom is good and the place fordable because the gravel and sand which the River does commonly carry along with it is more fixed there as has been often seen by experience Zanobi Suppose the flood should have loosened the earth at the bottom of the ford so as the horse should sink in what remedy then Fabr. You must make grills or lettices of wood sink them into the River and let them pass over them But to follow our discourse CHAP. XI How to make your passage thorow a streight though you be pressed by an Enemy Fabr. IF a General by accident be conducted with his Army betwixt two Mountains and that he has but two passages one before and the other behind and the Enemy has got possession of both he can have no better remedy than to do as has been done before that is to dig a deep Trench behind him and make it as unpassable as he can that the Enemy may believe he intended to stop him there in the rear that with his whole force he might make his way thorow the passage in the Van Which being observed by the Enemy he concluded according to appearance sent what strength he could make to the other end of the pass and abandoned the Trench whereupon the other clap'd a wooden bridge over the Trench immediately which he had prepared on purpose and passed back again without any obstruction Lucius Minutius a Roman Consul was in Liguria with an Army and was shut up by the Enemy betwixt the Mountains so as he could not disingage himself being sensible of his condition he sent certain Numidians which he had in his Army upon small scrannel Horses towards the places where the Enemy had their Guards At first sight the Enemy put themselves into a posture to defend the Passes but when they observed the Numidians in ill order and ill mounted in respect of themselves they began to despise them and to be more remiss in their Guards which was no sooner perceived by the Numidians but they clap'd spurs to their Horses and charging suddenly upon them they passed on in spight of all their opposition and being passed the mischief and devastation that they made in the Country constrained the Enemy to give free passage to the whole Army A certain General being infested by a numerous Enemy drew up his Army so close that the Enemy was able to encompass him round and afterwards he fell so smartly upon that Quarter where the Enemy was weakest that he not only worsted them but disintangled himself Marcus Antonius in the retreat from the Parthians observed that every morning by break of day they were upon his back as soon as he moved and continued skirmishing and molesting him quite thorow his march whereupon he resolved not to remove before noon The Parthians observing concluded he would not stir that day and returned to their Posts insomuch that Marcus Antonius had opportunity to march all the rest of that day without interruption The same person to avoid the Darts of the Parthians commanded his Men that when the Parthians came near them the first rank should fall down upon their knees and the second rank clap their Bucklers over the heads of the first rank the third over the second the fourth over the third and so on so as the whole Army lay as it were under a Shield and was defended from their Arrows And this is all I can remember about the accidents to which an Army is subject upon a march I shall pass now to another thing unless you have something else to demand THE SIXTH BOOK CHAP. I. What kind of places the Greeks and the Romans chose out for their Camps with a short recapitulation of what has been said before Zano I Think it very convenient that Battista takes upon him the Office of demanding and that I lay it down by doing so we shall seem to imitate the good Generals of old who as I have been taught by Seignor Fabritio did usually place the valiantest of their Soldiers in the front and in the rear of the Army conceiving it necessary to have those in the Van who would begin the fight bravely and such in the rear as would bravely maintain it And as Cosimo began this discourse with a great deal of prudence so Battista may finish it with the same Luigi and I having born the brunt in the middle as well as we could and seeing hitherto every man
who are sick for a General will find himself overlaid when he is at once to contend with an Enemy and a Disease But of all remedies nothing is so powerful as exercise and therefore it was a custom among the Ancients to exercise them continually Think then of what importance exercise is when in the Camp it keeps you sound and in the Field it makes you Victorious CHAP. VIII Directions as to Provisions Fabr. AS to Famine you must not only have a care that the Enemy cannot cut off your Provisions but you must consider from what place you may be supplyed and see that what you have already be not imbezled It is convenient therefore that you have with you always a months Provision before hand and then you are to oblige your Neighbours and Friends to furnish you daily with more You must likewise have a good Magazine for Ammunition in a strong place which is to be distributed with great care giving every man a reasonable proportion every day and keep such an eye over it that want of it may occasion no disorder for in matters of War every thing else may be repaired in time but hunger the longer it lasts will the more certainly destroy you Nor will any Enemy that can master you with Famine ever seek to attach you with his Arms because though the Victory be not so honourable it is more easie and secure That Army therefore in which Justice is not observed That Army which squanders and consumes lavishly as it pleases cannot so well barricado or fortifie its Camp but that Famine will find the way in for where Justice is neglected Victuals is not constantly supplyed and where Soldiers are lavish and profuse though they have plenty it is quickly consumed For this cause among the Ancients it was commanded that the Soldiers should eat what was given them and at a prefixed time for no Soldier durst eat but when the General went to dinner but every body knows how little this is observed in our days and if then the Soldiers might be justly term'd sober and orderly they may now with as much justice be said to be licentious and debauched Battista When you began first to order your Camp you told us you would not confine your self to two Battalions but take four that you might shew us how a just and compleat Army was to be lodg'd I desire therefore that you would satisfie me in two things One is when I have either more or less than four Battalions how I am to dispose of them The other is what number of Soldiers would suffice you to expect and engage any Enemy whatever CHAP. IX How to lodge more or less than four Battalions and what number of men is sufficient to make head against an Enemy be he as numerous as he may Fabr. TO your first demand I answer that be your Army composed of more or less than four or six thousand men you may increase or lessen their lodgments as you please and in the same manner you may proceed to less or more in infinitum Nevertheless when the Romans joyn'd two Consular Armies together they made two Camps and turned the place of the unarmed men one against the other To your second demand I reply That the ordinary Roman Army consisted of about 24000 men but when by accident they were over-pressed with numbers they never exceeded 50000 with this number they opposed 200000 Gauls which assaulted them after their first War with the Carthaginians with this number they opposed themselves against Hanibal and you must observe that the Romans and the Greeks always carried on their Wars with a few men fortifying themselves with their good order and the excellence of their discipline whereas the Eastern and Western Nations did all by their multitudes but the Western people performed all by their natural fury and the Eastern by their submission and obedience to their King In Greece and in Italy where their natural fury and their natural reverence to their King was not so great it was necessary to apply themselves to discipline which was of such efficacy that it has made a small Army prevail against the fury and natural obstinacy of a greater I say therefore that if you would imitate the Romans and the Greeks you are not to exceed the number of 50000 men but rather to be fewer because more do but breed confusion and hinder the order and discipline that you have learn'd Pyrrhus used ordinarily to say that with 15000 men he would go thorow the world But let us pass now to another part of our discipline CHAP. X. Certain Artifices and Advertisements of War Fabritio WE have gained a Battel with our Army and shown most of the accidents which may happen in it We have caused it to march and discoursed with what impediments it might be incumbered in its march and at length we have brought it into its Camp where it is to take not only a little repose after its travel and fatigues but consider and deliberate how it is to finish the War For in the Camp many things are transacted especially there being an Enemy in the Field and Towns to be suspected of which it is good to secure your self and to reduce such as are in hostility It is necessary therefore to come to some demonstrations and pass these difficulties with the same glory and honour with which we have proceeded thus far To descend therefore to particulars I say that if many people or persons have any thing in controversie betwixt them to your advantage and their own detriment as if they should beat down the walls of their City or send several of their Citizens into banishment you must cajole them in such manner that none of them may think it has any relation to them to the end that neither of them relieving one another they may all of them be oppressed without remedy or else you must command all of them what they are to do the same day that each of them believing himself particularly commanded may think rather of obeying than looking out for a remedy and by that means your commands be executed without sedition or disorder If you suspect the fidelity of a people and would assure your self of them and surprize them unawares you cannot do better than to communicate some design with them desire their assistance and pretend to some farther enterprize without the least ombrage or suspition of them and by doing so not imagining you have any jealousie of him he will neglect his own defence and give you opportunity of effecting your designs If you suspect that there is any body in your Army that gives advice of your designs to the enemy the best way to make your advantage of his treachery is to impart some things to him which you never intend to do and to conceal what you intend to pretend doubts where you are perfectly resolved and to conceal other things that you have absolutely determined by this
their numbers quickly distress'd them and they were forced to surrender CHAP. IV. Other Advertisements both for the Besiegers and the Besieged Fabr. IN matters of assault I say the first thing to be provided against is the Enemies first Effort for by that way the Romans gain'd many a Town assaulting it suddenly and in all places at once and this they called Aggredi urbem Corona or to make a general assault as Scipio did when he took new Carthage in Spain But if the Besieged can stand the first shock it gives him such courage he will hardly be taken afterwards And if things should go so far that a breach should be made and the enemy enter yet the Citizens have their remedy if they will stand to one another for many Armies have been repelled and defeated after they have entered a Town The remedy is this that the Inhabitants make good the highest places of the City and fire upon them from the windows and tops of their houses But against this the Assailers have made use of two inventions one was to open the Gates of the City and give the Inhabitants opportunity to escape The other is to make Proclamation that whoever throws down his Arms shall have quarter and none put to the Sword but such as are taken in Arms and this artifice has been the taking of many a Town Moreover a Town is taken with more ease when it is so suddenly attacked as when an Army keeps at such a distance as that the Town believes either you will not at all or cannot attempt it before they shall have the alarm of your motion because it is at present so far off Wherefore if you can come upon them suddenly and secretly not once in twenty times but you will succeed in your design I speak very unwillingly of the occurrences of our times because it must be done with reflection upon me and my friends and if I should discourse of other people I should not know what to say Nevertheless I cannot pass by the example of Caesar Borgia called Duke Valentino who being with his Army at Nocera under pretence of making an inroad into the Dutchy of Camerin turned suddenly upon the State of Urbin and master'd it without any trouble in one day which another man would not have been able to have effected in a much longer time CHAP. V. A man is not to depend upon the Countenance of the Enemy but is rather to suspect what even he sees with his eyes Fabr. THose who are besieged are to be very careful of the tricks and surprizes of the Enemy and therefore they are not to relye upon the countenance that he carries but are rather to suspect there is some fraud or deceit that will fall heavily upon them if they suffer themselves to be deluded Domitius Calvinus besieging a Town made it his custom every day to march round about the Walls with a good part of his Army The Garrison fancying by degrees that it was only for his recreation began to slacken their Guards of which Domitius having notice fell suddenly upon them and carried the Town Other Generals have had intelligence of relief that was expected in the Town and having habited a certain number of their Soldisrs and disposed them under counterfeit Ensigns like those which the besieged expected they were received into the Gates and possessed themselves of the Town Cimon an Athenian General having a design to surprize a Town in the night set fire on a Temple that was without it and the Inhabitants flocking out to extinguish the fire they fell into an Ambuscado and lost their Town Others having taken some of the Servants and such people as came forth for forrage put them to the Sword and disguising their own Soldiers in their Cloths have entred the Gates and made themselves Masters of the Town CHAP. VI. How to disfurnish a Garrison of its men and to bring a terror upon a Town Fabr. THe Ancients have besides these made use of several Stratagems and Artifices to unfurnish the Enemies Garrisons of their men When Scipio was in Affrica being desirous to possess himself of some of the Garrisons which the Carthaginians had in their custody he made many offers to besiege them but pretending fear he not only drew off on a sudden but marched away with his Army to a great distance Hanibal supposing our apprehension real to follow him with a greater force drew out his Garrisons which Scipio understanding sent Massinissa to surprize them and he did it with success Pyrrhus making War in Sclavonia advanced against the chief Town in that Province in the defence of which Town several people having got together he pretended to despair of carrying it by force and turning his Arms against other Towns which were not visibly so strong he prospered so well in his design that the said Town drawing out a good part of its Garrison in relief to their Neighbours left it self so weak as it became a prey to the Enemy Many have corrupted and defiled the waters and turned Rivers out of their Channels to make themselves Masters of a Town and have miscarried when they have done It is a way likewise that contributes much to the taking of a Town to affright them with reports as of some great Victory that you have obtained some great supplies that you have received and an obstinate resolution if they do not surrender quickly to put them all to the Sword CHAP. VII To corrupt a Garrison and take it by Treachery Fabr. SOme Generals of old have endeavoured to take Towns by treachery by corrupting some of the Garrison and they have done it several ways Some have sent of their own men as fugitives into the Town thereby to put them into credit and Authority with the Enemy and give them opportunity to betray them Some by this means have discovered the strength of the Garrison and by that discovery have taken the Town Some under feigned pretences have stopped up the Gates of a Town from shutting with a Cart or beam or such kind of thing and given their party the convenience of entring Hanibal besieging the Town of Tarentum in Calabria which was defended by the Romans under the Conduct of Levius corrupted a person in the Garrison called Eoneus and ordered him that he should go out a hunting in the night and pretend he durst not do it in the day for fear of the Enemy Eoneus observed his directions went out and in several nights together and the Guards had not the least suspition at length Hanibal disguizing some of his men in the habit of Huntsmen sent them in after him who killed the Guards possessed themselves of the Gates and let Hanibal into the Town A Garison is likewise to be cheated by drilling them a good distance out of Town and pretending to fly when they come to charge you Many and Hanibal among the rest have suffered their Camps to be possessed by the Enemy that they
might have opportunity to clap between with their Army and get into the Town Again they are sometimes deluded by pretending to raise the Siege as Formio the Athenian did who having plundered and harrassed the Country of Calcidon received their Embassadors afterwards with propositions of Peace He gave them very good words and sent them back full of security and fair promises upon which the poor people presuming too much Formio fell suddenly upon them and overcame them Those who are shut up in a Town are to keep a strict eye upon such as they have any reason to suspect but they are sometimes to be secured and obliged to you by preferment as well as by punishment Marcellus knew that Lucius Baucius the Nolan was a great favourer of Hanibal yet he carried himself to him with so much kindness and generosity that of an Enemy he made him his intimate Friend CHAP. VIII Good Guard is to be kept in all places and times Fabr. THose who are in any fear of being besieged are to keep diligent guard as well when the Enemy is at a distance as at hand and they are to have most care of those places where they think themselves most secure for many Towns have been lost by being assaulted on that side where they thought themselves impregnable and this miscarriage arises from two causes either because the place is really strong and believed inaccessible or else because of the policy of the Enemy who with great clamour and noise pretend to storm it on one side whilst on the other he does it as vigorously but with all the silence imaginable And therefore it concerns the besieged to be very careful and keep good Guards upon the Walls especially in the night and that as well with Dogs as with Men for if they be fierce and watchful they will give an alarm if the Enemy approaches as soon as any thing And not only Dogs but Birds have been known to have preserved a Town as it happen'd to the Romans when the French besieged the Capitol when the Spartans lay before Athens Alcibiades to discover how his watches were kept commanded that in the night when ever he held up a light each of the Guards should hold up another and great punishment was to be inflicted upon any that neglected it Isâ—crates killed a Centinal that he found a-sleep with this expression I leave him as I found him CHAP. IX Ways to write privately to ones Friends Fabr. THose who have been besieged have contrived several ways of conveying intelligence to their friends not daring to trust their affairs to the tongue of a messenger they write in cyphers many times and conceal them several ways The cyphers are made according to every mans fancy and the ways of concealing them are divers some have writ on the in-side of a scabard of a Sword others have put their Letters up in Paste baked it and then given it for sustenance to the messenger that is to carry it some have hid them in their privities some in the collar of the messenger's dog There is another very useful and ingenious way and that is by writing an ordinary Letter about your private affairs and afterwards betwixt every two lines to write your intrigues with a certain kind of water that will never be discovered but by dipping it into other water or by holding it to the fire and by so doing the Letters will be visible And this trick has been very subtilly practised in our times in which a certain person having a desire to signifie a secret to some of his friends and not daring to trust it to a messenger he sent out Letters of Excommunication written very formerly but interlined as abovesaid and caused them to be fixed to the doors of the Churches which being known to his friends by some private marks they understood the whole business and this is a very good way for he who carries it may be deceived and he that writes it is in no great danger There are a thousand other ways invented according to every mans fancy and wit But it is much easier to write to those who are block'd up in a Town than for those who are besieged to write to their friends abroad because these Letters cannot be conveyed but by somebody who must pretend to run away out of the Town which is a hard and a dangerous thing if the enemy be any thing careful But 't is otherwise with Letters to be sent into a Town for a man has a thousand occasions to come into a Leaguer where he may watch his opportunity and slip into the Town CHAP. X. How to repair a breach and the way to defend it Fabr. BUt let us come now to the present way of beleaguering of Towns I say that if you be assaulted in a Town that is not fortified with ditches on the in-side as I have mentioned before that your enemy may not enter at the breaches which the Artillery make for against other breaches there is no remedy it is necessary whilst the Artillery is playing to cut a new ditch behind the breach of at least thirty yards wide and to throw all the earth that comes out of it towards the Town that it may make a good Rampart and add to the depth of the ditch and this work is to be carried on with such diligence that when the wall falls the ditch may be at least five or six yards deep and whilst they are at work to make this ditch it is necessary that they be secured with two Caseniats that may flank the Enemy in case he should endeavour to disturb them and if the wall be so strong as to give you time to make your ditch and your casemats that part which is battered will be the strongest part about the Town for that Rampart will be of the same form and model which we proposed for the ditch within But where the wall is so weak as to allow you no time then you must show your courage and present yourself bravely at the breach your Souldiers well arm'd and with as much chearfulness as is possible This way of throwing up new works was observed by the Pisans when you besieged it and they might do it well enough for their walls were strong which gave them time and the earth good and proper for Ramparts whereas had they wanted either of those conveniences they must of necessity have been lost It is wisdom therefore to make these ditches round about the Town before there be any necessity as we said before for in that case you may expect the enemy without fear CHAP. XI Of Mines Fabr. THe ancients took several Towns by mining under ground and that two ways either by carrying their mines under ground into the Town and entring thereby as the Romans did when they took the City of Vejentum or by undermining only the walls and so tumbling them down At present this latter way is more used than the other and
renders those Towns which stand high weaker then the rest because more subject to be min'd and then adding but a good quantity of powder which takes fire in an instant you do not only ruine the wall but you open the very mountain and cleave the works into pieces The way to prevent this is to fortifie in a flat Country and make the ditch which encompasses your Town so deep that the enemy may not dig under it without coming to the water which is the best defence against mines But if you be to defend a Town upon an eminence your best way will be to make several deep holes in the wall that may give vent to the powder when the enemy sets in on fire There is another way likewise to prevent them and that is by countermining if you find where the enemy mines but 't is a hard matter to discover them especially if you be besieged by a cautious enemy CHAP. XII Good guards are always to be kept and your Souldiers not to be divided Fabr. HE who is besieged is to take extraordinary care that he be not surprized in time of repose as after a storm after the Guards are set which is either at break of day or at the shutting in of the evening or especially whilst you are at dinner in which time many Towns have been taken and many sallies have been made to the destruction of the besiegers Wherefore it is necessary to be upon the Guard in all quarters and your men generally arm'd and here I cannot omit to tell you that nothing makes a Town or Camp harder to be defended than the dividing of your forces for the enemy being able to attack you when he pleases with all his power at once you must be ready on all sides and having parted your Forces you will be forced to defend your self with a part and to keep the same guards with the remainder when ever the enemy assails you as you should have done when your whole Garrison was together which is a great disadvantage for he can attack you with his whole power when you have but a part of yours to defend your self CHAP. XIII That when ones sees himself block'd up on every side it is good to expose ones self now and then and of the advantages which have ensued Fabr. IF he who is besieged be beaten considerately he is certainly lost but the Besieger can only be repulsed for which reason many who have been besieged either in Camp or Town though they have been inferior in number have nevertheless sallied with their whole force at a time and been two hard for the enemy Thus Marcellus did at Nola thus Caesar did in France when his Camp was encompassed with a vast number of Gauls for finding he was not able to defend it because he must divide his men into partles and distribute them round and finding also that standing within his stoccado's he could not do so much execution upon the enemy as he desired he opened his Camp on one side and issuing out of it with his whole force charged the enemy with such fury and courage that he put them to the rout Besides the obstinacy and resolution of the besieged does many times astonish and terrifie the enemy Pompey being encamped against Caesar and Caesar's Army in great distress for provisions Pompey had presented him a piece of Caesar's bread which was made of herbs and look'd upon as a very strange thing Pompey having viewed it commanded that it should not be shewn in his Army lest it should discourage them to consider the obstinacy of their Enemy Nothing was more honourable to the Romans in their War with Hanibal than their constancy because in the greatest of their distress and in the worst of their fortune they never demanded peace nor discovered any token of fear on the contrary when Hanibal was under their Walls they sold the ground in which he was encamped at an higher rate than it would have been sold at another time and they were so true and firm in their enterprizes that they would not draw off from Capua to defend their own City though they had an Army before that when Hanibal appeared before Rome I am sensible that I have told you several things that you understood and perhaps considered already yet I have done it as I said before by that means to give you a better comprehension of the quality of this Army and to satisfie such if there be any such here as have not had the opportunity to understand it so well as you I suppose now there remains nothing but that I give you some general rules which are very obvious and common CHAP. XV. General Rules to be observed in Military Discipline Fabr. THat which is beneficial to you is prejudicial to your Enemy and that which is beneficial to him is prejudicial to you He who in War is most vigilant to observe the designs and enterprizes of the Enemy and takes most pains in exercising and disciplining his Army shall expose himself to less danger and have greater probability of victory Never bring your men to fight till you have some just confidence in their courage till you have seen them well arm'd and well ordered and never let them engage but when you find them cheerly and hopeful of success It is better to conquer an Enemy by hunger than fighting in which last victory fortune has more share than virtue or courage No resolution is so likely to succeed as that which is concealed from the Enemy till it comes to be executed Nothing is of more importance in the whole art of War than to know how to take advantage when it is offered Nature produces few persons strong but industry and exercise makes many Order and discipline is more available in War than valour or force When any come over to your service from the Enemy they are of great advantage to you provided they be faithful for it is more diminution to the Enemies strength to have Soldiers revolt than to have so many slain though the name of a fugitive is suspicious to new friends and abominable to old It is better in the drawing up your Battalions for a Battel to draw them up with reserves and place such behind the front as may supply it upon occasion than to enlarge your front and make as it were but one rank of your whole Army He who understands his own Forces and the Enemies too can hardly miscarry The courage of Soldiers is better than their number The situation of the place is sometimes more effectual than the courage of your men New and unexpected things are an astonishment to some Armies Your Soldiers despise things that are common and are weary of any thing that is tedious I would advise therefore that by pickeering and little skirmishes you acquaint your men with your Enemy before you bring them to a Battel He who pursues an Enemy that is disordered in disorder himself shall lose
the victory he had gained and perhaps give it to the Enemy He who makes not provision of Victuals will be beaten without a blow He who relies more upon his Horse than his Foot or his Foot than his Horse must accommodate himself to the place If you would know at any time whether you have any spies in your Army you have no more to do but to command every man to his Tent. If you find the Enemy has any knowledge of your designs you must change them What you are to do you may advise with many what you are resolved to do communicate with few When Soldiers are in their quarters they are to be kept in order by fear and by punishment when in the field with hopes and reward A good General never comes to a Battel but when necessary requires or some great advantage invites him You must endeavour that your Enemy may not know how you intend to draw up your Army when you come to fight and let your figure be what it will be sure your first Companies be so ordered as that they may fall back into the second and both into the third When you are engaged never employ any of your Battalia's about any thing but that to which you deputed them at first if you would avoid putting things into disorder Sudden accidents are not easily prevented but those which are foreseen are prevented without difficulty Men Arms Money and Provisions are the nerves of War but the first two are most necessary because Men and Arms will find Money and Victuals but Money and Victuals can never find Men. The Rich Man unarm'd is but a prey to the Soldier Use your Soldiers to abominate luxury either in diet or cloths This is as much as I can think fit to speak of in general though I am sensible other things would have fallen in well enough with my Discourse As how and in what manner the ancients ordered their Squadrons how they were habited and how they exercised them in several other things and I could have added several particulars which I have not thought necessary at this time because you may know it your self and likewise because it was not my intention at first to shew you exactly how the ancient Malitia was constituted but how it was to be done in our times For this reason I have thought unnecessary to speak any farther of those kind of antiquities than what might be serviceable to this introduction I know likewise I might have inlarged myself more about the exercising of Horse and come afterwards to discourse of Sea-fights for to distinguish Militia's their Armies at Sea and Armies at Land Armies of Foot and Armies of Horse but of Sea discipline I shall not presume to say any thing because I know nothing of it I shall leave that to be treated of by Genoueses or Venetians who by their experience in that kind have done very great things formerly Nor shall I speak any farther of Horse than what I have said before because they are not so corrupt and disorderly For if your Foot which is the strength of an Army are well disciplin'd and in good order your Cavalry must be good of necessity CHAP. XV. The way to have many Horse in your Country Fabr. I Would however remember him who is desirous to settle and establish a good Militia in his Country that to furnish it handsomly with Horse he should do two things one is that he should distribute a certain number of good Stalions up and down that the Country-men may breed and drive a Trade with Foles and Colts as you do in this Country with Calves and young Mules The other is that there might not want Chapmen for the Colts I would oblige every man that keeps a Mule to keep an Horse and he that would keep but one thing for his Saddle should be enjoyned to have it an Horse besides I would constrain every man that wore Cloth-clothes to keep an Horse in his Stable This order was taken not long since by a Prince of our times and succeeded so well that in a short time he had a most excellent Cavalry As to other things relating to Horses I refer you to what has been said this day and what has been practised of old CHAP. XVI A General is to invent of himself and not follow altogether the practiecs of his Predecessors Fabr. BUt perhaps you would desire to know what parts and qualifications there ought to be in a General and I will satisfie you in short for I cannot make choice of a properer man than he who understands all those things which I have recommended this day and yet that would not be sufficient unless he had abilities to invent some thing of his own for never any man was Master of a Trade who had no invention of his own and if invention be honourable in any thing it is most certainly in this This is manifest in all Authors who have constantly applauded all sorts of inventions how slight and inconsiderable soever as appears by the great Character they bestowed on Alexander the great for his wisdom in appointing a Cap to be put upon the top of a Launce as a signal for the dislodging of his Army rather than to do it by sound of Trumpet as formerly because it imported him much that they should remove privately He was commended likewise for ordering his Soldiers upon a charge to fall down upon their left knee as an expedient that would make them receive the charge with the more strength and firmness which invention got him the Victory and occasioned him so much honour that all Statues erected afterwards in his honour were erected in that posture But because it is time to conclude our discourse I will leave where I began to avoid the reproach which is incident to such persons as when once straggled know not how to return CHAP. XVII The Author returns and with a short Discourse concludes his Book Fabr. IF you remember Cosimo you told me that you could not imagine the reason why in one place I should commend Antiquity and blame those which would not imitate it in great things and yet I have not imitated it my self in my Martial affairs in which I have taken much pains and spent a great deal of my time To which I answer That men who are to execute any thing are first to learn which way it is to be done that they may be afterwards the more able when it comes to operation Now whether or no I understand how to establish a Militia according to the method of the Ancients I leave you to judge who have heard me discourse of it so long from whence you may imagine how much time has been spent in those thoughts by me what great desire I have had to bring them to effect and whether I have already or ever may have occasion to do it But to satisfie you farther and justifie my self I will give you the reasons and
thereby observe my promise in some measure by shewing you the conveniencies and inconveniencies in such imitations I say then that no action this day among men is more easily executed according to the method of the Ancients than Military discipline but it must be among such Princes as are able to bring together 15 or 20000 of their own Subjects against an Enemy On the other side there is nothing more difficult to such Princes as have not that convenience And that you may comprehend it the better you must understand that Generals are commended upon two several accounts some are famous for that with an Army ordered and prepared by their own natural discipline they have performed great things so it was with most of the Roman Citizens and others who had the command of Armies whose only task was to keep their Soldiers good and Conduct them securely Others have been not only to contend with and conquer the Enemy but they were first to instruct and exercise their Army and these doubtless were worthy of more praise than they who with their old and well experienced Soldiers performed such Exploits Of this sort was Pelopidas Epaminondas Tullus Hostilius Philip of Macedon Cyrus King of Persia and Gracchus the Roman All those were forced to model and discipline their Armies before they ventured them to sight and all these were able to do it in respect of their own experience and that they had other persons which were able to exercise their Soldiers as they desired Nor would it ever have been possible that any of those Generals how good and excellent soever could ever have done any great thing in another Province full of corrupt men unless it had been accustomed to some honest obedience It is not sufficient then in Italy to understand how to manage a Veteran Army but you must first know how to make and prepare it and then how to govern and conduct it Again those who do this must be such Princes as have great revenues and many Subjects in which number I am not to be reckoned as one who never commanded nor never can unless it be foreign Forces under some other Prince into which foreigners whether it be possible or not to insuse any of these things of which I have discoursed I leave you to judge How could I perswade a Soldier of our days to carry more Arms than he was accustomed and besides his Arms two or three daies Provision at his back and a Spade or Pickaxe at his girdle How could I prevail with him to work or digg all day to stand all day to his Arms in counterfeit exercises that I might rely the more confidently upon him when he came to it in good earnest How could I work upon him to abstain from play lasciviousness blasphemy and insolence which is their practice every day How long would it be before I could reduce them into such order such discipline and awe that if an Apple tree was never so full and stood in the middle of their Camp none of them should venture to touch it as is many times read of the Roman Armies What is it that I can promise them that may make them either fear me or love me when the War being ended I shall have no farther to do with them How can I make them sensible of shame who have been born and bread without any How should they pay me a respect whom they do not know By what God by what Saint shall I conjure them By the Gods which they adore or by the Gods which they blaspheme Which it is that they adore I cannot tell but am sure they blaspheme them all How can I expect they should keep their promise which they do hourly despise How can they who pay no honour to God express any to men What good discipline then are we like to imprint upon so depraved a Mass If you object that the Swizzers and Spaniards are good Soldiers I confess them much better than the Italians but if you consider what I have said and the manner of proceeding of both those Nations you will find them come short in many things of the perfection of the Ancients The Swizzers are become good Soldiers by natural practice of those things which I have recommended and the Spaniards by necessity for their Wars lying in Foreign Provinces where they are constrained either to overcome or dye because they can never hope to get off by flying are grown good and yet their goodness is in many things defective for their excellence is only to stand and receive the Enemy at push of Pike and the Swords point besides their is not any man among them fit to instruct another in what is necessary much less if he be not of their own Country But to return to our Italians who having wanted wise Princes have not been capable of good orders and having wanted that necessity which was incumbent upon the Spaniards they have not taken it up of themselves so that now they are the very scorn and contempt of the world not for any fault in the people but in their Princes who thereby have been chastised for their ignorance and justly punished for losing their Territories so ignominiously without any considerable resistance Will you see that what I say is true Consider what Wars we have had in Italy since the Expedition of Charles 8th to this day and although otheâ— Wars rendered Soldiers formidable and martial these Wars by how much they were more great and more furious by so much both Officers and Soldiers became more dissolute and cowardly And this must necessarily proceed from ill orders which are not much better at this day and the misery is there was nor is none able to reform them Do not think that there is any way to recover reputation to the Arms of the Italians but by this way that I have proposed and by means of such Princes as have great Territories there for this form may be imprinted in men that are simple and plain and ones own Subjects much sooner than in such as are lew'd and disorderly and strangers A good Sculptor never expects to make a good Statue out of a piece of Marble that is mangled and has been ill handled but he will do well enough if it has never been touched Our Princes in Italy before they were sensible of their Wars with the Northern Nations believed it was enough for a Prince to know how to write a civil answer how to direct a Letter with all its Punctilio's how to show himself witty and quick in his reparties how to juggle and dissemble how to dress himself handsomly and dispose of his Jewels to the best advantage how to eat and sleep in more state and magnificence than other people to have a thousand dalliances and pleasures about him to behave himself haughtily and extort from his Subjects to live in idleness and ease to dispose of Military commands to their Parasites to despise those who proposed
miscarried in the Expedition but it was more by the falshood than gallantry of the Enemy for relying too much upon their promises he was reduced to such distress for Provisions that he and his whole Squadron were lost nevertheless in the midst of these exigences being in an open and Champian Country where there were no Mountains no Woods no Rivers to shelter or ease them far from all relief and nothing left to sustain them the Foot brought themselves off under the command of M. Anthonie and behaved themselves so well in the opinion of the Parthians themselves that their vast Army of Horse durst not venture upon them But to what purpose do we trouble our Reader with examples so remote we have testimony nearer home that will do it effectually We have known in our time 9000 Swizzers at Novara attack 10000 Horse and as many Foot being most Gascoignes they never regarded After this 26000 Swizzers set upon the King of France in Milan who had with him 20000 Horse 40000 Foot and a hundred pieces of Artillery and though they did not vanquish him as at the Battel of Novara yet they fought him bravely for two days together and though worsted at last yet the greatest part of them got off Marcus Regulus Attilius placed such confidence in his Foot that he not only opposed them to the Enemies Horse but to their Elephants and though his success did not answer his expectation yet it hindered not but that as great matters might have been expected from his Foot So then whoever would defeat a Body of Foot well ordered must do it with another Body better ordered than they or it is never to be done In the time of Philip Visconti Duke of Milan 16000 Swizzers having made a descent into Lombardy Carmignuola the said Dukes General marched against them with about 1000 Horse and some Foot for not being acquainted with their way of fighting he thought they would have been sufficient but having fallen upon them with his Horse and been repulsed with loss being a wise man and one that knew how to frame himself to every accident he recruited very well marched against them again and coming to an engagement caused all his Cuirassiers to dismount and at the Head of his Foot fall on upon the Swizzers who were not able to resist them For the Cuirassiers being compleatly arm'd forced their way into the Body of the Swizzers without any loss so as their whole Army was defeated and cut off and none left alive but what were preserved by the humanity of Carmignuola I do not doubt but many people are well enough satisfied in their judgments that Foot are more serviceable than Horse yet such is the infelicity of our times that neither ancient nor modern examples nor the confession of those who have tryed them are sufficient to prevail with our Princes to correct this Error or to believe that to give reputation to the Arms of a Province it is necessary to revive this Order countenance their Foot and see them well pay'd and then doubtless they will repay him by their noble Exploits But they deviate from this way as they do from the rest and therefore no wonder if their Conquests be more to the detriment than augmentation of their State CHAP. XIX The Conquests of Commonwealths that are ill governed and contrary to the Model of the Romans do conduce more to the ruine than advancement of their affairs THese false opinions of the use and excellence of Horse and Foot are so rooted in the minds of men and so confirmed with ill Examples that no body thinks of reforming our late errors or restoring the old Discipline of the Romans Thirty years since who could have persuaded an Italian that 10000 Foot could have assaulted 10000 Horse and as many Foot and have beaten them Yet this was done by the Swizzers at Novara For though all Histories ring of it yet none of our people will believe that it is possible to do now what was anciently done They object the excellence of our Horse and say they are so well arm'd that they are able to repulse not only a Body of Foot but even a Mountain or Rock and by these kind of fallacious Arguments they deceive themselves not considering that Lucullus with a few Foot defeated 150000 of Tigranes Horse and yet they had a sort of Cuirassiers among them like ours This Exploit of Lucullus we have seen acted over again by the Germans in Italy as if on purpose to convince us of our error Which if Princes and Common-Wealths could be persuaded to believe they would commit fewer faults be more strong against the insults of the Enemy and not place all their hopes in their Heels as they do at this day and those who had the Government of any Civil State would know better how to conduct and manage themselves either as to the enlargement or conservation of their Dominion and find that Leagues and Confederacies rather than absolute Conquests sending Colonies into what they had conquered making publick feuds of the spoils of the Enemy to infest and perplex the Enemy rather with Excursions and Battels than Sieges to keep the publick rich and the private poor and with all possible caution to keep up the Discipline of the Army are the ways to make a Common-Wealth formidable and great These are the true ways of enlarging an Empire all the rest are uncertain or pernicious and if thereby any to whom these ways are not pleasing they are by any means to lay aside all thoughts of extending their Dominion to think only of regulating their Laws at home and providing for their defence like the little States in Germany which by so doing have lived in peace and tranquillity for many years together But how industrious and careful soever we are in abstaining from injury or using violence to our Neighbour some body or other will be injuring us and it will be impossible to live always in quiet from which provocation will arise not only a desire in us but a necessity of vindicating our selves and retaliating upon them and when this desire is once kindled if our Neighbors do not supply us with occasion we can find it at home as will inevitably fall out where Citizens are opulent and strong And if the Cities of Germany have continued free and at peace a long time it proceeds from a peculiar disposition in that Country which is scarce to be found any where else That part of Germany of which I now speak like France and Spain was subject to the Empire of the Romans But when afterwards that Empire began to decline and the title of the Empire was removed into that Province Those that were the wealthiest and most powerful of the Cities taking advantage of the pusillanimity or distresses of their Emperors made themselves free paying only a small annual Rent for the redemption of their Liberties which being permitted by degrees all those Cities which held immediately
were willing they should I do not see how it was possible having no Battalia's with intervals behind them to give them reception Fabr. If when the Enemy forces the Battalia's to retire he does not press them too hard they may stand firm in their order and flank the Enemy when the Battalia's in the front are retired But if they be charged as may be reasonably expected and the Enemy be so strong as to force the other they may retire with them and that without difficulty though there be no Battalia's behind with spaces to receive them for the Body in the midst may double to the right and thrust one File into another as we shall show more at large when we speak of the manner of doubling of Files 'T is true to double in a retreat you must take another way than what I have described for I told you the second Rank was to enter into the first the fourth into the third and so on But here in this case we must not begin in the Front but in the Rear to the end that by doubling our Ranks we may retreat and not advance CHAP. VIII The Exercises of an Army in general Fabritio TO answer now to whatever may be objected against my Battel as I have drawn it up before you I must tell you again that I have ordered and engaged it in that manner for two reasons one to show you how it is to be drawn up the other to show you how it is to be exercised As to the drawing up of an Army I doubt not but you understand it very well and as to the exercising I must tell you it ought to be done as often as is possible that the Captains may learn to keep their Companies in these orders for it belongs to every particular Souldier to keep the orders exact in every Battalia and to every Captain to keep his Company exact with the order of the whole Army and know how to obey the Command of the General It is convenient likewise that they understand how to joyn one Battalia with another how to take their place in a moment and therefore it is convenient that the Colours of each Company may have its number of Soldiers described in it for the greater commodity of commanding them and that the Captain and Soldiers may understand one another with the more ease and as in the Battalia's so it is convenient likewise in the Battalions that their numbers should be known and described in the Colonel's Ensign That you should know the number of the Battalion in the left or right wing as also of the Battalia's in the front or the middle and so consequently of the rest It is convenient likewise that there be degrees of Offices and Commands to raise men as it were by steps to the great honours of an Army For example The first degree should be File-leaders or Corporals The second should have the command of fifty ordinary Velites The third of a hundred with the title of Centurion The fourth should command the first Battalia the first the second the sixt the third and so on to the tenth Battalia whose place should be next in honour to the Captain General of the Battalion to which command no person should be advanced but he who has passed all those degrees And because besides these Officers there are three Constables or Commanders of the Pikes extraordinary and two of the Velites extraordinary I did not much care if they were placed in the same quality with the Captain of the first Battalia nor would it trouble me if six men more were preferred to the same degree that each of them might put himself forward and do some extraordinary thing to be preferred to the second Battalia If then each of these Captains understands in what place his Battalia is to be ranged it must necessarily follow that at the first sound of the Trumpet the Standard being erected the whole Army will fall into its place And this is the first exercise to which an Army is to be accustomed that is to say to close and fall in one with another to do which it is convenient to train them often and use them to it every day Luigi What mark and difference would you appoint for the Standard of the whole Army besides the number described as aforesaid Fabritio The Lieutenant General 's Ensign should have the Arms of his General or Prince and all the rest should have the same Arms with some variation in the Field or Colours as the Prince shall think best for it imports not much what their Colours are so they distinguish one Company from another But let us pass to the other exercise in which an Army is to be train'd that is in its motions to be taught how to march advance or fall back with exact distance and time and to be sure that in their marches a just order be observed The third exercise is Teaching them to manage their Arms and charge in such a manner as that afterwards they may do both dexterously when they come to fight teaching them how to play their Artillery and how to draw them off when there is occasion Teaching the Velites extraordinary to advance out of their places and after a counterfeit charge to retreat to them again Teaching the first Battalia's as if they were over-powered to fall back into the intervals of the second and all of them afterwards into the third and having done so to divide again and return to their old posts in short they are so to be accustomed in this exercise that every thing may be known and familiar to every Soldier which with continual practice is easily obtained The fourth exercise instructs your Soldiers in the usefulness of the Drums and Trumpets and Colours informing them of the Commands of their Captain by the beating of the one the sounding of the other and the displaying and flourishing of the third for being well used to them they will understand what they are to do by them as well as if they were directed by word of mouth And because the effects of these Commands depend altogether upon these kind of sounds I shall tell you what kind of Instruments the Ancients made use of in their Wars The Lacedemonians if we may believe Thucidides in their Armies made use of the Flute conceiving that Harmony more apt to infuse gravity than fury into their Soldiers Induced by the same reason the Carthaginians sounded their charges upon the Harp with which Instrument they began the Fight Aliatte King of Lydia in his Wars made use of them both But Alexander the Great and the Romans used Horns and Trumpets supposing the clangor and noise of those Instruments would enflame the courage of their men and make them more valiant in Fight But as in the arming of our Army we have followed the way both of the Greek and the Roman so in the choice of our Instruments of Intelligence I would follow the Customs both
performed but it was recompensed by the Consul and applauded publickly by the rest and those who received any of these prizes for any generous act besides the glory and fame which they acquired among their fellow Soldiers when they returned home into their Country they exhibited them to the view of their Relations and Friends and were received with great acclamation It is not then to be admired if that people extended its Empire so far being so far in their discipline and in the observation of their punishments and rewards towards such as by the generosity of their actions had merited the one or by their offences the other of which things I am of opinion the greatest part should be observed now I think it not amiss to mention one of their punishments and it was this The Criminal being convict before the Tribune or Consul was by him strook gently over the shoulders with a rod after which the Malefactor had liberty to run but as he had liberty to run so the rest of the Soldiers had liberty to kill him if they could so that immediately some threw stones at him some darts some stroke him with their Swords some with one thing some with another so that his life was but short for seldom any escaped and those who did escape could not return to their houses but with so much ignominy and scandal that they had much better have died This sort of punishment is in some measure used still by the Swissers who cause those who are condemned to pass thorow the Pikes which is a punishment well contrived and most commonly well executed for he who would order things so that a man should not side or defend a Malefactor cannot do better than to make him an instrument of his punishment because with another respect he favours and with another appetite he desires his punishment when he is Executioner himself than when the execution is committed to another To the end then that a Malefactor may not be favoured by the people nor upheld in his offence the best remedy is to refer him to their judgment To confirm this the example of Manlius Capitolinus may be brought who being accused by the Senate was defended by the people till they were made his Judges but when his case fell once into their Cognizance and they were made Arbitrators in the business they condemn'd him to death This then is the true way of punishing to prevent Seditions and execute Justice But because neither fear of the Laws nor reverence to men was sufficient to keep Soldiers to their duties and to a just observation of their discipline the Ancients added the fear and authority of God For this cause they made their Soldiers to swear with great Ceremony and Solemnity to preserve their discipline that if they transgress'd they might be in danger not only of humane Laws but divine Justice endeavouring by all industry to possess them with principles of Religion however they were false Battist I pray satisfie me whether the Romans permitted any Women in their Armies and whether they suffered their Soldiers to game as we do now adays in ours CHAP. VI. The Ancients had neither Women nor Gaming in their Armies and of the manner how they discamp'd Fabr. THe Romans allowed neither the one nor the other and indeed it required no great difficulty to prevent them for to speak truth the exercises to which they kept the Soldier constantly either in parties or together were so many that they had no time either for dalliance or play nor for any thing else that could make them mutinous or unserviceable Battista What you say pleases me very well But pray tell me when your Army Discamps what orders do you observe Fabritio The General 's Trumpet sounds three times The first sound they take down the Tents and the Pavillions and pack them up The second sound they load their Sumpters and the third they march in the same order as I said before with their Baggage and Train behind every Battalia and the Legions in the midst Then the Auxiliary Battalion moves and it's Baggage and Train after it and a fourth part of the common Baggage and Train which should consist of all those who were lodged in either of the quarters which I have shown before in the description of my Camp Wherefore it was convenient that each of the said quarters should be assigned to a Battalion that upon the motion of the Army every man might know in what place he was to march So that every Battalion was to march with its own Baggage and a fourth part of the common Baggage behind it and this was the manner which the Roman Army observed in its march as you may understand by what we have said Battista Tell us I beseech you in the placing of their Camps did the Romans use any other customs besides what you have related CHAP. VII The safety and health of a Camp is to be regarded and it is by no means to be besieged Fabr. I Must tell you again that the Romans in their Encampments were so constant to their old method that to retain that they applyed themselves with incredible diligence not regarding what pains or what trouble it required But two things they observed with a curiosity more than ordinary one was to place their Camp in an Air that was healthful and fresh And the other was to place it where the Enemy might not easily besiege them or cut off their provisions To avoid the unhealthfulness of the place they avoided all fenny and boggish places or where the wind was cold and unwholsom which unwholsomness they did not so much compute from the situation of the place as from the complexion of the Inhabitants and when they found them swarthy or blowsy they never encamped there As to the other thing never to be besieged or streightned by an Enemy you must consider the nature of the place both where your Friends are placed and where your Enemies and then to make your conjecture whether you can be besieged or no. It is necessary therefore a General be very skilful in the situation of the Country and that he have those about him who understand it as well as he Besides this there is another way of preventing diseases and that is by providing that no disorder be used in your Army for to keep it sound and in health the way is that your Army sleep in Tents That they be lodged as often as may be under Trees that are shady where they may have firring to dress their meat that they may not be obliged to march in the heat So that in the Summer time you must dislodge them before day and have a care in the Winter that they march not in the snow nor upon the ice without the convenience of fires That they want not necessary cloths nor be constrained to drink ill water you must command the Physitians of the Army to have a particular care of those