and that for a whole year they would treat no more of Terentillus his law and the Consuls for a year should not draw the people out to war and thus the Religion gave the Senate means to overcome that difficulty which without it they could never have master'd CHAP. XIV The Romans interpreted their Auspices as necessity requir'd and with discretion made a shew to observe their Religion yet upon occasion they neglected it but if any did rashly contemn it they punisht them THe Soothsayings were not only as before we have discours'd for the most part the ground of the Gentiles ancient Religion but they were also the occasions of the Roman Republiques welfare Whereupon the Romans had more regard of them than of any order else and made use of them in their Consular assemblies in the beginning of their enterprises in drawing forth their armies into the field in fighting of pitcht battells and in any other action of theirs of importance either civill or military Nor ever would they have undertaken any expedition till first they had perswaded the soldiers the Gods had promis'd them the Victory And among the other orders of Soothsayers they had some in their Armies they call'd Pollarij And whensoever they intended to fights battell with the Enemy they would have the Pollarij to make their conjectures and when the Chickens peckt they went to fight with good Auspaces and not pecking they forbare to fight Notwithstanding when â—ason shew'd something was to be done hough the divination were averse yet were they not scarr'd from it but they turn'd and woond it with such terms and fashions so properly that it appear'd they did it not with an contempt of Religion Which course was us'd once in a fight by Papirius the Consull which he had of great importance with the Samnites after which they were much worn and broken For Papirius encountring with the Samnites and perceiving in the skirmish that the victory was sure had a mind hereupon to fight a full battell and therefore commanded the Pollarij they should make their conjectures but the Chickens not Pecking and the chief soothsayer seeing the forwardness of the army to fight and the opinion the General and all the soldiers had of the victory that he might not take away the occasion of well doing from the army sent back to the Consull that the soothsayers answer'd well so that while Papirius was ordering his squadrons some of the Pollarij having told certain soldiers that the Chickens had not peckt they told it to Spurius Papirius the Consulls nephew and he again to the Consul whereto he suddenly reply'd that he should take a care to perform his own duty well and that for himself and the army the conjectures were faire and if the Soothsayer had told lyes it would turn to his own loss and that in effect it should succeed according to his prognostication he commanded the Lâ—vetenants to place the Pollarij in the forefront of the battell Whereupon it chanc't that going forward against their enemies one of the Roman Soldiers threw a dart and as it hap'd slew a principal Soothsayer which being come to the Consuls eare he said that all things went forward luckily and with the Gods favour for the Army by the death of that lyer was purg'd of all crime and excus'd of the wrath conceiv'd against them And thus by knowing how to accommodate his designs to the divinations he chose to fight the Army never perceiving that he had any whit neglected the rites of their Religion Appius Pulcher went a contrary course to this in Sicily in the first Carthaginian wars who desirous to fight with the enemy caus'd the Pollarij to make their divinations and they answering that the Chickens did not feed he said let us see then if they will drink and so made them be thrown into the sea and then fighting lost the day And thereupon he was afterwards condemn'd at Rome and Papirius honour'd not so much the one for having won and the other for having lost as the one for having crost the soothsayers with much discretion the other very rashly Nor was there any other end of this manner of soothsaying then to incourage the soldiers to fight for boldness always wins the victory which thing was not only in use with the Romans but with forrainers also whereof I have a purpose to bring an example in the Chapter following CHAP. XV. The Samnites for the extream remedy to their broken State have recourse to Religion THE Samnites having been sundry times routed by the Romans and at last overthrown in Tuscany their Armies and their Captains slain and their confederates overcome who were the Tuscans French and Umbrians They could not suhsist neither by their own nor their friends forces yet they would not quit the war not regarding though they had but ill success in the defence of their liberty but had rather be overcome then forbear to trie if they could get the victory Whereupon they put it to the last proof And because they knew the obstinacy of the soldiers minds would help the victory well forward and to induce them hereto there was no better means then Religion they advis'd to renew an old sacrifice of theirs by the help of Ovius Pattius their Priest which they order'd in this manner the folemn sacrifice being made and amidst the slain beasts and the altars set on fire having caus'd the chief of the Army to swear never to forsake the fight they cal'd the soldiers one by one and in the midst of those altars enclos'd by many Centurions with their fwords drawn first they made them swear they should not disclose any thing they either heard or saw afterwards with words of execration and verses full of horrour made them vow and promise to the Gods to be ready in whatsoever their General should command never to abandon the fight and kill whomsoever they saw fly which if they fail'd in might it light upon their family and kindred And some of them being amaz'd and refusing to swear were presently slain by their Centurions so that the rest that followed them frighted by the sierceness of the spectacle swore all And to augment the magnificence of their meeting being sixty thousand men half of them were clad with white cloth with plumes and seathers upon their helmets and thus arrai'd they incamp'd themselves at Aquilonia Against these came Papirius who in his speech to incourage his soldiers said Surely their plumes could make no wounds nor their painted and golden shields defend the blows of the Roman Pikes And to take away the doubt his soldiers had of their enemies because of the oath taken said it was rather a discouragement to them then otherwise for they were afraid of their own people the Gods and their enemies And when they came to the fight the Samnites were overthrown for the Roman vertue and the feare conceiv'd by reason of their former losses overcame what ever
Gentilisâ—â—e had done formerly to the Sect that preceded it and because the sects in a five or six thousand years chance two or three times the memory of things past before that time is utterly lost And though yet there remain some remembrance thereof we take it as some fabulous thing whereunto no man gives credit as it befalls the story written by Diodorus Siculus in which though he gives account of a forty or fifty thousand years nevertheless is it esteemed and so I think it too a false tail As for the causes that proceed from heaven they are such as extinguish the race of mankind and reduce to a small number the inhabitants of part of the world and this comes to pass either by pestilence or famine or by a deluge of waters but that of most importance is this last because it is more universal and because those that escape are all such as live among the mountains and are simple and ignorant people who having no knowledge of antiquity cannot derive it to their posterity and if among them any knowing man chance to escape to gain himself reputation and a name he conceals it and alters it at his own pleasure so that there is left to his successors only so much as he hath bin pleas'd to commit to writing and no more And that these in undations pestilences and famines sometimes come I beleeve there is no doubt as well because all histories are full of them as for that we see this effect of defacing the memory of things as also becauie it accords well with reason that it is so for nature as in simple bodies when there is gatherd together enough superfluous matter moves many times of it self and makes a purgation which is the preservation of that bodie so it falls out in this mixt body of mankinde that when all countries are stuffed with inhabitants that they can neither live there nor go otherwhere because all places are already possessed and replenish'd and when the subtilty and wickedness of man is grown to that fulness it can attain to it holds with reason that of force the world be purged by one of these three waies that men being become few and having suffer'd much may live with more convenience and grow better whereupon it is nothing strange that as it is abovesaid the Tuscan nation in old time was very potent full of Religion and vertue had their own manners and their native tongue which the power the Romans quite abolish'd so that as it is said onely their name remains still in the memory of posterity CHAP. VI. How the Romans proceeded in making of war HAving discours'd how the Romans proceeded in enlarging their State we will now treat of their proceedings in making of war and in every one of their actions it will appear with how great judgement they left aside the common way that others went whereby they might more easily attain the highest pitch of greatness The intention of that man that makes war either by election or by ambition is to get and keep what he hath gotten and to proceed so there with that he may enrich and not impoverish his own country It is necessary for him then both in getting and holding to take a care not to diminish but rather to augment the publique profit of his countrey He that will do these things must follow the way and course the Romans took who at first made their wars great and short for comming into the field with huge armies all the wars they had with the Latines Samnites and Tuscans they dispatcht in a very short time and if notice were exactly taken of all those wars they made from the beginning of Rome til the siege of Veium we should find they were all ended one in six dayes another in ten and a third in some twenty dayes space for their custome was this so soon as ever they had discover'd the war they presently went out with their armies and fought with their enemies who being overmaster'd to save their Countrey from spoil yeilded to their conditions and the Romans condemn'd them in loss of some of their territories and those they turn'd to their private Profits or bestow'd them upon some Colony they sent thither which being seituate upon some Frontier of theirs became Guardians of their confines to the advantage of the inhabitants of that Colony who had those fields in possession and with the profit of the generality of Rome that held this guard without expence Nor could there be any way more assured nor of more strength or advantage for til the enemy went into the field this guard was sufficient And when they went forth strong into the field to oppress that Colony the Romans also went out with their forces and join'd battel with them wherein having got the day they laid more heavy burdens on them and so return'd home Thus came they by little and little to great credit among them and forces in themselves And this course held they alwaies till they chang'd their manner of proceeding in war which was after the siege of Vejum where to enable them to make a long war they determined to pay the soldiers whereas formerly being that the wars were short there was no need to give them pay And though the Romans gave pay and that by vertue hereof they were able to make longer wars and to make those more remote they were forc'd to stay longer in the field yet did they never alter from their first order to dispatch them quickly according to the time and place Nor did they ever leave sending of Colonies for besides their natural guise the Consuls ambition held them to their first custome of making their wars short for being created but for a years time and thereof to stay at home six moneths they desired to finish the war that they might triumph To send Colonies the profit and great advantage they made thereof still prevail'd with them They altered indeed somwhat touching the spoiles whereof they were not so liberal as in former times they had bin because they thought there was not so great need the soldiers receiving their stipends as also because the spoiles being greater they intended therewith so to fill the common treasure that they might not be constrain'd upon any enterprise in hand to leavy monies upon the City Which order in a very short time much enrich'd their treasury These two courses then they took about the dividing the spoiles and sending of Colonies caus'd Rome to grow rich by the war whereas other Princes and Republiques if they find that means to releeve themselves become impoverishd so that it came to this at last that a Consul thought he might not triumph unless he brought much gold and silver and spoils of every kind into the treasury Thus the Romans by their above written waies sometimes by making a quick end of the wars otherwhiles by drawing them out at length with discomfitures and invasions and treaties to
ignorance that govern'd the State by reason that for these twenty-five years last past all the military affairs in Italy were in the hands of men that had no setled estates but were Captains adventurers serving where they could have pay who presently devised how they could maintain their reputation they continuing in armes when the Princes were unarmed And because they could not continually get pay for a good number of foot nor had any subjects whereof to serve themselves and a small number got them no credit they be took themselves to horse for a Captain having pay for 200 or 300 horse subsisted thereby in good repute and the payment was not such but that those that rul'd the State could easily satisfie it And to the end this should come on more easily and to keep themselves the better in esteem they took all respect and reputation from the foot and reserred all to their cavallery And so far increas'd they this disorder that in the greatest Armie they levyed the least part of them was foot Which custom together with many other disorders intermixt with it hath much weakned the Italian Soldiery so that this Country hath easily bin trodden under foot by all strangers This error of esteeming the horse more than the foot is laid open yet more plainly by another example of the Romans The Romans were incamped at Sora and a troop of horse having made a sally out of the town to assualt the Camp a Captain of the Roman horse went to incounter them with his Cavalry whereupon the first shock meeting brest to brest it chanc'd that the Commander of each troop was slain and the residue being left without government and the skirmish still continuing the Romans that they might the better vanquish their enemies light from their horses and forc't their enemies if they would defend themselves to do the like wherewith the Romans carried away the victory This example could not serve better to the purpose in shewing of how much value the infantry is above the horse for if in other occasions the Consuls made the horsemen to dismount it was to succour the foot that were in distress and had need of ayd But in this place they light not to assist the foot nor to fight with their enemies foot but fighting a horseback with horsemen they thought that though they were not able to master them on horseback that alightning they could more easily vanquish them I will therefore conclude that a body of foot in good order and array cannot without much difficulty be overcome by another body of foot Crassus and Marchus Antonius both Romans made an introde of many daies journeys into the Parthians Kingdome with a very few horse and a good number of foot where they incountred with numberless troops of the Parthian horse Crassus was left there dead with part of the Army Marcus Antonius valorously sav'd himself Nevertheless in these Roman losses it appears how much the Infantry exceeded the horse for being in an open Country where there are few mountains and very few rivers and the Sea-coast far off and remote from all conveniency yet for all this did Marcus Antonius even in the opinion of the Parthians themselves very valourously escape nor ever durst the whole Parthian Cavalry venture to break into the ranks of his Army If Crassus perish'd there whosoever well reads his actions shall find that he was rather treacherously beguild than forc'd nor ever in all his disorders durst the Parthians set upon him but alwaies went along by him to keep in his soldiers from stragling and getting of provisions and by promising fairly but observing nothing brought him at length unto extream distress I should think I were to take much pains in perswading that the valour of the infantry does much excel that of the horse but that there are many modern examples which give us a very satisfactory testimony And t is well known that 9000 Swisses at Navarra formerly alleaged by us went to encounter 10000 horse and as many more foot vanquish'd them for the horse could no way harm them and the foot being for the most part Gascoignes and ill ordered they made small account of We see likewise that afterwards 36000 Swisses went to find Francis the French King about Milan who had an army of 20000 horse and 40000 foot and a 100 tire of Ordnance and though they gaind not the battel at at Navarra yet they fought bravely two dayes together and when at length they were broken the moity of them escap'd Marcus Regulus Attilius presum'd with his infantry to incounter not onely the enemies horse but their Elephants and though his purpose came not to effect yet was it not so but that the valour of his infantry was such that he had very good reason to hope he might well overcome that difficulty And therefore I answer that he that would overcome a body of foot in good array must oppose them with another body of foot in better order than they otherwise he sustains an evident loss In the dayes dayes of Philip Visconti Duke of Milan there came down into Lombardy some 16000 Swisses whereupon the Duke Carmignuola being then his General sent him with neare upon a thousand horse and some few foot to incounter them Who not knowing the manner of their fighting went to meet them with his horse not doubting but that he could presently rout them But finding them to stand firm and having lost many Souldiers retir'd yet being a very able man and knowing in new accidents how to try new wayes having repaird his broken troupes he went again to meet them where he made all his armed men a light and serve on foot and so by them having made a head to those of his infantry he invested the Swisses who found no way to help themselves for Carmignuolaes horsemen bring lighted who were wel arm'd were able with facilitie to enter into the Swisses ranks without much hurt which when they had pierc'd they could easily harme so that of their whole number there was left onely that part alive that was by Carmignuolaes curtesie preserv'd I beleeve well that many know this difference of valour that is between the one and the other of these orders but so unhappy are these times that neither the ancient nor modern examples nor the acknowledgement of the error is of force to prevail with modern Princes to readvise themselves and consider that to recover the reputation of the Souldiery of a Countrey or State it is necessary to revive again these orders and entertain them near their persons to encourage them and allow them means to live to the end they may restore to them both life and reputation But as we use to forsake these customs so we leave other orders also formerly spoken of whereupon it comes to pass that the very conquests we make turne to our losses and not to the advancement of a State as hereafter we shall say CHAP. XIX That Conquests
own For if a man will abide in the field and not fight the surest way is to keep himself fifty miles off from his enemy at least and then keep good espiouns so that if he chance to bend towards thee thou maist avoid him at leisure Another course is to immure himself up in a City but the one and the other of these two courses is very pernicious In the first he leaves his Country in prey to the enemy and a valiant Prince will rather hazard the battel than prolong the war with so much dammage to his Subjects And in the second the loss is evident for it must needs be that retiring thy self within the walls of a Town with thy Army thou be besiged and at length suffer famine and so be forced to yeeld insomuch as to avoid battel by either of these two means must needs prove very hurtful The course that Fabius Maximus held to abide in strong places is very good when thou hast an Army so valorous that the enemy dares not come to find thee in thy advantages Nor can it be said that Fabius avoided fighting but rather that he would fight at his advantage For if Hannibal had gone to find him Fabius would have staid for him and fought with him but Hannibal durst not deal with him after his manner So the battel was as well avoided by Hannibal as by Fabius but if one of them had been desirous to have hazarded in any case the other had but one of these three remedies to wit those two we have before mentioned or to flie There are many examples and maximes in the war which the Romanes made with Philip of Macedon Father of Perses to make good what I say for Philip being assailed by the Romanes resolved not to come to battel and therefore first he thought to do as Fabius Maximus had done in Italy and placed himself with his Army upon the top of a mountain where he fortified himself all he could deeming that the Romans had not the heart to come and find him there but when they went thither and fought with him and drove him from the mountain being not able to withstand them he fled with the greater part of his people and that which saved him was the roughness of the Country so that the Romans could not follow the pursuite Philip then being unwilling to fight and having pitcht his campe near the Romans had no other mean but to fly and having found by this experience that when they meant not to fight it was not enough for them to get upon the top of the mountains and having no mind to inclose himself in any Town resolved to take the other course to remove many miles distant from the Romanes Campe. Whereupon if the Romanes were in one Province they went into another and so always they went thither from whence the Romanes were parted and considering in the end how that in prolonging the war this way his own estate declined and how that his Subjects were sometimes by himself otherwhile by his enemies daily oppressed resolved to put it to the tryal of a day and so came to a set battel with the Romanes It is profitable then not to fight when the Armies have these conditions which Fabius his Army had or that then had that of Cneus Sulpirius which are to have an Army so good that the enemie dares not come and find thee within thy fortifications and that the enemy though he be in thy Country yet hath he not much footing therein where he may suffer want of provisions and in this case the course is advantagious for the reasons Titus Livius alledges Vnwilling to stand at fortunes discretion on a tryal against his enemy whom time and a strange Country would daily weaken and consume But in any other case the battel cannot be avoided but with thy shame and danger for to flie as Philip did is the same that it is to be routed and that with the more disgrace by how much the less thou hast made proof of thy valor And however he had the luck to escape another could not have had the like unless he had help by the scituation of the Country as well as he That Hannibal was a master in the art of war I think every one will acknowledge and being to oppose Scipio in Affrica if he had seen any advantage in prolonging the war without doubt he would have done it and peradventure could too being a good Commander and having a good Army as well as Fabius did in Italy But being he did it not we may well believe that some important reason perswaded him so for a Prince that hath an Army levied and sees that for want of moneys or friends he cannot keep them long together is a very fool if he ventures not his fortune before his Army falls asunder for by delaying he certainly loses whereas hazzarding he might overcome Another thing there is yet much to be accounted of which is that a man ought even in his losing seek to gain glory and it is more glory to be overcome by force than by any other inconvenient that may have made thee lose Therefore it must needs be that Hannibal was forc't by these necessities and on the other side Scipio if Hannibal would have protracted the war and he durst not have adventured to go seek him in his Trenches had not suffered therein in that he had already overcome Siphax and taken so many Towns in Affrick so that he could have continued there with security and conveniency as well as in Italy Which was not so with Hannibal when he had to deal with Fabius nor with those French-men when they were opposed by Sulpitius So much the less also can he avoid the fight that with an Army invades another mans Country he must whensoever the enemie faces him fight with him and if he incampes before any Town so much the rather is he obliged to fight as in our days it befell Duke Charles of Burgundy who being set down before Morat a Town belonging to the Swissers was assaulted by them and broken and so it chanc'd to the French Army that incamping at Novarra was in like manner routed by the Swissers CHAP. XI He that hath to deal with many however that he be the weaker provided that he can but support their first violence overcomes THe Tribunes of the peoples power in Rome was great and necessary as many times we have said for otherwise it would never have been possible to bridle the Nobilities ambition which would much sooner then it did have corrupted that Commonwealth yet because in every thing as is often said some evil proper to every thing lies lurking in it which causes new accidents to arise it is needful with new orders to remedy them Wherefore the Tribunitial power being grown insolent and terrible to the Nobility and to all Rome some very hurtful inconvenient to the Romane liberty would have risen if the way had
otherwhere being no more in doubt of the issue of her warrs thought she might give the Command of her Armies to whom she pleas'd not so much regarding their vertues as their other qualities ingratiating them with the people for we see Paulus Emilius had several repulses in demanding the Consulate before he was made Consul till the Macedonian war chanc'd which because it was thought dangerous by general consent of the City was committed to him In our City of Florence after the year 1494. many warrs following one upon the neck of the other and all the Citizens of Florence having made unlucky tryal of themselves the City by chance lit upon one man who-shewed them the manner how their Armies were to be commanded which was Antoni Giacomini and whiles the warrs in hand were perillous the other Citizens ambitions ceas'd and in the election of Commissary or Commander of their Armies he had no competitor stood with him But when as any war was to be made where no hazard was but a great deal of honor and dignity he found alwaies so many competitors that they being to make election of there Commissaries to beleager Piza he was left out of the number And however it was not perceiv'd evidently that evill would befall the State because Antony was not sent thither yet may we easily conjecture because the Pisans having no means for further defence or sustenance had Antony been sent thither they would before that have been so straightly beset that they should have surrendred themselves to the Florentines directions But they being besieged by Commanders that understood not how to begirt nor force them were so long held in hand that the City of Florence bought them whereas they might have had them by force It was likely that such a distaste with Antony might have done much and he had need truly of much patience and so good a disposition as not to desire revenge hereupon either with the destruction of the City if he were able or with the wrong of any particular Citizen where of a Republick ought to beware as in the Chapter following we shall treate CHAP. XVII That he who hath receiv'd any notable disgrace or injury done him from a Prince or Commonwealth should never after be intrusted by them with any imployment or service of importance A Commonwealth should be well advis'd never to commit any weighty service to any one to whom any notable injury hath been done Claudius Nero who left his Army which he had lying in front against Hannibal and with part thereof went into the Marches to find the other Consul to combate Asdrubal before he should joyn with Hannibal had formerly in Spain been incamp'd against Asdrubal and having shut him up in a place with his Army so that Asdrubal was either to fight at disadvantage or perish by famin was cunningly by Asdrubal so long held in hand with certain treaties of agreement that hee scap'd him and took from him the opportunity he had to suppress him Which thing being known at Rome got him great discredit as well with the Senate as the people and he was spoken of very disgracefully throughout the City to his great disreputation and despight thereat too but being afterwards made Consul and sent against Hannibal took the course we have said which was a very dangerous one so that Rome was amazed and in tumults till news arived of Asdrubals defeat and Claudius being afterwards asked on what ground he undertook so dangerous a course where without an extream necessity he had hazarded the liberty of Rome answer'd that he had done it because if it prov'd lucky he should recover the glory he had formerly lost in Spain and if it fayl'd him and this course fell out cross he knew he should be reveng'd of that City and those Citizens who had unthankfully and undiscreetly wrong'd him And when these passions arising from such offences are of such force in a Citizen of Rome and in those dayes before corruption was crept into Rome we may well ghesse how powerfull they are in a Citizen of such a City that is not so regulated nor order'd as she then was and because to such like disorders which grow up in Common-wealths no certain remedy can be assign'd there followes an impossibility to frame a perpetual Commonwealth for by many unexpected waies desiruction breaks in upon it CHAP. XVIII There is nothing more worthy of a Commander than to be able to discover before haâ—d and espye out the enemies practises EPaminondas the Theban said that nothing was more advantageous or useful to a Commander than to know the enemies designes and purposes and because it is hard to attaine to that knowledge â—he deserves the greater commendations who takes such a course that he ghesses it out And it is not so hard to discover the enemies purposes as some times to understand his actions and not so much his actions which by him are done a far off as those present and near hand for it hath many times chanc'd that a fight having continued til night he hath vanquished that thinks he hath loâ— and he lost that thought he had overcome which error hath caus'd some to take resolutions clean contrary to their own good as it befell Brutus and Cassius who upon this mistake lost their war for Brutus having overcome on his wing Cassius beleev'd he had lost that the whole Army was broken and upon this error despairing of his own safety slew himself In our daies in the battell at Saint Cecily in Lombardy that Francis the King of France sought with the Swissers the night overtaking them that part of the Swissers which remained entire thought they had got the victory knowing nothing of those that had been broken and slain Which error was the occasion that they themselves escap'd not staying to fight again on the morning much at their disadvantage such like error also caused to mistake and well near ruined thereby the Popes the Spanish Army which upon this false advice of victory passed the Po and had it gone never so little on for warder had been prisoner to the French who were the Conquerors The like error to this happened in the Romans Campe and in that also of the Equi where Sempronius the Consul was with the Army to enconnter the enemy and the battell being joyned the combat lasted while night with variable fortune on the one and the other side and night being come each Army being halfe broken neither of them returned to their quarters but both of them chose rather to withdraw themselves unto the adjoyning hills where they thought they might beÌ„ more secure and the Roman Army divided itself into two parts whereof the one went with the Consul the other with one Tempanius a Centurion whose valor that day kept the Roman Army from being wholly routed the morning being come the Roman Consul without hearing further of the enemy retired towards Rome and the like did the Equies
against the Samnites who were new enemies and these formerly had never proved the one the others forces where T. Livius sayes that Valerius caused the Romans to make some small skirmishes with the Samnites That a new war and a new enemy might not affright thâ—m Notwithstanding it is a very great hazzard that thy Souldiers in those skirmishes remaning losers their fear and cowardise grow not more upon them and that effects contrary to thy purpose follow not thereupon that is that thou fright them not whereas thy design was to assure them So that this is one of those things which hath the evill so near neighbouring unto the good or rather they are so neare joyn'd together that it is very easy to mistake the one for the other Whereupon I say that a good Commander should be very careful that nothing arise which upon any accident may take away the courage and heart of his soldiers That which may be of force to take away their courage is to begin to lose and therefore a man should be well aware of these small skirmishes and no way suffer any of them unless with exceeding great advantage and certain hope of victory Nor ought he undertake to guard any passages where he cannot bring his whole Army together Nor should he keep any Towns unless it be those that by losing of them his utter ruine followes thereupon and those that he guards he should take such care both with their defences and also with his Army that whenever the enemy hath any design to assayle them he may make use of all his forces in rescue of them the others he should leave undefended for whensoever any thing is lost that was before abandon'd the Army being yet afoot there is neither the reputation of the war lost nor the hope of conquest But when any thing is lost which thou hadst purposed to defend and every one beleeve thou mightst defend there is the dammage and loss and there thou hast in a manner as those Frenchmen did by a matter of small moment lost the whole war Philip of Macedon the Father of Perse a warlick man and of great esteem in his time being assavl'd hy the Romans forsook and laid wast much of his Country as he who because he was wise thought it more pernicious to lose reputation by not being able to defend that which he undertook to defend then by leaving it in prey to the enemy to lose it as a thing neglected The Romans when after the defeat at Canna their estate was in great perplexity refus'd many that were under their protection and so also divers of their own Subjects charging them to defend themselves the best they could which are better courses far than to undertakes defences and afterwards nor be able to go through with them for hereby those friends are lost and forces only in those friends But returning to the small skirmishes I say that yet if a Commander be forc'd by reason of the newness of the enemy to make any skirmish he ought take so much advantage in it that he run no hazard to lose it nor do as Marius did which is the better way Who going against the Cimbrians which were an exceeding fierce people and came to make a prey of Italy and wheresoever they came casting a great terror because of their fierceness and multitude and by reason they had formerly vanquish'd a Roman Army Marius thought it necessary before he came to joyn battell to worke somewhat which might make his Souldiers lay aside that terrour which the feare of the enemy had put them in and as a very well advis'd Commander brought his Army several times where the Cimbrians with their troupes were to pass And thus within the fortifications of his Campe he would that his Souldiers should see them and accustome their eyes to the view of that enemy to the end that by seeing a disordinate multitude loaded with baggage and unprofitable armes and in part too disarm'd they might reassure themselves and grow desirous of battell which course as it was discreetly practis'd by Marius so likewise ought it be diligently imitated by others whereby they might not be forc'd to incurre those dangers which I mentioned before nor to do as the Frenchmen did Who for a matter of small moment fled in a fright into the Triburtine Country and streight after into Compania And because wee have alledg'd Valerius Corvinus in this Treaty in the Chapter following I intend by the helpe of his words to shew what manner of man a Commander should be CHAP. XXXVIII What manner of man that General ought to be on whose abilities an Army may confidently relie VAlerius Corvinus was as we faid formerly abroad with an Army against the Samnites new enemies of the people of Rome whereupon partly to assure his own Souldiers and partly to make them know the enemy he caus'd some of his to enter into certain light skirmishes with them nor contented herewith before the day of battell would needs speak to his own souldiers and shew with all efficacy how little esteem they were to make of such enemies putting them in minde of their own and his valour also where it may be noted by the words that Livius brings him in speaking what manner of man a Commander ought to be in whom an Army is to have confidence which words are these And also to consider under whose conduct and auspices you fight whether he you are to hearken unto be only a magnificent exhorter fierce in words but not of prowesse to shew you any military examples or else such a one that knows how to make use of your armes to march before your ensignes and behave himself bravely in the thickest of your troops I would have yon my souldiers to follow my deeds rather then my words and not to seek your discipline only from me but your example who by this right hand have gained three Consulships and the height of honour Which words well consider'd teach every man how he ought to proceed if he would hold the dignity of a Commander and whosoever shall otherwise carry it shall find in time that dignity when either by chance or ambition he is raised thereunto will rather take from him then any way gain him reputation for titles honour not men but men their titles And from the beginning of this discourse we may consider that if great Commanders have us'd extraordinary means to confirme the resolutions of an Army of old soldiers when they were to encounter with unaccustomed enemies how much rather is there pains to be taken with an army of fresh-water soldiers who never yet look'd the enemy in the face for if an unaccustomed enemy terrifies an army of old soldiers much more probable is it that any enemy should affright an army of new soldiers Yet we have many times seen all these difficulties overcome by the exceeding great wisdome of good Commanders as Gracchus the Roman did
means to win them But Master Francis Guinigi now chancing to dye and having left behind him a son named Paul of 13 years of age appointed Castruccio his Tutor and the Governor of his estate having first caused him to be called to him before his death and intreated him that he would take upon him the eare to bring up his son with that faithfulness he had found himself and that what kindnesses he could not return to the father he would requite to the son And now at length Master Francis Guinigi being dead Castruccio left Tutor and Governor to Paul grew in such credit and power that the favor he was wont to find in Lucca in some part was turned into envy and he was calumniated by many as who they doubted had some projects upon a tyranny Among whom the Principal was M. George Opizi head of the Guelfes faction This man hoping by the death of Mr Francis to remain without competitor in Lucca thought that Castruccio being left with that trust by the grace favor of his discreet carriage gaind him had bereav'd him of all means to attain thereto and hereupon sowed many seeds of scandal against him whereby to choak his well grown credit Which at first Castruccio disdained but afterwards grew jealous of it for he thought that Master George would never rest till he had so far disgrac'd him with King Robert of Naples his Lieuftenant as to cause him to chase him out of Lucca At that time there was one Vguccion of Fagginolo of Arezo then Lord of Pisa who by the Pisans was first chosen for their commander and afterwards made himself their Lord. Divers out-lawed Luccheses of the Gibellin faction abode with Vguccion whom Castruccio practised to restore again with Vguccions aid and this design he communicated also with his friends at home who could no way endure the Opizies authority Having therefore given order as was requisite to this purpose Castruccio fortified the tower of the Honesti and furnished it with munition and store of victuals whereby upon occasion he might be able to defend himself therein for some time and the night being come which was agreed of with Vguccion he gave the signe to him who was gone down into the plain with much people between the mountains and Lucca and having seen the signal he came close to Saint Peters gate and fired the antiport Castruccio on the other side raised a great cry calling the people to armes and forced the gate on the other side within so that Vguccion entring with his men forced the town and slew Master George with all those of his family and many others his friends and partisans and chased out the governor and changed the State of the City as Vguccion liked best to the great dammage thereof for it appeard then that there were above a hundred families chased out of Lucca Those that fled part went to Florence and part to Pistoya which Cities were then governed by the Guelfes faction and hereupon they became enemies to Vguccion and the Lucheses And upon this the Florentines and the rest of the Guelfes thinking the Gibellines faction grown too mighty in Tuscany accorded together to restore again these exiled Luccheses and having Levyed a huge army they came to the vale of Nievole and seizing upon Mount Catino from hence they went to incampe at Mount Carlo whereby to have the passage open to Lucca Whereupon Vguccion having gathered a good army of Pisans and Luccheses besides many Dutch horse which he drew out of Lombardy went to find the Florentines camp which perceiving the enemies approach was removed from Mount Carlo and setled between Mount Catino and Pescia and Vguccion sat down under Mount Carlo about some two miles of the enemy where for some daies between the horse of the two armies there passed some slight skirmishes for Vguccion being faln sick the Pisans and Luccheses refused to come to battel with the enemy But Vguccions malady augmenting he retired to mount Carlo for his recovery and committed the charge of the army to Castruccio which was the Guelfes destruction for hereupon they took courage esteeming the enemies armies as left without a head which Castruccio understood and lay still some few dayes the more to confirm this their opinion making shew of feare and not suffering any one to goe out of the trenches and on the other side the Guelfes the more they saw this feare the more insolent they became and every day being orderd for fight they presented themselves before Castruccios army who thinking he had now enough emboldned them and having had full notice of what order they kept resolved to come to the tryall of a day and first with his speeches he confirmd his soldiers courage and shewd them the victory certaine if they would follow his directious Castruccio had seene how the enemy had plac'd all his strength in the body of the army the weakâ—r sort in the wings thereof whereupon he did the cleane contrary for he put his best soldiers in his wings and his slightest people in the body and issuing out of his trenches with this order so soone as ever he came within view of the enemy which solently as before they had wont came to find them out he commanded that those squadrons in the middle should goe on leisurely but that the rest should move with speed insomuch that when they came to ioyne battell with the enemy onely the wings of each army fought and the troops in the middle stood unimployd because the middle part of Castruccio's army had lagguerd so much behind that the enemyes body had not yet reach'd to them and thus the ablest of Castruccio's army came to fight with the weakest of the enemies and the enemies strength lay idle not able to endammage those they were to encounter with nor could they ayd any of their owne party so that without much difficulty the enemies two wings were both put to flight and they in the middle seeing themselves left naked on each flanke without having whereupon to shew their valour fled likewise The rout and the slaughter were great for there were slaine above ten thousand men with many Officers and great Cavaliers of the Guelfes faction throughout all Tuscany and many Princes who came thither in favour of them to wit Peter King Roberts Brother and Charles his nephew and Philip Lord of Taranto but of Castruccio's side they came not to above three hundred among which Francis Vguccions sonne was slaine who being young and over-venturous was killd at the first onset This overthrow much augmented Castruccio's credit so that Vguccion grew so jealous and suspitious of his owne State that he continually busied his brains how to bring him to destruction thinking with himselfe that that victory had rather taken his power from him than setled it and being in this thought while he awaited some fair colour to effect his designes it happned that Pieragnolo Michaeli was slaine in Lucca
make their Foot pass on that part beneath the river to fight with the flank of Castruccio's troops But the channel being deep and all above already possest by his men all this prov'd vain Whereupon the whole army was put to rout to Castruccio's great glory and honor and of so great a multitude there escap'd not a third Many Chieftains were taken and Charles son of King Robert together with Michaelangelo Falconi and Taddeo of the Albizi Florentine Commissaries fled thence to Empoli The spoyl taken was great the slaughter exceeding great as a man may imagine in such and so great a conflict for of the Florentine army 20231 of Castruccio's part 1570 were left dead upon the place But Fortune being enemy to his glory when as she should have given him life took it from him and interrupted those designes which he a long time before had purposed to put in effect neither could any thing but death hinder him Castruccio had toyld himself all that day in the battel when at the end thereof all weary and sweaty he stayd about the port of Fucchio to attend the soldiers as they should return from the victory and in person receive and thank them and partly if peradventure any thing should arise from the enemies that they had made head in any place he might be ready to give order thereto judgeing it the office of a good Commander to be the first to get a horse-back and the last to light off Whereupon he standing exposed to a wind which ordinarily about mid-day rise upon the Arno and uses to be pestiferous he was all over chil'd Which thing not being made account of by him was the occasion of his death for the night following he was taken with a dangerous feaver which continually augmenting and the sickness being judged mortal by all the Physitians and Castruccio perceiving of it called Paul Guinigi and spake to him these words Had I beleeved my son that Fortune would have cut of my course in the midst of the way to arrive unto that glory which I by my so many good suce cesses had promis'd my self I should have less wearied my self and to thee as I should have left a smaller estate so also fewer enemies and less envy for I would have been content with the dominion of Lucca Pisa and never subdu'd the Pistoyeses nor with so many injuries provoked the Florentines but by making the one and the other of these people my friends I should have led a life though not longer yet surely more quiet and to thee should I have left an estate though less without doubt more secure and firm but Fortune who will dispose of all human affairs gave me not so much judgement that I was able first to know it or so much time that I was able to overcome it Thou hast heard for many have told thee and I never denyed it to thee how I came into thy fathers house being yet a young lad and voyd of all those hopes which every generous spirit ought to conceive and how I was by him brought up and beloved by him as much as if I had been of his own blood whereupon under his government I became valorous and grew capable of that fortune in which thou hast and dost see mee and because at his death he committed thee and all this fortunes to my fidelity I have brought thee up with that affection and increased them with that fidelity that I was and am bound to And because not only whether that alone which was left thee by thy father but that also which my fortune and valor got were thine I never would marry to the end that the love of children should never take me off from shewing in any part that thankfulness towards thy fathers blood which I thought I was obliged to shew I leave thee therefore a very fair State whereat I am much pleased but for that I leave it thee weak and unsetled I am exceedingly grieved there remains to thee the City of Lucca wich will never be content to live under thy government Pisa is also thine wherein there ere men naturally inconstant and full of treachery which however it be divers times accustomed to serve yet will it alwaies disdain to have a Lucchese for its Lord. Pistoya likewise is left to thee very little faithfull to thee because it is divided and by fresh injuries provok'd against our Family Thou hast the Florentines for thy neighbors and those offended and divers waies injuryed by us and not extinguisht to whom the news of my death would be more welcome than the Conquest of all Tuscany Thou canst not rely upon the Princes of Milan nor upon the Emperor because they are far hence lazy and very slow with their succors wherefore thou oughtst not to hope in any thing but in thy own industry and the remembrance of my valor and in the reputation which this present victory gains thee which if thou shalt know with discretion how to make use of will ayd thee to make an accord with the Florentines who being affrighted at this present defeat ought with desire to condiscend thereto whom though I sought to make them mine enemies and thought it would procure me both power and glory yet thou art by all means to seek to gain for thy friends for their friendship will prove thy security and advantage It is a thing of very much importance in this world for a man to understand his own self and to know how to measure the forces of his own courage and State and he that finds himself unfit for war should endeavor to settle his government by the rules of peace whereunto thou shalt do well if by my advice thou address thy self and strive by this way to enjoy my pains and dangers which shall easily prove successful to thee when thou shalt account these my advertisements true and herewithall thou shalt be doubly oblig'd to me first that I have left thee this State and secondly that I have taught thee how to keep it Afterwards having caused those Citizens to come to him who of Lucca Pisa and Pistoya served in the wars under him and having recommended Paul Guinigi to them and made them swear obedience to him he died leaving to all those that ever knew him a happy remembrance of him and to those that had been his friends so great a desire of him that never any Prince that died at any time left more His funerals were most honorably solemnized and he was buried at St. Francesco in Lucca But neither valor norfortune were so favorable to Paul Gninigi as to Castruccio for not long after he lost Pistoya and after Pisa and with much adoe held he the government of Lucca which continued in his family till Paul the grand-child Castruccio then was by what is here shewed a man of rare note not only for those times he lived in but for many ages that had past long before He was of a
defend themselves to take upon them the protections of others which the Tarentines also did who when the Roman army was going to joyne battell with that of the Samnites sent their Ambassadours to the Roman Consul to let him understand that they will'd there should be peace betweene those two people and how that otherwise they should make warre against the party that should refuâ—e it So that the Consul scoffing at this proposition caus'd the triumphs to sound in presence of their ten Ambassadours and so made his army march towards the enemy shewing the Tarentins by his deeds and not by words what answer they deserv'd And having now discours'd in this Chapter against some courses Princes take amisse for others defence I will in that that followes speake touching those they take for their owne defence CHAP. XII Whether it be better for a Prince fearing to be assail'd by his enemy himselfe first to begin the warre with him or to expect while it comes home to him I Have heard it disputed sometimes by men well practis'd in military discipline if there be two Princes neare of equal force and the one that is the more resolute have proclaim'd warre against the other which were the best course for that other either to attend quietly in his owne confines whiles his enemy come upon him or else to goe finde him at home and there assaile him And I have heard them alledge arguments on both sides and those that argue for this going to assaile him produce the counsell that Croesus gave Cyrus when being arriv'd upon the borders of the Messagetes to make warre against them their Queene Thomyris sent him word that he should take his choice either to enter into her kingdom where she would awaite him or if he would rather that she should come and siâ—nde him in his owne And when the matter came to dispute Croesus advis'd against the opinion of the rest to goe seeke her in her owne country urging that otherwise if he overcame her farre from her owne confines he could not take her kingdome from her because she would have time to repaire her losses but if he conqur'd her within her owne territories he might pursue her just upon her slight so giving her no time of recovery take the state from her Moreover they alledge the advice that Hanniball gave Antiochus when that King had a purpose to make warie against the Romans where he shewes how the Romans could not be overcome but in Italy for there another might availe himselfe of their armes their wealth and their friends also But whosoever fought with them out of Italy leaving Italy free to them left them that strength that never would want life to give them fresh supplies at all occasions And concluded that it was easier to take Rome from them then the Empire and Italy rather than their other provinces Agathocles also is alleadg'd who not being able to support the war at home assail'd the Carthaginians who then had made warre against him and brought them to aske peace The example of Scipio is likewise urg'd who to take the warre out of Italy assail'd Affricke They that maintaine the contrary say that he that would bring his enemy to destruction should withdraw him from home The Athenians are brought for example who while they made a convenient warre at their owne homes remain'd victors but when they departed out of their country and transported their army into Sâ—cily they quite lost their liberty They alledge the poeticall sables withall where it is shew'd how that Anteus King of Lybia assail'd by Egyptian Hercules was insuperable whiles he staid for him within the confines of his owne Kingdome but when by Hercules subtilty he was trained out of it he lost both state and life Whereby occasion was given to the fable of Anteus that while he was upon the ground he recovered forces from his Mother which was the ground which Hercules perceiving took him up in his armes and held him from the earth Moderne advices also are alledged every one knowes that Ferdinand King of Naples was in his dayes held a very wise Prince and some two years before his death fame flying that Charles the eight then King of France had a determination to come and assail him after he had made much preparation fell sick when on his death-bed among other memorials he left his sonne Alphonsus was this also that he should attend his enemies comming within his Countrey and upon no case should drâ—w any of his forces out of his state but should await them within his own confines with his strength entire Which was not followed by him but there was an army sent into Romania which without any combat lost both it self and the state The arguments which besides the things abovesaid are brought on each side are these that he that assailes comes on with more courage then he that attends which gives the army more confidence Besides this it takes away from the enemy divers conveniencies of being able to make use of what is his own for he cannot help himself upon those subjects whose houses have first bin sackt and their goods pillaged and for having the enemy in the house the Prince is constrained to take more care how he wrings money from them and vexes them so that he comes to dry that fountain as Hannibal sayes which furnishes him with means to sustain the war To this may be added that the souldiers being in a forrain countrey are forced to fight and of that necessity makes a vertue as we have often said on the other side they say when one awaits his enemy he does it with much advantage for without any discommodity to thy self thou art able to give thine enemy much trouble to come by his provisions and other necessaries belonging to an army Thou canst also better hinder his designs because thou knowest the countrey better then he Thou canst also incounter him with more forces because there they may easily be united which thou canst not draw all from home Thou canst also being routed recover thy self with more ease because many of thy army will save themselves in that they have their places of refuge near as well because the supplies are not to come from far thou bringst to the hazzard all thy forces and not all thy fortune whereas parting thence thou hazzardst all thy fortune with but a part of thy forces And some there have bin who the better to weaken their enemie suffer him to enter many dayes journies into their countrey and take divers townes to the end that leaving gatrisons in all of them he may weaken his army and so they may afterwards fight with him at more ods But to give my opinion herein what I think I beleeve this distinction is to be made Either my countrey is armed as was that of the Romans or that of the Switzers is or it is disarmed as that of the Carthaginians was or else that of the
the artillery I say that this opinion is utterly false and so shall it be held by those who according to the valour of old will imploy their armies for whosoever will have a good army must use them in trainings or rather in battels to come up close to the enemy and there fall to handy blows with him and take him by the coller and they ought to ground more upon the infantry then the cavallery for some reasons we shall here after alledge And when they shall rely most upon the foot and upon these waies we have spoken of the artillery becomes quite unprofitable for more easily can the infantry avoyd the blow of the cannon by comming up close to the enemy then of old they could escape the sury of the Elephants the chariors arm'd with hooks and such other unaccusiomed encounters which the Roman infantry met with and sound remedy against which they would to much the more easily have found against these as much as the time is of very short durance in which the artillery can harme thee in comparison of of that wherein the Elephanâ—s and chariots â—id mischeif for these in the very middle and heat of the battle did put all into disorder whereas the artillery hinders thee onely before the battel which hinderance the infantry easily avoid either by going cover'd under the naturall scite of the place or by stooping towards the ground when they shoot which also we see by experience is not necessary especially to escape the canon which can hardly be so right levell'd but that if they go high they miss thee if low they come short of thee Afterwards when the armies are come to handy blowes this is more clear then the light that neither the great nor small shot can do thee much harm for if the enemy places the artillery before him thou mayst easily take it if behind him it hurts himself before it can touch thee or if it be on either side of thee it cannot so gall thee but that thou mayest come up close to it whereupon will follow the effect we have said Nor needs there much dispute upon this for we have seen it by the example of the Switzers who at Navarra in the year 1513. without arrillery or horse assail'd the French army within their fortifications being guarded with artillery and yet routed them being no way hinder'd thereby and the reason is besides the things formerly alledged because the artillery hath need to be guarded if we would it should make any good execution either by some wall or trenches or some kind of fortifications and when it fails of these defences it becomes a prey to the enemy so is made unprofitable as it comes to pass when it is defended onely by men or as it may be in field battels it cannot be plac'd on the flank unless it be on that manner that the ancients used their instruments of war when they plac'd them without their squadrers because they should play from without the ranks and whensoever they were put at either by the horse or others they retired behind the legions whose ever accounts otherwise of them does not well understand the use of them and trusts'upon that which may easily deceive him and if the Turk by the help of his artillery have gaind any victory of the Sophy and the So'dan it was not occasion'd by other vertue of it then by the affright the unusual noise thereof put the horse into Therefore I conclude comming to the end of this discourse that the artillery is prossitable in an army where there is a mingle of the ancient valour without which it avails little against a couragious army CHAP. XVIII How by authority taken from the Romans and from the use of the ancient military discipline the foot is more to be esteemd than the horse WEE can plainly sshew it by many reasons and examples how much the Romans in all military actions did prefer the infantry before the cavalry and thereupon grounded the assurance of all their executions as it appears by many examples and among others when they sought with the Latins near the lake of Regillum where the Roman Army giving ground a little for their succours the horse-men were commanded to light and serve a soct whereby they made good the fight and gaind the victory Where it is manifest the Romans had more confidence in them being a foot than a horseback They us'd the same termes in many other fights and sound it alwaies a present help in their dangers Nor let Hannibals opinion counterballance this who seeing in the battel at Canna that the Consuls made their horsemen light and serve afoot scoffing at the course they took said I had rather indeed they should be delivered bound into my hands Which opinion however that it was utterd by a very able man yet if we are to follow authorities we may rather give credit to a Roman Commonwealth and so many excellent Captains that flourished in it than to one Hanniball alone though without this authority the reasons are evident for a man on foot can go in many places where a horseback he cannot he may be able to instruct them how to keep their ranks and being somewhat confus'd how they may be restored again It is very hard to make the horse keep their ranks and when once they are in disorder it is impossible to recover them Besides this as we see it among men so is it among horses some there are which have but small courage others again exceeding couragious And many times it falls out that a brave horse is back'd by a cowardly fellow and sometimes a timerous jade is mounted by a stout Souldier and there which way soever it is that this disparitie follows arises uprofitableness and disorder The infantry well united in their ranks are easily able to rout the horse and very hardly can they be routed by them Which opinion is confirmed besides many ancient moderne examples by their authorities who have left us the records of ancient Republiques where they shew us how that at first they began to make war a horseback because they understood neither the order nor the use of the foot which when they once had the knowledge of they quickly conceiv'd how much more profitable they were than the horse But hereupon it follows not that the horse are not necessary in armies to discover and to forrage and prey about in the Countrey and to pursue the enemies in their slight and in part also to oppose all the attempts of the the adversaries horse But the ground-worke and the very nerves of the army and whereof most account is to be made is the Infantry And among the Italian Princes faults which have euthral'd Italy to strangers there is none greater than that they made no account of this order and turn'd all their regard towards the service of horsemen Which disorder proceeded from the evil disposition of the Captains and their
abode and keep it in good strength and the Citizens thereof well disposed whereby he may be able to support the enemies violence till either some accord or some forrain aid come to his relief All other designes are expensive in time of peace and unfruitfull in time of war And whosoever shall well weigh all this that I have said shall perceive that the Romans as they were in all other their affairs very judicious so were they very well advised in this judgement they gave upon the Latins and the Privernates where taking no care at all for citadels they assur'd themselves of them by wiser and better waies CHAP. XXV It is a wrong course to assayle a City fallen into discord thinking by means thereof to master it IN the Roman Republick the people and the Nobility were so far fallen asunder that the Veyentes together with the Eburans by means of their disagreement thought they might be able quite to root out the Romans and having levied an Army and forrag'd all the Country of Rome the Senate armed out Cneus Manilius and M. Fabius against them who having brought their Army near to that of the Veyntes they forbear not with all insolences and reproaches to revile them and disgrace the Roman name and such was their fool-hardiness and presumptions that the Romans though then they were arâ—ods one with another came to agreement and so comming to the combat broke and vanquish'd them We see therefore how much men deceive themselves as formerly we have treated in the courses they take and that many times where they think to get they lose The Veyentes beleev'd that by getting upon the Romans that were at variance one with another they should overcome them but it prov'd the occasion of reconcilement to the Romans but of ruine to themselves for the causes of discord in Republicks is most commonly idleness and peace and the cause of union and concord is fear and war Wherefore had the Veyentes been wise the more at variance they had perceived Rome to have been so much the more should they have forborn from war against them and with devices of Peace cast about how to master them The way is to endeavour to be reputed a confident friend of that City which is in discord and whiles they come not to armes to carry himself as an Umpire between both parties And when they do come to armes to afford some slow favours to the weaker party as well to keep them still at war and consume them as to hinder them from doubting that with thy great forces thou meanest to suppress them and become their Prince And when this part is well plaid it cannot fail ordinarily but that it will directly have the success thou lookest for The City of Pistoya as in another discourse and to another purpose I said came to the Florentines Republick by no other trick than this for it being divided in factions the Florentines now favouring the one and then the other without any imputation of blame from either brought them to such terms that being tir'd with their tumultuous living they came willingly to cast themselves into the Florentines armes The City of Siena never changed her State upon the Florentines favour but when their courtesies came but thin and small for when they were frequent and strong they united them rather for the defence of the State in which they liv'd I will adde to these aforesaid one other example Philp Visconti Duke of Milan several times made war against the Florentines grounding much upon their disagreements and alwaies came off a loser Whereupon he was wont to say when he complained of the evill success of his undertakings that the Florentines follies had made him spend two millions of gold to no purpose Therefore as it was said before the Veyentes and the Etruscans deceived themselves by this conceit of theirs and were at last in a set battell vanquish'd by the Romans And thus will others find themselves deceiv'd whoever shall seek by the like course and upon the same occasion to subdu any nation or people CHAP. XXVI Contempt and contumely begets a hatred against those that use it without any returne of advantage to them I Eeleeve it is one of the greatest parts of wisdome in men to abstain from threatning or injuring of any one in words for neither the one nor other bereave the enemy of any part of his strength but the one makes him more wary of thee and the other bear more deadly hatred against thee and devise by all manner of waies he can to hurt thee This is plain by the example of the Veyentes whereof we spake in the former Chapter who to the wrong of making war against the Romans added the reproach of words from which every prudent Commander ought to restrain his soldiers so that they are things that incense and provoke the enemy to revenge and are no defence as it is said against the hurt he does insomuch that they are all weapons thrown from thee which returne againe upon thee Whereof there followed a notable example a good while since in Asia where Gabades a Commander of the Persians having a long while lien incamped before Amida and determined upon the tediousness of the siege to depart and therefore to that purpose rising with his campe those of the Town being come all upon the walls and grown insolent upon their victory forbore no kind of outrage disgracing blaming and reproaching the enemy with his baseness and cowardise whereupon Gabades being incensed alter'd his purpose and return'd to the siege where such was their indignation at the contumely that in a few daies they took and sack'd the Town In the same manner it befell the Veyentes who were not content as is said to make war against the Romans but they rayl'd on them in vile termes going even to their very trenches to reproach them so that they incensed them more with their words then blowes and those soldiers which were hardly drawn to fight constrein'd the Consul to begin to fight so that the Veyentes suffer'd as the others we spoke of before for their insolence Wherefore every good Commander of armies and good Governor of Commonwealths is to practice all possible remedies that these injuries or reproaches be not us'd either in the city or the army neither one among another nor against the enemy for being practised against the enemy there arise from thence the aforesaid inconvenients and among themselves they would do worse when there is no reparation made which wise and judicious men have alwaies awarded When the Roman legions left at Capua conspired against the Capuans as in its place shall be related and a sedition was there occasioned by this conspiracy which was afterwards quieted by Valerius Corvinus among other constitutions which were made in the agreement they ordained very grievous punishments for those that should ever reproach any of those soldiers with that sedition Tiberius Gracchus who during the warrs
walls which was to beleagure a town round with an army for they environd it and combatted it on all parts and many times it prov'd so luckily to them that in one assault they took a town though a very vast one as when Scipio took new Carthage in Spain Or when this assault served not they betook them to break down the walls with their rams and oher their warlike engines or else by some mine or vault they made whereby they enter'd the City by which way the took the City of Veium or to make themselves equal in height with those that defended the walls they made towres of wood or cast up mountains of earth which leaned upon the wall on the outside whereby they might get to the hight of it Against these assaults they that defended the towns in the first case in regard of their being besing'd round rannne a more sudden hazard and had more doubtfull remedies for having need in every place of many defendants perchance either those that they had were not so many as could supply every place or change often to refresh them or if they could they were not all of equal courage to make resistance and in case the skirmish had inclin'd in any part all had bin lost Therefore it came to pass as I said that this way lit many times on good success But when it succeeded not at first they did not much more try that way because it was dangerous for the army for the City being able for so long a space to defend it self the army could not but grow weak and hardly be able to withstand any fally of the enemies from within and besides the soldiers disorder'd and wearied themselves hereby yet notwithstanding for once and that on the sudden they assayld that way As for the breaking down of the walls they made resistance as they do now adayes with new reparations and against their mines they made countermines and thereby they oppos'd their enemies either with their armes in hand or with other engines among others this was one they fill'd divers vessels with feathers and set fire on them which being thus kindled they put into the Mine so that by the smoke and stink thereof the enemy was hindred of entring thereinto and if they assailâ—d them with towers of wood they sought to fire them And for the mounts of earth they commonly broke open the wall underneath whereupon the mount did lean drawing thence the earth into the town whereby they without did raise their mount so that however they brought the earth without being that they within carried it away the mount came to no great matter These waies of assailing cannot be continued long for they must either rise from the siege and seek by other means to make an end of the war as Seipio did when being entred into Affricke he assaulted Vtica but could not take it he rose thence with his whole camp and sought how to overthrow the Carthaginian armies or else they must turne again to the siege as they did at Veium Capua Carthage and Ierusalem and other like townes which they took by siege As for conquest by force and fraud as it befel Palepolis it chanced that the Romans by treating with the inhabitants took some towne But by his assailing the Romans and others tried many but prevail'd in few the reason is because every small impediment breakes the designe and impediments easily happen for either the conspiracie is discover'd before it takes effect and without much difficultie it is discovered as well through their infidelity to whom it is communicated as by the difficulty to put it in practise being they are to agreee with enemies with whom they cannot parly but under some other colour But in case the conspiracy be not disclosed in the ordering of it there arise multitudes of difficulties in putting it in execution for if either thou commest before the time appointed or after all is spoiled if any false alarme be given as was that of the geese in the Capitol if any usual order be broken every little error or affright taken spoiles the designe Hereunto may be added the darkness of the night which often puts in fear the rather those that undertake such perilous things And the greater part of those men that are brought upon such enterprises being unexperienced in the scituation the countrey and the places whether they areled become astonished disheartned and confused upon every small accident shall happen And every shadow is of force to make them run away Nor ever was there any more happy in thefe fraudulent night plots then Aratus Sicioneus who was as base and cowardly in any action by day as he was of worth and spirit in these by night Which we may well think was rather through some hidden vertue wherewith he was endowed then because there was naturally required in them the more good luck Many of these waies are put in practice few of them come to trial and very few take effect Touching the gaining of townes by yeelding they yeeld either of good will or by force this willingness arises either upon some forrain necessity which compels them to fly unto thy protection as Capua did unto the Romans or through a desire to be wel governed being allur'd by the good government that Prince holds among them that have given themselves into his hands as the Rodians the Massilians and other like cities did that gave themselves unto the Romans Touching surrendring up upon force proceeds either from a long siege as is formerly said or from a continual oppression of incursions pillagings and other hard usages which when a city desires to be freed from she yeelds her self Of all those said ways the Romans practised this last more then foure hundred and fifty years to weary out their neighbors with routs and incursions and by gaining credit with them by gaining credit with them by means of agreements made as we have said otherwhere and upon that way they alwaies grounded though they tryd all but in the other they found things either dangerous or unprofitable For in a siege there is length of time and expences in forcible assault doubt and danger and in conspiracies uncertainty And they saw that by the defeat of an enemies army sometimes they got a Kingdom in one day and to take by siege a town that was obstinate it cost them many years CHAP. XXXIII How the Romans gave the Commanders of their armies free and large Commissions I Think it fit for him that by reading of Livies story would make advantage thereof wel to consider all the waies of the people and Senate of Romes proceedings and among other things that merite consideration his is one to see with what authority they sent forth their Consuls Dictators Commanders of armies which we see was very great and the Senate reserved thing else to themselves but a power to make new wars and to confirme peace but they referred every
free Towns A Commander therefore should to return to our first discourse when he sits down before any Town provide with all diligence to take from the defendants all scruples of such necessity and conquently such obstinacy promising pardon if they are afraid of punishment and if they doubt their liberty is aimed at shew them there is nothing intended against the common good but against some few ambitious men in the City which thing hath many times facilitated such enterprises and takings of Towns And though such colours are easily seen through and especially by understanding men yet are the people ost deceived thereby who being desirous of the present peace shut their eyes against any other snare that under large promises can be laid for them And this way exceeding many Cities have been reduced to servitude as it befell Florence in these latter days and Crassus also with his whole Army who though he knew the Parthians promises were not to be credited which were made onely to take from his soldiers the necessity of defending themselves yet could he not keep them obstinate being blinded by the offers of peace made them by their enemies as in particular may be seen in his life by him that shall read it When the Samnites contrary to the articles of agreement upon the ambition of some few had forraged and spoiled the Romans their confederates fields and afterwards sent Ambassadors to Rome to require peace offering to make restitution of all that was taken and deliver them prisoners the authors of those broyles and robberies they were refus'd by the Romans and sent back to Samnium without hope of agreement Claudius Pontius the commander of the Samnites Army with a notable oration of his shewed the Romans would have war in any case and though for their own parts they wished for peace yet necessity made them take the war in hand saying these words They justly take arms that are forced to do so and piously too who have no other hope but in them Upon which necessity he with his souldiers grounded his hopes of victory And to the end I need not return again to this matter I think it fit to alledge those examples of the Romans which are most worthy of remarke Caius Manilius went forth with an army to incounter the Veientes and part of their Army having forced his trenches Manilius came speedily with new Troops to sucour his own and that the Veientes should not escape guarded all the passages into the campe Whereupon the Veientes seeing themselves shut in of all sides began to fight with such fury that they slew Manilius and would have otherthrown all the rest of the Romans if by the wisdom of one Tribune a way for them to escape by had not been opened Where we see that whiles necessity constraned the Veientes to fight they stood to it stoutly but as soon as a way was opened for them they thought more upon flying then fighting The Volsci and Equi having entered with their armies upon the Roman territories the Consuls were sent against them and whiles they were in fight the Volscies army the chief whereof was Vectius Metius chanced to to be inclosed between their own trenches which the Romans were now become masters of and the other Roman Army who seeing they must all either die or make way by the sword he spake thus to his soldiers Come along with mee there is neither rampire nor ditch to oppose you but men only against men you are equall to them in valour and which is the last and hardest weapon your necessity gives you advantage of them Insomuch as this necessity is term'd by Titus Livius the extreamest and greatest weapon Camillus the wisest of all the Roman commanders being got within the walls of the Vejentes City with his Army whereby to take it more easily and to free the enemies from that last necessity of defending themselves gave command so that the Vejentes heard it that none should hurt those that were disarmd so that having cast all their armes upon the ground that City was taken with little or no effusion of blood Which course was afterwards followed by many Commanders CHAP. XIII Whether more trust is to be reposed in a good Commander that hath a weak Army or in a good Army that hath a weak Commander COriolanus being banished from Rome went from thence to the Volsci where having gotten together an Army to be reveng'd of his own Citizens came from thence to Rome from whence he was mov'd to depart rather for pitty to his mother than by the Romans forces Upon which place T. Livius saies that hereby it is known that the Commonwealth of Rome grew more by the Captains valours than the soldiers considering that the Volsci formerly had been alwaies losers and only then had overcome when Coâ—iolanus was their General And how ever that Livie holds such an opinion yet we see in many places of his History that Soldiers without any Captain have given extraordinary proofs of their valors and have been better ordered and fiercer after the death of their Consuls than before they were slain as it happend in the Army which the Romans had in Spain under the Scipioes which when the two Captains were slain was able by its own valor not only to save it self but overcome the enemy and keep that Province for the Republick So relating all wee shall find many examples where the Soldiers valor alone hath got the day and many others where the Generals valor only hath done the same effect In so much as wee may well judge that either of them hath need of the other And here it is not amiss to consider first whether is most to be feared either a good Army led by an unskilfull Commander or a good Commander followed by a bad Army And taking after Cesars opinion small account is to be made of the one or the other for when he went into Spain against Afranius and Petrejus who had with them a good Army he said he little doubted them Because he went against an Army that lacked a Commander shewing the Commanders weakness On the contrary when he went into Thessaly against Pompey he said I go against a Commander without an Army Another thing may be considerd which is more easie either for a good Commander to make a good Army or for a good Army to make a good Commander Whereupon I answer that the question seems already decided for more easily many shall find one or shall instruct one so that he become good than one alone shall many Lucullus when he was sent against Mithridates was altogether unexpert in the war yet that good Army wherein were so many good Chieftaines quickly made him a skilful Commander For want of Soldiers the Romans put many slaves in Armes and gave order to Sempronius Gracchus to train them who in a small time made a very good Army of them Pelopidas and Epaminondas as we have said
otherwhere after they had delivered Thebes their native Country out of the Spartans bondage made the Thebans exceeding good Soldiers in a short time that they were able not only to sustain ' but overcome the Soldiers of Sparta so that the case is equal on both sides for the one being good may soon find the other so yet a good Army without a good head ordinarily becomes insolent and dangerous as was the Macedonian Army after Alexander his death and likewise the Veterane soldiers in the civil warres So that I think that much more account is to be made of a Commander that hath time and convenience to train up and arme his Soldiers than of an insolent Army having a Captain from among them tumultuarily made their Chief Wherefore double glory and renown may well be ascrib'd to those Commanders who have not only taken upon them to overcome the enemy but before their comming to fight with them have to make them fit for the occasion disciplind and instructed their Armies well for therein appears their vertuo double and admirable whereas if the charge hereof were communicated to many far less account or esteem would be made of them CHAP. XIV New sleights and inventions that are usd in the midst of a fight and new cryes that are heard what effects they produce OF what moment in combates and fights a new accident is that arises upon any new matter seen or heard appears in many places and especially in that occasion where the Romans fought with the Volsci where Quâ—ntius seeing one of the horns of his Army beginning to fayle began to cry out aloud that they should stand firm because the other horne of the Army was already victorious by which words having encourag'd his own and affrighted his enemies hee overcame them And if such vociserations in an Army well orderd be of great effect in one then that is but tumultuary and ill disciplind they must needs be of much greater because the whole frame thereof moves by the like wind To this purpose I will alledge a notable example befaln in our dayes The City of Perugia a few years since was divided into two factions of the Oddi and the Bagliori these raignd there the others were banishd men who having by help of their allies gotten an Army together and brought it into some Town consining upon Perugia by favour of their faction one night enterd the City without being descryd came to take the Piazza because that City hath chains on all the corners of the waies which kept them bard the Soldiers belonging to the Oddi had a man went before them who with a bar of Iron was to break the locks of those chains to the end the horse might pass there being but one only left them to break which immediately opened into the Piazza and now a generall alarme being given and he that broke them being oppressed by the multitude that followd him and not able therefore well to lift up his armes with his bar whereby to imploy it chanc'd to say Stand back which word going by degrees saying back began to cause the furthest off to flie and so by little and little the rest with such force that they all routed one another And thus the design of the Oddi by occasion of so poor an accident became frustrate Where we may consider that discipline and order is not usefull in an Army so much for orderly fighting as that every small accident put thee not quite into disorder for were it for nothing else the ordinary multitude is unfit for the warrs because every rumor every voice every noise changes them and puts them to flight And therefore a good Commander among his other orders ought appoint those that are to take the word from him to pass it to others and accustome his Soldiers so that they give no credit save only to their own officers to the end that they tell them only what is given them in charge from him for when this part is not well observ'd many disorders often fall out Touching the sight of these new things every Commander ought well bend his wits to make some shew whiles the battail is in tryal whereby to encourage his own and dishearten the enemy because among those accidents which may give thee the victory this is the most effectuall Whereof wee alledge for testimony the example of Cneus Sulpitius the Roman Dictatour who comming to fight a battell with the French arm'd all the poor drudges and rascality of the Camp and having mounted them upon Mules and poor Asses with armes and ensignes to make them seem as if they were cavallry he plac'd them behind a hill and commanded that at a signall given whiles he was in the hottest of the battel they should shew themselves to the enemy which thing so ordered and done put the French men in such a fright that they lost they day And therefore a good Commander ought to do two things the one is to try some of these inventions to startle the enemy the other to stand so prepard that the enemy offering any such to him he may be able to discover and quite frustrate them as did the Indian King to Semiramis who seeing that King had a great number of Elephants to affright him and make him think shee had more her self than he made a great many of them of Bulls and Bufaloes hides and having put them upon Camells sent them before but that King finding out her deceit turnd it upon her not only vain but hurtfull Mammercus was sent Dictator against the Fidenates who to affright the Roman Army appointed that in the heat of the skirmish a good number of soldiers should sally forth of Fidenas with lights upon the top of their Lances to the end that the Romans taken a while with the novelty of the matter should fall into some disorder Whereupon it is to be noted that when such devices carry more truth than appearance with them they may well be represented to the view of men because that having in them a great deal of that which is lively and likely their weakness cannot so quickly be discoverd but when they have more of fiction in them than of truth it is better either not to use them or using them to keep them off at such a distance that a full discovery of them cannot suddenly be made as was that trick of the Muleters Cn. Sulpitius practisd for when there is nothing but weakness within them as they are approached they are quickly seen through and do thee wrong rather than give thee advantage as those Elephants did to Semiramis and the fires to the Fidenates which however that at first they a little troubled the Army yet when the Dictatour came up to them and began to cry out That they might be ashamd to fly from the smoak like Bees but that they should rather turn back their slames upon them saying Bnrne out these people of Fidenas with
Armie because each of these thought the enemy had been victour and therefore they each withdrew themselves without any regard that they left their Campes in prey to the Enemy It fell out that Tempanius who was there with the remainder of the Roman Army retiring too learned by certain wounded soldiers of the Equi that their Captaines were gone and had abandoned their quarters upon which news he went into the Roman quarters and saved them but sacked those of the Equi and so returned victorious to Rome which victory as wee see consists only in who hath notice of the enemies disorder Where we should consider that it may often come to pass that the two Armies which are in front one against another may be both in the like disorder and suffer the same wants and that after remaines vanquisher that first comes to knowledge of the others necessities And hereof I will give a domestick and moderne example In the year one thousand four-hundred ninty eight when the Florentines had a great Army about Pisa and beleaguerd the Town very strongly whereof the Venetians having undetaken the protection and notseeing any otherway to save it resolved to divert the war by assayling the territories of Florence on the other side wherefore with a strong Army they entred by the vally of Lamona and seised upon the Village of Marradi and besieged the Fortress of Castiglione which is upon the hill above Which the Florentines perceiving resolved to succour Marradi and yet not lessen their forces which they had about Pisa so that having levied new foot and appointed new horse they sent them that way whose Commanders were Jacobus Quartus of Appian Lord of Piombin and Count Rinuccius of Marcian These then being come to the hills above Marradi the enemies lest beleaguering Marradi and betook themselves to the Village where these two Armies being infront one against the other for some daies both suffered much for the scarcity of provisions and other necessaries and neither daring to set upon the other nor either knowing the others wants both at once resolved over night to raise their Campes the morning following and retire the Venetian toward Berzighella and Faenza the other toward Casaglia and Mugello the morning then come and each Campe having begun to send away their carriages by chance a woman parted from the Bourg of Marradi and came towards the Florentine Campe being secure enough from wrong because of her old age and poverty desirous belike to see some of her friends in that Campe by whom the Florentine Captains understanding of the Venetian Camps departure upon this news grew a little more couragious and having changed their purpose as if they had dislodged their enemies went out and took their quarters and writ to Florence they had repulsed and vanquished them Which victory proceeded from nothing else than from having first had notice of their enemies departure which notice had it been given on the other side would have wrought the same effect against ours CHAP. XIX Whether in the government of a multitude mildness or severity be of greater availe THe Commonwealth of Rome was in a combustion because of the differences between the Nobles and the Commons nevertheless as occasion of wars was offered them they sent forth with their Armies Quintius and Appius Claudius Appius because he was cruell and rough in commanding was ill obeyed by those that followed him so that almost quite broken he fled from his charge Quintius by using a mild and gentle behaviour towards his soldiers found them very obedient and returned with victory Whereupon it seems that to governe a multitude it is better to be courteous then insolent compassionate rather then cruel Notwithstanding Cornelius Tacitus with whom many other writers agree in a saying of his concludes the contrary where he saies To rule a multitude severity is of more force then mildness And devising with my self how each of these opinions may be made good I say either thou art to governe men that ordinarily are thy companions or that are alwaies in subjection to thee When they are thy companions severity or rigour cannot fully be us'd against them according as Cornelius argues and because the common people of Rome had equal power in the Roman government with the Nobility he that became Prince among them for a time could not rule them with roughness and rigor And many time it was evident that the Roman Commanders did more good that got the good wills of their soldiers and held but a gentle hand over them then those that by rough handling kept them in a slavish aw of them unless they were accompani'd with extraordinary endowments as was Manlius Tarquatus But he that commands over subjects whereof Cornelius discourses to the end they grow not insolent and by reason of thy two great mildness tread thee not under foot ought rather betake himself to rigor then gentleness But this a so is not to exceed moderation for fear of incurring hatred for it never turns to any Princes advantage to gain the peoples hate The way to avoid it is to lay no hands on the subjects estates for of blood when rapine is not the covert cause there no Prince is thirsty unless forc'd thereto which seldome he is but where rapine is mixt this necessity comes alwaies upon them nor ever want they occasion nor desire to shed blood as in another treaty to this purpose is discours'd at large Quintius was more praise worthy then Appius and yet the saying of Cornelius limited as it ought to be but not in the case observ'd by Appius deserves approbation And because we have spoken of severity and mildness methinks it is not more then needs to shew how one action of humanity was of more force with the Falisci then many violent acts of hostility CHAP. XX. One example of humanity prevail'd more with the Falisci then all the force of Rome could CAmillus with the Army being set down before the Faliscies Town and besieging it a Pedagogue that taught the children of the cheifest men of the City thinking to gratify Camillus and the people of Rome under colour of exercise going forth with them out of the Town brought them all into the Campe before Camillus where having presented them he said that by means of them the Town would forth with be deliver'd into his hands Which present was not only not accepted by â—amillus but having caus'd the Pedagogue to be strip'd and his hands bound behind him and given to each one of those children a rod in his hand caus'd him to be whip'd back again by them with many stripes into the Town Which when they of the Town understood Camillus his humanity and integrity so much pleasd them that not desiring longer to defend themselves they resolv'd to render up the Town to him Where it is to be considered by this true example how much more a curteous and charitable act works in mens minds then any one
their whole power in case that at his rising up in arms the Florentines would pay him an hundred thousand ducates and at his arrival in Italy another hundred thousand to which agreements the Florentines consented and having made the first paiment and afterwards the second he came onely to Verona and thence returned back again having not done any thing in their behalf blaming them as if it were their fault for not having observed the conditions between them So that if Florence had not been either constrained by necessity or overcome by passion and had read and known the ancient customes of the Barbarians she would never have been neither this time nor many other times deceived by them they having behaved themselves always after one manner and in every part and with every one used the same terms as it appears they formerly did to the Tuscans who being oppressed by the Romans by reason they had been several times put in flight by them and routed and seeing that by their own forces alone they were not able to make resistance they agreed with the French who dwelt on this side the Alps in Italy to give them a sum of mony to oblige them to joyn their Armies with them whereby to make head against the Romans Whereupon it followed that they having taken the monies would not afterwards take arms for them saying these they had received not to make war upon their enemies but that they should forbear to forrage the country of Tuscany And thus the Tuscans through the covetousness and small truth of the French were bereft of their monies and left without the succors they expected from them Insomuch as we see by this example of the ancient Tuscans and that of the Florentines that the French have continually used the same terms and hereby may it easily be conjectured what trust Princes can repose in them CHAP. XLIV By sudden surprisall and boldness many times more is obtained then by ordinary means can be gotten THe Samnites being invaded by the Romans and their army unable to stand in the field against them determin'd having left their Towns well guarded in Samnium to pass with their whole Army into Tuscany which then had made truce with the Romans to try with that passage if by the presence of their Army they could induce the Tuscans to take armes again which they had denied to their Ambassadors and in the parly the Samnites had with the Tuscans shewing what principally moved them to take armes they used a notable terme where they said They had rebelled because peace was more grievous to these in subjection then was war to them that enjoy their liberty And so partly by perswasions partly by the presence of their army they wrought them to take armes Where it is to be noted that when any Prince desires to obtain any thing of another he ought if the occasion will bear it never give him time to advise himself but carry the matter so that he may see the necessity of his sudden resolution which is when he that is required perceives that by his deniall or delay there may arise a sudden and dangerous distaste These termes were seen to have been well used by Pope Julius with the French and by De Fois the French Kings General with the Marquess of Mantua for Pope Julius having a mind to expell the Bentivolij out of Bolonia and to this purpose thinking he had need of the French forces and that the Venetians should stand Newtralls and having sollicited the one and the other to this intent but receiv'd from them a doubtful and various answer resolv'd by not giving them leisure to bring them both to his bent Whereupon parting from Rome with those forces he could put together he went thence towards Bolonia and to the Venetians he sent that they should continue Newters and to the King that he should send him forces so that they all being restrain'd by the small time they had and considering that the Pope might with reason take an open distast at either their delay or refusal gave way to his will and the King sent him aid and the Venetians remain'd newters De Fois also being with his Army in Bolonia and having had notice of the rebellion of Bressia and being desirous to go to recover it had two ways the one through the Kings own dominions long and tedious the other short through the dominion of Mantua and not only was he necessitated to pass through the dominions of that Marquess but of force was to pass by certain sluces between marish grounds and lakes whereof that country is full which with fortresses other means were shut up and guarded by him whereupon De Fois having resolv'd to take the shorter passage to overcome all difficulties give no time to the Marquess to deliberate at the same instant brought his souldiers on that way and signified to the Marquess that he should send him the keys of the passage So that the Marquess surprised by this sudden resolution sent him the keys which he would never have done if De Fois had carried himself more cooly in the matter that Marquess being in league with the Pope and the Venetians and having a son of his in the Popes hands which things gave him many fair colours to deny him But being assailed by the sudden course taken upon the reasons already alledged yeelded So did the Tuscans with the Samnites having upon the presence of that Army of Samnium taken arms which they had otherwise denyed them CHAP. XLV VVhich course is the better in a battel either at the first to sustain onely the enemies shock and reserve some forces till the latter end to give them a blow withall or else as upon the main to venture all upon the fury of the first onset DEcius and Fabius the Roman Consuls were in the field with two armies against the Samnites and Tuscans and coming to the skirmish and to joyn battel together it is worth the noting in that service which of those ways of proceeding practised by those two Consuls were the better for Dâ—â—ius with all his force and violence assailed the enemy Fabius only held them up judging the slow assault to be of more advantage reserving his blow till the last when the enemy should have lost his first heat of fight or rage as some terme it where we see by the success that follow'd that Fabius his design took effect better then that of Decius who tir'd himself so in the first onset that seeing his souldiers ready to turne their faces to attain to that glory by death which by victory he could not in imitation of his father he sacrific'd himself for the Roman Legions Which thing when Fabius understood that he might gain no less glory by living then his Collegue had gotten by dying put forward all these forces which he had reserv'd for the last pinch whereby he carried away a very happy victory From hence is it
equalls and therefore cannot dispose nor command them at his pleasure But he that gaines the Principality by the peoples favor finds himselfe alone in his throne and hath none or very few neare him that are not very supple to bend besides this the great ones cannot upon easie termes be satisfied or without doing of wrong to others where as a small matter contents the people for the end which the people propound to themselves is more honest than that of the great men these desiring to oppresse they only not to be oppressed To this may be added also that the Prince which is the peoples enemy can never well secure himselfe of them because of their multitude well may hee bee sure of the Nobles they being but a few The worst that a Prince can look for of the people become his enemy is to be abandoned by them but when the greatones once grow his enemies he is not only to feare their abandoning of him but their making of a party against him also for there being in them more forecast and craft they alwayes take time by the forelocks whereby to save themselves and seeke credit with him who they hope shall get the mastery The Prince likewise is necessitated alwayes to live with the same people but can doe well enough without the same great men he being able to create new ones and destroy them again every day and to take from them and give them credit as he pleases and to cleare this part I say that great men ought to be considerd two wayes principally that is if they take thy proceedings so much to heart as to engage their fortunes wholly in thine in case they lye not alwayes catching at spoyle they ought to be well honourd and esteem'd those that bind themselves not to thy fortune are to be considerd also two wayes either they doe it for lack of courage and naturall want of spirit and then shouldst thou serve thy selfe of them and of them especially that are men of good advice for if thy affaires prosper thou dost thy selfe honour thereby if crost thou needst not feare them but when they oblige not themselves to thee of purpose and upon occasion of ambition it is a signe they think more of themselves than of thee and of these the Prince ought to beware and account of them as his discoverd enemyes for alwayes in thy adversity they will give a hand too to ruine thee Therefore ought hee that comes to be Prince by the peoples favour keepe them his friends which he may easily doe they desiring only to live free from oppression but he that becomes Prince by the great mens favour against the will of the people ought above all things to gaine the people to him which he may easily effect when he takes upon him their protection And because men when they find good where they look for evill are thereby more endered to their benefactour therefore growes the people so pliant in their subjection to him as if by their favours he had attaind his dignity And the Prince is able to gaine them to his side by many wayes which because they vary according to the subject no â—ertaine rule can be given thereupon wherefore we shall let them passe I will only conclude that it is necessary for a Prince to have the people his friend otherwise in his adversities he hath no helpe Nabis Prince of the Spartans supported the siege of all Greece and an exceeding victorious army of the Romans and against those defended his native countrey and State and this suffic'd him alone that as the danger came upon him he secur'd himself of a fewer whereas if the people had been his enemy this had nothing availd him And let no man think to overthrow this my opinon with that common proverb that He who relyes upon the people layes his foundation in the dirt for that is true where a private Citizen grounds upon them making his account that the people shall free him when either his enemyes or the Magistrates oppresse him In this case he should find himself often deceiv'd as it befell the Gracchyes in Rome and in Florence George Scali but he being a Prince that grounds thereupon who can command and is a man of courage who hath his wits about him in his adversiryes and wants not other preparations and holds together the whole multitude animated with his valour and orders shall not prove deceiv'd by them and shall find he hath layd good foundations These Principalityes are wont to be upon the point of falling when they goe about to skip from the ciuil order to the absolute for these Princes either command of themselves or by the Magistrate in this last case their State is more weak and dangerous because they stand wholly at the will and pleasure of these Citizens who then areset over the Magistrates who especially in adverse times are able with facility to take their State from them either by rising up against them or by nor obeying them and then the Prince is not at hand in those dangers to take the absolute authority upon him for the Citizens and subjects that are accustomed to receive the commands from the Magistrates are not like in those fractions to obey his and in doubtfull times he shall alwayes have greatest penury of whom he may trust for such a Prince cannot ground upon that which he sees in peaceable times when the Citizens have need of the State for then every one runs and every one promises and very one will venture his life for him when there is no danger neare but in times of hazzard when the State hath need of Citizens there are but few of them then and so much the more is this experience dangerous in that it can be but once made Therefore a prudent Prince ought to devise a way whereby his Citizens alwayes and in any case and quality of time may have need of his government and they shall alwaies after prove faithfull to him CHAP. X. In what manner the Forces of all Principalities ought to be measured IT is requisite in examining the quality of those Principalities to have another consideration of them that is if a Prince have such dominions that he is able in case of necessity to subsist of himself or else whether he hath alwaies need of another to defend him And to clear this point the better I judge them able to stand of themselves who are of power either for their multitudes of men or quantity of money to bring into the field a compleat armie and ioyn battel with whoever comes to assail them and so I think those alwaies to stand in need of others help who are not able to appear in the field against the enemy but are forc'd to retire within their walls and guard them Touching the first case we have treated already and shall adde somwhat thereto as occasion shall require In the second case we cannot say other save only to
by authority taken from the example of the Romans and from the use of the ancient military discipline the foot is more to be esteemed then the horse Chap. 18. That conquests in Republiques not well governed and that proceed not according to the Roman valour procure rather their ruine then advancement Chap. 19. What hazard that Prince or Commonwealth runs which is served by auxiliary and mercenary soldiers Chap. 20. The first Rector that ever the Romans sent to any place was to Capua four hundred years after they began to make war Chap. 21. How erroneus many times the opinions of men are when they give their judgments touching great affairs Chap. 22. How much the Romans in giving judgement upon their subjects whensoever occasion was offered that constrained them thereunto avoyded the middle way and rather betook themselves to one of the extreams Chap. 23. Fortresses in general do more harme then good Chap. 24. It is a wrong course to assail a City fallen into discord thinking by means thereof to become master of it Chap. 25. Contempt and contumely begets a hatred against them that use it without any return of advantage to them Chap. 26. Prudent Princes and Commonwealths ought to be content with the victory for oftentimes when that suffices not they lose it Chap. 27. How dangerous a thing it is for a Republique or Prince not to revenge an injury done against the publique State or against a private person Chap. 28. Fortune blinds mens eyes when she will not suffer them to prevent her designs Ch. 29. Republiques and Princes that really are mighty seek not by moneys to make alliance with others but with their valor and repute of their forces Chap. 30. How dangerous a thing it is to give credit to men that are banishd out of their Countrey Chap. 31. How may wayes the Romans used to make themselves masters of Towns Chap. 32. That the Romans gave their Commanders of their armies free and large Commissions Chap. 33. The Table of the third book FOr the maintenance of a Religion or Commonwealth long in being it is necessary oftentimes to reduce them to their first grounds Chap. 1. It is a very great part of wisdom sometimes to seem a fool Chap. 2. That it was necessary for preservation of the new gotten liberty to put Brutus his sons to death Chap. 3. No Prince lives secure in his Principality while those are living who were despoyled of it Chap. 4. What it is that makes a Prince lose his Kingdome which he injoys by right of inheritance Chap. 5. Of Conspiracies Chap. 6. From whence proceeds it that of the changes from liberty to slavery and from slavery to liberty some are without blood others exceeding bloody Chap. 7. He that will make alteration in a Republique must consider the subject he is to worke upon Chap. 8. How a man must of necessity change with the times if he will alwaies have good success in his undertakings Chap. 9. That a Captain cannot avoid battel when his enemy will fight in any case Ch. 10. He that hath to deal with many however that he be the weaker provided that he can but support their first violence overcomes Chap. 11. That a wise Commander upon his own soldiers should lay all manner of necessity to fight and take it as much as he can from his enemies Chap. 12. Whether more trust is to be reposed in a good Commander having a weak army or in a good army having a weak Commander Chap. 13. New sleights and inventions that are used in the midst of a fight and new cryes that are heard what effects they produce Chap. 14. That the command of an army ought to be given in charge onely to one and where there are more they alwaies erre Chap. 15. In time of difficulty and peril true worth and vertue is sought after and in calm and quiet times not their vertues but their wealth friends and parentage prefer them Chap. 16. That he who hath received any not able disgrace or injury done him from a Prince or Republique should never be intrusted by them in any employment or service of importance Chap. 17. There is nothing more worthy of a Commander then to be able to discover before-hand and espy out the enemies practices Chap. 18 Whether in the government of a multitude mildness or severity be of greater availe Chap. 19. One example of humanity prevailed with the Falisci more then all the force of Rome could Chap. 20. From whence it came that Hannibal by a manner of proceeding different from that of Scipioes wrought the same effect in Italy which the other did in Spain Chap. 21. How Manlius Torquatus his rigor and Valerius Corvinus his mildness gaind each of them the same glory Chap. 22. For what cause Camillus was banished Rome Chap. 23. The continuation of governments brought Rome into thraldom Chap. 24. Of Cincinnatus and many Romans poverties ' Chap. 25. How that upon the occasion of Women states have been ruined Chap. 26. How a City at discord in it self is to be united and how that opinion is not true that to maintain Cities in obedience it is necessary to keep them in discord and divided into factions Chap. 27. That the Citizens actions ought to be well weighed for many times under vertuous and charitable deeds are laid the fouudacions of Tyranny Chap. 28. That the peoples faults grow from their Princes Chap. 29. A Citizen that will of his own authority do any good in his own City of necessity must first extinguish all envy and what order is to be taken for the defence of a City upon the enemies approach Chap. 30. Powerful Commonwealths and great and worthy personages in all manner of fortune retain the same courage and the same dignity Chap. 31. What means some have practised to disturb a treaty of peace Chap. 32. It much furthers an army in the winning of a battel to be confident of their own forces and their Generals valor Chap. 33. What fame report or opinion causes the people to begin to cast their favors upon a Citizen and whether a Prince or a People do bestow their Magistracies with better judgement Chap. 34. What dangers they incur that put themselves forwards as Principals to advise any designe which are so much the greater by how much this carries with it the more difficulty and peril Chap. 35. The reason wherefore the French have been and are thought in combats at the beginning more then men and afterwards less then women Chap. 36. Whether slight skirmishes or battels are necessary before a great battel and what is to be done to know a new enemy when one would avoid those skirmishes Chap. 37. What manner of man that General ought to be on whose abilities an army may confidently rely Chap. 38. That a Commander ought exactly to know scituations Chap. 39. How deceit is commendable used against the enemy in time of war Chap. 40. That the defence of ones countrey
ought to be undertaken either with ignominy or with glory or whatsoever way it be done it is well defended Chap. 41. Promises extorted by force ought not to be kept Chap. 42. Those men that are bred in the same Country do throughout all ages keep very neere the same nature and dispositim Chap. 43. By sudden supprisal and boldness many times more is obtained then by ordinary means can be gotten Chap. 44. Which course is the better in a battel either at the first to sustain onely the enemies shock and reserve some forces till the latter end to give them a blow withall or else as upon themaine to venture all upon the fury of the first onset Chap. 45. Whence proceeds it that one family in a City holds a long time the same manners and disposition Chap. 46. That a good Citizen for the good of his Country ought to forget all private wrongs Chap. 47. When we see the enemy commit a great error we ought to beleeve there is some treachery in the business Chap. 48. A Republique if one would preserve it free hath every day neeed of provision of new orders and in regard of his good deserts that way Fabius was termed Magnus Chap. 49. FINIS MACHIAVELS DISCOURSES UPON THE First DECADE OF T. LIVIVS Translated out of Italian The Preface WHen I consider the esteem which is made of antiquity and that many times letting pass further examples a small piece of an ancient statute hath been bought at a great rate only to have it at hand to adorn the house withall and that thereby they may be able to cause others who take delight in the art to draw copies thereof and these likewise endeavour as lively as they can to represent it again in all their works and on the other side seeing the most vertuous actions that histories relate us to have been archieved by Kingdomes ancient Common-wealths Kings Captains Citizens and Law-givers and such others who have undergone much for their Countries good that these I say have been rather admired then follow'd or rather by every one have been so much avoided that now the very footsteps of that ancient vertue is utterly defac'd I cannot but both marvaile and grieve and the rather because I perceive that in matters of process arising in a Commonwealth among citizens or in criminal causes recourse is alwaies made to those judgements and those remedies which formerly have been ordain'd and practis'd by the ancients for the civil-lawes are nothing else but the opinions given by ancient Lawyers which since having been reduc'd to a method todirect our Doctors of the Law now a daies in giving of their judgements yet for all this in the ordering of Commonwealths in the maintenance of States in the government of Kingdomes in ordeining of military discipline in waging of war in giving judgment upon the subjects in amplifying of the Empire there are neither Princes nor Republiques Commanders nor Citizens who ever seek after any of these ancient patternes which I perswade my self proceeds not so much from that weakness into which the breeding and customes now a daies have brought the world or from that evill which idleness accompanied with ambition hath done to many Christian countries and Cities as from their want of the true knowledge of histories in that by reading them they conceive not that meaning nor relish that tastethey have in them whence it arises that many who read take delight to hear the variety of accidents which are frequent in them without further regard of imitating them deeming that not only hard but unpossible as if the heavens the sun the elements and men were alter'd from what they were of old in theâ—ir motion order and power Wherefore being desirous to withdraw men from this errour I thought fit to write upon these bookes of T Livius which have escap'd the malice of the times what I thought conformable to moderne and ancient affaires of purpose for the better understanding of them that they who shall well peruse these discourses of mine may there reap that profit for which end the knowledg of historie ought to be sought after And however this be a taske of great difficulty yet by the helpe of those who have incourag'd me to undergoe this burden I beleeve I shall carry it so far onwards that there shall be left for him that comes after me but very little way to bring it to a good end CHAP. I. What were in generall the beginnings of every city and especially that of Rome WHosoever shall reade what beginning the City of Rome had who were the Lawmakers and how it was founded will nothing marvaile that so great vertue was continued so many years in the city and that from thence afterwards there grew so mighty an Empire to which that Commonwealth attain'd And therefore to discourse first of her birth I say that all Cities were built either by the Natives of the place they were built in or by strangers The first comes to passe when the inhabitants being dispers'd in many and small numbers finde they cannot live safe each one not having strength apart as well by reason of their situation as their small number to resist the violence of those that would force them or if they would joyn together for their defence the enemy comming upon them they cannot do it in time and when they should be in one body they must of necessity abandon divers of their retreats so become a sudden prey to their enemies Wherefore to escape these dangers either of themselves or upon the motion of some one of authority among them they confine themselves to dwell together in a place chosen as well for their better commodity of living as more facility of defence Of this sort among many others were Athens Venice The first under the command of Theseus was upon the like occasions built by the scattered inhabitants the other much people being retired into certain little Ilands at the point of the Adriatique Sea to avoid those wars which then were beginning in Italy by reason of those huge and continual inundations of Barbarians upon the declining of the Roman Empire began among themselves without the authority of any particular Prince to live under those lawes they thought most proper for their preservation which prov'd luckily to them for the long quiet their situation gave them that Sea having no outlet and those people which then afflicted Italy not having ships to annoy them so that every little beginning was sufficient to give them that greatness they now have The second sort is when a City is built by strangers which are either absolute of themselves or depend upon others such are colonies which are sent out either by a Commonwealth or Prince to disburden their Towns of inhabitants or for the defence of some country which of late they have gotten and would safely keep without much expence of which sort the Romans built many througouht all their dominions
the Senate did defend them Moreover he shall see that the Eastern and Western Armies were not enough to save Caligula Nero Vitellius and the other wicked Emperors from their Enemies whom their vile conditions and damned lives had procured them And if their Story were well read over it might serve to give good instruction to any Prince to shew him the way of glory and of disgrace the way of security and of distrust Fot of 26 Emperors that were from Cesar to Maximinus 16 were slain 10. only died natural deaths And if any of those that were slain were good as Galba and Pertinax it proceeded from the corruption the predecessor had left among the soldiers And if among those those that died natural deaths any were wicked or lewd as Severus it was caus'd by his great fortune and valonr which two accompany very few Hee shall see also by reading this Story how a man may order a good Kingdome for all those Emperours that succeeded in the Empire by inheritance except Titus were mischievous those that were adopted were all good as were those five from Nerva to Marcus And as the Empire fell upon the heyres it return'd alwaies to its destruction Let a Prince be put in mind of the times from Nerva to Marcus and compare them with those that went before them and that follow'd them let him choose in which he would have been borne or over whether he would have had command For in those that were govern'd by the good he shall see a Prince live in security in the midst of his secure Citizens the world replenish'd with peace and justice the Senate enjoying their authority the Magistrates their honours and the wealthy Citizens their estates nobility and vertue exalted and with these all rest and good And on the other side all rancour dissoluteness corruption and ambition extinguished he shall see a returne of the golden age where every one may keep and defend what reputation he pleases and in the end shall see the world triumph the Prince reverenc'd and honour'd and the people in agreement and security If afterwards he consider severally the times of the other Emperours he shall find the warres made them terrible and seditions full of discord as well in peace as in war cruell so many Princes slain with the sword so many civil so many forrain warres Italy afflicted and full of new misfortunes the Cities thereof having been sackt and ruin'd he shall see Rome burnt the Capitol by her own Citizens defac'd and spoyl'd the antient temples desolated and their ceremonies neglected the cities repleate with adulteries the sea full of banishments and the rocks besmeard with blood He shall see follow in Rome a numberless number of cruelties and Nobility wealth honours and above all vertue reputed as a most capital crime He shall see accusers rewarded servants corrupted against their masters children against their parents and they who had not enemies oppressed by their friends and then he shall know very well how much Rome Italy and the world was beholding to Caesar And without doubt if he be borne of mankind he will be frighted from imitating those wicked times and inflam'd with zeale to trace the good And truly a Prince ayming at glory would with to be Lord of a disorder'd City not to ruine it wholly as did Caesar but to recompose and restore it as Romulus And beleeve me the heavens cannot give men greater occasion of glory nor men desire it And if to renew and restore the frame of a City there were necessity for a man to depose his Principality the man that did not set it in order because he would not fall from his dignity should yet deserve excuse But when he could hold his Principality and yet restore the government he is no way excusable And in sum let them be well advis'd to whom the heavens present such opportunity that either of these two wales be propounded them the one that gives them security in life and makes them glorious after death the other that causes them to live in continual troubles and leave behind them in everlasting infamy CHAP. XI Of the Romans Religion THough Romulus were Romes first founder and she was to acknowledge from him her birth and bringing up notwithstanding the heavens judging that Romulus his lawes were not sufficient for such an Empire put it into the Roman Senat 's mindes to elect Numa Pompilius to succeed Romulus that what he left unfinished the other might supply Who finding a very fierce people and being desirous to reduce them into civil obedience by peaceable waies applied himself to Religion as a thing wholly necessary to preserve civility and ordain'd it in such a sort that for many ages there was not such a feare of God as in that Commonwealth Which facilitated much any enterprise whatsoever either the Senate or those brave Roman courages did undertake And whosoever shall discourse of the innumerable actions of the people of Rome jointly and of many of the Romans by themselves in severall shal perceive that those Citizens fear'd more to break an oath than the lawes as they that made more account of the power of God than of man as it appears manifestly by the examples of Scipio and Manlius Torquatus for after that Hannibal had given the Romans an overthrow at Canna many Citizens assembled together and being affrighted resolv'd to quit the country and go into Sieily which Scipio understanding went and found them out and with his sword drawn in his hand compelled them to sweare they would never forsake their native country Lucius Manlius that was afterwards call'd Torquatus was accus'd by Marcus Pomponius Tribune of the people and before the judgment day came Titus went to find Marcus and threatning to kill him if he swore not to take the accusation off from his father bound him by his oath and he though by feare compell'd to sweare yet took the accusation off and so those Citizens whom neither the love to their country nor the lawes thereof could retain in Italy were kept by force of an oath they were constrained to take and that Tribune laid aside the hatred he bore to the father the injury he receiv'd of the son and his own reputation to keep the oath he took which proceeded of nothing else but the Religion Numa brought in among them And it is manifest if a man consider well the Roman histories of how much availe their Religion was for the commanding of armies to reconcile the common people to preserve good men and to shame the lewd So that if we were to dispute to whether Prince Rome were more oblig'd Romulus or Numa I beleeve Numa would be prefer'd for where Religion is military discipline is easily brought in and where they are already warlike and have no Religion this hardly followes And it is plain that Romulus to order the Senate and frame certain other civil and military ordinances had no need of the authority of a God
midst of esseminate people yet made no difficulty such was their vertue to train them up in arms and with those to go and meet the Spartan Armies in the field and overcome them And he that makes relation of it saies that these two prov'd in short time that not only in Lacedemon soldiers were bred but in any other place where men are bred if they found any could train them in the exercise As it appears that Tullus knew how to train them to the war And Virgill could not better express this opinion nor with other words come near it where he saies Residesque movebit Tullus in arma viros People with peace grown dull that nere us'd armes Tullus shall soldiers make CHAP. XXII What we may observe in the case of the three Horatij Romans and the three Curiatij Albans TULLUS the Roman King and Metius the Alban made an agreement that that people should be Lord of the other whose three above mentioned champions vanquisht the others All the Curiatij Albans were slain there remain'd alive onely one of the Horatij Romans and by this Metius King of the Albans with his people became subject to the Romans And this Horatius the Conquerour returning into Rome and meeting one of his own sisters who had been married to one of the three dead Curiatij that lamented the death of her husband slew her Whereupon that Horatius was brought into judgement and after many disputes freed rather at his Fathers suite than for his own merits Where three things are to be considered One that the whole fortune of the State ought never be hazzarded with a part of the forces The other that in a City well govern'd faults be never made amends for with deserts The third that matches were never wisely made where a man-ought or can doubt the performance will not follow For so much imports it a City to become subject that a man ought not beleeve that any of those Kings or people would rest content that three of their fellow citizens should have brought them to this yoke of which mind we saw Metius was who though presently after the Romans victory he acknowleg'd himself vanquisht and promis'd obedience to Tullus yet in the first expedition they were to meet against the Vejentes it appear'd how he sought to deceive him as he that was too late aware of his rashness in the bargain he made And because we have spoken enough of this third thing to be noted we shall speak onely of the other two in the two following Chapters CHAP. XXIII That the whole fortune ought not be laid at stake where the whole forces try not for it and for this cause it is often hurtfull to guard the passages NEver was he thought good gamester that would hazzard his whole â—â—st upon less then the strength of his whole game And this is done divers waies One is doing as Tullus and Metius did when they committed the whole fortune of their countrey and the valour of so many men as the one and the other had in their armies to the vafour and fortune of three of their citizens which were but a very small part of either of their forces Nor did they consider how by this adventure all the toyle their ancestors had taken in ordering the Commonwealth so that it might long continue free and to make the citizens defenders of their liberty was all in vain it being left in the hands of so few to lose it Which thing those Kings could not have known how more to have undervalued And for the most part they likewise fall into the same inconvenient who upon the enemies approach intend to keep the hard places and guard the passages For this resolution will alwayes be hurtfull unless in that hard passage thou canst bring together all thy whole forces And in such case this course may be well taken But the place being rough and it not being possible to hold all thy forces there there is loss in it And to judge thus I am perswaded by the example I finde of those that when they are assaulted by a powerfull enemy their country being environed with mountaines and rocky places have never endeavoured to fight with the enemy upon the passages or mountaines but have gone beyond to encounter them or when they would not do this they have expected them among the mountains in plain and easy places and not mountainous and the reason thereof hath been given before For it is not possible to bring many men together to the guard of mountainous places because provisions for long time cannot easily be furnish'd and because the passages are streight and capable of few and therefore not possible to withstand an enemy pressing on with the gross of his army And it is an easy thing for the enemy to come on with his gross because his intention is but to pass on and not to stay And it is impossible for him that awaits him to await in gross having to lodge there for a longer time not knowing when the enemy wiil pass in places as I said streight and barren Loosing therefore that passage which thou hadst intended to keep and wherein thy people and thy army repos'd some trust most commonly there enters such a terror into the rest of thy people that without any means to make trial of their valor thou art left the loser and with part of thy forces thou hast lost all thy fortunes Every one knows with what difficulty Anniball past the Alpes which divides Lombardy from France and those which divide Lombardy from Tuscany yet the Romans first expected him upon the Tesin and afterwards upon the plain of Arezo and would rather have their army wasted by their enemies in places where they might overcome then bring it upon the Alpes where likely it would have been destroyed by the malignity of the place And whosoever shall with discretion read histories shall find that very few expert Commanders have assayd to keep the like passages for these reasons we have said and because they cannot all divide themselves the mountains being as open fields and not having only ordinary and accustomed but many by-waies though not known to strangers yet to the inhabitants by whose help thou shalt be guided any way in despight of the opposers Whereof we can alleadg a very late example In the year 1515 when Francis the first King of France intended to pass into Italy to recover the State of Lombardy the greatest ground they had that disswaded his enterprise was that the Swisses would step his passage on the mountains And as after experience shew'd it this ground of theirs was slight For that King having left aside two or three places kept by them came from thence by another way unknown and was sooner in Italy then any were aware of him So that herewith being daunted they retir'd into Milan and all the people of Lombardy took the French party having fail'd in the opinion they had that the French
good POpe Julius the second going in the year 1505 to Bolonia to chase out of that state the house of the Benticogli which had held the Principallity of that city a hundred years had a minde also to draw Iohn Pagolus Baglioni out of Perugia whereof he was a Tyrant as he that had conspired against all Tyrants that were seised of any of the Churches lands and being come near Perugia with this resolution knowne to every one stayed not to enter the City with his Army to guard him but went in without a guard notwithstanding that Iohn Pagolus was therein with much people which he had got together for his defence So that carried forward by that rage wherewith he governed all things with his ordinary guard he put himself in his enemies hands whom afterwards he led away with him leaving a governor in that city to keep it for the Church By the wise men that were with the Pope was noted the rashness of the Pope and the base cowardise of John Pagolus nor could they conceit whence it came that he did not to his perpetual renown suppress then at once his enemy and enrich himself with the prey all the Cardinalls being then with the Pope who had the best of all their Jewels with them Neither could any man think that he abstain'd either for goodness or conscience sake that withheld him For into the heart of a wicked man that incestuously convers'd with his sister and that had slain his cousins and nephewes to rule there could never enter any religious respect Whereupon every one concluded that men know not how to be honourably mischievous nor perfectly good And where a mischief hath in it greatness and is generous in some part they know not how to enter into it So Iohn Pagolus who made no account of being an incestuous and publique paricide knew not or to say better had not the courage though upon just occasion to do an exploit that every one should have admir'd him for and he left of himself an everlasting memory being the first that had shew'd the Prelats what a thing it is to set at naught him that lives and reignes as they did and so had done an act whose greatness had surpast all infamy and what ever danger could depend on it CHAP. XXVIII For what reason the Romans were less ungratefull to their citizens than the Athenians WHosoever reades the actions of Republiques shall find in all of them some kinde of ingratitude towards their citizens but less in Rome than in Athens or peradventure than in any Commonwealth else And if we would enquire after the reason thereof speaking of Rome and Athens I think it happen'd because the Romans had less occasion to suspect their citizens than had the Athenians For at Rome considering her from the banishment of her Kings till Sylla and Marius her liberty was never taken away by any of her citizens so that she had no great reason to suspect them or by consequence suddenly to offend them The contrary befell Athens for her liberty being taken from her in her most flourishing time and under colour of doing her some good so soon as she became free remembring the wrong she had receiv'd and the slavery she had indur'd became a sharp revengeress not only of her citizens faults but of the shadow of their faults From hence came the banishment and the death of so many rare men From hence the order of the Osteacisme and all other violence which in several times by her was done to the prime of her citizens And that is very true which those that write of civil government say that the people bitâ— more siercely after they have recover'd their liberty than while they have continually maintain'd it Whosoever then considers what is said will neither in this blame Athes nor commend Rome but will â—ccuse onely the necessity because of the diversity of accidents which did arise in this city For he shall see if narrowly he look into affairs if Romes liberty had been taken away as was that of Athens Rome would not have been more pitifull to her citizens than was Athens Whereof one may make a very good guess by that which chanc't after the banishment of the Kings against Collatine and Publius Valerius whereof the first although he had his hand in the setting of Rome at liberty was banisht for no other occasion than that he was sirnamed Tarquin The other having onely given suspicion of himself by building a house upon the hill Celius was like to have bin banisht So that we may well think seeing how suspicious and severe Rome was in these two things that she would have bin as ungratefull as Athens if as she in her infancy and before her growth had bin so much wrong'd And that I need not turn again to this subject of ingratitude I shall speak further of it in the Chapter following CHAP. XXIX Whether of two be the more ungratefull a people or a Prince ME thinks it is not out of the purpose of our former matter to discourse whether a Prince or people give us greater examples of ingratitude â—nd the better to argue this part I say this vice of ingratitude growes either of covereousness or suspicion For when a people or Prince have sent out a Commander of theirs in any expedition of importance where that Commander overcoming hath gain'd a great deale of glory that Prince or people is in like manner bound to reward him and if in Fâ—w of reward he disgraces him or wrongs him incited thereunto by avarice not willing by reason of this coveteousness to satisfie him he commits an errour without excuse and drawes upon himself everlasting infamy Yet are there many Princes who offend in this kind And Cornelius Tacitus declares in this Sentence the occasion It is more pleasing to revenge an injury then to requite a courtesy for thanks is thought a burden but revenge a gain But when he rewards him not but rather hurâ—s him not through avarice but upon suspicion then the people or Prince deserves some excuse And of these ingratitudes practis'd for such cause we read many for that Commander who valorously hath gain'd his Lord a Kingdom by conquering his enemies replenishing himself with glory and his souldiers with riches of force gets such reputation with his own soldiers with his enemies and his Kings own subjects that that victory can no wayes sayour well to his Lord that put him in the imployment And because mens natures are ambitious and full of suspicion and know not how to set limits to their fortune it is impossible but that suspicion which grows in the Prince after that Commanders victory shall by himself be increas'd upon some way or terme insolently us'd so that the Prince cannot advise himself otherwise than to provide for his own safety And to this end thinks either to put him to death or to take away his reputation which he hath gotten in his army or
making of Tribuns of the people might perhaps be left The war was then resolved of and two armies were led forth commanded by part of the ten and Appius staid at home to govern the City Whereupon it happen'd that he fell in love with Virginia and when he would have taken her by force her Father Virginius to free her slew her whereupon ensued divers tumults at Rome and in the armies which being brought back again and joyn'd with the remainder of the people at Rome went apart thence to the holy mount where they staid til the ten had deposed their Magistracy and that the Tribuns and Consuls being created Rome was restor'd to the ancient forme of liberty It is noted then by the text that the inconvenient of setting up a Tyranny grew first upon the same occasions that the greater part of Tyrannies ordinarily use to arise upon in Cities and this is from the overmuch desire the people have of liberty and the excessive ambition the Nobility have to command And when they agree not to make a law in favor of liberty and either party betakes it self to favour some one then suddenly starts up a tyranny The people and the Nobility of Rome consented to create the ten and to create them with so great authority as they did for the desire they both had the one to extinguish the memory of the consuls the other of the Tribuns When they were created the people thinking that Appius was become of the popular faction and rudely handled the Nobility the people betook themselves to favour him And when a people is led into such an error as to give reputation to any one because he creates those evil that they hate if he hath wit it will alwaies come to pass that he shall make himself Lord of that City for he will wait his opportunity together with the peoples favor to extinguish the Nobility and will never endeavor to oppress the people till he hath quite supprest the Nobles at which time when the people shall perceive themselves to be in bondage they shall not know whether to have recourse for help This course have they all held that have laid the foundations of a Tyrannie in any Commonwealth Which if Appius had likewise held his tyrannie would have bin of longer durance and not have fail'd so quickly but he went the clean contrary way nor could a man have done more undiscreetly than he who to maintain a tyrannie made those his enemies that bestowed it first upon him and could still make it good and fought to gain those to be his friends who neither agreed to give it him nor could maintain it to him and so lost those that were his friends and strove to make those his friends that could not be so For though the nobility desire to tyrannize yet that part of the nobility that hath not a share in the tyrannie is alwaies enemy to the tyrant nor is it possible ever to gain them all to his side by reason of the nobilities exceeding ambition and excessive avarice seeing that the tyrant cannot have so great wealth nor so many honors as to satisfie them all And thus Appius forsaking the people and cleaving to the nobility committed a most evident error and so for other reasons abovesaid and because if a man will hold any thing by violence he that forces must needs be stronger than he that is forced From whence it comes that those Tyrarts who have the generality to friend and the great ones their enemies are in the more safety because their violence is supported with greater forces than that which is favored by the Nobility and hated by the people for with the peoples favor the Forces within are sufficient to maintain themselves as they were to Nabis Tyrant of Sparta when all Greece and the people of Rome assaulted him having made himself sure of some few of the Nobility and alwaies having the people his friend wherewith he defended himself which he could not have done if they had bin otherwise In that other degree to have but few friends at home the forces within suffice nor but must be sought after abread and they are to be of three kinds the one to have a guard of strangers to assure thy person the other to have an army in the country which may serve the same turn the people could the third to hold correspondence and friendship with thy put issant neighbours who may defend thee And whosoever takes these courses and observes them rightly though the people be his enemy yet in some sort may he save himself But Appius could not by any army make himself master of the Country the country there and Rome being one and the same thing and what he could do he knew not how to do and so perish'd in his beginning The Senate also and the people in the creation of the Decemviraâ—e committed very great errors For though it be formerly said in the discourse touching a Dictator that those Magistrates who are made of themselves not those that are chosen by the people endammage the liberty yet the people ought when they make their Magistrates take such order in their making that they restrain them by some regards from growing wicked And where they should set a guard over them to keep them good the Romans took it away creating that the sole Magistracy in Rome nullifying all the rest for the excessive desire as we before said The Senate had to suppress the Tribuns and the Common people the Consuls which blinded them both so that they concur'd in this disorder for men as King Ferdinand said do oftentimes like certain lesser birds of prey who so eagerly pursue the prey whereunto they have a natural provocation that they perceive not a greater bird over their heads with like eagerness ready to seize on them The people of Romes error then is made plain by this discourse as I propounded it in the beginning in going to save their liberty as Appius his errors also in going to seize upon the Tyranny CHAP. XLI Of humble to become proud ofâ— mercifull cruel without passing through the due means between these extreams argues indiscretion and turns nothing to advantage AMong other termsill us'd by Appius to maintain his tyranny it was not of small moment to leap too suddenly from one quality to another for his craft in deceiving the people by dissembling popularity was used to good purpose The terms likewise he held to cause a new creation of the ten were well us'd As also his boldness in creating himself one of them contrary to the nobilities opinion It was a course rightly taken to chuse his collegues to his own turn but it was not advisedly done presently upon this according as I sayd above to change his disposition at an instant of a friend to shew himself enemy to the people of curteous to become insolent of mild harsh and to do this so suddenly that without any excuse he
discovers to all the falshood of his heart For he that hath seem'd good for a while and would to serve his own turn become wicked should come to it by the due degrees and in such sort goeon with his occasions that before the different disposition deprive him of his ancient favors it may have given him so many new that his authority be no way diminished otherwise being found unmask'd and without friends he perishes CHAP. XLII How easily men may be corrupted IT is remarkable also in this matter touching the Decemvirate how easily men are corrupted so that they make themselves become of aquite contrary nature though at first good and well brought up considering how that youth which Appius had taken near to him for guard of his person began to favor the tyranny for a very small profit which they made thereof And how Quintus Fabisu one of the second ten that were chosen being an excellent man blinded with a little ambition and perswaded by the malignity of Appius chang'd all his good conditions into very bad and became like him which being throughly examin'd shall cause those that institute the lawes of Republiques or Kingdoms to be more exactin bridling humane desires and in taking from them all hope of escaping scot-free whensoever they offend CHAP. XLIII They that fight for their own glory are the good and faithfull soldiers IT is considerable also upon the above written treaty what difference there is between an army satisfied and contented in it self fighting for its own glory and that which is ill dispos'd fighting for other mens ambition for where the Roman armies were alwaies wont under the Consuls to be victorious under the Decem. virate they were alwaies losers From this example may we know in part the reasons why mercenary soldiers are unprofitable who have no other obligation to make them stand true to thee but some small stipend thou bestowest on them Which cannot be a motive so sufficient or of such weight as to gain thee their truth and love so far as to die in thy behalf For in those armies wherein there is not that affection towards him for whom they fight which makes them become his partisans where can never be so much valor as to subdue or resist an enemy that hath never so little vertue or courage And because neither this affection nor contention can grow in others more then in thy natural subject it is necessary in the maintaining of a state whether it be Commonwealth or Kingdom to arme the native subjects as we see all they have done who with their armies have made any great conquests The Roman armies under the Decemvirates were valorous as formerly but because the same disposition was not in them they atchiev'd not the like exploits But so soon as the Decemvirate had an end and they as free men began to war they took to them again their former courages and by consequence their undertakings prov'd successfull according to their ancient wont CHAP. XLIIII A multitude without a head is unprofitable and a man should not first threaten and afterward demand the power THe Common people of Rome upon the occasion of Verginius being gone apart armed into the Holy Mount the Senate deputed some unto them to demand by what authority they had forsaken their Captains and retired into the mountain and such was the esteem of the Senates authority that the people having no head of their multitude no man durst make answer And Titus Livius sayes they wanted not what to answer but they wanted who should answer Which thing does punctually shew the unprofitableness of a multitude without a head and therefore Verginius perceiving the disorder sound the expedient of creating twenty Tribuns of war who should be their head to answer and confer with the Senate And having demanded that Valenius and Horatius should be sent them to whom they would declare their mindes these refused to go til the ten had deposed their magistracy and being come to the mountain where the people was the demands were that they would have the Triburs of the people created again and that they might appeal to the people from every magistrate and that all the ten should be deliver'd into their hands and they would burn them quick Valerius and Horatius commended their first demands and blam'd their latter as Impious saying You condemn cruelty and yet you use it your selves And they were advis'd to leave making mention of the ten and attend onely to lay hold of their authority and power and afterwards they should not want means of satisfaction where plainly it appears how much it savors of folly and little of wisdome to demand a thing and before-hand to say I will do ill with it For a man ought not herein discover his intention but first in any case indeavor to be master of what he desires For it is enough to ask a man his weapons without saying to him I will kill thee with them being thou hast power when thou art possest of them to do as thou list CHAP. XLV It is a matter of very evil example when he that makes a law neglects the observing of it and it is very dangerous in a state to make a continuall practise of cruel executions THe agreement being made and Rome reduc'd to her ancient forme Verginius cited Appius before the people to defend his own cause whom appearing accompanied with many of the Nobility Verginius commanded to be cast into prison Appius began to cry out and appeal to the people Verginius said he was not worthy to be allow'd that appeal which himself had destroy'd or have the people defend him who had so much endammag'd them Appius replied that they ought not to violate that appeal which they with such earnest desire had ordain'd For all this he was imprison'd and before the day of giving judgment he slew himself And though Appius his lewd life deserv'd any punishment yet savor'd it but little of eivil government to violate the lawes and especially that which was but then made For I beleeve not there is any thing of worse example in a Republique then to make a law and not observe it and the more when he that makes it breaks it Florence after the ninty fourth year having its state reestablish'd by the aid of Frier Ierom Savanarola whose writings shew his learning wisdome and vertue and having among other ordinances to assure the citizens caus'd a law to be made that a man might appeal to the people from the sentences which for matter of state the Eight or the Seignory should give which law he long perswaded and with much a do at length obtain'd It happen'd that a while after the confirmation of it five citizens were condemn'd to death by the Seignory for some offence touching the state and they desiring to appeal were not suffer'd and so the law not observ'd Which more wrong'd the reputation of that Frier then any other accident For if that
was constraind to hazard the battell whereupon Q Curtius sayes that moneys are the firews of war which sentence is alledgd every day and followd too by some Princes not quite so wise as they should be for making this their ground they beleeve that this is able to defend them if they have treasure enough and never consider that if treasure were of force to overcome that Darius would have conquerd Alexander the Greekes masterd the Romanes and in our dayes the Duke Charles subdu'd the Swissers and not long time since the Pope and the Florentins together would have found no difficultie in overcomming Francis Maria nephew of Pope Julius the second in the warre of Orbin But all these above nam'd were overcome by those who esteemd not mony but good Souldiers the sinews of warre Among other things that Croesus King of Lydia shewd to Solon the Athenian was a treasure unmeasurable and asking him what he thought of his power Solon answerrd him he thought him no whit the more powerfull for that for warre was made with iron and not with gold and some one might come who had more iron than be and take his gold from him Moreover when after the death of Alexander the Great a vast multitude of French pass'd over into Greece and after into Asia the French sending Ambassadours to the King of Macedon to treate some accord that King to shew them his power and to fright them let them see his treasure where was much gold and silver whereupon these French who had in a manner concluded a firme peace brake t their desire grew so great then to take his gold from him and so was that King despoyld for that which he had gatherd together to defend him The Venetians also a few yeares since having their treasury full of coyne lost their whole State being not able to defend themselves thereby Wherefore I say that gold as the common opinion cryes it up is not the sinewes of warre but a good Armie of slour Souldiers for gold is not sufficient to finde good Souldiers but good Souldiers are able well to finde our gold As for the Romanes if they would have waged warre by moneyes rather tha with the sword the treasure of the world considering their vast undertakings and the great difficulties they had therein would not have servd their turnes But they making their warres with the sword never found scarcitie of gold for they had it in abundance brought even into their Camps by those that stood in feare of them And if that Spartan King for want of money were to hazard the fortune of a battell that befell him upon the matter of moneys which many times hath chanc'd upon other occasions for it hath been often seene that when an Armie wants provision of victualls and is necessitated either to samish or sight usually they make choyce to fight because it is greater honour and where in some sort Fortune hath in her power to savour thee Moreover it hath often come to passe that a Commander perceiving succours comming to his enemies Armie must either fight with them quickly and make tryall of the chance of battell or expecting the iâ—grossing of the Armie come at length to fight perforce upon many disadvantages Besides it hath been seene as it befell Asdruball when in the Marâ—hes he was assâ—ulted by Claudius Nero together with the other Romane Consull that when a Captaine is necsstated either to fly or fight he alwayes makes choyce to fight thinking by this bargaine though exceeding hazardous he may gaine but in that other he must needs lose in any case There are therefore many necessities that can force a Captaine beyond what he intended to resolve to put it to a battell among which sometimes may happen the scarcitie of moneys though not therefore should wee esteeme moneyes to be the sinews of warre rather than other things which bring men into the like necessities Wee may therefore resolve the question that money is not the sinews of warre but good Souldiers rather It is true moneys are necessary in the second place but it is such a necessitie which good Souldiers themselves may overcome for it it as impossible that good Souldiers should lack money as by moneys alone to produce good Souldiers What we here averre every History shews us to be true in many places notwithstanding that Pericles perswaded the Athenians to make warre with aâ—l Peloponnesus declaring that they might overcome that warre with industry and by force of money and though in that warre the Athenians sometimes prospeed yet at last they lost it and the advice and good Souldiers of Sparta prevayld more than the industry and money of Athens But Titus Livius gives us a better testimony for this opinion then any one else where discoursing of Alexander the Great whether if he had come into Italie he had been able to vanquish the Romans he shews there three things necessary in the warre a great number of Souldiers those good wise Commanders and good fortune where examining whether eyther the Romanes or Alexander excelld herein at length he concludes without making any mention of moneys The Capuans when they were requird by the Sidicins to take Armes in their behalfe against the Samnites should not have measurd their power by their treasure but by their good Souldiers for by taking that course they tooke to assist them after two overthrowes to save themselves they were forc'd to become tributaries to the Romanes CHAP. XI It is not a match wisely made to joyne alliance with a Prince whose credit is greater then his strength TItus Livius having a purpose to shew the Sidicins errour in relying upon the Capuans aid and the Capuans errour also in beleeving they were able to defend them could not expresse it in more lively termes then these The Capuans contributed to the Sidicins ayd rather more reputation then forces Where we may observe that those leagues that are made with Princes who have not either the commodity to assist thee by reason of the distance of place or forces to do it because of some disorder of their owne at home or for some other occasion add rather reputation to them that trust in them then any strength to their party as in our dayes it befell the Florentines when in the yeare 1479. the Pope and the King of Naples assayl'd them who being allyes of the King of France drew from that allyance more reputation to their side then safe guard as likely enough it would befall that Prince now who under Maximilian the Emperours protection should undertake any enterprise for this is one sort of those allyances which bring more fame then advantage as here in this text is alledg'd that of the Capuans brought the Sidicins Therefore in this point the Capuans committed an errour in esteeming their owne forces greater then they were And so sometimes the small discretion men have causes them when they neither know how nor have the meanes to
King of France or the Italians countrey is In this case the enemy is to be kept off from comming in because thy advantage than consists in thy revenue and not in thy men so that whensoever the current thereof is cut off from thee thou art quite spoil'd nor doth any thing so much hinder thee as the war within thy doores The Carthaginians yeeld us evident examples hereof who whiles they had their own home free were able with their revenue to make war against the Romans which when it was assaild could not supply them against Agathocles The Florentines had not any remedy against Castruccius Lord of â—ucca because he warr'd with them in their owne country so that they were faine for their defence to yeeld themselves to Robert King of Naples But Castruccius being dead the same Florentines had the courage to assail the Duke of Milan at his owne home and wrought so far as to take his countrey from him so much valor shew'd they in forrain wars and such cowardise in their domestick But when countries are armed as that of Rome was and as the Switzers are the nearer thou commest to them the harder they are to vanquish for these bodies are able to bring together more forces to resist a suddain violence then they are to assail an enemy abroad Neither in this case does the authority of Hanniball move me because his passion and his own interest made him say so to Antiochus â—r if â—hâ— Romans had in that space of time received those three routs in France which they had in Italy by Hanniball without doubt they had bin quite undone for then they could not have helped themselves by the remainders of their armies nor could they have had those conveniencies to repair their losses nor made head against their enemies with such strength as they did We never find that to afsail any countrey they sent out an army passing the number of 50000. But to defend themselves at home against the French after the first Punicke war they armed eighteen hundred thousand men Nor could they afterwards defeat them in Lombardy as they did in Tuscany because against so great a maltitude of enemies they had never been able to draw so great forces so far out nor fight with them upon the like advantage The Cimbrians broke an army of the Romans in Germany nor could the Romans any way help themselves But when they came into Italy that they once united their forces together they presently dispatched them The Switzers it is easy to vanquish our of their own Countrey whether they cannot send above thirty or forty thousand men but to overcome them at home where they are able to make a body of a hundred thousand men is exceeding difficult I conclude therefore anew that that Prince who hath his people armed and addrest for war may alwaies well expect a mighty and dangerous war at his own home neither let him goe to meet it But he whose subjects are unarmed and his countrey unaccustomed to war let him alwaies keep it as far from home as he can And so the one and the other each in their degree will better defend themselves CHAP. XIII That men rise from poore and small beginnings to great fortunes rather by the help of guile than force I Take it to be very true that seldome or never it comes to pass that men of meane fortunes attain to any high degrees without force or fraud unless that dignity which a man hath gotten came to him by gift or was cast on him by inheritance Neither do I think we ever find that force alone suffices but we often see that guile alone avails as he shall clearly perceive that reads Philip of Macedons life and that of Agathocles the Sicilian and many others such like who from very vile and poore fortunes have gain'd either a Kingdome or some other great dignities Xenophon in Cyrus his life declares this necessity of deceit being that the first expedition which he makes Cyrus to undertake against the Armenian King is full of guile and how by deceit and nor by force he makes him seize on his Kingdom by which Action he concludes nothing else but that it is necessary for a Prince that will atcheive great matters to learn to be a cunning deceiver Besides this he makes him deceive Ciaxares King of the Medes his Mothers uncle many waies without which fraud he shews Cyrus could never have attain'd to that greatness he afterwards came And I beleeve that there was never any plac'd in a low condition that ever came to any great dignity onely by plain force and ingenuously though I grant that by guile alone one well may as John Galeacius did who took from his uncle Barnard the state and rule of Lombardy And that which Princes are necessitated to do in the beginnings of their increase Republiques are likewise forc'd to till they are become mighty then force alone suffices And because Rome in every part lit either by chance or by choyce upon all the necessary means to become great it failed not also of this nor in her beginning could have dealt more cunningly than to take the course we formerly discoursed of to make her some companions for under this name she brought many to be her servants as were the Latins and other people neare about her for first she served her self of their armes in subduing her neighbours round about and in taking upon her self the reputation of the state afterwards when she had brought them under likewise she came to such growth that no power was able to withstand her And the Latins never perceived their own servitude til after that they saw the Samnites twice broken and forced to agreement Which victory as it gained the Romans great reputation with forrain Princes whereby they heard of the Romans name though they never felt their armes so it bred great envie and suspect in those that both saw and felt their strength among which were the Latins And so far prevailed this envie and fear that not onely the Latins but the Colonies which they had in Latium together with the Capuans by them lately defended conspired all against the name of the Romans And the Latins mov'd that war in that manner as is formerly said that for the most part wars are mov'd not assailing the Romans but defending the Sidicins against the Samnites against whom the Samnites made war with the Romans leave And that it is true that the Latins stirred upon the knowledge of this deceit T. Livius declares it by the mouth of Annius Setinus a Latin Pretour who told them in their assemblie thus For if yet we can endure servitude under the name of an equal league Wherefore we find the Romans in their first growth wanted not that guile which they had need to make use of that from low beginnings aim to mount high which the more covert it is is the less discommendable as was this of
pay â—ear to the Romans for this little way we have gone for if at first they had resolv'd either to help or not to help the Latins not helping them they had not given offence to the Romans but helping them had their aid come in time with the addition of their Forces they might have gain'd them the victory but by delay loss came every way as it befell them And had the Florentines observ'd this well they had never receiv'd so many dammages nor troubles by the French as they had in Lewis the twelfths passage into Italy against Lodowicke Duke of Milan for the King treating of such a passage sought the Florentines for their consent and their Agents that were with the King agreed with him to stand neuters and that the King comming into Italy should maintain them in their State and receive them into his protection and gave the City a moneths time to ratifie this Which ratification was delayd by some who in their little wisdome favour'd Duke Lodowicks affairs til that the King was even upon the point of victory when the Florentines offering the ratification it would not be accepted by the King who knew the Florentines came by force and not willingly to his friendship Which the City of Florence was to buy out dear and like enough to have lost the state as afterwards another time upon the like accident it chanc'r And so much the worse was the course they took for it was of no advantage to Duke Lodowicke who if he had bin victour would have shewed more displeasure against them than did the King And though touching the mischief this weakness brings upon a Republique we have formerly spoken in another Chapter yet upon a new occasion offerd by a new accident I had a minde to repeat it thinking it very specially a matter worthy to be noted by all Republiques like unto ours CHAP. XVI How much the orders used by our Souldiers in these modern times differ from those of the ancients THe Romans fought not a battel in any war they undertook with any Nation of greater importance than this with the Latins in Torquatus and Decius his Consulship for in all reason it had followed that as the Latins by losing it became Subjects the Romans should have undergone the same condition had not they got the mastâ—ry and of this opinion is Titus Livius for on each part he makes the Armies equal for their order valour resolution and number he makes there this difference only that the Commanders of the Roman Army were of more valour than those of the Latins It appears also that in the ordering of this battel there befell two accidents the like whereof was never seen before nor since have we had but rare examples following them that of two Consuls to hold their Soldiers minds firm and obedient to their commands and resolute to fight the one kill'd himself the other his Son The equality which Titus Livius sayes in these two Armies was because they had both serv'd in the wars a long time together they used theâ—ame language order and armes for in the ordering of their battel they had the same manner and their Troupes and the Captains of them had the same names there was a necessity being they were of equal force and valour that something extraordinary should happen that could seâ—tle and fix the ones resolution rather than the others in which as otherwhere we have said consists the victory for while that lasts in the combarants hearts the Armies never turne their backs And to the end it might last the longer in the Romans breasts than in the Latins partly fortune and partly the Consùls valour were cause for Torquatus killed his son and Decius himself Titus Livius where he shews the equality of their forces sets downe the whole order the Romanes used in their Armies and in their battels Which being that he relates at large I will not rehearse againe but discourse onely upon that I shall thinke remarkable and which because it hath been neglected by all our Captaines of later times hath been the occasion of many disorders in severall Armyes stand battells I say therefore that out of Livius his words wee gather that the Romane Army had three principal divisions which in proper termes may be calld Squadrons the first was of the Hastati the second of the Prencipi the third of the Triarij and each of these had their horsemen In the ordering of a battell they plac't the Hastati for most in the second place on the right side upon the shoulders of those the Prencipi were set and in the third place yet in the same file the riarij came The horse of all these ranks they plac't on the right hand and on the left of these three battells which Squadrons of horse from their formes and Places were call'd wings because they lookt like the two wings of that body They rangd the first Squadron of the Hastati which was in front in a manner close shut together that it might be able either to force upon or sustain the enemy The second Squadron of the Prencipi because it was not the first to fight but was ordeind to succour the for most in case it was either beaten or driven backe this they made not so compact together but kept their ranks thinne so that they might receive in to them without disordering themselves the first Squadron whensoever being prest on by the enemy they were forc't to retire The third Squadron of the Triarij had their ranks yet thinner than the second that if need were they might receive the two former Squadrons of the Hastati and Prencipi The troupes then being all plac'd in this order began the fight and if the Hastati were forc'd or overcome they retir'd into the thinnesse of the ranks of the Prencipi and they united together and having made of two battallions one body undertooke the fight afresh and if these were beaten back and routed they fell backe into the thinner rankes of the Triarij and so all the battallions became one body renewd the fight againe where if they vanquished because they had not other repayre they lost the day And because that alwayes when this last quadron of the Triarij came to try for it the Army was in danger thereupon grew his Proverb Thematter came so farre as the Triarij The Commanders of our dayes as they have abandoned all the other instructions and follow nor in any part the ancient discipline so have they quite neglected this part which is of no small importance for he that so arrangâ—s his Armie that in the fight he can three times repair himself to lose he must have fortune three times his enemy and be to incounter a valour sufficient to vanquish him But he that stands onely on the first shock as now our Christian Armies doe may easily lose for every little disorder or meane valour is able to take from him the victory That which makes
their conquests cost them more then they get by them as the Venetians the Florentins did who have bin much weaker when the one commanded all Lombardy and the other Tuscany then when the one was contented with the seaonley and the other with six miles round of territories for al this preceeded from their desire to conquer their ignorance to take the right course and they deserve the more blame in that they have very little excuse having seene the ways the Romanes went because they might have followed their example being that the Romanes without any patterne to follow by their own judgment found out a fit way to go Moreover sometimes such gains gotten do no smal harm to a well govern'd Commonwealth when either such a city or country is conquer'd that abounds with pleasures where by conversation with them their manners are learned as it happen'd to Rome at first in the conquest of Capua afterwards to Hannibal And had Capua been of further distance from the City that the soldiers error had not had the remedy near hand or that Rome had been in some part corrupted without question that conquest had prov'd the Roman Republicks ruine And T. Livius witnesses the same in these words Even then was Capua little good for the military discipline which being the instrument of all sorts of pleasures besotted the soldiers minds so that they forgot their native Countries And truly such like Cities sufficiently avenge themselves on their Conquerors without fight or loss of blood for by infecting them with their contagious vices they expose them to the conquest of whoever assailes them And Juvenal could not better have expressed this then where in his Satyres he saies that by their conquests of forrain nations their minds were possessed with forrain vices in exchange of parsimony other excellent vertues Glutrony and luxury making their habitation there revenged the worlds Conquest on them If therefore these gettings were likely to have been dangerous to the Romans in the times that they proceeded with such wisdome and vertue how will they prove to those who go on in much different waies from them and who besides the other errors they run into whereof we have formerly spoken enough serve themselves of either mercenary or auxiliary soldiers whereupon those mischiefs often befall them which we shall mention in the following chap. CHAP. XX. What hazzard that Prince or Commonwealth runs which is serv'd by auxiliary and mercenary soldiers IF in another work of mine I had not treated at large of mercenary and auxiliary soldiers how unprofitable they are and how very profitable the native soldiers of the Country are I would much more have inlarged my self in this discourse than now I purpose but having otherwhere discours'd hereupon at length I shall now only point at it Not yet did I think fit wholly to pass it over having found in Titus Livius so large an example belonging to those soldiers for auxiliary soldiers are those that a Prince or Commonwealth sends with their Captains and pay ready furnish'd in thy aid And comming to the text of T. Livius I say that the Romans having in severall places broken two armies of the Samnites with their forces which they sent to succor the Capuans and thereby freed them from that warr the Samnites made against them purposing to return to Rome to the end the Capuans dispoyl'd of ayd should not a new becom a prey to the Samnites left behind them in the country about Capua two legions to defend them Which legions growing corrupt through idleness began to be insnar'd with the delicacies thereof So that having for gotten their owne country and the reverence they ought to the Senate they resolved to take armes and make themselves Lords of that Country which they by their valours had defended thinking those inhabitants not worthy to injoy those goods which they knew not how to defend Which thing the Romanes having had some inkling of it before was stopped and punished by them as where we speak of conspiracies it shall be show'd at large Therefore I say again that of all kindes of souldiers the auxiliaries are the most dangerous Because among those that Prince or Republique that uses them for ayd hath no authority but onely he that sends them for auxiliary souldiers are those that are sent thâ—e by a Prince as I have sayd under the command of his own Captaines under his own ensignes and pay also as this army was which the Romanes sent to Capua These kinds of souldiers when they have vanquished most commonly pillage as well them that have hir'd them as the enemy against whom they have hired them and this they do either through the maligne disposition of their Prince that sends them or through their owne ambition And however the Romanes had no intention to violate the agreement and conventions made with the Capuans yet the facility wherewith those souldiers thought themselves able to take their towne was such that it might have been of force to perswade them to think of taking the town and State from the Capuans Many examples to this purpose may be alledg'd but this and that of the inhabitants of Rhegium shall suffice me from whom both lives town were taken by one legion of soldiers which the Romans had there left in garrison Therefore a Prince or a Republick should rather take any other course than seek to bring auxiliary soldiers into his Country principally when he is most to rely upon them for any accord or agreement though very hard to which he shall yeeld with his enemy shall be more tolerable than this And if things past were well call'd to mind and those that are present well consider'd on for one that hath had good success in such a business a man shall find exceeding many who have been abus'd And a Prince or an ambitious Republick can never have a fitter opportunity to seise on a Town or Country than when they are requir'd to send their armies for defence thereof Wherefore he that is so ambitious that not only for his own defence but for offence to another calls in such like aids seeks to gain that he cannot hold and which also he that gets it for him can at his pleasure take from him But so great is mans ambition that if he can fulfill his desire for the present he is never aware of that evill which shortly after may thence redound to him Nor do the ancient examples avail any thing with him as well in this as in other things we have treated of for were men hereby mov'd they would perceive that the more freely and fairly they dealt with their neighbours and the farther of they were from making themselves masters of them the more readily would they offer to cast themselves into their armes as hereafter shall appear by example of the Capuans CHAP. XXI The first Pretour that the Romans ever sent to any place was to Capua four hundred
his fear arising from the hatred his own subjects bear him and that hatred from his own evill carriages which evill carriages proceed from thence either that he beleeves he is able to keep them under by force or from the Princes small discretion and one of the causes that makes him think himself able to rule them by force is the having built these Citradels over them for evill treatings which are the causes of hatred for the most part are deriv'd from thence that that Prince or Republick hath Cittadels upon them which when this is true are far more hurtful than profitable for first as it is said they make thee bolder and more rough among thy subjects being that thou hast thy security within them for all these forces and violences which are in use to bridle a people withall are of no value but these two either that thou hast alwaies a good Army ready to send into the field as the Romans had or that thou doest disperse extinguish disorder and disunite them so that in no case they can make such a body as can hurt thee for be it that thou doest impoverish them They that are despoil'd of their goods have weapons left them If thou disarmst them Even rage will find them weapons If thou destroyest their heads and proceedest still to injure the rest there will grow up again new heads as fast as those of Hydra If thou buildest Cittadels they are quite unprofitable in time of peace because they encourage thee to wrong them but in time of war they are of least use for then are they assaulted by the enemy and thy subjects too nor is it possible they can resist them both And if ever they were unprofitable they are now a dayes so in regard of the Artillery by reasons of whose fury and violence it is unpossible to defend small fortresses and where there is no place for retiring with new retrenchments as formerly hath been shew'd But I will dispute this matter more plainly yet Wilt thou O Prince with these Cittadels curb thy Citizens or wilt thou whether Prince or Commonwealth that thou art bridle a City thou hast taken by war I will address my self to the Prince and tel him that such a Fortress to curb his Citizens cannot be more unprofitable for the reasons above alleadgd because it makes thee prompter and less careful how thou doest oppress them which oppression makes them desperate in attempting thy ruine and so inrages them that that Fortress which is the cause thereof can no way preserve thee so that a sage and good Prince to keep himself still good and that he may not give occasion to nor imbolden his children to become bad will never build fortress to the end they relie not upon the Cittadels but rather upon the hearts of men And if Count Francis Storce that came to be Duke of Milan was reputed wise and yet in Milan he built a Cittadel I say that herein he little shewd his wisdome as appeard by the effect seeing that Fortress proved rather a disadvantage and loss then any safeguard to his heirs for thinking that by means thereof they might pass their time in security and yet injure their Citizens and subjects they forbare not any kind of violence whereupon being grown very odious they lost the state so soon as they were assail'd by their enemy Nor could that fortress defend them nor did it any way advantage them in the war and in time of peace it had done them much harme for if there had been no such citradel and they for want of discretion onely had sharply handled some of their subjects they might sooner have discover'd the danger and withdrawn themselves from it and so afterwards they would have bin able with more courage to have resisted the French fury having their subjects to freind without any fortress then having them become thine enemies with thy fortress which gives thee no help at all For either it is lost by the treachery of him that guards it or is forced by the assailant or else by famine And if thou wouldest that these should avail thee and help the to recover a state lost where only the fortress holds for thee thou must have an army wherewith thou maist assault him that chased the from thence And whensoever thou hast this army thou couldest not in any wise faile of recovering the State howsoever there were no fortress at all and that the more easily by how much the Inhabitants would be more thy friends then if thou hadst ill-treated them through presumption upon thy fortress And it hath been proved by experience how that this Cittadell of Milan hath little availed either the forces or the French party in the adversity of the one or other but hath rather brought upon them many ruins and mischiefes having never advised by means thereof upon any fair way to keep that state Guido Vbaldo Duke of Vrbin son to Frederick who in his daies was esteemed a great Captain being driven out of his state by Caesar Borgia son to Pope Alexander the sixt when afterwards upon a new grown occasion he returned thither again he caused all the fortresses to be demolished that were in the Country thinking they did more harme then good for he having gained mens hearts to him for their sakes would not abide them and in regard of enemies he saw they were not able to defend him it being needfull to have a good army in the field to preserve them withall so that he resolved to raze them all Pope Julius having driven the Bentivogli out of Bolonia built a Cittadell there and caused a governor of his to ransacke them shrewdly insomuch that the people rebelled and he suddenly lost the Cittadel so that it served him to little purpose or rather wronged him as much as carrying himself otherwise it could have helped him Nicolas of Castello father of the Vitelli returning into his Country from whence he had been banished forthwith demolished two several fortresses which Pope Sextus the fourth had built there deeming that not the fortress but the peoples good wills were more likely to continue him in his State But of all other examples the freshest and of most remarke in every point and that which is fittest to shew the incommodity of building them and the fruit of razing them is that of Genua which fell out in these latter times It is well known how that Genua in the yeare 1507. rebelled against Lewis the Twelfth King of France who came in person and with all his strength to regain it which being done he caused an exceeding strong Cittadel to be built there surpassing in strength all others that are now adaies known for in regard of the scituation and the other circumstances belonging thereto it was impregnable being placed upon the very point of a hill which stretched it self out into the sea called by the Genueses Godefa And hereby the whole port and a great part of the Town of
Genua was subject to its battery It happend afterwards in the year of our Lord God 1512. when the French were driven out of Italy for all the fortress Genua rebelled and Octavian Fregoso recovered the State thereof who by his industry in the terme of 16 moneths took it by famine and as every one beleeved so he was advised by many to reserve it for his refuge in any accident But he as he was exceeding wise knowing that they were not fortresses but mens good wills that preserved Princes in their state razed it to the ground And so without laying the foundation of his dominion upon the fortress but rather upon his own valour and judgement he hath continually held it and holds it yet And whereas a thousand foot were formerly of force to charge the state of Genua his adversaries have since assailed it with ten thousand and have not been able to hurt him By this therefore it appears how the demolishing of the fortress hurt not Octavian at all nor did the building of it advantage the King of France for when he was able to come into Italy bringing an army with him he might recover Genua though he had no fortress there but when he could bring no army with him into Italy neither could he keep the Genueses in obedience though he had a fortress there It was therefore an expence to the King to build it and a shame to lose it and to Octavian a glory to regain it But let us come to those Republiques that raise up fortresses not in their native countries but in those they have conquered And to shew this fallacy if that example of France and Genua suffice not this of Florence and Pisa may where the Florentines had built a cittadel to keep that town in subjection And never advised themselves that a City which had alwaies been a prosessed enemy to the Florentines having lived free which hath a recourse to liberty for a colour of Rebellion it was necessary being desirous to keep her to use that manner the Romans had either to take her as a companion into the state or to deface and ruine her for of what value cittadels are we saw in King Charles his comming into Italy to whom they were yeelded either through the treachery or cowardise of their governors Whereas if they had not been the Florentines would never have grounded their ability of keeping Pisa stil upon them nor would the King have been of power that way to have bereaved the Florentines of that City and those means whereby untill that time it had been maintained would peradventure have been of force to preserve it And without doubt they could not have made a worse triall then that of the fortresses I conclude therefore that for the safety of ones native Country a strong hold is but hurtfull to keep under Towns that are conquered cittadels availe little And hereunto the Authority of the Romans shall suffice me who dismantelled the Towns they intended to hold by force never built up their walls and if any one against this opinion should alledge me the example of Tarentum in ancient times and in these modern that of Brescia which places by means of the cittadells were recovered from the subjects rebellion I answer that at the years end Fabius Maximus was sent with the whole Army to recover Tarentum who would have been able to recover that though thete had been no cittadell there And though Fabius put those means in practise yet had they never been he would have us'd some other which would have produced the same effect And I know not what advantage a cittadell yeelds that to regain thee the Town requires a Consular Army and a Fabius Maximus for commander before it can be done And that the Romans in any case had recover'd it plainly appears by the example of Capua where there was no cittadell but they got it by the soldiers valor But to that of Brescia I say that seldome chances which befell in that rebellion that the fortress which is possessed still by thy forces the Town being fallen into rebellion should have a great army to friend and near hand as was that of the French for the Lord De Fois the Kings General being with his army at Bolonia when he understood the loss of Brescia by means of the Fortress indeed recover'd the Towne Therefore that Fortress yet stood in need to do any good of such a one as was the Lord of Fois and a French army that in three daies might relieve them so that this example against those on the contrary side is of small weight for many fortresses have been taken in the wars in our daies and recover'd by the same fortune that the field hath been taken and recovered again not only in Lombardy but in Romania in the Kingdom of Naples and in all parts of Italy But touching the building of sortresses for defence against forrain enemies I say they are not usefull to those people nor Kingdoms who have good armies on foot they are rather unprofitable because that good armies without fortresses are of force to keep them but fortresses without good armies cannot defend thee And this we see by experience of those who have been held excellent in matters of state and government and other things as we know the Romans and Spartans were for if the Romans built no fortresses the Spartans did not only forbear from them but suffered none of their Cities to be wall'd in neither because they would have no other guard but a mans own valor to defend him Whereupon when a Spartan was asked by an Athenian whether the walls about Athens were not very faire he answered him yes if all the inhabitants of the Town were women To that Prince then that hath good armies when upon the maritime frontiers of his state he hath a fortress that for some few daies he is able to sustain the enemy till things are somewhat order'd it would sometimes be of small avail but of no necessity But when a Prince hath no strong army fortresses either in the heart of his State or at his frontiers are hurtfull or unprofitable hurtfull because he easily loses them and being lost they make war upon him or put case they are so strong that the enemy cannot take them they are left behind by the enemies army and so they become of no service For good armies if they meet not with very sharp encounters enter far into their enemies Countries 〈◊〉 thout regard either of Town or fortress they leave behind them As it was evident in the ancient Stories and as we see Francis Maria did who in these latter times without any regard of them left ten of the enemies Cities behind him to assayl that of Vrbin That Prince then that can raise a good army can do well enough without having any strong holds but he that cannot have an army ready should never build any well may he fortifie the City of his
because that in the one and other of these two ways the convenient terms are transgressed being that they cannot hit upon the true way both in the one and the other they fail But he fails least and oftnest lights upon good success that meets as I have said time in its own way and always proceeds according as his own nature puts him forward Every one knows how Fabius Maximus proceeded with his Army carefully and warily far from all that kind of metle and confidence which other whiles the Romans used and his good fortune would have it that this his way agreed well with the times for Hannibal being come a young man into Italy and with a fresh gale of fortune and having twice broken the Romane Armies and that Republike almost lost all her good soldiers and therefore being affrighted could not light upon better fortune than to have such a Captain who by his slowness and wariness should keep the enemy in play with vain delaies Nor could Fabius have met with times fitter for his ways whereupon came it to pass that he grew glorious And that Fabius did this upon the instigation of his own nature and not upon a meer choice we see that when Scipio desired to pass over into Affrica with those Armies whereby to make an end of the war Fabius much contradicted it as he that could not go out of his own pace nor leave his own custome so that for all him Hannibal might have continued still in Italy for he perceived not that the times were changed and it was needful to alter the manner of making war And had Fabius been King of Rome he might easily have spoiled that war because he would not have known how to alter his proceedings with the alteration of times But being he was born in a Republike where there was divers Citizens and divers humors as she had Fabius who was excellent in those times when the war was onely to be supported so had she Scipio in the times when their enemies were to be overcome Whence arises it that a Republike hath a longer life and longer enjoys good fortune than a principality because she can better fit her self for several accidents by reason of the variety of her Subjects that are in her then can a Prince for a man that is accustomed to proceed in one manner never alters as it is said and must of necessity when the times disagree with his way go to wrack Peter Soderini formerly spoken of proceeded in all his affairs with mildness and patience and he and his Country prospered while the times agreed with his manner of proceedings but when the times fell out so that it was needful to break off all patience and mildness he knew not how to do it so that together with his Country he fell to ruine Pope Julius the second carried himself all the time of his Pontificate with great violence and rage and because the times sorted well therewith all his undertakings succeeded well But if other times had come that would have required other advice of force he must have gone to destruction because he would never have altered his manner nor order in his proceedings And that we cannot change our selves there are two reasons the one because we cannot resist that which our nature is inclined to the other is because when one man in such a kind of proceeding hath gone on luckily it is impossible to perswade him that things will prove well where hee proceeds otherwise Whereupon it comes to pass that in one man fortune varies because shee changes the times and he changes not his courses Thence arises also the ruine of a City because the orders of Common wealths change not with the times as we have treated heretofore at large but they are flower for it is a greater trouble to them to change and to effect it they have need of times which should in a manner take a Republick quite off the things whereby a thorough alteration should be made in her for which one man alone suffices not by changing the manner of her proceedings And because wee have made mention of Fabius Maximus who held off Hannibal with delayes I purpose to treate in the following Chapter whether a Captain being desirous to fight a battel with the enemy in any case can be so hindred that he do it not CHAP. X. That a Captain cannot avoid battell when his enemy will fight in any case CNeus Sulpitius the dictator held off from fighting with the French being not willing to stand at fortunes discretion in a tryall against his enemy whom time and a strange Country would continually weaken and consume When such an error enâ—ues where all men or the greater part of them erre I think it not much amiss mary times to reprove it Wherefore though I have formerly several times shewed how the actions about great matters now adays differ from those of ancient times yet I think it not superfluous at this present to repeat it for if in any part it differs from the ancient orders it is especially in military orders where now is not any of those things observed which the ancients made much account of And this inconvenient grew first hereupon because Commonwealths and Princes have committed this care to oâ—hers and to avoid dangers have much laiâ— aside that exercise and if perchance sometime a King in our days venture to go in person we believe not therefore that he seeks out any new orders that are more commendable for when they chance to give themselves to that imployment they do it rather in shew of their pompe then upon any other laudable occasion Yet do these commit lesser errors personally visiting their armies and keeping in their own hands the Majesty of their Government then Republikes do especially those of Italy which trust to others not understanding any thing in the wars or attending to any thing belonging to them and on the other side when they are desirous whereby they may seem to be Princes to take any thing into deliberation they commit therein exceeding many errors And however that other where I have treated of some of them yet at this present I will not forbear to tell one of very great importance When these lazy Princes or effeminate Commonwealths send forth any Commander of theirs the wisest commission that they think they can give him is to charge him that in any case he fight not a battel but avoid it and conceiting with themselves that herein they imitate Fabius Maximus his discretion who by forbearing to fight saved the Romane State they understand not that most commonly this commission is either to no purpose or else hurtful For we must take this for a conclusion that a General that will abide in the field cannot avoid a battel when the enemy will in any case fight So that this commission is but thus as if he should say fight with thine enemy at his pleasure and not at thine
not been shewed by Appius Claudius whereby they might defend themselves against the Tribunes ambition which was that they always found some one among them that either was fearful or might be corrupted or that was a lover of the common good so that they disposed him to oppose other mens wills that desired to draw forward any deliberation against the Senates will Which remedy was a great allay to such an authority and a long time much helped Rome Which thing hath made me consider that whensoever many powerful ones are united together against one that is powerful though all they together are much more puissant then he yet may there much more be hoped for in him alone though less powerful then in those many though very strong for leaving a part all those things wherein one alone is able to do more then many which things are innumerable this will always come to pass that one alone taking but a little care shall be able to disunite those many and so weaken that body which was strong I will not herein alledge ancient examples which are very frequent the modern shall suffice me which have faln in our days In the year 1484. all Italy conspired against the Venetians who when they were in a manner wholly lost and could not any more abide in the field with their Army they corrupted Lodwick that then ruled in Milan and by means of that corruption made an accord wherein they not only had again the towns they had lost but usurped a part of the state of Ferrara And thus they that had been loosers in the war remained gainers by the peace A few years past the whole world conspired against France yet before they came to see the end of the war Spain broke off from her confederates and made agreement with her in so much as the rest of the confederates also were forced to make their accords too So that without doubt we ought always judge when we see a war made by many against one that that one is like to be a gainer at the end provided that he be of such valour that he is able to sustain the first brunts and so govern himself with the time as to attend time which if he were not able to do he would run the hazard of many dangers as it happened to the Venetians in the eighth year who if they could have temporised with the French Army and so have had time to gain themselves some of those that were confederated against them they might have escaped that destruction but not having so good an Army as thereby to play with the enemy awhile and hereupon not having had leisure to take any of them asunder they were ruined for we saw that the Pope when he had what was his became their friend and so Spaine and very willingly the one and the other of these two Princes would have saved them the state of Lombardy against France for fear of making it too great in Italy if it had been in their power The Venetians then might have given a part to save the rest which if they had done in time that it had appeared it was not of extream necessity and before the beginning of the war would have been wisely done of them but when the wars were begun it was disgraceful and peradventure of small benefit But before such imbroiles few of the Citizens of Venice could foresee the danger very few the way to help and none to advise it But to return again to the beginning of this discourse I conclude that even so as the Senate of Rome had a remedy to save their country from the Tribunes ambition because they were many so shall any Prince that is assailed by many finde a remedy whensoever he knows with discretion how to use the convenient means to disunite them CHAP. XII That a wise Commander upon his own souldiers should lay all manner of necessity to fight and take it as much as he can from his enemies AT other times we have treated of what advantage necessity is to hamane actions and to what glory they have thereby been promoted and that by some moral Philosophers it hath been written that mens hands and tongues two of their worthiest instruments to ennoble them would never have worked so perfectly nor have brought mens labors to that excellency whereunto we see them now come had they not been thrust forward by necessity The vertue then of such necessity being known by the ancient Commanders of Armies and how thereby the souldiers minds were made the more obstinate to fight they used all their industry to force them by it And on the other side they aswell endeavored to free their enemies from it and hereupon many times they opened that way to the enemy which they could have shut against them and shut it against their own soldiers which they could have left open for them He then that desires either that a City defend it self obstinately or that an Army in the field fight it out resolutely must try his wits to make an impression in the brests of them that are to fight that such a necessity lies upon them Whereupon a discreet Commander that is going to besige a Town may conjecture of the facility or difficulty in taking it by the knowledge and consideration of the necessity that binds the inhabitants to defend themselves and as he finds the necessity urging them to be great so let him judge it difficult to overcome them or otherwise easie Whence it proceeds that those Towns which have rebelled are harder to be regained then they were at their first conquest for in the beginning not having any cause to fear punishment as not having offended they yeeld easily but thinking after they have rebelled that they have offended and hereupon fearing the chastisement they prove harder to be recovered Moreover such obstinacy arises from the innate hatreds which neighboring Princes and Republiques bear one to another which proceeds from their ambition to rule and the jealousie of their own state especially if they be Republikes as it chances in Tuscany Which strife and contention hath caused and ever will a great difficulty in the mastery of the one or other Whereof he that considers well the City of Florences neighbors and those of Venice will not marvel as many do that Florence hath spent more in her wars and gained less then Venice for this is because the Venetians never found their neighboring Towns so obstinate in their defence as Florence hath for that all the Towns confining upon Venice have been accustomed to live in subjection under a Prince and not free and those that have been used to serve make small account of changing their Lord or rather many times they much desire it So that Venice however she hath had more powerful neighbors then Florence yet because she hath found the Townes lesse obstinate against her hath been able sooner to subdue them then the other could being enuironed round by
such decrees And if the other Citizens whose magistracies were prorogued had been wise and vertuous as L. Quintius this inconvenient would never have fallen out whose goodness in one example is remarkable for there being an agreement made between the Commons and the Senate and the Commons having prolonged the Tribunes charges for one year judging them able to resist the Nobilities ambition the Senate would for strife sake with the Commons and not to seem of less power then they prologue T. Quintius his Consulship who absolutely denyed this determination of theirs saying that they should endeavor to blot out and cancell evil examples rather then increase their number with another evil one and so would needs have them make new Consuls Which goodness and wisdom had it been in all the Cities of Rome it would never have suffered the introducing of that custome to prolong magistracies and from thence they would not have proceeded to the continuation of Commands over Armies which thing at length ruined that Republike The first who had his command continued to him was P. Philo who being incamped before the City of Palepolis and his Consulship coming to an end the Senate thinking he had need upon gotten the victory sent him no successor but made him Proconsul so that he was the first Proconsul Which thing though propounded by the Senate for the publike good was that which in time brought Rome into bondage for the further abroad the Romans went with their Armies the more thought they such prorogation necessary and the more they used it which thing produced two inconveniences the one that a smaller number of men were imployed and practised in commands and by this the reputation hereof came to be restrained to a few the other was that one Citizen continuing long time commander of an Army got it to himself and made it of his own faction For that Army in time forgot the Senate and took him only for their head Hereby it came that Sylla and Marius could finde soldiers that would take their parts against the Publike By these means could Caesar make himself Lord of his native country Yet if the Romans had not prolonged these magistracies and commands they had never so quickly attained so great power and had their conquests been more slow they would not so soon have faln into servitude CHAP. XXV Of Cincinnatus and many other Roman Citizens poverties WEE have otherwhere discoursed that the most profitable ordinance that can be made in a free State is that the Citizens be kept bare and poore And however in Rome it appears not what order that was which wrought this effect especially considering the Agrarian law had such opposition never theless it was seen by experience that four hundred years after Rome was built there was very great poverty nor is it credible that other greater order produc'd this effect than to see that poverty was no bar to any preferment whatsoever or any honor and that they went to find out vertue in what cottage soever she dwelt Which manner of living made people less covet wealth This appears plain because when Minutius the Consul besieged with his Army by the Equi Rome was exceedingly afraid least that Army should be lost so that they created a Dictator being the last recourse they had in their difficulties and this was L. Quintius Cincinnatus who at that time was in his little Country farm which he then manured with his own hands Which thing is celebrated by T. Livius in golden words saying It is worth the while to bear them talke that value nothing in regard of wealth nor think they a man can have access either unto honours or vertue but where riches flow abundantly Cincinnatus was then at plough in his Country Village which exceeded not the quantity of four acres of ground when from Rome Deputies were sent him by the Senate to let him know the election of his Dictatourship and to shew him in what danger the Commonwealth then was Hee then having taken to him his gown came to Rome and levied an Army and went thence and deliverd Minutius and having broken and despolyed the enemies and set him free would not permit that the besieged Army should partake of the prey saying these words I will not allow thou shouldst partake of thâ—â— prey whose prey thou wert to have been And deprived Minutius of the Consulship and made him Lieutenant telling him Thou shalt stay at this degree till thou knowest how to be Consul He had made L. Tarquinius General of his horse who out of meer poverty served afoot It is observable as is said what honour they did unto poverty and how that to a good and worthy man four acres of land were sufficient to maintain him Which poverty we see that it was also in the dayes of Marcus Regulus for being with the Armies in Affrica he asked the Senate leave he might turne to his Country farme which was spoyled by his husbandmen Where wee see two very notable things thè one the poverty and how they were contenâ—cd therewith and how it sufficed these Citizens to gain honour from the wars the profits thereof they left to the publick for if they had purposed to grow rich by the wars it would little have troubled them that their fields were spoyled The other is to consider the generous rage of those Citizens who when they were made Commanders of an Army exceeded any Prince in magnanimity of spirit they valued neither Kings nor Commonwealths nothing affrighted or terrified them and afterwards when they were returned to live private men became parsimonious humble and men that themselves husbanded and took pains in manuting their own small possessions obedient to the Magistrates reverencing their superiors so that it seems impossible that the same mind could endure such change This poverty continued yet till the days of Paulus Emilius which were in a manner the last happy daies of that Republick where a Citizen who by his triumph enrich'd Rome notwithstanding kept himself very poor And moreover so much was poverty in esteem that Paulus for reward of behaving himself bravely in the war gave a silver cup to a son-in-law of his which was the first peece of Plate he ever had in his house It were easy with a long discourse to shew how much better fruits poverty produces than riches and that the one hath honored Cities Countries and Religions and the other hath been the destruction thereof had not this subject been handled several times by other writers CHAP. XXVI How that upon the occasion of women States have been ruined THere fell out in the City of Ardea between the Nobles and the Commons a debate by reason of an alliance where a young woman that was an heire being as yet to marry one of the Commons and one of the Nobles woed her at the same time and she having no Father alive her Tutors desired to bestow her on the Plebeyan and her Mother on the
shal take this order in a City assailed will easily be able to defend themselves whoever does otherwise shal neither imitate Camillus nor defend himself CHAP. XXXI Powerfull Commonwealths and great and worthy personages in all manner of fortune retain the same courage and the same dignity AMong other matters of magnificence that our Historian brings in Camillus speaking or doing to shew how an excellent man ought to behave himself he puts these words in his mouth Neithor did my Dictatorship elevate my courage nor hath my banishment abated it By which words we see that great personages are alwaies the same in all fortunes And though she varies now exalting them and then bringing them low they never differ from themselves but alwaies hold a constant resolution so steadily fastened to their ordinary course of living that by every one of them it appears that chance hath no power over them Weake men behave themselves in another manner for they befoole and besot themselves in good fortune attributing all the good they have to those vertues which they never knew whence it proceeds that they grow insupportable and odious to those that are about them whereupon depends the sudden alteration of fortune which so soon as they look once in the face they fall presently into the other defect and become vile and abject From hence it comes that such manner of of Princes thinke rather in adversitie how to make an escape than to stand upon their defence as those that for having made evil use of good fortune are not prepared for any kind of safegard This vertue and this vice which I say is found in one man alone we find also in a Republike of which the Romanes and the Venetians serve us for example Those former never any bad fortune could make abject nor any good fortune insolent as it manifestly appeared after the defeat they had at Canna and after the victory they got against Antiochus for upon that defeat however a very great one because it had been the third together they never grew base upon it but continued to send forth Armies they would not redeem prisoners against the orders they had made nor send to Hannibal or Carthage to ask peace but casting aside all those unworthy courses they thought still upon providing for the war arming for want of souldiers their old men and slaves Which thing being known to Hanno the Carthaginian as was said before he shewed that Senate what small account they were to make of that defeat at Canna And so it appeared as those hard times did not affright nor abase them on the other part neither did their more fortunate times puffe them up for when Antiochus sent Ambassadors to Scipio to require an agreement before they came to joyn battel or that he had lost it Scipio gave him certain conditions of peace which were that he should retire into Syria and leave the rest to the Romans disposing which Antiochus refusing and coming to battel and losing it sent again his Ambassadors to Scipio with order that he would submit to all those conditions which the Conqueror should impose on him to whom he propounded no other conditions than what he had fomerly offered before the victory adding these words That the Romanes if they be overcome lose not their courages nor when they overcome grow they insolent Clean contrary hereunto we have seen the Venetians do who in their prosperity thinking they had gotten it by their own valor which they never were guilty of grew to such an excess of insolence that they termed the King of France Saint Marks son they contemned the Church and their ambition all Italy would not hold but imagined they were to frame a Monarchy like that of the Romanes Afterwards their good fortune abandoning them and that they were a little routed by the King of France at Vayla they not onely lost all their State by rebellion but a good part of it they gave up to the Pope and the King of Spaine even through meer baseness and cowardise And they became so vile and abject that they sent Ambassadors to the Emperor to offer themselves to be his tributaries and writ letters to the Pope full of baseness and submission whereby to move him to compassion Into which unhappiness they fell in four days space and after a half defeat for their Army come to battel and to fight in their retreat lost near one half of their men yet so that one of their Proveditors that escaped came to Verona with above five and twenty thousand souldiers between foot and horse in case that if either the Venetians or any of their orders had been of value they might easily have recovered themselves and looked fortune again in the face and have been ready either to overcome or lose more gloriously or get more honorable terms of agreement but the baseness of their spirits caused by the quality of their orders nothing good in matters touching the war made them at once lose both their State and courage And so will it alwaies befall any that shall behave themselves as they did for this growing insolent in good fortune and abject in evill arises from the manner of thy proceeding and from the education wherein thou hast been traind up Which when it is weak vain makes thee like to it self when otherwise it casts thee in another manner of mould and makes thee know the world better rejoycing less at the good besalls thee as also grieving less at the evill comes upon thee and that which is said of one man alone is said also of many that live in the same Commonwealth who attain to that perfection which the order and manner of government thereof wil afford And though otherwhere we have said that the foundation of all States is good military discipline and where this is not there can neither be good lawes nor any other thing good methinks it is not more than needs to repeate it again for to many purposes in the reading of this Story wee see this necessity appeares and wee see that neither can the soldiers be good unless they be traind and practis'd nor can they be train'd unless compos'd of thy own subjects for the wars do not alwaies last unpossible it is they should therefore is it necessary to be able to practise this military exercise in time of peace neither can this exercise be us'd in regard of the expence with others then with thy own subjects Camillus was gone as we said before with the Army against the Tuscans and his souldiers hāving seen the greatness of the enemies Army were much amazd at it thinking themselves too weak to sustain the violence of their enemies the rumor of this fearefulness comming to Camillus his eares he came forth abroad amongst them and going about through the Camp speaking now to one soldier and then to another workt this opinion out of their heads and in conclusion without any otherwise ordering of his
Army said Let every man doe what he hath learned and used to doe And whosoever shall well consider these termes and the words he said to them for their encouragement to encounter with their enemies shall perceive that none of these things could be said or done to an Army that had not first been orderd and exercised as well in peace as in war for upon those soldiers that have not learned to do any thing a Commander cannot rely nor beleeve they can do any thing to the purpose and were a new Hannibal to command them he could not subsist for a General during the battell not being able to be in every part unless he have first taken order to have men of his manner of courage knowing well his orders and the wayes of his proceeding must of force ruine there If then a City shall be armed and orderd as Rome and that every day the Citizens are put to it to make tryal in particular and in general of their own valor and the power of fortune it shall alwaies come to pass that at any time whatsoever they shall continue setled in the same resolution and keep themselves in the same dignity But when they shall be disarmed and rest only upon the helpes of fortune and not upon their own valours they shall change as her wheel turns and give that example of themselves which the Venetians gave CHAP. XXXII What means some have practised to disturb a treaty of peace CIrcei and Velitre two Roman Colonies being rebelled in hope that the Latines would defend them afterwards the Latines being overcome and so those hopes failing them divers of the Citizens advised they should send Ambassadors to Rome to recommend them to the Senate which course was hindred by those that had been Authors of the rebellion who were afraid least the whole punishment should fall upon their heads and therefore to cut off all treaty of peace they incited the multitude to take arms and make an incurfion upon the Rome territories And truely when any one desires that a people or Prince should wholly take their minds off from agreement there is no truer nor certainer way than to make them do some foul act against him with whom thou wouldst not have the accord made For the fear of that punishment which he shall think he hath deserved for his fault shall always keep him off After the first wars which the Carthaginians had with the Romanes those soldiers who had served the Carthaginians in that war in Sicily and Sardinia when the peace was concluded went back into Affrica where not being satisfied for their pay they made wars against the Carthaginians and having chosen two out of themselves for their heads Mathus and Spendius they took divers Towns of the Carthaginians and sacked divers The Carthaginians willing to try any other way then battell sent Asdrubal a Citizen of theirs Ambassadour to them who they thought had some credit with them having formerly been their General And he being come and Spendius and Mathus desiring to oblige all these Souldiers never to hope they could have peace again with the Carthaginians and to engage them in the war perswaded them it was better to kill him with all the Citizens of Carthage which then they had prisoners Whereupon they not only slew them but put them to death with torments to this villainy adding an edict that all Carthaginians who in time to come were taken should in the same sort be slain Which deliberation and execution made that Army exceeding cruell and obstinate against the Carthaginians CHAP. XXXIII It much furthers and advantages an Army in the winning of a battell to be confident of their own forces and their Generals valour IT much helpes an Army towards the winning of a battell to make them confident that in any case they cannot chuse but vanquish The things that give them this confidence are that they be well armed and well orderd and be acquainted one with another Nor can this confidence or this order be but among those Soldiers that have been borne and liv'd together The Commander also must be of repute so that the Soldiers may be confident of his wisdome and they shall alwaies be so when they perceive him to be a man orderly carefull and couragious and that maintains well and with esteem the Majesty of his dignity and he shall alwaies be able to do so while he punisheth their faults while he tires not out the soldiers to no purpose keeps his word with them shewes them an easie way to vanquish the enemy those things that may endanger them conceals from them or if they be evident by his speeches lessons their opinion of them which things well observed are a great occasion of confidence in the Army and that confidence of victory the Romans us'd to make their Armies thus confident by way of Religion from hence proceeded that by their southsayings and auspiees they created their Consuls they levied their souldiers march'd with their armies and fought their battels and without having done some of these things never would a good or discreet Commander have put any thing to hazard deeming that he might easily lose unless his souldiers had first understood that the gods were on their side And when any Consul or Captain of theirs should have fought contrary to the auspices they would have punishd him as they did Claudius Pulcher. And however we find this true in all the Roman Histories yet it is proved more certain by the words which Livie brings in Appius Claudius speaking who complaining to the people of their Tribunes insolency and shewing that by means of them the auspices and other matters pertaining to Religion were corrupted sayes thus Let them now scoffe at Religion for what matter is it whether the chickens feed or whether they come slower out of their cage whether a bird hath sung or no these t is true are all small things but by not contemning of these little things our Auncestours have exceedingly amplified this Commonwealth For in these small matters there is force to hold the souldiers united and confident which thing is a principall occasion of any victory Yet must these things be accompanied with valour otherwise they will avail little The Prenestini having their Army abroad against the Romans went to incampe upon the river of Allia a place where the Romans had been overcome by the French which they did to make their own souldiers confident and to affright the Romans with the fortune of the place And though the course they took was probable for those reasons wee have already said yet the conclusion of the matter shewed that true valour feares not every small accident Which the Historian sayes very well in those words which he makes the Dictatour speak who saies thus to the Master of his Cavallerie Seest thou how they taking benefit of their fortune have incamped themselves upon the river Allia But thou making use of thy Armes
and courage assayle the very heart of their Armie For a true valour a good discpline and an assurance taken from so many victories cannot be extinguished by matters of small moment nor does any vain matter affright them nor one disorder hurt them as we saw it for two Manlij being Consuls against the Volsei by reason that they had rashly sent part of their Army to forrage it followed that both they that were gone and those that staid behind were besieged from which danger not the wisedome of the Consuls but the Souldiers own valour freed them where T. Livius says these words The Souldiers valour even without a Commander was thought firme and constant I will not let pass one terme us'd by Fabius being newly entred with his Army into Tuscany to make them confident deeming such a confidence to be the more necessary now that he had brought them into a new Country and to fight with new enemies who speaking to his souldiers before the fight and having told them many reasons whereupon they might hope for the victory said that he could also tell them certain good things and where they might plainly see the victory but that it was dangerous to disclose them Which course as it was discreetly us'd so deserves it it to be followed CHAP. XXXIV What fame report or opinion causes the people to begin to cast their favours upon a Citizen and whether a Prince or a people do bestow their Magistracies with better judgement OTherwhere we said that T. Manlius who afterwards was termed Torquatus sav'd L. Manlius his Father from an acccusation which M. Pomponions Tribune of the people had made against him And however the manner of saving him was somewhat violent and extraordinary yet that filial piety towards his Father was so acceptable to the generall that it was not only not blamed but when Tribune were to be appointed over the Legions T. Manlius was chosen in the second place Upon which success I beleeve it fit to consider what way the people take to give their judgements upon men in distributing of their charge that thereby we may see whether that be true which we formerly concluded that the people is a better distributer than a Prince I say then that the people in their distribution follows the report that goes of one by publick voyce and fame when they know him not otherwise by his ordinary behaviour or by presumption or opinion conceived of him Which two things have been caused either by the Fathers of such who for that they have been great personages and of ability in the Cities it is thought their sons should be like them untill by their actions the contrary be found Or else it is caused by the courses such a one takes of whom we speak the best courses and waies that can be held are to keep company with grave men well dispos'd and such as by every one are reputed wise And because there cannot be a greater marke or discovery of a man then by the company he frequents without question he that uses good company gaines a good name for it is impossible but that he shall much resemble them Or indeed this publick reputation is gotten by some extraordinary and notable exploit however private that hath proved in thy hands very honorable And of all these three things which in the beginning gain any one a good reputation nothing gives if more amply then this last for that first of parents and fathers is so deceitfull that men advance therein very leisurely and that is presently quite spent when it is not accompanied by the the proper vertue of him that is to be censured The second way which makes thee be known by the company thou usest is better then the first but is much inferior to the third for untill thou hast given evidence of thy self by some worthy exploir thy repute is wholly grounded upon opinion which is very easily cancelled But that third being begun and grounded upon thy workes gives thee at first such renown that needs must it be that afterwards thou commit many acts contrary thereunto if thou wouldst disannul it Therefore ought those men that spring up in a Common-wealth take this course and indeavour by some extraordinary act to begin their rise Which many at Rome did in their youths either by publishing of a law furthering the common good or by accusing some potent Citizen as a breaker of the laws by doing such like notable things and unwonted whereof men should have occasion to speak afterwards Neither are such like things needfull only to begin ones reputation but they are as necessary for the maintenance and advancement of it And to do this a man had need to renew them again as Manlius did during his whole life for when he had defended his father so vertuously and beyond the ordinary strain and by this action taken his first degree of reputation after some years he fought with that Frenchman and took from him that chain of gold which gave him the name of Torquatus nor stay'd he upon this but afterwards in riper years he put his son to death for having fought without his allowance however he had vanquished his enemy Which three actions gave him a greater name and throughout all ages make him more famous then ever any triumph or victory did wherewith he was adorn'd as much as any other Roman And the reason is because in those victories Manlius had very many like him but in these particulars he had either very few or none Scipio the elder got not greater glory by all his triumphs then that action of defending his father upon the Tesin gained him in his youth and that other when after the defeate at Canna couragiously with his sword drawn he made many young Romans swear they would never abandon Italy as already then among them it was resolv'd which two actions were the beginnings of his reputation which made him a way to his triumphs of Spain and Africa which opinion of him was also increased when he sent back the daughter to her Father and the wife to her husband in Spain This manner of proceeding is not alone needful for those Citizens that would gain reputation whereby to attain the dignities in their Commonwealth but is also necessary for Princes to maintain their credits in their Principalities for nothing gives them so great esteem as to yeeld some rare examples of themselves by some deed or pithy saving agreeable with the common good which may evidently prove the Prince either magnanimous or liberall or just and that he is such a one that his life may serve for a patterne and his wise sayings may be used by his subjects as proverbs But to returne whereat we began this discourse I say ' that the people when they begin to confer any dignity upon one of their Citizens grounding upon any of those reasons before alledged take no ill ground but when afterwards the frequent examples of one mans
and Eâ—aminondas the Theban of whom we have spoken otherwhere who with their armies of new souldiers vanquished armies of Veteranes who had been of long experience The courses they took were for many months to exercise them in counterfeit skirmishes and train them up in obedience and order and from thence they came to imploy them with a great deal of assurance in very fierce battells Therefore ought no warlike man doubt but that he may be able to make good soldiers when he wants not men for that Prince who hath many men and wants souldiers should complain rather of his own sloth and small wisdome then of the peoples cowardise CHAP. XXXIX That a Commander ought exactly know scituations AMong other things befitting the General of an Army is the knowledge of scituations and countries for without this knowledge in general and in particular the Commander of an Army cannot well effectuate any thing And because all sciences if a man would be exact in them require practice this is one that askes exceeding much practice And this practice or as I may terme it particular knowledge is gain'd rather by means of hunting then by any other exercise Wherefore the ancient writers say that those Heroes that rul'd the world in their days were brought up in the woods and in frequent huntings for the chace teacheth thee many things besides this knowledge which very much concernes the war And Xenophon in Cyrus his life shewes that Cyrus going to assaile the King of Armenia as he gave order for the service he put his souldiers in mind that this was nothing else then one of those chaces which they had many times made in his company And he told those he sent to lie in ambush upon the mountains that they were like unto those that went to pitch their toiles upon the hills and those that scowred the plain that they were like those that went to put up the beast out of his covert to the end that being chased he fall into the toiles This is said to shew that the chase according as Xenophon allowes of it hath a kinde of resemblance of war And therefore is such exercise very honorable and well beseeming great personages Nor can this knowledge of countries by any fitter means be learned then by way of hunting for the chace makes him that frequents it know how in particular the country lies where he uses to hunt and when a man hath made himself well acquainted with the scite of one country he afterwards with facility comprehends that of all other strange Countries for every Country and every member of them have some kind of conformity one with another so that he who knows the one well may easily attain to the knowledge of the other But he that hath never practised the one very hardly or never unless it be by long experience can know the other whereas he that is well versed therein at the first cast of his eye knows how that plane lies or that hill rises how far that vally reaches and all such other like things whereof for the time to come he hath gained a settled knowledge And that this is true T. Livius shewes us by the example of Publius Decius who being Tribune of the souldiers in the Army which Cornelius the Consull led against the Samnites when the Consull was forc'd to betake himself to a vally where the Romans army might easily have been inclosed by the Samnites this Decius perceiving the danger they were in said to the Consul Seest thou Aulus Cornelius that hill which is above the enemy that is the strength of our hope and safety if we because the Samnites being blinde have neglected it quickly seise on it And before these words uttered by Decius T. Livius sayes Publius Decius the souldiers Tribune shewed a pretty high hill which lay a little higher then the enemies campe of hard ascent to men incombred with compleat armes but of easy access to men lightly harnessed Whereupon being sent thither himself by the Consull with 3000 souldiers and having sav'd the Roman army and purposing when night came himself to depart and so to save himself and his own souldiers he is brought in thus speaking Follow me that yet while it is day light we may discover what places the enemy guards and which way we may get out All these things he went to view clad in a souldiers cassocke to the end the enemy should take no notice the Captaine rounded them He therefore that well considers this whole text shall see how profitable and necessary for a Commander it is to understand the natural scituations of countries for if Decius had not well known them he had never been able to judge what advantage it was to the Roman army to seize upon that hill nor could he have been able to discerne at such distance whether thall hill were accessible or no. And when he had once gotten there upon it having a mind to depart and return again to the Consul being invironed round with enemies he would never have been able so far off to spy out the passages to escape thence and discerne which places were guarded by the enemy so that it must be of necessity that Decius had a very exact knowledge whereby he brought it to pass that by the taking of that hill the Roman Army was delivered and afterwards he himself being besieged knew how to find a way of escape both for himself and those that were with him CHAP. XL. How deceit is commendable used against the enemy in time of war HOwever that the use of fraud in any action be detestable yet in the managing of a war it is a thing laudable and glorious and he is as much praise that vanquishes the enemy by deceit as he that overcomes him by force And this we see by the judgment of those that write the lives of great personages who commend Hannibal and others who have been very notable in such like ways of proceeding Whereof because there are many examples every where obvious I will not adde any I will say this only that I mean not that that fraud is glorious which causes thee to breake thy faith given and agreements made for that though it may sometimes gain thee a state or Kingdom as formerly hath been said yet will it never get thee any glory But I speak of such a deceit which is put in practise against such an enemy that trusts not in thee and that consists properly in matter of war as was that of Hannibal when at the lake of Perugia he feigned a flight whereby he might have inclos'd the Consul and the Roman Army and when to escape out of Fabius Maximus hishand he tied flaming fire-brands to the horns of his whole heard of cattel The like unto which was that which Pontius the Samnites General practised to shut in the Roman Army at the gallows of Caudium where having placed his army behind the mountains he sent many
evident that Fabius his manner of proceeding is the more secure and warrantable CHAP. XLVI Whence proceedes it that one family in a City holds a long time the same manners and disposition IT seems that not only one City hath certain wayes and orders different from those of another City and breeds men either more hardy or more effeminate but in the same City we see the same difference among families which we find to be true in every City and in Rome we reade of many examples to this purpose for we see the Manlij were hard and obstinate men the Publicoli courteous and lovers of the people the Appij ambitious and enemies of the commonalty and so many other families have had their qualities differing one much from the other Which thing cannot proceede from the blood only for that must needs alter by reason of the variety of marriages but it must come from the education which one family hath diverse from another For it avails much that a youth from his tender years begins to relish well or ill any one thing for of necessity it must make an impression and thereupon give a rule to his manner of proceeding all the dayes of his life and were not this so it would be impossible that all the Appij should have had the same will and been led by the same passions as T. Livius remaâ—kes in many of them and for the last one of them being made Censor and his Collegue at the end of eighteen moneths having as the law order'd it depos'd his magistracy Appius would not depose his saying that he might hold his yet five years according to the first law ordain'd by the Censors And however hereupon many speeches were made and many tumults were caus'd yet was there no helpe to make him lay it down maugre the people and the greater part of the Senate And whosoever reads the oration he made against P. Sempronious Tribune of the people shall note upon that occasion all the Appian insolences and the goodness and humanity used by many other Citizens in obedience of the laws and in their love to their Country CHAP. XLVII That a good Citizen for the love of his country ought to forget all private wrongs MAnlius the Consul was imployed with an Army against the Samnites and he having been wounded in a battell and the Army therefore running some hazard the Senate judg'd it necessary to send Papirius Cursor thither for Dictator to supply the want of the Consul and there being a necessity that the Dictator should be nam'd by Fabius who was then in Tuscany with an Army and doubting that because he was his enemy he would not name him the Senators sent him two Ambassadours to intreate him that laying aside all private differences for the publick goods sake he would name him Which Fabius did moved by the love he bore his Country howbeit by his silence and many other signes he shewed that nomination pressed him much Whereof all those that would be thought good Citizens ought take example CHAP. XLVIII When we se the enemy commit a great errour we ought to beleeve there is some treachery in the business FVlvius remaining Lieftenant in the Army which the Romans had in Tuscany for that the Consul was gone to Rome by reason of some ceremonies there the Tuscans to see if they could draw this man forth laid an ambuscado near the Romans campe and sent some soldiers clad like shepherds with good store of cattel and caused them to come insight of the Roman army who so disguised came near their very trenches whereupon the Lieftenant marvelling at this their presumption not thinking it a thing reasonable found such an expedient as discovered the deceit and so the Tuscans plot was spoiled Here it may firly be noted that the commander of an army ought not to give much credit to an errour which he plainly sees the enemy run into for there will alwaies be some treachery lurking it being not a thir 〈◊〉 reasonable that men should be so unwary But oftentimes the desire of victory so blinds mens eyes that they can se nothing else but what they think makes all for their advantage The Frenchmen having overcome the Romans at Alia and comming to Rome and finding the gates open and without guard stayed all that day and the next night without entring in fearing some treachery and not possibly beleeving there could be such cowardise and so small understanding in the Romans as utterly to abandon their Country When in the year 1508 the Florentines besieged Pisa Alphonso del Mutola a Citizen of Pisa was then the Florentines prisoner and promised if he were set free that he would open a gate of Pisa to the Florentine army whereupon he had his liberty afterwards as if it had been to put the matter in execution he came many times to treate with the commissaries Deputies but came not privately nor by stealth but openly and accompanied by some Pisans who stood aside while he talked with the Florentines so that a man might well have guest at his double heart for there was no probability that if the end of this practice had been faithfuly intended as it was promis'd it should ever have been so openly treated But the desire the Florentines had to be masters of Pisa did so blind them that by his order comming to the gate of Lucca they left there divers of their Captains and many others to their great dishonour by meanes of the said Alphonsoes double dealing with them CHAP. XLIX A Republick if one would preserve it free hath every day need of provision of new orders and in regard of his good deserts that way Fabius was term'd Maximus THere is a necessity as it hath been said â—other where that every day in a vast City such accidents happen as have need of the Physitian and according as they are of more consequence so have they need of the wiser Physician And if in any City the like accidents ever happen'd it was in Rome where there fell out both strange and unexpected as was that when it seemed that all the Roman dames had conspir'd to kill their husbands so many were there that had poisoned their husbands and so many that had prepared the poyson to give their husbands Such like also was that conspiracy of the Baccanalls which was discovered in the time of the Macedonian wars wherein were intangled many thousands of men and women and had it not been revealed it would have proved very dangerous for that City or else if the Romans had not been accustomed to chastise a whole multitude of offenders for were there not other exceeding many evident tokens to shew forth the greatness and magnificence of that Republick and power of her executions yet would it sufficiently appear by the quality of the punishment she imposed on the offenders She never stood upon it to put to death by way of justice a whole legion at once and a whole City and
remove the army from place to place of which annoyance every one hath a feeling and so becomes enemie to thee as they are enemies I wis who are outraged by thee in their own houses whensoever they are able to do thee mischief Every way then is this guard unprofitable Besides he that is in a different Province as it is said should make himself Head and defender of his less powerfull neighbors and devise alwaies to weaken those that are more mighty therein and take care that upon no chance there enter not any foreiner as mighty as himself for it will alwaies come to pass that they shall be brought in by those that are discontented either upon ambition or fear as the Eâ—olians brought the Romans into Greece and they were brought into every countrey they came by the Natives and the course of the matter is that so soon as a powerfull Stranger enters a countrey all those that are the less powerfull there cleave to him provoked by an envy they beare him that is more mighty than they so that for these of the weaker sort he may easily gain them without any pains for presently all of them together very willingly make one lump with that he hath gotten He hath only to beware that these increase not their strengths nor their authorities and so he shall easily be able by his own forces and their assistances to take down those that are mighty and remain himself absolute arbitre of that Countrey And he that playes not well this part shall quickly lose what he hath gotten and while he holds it shall find therein a great many troubles and vexations The Romans in the Provinces they seiz'd on observed well these points sent colonies thither entertained the weaker sort without augmenting any thing their power abated the forces of those that were mighty and permitted not any powerfull forreiner to gain too much reputation there And I will content my self only with the countrey of Greece for example hereof The Achayans and Etolians were entertained by them the Macedons kingdome was brought low Antiochus was driven thence nor ever did the Achayans or Etolians deserts prevail so far for them that they would ever promise to enlarge their State nor the perswasions of Philip induce them ever to be his friends without bringing him lower nor yet could Antiocbus his power make them ever consent that he should hold any State in that countrey for the Romans did in these cases that which all judicious Princes ought to do who are not only to have regard unto all present michiefs but also to the future and to provide for those with all industry for by taking order for those when they are asarre off it is easie to prevent them but by delaying till they come near hand to thee the remedy comes too late for this malignity is grown incurable and it befalls this as the physicians say of the hectick feaver that in the beginning it is easily cur'd but hardly known but in the course of time not having been known in the beginning nor cured it becomes easie to know but hard to cure Even so falls it out in matters of State for by knowing it aloof off which is given only to a wise man to do the mischiefs that then spring up are quickly helped but when for not having been perceived they are suffered to increase so that every one sees them there is then no cure for them therefore the Romans seeing these inconvenients afâ—ar off alwaies prevented them and never sufferd them to follow for to escape a war because they knew that a war is not undertaken but deferred for anothers advantage therefore would they rather make a war with Philip and Antiochus in Greece to the end it should not afterwards be made with them in Italy though for that time they were able to avoid both the one and the other which they thought not good to do nor did they approve of that saying that is ordinarily in the mouthes of the Sages of our dayes to enjoy the benefits of the present time but that rather to take the benefit of their valor and wisdome for time drives forward every thing and may bring with it as well good as evil and evil as good But let us return to France and examine if any of the things prescribed have been done by them and we will speak of Lewis 〈◊〉 not of Charles as of whom by reason 〈…〉 he long possession he held in Italy we better knew the wayes he went and you shall see he did the clean contrary to what should have been done by him that would maintain a State of different Language and conditions King Lewis was brought into Italy by the Venetians ambition who would have gotten for their shares half the State of Lombardy I will not blame his comming or the course he took because he had a mind to begin to set a foot in Italy but having not any friends in the country all gates being barred against him by reason of King Charles his carriage there he was constrained to joyn friendship with those he could and this consideration well taken would have proved lucky to him when in the rest of his courses he had not committed any error The King then having conquered Lombardy recovered presently all that reputation that Charles had lost him Genua yeelded to him the Florentines became friends with him the Marquess of Mantua the the Duke of Ferrara the Bentivolti the Lady of Furli the Lord of Faenza Pesaro Rimino Camerino and Piombino the Lucâ—heses Pisans and Sieneses every one came and offered him friendship then might the Venetians consider the rashness of the course they had taken who only to get into their hands two Townes in Lombardy made the King Lord of two thirds in Italy Let any man now consider with how small difficulty could the King have maintained his reputation in Italy if he had followed these aforenamed rules and secured defended those his friends who because their number was great and they weak and fearful some of the Church and others of the Venetians were alwaies forced to hold with him and by their means he might easily have been able to secure himself against those that were mightiest but he was no sooner got into Milan than he took a quite wrong course by giving ayd to Pope Alexander to seize upon Romania and perceiv'd not that by this resolution he weakned himself ruining his own friends and those had cast themselves into his bosom making the Church puissant by adding to their Spiritual power whereby they gaind their authority and so much temporal estate And having once got out of the way he was constrained to go on forward insomuch as to stop Alexanders ambition and that he should not become Lord of all Tuscany of force he was to come into Italy and this sufficed him not to have made the Church mighty and taken away his own friends but for the desire he had to
to purge the minds of those people and to gain them wholly to himself he purpos'd to shew that if there was any cruelty used it proceeded not from any order of his but from the harsh disposition of his Officers Whereupon laying hold on him at this occasion he caus'd his head to be struck off one morning early in the market place at Cesena where he was left upon a gibbet with a bloody sword by his side the cruelty of which spectacle for a while satisfied and amaz'd those people But to return from whence we have digressd I say that the Duke finding himself very strong and in part out of doubt of the present dangers because he was arm'd after his own manner and had in some good measure suppress'd those forces which because of their vicinity were able to annoy him he wanted nothing else to go on with his Conquest but the consideration of of France for he knew that the King who now though late was advis'd of his error would never suffer him and hereupon he began to seek after new allyances and to waver with France when the French came towards Naples against the Spaniards who then besieged Gagetta and his design was only to be out of their danger which had been effected for him had Pope Alexander lived And thus were his businesses carried touching his present estate As for the future he had reason to doubt lest the new successor to the Papacy would not be his friend and would endeavor to take that from him that Alexander had bestowed on him and he thought to provide for this foure waies First by rooting out the races of all those Lords he had dispoyled whereby to take those occasions from the Pope Secondly by gaining 〈◊〉 the gentlemen of Rome whereby he might 〈◊〉 able with those to keep the Pope in some awe Thirdly to make the Colledge of Cardinals as much at his devotion as possibly might be Fourthly by making of so large Conquests before the Popes death as that he might be able of himself to withstand the first fury of his enemies Three of these fowre at Pope Alexanders death he had effected and the fourth 〈◊〉 had neare brought to a point For of those Lords he had stript he put to death as many as he could come at and very few escap'd him he gaind him the Roman Gentlemen and in the Colledge he had made a great faction And touching his new Conquest he had a designe to become Lord of Tuscany And he had possessed himself already of Perusia and Pombin and taken protection of Pisa and so soon as he should have cast off his respect to France which now he meant to hold no longer being the French were now driven out of the Kingdome of Naples by the Spaniards so that each of them was forc'd to buy his friendship at any termes he was then to leap into Pisa After this Lucca and Siena were presently to fall to him partly for envy to the Florentines and partly for fear The Florentines had no way to escape him all which had it succeeded with him as without question it had the very same year that Alexander dy'd he had made himself master of so great forces and such reputation that he would bave been able to have stood upon his own bottom without any dependance of fortune or resting upon others helps but only upon his own strength and valor But Alexander dy'd five years after that he had begun to draw forth his sword and left him setled only in the State of Romania with all his other designes in the ayre sick unto death between two very strong armies of his enemies and yet was there in this Duke such a spirit and courage and he understood so well how men are to be gaind and how to be lost and so firm were the grounds he had laid in a short time that had he not had those armies upon his back or had been in health he would have carried through his purpose in spight of all opposition and that the foundations he grounded upon were good it appeard in that Romania held for him above a moneth and he remained secure in Rome though even at deaths doore and however the Baglioni Vitelli and Orsini came into Rome yet found they none would take their parts against him And this he was able to have effected that if he could not have made him Pope whom he would he could have hindred him that he would not should be Pope But had he been in health when Alexander dy'd every thing had gone easily with him and he told me on that day that Julius the second was created Pope that he had fore-thought on all that which could happen in case his father chanc'd to dye and for every thing provided its remedy this onely excepted that he foresaw not that he himself should at the same time be brought unto deaths dore also Having then collected all the Dukes actions me thinks I could not well blame him but rather as I have here done set him as a pattern to be followed by all those who by fortune and others armes have been exalted to an Empire For he being of great courage and having lofty designes could not carry himself otherwise and the only obstacle of his purposes was the brevity of Alexanders life and his own sickness Whoever therefore deemes it necessary in his entrance into a new Principality to secure himself of his enemies and gain him friends to overcome either by force or by cunning to make himself beloved or feared of his people be followed and reverenced by his soldiers to root out those that can or owe thee any hurt to change the ancient orders with new wayes to be severe and yet acceptable magnanimous and liberall to extinguish the unfaithfull soldiery and create new to maintain to himself the armities of Kings and Princes so that they shall either with favor benefit thee or be wary how to offend thee cannot find more fresh and lively examples than the actions of this man He deserves to be found fault withall for the creation of Julius the second wherein an evil choice was made for him for as it is said not being able to make a Pope to his mind he could have withheld any one from being Pope and should never have consented that any one of those Cardinals should have got the Papacy whom he had ever done harme to or who having attaind the Pontificate were likely to be afraid of him because men ordinarily do hurt either for fear or hatred Those whom he had offended were among others he who had the title of St. Peter ad Vincula Colonna Sr. George and Ascanius all the others that were in possibility of the Popedome were such as might have feard him rather except the Cardinal of Roan and the Spaniards these by reason of their allyance and obligation with him the other because of the power they had having the Kingdome of France on their party
encourage such Princes to fortifie and guard their own Capital city and of the countrey about not to hold much account and whoever shall have well fortified that town and touching other matters of governments shall have behaved himself towards his subjects as hath been formerly said and hereafter shall be shall never be assaild but with great regard for men willingly undertake not enterprises where they see difficulty to work them through nor can much facility be there found where one assails him who hath his town strong and wel guarded and is not hated of his people The cities of Germany are very free they have but very little of the countrey about them belonging to them and they obey the Emperor when they please and they stand not in fear neither of him nor any other Potentate about them for they are in such a manner fortified that every one thinks the siege of any of them would prove hard and tedious for all of them have ditches and rampires and good store of Artillery and alwaies have their publick cellars well provided with meat and drink and firing for a yeer besides this whereby to feed the common people and without any loss to the publick they have alwaies in common whereby they are able for a year to imploy them in the labor of those trades that are the sinews and the life of that city and of that industry whereby the commons ordinarily supported themselves they hold up also the military exercises in repute and hereupon have they many orders to maintain them A Prince then that is master of a good strong city and causeth not himself to be hated cannot be assaulted and in case he were he that should assail him would be fain to quit him with shame for the affairs of the world are so various that it is almost impossible that an army can lie incampt before a town for the space of a whole yeer and if any should reply that the people having their possessions abroad in case they should see them a fire would not have patience and the redious siege and their love to themselves would make them for get their Prince I answer that a Prince puissant and couragious will easily master those difficulties now giving his subjects hope that the mischiief will not be of durance sometimes affright them with the cruelty of their enemies and other whiles cunningly securing himself of those whom he thinks too forward to run to the enemy Besides this by ordinary reason the enemy should burne and waste their countrey upon his arrival and at those times while mens minds are yet warme and resolute in their defence and therefore so much the less ought a Prince doubt for after some few dayes that their courages grow coole the dammages are all done and mischiefs received and there is no help for it and then have they more occasion to cleave faster to their Prince thinking he is now more bound to them their houses having for his defence been fired and their possessions wasted and mens nature is as well to hold themselves oblig'd for the kindnesses they do as for those they receive whereupon if all be well weigh'd a wise Prince shall not find much difficulty to keep sure and true to him his Citizens hearts at the beginning and latter end of the siege when he hath no want of provision for food and ammunition CHAP. XI Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities THere remains now only that we treat of the Ecclesiastical Principalities about which all the difficulties are before they are gotten for they are attained to either by vertue or Fortune and without the one or the other they are held for they are maintaind by orders inverterated in the religion all which are so powerfull and of such nature that they maintain their Princes in their dominions in what manner soever they proceed and live These only have an Estate and defend it not have subjects and govern them not and yet their States because undefended are not taken from them nor their subjects though not govern'd care not think not neither are able to aliene themselves from them These Principalities then are only happy and secure but they being sustained by superior causes whereunto humane understanding reaches not I will not meddle with them for being set up and maintained by God it would be the part of a presumptuous and rash man to enter into discourse of them Yet if any man should ask me whence it proceeds that the Church in temporal power hath attaind to such greatness seeing that till the time of Alexander the sixt the Italian Potentates and not only they who are entituled the potentates but every Baron and Lord though of the meanest condition in regard of the temporality made but small account of it and now a King of France trembles at the power thereof and it hath been able to drive him out of Italy and ruine the Venetians and however this be well known me thinks it is not superstitious in some part to recall it to memory Before that Charles King of France past into Italy this countrey was under the rule of the Pope Venetians the King of Naples the Duke of Milan and the Florentines These Potentates took two things principally to their care the one that no forreiner should invade Italy the other that no one of them should inlarge their State They against whom this care was most taken were the Pope and the Venetians and to restrain the Venetians there needed the union of all the rest as it was in the defence of Ferrara and to keep the Pope low they served themselves of the Barons of Rome who being divided into two factions the Orsini and Colonnesi there was alwaies occasion of offence between them who standing ready with their armes in hand in the view of the Pope held the Popedome weak and feeble and however sometimes there arose a couragious Pope as was Sextus yet either his fortune or his wisdome was not able to free him of these incommodities and the brevity of their lives was the cause thereof for in ten years which time one with another Popes ordinarily liv'd with much ado could they bring low one of the factions And if as we may say one had near put out the Colonnesi there arose another enemy to the Orsini who made them grow again so that there was never time quite to root them out This then was the cause why the Popes temporal power was of small esteem in Italy there arose afterwards Pope Alexander the sixt who of all the Popes that ever were shewed what a Pope was able to do with money and forces and he effected by means of his instrument Duke Valentine and by the ocasion of the French mens passage all those things which I have formerly discoursed upon in the Dukes actions and however his purpose was nothing at all to inlarge the Church dominions but to make the Duke great yet what he did turnd to the Churches advantage
which after his death when the Duke was taken away was the heir of all his pains Afterwards succeeded Pope Julius and found the Church great having all Romania and all the Barons of Rome being quite rooted out and by Alexanders persecutions all their factions worne down he found also the way open for the heaping up of moneys never practised before Alexanders time which things Julius not only follow'd but augmented and thought to make himself master of Bolonia and extinguish the Venetians and chase the French men out of Italy and these designes of his prov'd all lucky to him and so much the more to his praise in that he did all for the good of the Church and in no private regard he kept also the factions of the Orsins and Colonnesi in the same State he found them and though there were among them some head whereby to cause an alteration yet two things have held them quiet the one the power of the Church which somewhat affrights them the other because they have no Cardinals of their factions who are the primary causes of all the troubles amongst them nor shall these parties ever be at rest while they have Cardinals because they nourish the factious both in Rome and abroad and the Barons then are forced to undertake the defence of them and thus from the Prelates ambitions arise the discords and tumults among the Barons And now hath Pope Leo his Holiness found the Popedome exceeding puissant of whom it is hoped that if they amplified it by armes he by his goodness and infinite other vertues will much more advantage and dignifie it CHAP. XII How many sorts of Military discipline there are and touching Mercinary soldiers HAving treated particularly of the qualities of those Principalities which in the beginning I propounded to discourse upon and considered in some part the reasons of their well and ill being and shewd the waies whereby many have sought to gain and hold them it remains now that I speak in general of the offences and defences that may chance in each of the forenamed We have formerly said that it is necessary for a Prince to have good foundations laid otherwise it must needs be that he go to wrack The Principal foundations that all States have as well new as old or mixt are good laws and good armes and because there cannot be good laws where there are not good armes and where there are good armes there must needs be good laws I will omit to discourse of the laws and speak of armes I say then that the armes wherewithall a Prince defends his State either are his own or mercenary or auxiliary or mixt Those that are mercenary and auxiliar are unprofitable and dangerous and if any one holds his State founded upon mercenary armes he shall never be quiet nor secure because they are never well united ambitious and without discipline treacherous among their friends stout among their enemies cowardly they have no fear of God nor keep any faith with men and so long only defer they the doing of mischief till the enemy comes to assul thee and in time of peace thou art despoyled by them in war by thy enemies the reason hereof is because they have no other love nor other cause to keep them in the field but only a small stipend which is not of force to make them willing to hazard their lives for thee they are willing indeed to be thy soldiers till thou goest to fight but then they fly or run away which thing would cost me but small pains to perswade for the ruine of Italy hath not had any other cause now a dayes than for that it hath these many years rely'd upon mercenary armes which a good while since perhaps may have done some man some service and among themselves they may have been thought valiant but so soon as any forrein enemy appeared they quickly shewed what they were Whereupon Charles the King of France without opposition made himself master of all Italy and he that said that the causes thereof were our faults said true but these were not those they beleeved but what I have told and because they were the Princes faults they also have suffered the punishment I will suller shew the infelicity of these armes The mercenary Captains are either very able men or not if they be thou canst not repose any trust in them for they will alwaies aspire unto their own proper advancements either by suppressing of thee that art their Lord or by suppressing of some one else quite out of thy purpose but if the Captain be not valorons he ordinarily ruines thee and in case it be answered that whoever shall have his armes in his hands whether mercenary or not will do so I would reply that armes are to be imployed either by a Prince or Common-wealth The Prince ought to go in person and performe the office of a commander the Republick is to send forth her Citizens and when she sends forth one that proves not of abilities she ought to change him then and when he does prove valorous to bridle him so by the laws that he exceed not his commission And by experience we see that Princes and Republiques of themselves alone make very great conquests but that mercenary armes never do other than harme and more hardly falls a Republick armed with her own armes under the obedience of one of her own Citizens than one that is armed by forrein armes Rome and Sparta subsistâ—d many ages armed and free The Swissers are exceedingly well armed and yet very free Touching mercenary armes that were of old we have an example of the Car thagians who near upon were oppress'd by their own mercenary soldiers when the first war with the Romans was finished however the Carthagians had their own Citizens for their Captains Philip of Macedon was made by the Thebans after Epaminondas his death General of their Armies and after the victory he took from them their liberty The Milaneses when Duke Philip was dead entertaind Francis Sforza into their pay against the Venetians who having vanquisht their enemie at Caraâ—aggio afterwards joyned with them where by to usurp upon the Milaneses his Masters Sforza his father being in Joan the Queen of Naples pay left her on a sudden disarmed whereupon she to save her Kingdom was constrained to cast her self into the King of Arragon's bosome And in case the Venetians and the Florentines have formerly augmented their State with these kind of armes and their own Captains and yet none of them have ever made themselves their Princes but rather defended them I answer that the Florentines in this case have had fortune much their friend for of valorous Captains which they might any way fear some have not been victors some have had opposition and others have laid the aim of their ambitions another way He who overcame not was John Aouto of whose faith there could no proof be made being he vanquisht not but every one
and thereupon set up a third judge which was that to the end it should keep under the great ones and favour the meaner sort without any imputation to the King It was not possible to take a better nor wiser course then this nor a surer way to secure the King and the Kingdome From whence we may draw another conclusion worthie of note that Princes ought to cause others to take upon them the matters of blame and imputation and upon themselves to take only those of grace and favour Here againe I conclude that a Prince ought to make good esteeme of his Nobility but not thereby to incur the Commons hatred It would seeme perhaps to many considering the life death of many Romane Emperours that they were examples contrary to my opinion finding that some have liv'd worthily and shewd many rare vertues of the minde and yet have lost the Empire and been put to death by their owne subjects conspiring against them Intending then to answer these objections I shall discourse upon the qualities of some Emperours declaring the occasions of their ruine not disagreeing from that which I have alledgd and part thereof I will bestow on the consideration of these things which are worthy to be noted by him that reads the actions of those times and it shall suffice me to take all those Emperours that succeeded in the Empire from Marcus the Philosopher to Maximinus who were Mercus and Commodus his sonne Pertinax Julian Severus Antonius Caracalla his sonne Macrinus Heliogabalus Alexander and Maximin And first it is to be noted that where in the other Principalities they are to contend only with the ambition of the Nobles and the insolence of the people the Romane Emperours had a third difficulty having to support the cruelty and covetousnesse of the souldiers which was so hard a thing that it caused the ruine of many being hard to satisfy the souldiers and the people for the people love their quiet and therefore affect modest Princes and the souldiers love a Prince of a warlike courage that is insolent cruell and plucking from every one which things they would have them exercise upon the people whereby they might be able to double their stipends and satisfie their avarice and cruelty whence it proceeds that those Emperous who either by Nature or by Art had not such a reputation as therewith they could curbe the one and the other were alwayes ruind and the most of them specially those who as new men came to the principality finding the difficulty of those two different humours applyed themselves to content the sholdiers making small account of wronging the people which was a course then necessary for the Princes not being able to escape the hatred of every one ought first endeavour that they incurse not the hatred of any whole universality and when they cannot attaine thereunto they are to provide with all industry to avoyd the hatred of those universalities that are the most mighty And therefore those Emperors who because they were but newly call'd to the Empire had need of extraordinary favours more willingly stuck to the soldiers than to the people which neverthelesse turned to their advantage or otherwise according as that Prince knew how to maintaine his repute with them From these causes aforesayd proceeded it that Marcus Pertinax and Alexander though all living modestly being lovers of justice and enemies of cruelty courteous and bountifull had all from Marcus on ward miserable ends Marcus only liv'd and dy'd exceedingly honoured for he came to the Empire by inheritance and was not to acknowledge it either from the soldiers nor from the people afterwards being accompanyed with many vertues which made him venerable he held alwayes whilst he liv'd the one and the other order within their limits and was never either hated or contemnd But Pertinax was created Emperour against the soldiers wills who being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus could not endure that honest course that Pertinax sought to reduce them to whereupon having gotten himself hatred and to this hatred added contempt in that he was old was ruind in the very beginning of his government Whence it ought to be observed that hatred is gaind as well by good deeds as bad and therefore as I formerly said when a Prince would maintaine the State he is often forced not to be good for when that generality whether it be the people or soldiers or Nobility whereof thou thinkst thou standst in need to maintain thee is corrupted it behoves thee to follow their humour and content them and then all good deeds are thy adversaries But let us come to Alexander who was of that goodnesse that among the prayses given him had this for one that in fourteen yeers wherein he held the Empire he never put any man to death but by course of justice neverthelesse being held effeminate and a man that suffered himselfe to be ruled by his mother and thereupon fallen into contempt the army conspird against him Now on the contrary discoursing upon the qualities of Commodus Severus Antonius Caracalla and Maximinus you shall find them exceeding cruell and ravinous who to satisfie their soldiers forbeare no kinde of injury that could be done upon the people and all of them except Severus came to evill enâ—s for in Severus there was such extraordinary valour that while he held the soldiers his freinds however the people were much burthend by him he might alwayes reigne happily for his valour rendred him so admirable in the soldiers and peoples sights that these in a manner stood amazd and astonishd and those others reverencing and honoring him And because the actions of this man were exceeding great being in a new Prince I will briefly shew how well he knew to act the Foxes and the Lions parts the conditions of which two I say as before are very necessary for a Prince to imitate Severus having had experience of Iulian the Emperours sloth perswaded his army whereof he was commander in Solavonia that they should doe well to goe to Rome to revenge Portinax his death who was put to death by the Imperiall guard and under this pretence not making any shew that he aspird unto the Empire set his army in march directly towards Rome and was sooner come into Italy than it was knowne he had mov'd from his station Being ariv'd at Rome he was by the Senate chosen Emperour for feare and Julian slaine After this beginning two difficulties yet remaind to Severus before he could make himselfe Lord of the whole State the one in Asia where Niger the Generall of those armies had gotten the title of Emperour the other in the West with Albinus who also aspird to the Empire and because he thought there might be some danger to discover himselfe enemy to them both he purposed to set upon Niger and cozen Albinas to whom he writ that being elected Emperour by the Senate he would willingly communicate it with him and thereupon sent
him the title of Caesar and by resolution of the Senate tooke him to him for his Colleague which things were taken by Albinks in true meaning But afterwards when Severus had overcome and slaine Niger and pacified the affaires and in the East being returned to Rome he complaind in the Senate of Albinus how little weighing the benefits received from him he had sought to slay him by treason and therefore was he forc'd to goe punish his ingratitude afterwards he went into France where he bereft him both of his State and life whoever then shall in particular examine his actions shall finde he was a very cruell Lion and as crafty a Fox and shall see that he was alwayes feard and reverenc'd by every one and by the armies not hated and shall nothing marvell that he being a new man was able to hold together such a great Empire for his extraordinary reputation defended him alwayes from that hatred which the people for his extortions might have conceiv'd against him But Antonius his sonne was also an exceeding brave man and endued with most excellent qualities which causd him to be admird by the people and acceptable to the souldiers because he was a warlike man enduring all kind of travell and paines despising all delicate food and all kinde of effeminacy which gaind him the love of all the armies neverthelesse his fiercenesse and cruelty were such and so hideous having upon many particular occasions put to death a great part of the people of Rome and all those of Alexandria that he grew odious to the world and began to be feard by those also that were neare about him so that he was slaine by a Centurion in the very midst of his army Where it is to be noted that these kinde of deaths which follow upon the deliberation of a resolv'd and obstinate minde cannot by a Prince be avoyded for every one that feares not to dye is able to doe it but a Prince ought to be lesse afraid of it because it very seldome falls our Only should he beware not to doe any extreamd injury to any of those of whom he serves himself or that he hath near about him in any imployment of his Principality as Antonius did who had reproachfully slaine a brother of that Centurion also threatned him every day neverthelesse entertaind him still as one of the guards of his body which was a rash course taken and the way to destruction as befell him But let us come to Commodus for whom it was very easie to hold the Empire by reason it descended upon him by inheritance being Marcus his sonne and it had been enough for him to follow his fathers footsteps and then had he contented both the people and the soldiers but being of a cruell and savage desposition whereby to exercise his actions upon the people he gave himselfe to entertaine armies and those in all licentionsnesse On the other part not maintaining his dignity but often descending upon the stages to combate with fencers and doing such other like base things little worthy of the Imperiall majesty he became contemptible in the soldiers sight and being hated of one part and despisd of the other he was conspird against and slaine It remaines now that we declare Maximinus his conditions who was a very warlike man and the armies loathing Alexanders effeminacy whereof I spake before when they had slain him chose this man Emperour who not long continu'd so because two things there were that brought him into hatred and contempt the one because he was very base having kept cattell in Thrace which was well knowne to every one and made them to scorne him the other because in the beginning of his Principality having delayd to goe to Rome and enter into possession of the Imperiall throne he had gaind the insamy of being thought exceeding cruell having by his Prefects in Rome and in every place of the Empire exercisd many cruelties insomuch that the whole world being provok'd against him to contempt for the basenesse of his blood on the other side upon the hatred conceiv'd against him for feare of his crulty first Affrica afterwards the Senate with all the people of Rome and all Italy conspired against him with whom his own army took part which incamping before Aquileya and finding some difficulty to take the town being weary of his cruelties and because they saw he had so many enemies fearing him the lesse slew him I purpose not to say any thing either of Heliogabalus Macrinus or Itlian who because they were throughly base were sudenly extinguish but I will come to the conclusion of this discourse and I say that the Princes of our times have lesse of this difficulty to satisfie the Soldiers extraordinarily in their government for notwithstanding that there be some considerations to be had of them yet presently are those armies dissolv'd because none of these Princes do use to maintaine any armies together which are annex'd and inveterated with the governments of the provinces as were the armies of the Romane Empire And therefore if then it was necessary rather to content the soldiers than the people it was because the soldiers were more powerfull than the people now is it more necessary for all Princes except the Turk and the Souldan to satisfie their people than their soldiers because the people are more mighty than they wherein I except the Turk he alwayes maintaining about his person 12000 foot and 15000 horse upon which depends the safety and strength of his Kingdome and it is necessary that laying afide all other regard of his people he maintaine these his friends The Souldans Kingdome is like hereunto which being wholy in the souldiers power he must also without respect of his people keep them his friends And you are to consider that this State of the Souldans differs much from all the other Principalities For it is very like the Papacy which cannot be termd an hereditary Principality nor a new Principality for the sons of the deceasd Prince are not heires and Lords thereof but he that is chosen receives that dignity from those who have the authority in them And this order being of antiquity cannot be termd a new Principality because therein are none of those difficulties that are in the new ones for though the Prince be new yet are the orders of that state ancient and ordaind to receive him as if he were their hereditary Prince But let us returne to our matter whosoever shall consider our discourse before shall perceive that either hatred or contempt haye caus'd the ruine of the afore-named Emperors and shall know also from it came that part of them proceeding one way and part a contrary yet in any of them the one had a happy success and the others unhappy for it was of no availe but rather hurtful for Pertinax and Alexander because they were new Princes to desire to imitate Marcus who by inheritance came to the Principality and in
slay those of Castruccio's party But because in such matters if the small number be fit to keep the secret yet suffices it not to put it in execution while he went about to gain more men to this purpose some there were that be wrayed his plot to Castruccio neithet passed this discovery without the infamy of Bonifacio Cerchi and Iohn Guidi Florentines who were near neighbors to Pisa whereupon Benedicto being layd hand on was put to death and all the rest of that family banisht and many other Noble Citizens beheaded and thinking with himself that Pistoya and Pisa were not very faithfull unto him he took care both by his industry and forces to secure himself thereof which gave leisure to the Florentines to recover their strength and to be able to attend the return of Charles who being arrived they determined to lose no longer time and gatherd ae great number of men for they called together to their ayd in a manner all the Guelfes in Italy and made an exceeding great army of more than 30000 Foot and 10000 Horse and having advised which were first to be assaild either Pistoya or Pisa they resolved it were better to set first upon Pisa being a thing more likely to succeed by reason of the late conspiracy there as also of more profit deeming that if Pisa were once gotten Pistoya would soon render it self The Florentines then going forth with this army in the beginning of May 1328 suddenly took Lastra Signia Mount Lupo and Empoli and came with their army to St. Miniato Castruccio on the other part perceiving this great army which the Florentines had brought againe him was nothing startled but rather thought that this was the time when Fortune was to give him in his hand the whole dominion of Tuscany beleeving they should have no better success in this of Pisa than formerly they had in that of Serravalle and that now they could not hope to repair themselves again as then whereupon assembling twenty thousand Foot and 4000 Horse he brought his army to Fucchio and sent Paul Guinigi with 5000 Foot to Pisa Fucchio is seated in a stronger place than any other Castle upon the territory of Pisa because it is in the midst between the Goseiana and the Arno and a little raised from the plain where he abiding the enemies were not able unless they divided their army into two parts to hinder his provision either from Lucca or Pisa neither could they but upon disadvantage either come upon him or goe towards Pisa for in one case they might be inclosed in the midst between Castruccios troops and those of Pisa in the other case having the Arno to pass they could not do it with the enemy on their backs without very great danger And Castruccio for their encouragement to undertake the passage had not placed himself with his troops along the bank of Arno but a little aside near unto the walls of Fucchio and had left distance enough between the River and him The Florentines having gotten St. Miniato advised whether were to be done either to goe to Pisa or to find out Castruccio and having measured the difficulties of both courses they resolved to goe and invest him the river Arno was so low that a man might wade over it but yet not so but that the infantry was wet to the shoulders and the Horse even to the saddle Upon the tenth day then of June in the morning the Florentines in battel array caused part of their Cavalery to begin to pass and a body of ten thousand Foot Castruccio who stood ready and intent to what he had in his mind to do with a battalion of five thousand Foot and three thousand Horse fell upon them neither gave he them any time to get out of the water but that he was at blowes with them he sent a thousand light armed Foot up by the bank on that part under the Arno and a thousand above it the Florentines Foot were much distressed with the water and weight of their armes nor had they all yet got over the channel of the river When some of the Horse had passed by reason that they had moord the bottom of the Arno they made the passage the uneasier for them that came after them for the bottom proving rotten and miry some of the Horse came over and over on their riders and many stuck so fast in the mud that they were there stabled whereupon the Florentine Commanders seeing the difficulty to pass on that part caused them to retire and make proof of a higher part of the river whereby to find a sounder bottom and the channel more favorable for their passage against whom those whom Castruccio had sent under the bank made resistance who slightly armed with targets and darts in their hands with huge outcries wounded them both in the face and brest insomuch that the horses affrighted both with the cryes and stroaks would in no wise pass forwards but fell foule one upon another the fight between Castrucio's men and those that were already past was sharp and terrible andd of each side there fell many and every one used all his skill and strength to overcome his adversary Castruccio's men would force them back into the river the Florentines striv'd to put forwards to make place for others that being come forth of the water they might be able to stand to the fight to which obstinacy there was added the Captains encouragements Castrucio put his men in mind that these were the same enemies which but a little while ago they had beaten at Seravalle The Florentines reproached theirs that they being many should suffer a few to overcome them But Castruccio perceiving that the fight lasted and that his own and his adversaries were well wearied and that on each side many were hurt and slain he sent out another band of five thousond Foot and when he brought them up to the very back of his own that fought he gave order that they before should open and wheele about one on the right hand the other on the left and so retire which thing done gave room to the Florentines to advance and gain some ground But when once they came to handy blowes the fresh men with those that were tir'd they staid not long ere they forc'd them back into the river between the Horse of the one side and the other yet there was not much advantage whereupon Castruccio knowing his own inferior had given order to the leaders that they should only maintain fight as he that hoped to overcome the Foot which done he might be able with more ease to overcome the Horse which out as he purposed for having seen the Foot forc'd back into the river he sent the rest of his infantry against the enemies Horse who with lances and darts wounding them and the Cavalery also pressing them with greater fury put them to flight The Florentine Commanders seeing the difficulty that their Horse had to pass strove to
able to right himself upon his enemies yet thought he it the more safe and profitable way to beguile them and for all this not to stop the treaty for peace and this matter was so far labored in that he made a peace with them and assured to them their old pays gave them four thousand Duckats in hand promised not to molest the Bentivolii and made alliance with John and moreover that he could not constrain any of them to come in person to him more than he thought good himself On the other side they promised to restore unto him the Dutchy of Vrbiu and all the other places taken by them and to serve him in any expedition he should undertake nor without his permission to war with any one or take pay of any one This accord being made Guidubaldo Duke of Vrbin sled again to Venice having first caused all the fortresses of that State to be demolished for relying upon the people he would not that those sorts which he thought he could not defend should fall into the enemies hands whereby to bridle his friends But Duke Valentine having made this agreement and divided all his troops throughout all Romania with the Frenchmen at armes at the end of November departed from Imola and from thence went to Cesena where he abode many dayes to contriye with those that were sent by the Vitelli and the Orsini who were ready then with their forces in the Dutchy of Vrbin what action they should then anew enter in but not concluding any thing Oliverotto of Fermo was sent to offer him that if he would adventure an â—expedition against Tuscany they were at his service in case he would not they would be ready to serve him against Sinigallia to whom the Duke answered that in Tuscany he would not make any war because the Florentines were his friends but he was well content they should goe to Sinigallia whence it came to pass that not long after advice was brought that the town was yeelded to them but the Fort would not for the Governor would render it to the Duke in person and to none else and thereupon they perswad'd him to comebefore it the Duke thought this occasion very good and that it would not any way skare them being he was called by them and not going of himself and the more to secure them he dismis'd all his French forces which returned thence into Lombardy save only a hundred lances of Mounsieur Candiâ—les his kinsman and parting about the middle of December from Cesena he went thence to Fano where withall his wiles and craft he could he perswaded the Vitelli and the Orsini to expect him at Sinigallia shewing them that such strangenesse would make their accord to be neither faithfull nor durable and that he was a man that desird he might availe himselfe both of the forces and advice of his friends and however Vitellozzo was very unwilling and that his brothers death had taught him that he should not offend a Prince and afterwards trust him neverthelesse being wrought to it by Paulo Orfino who had been corrupted by the Duke with gifts and faire promises he agreed to attend him whereupon the Duke before the 30 day of December 1502 that he was to goe from Fano communicated his purpose to eight of his cheife confidents among whom were Don Michael and the Lord of Enna who was afterwards Cardinal and gave them charge that presently as soone as Vitellozzo Paulo Orsino the Duke of Gravina and Oliverotto had met them each two of them should get one of them between them consigning each one by name to certaine two who should traine them along even into Sinigallia nor suffer them to part till they had brought them to the Dukes lodging and that they were there taken He afterwards tooke order that all his Horse and Foot which were better than two thousand Horse and ten thousand Foot should be in the morning at breake of day upon the Metaure a River some five miles from Fano where they should attend him being then the last day of Deucmber pon the Metaure with those troops he causd some two hundred Horse to go before him afterwards the Foot mov'd and after them himselfe in person with the rest of his men at armes Fano and Sinigallia are two Cities of the Matches seituate upon the bank of the Adriatick Sea fifteen miles distant the one from the other So that he who goes towards Sinigallia hath the Mountaines on his right hand the feet whereof sometimes are so bounded by the Sea that between them and the water there remaines but a very small distance and where they are most extended there is not above two miles distance The City of Sinigallia from the foot of these Mountaines is not much further than a bow-shot and from the Sea not above a mile distant along the side hereof runs alittle river which washeth that part of the wals which is toward Fano looking towards the high way so that till it come neare unto Sinigallia it runs for a good part of the way along the Mountaines and being come neare up to the river that passes alongst by Sinigallia it turnes upon the left hand alongst the banke thereof So that running on for the space of a bow-shot it reaches to a bridge which passes that river and stands in front with the gate that enters into Sinigallia not by a right line but athwart before the gate there is a bourg of houses with a broad place before them which the bank of the river shoulders upon one side So that the Vitelli and Orsini having given order to attend the Duke and personally to honour him the better to give way to his men they retir'd their own into certaine Castles some six miles from Sinigallia and had left only Oliverotto in Sinigallia with his band which was some thousand Foot and a hundred and fifty Horse which were lodg'd in the bourg before nam'd Things being thus ordered Duke Valentine came thence towards Sinigallia when the first head of the Horse troops came up to the bridge they pass'd it not but making stand they turnd their horse the one part towards the river the other to the open field and so left a way in the midst whereby the infantry passd which without stop entred the Town Vitellozzo Paulo and the Duke of Gravina upon their mules accompanied with a few horse went to meet the Duke Vitellozzo disarmed having a cloak all lined with green being exceeding melancholy as presaging his own death near at hand caused a certain admiration of himself in all the valor of the man being well known and the fortune he had passd and it is said that when he left his soldiers to come into Sinigallia there to meet the Duke that he did in a manner take his last leave of them to his Captains he recommended his house and the welfare thereof and admonishd his Nephews that they should not so much mind the great
among his people and withall diligence to shew that his valour got not the victory but rather it came by chance or by the enemies cowardise or by the direction of the other Captaines who were together with him in that imployment After that Vespasian being in Judea was by his army declar'd Emperor Antonius Primus who was then with another army in Illiria took his part and came thence into Italy against Vitellius who commanded at Rome and valorously conquer'd two Vitellian armies and made himself Master of Rome so that Mutianus sent by Vespanian found all already gotten by Antonius his valor and all difficulties surpassed The reward Antonius gain'd hereby was that Mutianus took away his command of the army and by little and little made him of no authority in Rome whereupon Antonius went away to Vespasian who was yet in Asia by whom he was so coldly receiv'd that in a short time depriv'd of all dignity he dyed in despaire And of these examples stories are full In our daies every one living knows with what industry and valour Gonsalvus Ferdinand warring in the Kingdom of Naples against the Frenchmen for Ferdinand King of Arragon brought that Kingdom under his obedience and how he had for reward of his conquest that Ferdinand parted from Arragon and came to Naples and first discharged him of his command of soldiers afterwards took from him the fortresses and then brought him away with him into Spain where a while after he dyed in disgrace Therefore this suspicion is so natural in Princes that they cannot escape it and it is impossible they prove thankfull to those who by victory have under their banners made great conquests And from that which a Prince is not free 't is no marvaile nor a thing worthy of greater note that a people is not free For a city living free hath two ends the one to gain the other to keep it self free and it cannot be but in the one or the other by excess of love it may erre Touching the errors in getting they shall be spoken of in their place as for the errors in maintaining their liberty there are these among others to hurt those citizens they should reward and to suspect those they should repose upon And though these wayes in a Republique come to corruption cause great evils and that many times they hasten it to a Tyranny as at Rome it befell Caesar who by strong hand took away that which unthankfulness denied him yet in a Commonwealth not corrupted are they causes of great good and make it live more free keeping men for fear of punishment more vertuous and less ambitious It is true that of all people that ever reign'd upon the causes above alleadg'd Rome was the least ungratefull for of her ingratitude we may say there is no other example but that of Scipio for Coriolanus and Camillus were banisht for the injury the one and the other had done the people But the one was not pardoned because he alwaies continued his malicious mind against the people the other was not only recall'd but all his lifetime after ador'd as a Prince But the ingratitude us'd towards Scipio grew from a suspicion the citizens began to have of him which was never conceived of the others which arose first from the greatness of the enemy Scipio had overcome from the reputation that the conquest of so long and perrilous a war had given him from the quick dispatch of it from those favours which youth wisdome and other his memorable vertues had gotten him Which things were so great that the Magistrates of Rome fear'd his authority more than any thing Which displeas'd the grave men as a matter not accustomed in Rome And his manner of living was thought so extraordinary that Priscus Cato reputed a man of great integrity was the first that stir'd against him and said that a city could not be called free where the Magistrates stood in fear of one citizen So if the people of Rome in this case followed Cato's opinion they deserve that excuse which I said before those Princes and people merit who through suspicion prove unthankfull Wherefore concluding this discourse I say that whether this vice be used either through suspicion or covetousness it shall appear that the people never put it in practise upon covetousness and upon suspicion less than Princes having less cause to be suspicious as quickly it shall be declared CHAP. XXX What means a Prince or Republique should use to avoid this vice of ingratitude or what A Commander or Citizen to be free from their danger A Prince to avoyd this necessity of living with suspicion or being ungratefull ought personally go to the warrs as in the beginning did those Roman Emperors and in our daies the Turk does and as those that are valorous have done and yet do For overcoming the glory and the gain is all their own And when they are not there in person the glory of the action belonging to another they think they cannot well make that conquest their own unlefs they put out that glory in another which they themselves knew not how to get and so become ungratefull and unjust And without doubt greater is their loss than their gain but when either through negligence for lack of judgment they stay idle at home and send out a Commander I have no other precept to give them than what they know of themselves But I advise that Commander because as I think he can hardly escape the nips of unthankfulness that he betake himself to one of these two expedients either presently upon his victory let him leave his army and put himself into his Princes hands abstaining from any action savouring of insolence or ambition that so he having no occasion given of suspicion may have reason to reward him or at least not hurt him Or when he likes not to do thus let him resolutely take part against him and use all those means whereby he may think to hold from his Prince what he hath gotten procuring the soldiers and the subjects good wills let him make friendship with his neighbors possess with his men the strong places corrupt the Chief of his army and assure himself of those he cannot and this way endeavor to punish his Lord for the ingratitude he would have us'd towards him Otherwaies there are not but as it was said before men know not how to be wholly vicious nor wholly good And alwaies it comes to pass that presently after the victory they will not part with their army behave themselves with modesty they cannot and to stand upon defyance in some honorable termes they know not how So that being irresolute which way to take between delay and doubt they are suppressed But to a Republique which would avoyd this vice of ingratitude we cannot apply the same remedy we may to a Prince that is that she go herself and not send out in her imployments being necessitated to make use of some one
thou delay'd to tell me it untill now that I have no remedy and upon these words slew him with his own hand And thus he suffer'd punishment for his silence when he should have spoken and for having spoken when he should have held his peace neither avoided he the danger by not giving his advice Wherefore I beleeve the rules above given are to be kept and observ'd CHAP. XXXVI The reason wherefore the French have been and are thought in combats at the beginning more then men and afterwards less then women THe fierceness of that Frenchman who challeng'd any Roman whatsoever near the river Anien to fight with him and afterwards the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 him and T. Manlius put 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of that which T. Livius sayes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Frenchmen in the beginning of the combat are more then men and in the end thereof prove less then women And weighing well from whence this may proceed many beleeve that naturally they are so dispos'd which I think is true but hence it followes not that this their naturall humor which makes them so fierce in the beginning might not be so order'd by art as to continue them fierce till the very conclusion And for proof hereof I say that there are armies of three sorts the one where there is both fury and order for from the order arises fury and valour as was that of the Romans for it appears in all their histories that there was a very good order in that army which military discipline in tract of time had brought in amongst them For in a well train'd army no man is to do any thing but by rule and order And we find hereby that in the Roman Army from which insomuch as it conquer'd the whole world all others may take example they neither ate nor slept nor bought neither did they any military action nor domestick without the Consuls order for those armies which do otherwise are not right armies and if they come to make any trial of themselves in any action they do it by force of rage and violence and not by valour but where valour is accompanied with due ordinances it makes good use of the fury in such manner and in such times that no difficulty abates it nor ever quailes the courage because those good ordinances reinforce the spirit and the fury both being still maintained by the hope of over comming which never failes while the orders hold firme The contrary falls out in those armies wherein is fury and not order as were those of the French who ever faild by little and little For it proved not that their first assault prevailed and that their fury whereon they much relied was not maintained by an ordinate valour not having any thing else besides that wherein to trust as that grew coole so they failed On the other side the Romans doubting less of dangers by reason of their good orders not distrusting the victory fought resolutely and obstinately with the same courage and valour as well in the end as in the beginning or rather enraged by fighting they grew still more fierce The third kind of armies is where there is no naturall fury nor accidentall order as the Italian armies are in our daies which are quite unprofitable and unless they incounter with an army which upon some accident chances to run away they shall never overcome and without alledging other examples we every day see that they give good proofes they have no valour at all And because by T Livius his testimony every one may understand how the good sâ—uldiery ought to be ordered and how the bad is I will set down Papirius Cursor his words having a mind to punish Fabius the commander of the horse where he said Let neither GOD nor man be had in any reverence nor the Generals commands nor his auspices be regarded let the souldiers pillaging up and down for want of provision as well in their friends country as in their foes let them casheere themselves at their pleasures for getting their oaths let them quit their Ensignes nor come together at command let them fight without the Generals leave by night or by day in place of advantage or disadvantage caring neither for ranke nor order and let the sacred and and solemn rites of warfare become like the blind and obscure tricks and chances of robberies By the text here we may easily see whether the warfare in our daies be blind and casuall or sacred and solemn and how much it comes short of resembling that which properly is termed a warfare how it differs from a furious and ordinate warfare as was that of the Romans or from a furious only as was that of the French CHAP XXXVII Whether slight skirmishes or combats are necessary before a great battell and what is to be done to know a new enemy when one should avoid those skirmishes IT seemes that in humane actions as otherwhere we have discoursed besides other difficulties found in bringing any thing to its perfection there is alwaies some evill very nearly neighbouring to the good Which so easily grows up with that good that it seems unpossible if a man would injoy the one to be quit of the other And this wee see in all the works of man and therefore is that good attain'd with difficulty unless by thy good fortune thou be so assisted that she by her power overcome this ordinary and natural inconvenient The Combate between Manlius Tâ—rquatus and the Frenchman hath put me in mind hereof where T. Livius saies That combate so much imported the event of the war that the French Army leaving their Campe in a fright went into the Tiburtine Country and thence into Campania For I consider on the one side that a good Commander ought wholly avoid to do any thing which being but of small moment may produce but evill effects in his Army for to begin a skirmish or a combate wherein the whole forces are not imployed and yet the whole fertune is there laid to stake is a thing savouring too much of rashness as I said before when I condemn'd the guarding of the passages On the other side I consider that wise and experienced Commanders when they meet with a new enemy and that is of reputatson are forc'd before they come to joyne battell to cause their souldiers to make tryall of them by light skirmishes to the end that beginning to know them and to have to deale with them they may be rid of that terror which the report and reputation of these men have put them in And this part in a Generall is of exceeding great importance for there is a kind of necessity in it which forceth thee thereunte for thou wilt think that thou goest to thy manifest destruction unless thou have first by these small experiences made thy soldiers cast out that terror which by means of the enemies reputation had possessed their minds Valerius Corvinus was sent by the Romans with an Army