been needless as also by carrying into his Leaguer what was in the Villages and Countrey Neighbouring on his Works to deprive his Enemies Army of all sustenance but what they brought along with them or were daily to be fetch'd by them to their Camp from a great distance And lastly to have still in his Leaguer more Victuals than the Besieged could then have within the Town thereby to compel the Relieving Army to attack those almost unconquerable Works or the Town to surrender for want of Food in the sight of the Army which came for the Succor These necessary performances together with his often fighting against such Forces as almost hourly Night and Day made numerous Sallies and were obliged to do it both to harass and lessen Caesar's Army and to retard the finishing of his Works which when compleated would render it highly difficult if possible to relieve the Besieged I say and I think with reason all these Economies of War were at least as difficult in the Actings as the making those laborious Fortifications Yet all were to be done and done at one and the same time and in so short a space that I scarce know to which of the two my Admiration is justlier due At length the Relieving Army appear'd which consisted of 248000 men as Caesar who condescended to be the Commissary of their Musters reckons them to be and also writes how many every State of Gallia did particularly send so that at once he was to withstand 320000 of his Enemies and which was more to fight with them at the same time when they attacked him in Front and Rear This formidable Relieving Army was led by four Generals viz. Comius Veridomarus Eporedorix and Vergesilaunus All great Captains and accustomed to make War even against Caesar himself where they could not but have learn'd much having to do with such a General and yet for many Years continued the War against him and one of them viz. Comius had learn'd the Rudiments of War under Caesar himself and acquired so much Honour in serving the Romans that Caesar rewarded him with the Principality over the Morini The Gaules seated their Camp on a Hill half a mile from Caesar's Works and sent their Cavalry into a Plain under it and their nimblest Archers conceal'd behind their Troops Caesar makes his Cavalry match out to fight them lest the Gaules by having their Cavalry unfought with even under Caesar's Works might grow too insolent and his own Army be intimidated The Roman Horse were worsted by the help of the Gaules Archers but Caesar's German Horse Relieved them Routed the Gaules and cut in pieces their Archers and then all Caesar's Troops return d within their Line The Gaules made three several General Assaults on Caesar's Camp the first by Day the second by Night and the third at full Noon Vercingetorix every time Sallying out at the same hour with his Army In these three Attacks all that Valor Skill and Industry could perform on both sides was not omitted Some Particulars I shall enumerate the Gaules finding the Rows of Stakes and Holes and the Galthorps destroyd many of their Men flung up so much Earth over them as covered them and thereby made them useless to the Romans Then filling their Ditches with Fagots Hurdles and Earth raised the Outside on which they went to the Assaults higher than the Line they assaulted and so went on advantageous Ground to the Attack and Caesar when he found his Men distressed in Front by the Enemies over-numbring him and fighting on equal Ground would often command his Cavalry sometimes his Legionary Infantry to sally out of his Line and to fall on them in the Rear whereby he routed them The last dayes Attack seem'd several Battels rather than one General Assault such great Bodies fighting at once both within and without the first Lines towards the Field and towards the Town for the Gaules having discover'd the weakest or more properly the least strong part of Caesar's Line while all the residue of their Army were assaulting the rest of the Works Vergesilaunus who was Vercingetorix's near Kinsman in the obscurity of the preceding Night had marched behind a Hill and concealed himself there with 60000 select men who at Noon-day when the Romans were with all their Forces defending their Works both against the Besieged and Comius c. assaulted them unexpectedly entred the Line whose Ditch they had filled and with many shouts daunted Caesar's Soldiers as he himself confesses But Caesar at last by the Valor and Expertness of his men and by his excellent Conduct relieving them in all parts where they were oppressed and leading them in Person to many Charges was Victorious and Chaced the Gaules to the very Works of their Camp and to the Gates of the Town and adds If his Soldiers had not been quite spent with that dayes hot Service few of all the Gaules had scaped They lost in that last dayes attempt above 60000 men so that despairing to perform what they came for they did that Night abandon their Camp and many were kill'd by Caesar's Cavalry who pursued them in the obscurity and the next day Vercingetorix capitulated and yielded he himself gallantly mounted and armed at all points having first leisurely rid round about the Chair of State in which Caesar sate to receive him alighted off of his Horse and as an evidence of his being Conquer'd disarm'd himself and then went and sate down on the Ground at Caeâ—…ar's feet without speaking one word Some of those many Reasons which induced Caesar in my opinion to continue within his Lines and not to give the Enemy Battel in the Field I shall here set down I. He could not shut up in Alesia a much greater Army than his own without making very strong Lines of Countervallation against it II. Having made these wonderful â—…ines and knowing of the vast Relief which was certainly hastening to succor the Besieged he with so small an Army as his own which probably could not consist of above 30000 Foot and 6000 Horse for he never had above 10 Legions at once in all Gallia could not reasonably hope both to keep in Vercingetorix with 80000 chosen men and fight against Comius c. with 248000 good men unless by prodigious Works he could supply what he wanted in Numbers of men and also by so posting his Army between his Lines of Circumvallation and â—…ountervallation as to be thereby ready to resist both wayes and often with the same Reserve Battalions and Squadrons For whatever Justus Lâ—…psius computes That the space between these two Lines must be 5000 Foot yet in reason I am fully convinced they were much nearer each other for else they could not answer the end for which they were made since no Squadrons of Reserve can 〈◊〉 answer both wayes a distance of a Mile much less do it as often as need requires and our modern Lines of Circumvallation and Countervallation which are but Copies after
especially if the Counties allow'd some little encouragement to such Officers or if such of the Soldiery as fail'd were to contribute something to the Officer who did appear and teach those who came But above all if at least twice a year the several Militia Regiments were to Rendezvous and to Hutt for four or five dayes together and during that time were to perform all the Functions of War as if they were incamped near an Enemy it would in all likelihood be of excellent benefit in time of Rebellion or Invasion In which Campings I would have them make their Hutts in the form of Streets and Piatza's and in just as little room as if they were to make a Line about the Camp which would teach them what to do and make them expert therein against the need were real In which Campings also I would have all Excess or Debauchery both strictly prohibited and severely punish'd if practised for Debauchery in Armies is the High-way to Ruine since those obey best that are most sober During these Campings such time as was not employed in handling Arms exercising marching in several forms of Battel and Skirmishing I would have employed in Jumping Running but most of all in Wrestling to make their Bodies the more active and strong and to hinder them from all ill employments But above all I would recommend Wrestling for whoever thinks himself the strongest and activest of body will strive to come closest to his Enemy and if he be so will the sooner overcome him whereby in fight none will doubt those will charge the homest who find they are strongest at the grapple Lastly If to these before-mentioned Particulars there were at such half yearly Campings little Medals with Ribons or such other small Rewards for every one of those who should be judged best at the use of the Pike or Musket or at Shooting at Marks or at Running Jumping or Wrestling to the best at which last the Medal should be still of double value as that Exercise which ought most to be encouraged I believe it would so incite every individual person that the Generality could not but be highly improved and the Emulation those little Rewards could not but ingender would questionless produce desirable effects Besides the great Concourse of the Nobility Gentry and unlisted Commonalty which Curiosity or some other Motives would draw to see these Campings and Exercisings would be an additional Incentive to all the Militia to appear not only in their best Garbs but also to be more expert in the several performances during their Camping I leave it to the judgment of all men whether the benefit to the whole Kingdom would not much outweigh the charge and trouble if this method or something like it were constantly observed In which case what is here set down in generals and roughly might then be more minutely ordered and polished and many needful things added For the wit of man cannot in the Theory find out so much as in the practice will be discovered The Ancients especially the Romans had the choice of all their People from Seventeen to Forty five years of age We in imitation have the choice of such whom the Laws exempt not from Pressing from Sixteen to Sixty years of age out of them to form our Soldiery I think youths but Sixteen years of age are of the youngest to be led on actual Service though not to be Trained to Arms and Hardships And few men when Sixty years old are fit for the Wars especially if then they but begin to be Soldiers so that methinks the Romans therein began later and ended earlier than we do with much reason which therefore I could wish were altered by us and that none before he were past Seventeen and none after he was Fifty should ever be Pressed to be Soldiers I would allow Five years longer to our men who are to be Soldiers to continue such than the Romans allowed to theirs because our Climate is not so scorching as theirs and therefore the radical moisture which is as it were the sap and makes the vigor of our men lasts longer in our temperate Climate than in their hotter Besides most men when arrived at Fifty begin to participate of those infirmities which render them unfit for the Actions and Sufferings of the Lives of private Soldiers The Military Tribunes chose out of every Tribe every one alternatively those who were to compose their Legions But alas 't is not our Officers which choose our Soldiers but our Press-masters generally do it for them whereby 't is no wonder if often our Regiments and Troops have so many in them unfit to be Soldiers since too commonly these Press-masters Press those who are abler to buy themselves off than able to make fit Soldiers to serve their King and Countrey besides how often are they actuated to spare the fit for Favor and to send the unfit for Revenge or some other as bad motive The Tribunes were likely to choose well because they chose for themselves and if they chose ill they thereby expos'd their Honours and their Lives The Press-masters with us choose for our Tribunes or Colonels and are likely to choose all because few do it conscientiously and most do it out of sinister Considerations The Tribunes if they chose ill Soldiers were to lead them But the Press-masters if they choose ill men are only to be rid of them and may gain much by it 'T were therefore very highly to be wish'd that the Press-masters had some few and written Rules given them whom to Press and if they broke them that they might be severely punish'd for it Amongst which Rules possibly these might be fit to be exprest viz. To Press none that were not past Seventeen To Press none past Fifty To Press onely the younger the stronger the activer sort and if possibly not to Press the Married at least not to Press any of them till on Tryal 't were evident the unmarried were not sufficient to form the Forces since the Married are generally too much incumbred to follow the War with that intentness of mind which the Profession does require as appears by what St Paul sayes No man that warreth intangleth himself with the affairs of this life that he may please him who hath chosen him to be a Soldier The Ancients and the Romans most particularly had not only the advantage of us in the choice of their private Soldiers but also in the choice of their Officers for every higher Order of them choose the next and so in Sequence the second choose the third Order and the third the fourth till all were chosen whereas in the generality all our inferior Field Officers and Commissioned Officers are put upon our Colonels whereby perhaps they may have good Officers but the Tribunes were certain to have them if it were not their own faults And 't is worth marking how gradually the Romans proceeded therein First the People that is the State chose the
like to have been worsted for the Soldiers were forced to gnaw off much of the Lead others to cut their Bullets in which much time was lost the Bullets flew a less way and more uncertainly and which was worse so many pauses animated the Enemy by making him think our Courages cooled If there be two sizes of Muskets and shot on both ends of the Barrels which hold the shot should be written Lesser and Bigger that in the hurry of a Fight there might be no mistake but that Bullets be distributed according to the Bores of the Muskets I would also propound That in all Field Engagements especially in those where we intend not to cheapen an Enemy but to fall on merrily that the Musketeers would load their Muskets only with five or six Pistol Bullets which will do great Execution especially Fired near and then to fall in at Club Musket I have Experimented this and found it attended with great Success I would recommend the Fire-lock Musket above the Match-lock Musket for several Reasons some of which I shall mention First It is exceedingly more ready For with the Fire-lock you have only to Cock and you are prepared to Shoot but with your Match-lock you have several motions the least of which is as long a performing as but that one of the other and oftentimes much more hazardous besides if you Fire not the Match-lock Musket as soon as you have blown your Match which often especially in Hedge Fights and in Sieges you cannot do you must a second time blow your Match or the Ashes it gathers hinders it from Firing Secondly The Match is very dangerous either where Bandeleers are used or where Soldiers run hastily in Fight to the Budge-barrel to refill their Bandeleers I have often seen sad instances thereof Thirdly Marching in the Nights to avoid an Enemy or to surprize one or to assault a Fortress the Matches often discover you and informs the Enemy where you are whereby you suffer much and he obtains much Fourthly In wet weather the Pan of the Musket being made wide open for awhile the Rain often deads the Powder and the Match too and in windy weather blows away the Powder ere the Match can touch the Pan nay often in very high Winds I have seen the Sparks blown from the Match Fire the Musket ere the Soldier meant it and either thereby lose his Shot or wound or kill some one before him Whereas in the Fire-lock the motion is so sudden that what makes the Cock fall on the Hammer strikes the Fire and opens the Pan at once Lastly To omit many other Reasons the quantity of Match used in an Army does much add to the Baggage and being of a very dry quality naturally draws the moisture of the Air which makes it relax and consequently less fit though carried in close Wagons but if you march without Waggons the Match is the more expos'd and without being dried again in Ovens is but of half the use which otherwise it would be of And which is full as bad the Skeans you give the Corporals and the Links you give the private Soldiers of which near an Enemy or on the ordinary Guard duty they must never be unfurnished if they Lodge in Hutts or Tents or if they keep Guard in the open Field as most often it happens all the Match for instant service is too often render'd uncertain or useless nothing of all which can be said of the Flint but much of it to the contrary And then the Soldiers generally wearing their Links of Match near the bottom of the Belt on which their Bandeleers are fastened in wet weather generally spoil the Match they have and if they are to fight on a sudden and in the Rain you lose the use of your Small Shot which is sometimes of irreparable prejudice I am also on long experience an Enemy to the use of Bandeleers but a great Approver of Boxes of Cartridges for then but by biting off the bottom of the Cartridge you charge your Musket for service with one Ramming I would have these Cartridge Boxes of Tin as the Carabines use them because they are not so apt to break as the Wooden ones are and do not in wet Weather or lying in the Tents relax Besides I have often seen much prejudice in the use of Bandeleers which being worn in the Belts for them above the Soldiers Coats are often apt to take Fire especially if the Match-lock Musket be used and when they take Fire they commonly wound and often kill he that wears them and those near him For likely if one Bandeleer take Fire all the rest do in that Collar they often tangle those which use them on Service when they have Fired and are falling off by the Flanks of the Files of the Intervals to get into the Rear to Charge again To which I shall add that in secret attempts in the night their Ratling often discovers the design and enables the Enemy to prevent it And in the day time on service especially if the Weather be windy their Ratling also too frequently hinders the Soldiers from hearing and consequently obeying the Officers word of Command which must be fatal when it happens whereas the Cartridge Boxes exempt those who use them from all these dangers and prejudices they enable the Soldiers on Service to Fire more expeditiously they are also usually worn about the Waste of the Soldier the Skirts of whose Doublet and his Coat doubly defend them from all Rain that does not pierce both and being worn close to his body the heat thereof keeps the Powder dryer and therefore more fit to be fired on service Besides all this whoever loads his Musket with Cartridges is sure the Bullet will not drop out though he takes his aim under breast high for the paper of the Cartridge keeps it in whereas those Soldiers which on service take their Bullets out of their Mouths which is the nimblest way or out of their Pouches which is slow seldom put any Paper Tow or Grass to ram the Bullet in whereby if they fire above breast high the Bullet passes over the head of the Enemy and if they aim low the Bullet drops out ere the Musket is fired and 't is to this that I attribute the little Execution I have seen Musketeers do in time of Fight though they fired at great Battalions and those also reasonable near It might also do well if the Soldiers tyed their Links of Match about their middle and under their Coats and Doublets instead of tying them to their Bandeleer Belt or Collar for by that means the Match would be kept dryer and fitter for service in time of Action As to the Arming of the Cavalry both for Offence and Defence I am of opinion the Arms we use are as good as any viz. the Swords Pistols and Carabines And if in the Front of our Squadrons we had some Blunderbushes they might be of good use in Fight I
their Shot if not with their Pikes gaul your Enemy while under their Covert your Horse may Rally and come again and again to the Charge and possibly recover the day Nay it makes your Cavalry fight with more Confidence when they know that one or more disastrous Charges may by thus ordering some of your Infantry be repaired by their own Rallying in the Rear of them and those who know what belongs to War will not be over-forward to Charge the second Line of your Wing leaving at once such Battalions of Infantry and the disorder'd Cavalry Rallying at their backs but on the contrary will hardly judge it adviseable to attempt your second Line till they have intirely swept out of the Field your whole first Line I did frequently though unworthy of the Honour command Forces in Chief and therefore I esteem'd it my duty to be often thinking and arguing how they might be employed to the best advantage and though in the Wars I was in we alwayes were or at least thought our selves to be superior to the Enemy in Cavalry Yet I was not seldom busying my thoughts how we might best fight in case he should be at any time stronger than I in Horse and I stronger than he in Foot The Result of those Thoughts I will presume to Present my Reader with The Checquering my first Line of Cavalry with small Battalions of Shot I judg'd was not the most secure or the most effectual way and therefore I concluded the Impaling as it were my Musketeers by my Pikes as is before-mentioned was much the better And because whatever is new and surprising to your Enemy is still of considerable advantage especially at the instant in which you are going to Charge him I resolved had I ever had an occasion to do it to have acted when the Ground allow'd of it as followeth I. I would have drawn up all my Cavalry a-breast either two or three deep as I should have esteem'd it the best as things were circumstantiated II. I would have appointed previously what Squadrons should have composed my first Line and what Squadrons should have composed my second Line and what Officers should lead or be in the Rear of every Squadron in both Lines and have communicated to them respectively my Orders therein III. I would then have drawn up those small Battalions of Pike and Shot order'd as I formerly mentioned just in the Rear of every such Squadron only as was to compose the first Line of my Wing and just as many in a Rank as might fill up the intended Interval when it was made and have caused my Pike-men to trail their Pikes that they might not have been seen by the Enemy which if shoulder'd or ported they would be IV. I would then have advanced towards the Enemy as if I had had no second Line or Reserved Squadrons but just when I was come so near him as that it was time to form my first and second Line I would at the Trumpets sounding the Charge which should be the Signal for the doing it have composed my said two Lines of my Wing by the Squadrons of the Front Line continuing their motion and by the Squadrons of the second Line making a Stand or Halt V. As the first Lines would be forming it self by the Squadrons of it continuing their motion and the second Lines would be forming it self by standing I would in the Interval of Ground made thereby have caused my small Battalions of Pike and Shot behind every Squadron of the first Line to march up and made an even Front with the fame Squadrons in whose Rear they had till then marched and so have begun the Battel advancing with the Horse and those Foot my Shot firing under their Pikes inoessantly This I esteem'd would have been both new and surprizing for it would have been thought strange by the Enemy and likely have given him an ill opinion of my Conduct to see me bring all my Cavalry to fight at onde which the first Form of my advancing would probably make him believe was my intention But when he unexpectedly saw that I composed my two Lines orderly in my advancing it might amaze and surprize him And in all likelihood both those Productions might he heightned when he should also see my small Battalions of Pike and Shot appear unexpectedly from behind my Squadron and advance in an even Front with them to the Charge so that his Horse singly must endure the joint shock of my Horse Pikes and Musketeers If this method of Checquering my Squadrons in the first Line of my Wing with small Battalions of Pike and Shot order'd as I have set it down should be approved and that you have Infantry enough so to Checquer your second Line also and that you shall esteem it necessary to have it done by reason of your Enemies exceedingly overpowring you with Horse you may also observe the like method of doing it in your second Line as you did in your first by having such small Battalions of Pike and Shot drawn up and marching in the Rear of those Squadrons which are to compose your second Line who may advance by the Interval Ground between the Squadrons to the Front of them when by your first Lines continued motion they have left the Ground free In the doing of all this there are some Particulars I would recommend to be alwayes observed I. That your Pikes which are to be trail'd during your advancing behind the Squadrons that the Enemy may not discover by those long Weapons what you would conceal from his sight be ported as soon as ever you begin to appear between the Intervals between which you are to march up to make an even Front with your Cavalry that thereby they may be the readier to be Charged against the Enemy who will by that time be very near and therefore such preparative readiness to receive him is very needful II. I would have all my Firelocks load their Muskets with Pistol Bullets for the Enemy against whom you Fire will be alwayes very near and therefore several Pistol Bullets out of one Gun will do as much Execution as one Musket Bullet at a time out of many Guns III. Those commanded Pikemen which are to impale your Shot ought to be of the resolutest and strongest men for on their Courages will depend much of the safety of your Horse and of your Shot and therefore if I had Pikemen armed defensively with Back Breast Pott and Faces I would choose to place them there since they are also to endure the shock of your Enemies Cavalry IV. The shot of these small Battalions must be still bestowed on those Squadrons of your Enemies Wing which compose his first Line for those are the nearest and the most pressing and the Muskets being loaden with Pistol Bullets they will not do certain Execution on any Squadrons of the Wing of his second Line which are usually about 100 Yards less advanced than his first Line
imitation of the Roman Discipline when the Army or Forces were to march I observed these following Rules where I had the Honour to command in Chief Soon after the Reveill was beaten I caused all the Troopers and Wagoners or Men that tended the Baggage to take up their Horses and Oxen and to make ready to load At the sounding to saddle all began to take down their Tents and to load At the sounding to Horse all the Troopers did mount and the Foot Soldiers draw into Arms under their Colours When the Trumpets sounded to the Standard all the Soldiery marched out of the Ground they Quartered or Camped on into the Field or Fields appointed to draw up in and there were formed into as many and large Squadrons and Battalions as the time and ground would admit still those Forces of Horse and Foot having the Right which were to have the Van all day and the Guard at night all the Ordnance Wagons and Baggage being drawn up on one side by themselves ready to fall into the centre of the Foot as the Army or Forces marched off Those which had had the Guard the preceding night being drawn up in Battalia till the Army fell into their marching order and till the Ground was cleared and then they brought up the Rear all that day and commanded out a Rear-guard of Horse and Foot during that dayes march who were still to bring up all sick or lame Soldiers who could not keep pace with the Body And where any was unable to go to carry him behind a Trooper till he came to the Camp and then to deliver him to his Captain also to seize upon and secure all straglers and to give them to the Provost Marshal that they might be punish'd If I march'd through a Countrey which had narrow Cause-wayes Bridges Rivers or Passes I made those Forces which were on those Cause-wayes Bridges and Passes double the quickness of their march till they were gotten out or over them and then immediately draw up on the right or left hand as the Ground would permit till all the rest were got over in case I suspected the Enemy was near or watched my motion If I did not apprehend an Enemy then I made only every Regiment of Horse and Foot draw up when they had passed over those straights till the intire Regiment were got over and then to continue their march the like I practised over any fordable Rivers But still when the stream was rapid or above knee-deep I made the strongest Horse by turns in Files stand firm in the River on the upper and lower sides of the Ford that the Foot might pass the safelier between them the upper Files breaking much the rapidness of the stream and the lower catching up those Foot Soldiers who might be cast down by the violence of the Current by which means many Foot Soldiers Lives have been saved I did also order the Horse in the Van of all when they had gotten over the Ford to send out small Parties to discover while the rest of the Army were marching over the Fords or Bridges and if the Countrey were enclosed or hilly to be the more diligent and expeditious in such searchings and discovery For an Enemy cannot wish for a greater advantage than to fall upon an Army which is separated by a Ford Bridge or such narrow passage since then they are his at a cheap price therefore great and constant circumspection must be observed in all such cases and all the Forces as fast as they get over must be in a posture to fight in formed Squadrons and Battalions while the rest are getting over It ought also to be the constant care in a chief Commander especially marching through an Enemies Countrey or when an Enemy is near often to make short halts that the Army may not march disorderly and that it may be as short in its long march as possible for 't is better to make short and sure dayes marches than long ones and hazardous 'T is impossible to give one certain and standing Rule for the most advantageous and safe way of marching an Army for the form must vary according to the Country you march in and the Enemy you have to do with If I suspect he means to assault me during my march in my Front Rear or Flanks I must fortifie those several parts accordingly If he be an Enemy not strong enough to give me Battel and will only by his Horse and Dragoons possess the Passes and Bridges and Fords to obstruct and retard my march I would then have some Ordnance with their Necessaries march with the Foot which are in the Van of all the better and sooner to drive him from his Defences and I would march my Army in two or three several Bodies divers wayes which the French call Columes but we and I think more properly Lines yet still no farther distant the one from the other than to be ready speedily to unite if the need require and at evening all to Camp in one Field or quarter it conveniently whereby the whole would move the more expeditiously safely and at ease and the Enemy would be the less encouraged to defend a Bridge Ford or narrow Pass against one of the three Lines since while he is doing that one or both the others may encompass him and cut off his retreat There are several other Cases which must be provided against as the emergencies happen by the care knowledge and foresight of the Commander in chief for which no positive Rules can be set down but the Orders must be given on the place and proportionably to the Ground the Enemy and the Occasion In an Enemies or doubtful Countrey especially I would still have a general Officer with the Quartermaster general attended upon by the Quartermasters of the respective Regiments of Foot and Troops of Horse and Train to be on the ground to Camp on at night some convenient space of time before the Van of the Army comes up both to view the Ground thorowly to take all the advantages of it and to appoint the several places for the Guards for the general Officers the Regiments and Train to incamp in that against the Army comes up every one may know where to pitch his Tent for which end the several Quartermasters should near the first Avenue of the Camp attend and be ready to shew their men respectively as they come up where the Ground is and how much is allowed them to lodge in that all may go readily and without confusion to their several stations and that there may be no dispute those should be staked or marked out else too often quarrels or animosities do arise on those occasions And if an Enemy be near I would have the several Regiments draw up within the Camp or near it till the Rear be ready to enter into it to be the fitter to resist if assaulted or to relieve the Rear if fallen upon and only admit some of every
accustomed unto and therefore are generally the less knowing in it for I have seen eminent Commanders there when they came with Armies for the War of Ireland so great Strangers to the Rules of it as their Camps appeared to me to be like Fairs and some of them not only have ingeniously acknowledged to me they were to seek in that great part of War but condescended to inform themselves from me what I could tell them on that Subject choosing rather to confess their ignorance that they might mend it than to continue under it though I heartily wished them a better Instructer I also have been convinced by reading the Greek and Roman Histories that they ow'd as much of their Conquests to their well Incamping as to their other excellent Military Discipline and their Valor it would be almost endless to enumerate what Kingdoms and Provinces they kept in obedience by their standing Camps and how often they stop'd the invasions of Torrents of barbarous Nations as they were pleas'd to term them by the same proceeding and having first wearied out their Enemies by such safe and beneficial delayes then on some great advantages they would give them Battel and defeat them none of which they could have effected or rationally have attempted but by their thoroughly knowing how to Incamp advantageously by constantly practising it and by a timely providing of Food and Forage I have likewise observed these few last Years that the French who have not only many eminent Commanders if not the most of any one Nation and daily improve the Art of making War have begun to revive and with great benefit to themselves this almost obsolete part of it For I take the Prince of Conde to be one of the famousest Captains that any Age hath produced and I observed when the Prince of Orange the Imperialists under the Count de Souches and the Flemish Forces were united the Prince of Conde who was sent to oppose them would not give them Battel but Incamped himself advantageously on the French Frontiers so that they justly apprehended to enter them and leave him at their backs whereby he kept them long at a Bay and when he found his opportunity gave them at Seneff so considerable a blow as the French from having been on the defensive they became afterwards the Assaulters and closed that Campagne by taking some of their Enemies Garisons The Mareschal de Turenne also who was sent General to the War in Germany and who in the Military Art had hardly a Superior having there to do with the Count de Montecuculi who I believe has not been excell'd by any Captain in any Age would still by intrench'd Incampings when the Germans were the strongest preserve himself and Army by spinning out the time and cover those Territories and places he had won while he had been the most powerful and to me it seems a thing very worthy observation that after by the Mareschal de Turenne's being kill'd when the French King sent the Prince of Conde from the Army in Flanders to command his Army in Germany he did also by intrench'd Incampings weather that Storm which in it self was so threatning not only by the sudden loss of so great a Captain but also by the Germans being led by the Count de Montecuculi and the present Duke of Lorrain two persons as considerable as the very Forces they lead I say it seems to me very worthy of observation that two such justly celebrated Commanders as the Prince of Conde and Monsieur Turenne should observe the very same methods in managing the same War whereas usually when one General succeeds another in heading the same Army and ordering the same War the last Comer judges it a kind of diminution to his own skill to tread in the very paths of his Predecessors but the Prince of Conde not doing so thereby in my poor opinion renders three things evident I. That he truly judged himself so justly secure in his own Reputation as it could receive no diminution in following the steps of the dead General especially he having done the like before and successfully in Flanders II. That a wise and great Captain will rather by his actings confirm that course to be best if it be so in it self by imitating his Predecessor than try new methods of War whereby out of but a meer hope to do the like thing by a different way he may hazard his Reputation his Army and the Countrey he is to cover and protect III. What two such Generals have practised all circumstances consider'd is to me an Evincement that by Camps intrenched and well posted a Countrey may be best secured an invading Enemy may be best resisted and in time all advantages being taken in the nick may be defeated or made retire As the French King manages his Wars on the German side by his Captains and makes it oftner defensive there than invasive so on the Flanders side he makes it generally offensive and leads his Armies himself which is the solidest way to be successful some few of the many Reasons why I believe it is the very best way for a King to lead his own Armies I shall here set down I. It evidences he has a Genius to the Wars else he would not himself be at the head of his own Armies and that makes the Nobility and Gentry of his Kingdom Warlike since all Subjects of Quality generally addict themselves to what they find their Prince is most inclined II. No Prince is likely to be so well served or is so well served as he who with his own eyes sees who are active or remiss in their duties to reward the first and punish the last III. How many opportunities to be victorious are lost by a Generals sending for and staying to receive Orders from his Prince all which by his own being on the place are laid hold of and improved IV. How many brave men will not go to the War if the Prince be not there in person who if he be cannot then be kept from the honour and duty of waiting on him V. How many valiant men of his Guards are to attend his person which if it be not with his Army is thereby deprived of so many good Fighters VI. How many good heads may be consulted with in the Army when the King is there who would not be drawn thither unless he were there either by reason of their crazy healths or believing it below them to be in an Army where any commanded but themselves or some such other Considerations VII How many Garisons may be bought and Commanders bought off from the Enemy when the King in person is the Merchant which otherwise would not listen to or trust to the Bargains offer d by his General It were endless to enumerate all the real advantages which a Sovereign has who makes War in person against Enemies which make War only by their Generals nor can there be almost a larger illustration of the truth
of what I have said than what we have seen with our own eyes these three last Years even that the French King singly not only makes War in effect against all the Continents of Europe but also gains rather than loses Ground which possibly could hardly be done by him though he is a great and brave Prince himself though he has a large and noble Monarchy many eminent Commanders and almost an innumerable company of good subaltern Officers and is absolute and has all his Territories united and fronting upon the Countries of almost all his Enemies If to all these advantages he did not in person often lead his Armies where he means to make his chief impressions and if he did not by intrench'd Incampings oppose by his Generals those of his Enemies who else might invade his Dominions and if he did not also excellently manage the Wars on his side and if he were not also help'd by his Confederated Enemies being intangled under many inconveniencies and hinder'd by many obstructions I say if all these did not concur it would seem to me almost impossible to do as he does especially since he hath also at the same time engaged himself in the protection of the Messineses with his Maritine and Land Forces whose Militia he must not only pay but what is worse feed the useless mouths of both Sexes and of all Ages and which perhaps is more than all this he must send all things to them in his Fleets by a long Navigation and hinder'd therein by the joint Naval Forces of Spain and the United Provinces so that many conclude he may gain more fame by extending his Arms so far abroad even while he has so much need of them near home than solid benefit by engaging in that revolted Peoples defence unless some considerable Emergencies be favourable unto him but yet on the other side why may it not be believed that the inuring his Subjects to Navigation and Sea-fights is singly worth the expence of that Sicilian War and indeed all things rightly consider'd perhaps he could not more usefully attempt the attaining that end than by making War in the Mediterranean Sea against Spain for thereby he gives His Majesty and the States of the United Provinces less jealousie than if he managed it in any other of the European Seas he makes the War laborious chargeable and tedious to the States if they pay their Mediterranean Fleet or to Spain if that King be at the sole expence of doing it It is also no little augmentation of his Glory that France which till his Reign was so little considerable at Sea and that Spain which though during the Reign of King Philip the Second made Europe and the Ottoman empire apprehend his Armada's yet cannot now even in conjunction with the Fleet of the States hinder France from frequently relieving of Messina and the other revolted places of the Island of Sicily nay in Sea-Battels has forced his way to that end so that all things duely weighed perhaps the French Monarch could not make a more hopeful War by Sea than this to train up his Subjects to fight on that Element if he aspires to be as formidable on it as he is actually on the Land which may not be unreasonably presumed he does by the Stupendious and Royal Foundations he has laid for the building of Ships and equipping them and for the educating his Subjects to Navigation and encouraging them to pursue that Calling and by the numerous and stately Navy he has built in a very few Years which is such as some believe may at the present equal for Number and size even the Fleet Royal of England or the Navy of the States and should this be true may it not be more likely that he may ten Years hence if not sooner attempt to give the Law at Sea then that ten Years past he should be so strong in Ships of War as now he is especially if while his Navy is growing he can render his own Subjects capable to manage it for 't is easier to increase Fleets than at first to build them So that this Messinese War which some consider as a blemish in his Politicks may be none of the least depths of them But since I have asserted two particulars viz. the French Kings excellent management of his Wars and the advantage he reaps by the intanglements and difficulties which his Confederated Enemies are under I esteem my self obliged to set down some of my Grounds for those two Assertions I. I find that having so many formidable Armies to deal with and being thereby unable to have Forces both to face every one of them and reserve Armies also he is very cautious to avoid a general decisive Battel lest the loss of it might hazard his Monarchy II. He has been usually in the Field about the beginning of March and by having his Armies excellently well provided and frankly hazarding his Soldiery he has taken in 18 or 19 Weeks before the whole Confederacy can imbody more Countries and important Garisons than they have retaken in the six succeeding Months after they are imbodied III. Being an absolute Monarch and having none in his Armies but such as depend on his Will he may alwayes pursue the Councel which is in it self best and may execute it with expedition and secresie so that having resolved where to make his impression in the very opening of the Spring he provides in the Neighbouring Territories his Magazines for Victuals and Forage accordingly and thereby what supplies him with both doth disable those Territories to supply his Enemies on the place should they come to raise any of his Sieges with an Army formed of the Forces of the whole Confederacy And by his having formerly secured or consumed all Meat and Forage near his Leageurs makes it impossible for the other in that ill season of the Year to carry all of both forts on the Axle-tree sufficient for themselves though it were but for a few dayes and having by his Lines of Circumvallation made it almost an act of Temerity to attempt to force them he makes it also an impossibility to constrain him to raise his Sieges by a diversion For what place can they besiege in a Season when the earth yields no sustenance for Man or Horse and when they have not Magazines of both laid in beforehand to supply them And if they should attempt to raise his Sieges but by such part of the Forces of the Confederacy as can carry Provision and Forage with them on the Axle-tree or by Boats 't is much more than an even Wager that they will repent it sooner than he IV. Since the Germans are the greatest force of the Confederacy by his so early in the Year attacking the Spaniards Flemish Territories he renders the German assistance useless to those Countries in that Season since 't is almost a Winters march to lead Armies timely enough from the Centre or remote parts of the Empire where commonly
should resolve to give his Enemy Battel but on rational or at least very probable Grounds that he shall win it and also when the advantages of gaining it will be greater than the prejudices will be if he should lose it for whoever elects to fight a Battel on other Considerations cannot answer the doing it to his Prince to the Army he leads or to his own Judgment and Conscience III. The third is Whoever has his Enemy at such an advantage as he must submit in a short time without hazarding a Field ought on no terms to expose his Army to a Battel but should derive that from Time and Patience which else he must leave to the decision of Fortune As within my own memory I have known That a General greedy of Honour and impatient of Delay when by the wise conduct of those under him or the ill conduct of those against him his Enemies Army was so coop'd up that it could not long subsist nor Force its way he drew his own Army off of the Passes which shut up his Adversary that he might come out and decide it by a Battel which he lost and deservedly For the turns in a Battel are so many and are often occasion'd by such unexpected Accidents which also proceed from such minute Causes that a wise and great Captain will expose to Chance only as much as the very Nature of War requires IV. The fourth is When a Battel is resolved upon the Field to fight it in ought to be answerable to the Numbers of your Army and the quality of your Forces As for Example You should never choose a Ground to fight on if you can possibly avoid it which you cannot fill up with your fighting and reserve Squadrons and Battalions or as 't is now usually call'd your first and second Line That is you must still endeavor to cover the outward flanks of your Wings with a River a Wood a moorish Ground or something equivalent for else you will expose your Army too much if your Enemy does overwing you Whereas if you cannot be charg'd but in front you will have the less to fear and your Adversary the less to hope For Instance If I found my Army drawn up in Battalia would take up in its utmost extent but 15000 Foot I would not choose to fight in a Plain that was 20000 Foot wide if my Enemies Army were either more numerous than mine or were stronger in Cavalry than I But if by some Accident which I could not foresee or possibly avoid I were to fight on such a Ground I would immediately cover one or if possibly both of my Flanks with what the Nature of the Place afforded as besides a River a Brook a moorish Ground a Wood or Coppice or a steep Ground with a Ditch or Trench or some place so incumbred as my Adversaries Horse could not fall on that Flank without disordering himself before and in his doing of it But in case the Ground was so level and clear as it afforded me none of those Advantages which would be an extraordinary thing I would then by my Carriages or by immediately casting up a long and large Ditch or Trench on my Flanks supply by industry what I could not otherwise attain And if I had leisure at the two ends of each of these Ditches or Barricade of Wagons especially at the Front end I would cast up a Sconce Redoubt or Fort and stuff it with Musketeers whereby the Flank of my Wings would be covered and the Front and Rear of them defended by those Musketeers 'T was almost thus that Lewis Prince of Conde acted in the Battel at St. Denis in the Reign of King Francis the First of France And had not only thereby the Resolution with an handful of the French Protestants to fight the Constable of Montmorancy whose Army was three times as great as his but also to make it so disputable who had the Victory that the Historians of those Times give it without seruple to the Party they were of and wrote for And it seems indeed but doubtful who had the Victory for the next morning the Prince and the Admiral Chastillion by Andelot's being joined with them who brought them not above 1000 men with which until then he made the River of Seine useless to the Parisians drew up their Army again in the Field of Battel and shot some Peals of Cannon even into Paris yet none of that King's Forces came out to fight them so that the Protestants having for a few hours brav'd the French King's Forces and that vast City marched away towards Champagne to meet their German Relief But on the other hand the Historians who were Royallists attribute this wholly to the death of the Constable and not only to the Consternation which it caused but also to the Irresolution of the Counsels who should succeed him since the Duke of Anjou who at last did was by many judged too young for so weighty a Charge and it is reasonably to be believed he would not then have been nominated but that the Queen Regent was irremoveably setled not to lodge in such intricate times the absolute Military Power in any of the House of Guise or in that of Montmorancy but in one who intirely depended on her and would be guided by her And 't is probable that the Protestants who doubtless had been much disordered in the Battel durst not have made that Bravade depending only on their own strength but at least as much on the irresolution and disputes of their Enemies who should be their new General And therefore having set the best face they could on their tottering Affairs for a short time judged it not adviseable to continue playing that part any longer than they believed they might do it safely by the King's Army being without a Head I have only instanced this Particular to manifest how a lesser Army may oppose a much greater in Battel if the Flanks of the lesser be so well covered as that it can only be charged in Front which ought alwayes indispensibly to be provided for Nor is it only needful where a Battel is to be fought to pitch on a Ground answerable to the Number of your Army but also answerable to the quality of those Forces which compose it and to those of your Enemies with whom you must have to do As if my Enemy were stronger than I in Cavalry I would avoid all I might fighting him in a Plain or if I were the stronger in Horse I would use my utmost industry to engage him in an open Countrey And on the contrary if I were stronger in Infantry I would shun the Combat unless it were in an inclosed Country or incumbred by Woods Brooks Coppices Rocks or moorish Grounds so if he were the stronger in Foot I would avoid fighting in a place where he who has the most Infantry may therefore have the most hopes of Victory But if you are commanded to fight by your
Prince or are engaged to do it to answer an end worthy the hazard of a Battel or for any such other rational Consideration great care must be alwayes taken to make choice of that Ground which is fittest for you both in respect of your own Forces as also of your Enemies And in a most particular manner if you are weakest in Foot to cover them the best you can with your Horse and on the contrary if you are weakest in Horse to cover them with your Foot V. The Ranging of an Army in Battel to the very best advantage is a great furtherance to the winning of the Victory But the so doing of it depends much not only on the Wisdom and Skill of the General the Nature of the Ground and the Quality of his own Forces but also on those of his Enemies and on the disposition of him who commands them so that although no standing Rules can be given to answer all these varieties yet some positive Maxims may be set down which if punctually observed as things are circumstantiated may beneficially answer all occasions and emergencies And I the rather say this because I have seldom found that the greatest Captains of elder times whose military knowledge and practice the Moderns justly value and extol have ever observed one and the same form in giving Battel but have varied therein considerably according to the occasion Cyrus being to fight against Croesus King of Lydia and in a large Plain fearing to be inviron'd drew up his Army but Twelve deep in File whereas formerly the File was 24 deep Whereby he augmented the Front of his Army double overwing'd Croesus's and won the Victory Caesar at the Battel of Pharsalia against Pompey did quite alter the manner of the Roman Imbattelling For having found that Pompey exceedingly outnumbred him in Horse he covered one of his Flanks with a little River and drew all his Cavalry to the other Flank among the Squadrons whereof he placed Bodies of his best Infantry and there he began the Battel Where by having all his Horse in one Wing and those accompanied by select Legionary Foot he soon Routed that half of Pompey's Horse which opposed all his and then falling into the Flanks and Rear of his Enemy won the Victory These two are very remarkable Instances which among many others verifie what I have said I shall now mention some of those standing Maxims which in my humble Opinion are indispensibly to be observed immediately before and in a day of Battel 1. The first is With great diligence to view so well the Field you will fight in as when you have drawn up your Army on it you may not afterwards alter the Order of it or change your Ground for all such Mutations in the Face of your Enemy are very dangerous and gives him also the greater Confidence and your own Men the less as being an evidence to both of a great Failure in Conduct And it may also be highly hazardous either to remove the whole or even some gross Squadrons or Battalions to the Ground which on second thoughts may be believed the better Ground of the two since your Enemy being then near may take the benefit which such disorders while the alteration is making may give him and may improve it to your total overthrow so that 't is in my poor Opinion more adviseable to keep the Ground and Order you are in though by your oversight neither should be the very best than to alter it in the sight of your Enemy and when he is near And all changes of Grounds or Order in his view ought never to be made in Gross Bodies but almost insensibly to them and your own Army by a few Files at a time and where they cannot be so made 't is better to leave them unmade I had been often told but could scarcely credit it that at the fatal Battel of Naseby after my Lord Fairfax his Army was drawn up in view of His Majesties it having been judged that the Ground a little behind them was better than that they stood upon they removed thither I had the opportunity some time after to discourse on this Subject with Major General Skippon who had the chief ordering of the Lord Fairfax his Army that day and having ask'd him if this were true he could not deny it And when I told him I almost admir'd at it for the Reasons before exprest he averr'd he was against it but he obeyed the Orders for doing it only because he could not get them altered After the Ground to fight on is well chosen and all the advantages of it discovered then to possess and to secure the most useful and commanding Posts of it with all imaginable diligence As King Henry IV. of France did at the Battel of Arques where that great Monarch shewed as much conduct as any of the Greek and Roman Generals ever did in any of their greatest Battels II. The second is If you come near your Enemy but yet so late in the day that the Battel must be defer'd till the next morning then if the Season be sharp to shelter your own Army in the most convenient Villages and Woods adjoining to the Field you will fight in and thereby give them all the cease you can as King Henry IV. of France did the night before the Battel of Iuri But you must not on any terms neglect the safety of your Army for the ease of it and therefore it must be Quarter'd or Camp'd so well as that on the touch of the Drum all may be Embattled and ready to receive your Enemy For which end great Corps de Gards ought to be advanced and many Centinels as covertly as may be placed near the Enemy and every moment visited and relieved by vigilant Officers These Centinels or Perdu's are to give instant Notice to the advanced Guards if the Enemy moves and those Guards with their Seconds or Reserves are to find the Enemy play while your Army is drawing up to receive him But still fresh Troops must be sent to sustain your advanced Corps de Gard if they are vigorously attacked lest by their being totally overthrown your Enemy be encouraged to push at All and your own Men be somewhat disheartned For it may so happen that your Enemy if he finds all the advantages of the Place to fight in are so well secured by your care and diligence as that the next day it may be hazardous to fight in that Field he may make choice in the night if you are not Intrenched to attempt you where the confusion which darkness usually engenders may be equally divided between both Parties this of the two being the more eligible Nor were it amiss but very adviseable if you have to deal with a General who is hot and undertaking or one who by the necessity of his Affairs must put All to hazard that in such Nights when you are near your Enemy and may for the beforementioned Reasons have
the Battel on that side where you judge your self the strongest and your Enemy the weakest and with those Troops to advance as expeditiously as you can without disordering them while the rest of your Army moves as slowly as they may For if your first Impression be successful you may fall into the Flank and part of the Rear of your Enemies while the Residue of your whole Army is marching to attack them in the Front but then the motion of your Army must be quicker as soon as ever they see your advanced Wing is successful I would recommend to Practice one thing more which I have on tryal found very beneficial it is this During the motion of your advanced Wing to edge it by degrees and insensibly towards the outward Flank of that Wing of the Enemies which you go to charge so as by that time you mingle you may outwing them and thereby attack them at once in Front Flank and Rear if he has omitted to cover that Flank And therefore to begin the Battel with that Wing of yours which is the strongest is not only most adviseable but also to place your best men in that Wing of yours which is opposite to that Wing of his which has the Flank of it uncover'd if by neglect or want of time or means either of his Flanks are not secured I have known great advantage obtain'd thereby and if your Enemy be not very timely aware of this it may more than likely contribute considerably to win you the day I mention very timely aware of this because if he discover not your design until you are on the Point to execute it it will be too late to prevent it since no alteration can be made when you are ready to join but it will in all likelihood be ruinous to him who in that juncture of time shall attempt to make it When I mention your beginning the Battel with that Wing in which you have placed your valiantest Soldiers I intend thereby that the second Line of that Wing shall advance as well as the first else while you fall in the Flank and Rear of your Enemies Wing his second Line may fall into the Flank and Rear of as many of your first Line as are so employed unless your own second Line be ready to prevent it and to improve all the Advantages which your first Impression shall give you The placing the best Men in the Wings of an Army is very ancient and seldom has been omitted but to the loss of those who were guilty of such Omission the Reason is the Troops on your Wings are not wedg'd in as the Troops in your main Battel are but are at liberty to take all advantages that by accident or by the ill conduct of your Enemy or by your own good may be offer'd you and you cannot so much as rationally hope to fall into his Flank and Rear but by attacking one of his Wings because you cannot overwing him but only by falling upon one of his outward Flanks Hannibal who was so excellent a Captain to win Victories though possibly not to make the best use of them at the famous Battel of Cannes placed all his valiantest Men in both his Wings and the worst Men in the midst of his Battel whereby when the Romans came to the Charge who had placed their choicest Legions in their main Battel they soon pierced into the Body of Hannibals Army which was what he designed they should do for then with his two Wings in which were all his choicest Troops he immediately incompassed the Romans and totally defeated them But at the Battel of Zama or as some call it Nadagara which â—…e fought against Scipio though the Fate of Carthage depended on the issue of that day yet he totally altered the Order he had observed at Cannes and lost the Victory For at Zama he placed all his new raised Men by themselves to endure the first Attack of the Romans and of all his old Soldiers who had so memorably served him in his Wars in Italy he made as it were an Army apart and drew them up a few Furlongs behind his new raised Africans who were therefore soon cut in pieces as his reserve Army was not long after whereas if he had observed the like order of Battel at Nadagara as he did at Cannes he might have had the like success IX The ninth thing is To prohibit under the severest Penalties the absolute Chace or the Pillage until the Enemy is totally Routed on all sides and then have those Troops only to pursue which are expresly appointed for it alwayes having Squadrons to march after the Pursuers as near and in as good order as if they were going to the Charge that if the Pursued should Rally and Face about you may have those ready to fall on and break them a second time How many Victories seemingly won have in an instant been lost for want of due care in these two Particulars of such high concernment which therefore ought never to be omitted Neither is there any thing which more encourages flying Enemies to rally and fight again than the seeing a disorderly Pursuit of them for in such a Pursuit all the advantage of the prevailing Party is immediately vanished when the Chaced do but turn about for such an evidence of restored Valor too often daunts those who are to oppose it Nor can any thing more deterr the flying Party from doing that than to see several Bodies in good order ready to make them repent that confidence and though brave Officers will not cease pressing promising and threatning their Men that flie to Face about yet the Private Soldier who sees those Bodies are ready to fall on them conclude it is more dangerous to do so than to run and therefore are too often deaf to all Oratory or Menaces of that Nature for the frighted Soldier as well as the hungry Belly has no Ears These Nine Particulars may not improperly be called Maxims in War and therefore ought to be still practised before a Battel in a Battel and after the Enemy is Routed I know many of the Ancients and not a few of the Moderns have with much industry alwayes endeavored to gain the Sun and the Wind of their Enemy in the day of Battel and doubtless both are very desirable to be on our backs when they may be obtained without losing thereby more certain Advantages from the Nature of the Ground you are to fight on For those are mutable especially the latter and the former is still in motion so that no Precaution can ascertain the keeping of them when they are gotten and therefore one must not lose the stable Advantages in hope to gain the unstable but if both may be had at once they must never be neglected I shall now proceed to set down several other Particulars which I hope will be useful to whoever has the Curiosity and Patience to read them VVhen an Enemies Army advances to
raise the Siege of a place which otherwise can hardly hold out longer in my poor judgment it is not adviseable to defend the ordinary Line of Circumvallation but to draw out of it and give the Enemy Battel if your Men be as good your Numbers as great as his and that your Ground you fight on be as fit for you as him Some of the Reasons and Experiments which induce me to be of this Belief I shall here express If the place be large which you besiege your Line of Circumvallation must of necessity be many Miles about for it ought to be out of the reach of your Enemies Artillery else you will too much expose to the mercy of it your Army that is lodged within it All this Line must be equally defended unless it be where the situation of it secures it self or does it but thinly mann'd for not knowing in what part or places of it he will attempt to force it you must secure every Foot of it which in consequence does so disperse your Army that if he once enters it will be impossible to draw it together expeditiously enough to beat him out again for as soon as ever he is gotten within it he flings down immediately such parts of it as are near him that the Squadrons and Battalions of his Army may come in and they marching on the heels of each other will certainly be imbattelled and rout all the small Forces which may be in readiness near that place and will also hinder those further off from imbodying Besides if the place besieged is seated on an unfordable River or that may be so in a rainy season as most commonly considerable Fortresses are 't is not to be doubted but you will cast over it Bridges of Boats or fixed Bridges that you may surround the place which else might with safety be every day or night relieved and thereby also have free intercourse between both parts of your Army which are divided by the River and 't is as little to be doubted but as soon as he has enter'd your Line his first care will be to make himself Master of all those Bridges that such as are as it were in a Pound may not escape and that having defeated half your Army he may march over them to destroy the rest who seem then but too ripe for Ruin when half their Friends are cut off and all their Enemies are marching against them and the Besieged by their Sallies ready to assist them This seems to me to be the usual and fatal Consequences if your Enemies Army entring your ordinary Line of Circumvallation which being most frequently but a Parapet with a narrow and shallow Ditch is but too easily forced and indeed not to be held tenable of it self If the Forts Redoubts and other Works which flank it and which are usually raised a Musket-shot from one another with many hands to mann it did not in a good degree secure it But those Works usually are such slight things especially when an Enemy is entred that few of the Resolutest which are posted in them to guard them stay to do it after for commonly the attempt on such a Line is made a little before the break of day that the Obscurity may the less expose the Assailants while they advance to storm it and that the day-light may help them soon after they are gotten in to improve all advantages which are offer'd them thereby and 't is in this twilight ordinarily that those in the Works to defend the Line steal out of them when they find the Enemy is entred as those who then expect more safety from their feet than from their hands He who resolves to force an ordinary Line of Circumvallation either does it without any noise or else alarms it round and often most warmly where he means not to make his attempt while small Parties are doing this in the dark he is drawing all the rest of his Army to the place or places which still are near each other where he intends to make his real impression and does it with that silence as the Defendants cannot discover his intentions till usually it be too late successfully to oppose them I must therefore frankly acknowledge since the defences of such a Line are so inconsiderable since the equally manning them so dissipates the Army which does it since it cannot hopefully be defended otherwise And since it cannot be safely defended that way I have almost wonder'd at those who rather choose to make good such a Line than to give Battel to the Enemy who comes to raise the Siege This being a more hopeful thing a more glorious action and whose Consequences if Success attends the Besiegers in the Field will be much more great than to defend the Line can possibly be for thereby you can at last but carry the place But by a Battel gain'd over the Relievers you usually carry the Fortress but as one of the many good effects of getting the Victory for few if any Towns hold out after the relief sent them is defeated What I have said on this Subject proceeds from my taking two things for granted the first is that the Circumvallation Line is after the usual and common Form that is but a Parapet and that the Works which defend it are very inconsiderable either towards the Field or within the Line The second is that the besieging Army has as good Men and more than the Relievers bring for 't is necessary he leave his best and most advanced Works well guarded during the Battel both to preserve them against his return with Victory as also by them to hinder the Besieged from sallying on their backs while they are fighting with the Relief but indeed if the Line need not be of much circumference if it be high and the Graft large and deep if your Army is not strong enough both to fight the Enemy in the Field and to secure at the same time your most advanced and most necessary Works if the place you must fight in is an open Countrey and that your Enemy does much exceed you in Cavalry or if it be an inclosed incumbred Countrey and he does much exceed you in Infantry if you have Victuals and Forage enough within your Line and your Enemy have little with him or without it so that he can stay but a few dayes and that you may probably in fewer dayes take the place by Assault or have it surrendred by Capitulation I say in a Case thus Circumstantiated I would not admire a General would justifie his Line but rather admire if he should draw out of it to give Battel to the Relievers I shall therefore now instance some Examples of famous Captains who have kept within their Lines of Circumvallation when the Enemies Army came to relieve the Besieged and in them have resisted their Attempts and as a consequence of that success have gain'd the places I shall also give Examples of some other great Generals
who have chose rather to draw out of their Lines to give the Relieving Army Battel than to stay within their Lines and in them to oppose the Relief I shall then enumerate some of the many Reasons why I believe such various and opposite methods have been practised by such celebrated Chiefs in War nay sometimes by the very self-same General though I must say I find many more Examples in Histories and in my own time for drawing out of ordinary Lines of Circumvallation to give Battel to the Relievers Army than for opposing the Succors by continuing within them Caesar who I esteem the famousest Captain of the Universe in the famousest of all his Sieges that of Alâ—…sia in France chose to stay within his Lines to oppose the Relief of the united Gaules or at least fought them in the Field only with his Cavalry which on occasion he drew out of his Lines and in which Services he owns his German Horse did him most service who have been famous for their Valor even as long as Historians have recorded any great Actions of War in which that Nation had a share But because this memorable Siege is so minutely and particularly related by Caesar himself and does thereby imply he thought it even his Master-piece in that kind and since by his Conduct there the most eminent Captains of the Moderns as I have been credibly informed have model'd the design of their Sieges viz. the Prince of Orange the Duke of Parma and the Marquiss of Spinola in their great Sieges of Maestricht Antwerp and Breda I hope those who read this Book will at least judge me worthy of their Pardon if I stay a little in the Relation of this prodigious Siege of Alesia since also no less an Author than Paterculus when he treats of it has these very expressions viz. So great things were done at Alesia that they might seem too great for any Man to attempt or any but a god to effect Caesar having defeated the Cavalry of the Gaules whose Army was led by Vercingetorix a Person worthy to command a National Army Vercingetorix shuts himself up in Alesia with 80000 of his chosen Soldiers sends away the Reliques of his Cavalry as useless in that Siege and requires all the Nations of the whole Countrey of Gallia to come to his Relief which he conjures them to hasten having but 30 dayes Corn in the Town to feed his Men which in all probability by the frugallest management and the carefullest distribution could not suffice for above six Weeks Caesar immediately resolves to besiege this great General and greater Army in hope to reduce both before the Relief could come yet admirably well fortifying himself against the Relief if it should come early enough to succor the Besieged What these stupendious Works were both as to the Circumvallation to oppose the Relievers and as to the Countervallation to resist the Attempts of the Besieged you shall have briefly related and from his own Commentaries wherein he writes viz. That he made round about the Town a Ditch of 20 foot wide and 20 foot deep with upright sides as broad at the top as at the bottom 40 foot behind this Ditch he made his first Works behind them he made two other Ditches of 15 foot in breadth and 15 foot deep and behind all these he made a Ditch 12 foot wide and 12 foot deep with a Rampard and Parapet thereon and erected Towers round about the whole Work at every 80 foot distance the one from the other besides the Palisadoes Stockadoes and those other Fortifications which he comprehends under the name of Cippi of which there were five Ranks and of Stimuli of which there were eight Courses or Rows round about his whole Camp So that it seems to me none of his Enemies could come to attack his Works but must run on several Ranks of sharp Stakes or into Holes or on Galthrops which were also covered or hid with Branches of Osiers Caesar further adds That after the inner Fortifications were thus perfected he took in 14 Miles of Circuit and made the like Fortifications in All Points against the Enemy without as he had done against the Town which are his own words These are the first Lines of Circumvallation and Countervallation which I ever read of in any Siege and I fully believe the making of both as ordinarily they are made in our modern Sieges when we equally apprehend the numerous Sallies of the Besieged and the strong Attempts of the Relievers was taken from this Model of Caesars but the Copies are very much short of the Original as to the quantities and qualities of the Lines so many prodigious Works of 11 Miles about towards Alesia and 14 Miles about towards the Armies which came to succor it with the several Rows of Stakes Holes in the Ground and other Traps to destroy and catch the Gaules I think is admirable and to perfect them one would judge must be the labour of some years though a vast Army undertook it whereas indeed as I believe it could not possibly be the labour of many days For though Caesar mentions not how many days it was before the Relieving Army came Yet since he expresly says Vercingetorix found scarce 30 days Corn in the place when he shut up himself in it with his 80000 chosen Men and that he surrendred it not till the Relief had made three Attempts to succor it it is undeniable 't was not Famine only which made Vercingetorix yield And therefore it could not be many days in which Caesar began and perfected all these wonderful Works This being the true Narrative of the strength of his Lines both towards the Town and towards the Field it is not to be thought strange he elected to withstand his Enemy within such Fortifications and that he repulsed their General Assaults though three times made nor can any one reasonably believe Caesar's Army could have justified 11 miles of a Line against 80000 men within the Countervallation and of 14 miles against 248000 men without the Circumvallation had not the multiplicity of his Works the one within the other and the strength of them every way made them defensible enough for the paucity of the hands which were to justifie them Yet the finishing of these amazing Works were not the onely Labours of Caesar's Army but to do the constant Duty Night and Day of the Camp especially most strongly until the Line of Countervallation was finish't the providing not only Forage and Victuals from hand to mouth but also to lay in besides Magazines of both for 30 days which Caesar writes by his Orders were done That thereby as I suppose he might not be necessitated to stir out of his Lines when the Relief should Incamp it self close by them which else might have hazarded the cutting off his Army by piece-meel going to Forage or forced him to have come to a decisive Battel whereby all his Labour on his Lines would have
Caesar's Original are generally no farther asunder than to leave space to Camp the Army in and that the Battalions and Squadrons may be drawn up between them so near as timely enough to relieve either or both Lines and to me 't is inferredly evident that Caesar had this in his prospect by acknowledging he was necessitated to run that part of his Line which Vergesilaunus assaulted as the weakest on the hanging of a Hill for had he ran it on the top of the Hill it would have taken up too much Ground that is have made his â—…ine of Circumvallation too far distant from his Line of Countervallation and thereby rendered the Reserve Battalions between both Lines useless to one or both III. Caesar seeing that Vercingetorix not designedly but compelled by necessity had cast himself into Alesia with 80000 chosen men for the Gaules Cavalry having been defeated the day before by the Italian and German on which Cavalry of the Gaules Vercingetorix most depended and losing their support despaired of retreating in the face of the Roman Horse and of the Legionary Infantry had no better Game to play than to get into Alesia which was very near him Caesar therefore had abundant reason to believe the Town had not wherewithall long to feed so many mouths for I conclude it was not a Magazine of the Gaules since Caesar particularly mentions that the Manubii by whose interest only Vercingetorix was admitted into it were by him expelled out of it the longer to enable his Army to eat which sure he would not have been so ungrateful to have done if they had been his Garison and also had not meer want of Corn constrained him to it I say since Caesar by their want of Corn had probable hopes to reduce them by Famine before their expected Relief could come for a League of many petty States are not overwarm to adventure their Forces to relieve the Defeated but are more inclined to make their Peaces apart and therefore having shut them up with prodigious Works he was afterwards compelled as it were to make as vast Works against the Relief when he foresaw the Besieged could hold out till the Succor came for else all he had thitherto done had been uneffectual to answer his final end since the full manning of those Lines against the Besieged must take up too many of his small Army to leave him enough Forces to fight the vast Succors in the Field and therefore he resolved to continue within his Lines IV. Since he could lay up one months Magazine of Victuals within his Works which was more than Vercingetorix could have in Alesia after Comius c. came with the Relief Caesar had all the reason imaginable to justifie his Lines and not to draw out of them to give his Enemy Battel for he might justly believe that if the Relief had hopes of cutting him off from all Provisions which he had not got into his Camp before their coming they would only design to block him up within his Works and then he might sooner starve Vercingetorix than Comius c. could starve him And by having ruined the flower of the Gaules Forces and their Generalissimo he should be the better able to fight the rest in the Field when the Consumption of his Magazines within his Camp necessitated him to issue out of it Or if the Gaules soon after their Arrival should endeavor to storm and force his Camp on the Field-side of it and Vercingetorix at the same time on the Town-side of it he might be the better able to resist and repel both being within such Works so that which soever way they acted Caesar had great cause to keep within such stupendious Works by the help of which he at last defeated his Enemies Field Army and reduced to his mercy their besieged Army and did it both at one and the same time Nor had Caesar left Comius and the Relievers any probable hopes to besiege him successfully while he was besieging Vercingetorix could he have been fed within the Town longer than 30 or 40 dayes for Caesar had furnished his Camp for one month and had thereby brought into it all the Provisions which were near it in the Countrey and more than probably destroyed by his Cavalry all he could not bring within his Line and when 248000 Soldiers with the many useless mouths as to Fighting which in the best regulated Armies attend such Forces must be fed and all this Victual and Forage must be brought far off it would have been very difficult if possible to have supplied them for any considerable time with Food I beg the Readers pardon that I have thus largely insisted on this one Instance which in some degree to repair I will almost but name the subsequent ones The Example of Caesar's keeping within such excellent Lines and in them resisting and defeating the Relief being very ancient I will give the Reader a recent one to evidence that in parallel Cases equal Success has been the Consequence Henry Prince of Orange a most excellent Captain did in the Year 1632. besiege Maestricht the Spaniards apprehending they should not be able with their own Armies onely to force his Lines which were as strong in needful places as the very Fortifications of the Town prevailed with the Emperor to join with them for that Service the German Army commanded by Count Papenheim a brave and adventurous General and to heighten his endeavors to relieve the place he was promised 100000 Crowns and the Order of the Golden Fleece if he effected it But the Prince of Orange had made such Lines about his Camp and against the Town and so well furnished his Leaguer as thereby he resisted all their Assaults and when the Relief drew off Maestricht Capitulated and Surrendred The Reasons which in my poor opinion did engage the Prince of Orange to stay within and justifie his Lines were That his Works were almost as tenable as those of Maestricht That his Enemies did greatly exceed him in Cavalry and the Countrey about it was Champion That he was well furnished with Horse-meat and Mans-meat within his Leaguer That his Enemies Armies were ill furnished with both That he knew Papenheim could not long be spared by the Emperor and that the other Commanders without his help durst not attempt to force such extraordinary Lines And that if he had raised his Siege and retreated before the Enemy advanced he had not only lost all the Blood Treasure and Time which were consumed in this Siege but also had given the Enemy leisure and means to repair those defects in the place which his knowledge of had been a chief invitation to him to besiege it I shall now Present my Reader with two remarkable Instances of famous Generals who even in our own memories chose within an ordinary Line of Circumvallation to oppose the Army commanded to relieve the Besieged and were thereby defeated and forced hastily to abandon their Design The Archduke assisted by
Command may be clearly heard and punctually obeyed 'T is observed that the Grecians went alwayes silently to the Battel alledging for it That they had more to do than to say to their Enemies But such Shoutings is a kind of doing for it stirs up your own Men and often damps your Enemies This puts me in mind how that once marching in Battalia in a plain Countrey to fight the Enemies Army and as they marched in the like order to meet us some Musketeers of ours running hastily to a Budge-Barrel to fill their Bandeleers and being careless of their Matches the Budge-Barrel took fire and blew them up at which the Enemies Army shouted and finding our Men did not answer them I rid hastily to the next Squadrons and Battalions and commanded them also to shout which the rest of the Forces taking it from them repeatedly did soon after the like Accident happen'd to the Enemies Army and then our Men shouted but were not answer'd which I bid the next Troops to take notice of as a sign they were disanimated and a proof that their loss was considerable by that blowing up the Soldiers took it as an Omen of that Victory which God soon after was pleased to give us which seems to shew That Shouting according to the Soldiers understanding is a token of joy and the Enemies not answering it an evidence of fear and whatever may cause fear in your Enemy ought not to be omitted by you since Fear is truly said to be a Betrayer of that Succor which Reason else might afford Besides there is in all Mankind a weak Part and Experience has but too clearly evidenced that the difference between the Best and the Worst Men does not consist in those being totally exempted from the Influences and Operations of it but in the degrees of being less liable to it Now this weak Part is affected with Noise and Pageantry and therefore when the shew of danger is thoroughly imprest on the Intellect by the conveyance of the Senses the minds of Men are too much disturbed to be then actuated by the dictates of Reason The putting into Rank and File and the forming into the order of Squadrons and Battalions all the Men and Boyes which attend the Soldiers and can be spared from the Baggage and are not armed may be of good use for all those so ordered and placed at a competent distance as a Grand Reserve in the Rear of all make a formidable shew to your Enemy and inclines him to believe you have a third Line or Battalia to be broken before they can get the Victory Nor is this all the advantage which may be derived from thus disposing of those useless Persons in a day of Battel since thereby also you will hinder them from filching the Soldiers Goods while they are busie a Fighting and will keep the Field clear which you engage in I mention this last Particular having sometimes seen the Soldiers Boyes and the Drivers of Carriages either incited thereto by natural Valor or desire of Pillage or both so closely attend the Rear of their Masters who were fighting that when they were disordered it occasioned much hazard and confusion in the Rallyment But these appearances of Soldiers must alwayes be put at such a distance from the Enemy that he may not see they are unarmed and consequently but a meer show for then that will become ridiculous which otherwise will be terrifying Though I have already said in General That if your Enemy be stronger than you in Cavalry you must cover yours with your Infantry and if he be stronger than you in Infantry you must cover yours with your Cavalry Yet possibly it may not be useless to set down in some Particulars how those General Rules may be best practised If my Enemy did much outnumber me in Horse and I him in Foot I would flank every Battalion of my Shot with Files of Pikes Nay I would so order such of my Battalions as were likeliest to bear the often Charging of the Enemies Cavalry as that the Front and Rear of my Shot in them should be covered with my Pikes as well as my Flanks and under my Pikes my Shot should be still firing either keeping their Ground or Advancing or Retreating as there should be occasion Nor would I omit if my Enemy very much overpower'd me in Cavalry to place small Battalions of Shot and Pike so order'd as is immediately before express'd in the Intervals between my Squadrons of Horse in the first Line of my Wings For to me it seems much more adviseable if you mingle Battalions with Squadrons in your Wings that such Battalions should be of Pike and Shot so ordered than of Shot alone as is the usual method in such Imbattellings For if such small Battalions consist of Shot only the chief advantage you can derive from them is by their firing to disorder your Enemies Squadrons just as you are going to Charge them but if that fails of the hoped-for Event whatever becomes of your Squadrons these small Battalions are too much exposed to Ruine for Shot onely will not resist Horse in an open Field especially when those Shot also are disanimated by the Flight or Routing of the Horse that had fought on their side Besides I have found experimentally That private Soldiers never fight with the needful Courage when they are led on such a piece of Service as this of Firing on an Enemy and after to shift for themselves if that Volly does not the Work for then they do it in haste and too often timerously for even while they are firing they are looking which is the best Way to flie when they have done firing which would too much distract Men of more setled minds than private Soldiers are usually blest with To which I shall further add That Musketeers so imbattled and chequer'd as it were with Squadrons of Horse may too likely on the disordering of your first Line of Cavalry be so shuffled together by those of it that are Routed by those of your Enemy which pursue the Rout and by those of your second Line which advance to stop the Enemies pursuit that the poor Shot can neither be useful to their Friends nor offensive to their Enemies Whereas if those small Battalions be composed of Pike as well as Shot and be ordered as is formerly set down they will in the Spaces or Intervals between your Squadrons not only make almost as great Fire on your Enemies but also firing under the Pikes do it with less apprehension and consequently take their Aim the better and thereby do the more Execution Besides fighting with a Resolution to make good their Ground composes their Minds and makes them the more Resolute against their Enemies and the more obedient to their Officers Commands but what is most material of all is If your Squadrons should be disordered nay routed yet such Battalions as these will for some time at least keep their Ground and with
Lastly If it be on your Right Wing that these small Battalions of Pike and Shot are placed then I would have them when they advance to Front even with your Squadrons alwayes to do it to the Right of the Squadron they marched in the Rear of and if it be on the Left Wing alwayes to the Left For thereby your Flanks of your outward Squadrons in each Wing will be cover'd with Pike and Shot and the innermost Squadrons of your Wings will be flank'd with the Battalions of the Foot of your Army Therefore if this be not stedily observed your outmost Squadron of both your Wings will be needlesly left unflank'd by a small Battalion of Pikes and Shot which when you are much outnumbred in Horse will be too hazardous and therefore the preventing it highly adviseable I acknowledge I never practised this against an Enemy but it was meerly because I never had need to do it neither did I ever exercise my Men to it and that proceeded only from an apprehension that it might discover what I intended in case there had been need and thereby probably have made it less effectual But I am confident it is very easily practicable and to be made of very advantageous use in case the Enemy were much my superior in Cavalry and I stronger than he in Infantry But I submit this Notion to the judgment of those who are better able to determine of it than I. If your Army be stronger by much in Cavalry than your Enemies and his stronger by much than yours in Infantry I would then earnestly endeavor to fight both or at least one of his Wings with both or one of my Wings which I once did and I would make all my Infantry move as slowly towards the Enemy as they could while I advanced a round trot with my Cavalry and Charged that of my Enemies And if I had success in both my Wings against both his or in one of my Wings against one of his then I would make the next innermost Squadrons of my second Line of that Wing which had beaten the Enemies or of both my Wings if they had defeated both the Enemies Wings immediately march to flank my Battalions of Foot but not to hazard Infantry to Infantry till mine were Wing'd by some Squadrons of my second Line and then advance to the Charge as expeditiously as I could without disordering my Battalions thereby making my Squadrons doubly useful And the Enemies Infantry must be resolute men indeed when all their Horse are routed and that they are to be Charged with all my Infantry and divers Squadrons of my Cavalry and are to be raked with my Cannon which then may be drawn up for that end if they are not soon reduced to furl their Colours order their Pikes and crave Quarter I would further in case I were strong enough in Cavalry to do it even before my Wings were fighting against the Enemies Wings appoint some Squadrons of mine to draw up in the Rear of my Battalions both to countenance my own Infantry and the more to deter the Enemies from Charging them during the Engagement of all the Horse of both Armies For it is the duty of a General to order all things as safely as he may and to leave as little to what is called Fortune as possibly he can The clearing of the Ground you intend to imbattel on of all such Squadrons or Battalions as your Enemy may have advanced on it before you bring up your Battalions and Cannon on it ought never to be omitted and ought still to be done by your Horse and Dragoons or with few if any of your Infantry For the neglect of this may hazard your Army since the Enemy having the start of you by getting part of his Army in the Field of Battel before you get any of yours he may thereby cut you off by peece-meal while you are forming your Imbattelling This I observed was carefully practised by the Prince of Conde before the Battel of Rocroy and Monsieur de Gassion was commanded with his Cavalry to do that Work which being effectually done it did not a little contribute to the Princes Victory In the Imbattelling of your Army I would still do it where the Ground admits it by drawing up in one Line only all the Cavalry and Infantry and not as I have seen some unexpert Commanders do Draw up first a Squadron of a Wing which was to compose part of your first Line and then a Squadron of Reserve to it which was to compose part of your second Line and so in Sequence all your Squadrons and Battalions of your whole Army for that method is tedious and the just spaces of your Intervals between Squadron and Squadron and between Battalion and Battalion cannot be so well adjusted by the Eye as by the first filling up those spaces with the Soldiery for the first is but Guessing but the last is Certainty I would observe this method not only in order to the better and more expeditious Imbattelling my Army if the Ground allow'd it but I would also observe it as much as orderly I could in my advancing to the Charge until I saw it time to form my two Lines by the continued motion of those Troops which are to compose my first Line and by Alting of those Troops which were to compose my second Line and of my third Line if the Ground were so scanty as my two first could more than employ it all And this not singly for the Reasons before exprest but for this additional one also viz. It being very difficult for many and great Squadrons which have Intervals between every two of them to preserve the just Wideness of the Intervals if they march far and if those Intervals are not duly observed 't is impossible to avoid one of these two mischiefs either if they are contracted during your Advance the Troops which at need are to march up through them will be disabled from doing it or at least so many of them as cannot will in their separating from those which can be disorder'd and too likely remain useless Or if these Intervals be inlarged your Flanks are thereby exposed to be fallen into by the Enemy therefore in my poor judgment that way is the very best which will most likely prevent your being involved in either of them and that is practicable and attainable I believe by not making any Intervals till almost you may have need of them which by advancing all your Army in one Line until you come so nigh the Enemy as you judge is a fit time to form your Lines in the manner before set down And then the distance being so little between you and your Enemy 't is not likely if but ordinary care is taken that the Interval Ground can be either much contracted or much enlarged at least 't is not so likely that either of those Ills will be run into marching over but a little Ground as marching over