in his way as it was almost impossible for him to unite his legions In so great difficulties he findeth no other means but to surmount them by incomparable labour wherewith he maketh way over the mountains covered six foot thick with snow and affrighteth his enemies more appearing in the middest of them when they believed him still in Italy and out of possibility to get to them then by his great forces He also added to this astonishment by industry causing his cavalry to shew it self in severall places at one and the same time to cause a belief that he was very powerfull Let us further consider that Cesar seeing the fashion of the warre changed and that the enemy avoided battel applyeth himself to sieges wherein he sheweth himself no lesse a master then in his other actions of warre For all that which the most excellent modern Generalls put in practice is drawn from his actions and whatsoever we admire of Ostend Breda The Busse â— Bolduc and many other sieges of the late Prince Maurice who hath surpassed all others in that matter is infinitely inferiour to the two circumvallations of Alexia where the industry the labour and the short time in which they were finished farre exceedeth all that hath been done elsewhere I am not ignorant that the invention of powder and of artillery hath changed the manner of fortifications of assaults and of the defense of towns but not in such sort but that the principall foundations whereupon they are established are particularly taken from Cesar who in that hath far surpassed all the Romane Generalls He is also admirable in his inventions and stratagemes in the undauntednesse of his enterprises who when he intended an assault upon the trenches which were about Clermont he put a jealousie into them by a body which he made of the horse-boyes and baggages of the camp which he caused to march in their sight towards that part which he meant not to assault but not at so near a distance that they might discover what kind of people they were and having laid a legion in embuscado in the night-time and caused some selected souldiers to convey themselves into the little camp which was nearer to the town he assaulteth them so at unawares that he made himself master of all their trenches When he would have passed the river of Alliers which Vercingetorix attempted to oppose he caused some legions to lie in ambush near to a bridge which had been broken and with the rest of the army which he made shew as if it had been intire he passeth along the river as if he had sought some other passage by which means he so deluded the enemies as that he caused the bridge to be repaired before it could be taken notice of and so passed over without any hindrance When Vercingetorix in the time of the siege of Burges was gone out with his cavalry he departed by night and went and assaulted his infantery within the camp and wanted little of defeating it When at the siege of Clermont he understood of the revolt of ten thousand Autunois which came to his relief he taketh foure legions marcheth day and night to overtake them which he doth and took them all and returneth time enough to defend his camp which was assailed by Vercingetorix Whereby we may observe by the way the benefit of having a camp alwayes well fortified to the end we may be ever in a readinesse to attempt upon the enemy as occasions shall offer themselves I cannot forget his great modesty Comius whom he had favoured raised to wealth honour and on whom he much trusted he rather excuseth then blameth for revolting alledging that he was forced to comply with the generall resolution for recovering the liberty and glory of all Gallia Let us speak a word or two of Labienus one of his Lieutenants who finding himself in a strait with foure of Cesars legions in this generall revolt encircled on all parts with enemies and being to passe the river Seine upon boats to joyn himself to Cesar opposed by strong forces which encreased every houre in this extremity be imployeth both his courage and industry divideth his troups into three parts maketh great appearance of passing over in two places where indeed he intended it not by which means having separated their forces into divers troups not knowing where to attend to oppose him he passeth over by night with three legions or lesse with which he fought with the first troups that came against him and defeated them insomuch that having passed the rest of his troups at their ease joyned them without further inconvenience to Cesar Whereupon I will make this observation namely That he which is not very carefull and diligent in the guarding of a passage of a river or mountain is for the most part circumvented because he which hath the possession thereof sleepeth securely upon the advantage he hath and he which would have it searcheth out all possible means and at last findeth them to remove all obstacles The tenth warre The VIII Book THe Gauls desirous to make one attempt more to shake off their yoke of servitude divers towns conspired together to revolt whereof Cesar being advertised surpriseth them so unexpectedly as that he continued those in their fidelity which were not as yet revolted and reduced the rest Eighteen daies after his return to his winter-garrisons they of Bourges gave him knowledge that they were assaulted by those of Castres he goeth to relieve them notwithstanding the unseasonable weather bringeth them to submission After that those of Rhems desired his assistance against the people of Beauvois the most powerfull and valiant of Gallia led by Corbeius and Comius two brave Commanders he marcheth thither taketh care to get intelligence from them encampeth himself before them where his souldiers receive an affront going to forrage but after that Corbeius had charged his camp and better fortified his quarters he understood that he had laid an embuscado for his souldiers which went to forrage whither he goeth so strong that he defeateth and killeth him This victorie obliged those of Beauvois to yield themselves But Comius fled not daring to trust himself amongst the Romanes because that a little before Labienus would have caused him to have been made away by Vollusenus contrary to publick faith This warre thus ended Cesar goeth and wasteth Ambiorix his countrey to procure him hatred amongst his own people under the command of Fabius one of his Lieutenants he relieveth Limoges which was assaulted by Dumnacus Lemovicum whom he pursueth and as he hasted to gain the river Loyre to put himself into safetie he defeateth him Then subjugated those of Chartres and Bretagne with great promptitude and alacritie Under the command of Caninius he besiegeth Drapes and Luterius in the citie of Cadenac Uxellodunum who sallying out to provide corn for the town Luterius going about to convey it in is defeated and at length
had foreseen them which he made to appear to good purpose in this great tempest which shattered all his ships and would have driven any but himself to desperation Thirdly though he were renowned for the Captain which best knew how to make use of his victories and which hath pursued them homest he would not do it here because he was in an unknown countrey and his camp not as yet well fortified Let us consider also that howsoever the scarcity of corn compelled him contrary to his custome to cause his army to make their winter-garrisons in severall places and not all together to the end that they might with more facility be furnished with victuall yet he did it with such judgement as that the places where they quartered were not so far distant but that they could easily relieve each other nor so near but they held divers States in obedience Neverthelesse the successe sheweth us evidently that it is not so good as to be quartered in an intire body because it is easier to assail a small troop then a great which gave encouragement to the Gauls to revolt and to assail the camp of Sabinus Cotta where the artificiall oration of Ambiorix perswading them that the revolt was so generall that at the same instant all the other camps were assaulted and could not relieve each other put them into such a confusion in matter of counsel that fear made them choose the worst which was to forsake their camp and retreat Whence we may learn That he never speedeth well that followeth the counsels of an enemy and That a retreat in view of the enemy is the most dangerous action that can be undertaken Cicero his resistance â—ithiâ— his camp which refused to follow his enemies counsel and resolved to defend himself within his trenches proved for his safetie and great glory and gave time to Cesar to relieve him wherein there be two things remarkable The first of Cesar who having understood that the Gauls came towards him to give him battel finding himself weak maketh choice of an advantageous place fortifieth it maketh his camp very small to the end he might the better defend it and make his enemies believe that he was exceeding weak whom after they had many times provoked him to fight they began to disregard which begot a neglect of all order amongst them so that they assaulted him ever after disorderly having thus lulled them asleep on a day he chargeth them so furiously that he defeateth them without resistance And Labâ—enus one of his Lieutenants by a like stratageme did the like to Induciomarus The second of the Gauls who not being able to force the camp of Cicero shut him up by a retrenchment which conteined ten miles in circuit made in three houres and by men which had nothing to dig with but their swords and nothing to carry earth with but their clothes which argueth they were a great multitude and sheweth what may be done by armies well regulated and well provided The eighth warre The VI. Book CEsar perceiving the affairs of the Gauls to incline to warre fortifieth himself by three Romane Legions and as many other souldiers as he could get which fell out very happily for him for after the death of Induciomarus the Trevois put their government into the hands of his kindred which made league with all that would revolt and particularly with Ambiorix whereof Cesar being advertised joyns foure legions together in winter surprises those of Tournay forceth them to yield deliver hostages And in the spring following causeth the Gauls to assemble at Paris Lutetia from whence on the same day that the assembly brake up he goeth and assaulteth those of Sens Senones Carnutes then those of Chartres who finding themselves surprised yield From thence he prepareth to set upon Ambiorix and those of Triers but first he laboureth to draw away from them their allies To which end he discardeth all his baggage which he commits to Labienus who was in the countrey of Triers with two legions to guard it and himself with five goeth to assail the Gauls For execution whereof he divided his army into three parts for that he well knew they were not able to dispute the champain with him and so burnt and pillaged their countrie that he constrained them to yield to deliver hostages and to forsake Ambiorix At the same time they of Triers assail Labienus who making a shew of fear and retreating as if he had fled draweth them in disorder into places of disadvantage where he defeateth them and taketh the very citie of Triers This expedition being finished Cesar maketh a bridge over the Rhine and passeth it they of Cullen adhere to him he fortifieth his camp and maketh provision of victuall attempteth to compell the Suevians to battel but seeing them retreat into vast and deep forrests he forbeareth to pursue them repasseth the Rhine cutteth off on the Germane side onely 120 foot of his bridge maketh a good tower on the end thereof at the other end on the side of Gallia he buildeth a fort leaving twelve cohorts to guard that and the said bridge In this place Cesar maketh a description of the manners and customes of the Gauls and the Germanes That done he goeth to continue the warre against Ambiorix and the better to surprise him he sendeth L. Minutius Basilius before with all the cavalrie forbidding him the making any fire in his camp to the end his approch might be undiscovered by which means he thought to have seised upon Ambiorix who saved himself miraculously by flying from one place to another Cesar the better to follow him conveys again his baggage into a castle of the Liegeois called Vatucca Eburones Wachtendonck for guard whereof he left Q. Tullius Cicero with one legion commanding him for seven dayes the time which his expedition would take up to look carefully to his guards and not to stirre out of his trenches Then divided he his army into three parts to harrasse all that countrey who meeteth with nothing in the form of an army to oppose him insomuch that his greatest care was to prevent that his souldiers covetous of booty straggled not too far abroad for fear of being cut off by the enemies which lay hidden in forrests and boggs The report reached presently to the other side of the Rhine that Cesar exposed the countrey of Gueldres to pillage Menapii which occasioned the Westfalians to participate of the booty Sicambri they presently get together two thousand horse passe the Rhine pillage without resistance are so well pleased with tast thereof that they resolve to set upon the Romane camp when by misfortune that day being the seventh from Cesars departing Cicero which had observed his command very exactly and having no news nor suspecting an enemie suffered himself by the importunity of his souldiers to give way to them to forrage and at the same instant was unexpectedly assaulted by the
Drapes is assaulted and taken in his camp After this he really formed the siege whither Cesar came in person who found means to hinder them from water so that this poore people yielded themselves to his discretion with whom he dealt rigorously causing their hands to be cut off which had born arms which so went to the heart of Drapes then their prisoner as that he wilfully starved himself and a few dayes after Luterius was taken and brought to Cesar At the same time Labienus defeated those of Triers and the Germanes and took all their Commanders After so many happy victories of Cesar obteined by himself or his Lieutenants he finisheth that summer by visiting the towns of Gallia the better to assure his conquest especially in Gasconie where he had been but little and disperseth his army composed of ten legions into such places as he conceived most advantageous which served him for a strong support to maintein himself in the civil broils of his native countrey which he was going into Observations SOme attribute the so frequent revolts of the Gauls to their changeable and impatient humour which cannot endure to be lorded over by strangers and others to the too great clemency of Cesar I grant that clemency apt to pardon emboldens to revolt for that we easily forget all benefits which do not intirely establish our liberty but if cruelty causeth them lesse frequent yet it renders them more dangerous for that when despair driveth men thereunto and that the hope of safety resteth onely in victory the revolted become all valiant obstinate constant and faithfull to the end which never falleth out where there is hope of the enemies clemency We have here plentifull examples thereof Cesar in the greater part of the revolts of the Gauls hath often found great facilities to reduce them to his obedience by reason of his clemency which hath been a powerfull means for him to make divisions amongst themselves and to prevent obstinacy in their revolts and if sometimes it hath so happened that he hath used severity it hath been occasioned by fowl and unworthy acts as when they of Vannes under publick faith imprisoned the Romane officers which came to them to buy corn for the sustenance of the army but I cannot excuse that of Cadenac On the contrary the cruelties of the King of Spain executed by the Duke of Alba drove poore fishermen so into despair that they have shaked off his insupportable yoke and with an admirable constancie have mainteined and enriched themselves and are grown so potent as that they are able to resist him by land and by sea take from him his treasure in the Indies Cesar sheweth us also by â—â—s care and industry to get intelligence of the enemies proceedings whether by taking prisoners in the field or by having good spies the advantage which may be made thereof many of his successefull designes having been founded thereupon there being great advantage in the attempting them for that he which assaileth hath more courage then he which is assailed and alwayes believeth the assaliant to be the stronger not knowing what part he will assail and ever jealous that he hath some secret intelligence Briefly all that a well exercised and well disciplined army is able to do in such a case is to defend it self but where are new-levied souldiers fall out great disorders which was the reason he took so much care to fortifie his camp very strongly to the end he might defend it all his baggage with a few men might without danger execute many brave designes being alwayes assured of his retreat Let us further take view of the siege of Cadenaci which Cesar judging to be impregnable by force and knowing it to be well provided of corn undertaketh by a great and dangerous labour to keep them from water which was from a fountain without the town from whence they were onely supplyed which the besiâ—ged perceiving having set fire on Cesars works by a salley they hindred him from quenching it Cesar not being able to repulse them by reason of the advantage of the place resolveth to make an assault upon the town which apprehension caused them to retreat The Abbridgement of the civil wars of Cesars Commentaries The I. Book THe true cause of the civil warre between Pompey and Cesar was because the one would have no companion and the other could not endure a superiour but that which appeared was the refusall made to Cesar of admitting his solicitation for the Consuâ—ship being absent though it had been promised him or else because they would have him alone disarm and that they which were his declared enemies should continue still armed a forced resolution and contrary to the will of the Commons insomuch that the Tribunes of the people were constrained to quit the citie and to go find out Cesar Who taking occasion by the forelock of his private cause he maketh a publick declaring to his souldiers that he is not in arms to other purpose but to restore the people now oppressed by the Senate to their libertie and having well incouraged them thereupon he departeth from Rimini Ariminum which was yet part of his goveâ—nment and possesseth himself of all the marches of Ancona which caused a great astonishment at Rome Pompey and the Consuls forsake the citie and dare not gather their grosse nearer then Capua mean time Cesar continuing his march besiegeth Domitius Aenobarbus within Corfinium who with all the Senatours which accompanied him were delivered unto him by his own souldiers which adhere to Cesars partie He gave leave to Domitius and the Senatours to dispose of themselves where they pleased causing all to be restored that belonged unto them Following his designe he besiegeth Pompey in Brundusium who unwilling to sustein the siege crosseth the seas with his armie which he could not do but at two times for want of shipping yet used he much art and precaution to conceal his retreat from Cesar and to prevent those of Brundusium from giving means to his enemie to entrap him Cesar not being able to follow him for want of vessels sendeth Valerius into the Island of Sardinia and Curio into that of Sicilia Cotta abandoned the one and Cato the other complaining that Pompey had very inconsiderately imbarked them in this warre and so went into Africa Mean while Cesar cometh to Rome justifieth his actions and offereth to condescend to a reasonable peace but seeing that his enemies protracted time he passeth into Gallia to strengthen his armie with Gauls Mâ—ssitia Marseilles refuseth him entrance he besiegeth it and in the mean time sendeth C. Fabius to possesse himself of the passages of the Pyrenean mountains which he doth bravely Then approcheth to Petreius and Afranius which had their camp below Ilerda and encampeth on the river Segre Sicoris where he maketh two bridges At first there passed onely slight skirmishes between them untill that two of Fabius his Legions being gone to forrage
it had failed It must be observed that here onely one Tribune is mentioned which causeth me to believe that the two Tribunes which had the authority for two moneths time did agree to command every day by turns Concerning the guard it was kept day and night and the foure and twentie houres were divided into eight watches First the Consul was guarded by his ordinary Cohort then every body made their guard round about his lodging and besides there were three guards kept one at the Questors lodging and the two other at the lodgings of the Consuls two Lieutenants The Tergiductours or Rear-commanders ordered the guards which drew by lot which should begin first and they which were to begin were led to the Tribune which then commanded who gave them the order of the guard and besides that a little tablet with a mark and all the guards were set after the same manner The rounds were made by the Cavalrie whereof the chief officer commanded foure for the day and foure for the night the first went and took their orders from the Tribune who gave them in writing what guards they were to visit The relieving and visiting of the guards was done eight times in foure and twentie houres at the sound of the trumpet and the first Centurion of the Triarii had the charge to cause them to march when occasion served When the trumpet gave them warning the foure forementioned souldiers drew lots and he to whom it fell to begin took some of his friends with him and if in going the round he found the guards in good order he onely took from them the mark which the Tribune had given them and carried it him back again next morning But if he found the guard abandoned or any sentinels asleep or any other disorder he made his report thereof to the Tribune with his witnesses and presently a councel was called to prove the offense and to punish the delinquent according to his desert The Velites made the guard round about the retrenchment on the outside and inside of it and at the gates The Allies had the same order We find not in writing the number of their Corps-du-guards how they placed their Sentinels round about the camp and how many a day were free from the Guard CHAP. VI. Of punishments and rewards NOne but the Consul could condemne any to death and he had this authoritie as well over the principall commanders of the army as over the meanest souldiers thereof The Tribunes administred military justice which was rigourously practiced The manner of their ordinary punishing was thus So soon as the Tribune had touched the partie condemned with a staff or a rod every souldier laid on upon him with cudgels or battered him with stones and oftentimes before he could get out of the camp he was killed but yet if he escaped he was not received into his countrey again and none of his kindred durst give him enterteinment He that opposed or neglected the orders given for the guard or for the rounds or other service concerning the securitie of the camp or falsely pretended to have done some signall act or had forsaken the place where he had been placed or had lost his arms in the battel or had stolen any thing in the camp or born false witnesse or else had forsaken his ensigne was punished after this manner as also he which committed smaller faults thrice If it happened that many Legions or one Legion or a grosse troup had run away they were punished two wayes the more rigourous way was to make them all draw lots and to punish every tenth man or more or fewer according to the exigence of the cause by this means all were partakers of the fear and a small number of them were punished The more gentle way was to cause them to lodge without the camp and to give them barley in stead of wheat which was a mark of ignominie which many troups have wiped out by performing valourous and memorable acts Concerning their rewards they excited those souldiers by honourable acknowledgements and publick commendations in presence of all the rest which had performed some valourous and extraordinary act Besides that to him that had wounded an enemy in some light skirmish or that voluntarily had gone and assaulted him they gave a dart To him which had killed and disarmed him if he were one that served on foot they gave a target if he were a horseman a horse-furniture To him that at the assault of a town was first got up upon the wall they gave a crown which they called Muralis to him which had rescued a Romane citizen a crown called Civica which was set upon his head by him which was so rescued whom he respected and honoured all his life after as his father The commanders had also their shares of honour by the severall triumphs which they obteined according to the greatnesse of their actions and the felicitie of their victories CHAP. VII Of their Pay COncerning their pay It began not untill three hundred fourty eight years after the foundation of Rome before that every souldier armed and victualled himself at his own charge which was no hard thing in those times because their warre was then extended no further then Rome But when they began to go out of Italy it was necessary to give them pay which at the beginning was very small afterwards it encreased as the Romane empire grew in greatnesse I will not trouble my self to make the valuation of it according to our money it being a thing of no utility onely I will say that the souldiers pay must be so proportioned as he may maintein himself well thereby I will further observe here that the Romanes charged themselves with the furnishing of bread apparel arms and tents for all their souldiers and besides barley for the horsemens horses abating these things out of their pay which I find to be a good order and above all things necessary to make an army subsist for besides that the greater part of souldiers are bad husbands and such as if a care be not taken will never be well clothed nor well fed it is impossible that a souldier should everywhere find bread to be bought and that he should carry all things with him which he standeth in need of CHAP. VIII Of their order of battalia THere is a diversitie of opinions about the order of battel of the Romanes Some would have it that when the Hastati be not able to sustein the enemies charge in their retreat they should fall into the order of the Principes by files and both they into the order of the Triarii and so to renew the fight three times Others will have it to be done by troups whereof I conceive there is much the greater probability holding the first way not onely impossible to be put in practice but also most dangerous the other exceeding feisible and profitable For to fall one into another in that maner by files
be sometimes so infamous actions committed as you are constrained to use great severity to give a terrour to all finding it very good to strike a fear into all those that have escaped by the means of the lot and to put but few to death For you must imprint this belief into your souldiers that by base flight they escape not death but they onely exchange a glorious death which they should have acquired by fighting valiantly for an infamous one After that the souldier be incouraged by the honour of being esteemed valiant and brought to a hatred of being held a coward it must be made a like degree of honour for every one to know how well to obey his superiour from the private souldier to the Lieutenant generall for on this obedience all the functions of an army depend and without it you can keep nothing in rule nor do any thing that is good This must be ingraffed into the hearts of the souldiers as being one of the principallest vertues required in them From hence groweth order by this military exercise is mainteined briefly by this brave designes are executed and without this all goeth to confusion and ruine I will not trouble my self here to speak of the particular military exercises which the souldier is to be exercised in because divers books are ful of them and that custome doth alwaies change something or other in them I will onely say that there is nothing so profitable as to exercise every souldier to carry his arms properly to use them souldier-like to keep his rank well and therein well to execute all the motions and charges which are commanded him So much concerning the souldiers But concerning the recompense of Generals of armies I will say the same which I said for the souldiers namely that according to the time or the constitution of kingdomes or common-wealths such courses ought to be taken as the honour of such as have done brave actions and great services be not diminished nor blemished For that the most generous spirits which will easily excuse all want of other recompense for their services will never endure to be robbed of the honour due to their brave actions and will sooner stomach such a want of due honour then any other thing whatsoever whereupon very often great mischiefs have followed CHAP. IV. Of the obedience of souldiers NOw as the Generall of the armie requireth of the souldiers that obedience which is due to him so he must have a care to give them no just cause to exempt themselves from it to this end he ought to keep them in continuall imployment for that idlenesse engendreth corruption of manners and discipline whence proceed luxury neglecting of exercises and the guards and disobedience to superiours It was the ease and idlenesse of Capua that destroyed Hannibals army and the delicacies of Babylon which corrupted Alexander himself and from whence he drew away his army to prevent the totall ruine of it there being no means of greater efficacy to keep it in due order and to prevent seditions then to imploy it in warre It is therefore a maxime which must be exactly observed never to suffer your souldiers in any place to be idle especially when the army is brought together in a body for if you imploy them not in that which is good they will busie themselves in that which is naught This course must be taken aswell in the time of securest peace as of open warre particularly to exercise them to use their arms well and to observe good order and though there be no need yet to use them to make retrenchments of the camp and to make their huts that so they may be so accustomed to remove the earth that when necessity shall require it may be no trouble to them I would further imploy them to make fortifications and other works of this kind not onely to keep them in exercise but that also they may get besides their pay wherewith the better to maintein themselves and that they accustome themselves to that which in time of warre is as profitable to them as to fight well there being nothing impossible for twenty or thirty thousand men which will work in the earth for in eight dayes they will make fortresses which shall be impregnable And Cesar hath made himself as much redoubted and admired by the great works which he hath caused his souldiers to make as by his great battels Moreover the Generall must take care that they be well clothed and well fed especially that out of their payes they be furnished with clothes and shoes otherwise he will soon find his army to decay and diseases to rage in it for want thereof He must also have a great care of those which are sick and hurt and therein to spare for no cost that so the souldiers may not excuse themselves from going on upon dangerous services or to undergo laborious imployments because they are abandoned when they are sick or wounded The General ought also to take a particular care not to overlabour his souldiers nor to put them to extraordinary hard marches without great necessity but when need requireth it he must be the first to undergo the labour for the example of the commander maketh all things easie to the souldier The examples not onely of the greatest Captains amongst the Ancients but even of the greatest Monarchs and Emperours should shame our delicate Captains of these times which are afraid to spoil their fair complexion in the sunne and their goodly plumes in the rain which would believe themselves to be dishonoured if they should march on foot at the head of their companies and those great men have not scorned to march at the head of their armies and have refused to quench their extraordinary thirst because there was not water enough to make all the army to drink and so making themselves companions of the dangers and labours of their meanest souldiers have made themselves masters of the greatest part of the world and have gained an immortall glory CHAP. V. Of Marching THere are divers considerations to be made upon the marching of an army which may be assaulted in the day-time or at its dislodging or even in the night when it is lodged If it be not encamped but lodge in villages you must to cause it to meet in one body give it a Rendez-vous on the way which it must take which if the enemy learn time enough to be there first or that he meet with it there by chance he will put the army to run a great hazard which cometh to its Rendez-vous at divers times and by divers wayes The best means to guard ones self from such an accident are to keep your Rendez-vous very secret to have good spies amongst the enemies and to send out many discoverers for intelligence When you encamp you are not subject to that danger because the army is alwayes together For the march you must consider the countrey where you are
must be well strengthened by good moats and flanked by good corps-du-guards to preserve them against the sallies of the besieged If there be any out-works which are not yet in good defense and which may be carried by force you must attempt them otherwise you must approch them by little and little for it is there where the bravest defense is made because that at the beginning they can easiliest make their sallies When the outworks are taken and the cannon is planted on the counterscarp and you sap into the moat and prepare your self to lay over your galleries to get over to the bulwarks you must then place your musketiers all along the counterscarp that so under favour of them and of your cannon you may passe over your galleries If the moats be drie they will dispute it with you but at last the stronger overcometh the weaker If they be full of standing water that hindereth you not from making your cawsie whereupon you place your gallerie If they be full of running water you must make use of floting bridges to put over your miners When you are got close to the bulwarks you are to use mines great or small so by little and little to get into the ground and the retrenchments which may be made behind the bulwarks I trouble not my self here to shew how to make the quarters forts circumvallations the trenches that they lie not open to the enemy the batteries that they be well assured the descents into the moat how to assail the false brayes how the galleries are to be made also the mines and the lodgings which are to be made after they be sprung because whatsoever may be said on that subject is alreadie written and it must be experience that must perfect the rest where every day something is altered or some new thing is added CHAP. XII Of the defense of towns against sieges TO withstand a siege well the town must be well fortified it must have a sufficient number of souldiers to defend it it must abound in victuall and it must have good store of arms and munitions of warre And these foure things are so necessary as that if there were an abundance of three of them if the fourth be wanting the rest will serve for nothing For what will a well fortified place serve for if there be not souldiers to defend it or what good will souldiers do if they have neither arms nor munitions of warre to fight neither will arms nor munitions avail if they want bread to live by to which I adde instruments to work in the earth without which it is impossible to make any great resistance But it is not enough to have all that is necessary for resistance there must be a good order and rule kept otherwise it will all be dissipated by those which will desire to get out of danger quickly and will find some pretext to yield upon terms which shall not be dishonourable the number of such being alwayes greater then of those which will reâ—â—st stoutly You must proportion the labour anâ—â—â—st amongst the souldiers and the townsmen that so they which are well affected be not suppressed and that the rest grow not lazie through idlenesse They must be distinguished by companies of pioners miners carpenters smiths and all artificers usefull for a siege appointing a commander to every of them You must take an inventory in the town of all the iron wood linen instruments to work in the ground drugs fit for artificiall fires and other such things necessary for a siege and take care that there be alwayes of them in the magazins to serve for the present necessity and to avoid disorder in the distribution of all these things there must be a counsel which must have the oversight thereof and which shall cause all to be delivered out and received in according to the order of the Governour and the Counsel of warre These things thus put in order you must think upon defense which is done principally after two wayes by holding the enemy off by retrenchment and by hindring him when he approcheth by sallies For the first it is approved and practiced by all and he which breaketh ground best and beginneth to dispute it the furthest off is he which maketh the longest resistance For the smallest retrenchment without accommodated with pallisadoes is hard to be forced But if it be mined and that there be another made behind it it is a dangerous piece to enter and you constrain the enemy to approch by little and little and with the same ceremonies which are used to fall upon the bulwarks and the great moat so that by divers retrenchments you keep off the enemy at a distance a long time before he can come to fall upon the counterscarp who cannot take away your outworks but by mines which taketh up good store of time The moat also may be defended if it be dry by portable casemats which are called coffers incircled by little moats or pallisadoes to hinder the approch which are placed in severall places of the great moat to defend it and not to be discovered by the cannon of the assailant The bulwarks are also to be defended by retrenchments which you are to make either at the point or at the middle or at the gorge according as they are capable and that the mines of the besiegers do enter forward within the bulwarks And when all that is forced the last defense is a retrenchment of the whole town reducing it to keep onely one part of it For the second way of defense in stead of many sallies to drive back them that work in the approches some would have onely some few to good purpose in great necessitie alleaging that the besieged there alwayes lose some men and of the best of them which they ought to conserve against a strong assault and that oftentimes they which would have a fair pretext to yield the town cause their souldiers to be maimed by continuall sallies to shew that they yield not themselves but through necessitie For mine own part which do approve of the quantitie of sallies and which have alwayes seen the works of the assailants retarded by them more in one houre then in eight dayes by other defenses I answer that these reasons would carry some shew if the town were attempted by assault for they not taking any other but that way at that time it were fit to preserve the souldiers to withstand them but whilest the assailant getteth ground by little and little if you defend not the town otherwise then by retrenchment you must lose it at last wherein your quantitie of souldiers standeth you in no stead at all in so much that the care you have taken to preserve your souldiers doth not prolong the taking of the town one day but if by your brave sallies you ruine batteries throw down trenches force the redoubts which defend them and when they are within the moat you burn their galleries they
enemies You must also be very carefull to use this faction very courteously and to engage them by little and little into actions which may make them irreconcilable to their Prince But when you see they make warre with respect and that they will but by halves offend him from whom they have revolted you must have them in great suspicion and march with them with bridle in hand for whether it be the fear of a ruine without recovery or the hope of a reconciliation that hindreth them from putting themselves upon reall extremities the one and other are equally dangerous and at last you may fear they may accommodate themselves to your prejudice wherefore if they will not engage themselves to do extraordinary and irremissible actions at the beginning you ought not to joyn with them but under good pledges You must also use such as do voluntarily yield themselves to you with all humanitie clemencie and liberalitie and such as resist you with all severitie for beneficence towards the one and severitie towards the other are the two principall means which get you obedience A town taken by force and hardly used or one which yieldeth it self of its own accord and favoured openeth the gates of a dozen others as on the other side a town taken by force and spared or which rendred it self voluntarily and is evil intreated shutteth a great many Whence I conclude that a Conquerour must be as good as his word whatsoever he promiseth be it in clemency or severity CHAP. XIX Of the defense of States according to their forces and situations TO treat of this subject well we must divide it into three parts namely into small States those of a middle rank and those which are puissant The small ones are of that nature as they subsist not but by the jealousies which their neighbours have one of another for that if one of them will assail a weak State the other will defend it neverthelesse it is but a tottering condition and ill assured for if the one findeth himself able enough to assail them the other will not find himself sufficient to defend them The counsels of Princes and States are not alwayes governed so equally but for the most part one prevaileth above the other Besides this inconvenience there is yet another that sometimes they agree to divide the prey so that such kind of pettie States which have not strength within themselves for their own defense are alwayes in perill and they must use very much pliantnesse to remove all pretexts from their neighbours of undertaking something against them The onely means which they have is to have one or two towns exceeding well fortified with arms and money enough to defend them well that so they may give leisure to them which will not suffer the growth of him which shall assail you to aid you for if you have no means at all to resist your countrey will be taken before they shall have time to assist you and besides that the happinesse which they conceive of conquering you giveth them a spur to assail you you shall find many more persons disposed to succour you then to reconquer your countrey for that the one is easie with equall forces and the other without greater strength is very difficult To which I adde that there is ofttimes as great danger that he which regaineth your countrey as your friend keep it not for himself as well as he which had taken it as your enemy or if he restore it to you it will be with so hard conditions as you shall possesse but the shadow of a Sovereigntie And thrice happy are they which meet with so good and so generous Princes which do reestablish them into their lost States with the same authoritie and liberty as they possessed them before for such examples are exceeding rare Concerning those States of a middle condition I propound a Prince or common-wealth which for his defense is able to entertein an army of 20000 foot and 3000 horse with all necessary equipage If his countrey be of a difficult accesse and that there be no entrance into it but by certain passages and mountains guarded and fortified he hath a great advantage but they which too much do trust and rest upon them and have neglected other defenses have deceived themselves and have been lost by those wayes wherein they thought themselves most assured If it be encompassed by the sea it is a fair moat notwithstanding he which is stronger will find means to make his descent into the island If it be environed with moorish grounds and rivers yet an enemy will find wayes to passe them especially when he hath artillery to favourise such passages insomuch that the surest way is to trust to your own forces namely a good army and good fortresses I say both joynned together for that the army without fortresses being weak and not daring to hazard any thing leaveth the victuall of the champain to the enemy and so the means to subsist at your charge and at last to ruine you And fortresses without an army are not able to preserve you longer then the time you have made your magazines of victuall for within them but these things being proportioned with judgement you may make a great resistance In these things you must not suffer your self to be led by the fansies of the people which without considering the situations of their towns or the publick good when they see their neighbours fortifie themselves will all imitate them a thing equally dangerous to have more fortresses then you can guard or to have none at all Yet I should rather like the last then the first for that at least by hazarding a battel you put your enemy to half the fear but by the other way you must surely perish without being able to do any other thing but prolong your ruine for the jealousie which you have to preserve all your fortresses by leaving great garrisons in them hindreth you of the means of keeping an army in the field and then the spoil of two or three harvests compelleth you to yield your neck to the halter I know there are some which ground themselves upon this reason That when all the principall places of a State be fortified all the victuall of the champain may be drawn into them so that an army coming thither if it stayeth there it dieth through famine and if it doth but passe through it doth no great hurt insomuch that it is almost impossible to make any great siege there Whereunto I answer that fortresses are principally invented for the weaker that so a few men may resist a great number and if you have so great a number of fortresses and those requiring great guards as the great fortified towns do you must have a greater number of souldiers then he shall have which cometh to assail you otherwise you were not able to provide them all with sufficient garrisons to preserve them from a siege And if you be
the stronger without any fortified place you shall preserve your countrey in keeping the field There is yet a further inconvenience in the fortifying of great towns that is that you make them so proud as they will not acknowledge their Sovereigne but upon good terms and upon the least discommoditie they receive in any warre the inhabitants desire rather to change their master then to see their goods wasted Insomuch that I conclude that you ought to have so few fortresses that they may not hinder you from keeping the field that those which you have be so well fortified and furnished with munition as they may make a great resistance and to place them so well as they may bridle the great towns and that they may assure the frontiers that so the enemy may make difficultie to leave a place behind him which might discommodate his victuall and that by intelligence or otherwise he may not seise upon some principall town which may serve him for a seat to entertein warre within the countrey These things thus disposed of you must regard what enemy assaileth you If it be a power of confederates united together it is the more easie to disunite then when it dependeth on one alone and in this case it is exceeding good to cause some diffidence to grow betwixt them by feigning of intelligence with some one of the confederates to whom shewing more respect and lesse animositie you may give jealousie to the rest as also by procuring a diversion upon the countrey of one of the rest It being a very difficult thing that many sovereigne powers should long hold a league together without some disgusts to arise amongst them or mistakings envies and even enmities by reason of the diversitie of their humours and interests so that that power which onely dependeth upon one State onely is much more to be feared And because you may be assailed more or lesse fiercely I must say a word for that If it be by forces which are not too much disproportionable to yours you may preserve your countrey without forsaking it and with your army and fortresses tie up the enemy in hindring him from victuall and by entrenching alwayes so near him as you shall hinder him from making any siege of importance For if a Conquerour advanceth not forward he recoileth and it is impossible for him to subsist in a countrey which he would conquer if at first he taketh no footing and doth not strengthen himself by some considerable prise If also you be assailed by a power altogether disproportionable to your forces in this case you must leave the field and burn all the victuall which you cannot contein within your fortresses and also all the towns and villages which you cannot guard for it is better for you to preserve your self in a ruined countrey then to keep it for your enemy And it is in this that a Prince to gain as he thinketh the name of being compassionate towards his people which in such occasions turn their backs upon him becometh cruel towards himself But it is rather a vice of irresolution and of weaknesse of courage which possesseth us then a true compassion which we have of the misfortune of another as that of the Emperour Otho who upon the first ill fortune that befell him his forces being yet entire durst not trie the hazard of a battel any more And he who could not afford any pitie to Galba in his decrepit age being his designed successour to the Empire and which had committed all kinds of villanies to attein it would perswade posterity that compassion to see the Romane bloud shed had made him resolve to estrange himself from it by killing himself Thus it is that we oftentimes desire to cover our vices with the vertue which is nearest thereunto But as it is a maxime that no publick good can be without some prejudice to some particular men so a Prince cannot disintangle himself from a perilous enterprise if he will please every man And the greatest and most usuall faults which we commit in matters of State and war proceed from suffering our selves to be carried away with this complacencie whereof we repent us when there is no remedy left But to avoid such storms you must hold this for a fundamentall law for your own preservation Never to suffer that neighbour of yours to grow up which maketh himself the strongest for it is better to offend him by hindring him from enabling himself to destroy you then to suffer him to grow greater out of fear to offend him It being a thing certain that no man preserveth his libertie against a conquering enemy by complements but onely by force It remaineth that we speak of puissant States which without help of another have arms money and what else is needfull to maintein a continuall warre Of this kind there be but few and they need to care for none but themselves for that one sole enemy is not able to assail them and that it is hard for the leagues of severall Princes all to agree in such a designe or for any long time to subsist together Neverthelesse I will say a word on this subject Great States are either compacted altogether or spread abroad in severall places the first which have all their forces united are able to assail and to defend themselves more powerfully then they which are so separated because they carry all their forces where need requireth with more diligence and facilitie and lesse charge the other put a great part of the world into an alarm and jealousie because they frontier upon the greatest number of States Neverthelesse if the one or the other be assailed they must make use of the defenses we propounded before onely I will say that they ought to have no fortresses but good ones and few in number and onely on the frontiers and none within the heart of the countrey for that having more cause to fear civil warres then forrein and without which no man will ever assail a great Empire it is the way to take away the main root from them which maketh them to undertake the enterprise and to subsist Besides you ought not to perpetuate any governments neither to families nor yet for life But the principall and most able remedy against civil warre is to entertein a forrein warre which chaseth away idlenesse setteth all on work and particularly giveth satisfaction to ambitious and stirring spirits it banisheth luxurie it maketh your people warlike and mainteineth you in such reputation amongst your neighbours as you are the arbitratour of all their differences It is true that this maxime is not good to be observed but by such States as are of this last sort For as it is necessary for them I find it hurtfull for pettie States which must fear all sorts of warre for being too weak to gain by it they run the hazard to be the pray of such as are the stronger CHAP. XX. Of the means how to assure a
Island he giveth them combat and defeateth them Which forceth them afresh to desire peace he granteth it taketh hostages of those that would readily deliver them and carrieth back his armie into Gallia safe and sound onely two shippes with three hundred souldiers which landed a little lower were set upon by those of Teraenne which Cesar being informed of hastneth thither with his cavalrie rescueth them and defeateth the enemies Observations IT is to be observed that to beginne a warre in autumne without apparent advantage in a countrey undiscovered not having any intelligence there and the Ocean to passe is an enterprise in my opinion well worthy the invincible courage of Cesar but not of his accustomed prudence Neverthelesse this escape must be attributed to his good fortune which he had subjected to his will For in this designe where it seemed that men and elements were conjured against him the earth refusing him victuall the sea battering his ships the air furnishing tempests and the countrey where he landed conspiring his ruine he constantly resisted all this opposing against famine his providence of making provisâ—â—n for his armie against the wracks of the sea his diligence in repairing his vessels against the assaults of his enemies his armies to resist them insomuch that he constrained them to beg for peace and so he returned gloriously from a bad countrey where any else would have suffered extremely Let us also consider that before he departed from France he took care to provide what was necessarie to keep it in obedience and for the securitie of his return Let us further note how abundant Cesar was in his inventions for the advantagious taking of his time in the very occasion it self for perceiving that his souldiers not accustomed to sea-fights were distracted at their landing he in the very action changeth his first order and with his galleys approcheth nearer the coast and in spite of his enemies landeth and they seeing a kind of vessels they knew not were affrighted and betook themselves to their heels Also we ought to admire in Cesar two things which he had to perfection and which render a commander excellent namely that he forecast and provided for all things which might either further or hinder this designe before he undertook it and that in the very execution be sailed not to take his advantage when occasion presented it or to remedy upon the instant such unexpected accidents as befell wherein he hath been inimitable The seventh warre The V. Book CEsar not satisfied with his first voyage into Britain imployeth the winter to cause such equipage to be prepared as was necessarie for his passage thither the second time and according to his custome goeth into Lombardy from whence before his return he passeth into Sclavonia to quiet some seditions which were there befallen Illyricum afterwards returneth to his armie findeth all in good order commendeth every man for their diligence in getting all things in readinesse But before his departure he goes to Triers a very powerfull people about a division fallen between Induciomarus and Cingentorix the two great men of the town The last cometh to him and promiseth him all obedience the other prepareth for warre neverthelesse fearing to be abandoned yieldeth himself Cesar receiveth him but diminisheth his authoritie and augmenteth that of Cingentorix whom he believeth best affected to him which done he continueth his designe takes along with him the principall men of Gallia in this warre Dumnorix of Autun makes difficulties Cesar presseth him he excuseth himself then attempts to seduce the Gauls at last he flies Cesar sendeth after him but refusing to return Iccius is slain He imbarkt at Calice where he left Labienus with three legions and two thousand horse he passeth into Britain and landeth without resistance he fortifieth a camp to guard his vessels leaveth Q. Atrius there and passeth further forceth the camp of the Britains not farre distant from thence The next day Atrius sendeth him word that the tempests had shattered the greater part of his navie he returneth thither imployeth ten whole dayes about repairing them draws them on shore causeth the camp to be well fortified commandeth Labienus to cause nâ—w ships to be built then advanceth towards Cassivellanus declared Generall for the Britains who dares not assail him but when he goes to forrage which causeth him to go strong and in good order after he had triall of his manner of fight by some skirmishes he defeated him by C. Trebonius one of his Lieutenants who went thither with three legions and all the cavalry After this defeat there appeared no more enemies in grosse and Cesar being come to the river Thames passeth it at the onely place where it was fordable in despite of the Britains who endeavoured to their utmost to hinder him which so astonished Cassivellanus that all his care was to hide himself in the woods seeing that divers towns had yielded themselves to Cesar he also sent to him who received him giving hostages imposing a certain tribute upon the countrey TheÌ„ seeing the season much spent and fearing some tumults in France he repasseth the sea bringing back his armie gloriously which contrary to his custome he was constrained by reason of the barrennesse of the yeare to separate into divers garrisons to keep it alive But before he could go into Italie Ambiorix and Cativulcus instigated by Induciomarus take arms assail Sabinus and Cotta two of his Lieutenants defeat and kill them as they were removing from their camp from thence they go and assail Cicero in his camp another of his Lieutenants which defendeth himself with much difficulty Cesar relieveth him and defeateth the Gauls The report of the defeat of two Romane legions inciteth the other Gauls to revolt insomuch that Labienus is assaulted in his camp by Induciomarus he withstandeth the assault afterwards conquereth and killeth him As the first defeat of the Romane legions moved all the Gauls to revolt so these two last overthrows made them lay down their arms Observations IN this second voyage of Cesar into Britain though he went thither with greater forces and better prepared then at first having supplied those defects which were wanting before neverthelesse going into a countrey which he could not come to but by sea where he had no intelligence and going from another newly conquered subject to revoltings and which grudgingly endured subjection he rather therein satisfied his own ambition then that he added any great profit to the Romanes Wherein we will first observe his dexterity and prudence in that he carried along with him as voluntaries all the stirring spiritâ— amongst the Gauls which served as hostages for him But it appears his naturall clemency made him commit an errour in contenting himself to have diminished the authority of Induciomarus when indeed he should have ruined him whereof he found the inconvenience afterward Secondly that he never was moved at any unexpected accidents for which he was prepared as if he
Autunois there were put to the sword which news he presently conveyeth to Autun so that both there and in his camp all that was Romane suffered the like with the losse of their goods to boot but chiefly the corn which they carried to relieve the army withall Whereof Cesar being advertised by Eporedorix without consultation taketh foure legions and all his cavalrie marcheth day and night overtaketh Litavicus with his forces maketh known his fraudulent dealing to the souldiers and without striking stroke reduceth them to obedience and with great diligence sendeth to those of Autun to give them knowledge of what had happened with the same celeritie returneth very opportunely to his camp which he relieveth finding it strongly assaulted and hardly put to it by Vercingetorix That done he taketh his way again towards the river of Alliers and passeth it mean time Litavicus who was fled towards Vercingetorix procureth a league of the Autunois with him Noviodunum Eporedorix and Viridomarus seise upon Nevers where Cesar had left his hostages corn and publick treasure which they pillage and burn Which drove him into great straits because that Vercingetorix alwayes coasted him and cut off his victuall At last he resolved by great marches to gain the river Loyre Ligeris which he passed over to joyn with Labienus to whom in the beginning of this warre he had given foure legions to go towards Paris Whilest things passed in this manner Labienus was much distracted by the garboils of all these revolts Melodunum notwithstanding having possessed himself of Melun he gave jealousies to his enemies in many places insomuch that by this trick he passed the river Seine Sequana before that all these revolted people could joyn forces he defeated the first which opposed themselves took Prouvins Agendicum and from thence joyned with Cesar At the same time the Gauls renew their conspiracies and intelligences they hold an assembly where almost all the Gauls are present they again choose Vercingetorix Generall who maketh provision of great store of cavalrie to the end he might disaccommodate the Romanes by cutting off their victuall On the other side Cesar maketh his provisions payeth his Germane cavalry but Vercingetorix being carried away with good opinion conceived of his cavalry adventureth a battel with Cesar where he was defeated After that he retireth himself to Alexia whither Cesar followeth him and resolveth to besiege him Vercingetorix perceiving his designe gathereth together all the victuall of the town causeth it to be distributed by measure and judgeth that by well managing thereof there would be enough for near upon two moneths dischargeth his cavalry sendeth every one into his countrey to procure him relief in time and he with eighty thousand fighting men shutteth himself into Alexia which Cesar surroundeth with double treble trenches then maketh a second circumvallation to keep out reliefs from without with an incredible labour and diligence and maketh a provision of victuall sufficient to make the besieged consume theirs which suffer great extremity At length relief cometh under the conduct of Comius to the number of two hundred and fifty thousand he maketh three strong assaults at divers times two in the day and one in the night is repulsed and retreateth whereby they of the town are constrained to yield themselves to the discretion of Cesar who reteined the Autunois and Auvergnats to regain those towns which were necessary for him and distributeth the rest amongst his souldiers After this all the rest submitted Thus ended this warre the greatest and most dangerous of all that Cesar had in Gallia Observations ALl Cesars other warres in Gallia have been made by divided parts having made use of their divisions to ruine them but this by a generall consent of almost all they chose one supreme Commander great in prudence courage who well perceiving that the good discipline of the Romanes and their knowledge in the art military made them invincible by way of battels changed his own way of making warre against them and by prolonging time without hazarding a generall battel finding himself superiour in horse and the countrey to friend not ready to supply their armies with victuall made just account to have ruined them whereupon we may make very good observations First upon Vercingetorix who having been by a generall consent chosen Generall of divers States which had emulations one towards another hath known so well how to govern them that what adversitie soever he met with in his affairs he hath alwayes mainteined himself in great authority and aw amongst them not sparing to be severe where occasion required fear being the most powerfull means to keep men in order ill successes never being able to deject him or diminish his confidence Even at that time when he was accused to have had intelligence with the enemy he so boldly defended himself by an oration that he came off more authorised then before Also it is an efficacious means to continue severall people in a fair obsequencie to parle often with them upon such affairs as happen He had the power to make them set fire on above twenty cities to discommodate their enemies which argued his great judgement for it was the onely way to have overcome the Romanes stronger then they in battel to have fought with them by famine And in such affairs all moderate counsels or but half executed are ruinous as the taking of Bourges serveth us for a memorable example for the saving of it from burning preserved it for the benefit of the Romanes which by taking thereof found therein such commodious things as they stood in need of His great credit is very remarkable for to a free people at the beginning of a warre before they had tasted of bad successe and in their hope to be able to overcome without being driven to so smart remedies he prevaileth with them to fire their houses and goods for the conservation whereof warre is for the most part made It was a very hard enterprise for that the losse of things certain and present which we see and feel is preferrable with the ignorant to things whereof the events are uncertain and the benefits remote and no man can well apprehend this difficulty that hath not experimented it in the government of the people He hath besides shewed his constancy even to the end and made no scruple being the chief of so many severall nations to be shut up in a citie where he did all that a provident and brave Generall ought to do and hath surmounted hunger and the discommodities of a siege having held out even untill his relief was repulsed and defeated but because histories make not but for the victorious we see usually none had in esteem but the sonnes of fortune Now let us examine Cesars carriage in this warre which brake out he being in Italy in the depth of winter his army dispersed in severall countreys far distant from each other and the revolted States so
by that bridge which was furthest from the camp it happened to break whereof the enemies being advertised they go with foure Legions and all their cavalrie to give on upon them but being retreated to a hill of advantage and Fabius misdeeming something going to relieve them delivered them out of that danger While these things were a doing Cesar having left C. Trebonius Lieutenant Generall at the siege of Marseilles and D. Brutus commander of his naval armie arrived in his camp where being he would encamp himself between Ilerda and his enemies camp buâ— after a long fight whereof either of them made advantage both the one and the other retreated into their camp Presently after the continuall rain carried away both these bridges and made the river altogether unpassable which drave him to extreme necessities not being able to supply himself with victuall nor receive those new forces which came to him out of Gallia nor repair his bridges by reason of the violence of the waters and the hindrance which his enemies gave him which were on the other side of the river At last he caused boats to be made and whilest the Pompeians busied themselves to entrap certain Gauls which came to joyn with him he carrieth boats on wagons twentie miles from his camp putteth them into the river causeth some souldiers to passe over to the other side and without losing time conveyeth thither two legions more by favour whereof he maketh his bridge and by that means recovereth his way and safe passage for his victuall and receiveth those troups which came to relieve him This action reassured his army astonished the enemy and gave so much reputation to his affairs with the news which he received at the same time that Brutus had defeated the Marseillians at sea that five good cities yielded themselves and divers others came to parle But following this good successe he maketh divers trenches to cut off the water from his enemies camp and to make the Segre fordable Afranius and Petreius fearing the prosperitie of his designes resolved to gain Octogesa sited upon the river Iberus whither they had beforehand sent to have a bridge made To this end they depart at midnight Cesar causeth them to be pursued by his cavalrie which he maketh to ford over because his bridge was a great way off afterward leaving his baggage within his camp he followeth with his Infantery and pursueth them so hotly that he overthroweth their designe hindring them from going whither they intended and returning from whence they came insomuch that he drave them into such extremitie of hunger and thirst that without striking one blow they were constrained to yield themselves to his mercy He dismisseth them all and winneth them by incredible courtesies never used elsewhere towards enemies Thus he remaineth master of Spain sending away his enemies laden with disgrace and also with obligations to publish though unwillingly his clemency and valour Observations IT is a most dangerous thing for a people a Generall of an army or an army it self to be surprised with fear for that it is alwayes seconded with perverse and ruinous accidents which all Leaders and Commanders of armies ought to foresee and carefully to prevent There be three not able examples in this book on this subject The first when Cesar passed the Rubicon for before that they declared him enemy to the weal-publick Pompey undertaketh with a stamp with his foot to raise an armie to him that at his approch Cesars own souldiers shall deliver their Generall into his hands neither doth he think him worthie consideration such as dare but name Cesar are driven out of Rome briefly he is proceeded against as a criminall offender Notwithstanding so soon as he had but set the first step to declare the warre and though he did the same at Pezaro which he did at Rimini having not the fourth part of his armie every man was amazed Pompey and the Consuls betake them to their heels the care of leavying of souldiers is cast aside and Rome it self abandoned The causes of this great change proceeded from this that Pompey never imagined that Cesar durst have undertaken so high a designe grounding upon a presumption which his vertues and good fortune had added unto him which made him rather thoughtfull how to maintein his partie in the citie then provide for defense thereof Insomuch that when he saw things go otherwise then he had published he stood amased It was therefore no great wonder if an ignorant people which toke assurance or fear from the good or bad countenance of him into whose protection they had delivered themselves did the like Whereupon I will say that in affairs of such importance we ought in imitation of Cesar before we enter into them to consider maturely the worst that can befall so that evil successe dismayeth us not but when we are imbarked we must not check at whatsoever happeneth but with constancie go on to the end The second example is when Domitius Aenobarbus being out of hope of being relieved by Pompey took a resolution to save himself within Corfinium where he was besieged but for that his countenance was sadder then usuall his speeches lesse resolute then the time required and by some neglect of the necessary works for the common defense he discovered to his souldiers that which he would have concealed from them so that preventing his flight they delivered him unto Cesar It is a fair lesson for a commander to teach him that in greatest danger he ought to shew most resolution for his souldiers become courageous or fearfull according to that they observe in his countenance The third is when Cesar discovered the fear of Afranius and Petreius souldiers in that they seconded not each other that they scarcely had received the brunt of the cavalrie but their ensignes were all on a heap that they made not good their ranks nor distances and that they stirred not from the field of battel where they could not subsist for want of water And howsoever in these times armies approch not so near each other as then they did by reason of the canon neverthelesse experimented Captains will make profitable use of such judgements I have seen Henry the Great chase eight hundred horse with lesse then two hundred judging they would not dare to combat him because of their confusion and not observing distanceâ— which fell out as he had foretold it And howsoever to retreat from a besieged citie by a port of the sea seemeth to be no very hard matter neverthelesse the precautions which Pompey used to retire himself into Brundusium was that which saved him For having to do with a people which he abandoned and an enemy vigilant he had been lost if he had not walled up the gates and barricadoed up all the entries into Brundusium except onely two which were covert enough by which his men issued to the haven because when his last men departed from the walls the inhabitants at the
counsellers in warre At the battel of Pharsalia Pompey was twice as strong as Cesar especially in cavalry whereupon he principally grounded his victory but he had not an army so well disciplined nor so exercised to fight as Cesar had insomuch that fearing that if his gave the charge they would do it disorderly he commanded them to attend the giving on of the enemy with charge not to â—â—rre from their places Cesar disliking that course commanded his souldiers to give on upon the adverse army alledging that this exciteth the courage of souldiers to play the men which ought rather to be increased then abated not disapproving the ancient custome of beginning the fight with a generall shout And experience teacheth us that in all actions of warre he which giveth the charge redoubleth his courage and he which is charged diminisheth his Touching Pompey's order of battel Having a river on his right hand he placed all his horse on the left promising to himself that after he had repulsed Cesars cavalry he should enclose his army Cesar judging his cavalry not of sufficient strength to resist that of Pompey strâ—â—gtheneth it by foot which were fitted for that purpose and mingled amongst them Besides that he taketh from every battalion one troup whereof he composed a battalion to be as a reserve which he placeth without the ranks of the three orders of infantery and commandeth them not to stirre to the conflict untill he appointed so that when Pompey's horse had repulsed Cesars which they could not do without putting themselves into disorder they met with this battalion which put them to a sudden stop and afterward to shew their backs and wholly to abandon the left wing of Pompey's army by which means Cesar following his advantage easily putteth all the rest to rout Whereupon we ought to observe two things the one That we ought never to hazard all our troups upon one onely charge but make a reserve of the one to relieve the other and the other That we ought so well to observe the distances or intervalls as well to the flanks as the rear that the first troups happening to be reversed they reverse not those which should relieve them but to leave them a convenient space to fall back and to rally themselves again in the rear If Cesar knew how to conquer he knew better how to prosecute and make his benefit thereof but in none like to this of Pharsalia where he contented not himself to force the camp to besiege the rest of the army on a hill whither they retired nor to pursue Pompey's person certain dayes journeys but with three or foure thousand men onely followed him so close both by sea and land that he found him dead in Egypt where he arrived almost assoon as the other never giving him leisure to recollect himself or reinforce his troups Which serveth to teach us to make use of occasion when it offereth it self favourable unto us not to deferre that to another time which may be presently executed for the affairs of the world are subject to great revolutions And the affairs which Cesar yet had after the death of Pompey give us occasion enough to judge that if in imitation of many great personages he had gathered the fruits of his victories before they had been ripe or tasted of repose before he had been secured he might full well have repented thereof Of the Alexandrine warre written by Aulus Hircius or Oppius The IIII. Book ASsoon as Cesar was arrived in Alexandria with three thousand two hundred foot eight hundred horse ten Rhodian galleys and some ships of Asia he understood of the death of Pompey and upon the bad quarter he perceived was between the souldiers of Pompey and the people of the city he sent for new Legions into Asia Mean time he required to be informed of the testament of the late king Ptolemee who had made the people of Rome his executours and to this end ordained that Ptolemee the eldest son Cleopatra the eldest daughter should discharge their army come to him to give an account of their rights But Ptolemee's Counsel did not approve of this way of accommodation and underhand sendeth for his troups which were at Pelusium under the command of Achillas whereof Cesar being advertised and that the King himself had intelligence with the said Achillas he deteineth him and prepareth for defense he giveth them the repulse at their first approch then cantons himself in one part of the city and the rest in the other part Arsinoe the Kings second sister causeth Achillas to be slain putteth Ganymedes into his place and possesseth her self of the authoritie who continuing the former designe putteth Cesar to great extremities infecting his fresh waters which he readily remedied by digging great store of pits He also sendeth for souldiers ships and arms from all parts and upon the news which he received that the thirty seventh Legion with great provisions of victuall and arms was arrived on the coast of Africa but could not get to him by reason of contrary winds he putteth himself alone into a ship taketh all his shipping with his mariners onely and putteth to sea in the very face of them The enemies knowing him to be without souldiers assail him he beateth them and without other relief getteth to his legion then returneth to Alexandria This first conflict affrighted the Alexandrians neverthelesse they make their naval army stronger then ever which Cesar defeateth the second time where Euphranor Captain of the Rhodian galleys behaved himself very bravely There is an isle before the haven of Alexandria built and inhabited which sheltreth the town and is joyned to the city by the peer which is 900 paces long and 60 broad upon which there were two forts Cesar thinketh it necessarie to take this isle that so he may have the sea at liberty He taketh it then taketh one of the forts of the peer but at the other he had a hot skirmish and was repulsed with so great disorder as not being able to hinder the souldiers from casting themselves abord he saveth himself by swimming rather then to perish The Alexandrians astonished by these brunts betake them to their subtilties demand of Cesar their King who delivereth him to them hoping it would be a means to facilitate agreement Whilest these things were in agitation Mithridates a Pergamenian a man of high descent a great souldier of great valour and most faithfull to Cesar arriveth to his relief with goodly forces taketh Pelusium in his way cometh to passe the Nile at a place called Delta Whereof Ptolemee being advertised goeth in person to oppose him and Cesar on the other side goeth to relieve Mithridates who before the arrivall of either of them had already encountred with and beaten Ptolemee's forces and Cesar also before he could come to Mithridates had defeated others After which he goeth and assaulteth a small fort which was between his camp and that of Ptolemee's
were taken At last his troups come from divers parts he beginneth with purging his army of some seditious persons and libertines then resolveth upon a definitive battel To this end he goeth and encampeth before Thapsus which he environeth with trenches not doubting but Scipio would come and relieve the town who having caused king Juba to return again they come and encamp near Cesar in three severall camps And there was the battel fought which Cesar gained with losse of fiftie souldiers onely and some few hurt but on the other side were ten thousand slain and the three camps taken Thapsus on the report of this victory was yielded to C. Rebilius Cato seeing he could not prevail with his men to resolve to defend themselves killeth himself Vtica openeth her gates to the Victour Adrumetum doth the like Zama shutteth hers against her conquered king and calleth in Cesar all the rest of Juba his kingdome revolteth he and Petreius kill each other through despair Sitius having defeated and killed Saburra Juba's Lieutenant and coming to Cesar meeteth with Afranius and Faustus Sylla which were going for Spain these he defeateth and taketh prisoners who afterwards in an uprore were both slain Scipio and divers Senatours having imbarked themselves for Spain were by a tempest cast amongst Sitius his fleet where all perished or killed themselves This was the sequele of that battel wherein all things concurred as if by consent to smooth the way to Cesars absolute victory who pardoned all that had recourse unto his clemencie and after that returned to Rome Observations CEsar hath done three things in this warre which came near to rashnesse the first to passe into Africa in the dead of winter with a small force not having any assured port there for which cause he was not able to appoint any Rendes-vous for his shipping which thing was imputed him as a want of foresight Neverthelesse after his passage his manner of proceeding was altogether admirable He maketh choice to encamp himself near the citie Ruspina which was within half a league of the port which he joyneth to the citie and his camp and fortifieth it exceedingly for from thence he had one foot on land and the other on the Sea and could as occasions should require act by either sea or land and be secured from being shut up whatsoever should befall This is a good lesson for such as enterprise upon a forrein countrey being weak at the beginning for in this posture great attempts may be withstood and in all extremitie a good retreat may be made The second to leave his army near Ruspina and without giving knowledge to any man to cast himself abord to go seek his shipping And the third having news of the defeat of his fleet to leave his camp to hasten in full carier to Leptis to cast himself into a ship and to rally others and assault the enemies and although he perished in none of them there can be nothing said in his defense but that he trusted wholly to his good fortune and that he never was wearied or disheartned in the most dangerous or laborious designes It is observable that Cesar in all his warres hath alwayes been inferiour to his enemies in number for which cause he hath alwayes helped himself by fortifications more then ever any other hath done which he made much the better when he found himself not sufficiently strong to give battel as he was a long time in Africa insomuch that Scipio himself wondered at his coldnesse neverthelesse he alwayes continued his souldiers in exercise and himself exercised new-levied men and entred them by small skirmishes wherein by his industry for the most part he had the best and alwayes attempted something upon his enemy Which is an excellent maxime to give courage to your souldiers and secure you from being surprised The Spanish warre against Pompey's sonnes The VI. Book THe reliques of the Africane troups reassemble themselves once more in Spain under Cneus and Sextus the sonnes of Pompey Cesar goeth thither He findeth the one laying siege to Vlla and the other in Cordova He sendeth relief into the first and goeth and encampeth himself before the other which inforceth Cneus to quit his siege to relieve his brother Some skirmishes passed between both armies but Cesar not being able to draw his enemy to battel goeth and besiegeth Ategua and after a bold resistance he taketh it in view of Cneus Afterwards both armies had divers encounters and combats but to little purpose at last they encamp themselves in a champain near Munda both resolving not to refuse battel neverthelesse â—neus took a high anâ— advantageous ground for his field of battel where Cesar making difficultie to assail him was put upon it by the fury of his souldiers The fight was long and doubtfull even by his own confession and with much ado he got the victory which was bloudy Thirtie thousand on Pompey s part died upon the place and a thousand on Cesars they which saved themselves into Munda were constrained to yield themselves Sextus Pompeius abandoneth Cordova Cneus is swiftly pursued overtaken and killed All places yield themselves to the victour This was Cesars last battel and the deadly wound to Pompey's party The military order of the Grecians and particularly of their Phalanx THe order of the Grecians is but obscurely to be found amongst their authours because the most part of the books which they have written thereof are lost and none have come to our hands but fragments so that it is hard to collect it very exactly The Phalanx was formed after this manner Zugos Jugum signifieth two men in front and more joyned together make a rank and so the word is often taken Stichos Versus signifieth two men one behind the other and more behind each other make a file and versus is often taken for a file Lochos Decurio signifieth a file which the Grecians made of severall depths but never exceeded the number of sixteen as being sufficient to sustein the violentest charge conceiving that to give a greater depth to their Phalanx was but to imploy men unprofitably and that it was better to extend the battalia into breadth to prevent overwinging and so to be charged on the flanks or else by this means to overwing the enemie then to give so great a depth to their Phalanx The Phalanx was compounded of hoplitae onely that is heavie-armed with sarissas that is long pikes and their bucklers for the archers slingers and other casting-weapons had their orders apart In a Lochos or file of 16 men there were five which had command namely the first fifth ninth thirteenth and sixteenth as we may see by the figure following and their names The first figure Lochagos o File-leader 1. Enomotarcha o  2. Enomotarcha o Half-file-leader 3. Enomotarcha o  Vragos o Bringer-up They made the most valiant the File-leader and the most prudent the Bringer up Now to begin their order They joyned two files
and the number of souldiers which you have If you march in great plains you may for the most part march in battalia or at least with formed battaillons and squadrons then it is very easie to put your self readily into a good form to fight well because you march not in a long order But when you march through a strait countrey where but few can march in front then you must compute the discommodity of the way and the time you have for your march with the number of souldiers whereof your army consisteth for 10000 foot marching 10 in front and 1000 horse marching 5 in front with the lightest baggage they can possibly have and ten cannons with equipage for every piece to shoot 100 bullets take up about 28000 foot of way in length whereby you may judge how much way in file 30000 foot and 6000 horse will take Therefore when so great armies find themselves in such a troublesome way you must of necessity divide them into severall bodies which may march one after another and lodge severally or rather cause them to march by divers wayes some miles distant from each other or howsoever to make wayes through the fields for your souldiers to march in leaving the great road for your cannon and baggage If there be a river to passe where you can make but one bridge or some passage over a mountain moorish ground or forrest where you cannot make severall wayes then you must march one after another and on severall dayes I trouble not my self to shew how you are to passe through such bad passages in view of the enemy because many have written thereof yet when it cometh to execution few will get off well if they be charged home but I will onely say that the best way is to calculate the time so well as you may avoid such encounters Concerning the march I find it almost impossible that two armies should meet each other if one of the two Generals be desirous to avoid it especially in an inclosed countrey but whatsoever happen the best way is to have the baggage wholly separated from the souldiers leaving onely on the rear some few troups to keep it from disbanding for if in time of alarm every body have their baggage behind them it causeth a great confusion and hindreth the souldiers from rallying themselves and helping each other The time of lodging is also a dangerous time to be assaulted in because the army is then tired and every man desirous to be lodged hastneth to the quarter in disorder which is a thing hard to avoid if before you enter your lodgings you cause not your army to stand in battalia and so cause them to lodge troup after troup without suffering any to lodge but by command mean time sending out on all sides upon discovery There remaineth the assaulting of a quarter which is that which is more frequently attempted especially when the army is not encamped because it being lodged in severall quarters the enemy may attempt to surprise some one quarter without hazarding a generall combat foâ— which I do not find the ordinary guard alone how exactly soever it be performed sufficienâ— to remedy such an accident because it cannoâ— give the alarm but at too near a distance and thaâ— ofttimes you have not leisure to put your self in order to fight therefore you must be carefull to send out discoverers every night by divers small troups which if they do well perform their task will not suffer you to be surprised for an army or a grosse troup capable to assail a quarter of an army cannot march so secretly that it be not perceived And when you have to do with a vigilant enemy and that you fear such assaults in the night there is nothing so good as to prevent him if it be not in earnest at least to give him alarms every night that so he may be more troubled about keeping himself upon his guards then about assailing you If it be in an intrenched camp where all the army is in one body it is a high enterprise to assault it And this one chapter sheweth the security of an intrenched camp which I will end with this conclusion That all the forementioned things to assure the quarters must never be omitted though you believe your self to be far off from any enemy for that besides the profit you draw from hence in accustoming your army to do their duties there may such an occasion befall you as it may be the safety of your army of your life and of your reputation CHAP. VI. Of encamping I Will not here describe the form of entrenched camps but onely the profitablenesse of them not being able to wonder enough that they have been wholly discontinued No people made so exact use of them as the Romanes and in our time Maurice Prince of Orange hath revived the use of them or at least hath given them a great perfection The entrenchment of a camp assureth an army in that it is never dispersed in the villages where some quarter or other is ever in danger to be surprised but lodgeth all in one body and in such fashion as being assailed it may fight with great advantage The entrenchment saveth a great deal of trouble because by it there is need of the fewer guards by many those lesse toilsome especially to the Cavalry which when they are lodged in open villages are constrained to be on horseback almost all night The entrenchment encloseth your army as a walled city from whence you may march privately with such troups as you please to execute all sorts of brave designes leaving your baggage in safety The entrenchment hindreth the enemy from constraining you to fight unlesse when you please The entrenchment causeth you to be without danger at the head of the most dreadfull armies The entrenchment causeth you to take strong cities in the face of more puissant armies then your own Briefly the entrenchment is lesse subject to infection then the villages where you lodge because you choose a wholsome place to sit down in and in villages you must take them as they fall out Also because this is more ayrie the lodgings are here better divided those things which may cause bad air are more easily removed and in effect an army incamped and entrenched wil rather subsist three moneths in health in a camp then a forthnight in the best villages Whence I conclude that one of the most necessary parts of warre is well to know how to incamp and entrench CHAP. VII Of Battels OF all the actions of warre the most glorious and most important is to give battel the gaining of one or two acquireth or subverteth whole Empires Anciently all warres were divided by battels which caused such speedy conquest For the present warres are managed more fox-like then lion-like and are rather founded upon sieges then combats Neverthethelesse there be divers nations at this day which decide the most part of their warres by
the work to last the longer In fortresses you must observe foure principall things namely that the line of defense be within musket-shot that the flanked angle exceed not ninety degrees nor be lesse then sixty that the gorge of the bul-wark be not too narrow and that the flank be as great as may be And these foure generall maximes must be so proportioned amongst themselves as that to make one of them exceeding good you destroy not the rest You must also avoid tenailles in the principall body of fortification unlesse the ground be so small as it will not suffer you to make good flanks For the interior angle of such a fortification raised as it ought to be cannot be defended by any flank and men may lodge themselves at the foot of it without receiving any hurt unlesse it be by stones thrown over This is the reason why tenailles are not used but in the counterscarps The moats are usually proportioned according to the earth necessary to make the fortifications and such as are full of water are best to hinder a surprise and the forts defend themselves the best against an assault their breadth must have a due proportion for when they are too broad the out-works are too farre distant from the defense of the principall fortification but depth never spoiled a moat The false brayes are joyned to the body of the fortification It is anew invention and excellent to hinder the approching to the bulwarks by galleries The counterscarp half-moons ravelins and horn-works are beyond the great moat all the out-works if it be possible must be commanded by the body of the fortification These are in grosse the principall observations which are in fortifications in a place which is levell and approchable the rest dependeth on the judgement of the Enginier which must make profitable use of the situation of the place which he is to fortifie either in taking what serveth for his advantage or in avoyding whatsoever is to his hinderance I adde further that there be situations so favourable as nature it self defendeth them and maketh them more inexpugnable then all the art in the world as an inaccessible rock a quagmire or a lake But every commodity hath its discommodity seldome you shall meet with such situations on frontier-places or upon any important passage or capable to contein a garrison of sufficient strength to give â—ealousie to an enemy which would invade your countrey or else they are found so easie to be blocked up as five hundred men without are able to besiege five hundred within They which desire to know the particularities of fortification may find them amongst an infinite number of books where they are described but much better in the exercise of warre where expeâ—â—ence causeth every day something to be added CHAP. IX Of defense against surprises NOw that we have spoken of fortresses we must come to the way of guarding them and not suffer them to be surprised It is most certain that men will alwayes attempt to take them by surprise rather then by open force for that thereby they save charge and time But because surprises are grounded upon some defects which they find in the place or in the guard thereof I will begin with that which must be observed to defend your self against such surprises The Captain which shall have a place to guard must provide for six principall things whereon all the rest depend namely to see that the walls be out of danger of a scalado the gates not subject to the petard the way for the rounds easie and convenient the sentinels well set the guard very exact and to hinder intelligences and treacheries For the five first the way is beaten for them there be books full of instructions aâ—d there be now so many Princes orders in writing and in practice as he must be very negligent which is not carefull therein But for the last it is not so easie to give rules Treachery may be wrought by the townsmen or souldiers the mingling of them together whether it be on the guards rounds or patroullies may much hinder it as also the drawing all the functions of the guard by lot the keeping a guard without the town and the having of spies amongst the enemies You must double your guards at times of fairs and markets in harvest and time of â—intage because men use to spy out such times to frame a designe You must observe to be in arms at the opening and shutting of the gates and in whatsoever time of peace it may be you must never neglect the observation of any of these particulars There is also a way to avoid intelligences namely by making double enterprises your self feigning to discontent an officer private souldier or townsman who running over to the enemy causeth him to undertake some designe probably feisible and facil for besides the profit which you gain by it by getting the boldest of them in a trap you reap this advantage by it that your enemie dreameth on no other so long as he hopeth in that for that every one alwayes undertaketh that which he believeth will succeed most assuredly Whereby we may see how doubtfull those enterprises are which are grounded upon intelligence either for that they may be double or else by the fault of traitours which in the very point of execution may lose courage and discover all or by their indiscretions and not keeping secret their negotiations For these reasons in enterprises made upon intelligence both the defendant and assailant must be very suspicious and exceeding diligent to observe the words actions and behaviour of such as promise to serve them by betraying their own side and to omit no precautions to assure themselves of their persons so that they may not catch them the hostages of women and children being not alwayes sufficient as Montluc observeth at the enterprise of Darges for that some traitours are so resolute as they will hazard all to attein the height of their designes and make account to release their pledges by such prisoners as they intend to take There remaineth a word to be spoken of alarms You may therein use two wayes the first and usuall way is to put your self in order in the allarm-place where the governour must be present that so from thence he may lead to the place of danger the second is for every company to repair to their colours and from thence to go and find out their squadron which is upon the guard If the garrison be weak the scalado easie and the place large this last way of going to the alarm is the best because they go more readily to the defense of the walls but in this case they must have no suspicion of the fidelitie of the inhabitants CHAP. X. Of assaults by surprises THe enterprises of fortified places are made after severall fashions either by petard or by scalado or by some holes in the wals or by saucidges or by some such other wayes and
must be inforced to begin their work anew as ofttimes as you overthrow it insomuch as the besieger finding himself so enterteined he approcheth with much more ceremonie and at last his souldiers draw back So that in my opinion it is very fit that the besieged should make frequent sallies but they must make them at severall houres that so they may the better surprise the enemy with few men but resolute to avoid the disorder in the retreat and to do no other thing but what is commanded For though you find not resistance at the falling on as is usuall if you stay to little purpose you runne the hazard to be ill led off at the retreat The other particularities of defense depend upon those of assailing the besiegers teaching you by necessitie what you are to do wherein there is nothing but practice and experience which can well direct you CHAP. XIII Of Artillery IT is fit to speak of Artillery after sieges since it is principally by means thereof that towns are taken and that since this hath been in use there are no places found impregnable if they be not inaccessible It hath changed all the form and matter of fortifications for in stead of towers and ancient walls which have not been able to resist it we now make bulwarks and other works of earth We may say that it hath even in a manner altered the manner of making warre Anciently they began their approches to towns where now we end them for on the first day they lodged on the brim of the moat and now adayes we must go a great way before we come at it then the circumvallation was made out of reach of arrows onely now they must be made beyond reach of cannon then it mattered not though the fortresses of the encamped armies were overtopped so as they had their other conveniences now-adayes there must be care taken above all things that they be not In those times two armies were quietly led in batalia at two or three hundred paces distance from each other and remained there whole dayes without being able to be dislodged but by a hazard of a general battel now one cannot be before another but out of the reach of the cannon otherwise he that hath most of them or that hath planted them best beateth out the other without fighting At that time a Generall of an army could know the order of his enemy at a near distance and form his own according to that seeking his advantages upon the defects of another and all without danger now these things can no more be observed but so farre off as you must rather trust to your own good order then upon any defect in that of your enemy Then one army could charge another without losing their order because they had not above two or three hundred paces to march in these times it is impossible to observe it in sight of the enemy for half a league together and to find a plain which shall be even and without hindrances Whereunto I adde further that without a great exercise of marching in battalia you are not able to march a thousand paces without losing all your distances of battalions and squadrons and by consequence without being in confusion Since therefore the cannon is of so great use in warre and hath so great a share in the victory it is necessary that you know how to make good use of it It is an engine which all cannot well imploy for it is of great expense and belongeth onely to great and puissant States to make ordinary use of them They tie them to a great charge for draught there being a hundred draught-horses required to draw one cannon for battery through all kinds of wayes and to shoot onely a hundred bullets By this you may judge according to the number which you mean to imploy what length of ground it taketh up To mannage one piece of battery well there must be eighteen men besides how many smiths carters farriers and other workmen must there be in the train to repair the carriages how many carpenters to make bridges how how many pioners to accommodate the high-wayes Briefly an army which carrieth cannon with it cannot march but leisurely and that which hath none can do no great effect therefore in these times the artillery is an essentiall part of an army but withall if the Generall suffereth himself to be approched too near without entrenching himself it is impossible for him to disintangle himself without fighting or losing it which cannot so happen without losing much of his reputation For this reason he ought to inform himself very particularly of all that dependeth on the artillery and that he may not be deceived he must know the least even of the smallest things namely of the mixture founding proportion weight calibre and carriage of what wood it must be how it must be conducted according to the severall wayes miry or mountainous how to passe rivers how to secure the batteries as well against the cannon of the enemy as against his sallies what ground the cannon must have for his reverse what distance between piece and piece in what manner the platform must be made at what distance the batteries are sufficient and other things whereof I do not here specifie the particulars because others have written of them It sufficeth me to shew the use of artillerie the chargeablenesse of it the turmoil of it and whereunto it engageth you to incite Generals not to rely upon others and to know the benefit and discommoditie thereof so well that they may make use of the one to their advantage and avoid the other by their foresight CHAP. XIV Of the baggage and pioners AFter the great turmoil of the artillery I will speak a word of that of the baggage It is a great shame to lose it but it is also a hard matter to preserve it when it is excessive there being nothing that bringeth so much disorder to an army therefore it is highly necessary to reduce it to the smallest proportion that may be and to make a review of it every moneth for it groweth in the twinkling of an eye We are so delicate now a dayes as we will hardly carry our arms much lesse would we carry a weeks victuall about us So long as such an abuse be suffered in an army it will make it self incapable to do any thing that is good For as in a battel he which can last preserve some troups which have not fought carrieth away the victory so he that last keepeth his army in health complete and accustomed to labour doth the like which he cannot do if the souldiers be so delicate as they cannot carry their baggage Besides that sicknesse and famine getteth not into an army but by this rascalliâ—ie of souldiers boyes and this thing which seemeth to be a thing of nothing is of such importance as it is for the most part the dissipation of the most flourishing yea I