whereby it is offended and cannot performe his office towards the other but runneth into such inconueniences by reason of his infirmity and for want of reasons direction And whereas Hippocrates saith that they that being sicke in minde and touched with anie corporall disease haue little or no feeling of paine it sheweth plainely that it is as I haue said For if you marke it well this word feele explaneth the whole since feeling is a propertie of the Sensitiue soule and the vnderstanding feeleth not And in like manner are the words of Aristotle to be vnderstood where he saith that such whose flesh is soft are apt to learne and they that are melancholy to be wise For that the Sensitiue vertue taketh more easily the formes or kindes of things in such subiects according to their nature and representeth them to the vnderstāding from whence knowledge and vnderstanding proceedeth as yesterday was sayd And this happeneth not onely in these passions but also in all other alterations as of gladnesse of sorow of hope and of feare with such like which appertaine not to the vnderstanding to which sayd Aristotle who would ascribe such affects might as well say that the vnderstanding layed bricke to build or cast a loome to weaue Why say M. Spencer doth your author meane as some haue not sticked euen in our dayes to affirme that there are in vs two seuerall soules the one sensitiue and mortall and the other Intellectiue and Diuine Nothing lesse said I for that I hold were manifest heresie as well in Philosophie as in Christianitie For Aristotle teacheth vs that the Vegetatiue and Sensitiue soule or their powers were in the soule Intellectiue as the triangle is in the square which could not be if the sensitiue were separated from the Intellectiue And speaking of the varietie of soules and of their powers he sayth that the Sensitiue could not be without the Vegetatiue but that this latter might well be without the former and that all the other vertues of all the three soules are in those creatures that haue reason and vnderstanding It cannot therefore be sayd according to Aristotle that the Sensitiue soule in man is seuered from the Intellectiue And because man participateth as hath bene sayd of all the three faculties of the soules I see not why these fellowes that mention two speake not of all three as well seeing that in man are the operations of all three For if they say that it sufficeth to speake of the Sensitiue by which man is a liuing creature and containeth the Vegetatiue why should they not as well say that the Intellectiue alone includeth both the other and then is there no need of seuering at all By which it may appeere that this frantike opinion gathered from the Assirians is not onely contrary to Aristotle but to reason it selfe For Aristotle saith that all things haue their being from their formes and that in naturall things the more perfect containe the lesse perfect when the lesser is ordained for the more and that therefore onely the Intellectiue soule which containeth within it the natures of both the others is the onely and true forme of man malgre all such dolts as would haue man to be by reason of diuers formes both a brute and a reasonable creature who seeke to set men astray from the right way with such fanaticall deuices Let vs therefore conclude with Aristotle that both the passible and the possible vnderstandings are vertues of the Intellectiue soule insomuch as she is the particular and proper forme of euery man and that as a humane soule she is euerlasting impassible not mingled with the bodie but seuered from the same simple and diuine not drawne from any power of matter but infused into vs from abroade not ingendred by seede which being once freed from the bodie because nature admitteth nothing that is idle is altogether bent and intent to contemplation being then as Philosophers call it actus purus a pure vnderstanding not needing the bodie either as an obiect or as a subiect In consideration whereof Aristotle sayd that man through contemplation became diuine and that the true man which both he and his diuine master agreed to be the minde did enioy thereby not as a mortall man liuing in the world but as a diuine creature that high felicitie to which ciuill felicitie was ordained and attained to wisedome science after the exercise of the morall vertues as meanes to guide and conduct him to the same And not impertinently haue the Platonikes following their master in that point sayd that nature had giuen vs sense not because we should stay thereupon but to the end that thereby might grow in vs imagination from imagination discourse from discourse intelligence and from intelligence gladnesse vnspeakable which might raise vs as diuine and freed from the bands of the flesh to the knowledge of God who is the beginning and the end of all goodnesse towards whom we ought with all endeuour to lift vp our minds as to our chiefe and most perfect good for he onely is our summum bonum For to them it seemed that the man whom contemplation had raised to such a degree of felicitie became all wholy vnderstanding by that light which God imparteth to the spirits that are so purged through the exercise of morall vertues which vertues are termed by Plato the purgers of the mind stirring vp therein a most ardent desire to forsake this mortall bodie and to vnite it selfe with him And this is that contemplation of death which the Philosophie of Plato calleth vs vnto For he that is come to this degree of perfection is as dead to the world and worldly pleasures because he considereth that God is the center of al perfections that about him al our thoughts desires are to be turned employed Such doth God draw vnto himselfe and afterwards maketh them partakers of his ioyes euerlasting giuing them in the meane while a most sweet tast euen in this life of that other life most happie and those exceeding delights beyond which no desire can extend nor yet reach vnto the same So as being full of this excellent felicitie they thinke euery minute of an houre to be a long time that debarreth them from issuing out of this mortall prison to returne into their heauenly countrey where with that vertue which is proper to the soule alone they may among the blessed spirits enioy their maker whose Maiestie and power all the parts of the world declare the heauens the earth the sea the day the night whereat the infernall spirits tremble and shake euen as good men on earth bow downe and worship the same with continuall himnes and praises and in heauen no lesse all the orders and blessed companie of Saints and Angels do the like world without end This loe is as much as mine author hath discoursed vpon this subiect which I haue Englished for my exercise in both languages and haue at your intreaties communicated vnto you I will not say being betrayed by M. Spencer but surely cunningly thrust in to take vp this taske whereby he might shift himselfe from that trouble But howsoeuer it be if it haue liked you as it is I shall thinke my time well spent both in the translating of it at the first and in the relating of it vpon this occasion in this manner For as I sayd before I began that I would not tye my selfe to the strict lawes of an interpreter so haue I in some places omitted here and there haply some sentences without which this our Discourse might be complete enough because they are rather points of subtiller inuestigation then our speech required though the Author therein perhaps aymed at the commendation of a great reader or absolute Philosopher and in the descriptions of some of the morall vertues added somewhat out of others And what hath beene sayd concerning ciuill felicitie by him and deliuered in substance by me I thinke you will allow to be sufficient Since therefore my taske is done and that it groweth late with this onely petition that you will be content to beare with the roughnesse of my speech in reporting that vnto you which in his language our Author hath eloquently set downe I end Here all the companie arose and giuing me great thankes seemed to rest very well satisfied as well with the manner as with the matter at the least so of their courtesie they protested And taking their leaues departed towards the Citie FINIS ERRATA PAge 12. line 17. climbing pag. 16. lin 32 auoyde pag. 68. lin 14. speake of pag. 81. lin 4. meere pag. 82. lin 1. Politikes pag. 95. lin 10. men pag. 109. lin 15. Dioxippus pag. 140. lin 15. leaue out to pag. 143. lin 13. supposing that c pag. 145. lin 6. their marching pag. eadē lin 7. they neuer went pag. 163. lin 17. flow pag. 164. lin 4. determine pag. 168. lin 25. hath man pag. 173. lin 9. Platonikes pag. 199. lin 17. leaue out to pag. ib. lin 18. leaue out vvhich pag. 216. lin 5. make shew of pag. ibid. lin 18. that she be Pag. 238. lin 14. himselfe
not esteeme the purchase thereof at a farre higher rate then any office in Ireland whatsoeuer M. Smith therfore may well enough put vp his pipes and hold his peace henceforth and I hope not onely yee two but all the rest of this companie will hold him sufficiently put to silence and begin to allow of this my resolution especially seeing it aimeth at so high a marke as humane felicitie At which word the Primate seemed as it were to start said what sir though we can be content to admit your reasons against M. Smith and to allow of your resolutiō as hauing chosen as our Sauiour said to Martha of her sister the better part yet must you not thinke that we will let euery thing go with you which you say but by your leaue plucke you a little backe by the sleeue when we see you presse forward presumptuously as now in my opinion you do when you seeme to shoote at such a marke as humane felicitie which is without not your reach onely but all mens whiles they are here in this low and muddie world for I wis that is no where to be found but aboue the stars mans felicity is placed only in heauē where God of his mercie hath appointed it for him to be found and not here on earth I say of his mercie because albeit he had ordained the same for man from before all ages yet our first father by his disobedience depriuing himselfe and all his posteritie of all possibilitie thereof the same was eftsoones by the infinite goodnes and mercie of God purchased to him againe at a deare price euen the precious bloud of his dearest Son which he was content to shed for the ransome of mankind entrapped by the diuell and taken captiue whereby he might returne into his heauenly countrie againe to enioy that happie inheritance prepared there for him Whosoeuer therfore shall seeke to get his felicitie here in this world will find himselfe deceiued and although it be said to some purpose fitly that he that shooteth at a starre aimeth higher then he that shooteth at a furbush yet well ye wot that to shoot vp to the starres is but meere follie and vanitie and no lesse do I hold your aiming at so high a marke to be which is so farre out of your reach I crie you mercie my Lord quoth I if I haue stepped into your marches before I were aware But I may the better be excused because I had no intention or purpose so to do but simply and after the cōmon maner of speech haue vsed the general word in stead of the particular For though I said I aimed at the high marke of humane felicitie yet for so little as I haue read in Morall Philosophy I haue learned that Plato hath made mention of two distinct felicities of man and others besides him the one a contemplatiue felicitie which some men haply draw neare vnto but cannot perfectly attaine in this life the other an actiue or practicke felicitie consisting in vertuous actions and reducing of a mans passions vnder the rule of reason Which practicke felicitie may not onely be atchieued here on earth by mans endeuour assisted with Gods grace and fauour but is also a great helpe and meane for such as obtaine the same to bring them after this life vnto the other in heauen Of this latter the rules whereof are to be taken from you Church-men and Diuines I meant not when I said I aymed so high at the lestwise my purpose was not properly to say that I shot at that marke by my studie for then I should haue contradicted my former words when I protested I durst not presume to the studie of Diuinitie which I well vnderstood required a particular calling But onely my meaning was to get your approbation in that I had resolued by the study of Morall Philosophie to compasse so farre forth as my endeuours could preuaile that humane practicke felicitie which of all men in all ages hath bene so highly esteemed and for the directing of men wherunto so many great learned Philosophers haue taken so great trauell and paines to find out the ready way vnto it and by their writings to make the same knowne to others whereby not onely particular persons might in this life attaine to liue happily but also purchase the same happines to their families yea to whole Cities and Common-wealths This felicitie I think euery wel disposed man is to labor for in this life the better he is borne the more ought he to bend his study to learne by what meanes the same is to be attained and by working accordingly to prepare himselfe to be fit and capable of that other when soeuer he shall be called out of this world knowing how assured promises therof are giuen to them that in this life liue vertuously and how certain he may be that the further that good which his vertuous actions shall extend to the benefite of others in this life the greater shall be his reward in the life to come where that felicitie is prepared for them that by the treading downe of their passions and sensual appetites shal endeuour to reduce their soule to that purenesse and cleannes which is required in them to whom that euerlasting blisse and felicitie is promised For my part the thing which I most earnestly desire is to learne the shortest way to compasse the same and happpie should I thinke my selfe if I could find any man whose knowledge and learning might helpe me to direct my study to that end because I know right well how hard it is for a man by his owne labour to search out the ready way to vnderstand those precepts which haue bin set downe in the learned writings of Philosophers that haue treated of that matter especially in the Greeke and Latine tongues in which it hath bin substantially handled For although I cannot truly pretend ignorance in the Latine in which the workes of Plato and Aristotle are to be read yet I confesse that I do not find that facilitie in the conceiuing of their writings as I could wish or as the greedinesse of my desire to apprehend might ouertake For Plato hath couched his sense thereof so dispersedly in his dialogues as I thinke he must be a man of great learning and exact iudgement that shall picke them out and seuer them from the other parts of Philosophie which he indeed most diuinely discourseth vpon And Aristotle is not to me so cleare nor so easily vnderstood without deepe study as my meane capacitie would require specially without the interpretation of some better scholer then my selfe And herein do I greatly enuie the happinesse of the Italians who haue in their mother-tongue late writers that haue with a singular easie method taught all that which Plato or Aristotle haue confusedly or obscurely left written Of which some I haue begun to reade with no small delight as Alexander Piccolomini Gio. Baptista Giraldi and Guazzo all
of his owne counsell How then doth Menander say that men did many euils compelled by necessitie I meane not by necessitie as commonly we do want or pouertie but by necessitie of destinie We may then conclude that our will and election is free and that it is in our power to follow vice or vertue Neuerthelesse true it is that man may abuse this his libertie and of a free man make himselfe bond if he will and therefore do the Platonike say that a good and a wel-minded man doth all his actions freely but that if he giue himself to do euill forsaking the light of reason he becommeth a bruite beast and looseth the diuine gift of his libertie for thenceforth doth he work no more freely of himself but yeeldeth his minde which ought to be the Lord of our libertie slaue to the two basest parts of the soule and then reigneth no more the reasonable soule but the brutish which maketh him abandon the care of the minde and onely to attend the pleasures of the body as brute beasts doe Hitherto said my Lord Primate I find nothing to be misliked in your discourse which as a Philosopher is declared according to morall reason But as a Christian what sayth your author to Gods predestination Is it not necessary that whatsoeuer God hath determined of vs from the beginning in his fore-knowledge being the most certaine and true knower of all things shall come to passe This is said I no small question to be fully answered and being also not very pertinent to the matter we haue in hand being meerely morall my author medleth not with the particular points of the same onely hereof he saith that Euripides had little reason to say that God had care of greater things but that he left the care and guiding of the lesser to fortune For we are bound by holy writ to beleeue and some of the auncient Philosophers haue likewise so thought that there moueth not a leafe vpon a tree nor falleth a haire from our heads but by the will of God Whereupon the holy Prophet Dauid sayd that God dwelleth on high and beholdeth the things that are humble in heauen and in earth And the Peripatetikes seemed to consent thereunto when they sayd that the heauenly prouidence foreseeing that the particulars were not apt to preserue themselues eternally had therfore ordained that they should be continued in their vniuersalities which are the seuerall kinds or species containing vnder them the particulars which of themselues are mortal and perishable but are made perpetual in them through generation He sayth also that predestination is an ordinance or disposition of things in the mind of God from the beginning of what shal be done by vs in this life through grace But he thinks not that it tieth our free wil but that they go both together that our well doing is acceptable and pleasing to God and our euil deeds displeasing and offensiue to his diuine Maiestie and that for the good we shall receiue reward and punishment for the euill The further discussing whereof appertaining rather to Diuines then Morall Philosophers he thinketh fit to referre vnto them and to beleeue that this is one of those secrets which God hath layed vp in the treasury of his mind whereunto no mortall eye or vnderstanding can reach or penetrate humbling our selues to his holy will without searching into that which we cannot approch vnto And if Socrates in that time of darknesse and superstition of the heathen could exhort men to assure themselues that God hauing created them wold haue no lesse care of them then a good and iust Prince would haue of his subiects how much more are we to beleeue that our heauenly Lord and God Almightie who hath sent his onely begotten Sonne to redeeme vs from the bondage of Sathan doth dispose and ordaine of vs as is best for vs and for the honor of his diuine Maiestie For as they are to be commended that referre themselues humbly to whatsoeuer he hath determined of them doing their best endeuours to purchase his grace and fauour so are they to be misdoubted who ouer-curiously will needes take vpon them the iudgment of Gods predestination or prescience And that sentence cannot but be very good which sayeth that he that made thee without thee will not saue thee without thee For were a man certaine to be damned yet ought he not to do otherwise then well because he is borne to vertue and not to vice which the very heathen by the onely light of reason could well perceiue Besides it is thoght that al they that are signed with the character of Christ in baptisme may stedfastly beleeue that they are predestinated and chosen to saluation not that our predestinatiō giueth vs a necessitie of wel doing but because we hauing the grace of God to assist vs dispose our selues by the same grace to keep his cōmandements for our saluation and for the honor and glory of his maiestie whereas by doing otherwise it is our owne wickednesse that excludeth vs from that blisse And further mine author saith not In good sooth said sir Robert Dillon this seemeth to me to be well and Christian like spoken For he that acknowledgeth not so great a gift from God being a speciall marke or token by which we are distinguished from brute beasts who wanting the vse of reason can haue no free election is not onely vnthankfull but doth foolishly thrust himselfe into the number of vnreasonable creatures while he will needs depriue himself of that he hath specially different from them Neither doth the reuerent regard to Gods prouidence impeach our free wil which prouidence the Platonikes partly vnderstanding affirmed as I haue heard that it did not alter or change the nature of things but guided and directed destinie imposing no necessitie of doing good or euill vpon vs. And if any it did impose it should be onely to good and neuer to euill For what is diuine must needes worke diuinely and diuine working can produce none but good effects Wherefore they concluded that our election was not constrained by Gods prouidence This they confirmed by common experience For sayd they if prouidence tie things to necessitie then chance or fortune can haue no place in the actions of men But we see dayly many things maturely debated which should by the naturall and ordinary course of causes haue a determinate and certaine end yet misse their effect whereunto they are ordained and another produced which was neuer intended which is the proper worke of fortune I haue also heard some Diuines say that it should seeme strange if wise prudent men in this world by their prouidence and foresight seek euermore to bring perfection to those things which are vnder their gouernement God contrariwise who is the fountaine of all wisdome prudence and the true and absolute preseruer and conseruer of all things by him produced should not giue perfections and continuance through his prouidence
may I say of my selfe that am tied to declare to you in our lāguage inferior much to the Italian al that he hath set downe touching the same Sure it is that if I were able to set before the eyes of your mindes a liuely image of this excellent end you wold be so delighted therewith that in regard thereof you would contemne and set light by all other pleasures in the world But howsoeuer my vtterance be which I will do my best to fit as wel as I can to so high a subiect you shall heare what he in substance saith therupon and I assure my self that the quality of the matter will easily supply whatsoeuer defect you may find in my phrase or maner of speech You are therefore to vnderstand that as they whose iudgements are corrupted and minds informed with an il habite to make them liue after the maner before mentioned do swarue frō the nature of man so much as they become like brute beasts or insensible plants voide of reason euen so are they among men as diuine creatures who apply themselues to liue according to reason And such haue aunciently bin called Heroes because they approched in their actions neerer to God then others that liued not so For they put all their endeuours to adorne and set foorth that part of man which maketh him like vnto the diuine nature or rather partaker of the same teacheth him what is good comely honest and honorable and inuiteth him continually to that which may conduct him to the highest and supreme good This part is the minde with the vse of reason proceeding from it as from a roote But because two speciall offices appertaine to the vse of reason so farre foorth as serueth to this purpose the one contemplation and the other action Touching the first it raiseth vs by the means of Arts and sciences which purge the minde from base and corrupt affections to the knowledge of those things that are vnchangeable and still remaine the same howsoeuer the heauens turne time runne on or fortune or any other cause rule things subiect vnto them By means of which sciences the minde climbing by degrees vp to the eternall causes considereth the order maner wherewith things are knit together linked in a perpetual bād And thence it comprehendeth the forme of regiment which the Creator and mouer of all things vseth in the maintaining and keeping them euerlastingly in their seuerall offices and duties And out of the consideration hereof we learne that he that directeth not his course of gouernment by this rule as neere as he can to guide himselfe his family and the Common-wealth can seldome or neuer attaine a good and happie end Wherefore he draweth the celestiall gouernement to the vse of humane and ciuill things so farre as mans frailtie will permit As Socrates did who was said to haue drawne Philosophie from heauen to the earth to reforme the life and māners of men Thus turning himselfe to the knowledge of his owne nature and finding that he is composed of three seuerall natures whereof ech hath her seuerall end yet seeketh he to draw the ends of the two lesse perfect to the end of that which is most perfect and proper to him But finding that continuall contemplation of higher things would be profitable onely to himself and to none other in that he should thereby purchase no happinesse to any but to himselfe And because he knoweth that he is not borne to himselfe alone but to ciuill societie and conuersation and to the good of others as well as of himselfe he therefore doth his endeuour with all care and diligence so to cary himselfe in words and in deeds as he might be a patterne and example to others of seemly and vertuous speeches and honest actions and do them all the good he could in reducing them to a good and commendable forme of life For the performance whereof he perceiueth how requisite it is that honestie and vertue be so vnited with profite and pleasure that by a iust and equall temper of them both himselfe and others may attaine that end which is the summum bonum and the thing wherupon all our discourse hath bin grounded This end is not to be attained but by the meanes of morall vertues which are the perfection of the minde setled habits in ruling the appetite which ariseth out of the vnreasonable parts of the soule for vertues are grounded in those parts which are without reason but yet are apt to be ruled by reason He therefore seeing morall vertues are not gotten by knowing onely what they be but through the long practise of many vertuous operations whereby they fasten themselues so to the mind as being conuerted once into an habite it is very hard afterwards to lose the same euen as of vicious actions on the other side the like ensueth therefore with all carefulnesse and diligence possible he laboreth to embrace the one and to eschue the other euermore striuing to hold himselfe in the meane and to auoide the approching of the extremes to which profite and delight vnder deceitful maskes of good would entise and allure him I pray you said Captain Norreis tel vs since you say that vertue is in the mids betweene two extremes whether that meane you speake of wherin vertue sits be so equally in the midst as the extremes which be vicious be alike distant from the same or no No said I they are not in that manner equidistant for oftentimes vertue approcheth neerer to one of the extremes then to the other As for example Fortitude which consisteth in a meane betweene fearefulnesse and foole-hardinesse hath yet a neerer resemblance to foole-hardinesse then to cowardise and consequently is not alike distant from them both and is in this manner to be vnderstood that albeit vertue consist in a meane between two extremes whereof the one is a defect and the other a superabundance yet she is neither of them both as by our example of Fortitude appeereth which is neither foole-hardines nor yet cowardise but onely a commendable meane or temper betweene them both And therfore Aristotle said right well that the meane of vertue betweene two extremes was a Geometricall meane which hath a respect to proportion and not an Arithmeticall meane which respecteth equall distance so as you must vnderstand that vertue is not called a meane betweene two extremes because she participateth of either of them both but because she is neither the one nor the other And why said Captaine Norreis is the Geometricall proportion rather to be obserued therein then the Arithmeticall Because said I though vertues are in the meane yet do they bend oftentimes towards one of the extremes more then to the other as hath bin said already and by proportion Geometricall they are in the middest which by Arithmeticall would not be so For thereby they must be in the iust middest and equally distant from both the extremes As for example let vs