also to study always to please their Parents But since this Duty is not by force of any moral faculty as those former are but only of Piety Observance and Duty of repaying Thanks it doth not make any thing void which is done against it as neither a gift of any thing is void being made by any Owner whatsoever against the rules of Parsimony In both these times the Right of Ruling and Compelling is as Grotius acknowledgeth comprehended so far forth as Children are to be compelled to their Duty or amended although the power of a Parent doth so follow the person of a Father that it cannot be pulled away and transferred upon another yet the Father may naturally pawn or also sell his Son if there be need In the third time he saith The Son is in all things Free and of his own Authority always that Duty remaining of Piety and Observance the cause of which is perpetual In this triple distinction though Grotius allow Children in some cases during the second and in all cases during the third time to be free and of their own Power by a moral Faculty yet in that he confesseth in all cases Children are bound to study always to please their Parents out of Piety and Duty the cause of which as he saith is perpetual I cannot conceive how in any case Children can naturally have any Power or moral Faculty of doing what they please without their Parents leave since they are always bound to study to please their Parents And though by the Laws of some Nations Children when they attain to years of Discretion have Power and Liberty in many actions yet this Liberty is granted them by Positive and Humane Laws only which are made by the Supreme Fatherly Power of Princes who Regulate Limit or Assume the Authority of inferiour Fathers for the publick Benefit of the Commonwealth so that naturally the Power of Parents over their Children never ceaseth by any Separation but only by the permission of the transcendent Fatherly Power of the Supreme Prince Children may be dispensed with or priviledged in some cases from obedience to subordinate Parents Touching the Point of dissolving the Vows of Children Grotius in his last Edition of his Book hath corrected his first for in the first he teacheth That the power of the Father was greater over the Daughter dwelling with him than over the Son for her Vow he might make void but not his But instead of these words in his last Edition he saith That the power over the Son or Daughter to dissolve Vows was not perpetual but did endure as long as the Children were a part of their Fathers Family About the meaning of the Text out of which he draws this Conclusion I have already spoken Three ways Grotius propoundeth whereby Supreme Power may be had First By full Right of Propriety Secondly By an Vsufructuary Right Thirdly By a Temporary Right The Roman Dictators saith he had Supreme Power by a Temporary Right as well those Kings who are first Elected as those that in a lawful Right succeed to Kings elected have Supreme Power by an usufructuary Right some Kings that have got Supreme Power by a just War or into whose Power some People for avoiding a greater Evil have so yielded themselves as that they have excepted nothing have a full Right of Propriety Thus we find but two means acknowledged by Grotius whereby a King may obtain a full Right of Propriety in a Kingdom That is either by a just War or by Donation of the People How a War can be just without a precedent Title in the Conquerour Grotius doth not shew and if the Title only make the War just then no other Right can be obtained by War than what the Title bringeth for a just War doth only put the Conquerour in possession of his old Right but not create a new The like which Grotius saith of Succession may be said of War Succession saith he is no Title of a Kingdom which gives a Form to the Kingdom but a Continuation of the old for the Right which began by the Election of the Family is continued by Succession wherefore so much as the first Election gave so much the Succession brings So to a Conquerour that hath a Title War doth not give but put him in possession of a Right and except the Conquerour had a full Right of Propriety at first his Conquest cannot give it him for if originally he and his Ancestors had but an usufructuary Right and were outed of the possession of the Kingdom by an Usurper here though the Re-conquest be a most just War yet shall not the Conquerour in this case gain any full Right of Propriety but must be remitted to his usufructuary Right only for what Justice can it be that the Injustice of a third Person an Usurper should prejudice the People to the devesting of them of that Right of Propriety which was reserved in their first Donation to their Elected King to whom they gave but an usufructuary Right as Grotius conceiveth Wherefore it seems impossible that there can be a just War whereby a full Right of Propriety may be gained according to Grotius's Principles For if a King come in by Conquest he must either conquer them that have a Governour or those People that have none if they have no Governour then they are a free People and so the War will be unjust to conquer those that are free especially if the Freedom of the People be by the primary Law of Nature as Grotius teacheth But if the People conquered have a Governour that Governour hath either a Title or not If he hath a Title it is an unjust War that takes the Kingdom from him If he hath no Title but only the Possession of a Kingdom yet it is unjust for any other man that wants a Title also to conquer him that is but in possession for it is a just Rule That where the Cases are alike he that is in Possession is in the better condition In pari causa possidentis melior conditio Lib. 2. c. 23. And this by the Law of Nature even in the Judgment of Grotius But if it be admitted that he that attempts to conquer hath a Title and he that is in possession hath none here the Conquest is but in nature of a possessory Action to put the Conquerour in possession of a primer Right and not to raise a new Title for War begins where the Law fails Vbi Judicia deficiunt incipit Bellum Lib. 2. cap. 1. And thus upon the matter I cannot find in Grotius's Book De Jure Belli how that any Case can be put wherein by a just War a man may become a King pleno Jure Proprietatis All Government and Supreme Power is founded upon publick Subjection which is thus defined by Grotius Publica Subjectio est quâ se Populus homini alicui aut pluribus hominibus aut etiam populo alteri in ditionem dat Lib. 2.
quovis tempore revocabile id est precarium as the Vandals in Africa and the Goths in Spain would depose their Kings as oft as they displeased them horum enim actus irriti possunt reddi ab his qui potestatem revocabiliter dederunt ac proinde non idem est effectus nec jus idem Here he doth teach in plain words the Effect doth depend upon the Will of the People By this we may judge how improperly he useth the instance of a Woman that appoints her self a Husband whom she must always necessarily obey since the necessity of the continuance of the VVife's obedience depends upon the Law of God which hath made the Bond of Matrimony indissolvable Grotius will not say the like for the continuance of the Subjects obedience to the Prince neither will they say that VVomen may chuse Husbands as he tells us the People may chuse Kings by giving their Husbands as little power and for as little a time as they please Next it is objected That Tutors who are set over Pupils may be removed if they abuse their power Grotius answers In Tutore hoc procedit qui superiorem habet at in Imperiis quia progressus non datur in infinitum omnino in aliqua persona aut coetu consistendum est We must stay in some one Person or in a Multitude whose faults because they have no superiour Judge above them God hath witnessed that he will have a particular care of either to revenge them if he judge it needful or to tolerate them either for Punishment or Tryal of the People It is true in Kingdoms we cannot proceed in infinitum yet we may and must go to the highest which by Grotius his Rule is the People because they first made Kings so that there is no need to stay in aliqua persona but in coetu in the People so that by his Doctrine Kings may be punished by the People but the faults of the People must be left to the Judgment of God I have briefly presented here the desperate Inconveniences which attend upon the Doctrine of the natural freedom and community of all things these and many more Absurdities are easily removed if on the contrary we maintain the natural and private Dominion of Adam to be the fountain of all Government and Propriety And if we mark it well we shall find that Grotius doth in part grant as much The ground why those that now live do obey their Governours is the Will of their Forefathers who at the first ordained Princes and in obedience to that Will the Children continue in subjection this is according to the mind of Grotius so that the Question is not Whether Kings have a fatherly Power over their Subjects but how Kings came first by it Grotius will have it that our Forefathers being all free made an Assignment of their Power to Kings the other Opinion denies any such general freedom of our Forefathers but derives the Power of Kings from the Original Dominion of Adam This natural Dominion of Adam may be proved out of Grotius himself who teacheth That generatione jus acquiritur Parentibus in Liberos and that naturally no other can be found but the Parents to whom the Government should belong and the Right of Ruling and Compelling them doth belong to Parents And in another place he hath these words speaking of the fifth Commandment Parentum nomine qui naturales sunt Magistratus etiam alios Rectores par est intelligi quorum authoritas Societatem humanam continet and if Parents be natural Magistrates Children must needs be born natural Subjects But although Grotius acknowledge Parents to be natural Magistrates yet he will have it that Children when they come to full age and are separated from their Parents are free from natural Subjection For this he offers proof out of Aristotle and out of Scripture First for Aristotle we must note he doth not teach that every separation of Children of full age is an Obtaining of liberty as if that men when they come to years might voluntarily separate themselves and cast off their natural Obedience but Aristotle speaks only of a passive Separation for he doth not say that Children are subject to Parents until they do separate but he saith until they be separated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Verb of the Passive Voice That is until by Law they be separated for the Law which is nothing else but the Will of him that hath the Power of the Supreme Father doth in many cases for the publick Benefit of Society free Children from subjection to the subordinate Parent so that the natural Subjection by such Emancipation of Children is not extinguished but only assumed and regulated by the Parent paramount Secondly Grotius cites Numb 30. to prove that the power of the Fathers over the Sons and Daughters to dissolve their Vows was not perpetual but during the time only whilst the Children were part of the Fathers Family But if we turn to the Chapter we may find that Grotius either deceives himself or us for there is not one word in that Chapter concerning the Vows of Sons but of Daughters only being in their Father's Family and the being of the Daughter in the Father's House meaneth only the Daughter 's being a Virgin and not married which may be gathered by the Argument of the whole Chapter which taketh particular order for the Vows of VVomen of all estates First for Virgins in the third Verse Secondly for VVives in general in the sixth Verse Thirdly for VVidows and VVomen divorced in the ninth Verse There is no Law for Virgins out of their Father's Houses we may not think they would have been omitted if they had been free from their Fathers we find no freedom in the Text for VVomen till after Marriage And if they were married though they were in their Father's Houses yet the Fathers had no power of their Vows but their Husbands If by the Law of Nature departure from the Father's House had emancipated Children why doth the Civil Law contrary to the Law of Nature give power and remedy to Fathers for to recover by Action of Law their Children that depart or are taken away from them without their consent Without the consent of Parents the Civil Law allows no emancipation Concerning Subjection of Children to Parents Grotius distinguisheth three several times The first is the time of Imperfect Judgment The second is the time of Perfect Judgment but whilst the Son remains part of the Father's Family The third is the time after he hath departed out of his Father's Family In the first time he saith All the actions of Children are under the dominion of the Parents During the second time when they are of the age of mature Judgment they are under their Father's command in those actions only which are of moment for their Parents Family In other actions the Children have a power or moral faculty of doing but they are bound in those
the whole people but to the supream Heads and Fathers of Families not as they are the people but quatenus they are Fathers of people over whom they have a supream power devolved unto them after the death of their soveraign Ancestor and if any can have a right to chuse a King it must be these Fathers by conferring their distinct fatherly powers upon one man alone Chief Fathers in Scripture are accounted as all the people as all the Children of Israel as all the Congregation as the Text plainly expounds it self 2 Chr. 1.2 where Solomon speaks to All Israel that is to the Captains the Judges and to every Governour the CHIEF OF THE FATHERS and so the Elders of Israel are expounded to be the chief of the Fathers of the Children of Israel 1 King 8.1 and the 2 Chr. 5.2 If it be objected That Kings are not now as they were at the first planting or peopling of the world the Fathers of their People or Kingdoms and that the fatherhood hath lost the right of governing An answer is That all Kings that now are or ever were are or were either Fathers of their People or the Heirs of such Fathers or Usurpers of the right of such Fathers It is a truth undeniable that there cannot be any multitude of men whatsoever either great or small though gathered together from the several corners and remotest regions of the world but that in the same multitude considered by it self there is one man amongst them that in nature hath a right to be the King of all the rest as being the next Heir to Adam and all the other subject unto him every man by nature is a King or a Subject the obedience which all Subjects yield to Kings is but the paying of that duty which is due to the supream fatherhood Many times by the act either of an Usurper himself or of those that set him up the true Heir of a Crown is dispossessed God using the ministry of the wickedest men for the removing and setting up of Kings in such cases the Subjects obedience to the fatherly power must go along and wait upon God's providence who only hath right to give and take away Kingdoms and thereby to adopt Subjects into the obedience of another fatherly power according to that of Arist 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Monarchy or Kingdom will be a fatherly government Ethic. l. 8. c. 12. However the natural freedom of the People be cried us as the sole means to determine the kind of Government and the Governours yet in the close all the favourers of this opinion are constrained to grant that the obedience which is due to the fatherly Power is the true only cause of the Subjection which we that are now living give to Kings since none of us gave consent to Government but only our Fore-fathers act and consent hath concluded us Whereas many confess that Government only in the abstract is the ordinance of God they are not able to prove any such ordinance in the Scripture but only in the fatherly power and therefore we find the Commandment that enjoyns obedience to Superiours given in the terms of Honour thy Father so that not only the Power or right of Government but the form of the power of governing and the person having that power are all the ordinance of God the first Father had not only simply power but power Monarchical as he was a Father immediately from God For by the appointment of God as soon as Adam was created he was Monarch of the World though he had no Subjects for though there could not be actual Government until there were Subjects yet by the right of nature it was due to Adam to be Governour of his posterity though not in Act yet at least in habit Adam was a King from his Creation And in the state of innocency he had been Governour of his Children for the integrity or excellency of the Subjects doth not take away the order or eminency of the Governour Eve was subject to Adam before he sinned the Angels who are of a pure nature are subject to God which confutes their saying who in disgrace of civil Government or power say it was brought in by sin Government as to coactive power was after sin because coaction supposeth some disorder which was not in the state of innocency But as for directive power the condition of humane nature requires it since civil Society cannot be imagined without power of Government for although as long as men continued in the state of innocency they might not need the direction of Adam in those things which were necessarily and morally to be done yet things indifferent that depended meerly on their free will might be directed by the power of Adam's command If we consider the first plantations of the world which were after the building of Babel when the confusion of tongues was we may find the division of the Earth into distinct Kingdoms and Countries by several families whereof the Sons or Grand-children of Noah were the Kings or Governours by a fatherly right and for the preservation of this power and right in the Fathers God was pleased upon several Families to bestow a Language on each by it self the better to unite it into a Nation or Kingdom as appears by the words of the Text Gen. 10. These are the Families of the Sons of Noah after their generations in their Nations and by these were the Nations divided in the Earth after the floud Every one after HIS TONGUE AFTER THEIR FAMILIES in their Nations The Kings of England have been graciously pleased to admit and accept the Commons in Parliament as the Representees of the Kingdom yet really and truly they are not the representative body of the whole Kingdom The Commons in Parliament are not the representative body of the whole Kingdom they do not represent the King who is the head and principal member of the Kingdom nor do they represent the Lords who are the nobler and higher part of the body of the Realm and are personally present in Parliament and therefore need no representation The Commons only represent a part of the lower or inferior part of the body of the People which are the Free-holders worth 40 s. by the year and the Commons or Free-men of Cities and Burroughs or the major part of them All which are not one quarter nay not a tenth part of the Commons of the Kingdom for in every Parish for one Free-holder there may be found ten that are no Freeholders and anciently before Rents were improved there were nothing near so many Free-holders of 40 s. by the year as now are to be found The scope and Conclusion of this discourse and Argument is that the people taken in what notion or sense soever either diffusively collectively or representatively have not nor cannot exercise any right or power of their own by nature either in chusing or in regulating Kings But whatsoever power any people
the Crown does escheat for want of an Heir Whether doth it not then Divolve to the People The Answer is It is but the Negligence or Ignorance of the People to lose the Knowledge of the true Heir For an Heir there always is If Adam himself were still living and now ready to die it is certain that there is One Man and but One in the World who is next Heir although the Knowledge who should be that One Man be quite lost 2. This Ignorance of the People being admitted it doth not by any means follow that for want of Heirs the Supreme Power is devolved to the Multitude and that they have Power to Rule and Chose what Rulers they please No the Kingly Power escheats in such cases to the Princes and independent Heads of Families for every Kingdom is resolved into those parts whereof at first it was made By the Uniting of great Families or petty Kingdoms we find the greater Monarchies were at the first erected and into such again as into their first Matter many times they return again And because the dependencie of ancient Families is oft obscure or worn out of Knowledge therefore the wisdom of All or Most Princes have thought fit to adopt many times those for Heads of Families and Princes of Provinces whose Merits Abilities or Fortunes have enobled them or made them fit and capable of such Regal Favours All such prime Heads and Fathers have power to consent in the uniting or conferring of their Fatherly Right of Sovereign Authority on whom they please And he that is so Elected claims not his Power as a Donative from the People but as being substituted properly by God from whom he receives his Royal Charter of an Vniversal Father though testified by the Ministry of the Heads of the People If it please God for the Correction of the Prince or punishment of the People to suffer Princes to be removed and others to be placed in their rooms either by the Factions of the Nobility or Rebellion of the People in all such cases the Judgment of God who hath Power to give and to take away Kingdoms is most just Yet the Ministry of Men who Execute Gods Judgments without Commission is sinful and damnable God doth but use and turn mens Vnrighteous Acts to the performance of his Righteous Decrees 10 In all Kingdoms or Common-wealths in the World whether the Prince be the Supream Father of the People or but the true Heir of such a Father or whether he come to the Crown by Usurpation or by Election of the Nobles or of the People or by any other way whatsoever or whether some Few or a Multitude Govern the Commonwealth Yet still the Authority that is in any one or in many or in all these is the only Right and natural Authority of a Supream Father There is and always shall be continued to the end of the World a Natural Right of a Supreme Father over every Multitude although by the secret Will of God many at first do most unjustly obtain the Exercise of it To confirm this Natural Right of Regal Power we find in the Decalogue That the Law which enjoyns Obedience to Kings is delivered in the terms of Honour thy Father as if all power were originally in the Father If Obedience to Parents be immediately due by a Natural Law and Subjection to Princes but by the Mediation of an Humane Ordinance what reason is there that the Laws of Nature should give place to the Laws of Men as we see the power of the Father over his Child gives place and is subordinate to the power of the Magistrate If we compare the Natural Rights of a Father with those of a King we find them all one without any difference at all but only in the Latitude or Extent of them as the Father over one Family so the King as Father over many Families extends his care to preserve feed cloth instruct and defend the whole Commonwealth His War his Peace his Courts of Justice and all his Acts of Sovereignty tend only to preserve and distribute to every subordinate and inferiour Father and to their Children their Rights and Privileges so that all the Duties of a King are summed up in an Universal Fatherly Care of his People CHAP. II. It is unnatural for the People to Govern or Chose Governours 1. ARistotle examined about the Freedom of the People and justified 2. Suarez disputing against the Regality of Adam 3. Families diversly defined by Aristotle Bodin and others 4. Suarez contradicting Bellarmine 5. Of Election of Kings 6. By the Major part of the People 7. By Proxy and by silent Acceptation 8. No Example in Scripture of the Peoples chosing their King Mr. Hooker's Judgment therein 9. God governed always by Monarchy 10. Bellarmine and Aristotle's Judgment of Monarchy 11. Imperfections of the Roman Democratie 12. Rome began her Empire under Kings and perfected under Emperours In danger the People of Rome always fled to Monarchy 13. Whether Democraties were invented to bridle Tyrants or rather that they came in by Stealth 14. Democraties vilified by their own Historians 15. Popular Government more bloody than Tyranny 16. Of a mixed Government of the King and People 17. The People may not judge or correct their King 18. No Tyrants in England since the Conquest 1. BY conferring these Proofs and Reasons drawn from the Authority of the Scripture it appears little less than a Paradox which Bellarmine and others affirm of the Freedom of the Multitude to chose what Rulers they please Had the Patriarchs their Power given them by their own Children Bellarmine does not say it but the Contrary If then the Fatherhood enjoyed this Authority for so many Ages by the Law of Nature when was it lost or when forfeited or how is it devolved to the Liberty of the Multitude Because the Scripture is not favourable to the Liberty of the People therefore many fly to Natural Reason and to the Authority of Aristotle I must crave Liberty to examine or explain the Opinion of this great Philosopher but briefly I find this Sentence in the Third of his Politiques Cap. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It seems to some not to be natural for one man to be Lord of all the Citizens since a City consists of Equals D. Lambine in his Latine Interpretation of this Text hath omitted the Translation of this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by this means he maketh that to be the Opinion of Aristotle which Aristotle alleadgeth to be the Opinion but of some This Negligence or Wilful Escape of Lambine in not translating a word so Material hath been an occasion to deceive many who looking no farther than this Latine Translation have concluded and made the World now of late believe that Aristotle here maintains a Natural Equality of Men and not only our English Translator of Aristotle's Politiques is in this place misled by following Lambine but even the Learned Monsieur Duvall in