effectus nec jus idem Here he doth teach in plain words the Effect doth depend upon the Will of the People By this we may judge how improperly he useth the instance of a Woman that appoints her self a Husband whom she must alwayes necessarily obey since the necessity of the continuance of the Wives obedience depends upon the Law of God which hath made the Bond of Matrimony indissolvable Grotius will not say the like for the continuance of the Subjects obedience to the Prince neither will he say that Women may choose Husbands as he tells us the People may choose Kings by giving their Husbands as little Power and for as little a Time as they please Next it is objected that Tutors who are set over Pupils may be removed if they abuse their Power Grotius answers In tutore hoc procedit qui superiorem habet at in imperiis quia progressus non datur in infinitum omnino in aliqua persona aut coetu consistendum est We must stay in some one Person or in a Multitude whose faults because they have no superiour Iudge above them God hath witnessed that he will have a particular care of either to revenge them if he judge it needful or to tolerate them either for Punishment or Tryal of the People It is true in Kingdomes we cannot proceed in infinitum yet we may and must go to the highest which by Grotius his Rule is the People because they first made Kings so that there is no need to stay in aliqua persona but in coetu in the People so that by his Doctrine Kings may be punished by the People but the faults of the People must be left to the Judgment of God I have briefly presented here the desperate Inconveniences which attend upon the Doctrine of the natural freedom and community of all things these and many more Absurdities are easily removed if on the contrary we maintain the natural and private Dominion of Adam to be the fountain of all Government and Propriety And if we mark it well we shall find that Grotius doth in part grant as much The ground why those that now live do obey their Governours is the Will of their Fore-fathers who at the first ordained Princes and in obedience to that Will the Children continue in subjection this is according to the mind of Grotius so that the Question is not Whether Kings have a fatherly Power over their Subjects but how Kings came first by it Grotius will have it that our Fore-fathers being all free made an Assignment of their Power to Kings the other opinion denies any such general freedom of our Fore-fathers but derives the Power of Kings from the Original Dominion of Adam This natural Dominion of Adam may be proved out of Grotius himself who teacheth that geneâ—…ione jus acquiritur Parentibus in Liberos and that â—…urally no other can be found but the Parents to whom the Government should belong and the Right of Ruling and Compelling them doth belong to Parents And in another place he hath these words speaking of the first Commandment Parentum nomine â—…i naturales sunt Magistratus etiam alios Rectores 〈◊〉 est intelligi quorum authoritas Societatem humaâ—…m continet and if Parents be natural Magistrates Children must needs be born natural Subjects But although Grotius acknowledge Parents to â—…e natural Magistrates yet he will have it that Children when they come to full age and are â—…parated from their Parents are free from natural Subjection For this he offers proof out of Ariâ—…le and out of Scripture First for Aristotle we â—…ust note he doth not teach that every separation of Children of full age is an Obtaining of liberty â—…s if that men when they come to years might voâ—…ntarily separate themselves and cast off their â—…atural Obedience but Aristotle speaks onely of passive Separation for he doth not say that Children are subject to Parents until they do sepaâ—…te but he saith until they be separated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in â—…he Verb of the Passive Voice That is until by â—…aw they be separated for the Law which 〈◊〉 nothing else but the Will of him that hath the Power of the Supreme Father doth in many cases for the publick Benefit of Society free Children from subjection to the Subordinate Parent so that the natural Subjection by such Emancipation of Children is not extinguished but onely assumed and regulated by the Parent paramount Secondly Grotius cites Numb 30. to prove that the Power of the Fathers over the Sons and Daughters to dissolve their Vows was not perpetual buâ—… during the time only whilst the Children were part oâ—… the Fathers Family But if we turn to the Chapter we may find that Grotius either deceives himself or us for there is not one word in that Chapter concerning the Vows of Sons but of Daughters only being in their Father's Family and thâ—… Being of the Daughter in the Father's House meaneth only the Daughter 's being a Virgin and noâ—… married which may be gathered by the Argumenâ—… of the whole Chapter which taketh particular order for the Vows of Women of all Estates Firsâ—… for Virgins in the third verse Secondly foâ—… Wives in general in the sixth verse Thirdly foâ—… Widows and Women divorced in the nintâ—… verse There is no Law for Virgins out of theâ—… Father's houses we may not think they woulâ—… have been omitted if they had been free froâ—… their Fathers we find no freedom in the Teâ—… for Women till after Marriage And if they weâ—… married though they were in their Father's hoâ—…ses yet the Fathers had no power of their Vowâ—… but their Husbands If by the Law of Nature departure from tâ—… Fathers house had emancipated Children wâ—… doth the Civil Law contrary to the Law of Nâ—…ture give Power and Remedy to Fathers for to recover by Action of Law their Children that deâ—…rt or are taken away from them without their Consent Without the Consent of Parents the Civil Law allows no emancipation Concerning Subjection of Children to Parents Grotius distinguisheth three several times The first is the time of Imperfect Iudgment The second is the time of Perfect Iudgment but whilst the Son remains part of the Father's Faâ—…ily The third is the time after he hath departed out of his Father's Family In the first time he saith All the actions of Children are under the dominion of the Parents During the second time when they are of the â—…ge of mature Iudgment they are under their Father's Command in those actions onely which are of moment for their Parents Family In other actions the Children have a Power or moral Faculty of doing but they are bound in those also to study alwayes to please their Parents But since this Duty is not by â—…orce of any moral Faculty as those former are but â—…ely of Piety Observance and Duty of repaying Thanks it doth not make any thing void which is done against it as neither a gift of any thing
is void being made by any Owner whatsoever against the â—…ules of Parsimony In both these times the Right of Ruling and Compelling is as Grotius acknowledgeth comprehended so far forth as Children are to be compelled to their Duty or amended although the Power of a Parent dâ—…th so follow the person of a Father that it cannot be pulled away and transferred upon another yet the Father may naturally pawn or also sell his Son if there be need In the third time he saith the Son is in all things Free and of his own Authority always that Duâ—… remaining of Piety and Observance the cause of which is perpetual In this triple distinction though Grotius allow Children in some cases during the second and in all cases during the third time to be free and of their own Power by a moral Faculty yet in that he confesseth in all cases Children are bound to study always to please their Parents out of Piety and Duty the cause of which as he saith is perpetual I cannot conceive how in any case Children can naturally have any Power or moral Faculty of doing what they please without their Parents leave since they are alwayes bound to study to please their Parents And though by the Laws of some Nations Children when they attain to years of Discretion have Power and Liberty in many actions yet this Liberty is granted them by Positive and Humane Laws onely which are made by the Supreme Fatherly Power of Princes who Regulate Limit or Assume the Authority of inferiour Fathers for the publick Benefit of the Commonwealth so that naturally the Power of Parents over their Children never ceaseth by any Separation but only by the Permission of the transcendent Fatherly power of the Supreme Prince Children may be dispensed with or privileged in some cases from obedience to subordinate Parents Touching the Point of dissolving the Vows of Children Grotius in his last Edition of his Book hath corrected his first for in the first he teacheth that the Power of the Father was greater over the Daughter dwelling with him than over the Son for her Vow he might make void but not his But instead of these words in his last Edition he saith that the Power over the Son or Daughter to dissolve Vows was not perpetual but did indure as long as the Children were a part of their Fathers Family About the meaning of the Text out of which he draws this Conclusion I have already spoken Three wayes Grotius propoundeth whereby Supreme Power may be had First By full Right of Propriety Secondly By an Usufructuary Right Thirdly By a Temporary Right The Roman Dictators saith he had Supreme Power by a Temporary Right as well those Kings who are first Elected as those that in a lawful Right succeed to Kings elected have Supreme Power by an usufructuary Right some Kings that have got Supreme Power by a just War or into whose Power some People for avoiding a greater Evil have so yielded themselves as that they have excepted nothing have a full Right of Propriety Thus we find but two means acknowledged by Grotius whereby a King may obtain a full Right of Propriety in a Kingdome That is either by a just War or by Donation of the People How a War can be just without a precedent Title in the Conquerour Grotius doth not shew and if the Title onely make the War just then no other Right can be obtained by War than what the Title bringeth for a just War doth onely put the Conquerour in possession of his old Right but not create a New The like which Grotius saith of Succession may be said of War Succession saith he is no Title of a Kingdome which gives a Form to the Kingdom but a Continuation of the Old for the Right which began by the Election of the Family is continued by Succession wherefore so much as the first Election gave so much the Succession brings So to a Conquerour that hath a Title War doth not give but put him in possession of a Right and except the Conquerour had a full Right of Propriety at first his Conquest cannot give it him for if originally he and his Ancestors had but an usufructuary Right and were outed of the possession of the Kingdom by an Usurper here though the Re-conquest be a most just War yet shall not the Conquerour in this case gain any full Right of Propriety but must be remitted to his usufructuary Right onely for what Justice can it be that the Injustice of a third Person an Usurper should prejudice the People to the devesting of them of that Right of Propriety which was reserved in their first Donation to their Elected King to whom they gave but an usufructuary Right as Grotius conceiveth Wherefore it seems impossible that there can be a just War whereby a full Right of Propriety may be gained according to Grotius's Principles For if a King come in by Conquest he must either conquer them that have a Governour or those People that have none if they have no Governour then they are a free People and so the War will be unjust to conquer those that are Free especially if the Freedom of the People be by the primary Law of Nature as Grotius teacheth But if the People conquered have a Governour that Governour hath either a Title or not If he have a Title it is an unjust War that takes the Kingdom from him If he have no Title but only the Possession of a Kingdom yet it is unjust for any other man that wants a Title also to conquer him that is but in possession for it is a just Rule that where the Cases are alike he that is in Possession is in the better condition In pari causa possidentis melior conditio Lib. 2. c. 23. And this by the Law of Nature even in the judgment of Grotius But if it be admitted that he that attempts to conquer have a Title and he that is in possession hath none here the Conquest is but in nature of a possessory Action to put the Conquerour in possession of a primer Right and not to raise a new Title for War begins where the Law fails Ubi Iudicia deficiunt incipit Bellum Lib. 2. c. 1. And thus upon the matter I cannot find in Grotius's Book de Iure Belli how that any Case can be put wherein by a just War a man may become a King pleno Jure Proprietatis All Government and Supreme Power is founded upon publick Subjection which is thus defined by Grotius Publica Subjectio est qua se Populus homini alicui aut pluribus hominibus aut etiam populo alteri in ditionem dat Lib. 2. c. 5. If Subjection be the Gift of the People how can Supreme Power pleno Iure in full Right be got by a just War As to the other means whereby Kings may get Supreme Power in full Right of Propriety Grotius will have it to be when some People for avoiding a
Statutes to the Kings meer Will and Pleasure as if there were no Law at all I will offer a few Precedents to the Point 3 Edw. 1. c. 9. saith That Sheriffs Coroners aâ—… Bailiffs for concealing of Felonies shall make grievoâ—… Fines at the Kings pleasure Chap. 13. Ordains That such as be found culpablâ—… of Ravishing of Women shall Fine at the Kings pleasure Chap. 15. saith The penalty for detaining a Prisoâ—…er that is mainpernable is a Fine at the Kings pleasure or a grievous Amercement to the King and he thâ—… shall take Reward for deliverance of such shall be at thâ—… Great Mercy of the King Chap. 20. Offenders in Parks or Ponds shall maâ—… Fines at the Kings pleasure Chap. 25. Committers of Champerty and Extortioners are to be punished at the Kings pleasure Chap. 31. Purveyors not paying for what they takâ—… shall be Grievously punished at the Kings pleasure Chap. 32. The King shall punish Grievously the Sheriff and him that doth maintain Quarrels Chap. 37. The King shall grant Attaint in Plea of Land where it shall seem to him necessary 7 Edw. 1. saith Whereas of late before certain Persons deputed to Treat upon Debates between Us and certain Great Men it was accorded that in our next Parliament provision shall be made by Us and the common Assent of the Prelates Earls and Barons that in all Parliaments for ever every man shall come without Force and Armour And now in our next Parliament the Prelates Earls Barons and Commonalty have said That to US it belongeth through Our Royal Signory straitly to defend Force of Armour at all times when it shall please Us and to punish them which shall do otherwise and hereunto they are bound to Aid Us their Sovereign Lord at all Seasons when Need shall be 13 Edw. 1. Takers away of Nuns from Religious Houses Fined at the Kings Will. If by the Default of the Lord that will not avoid the Dike Underwoods and Bushes in High-wayes murder be done the Lord shall make Fine at the Kings pleasure 28 Edw. 1. If a Gold-smith be attainted for not Assaying Touching and Working Vessels of Gold he shall be punished by Ransome at the Kings pleasure 2 Hen. 4. The Commons desire they may have Answer of their Petitions before the gift of any Subsidy to which the King answers He would conferr with the Lords and do what should be best according to their Adâ—…ice and the last day of Parliament He gave this Anâ—…er That that manner of Doing had not been Seen nor used in no time of his Progenitors or Predecessors that they should have any Answer of then Petitions or knowledge of it before they have shewed and finished all their other Business of Parliament be it of any Grant Business or otherwise and therefore the King would not in any wayes change the Good Customs and Usages Made and Used of Antient Times 5 Hen. 4. c. 6. Whereas one Savage did Beat and maime one Richard Chedder Esquire Menial Servanâ—… to Tho. Brook Knight of the Shire for Somerset-shire the Statute saith Savage shall make Fine and Ransom at the Kings Pleasure 8 Hen. 4. It is said POTESTAS PRINCIPIS NON EST INCLUSA LEGIBUS the Power of the Prince is not included in the Laws 13 Hen. 4. nu 20. we read of a Restitution iâ—… Bloud and Lands of William Lasenby by the King by the Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Commons omitting the Lords Temporal 2 Hen. 5. in a Law made there is a Clause That it is the Kings Regalty to grant or deny such of their Petitions as pleaseth Himself 6 Hen. 6. c. 6. An Ordinance was made for to endure As long as it shall please the King 11 Hen. 7. c. 1. hath this Law The King oâ—… Sovereign Lord calling to His remembrance the duty of Allegiance of His Subjects of this His Realm and that by reason of the same they are bound to serve their Prince and Sovereign Lord for the time being in His Wars for the Defence of Him and the Land against every Rebellion Power and Might reared against Him and with Him to enter and abide in Service in Battel if Case so require and that for the same Service what fortune ever fall by chance in the same Battel against the Mind and Will of the Prince as in this Land some time past hath been seen that it is not reasonable but against all Laws Reason and good Conscience that the said Subjects going with their Sovereign Lord in Wars attending upon Him in His Person or being in other places by his Commandement within the Land or without any thing should lose or forfeit for doing their true Duty and Service of Allegiance Be it therefore Enacted That no Person that shall attend upon the King and do Him true Service shall be attainted therefore of Treason or any other Offence by Act of Parliament or otherwise Also the 18 Chap. of the same Year saith Where every Subject by the Duty of his Allegiance is bounden to Serve and Assist his Prince and Sovereign Lord at all Seasons when need shall require and bound to give attendance upon his Royal Person to defend the same when He shall fortune to go in Person in War for Defence of the Realm or against His Rebels and Enemies for the Subduing and Repressing of them and their malitious purpose Christopher Wray Serjeant at Law chosen Speaker 13 Eliz. in his Speech to Her Majesty said that for the orderly Government of the Commonwealth three things were necessary 1. Religion 2. Authority 3. Law By the first we are taught not only our Duty to God but to obey the Queen and that not only in Temporals but in Spirituals in which Her Power is absolute Mr. Grivel in the 35 Eliz. said in Parliament He â—…ished not the making of many Laws since the more we make the less Liberty we have our selves Her Majesty not being bound by them For further proof that the Legislative Power is proper to the King we may take notice that in antient time as Sir Edw. Coke saith All Acts of Parliament were in form of Petitions if the Petitions were from the Commons and the Answer of them the King 's it is easie thereby to judge who made the Act of Parliament Also Sir Io. Glanvil affirms that in former times the course of Petitioning the King was this The Lords and Speaker either by Words or Writing preferr'd their Petition to the King this then was called the Bill of the Commons which being received by the King part He received part He put out and part he ratified for as it came from Him it was drawn into a Law Also it appears that Provisions Ordinances and Proclamations made heretofore out of Parliament have been alwayes acknowledged for Laws and Statutes We have amongst the printed Statutes one called the Statute of Ireland dated at Westminster 9 Feb. 14 Hen. 3. which is nothing but a Letter of the King to Gerard Son of
End of Government frustrated If the Obligation upon the Commands of a Sovereign to execute a dangerous or dishonourable Office dependeth not on the words of our Submission but on the Intention which is to be understood by the End thereof No man by Mr. Hobs's Rules is bound but by the words of his Submission the Intention of the Command binds not if the words do not If the Intention should bind it is necessary the Sovereign must discover it and the People must dispute and judge it which how well it may consist with the Rights of Sovereignty Master Hobs may consider Whereas Master Hobs saith the Intention is to be understood by the End I take it he means the End by Effect for the End and the Intention are one and the same thing and if he mean the Effect the Obedience must go before and not depend on the understanding of the Effect which can never be if the Obedience do not precede it In fine he resolves refusal to obey may depend upon the judging of what frustrates the End of Sovereignty and what not of which he cannot mean any other Judge but the People XV. Mr. Hobs puts a case by way of Question A great many men together have already resisted the Sovereign Power unjustly or committed some Capital Crime for which every one of them expecteth death whether have they not the liberty then to joyn together and assist and defend one another Certainly they have for they but defend their Lives which the Guilty man may as well do as the Innocent There was indeed Injustice in the first breach of their Duty their bearing of Arms subsequent to it though it be to maintain what they have done is no new unjust Act and if it be only to defend their Persons it is not Unjust at all The only reason here alleged for the Bearing of Arms is this That there is no new unjust Act as if the beginning only of a Rebellion were an unjust Act and the continuance of it none at all No better Answer can be given to this case than what the Author himself hath delivered in the beginning of the same Paragraph in these words To resist the Sword of the Commonwealth in defence of another man Guilty or Innocent no man hath liberty because such Liberty takes away from the Sovereign the Means of protecting us and is therefore destructive of the very Essence of Government Thus he first answers the question and then afterwards makes it and gives it a contrary Answer other Passages I meet with to the like purpose He saith Page 66. A man cannot lay down the Right of Resisting them that Assault him by Force to take away his Life The same may be said of Wounds Chains and Imprisonment Page 69. A Covenant to defend my self from Force by Force is void Pag. 68. Right of Defending Life and Means of living can never be abandoned These last Doctrines are destructive to all Government whatsoever and even to the Leviathan it self hereby any Rogue or Villain may murder his Sovereign if the Sovereign but offer by force to whip or lay him in the Stocks since Whipping may be said to be wounding and Putting in the Stocks an Imprisonment so likewise every mans Goods being a Means of Living if a man cannot abandon them no Contract among men be it never so just can be observed thus we are at least in as miserable condition of War as Mr. Hobs at first by Nature found us XVI The Kingdom of God signifies saith Master Hobs page 216. a Kingdom constituted by the Votes of the People of Israel in a peculiar manner wherein they choose God for their King by Covenant made with him upon God's promising them Canaan If we look upon Master Hob's Text for this it will be found that the People did not Constitute by Votes and choose God for their King But by the Appointment first of God himself the Covenant was to be a God to them they did not contract with God that if he would give them Canaan they would be his Subjects and he should be their King It was not in their power to choose whether God should be their God yea or nay for it is confessed He reigned naturally over all by his Might If God Reigned naturally he had a Kingdom and Sovereign Power over his Subjects not acquired by their own Consent This Kingdom said to be constituted by the Votes of the People of Israel is but the Vote of Abraham only his single Voyce carried it he was the Representative of the People For at this Vote it is confessed that the Name of King is not given to God nor of Kingdom to Abraham yet the thing if we will believe Master Hobs is all one If a Contract be the mutual transferring of Right I would know what Right a People can have to transferr to God by Contract Had the People of Israel at Mount Sinai a Right not to obey God's Voice If they had not such a Right what had they to transferr The Covenant mentioned at Mount Sinai was but a Conditional Contract and God but a Conditional King and though the People promised to obey Gods word yet it was more than they were able to perform for they often disobeyed Gods Voice which being a breach of the Condition the Covenant was void and God not their King by Contract It is complained by God They have rejected me that I should reign over them but it is not said according to their Contract for I do not find that the Desiring of a King was a breach of their Contract of Covenant or disobedience to the Voice of God there is no such Law extant The People did not totally reject the Lord but in part onely out of timorousness when they saw Nahash King of the Children of Ammon come against them they distrusted that God would not suddenly provide for their Deliverance as if they had had alwayes a King in readiness to go up presently to fight for them This Despair in them who had found so many miraculous deliverances under Gods Government was that which offended the Lord so highly they did not desire an Alteration of Government and to cast off Gods Laws but hoped for a certainer and speedier deliverance from danger in time of War They did not petition that they might choose their King themselves that had been a greater sin and yet if they had it had not been a total rejection of Gods Reigning over them as long as they desired not to depart from the Worship of God their King and from the Obedience of his Laws I see not that the Kingdom of God was cast off by the Election of Saul since Saul was chosen by God himself and governed according to Gods Laws The Government from Abraham to Saul is no where called the Kingdom of God nor is it said that the Kingdom of God was cast off at the Election of Saul Mr. Hobs allows that Moses alone had
Soveraignty or power absolute except such conditions annexed to the Soveraignty be directly comprehended within the Laws of God and Nature Albeit by the sufferance of the King of England controversies between the King and his people are sometimes determined by the high Court of Parliament and sometimes by the Lord Chief Iustice of England yet all the Estates remain in full subjection to the King who is no ways bound to follow their advice neither to consent to their requests It is certain that the Laws Priviledges and Grants of Princes have no force but during their life if they be not ratified by the express consent or by sufferance of the Prince following especially Priviledges Much less should a Prince be bound unto the Laws he maketh himself for a man may well receive a Law from another man but impossible it is in nature for to give a Law unto himself no more than it is to command a mans self in a matter depending of his own will The Law saith Nulla obligatio consistere potest quae à voluntate promittentis statum capit The Soveraign Prince may derogate unto the Laws that he hath promised and sworn to keep if the equity thereof be ceased and that of himself without the consent of his Subjects The Majesty of a true Soveraign Prince is to be known when the Estates of all the people assembled in all humility present their requests and supplications to their Prince without having power in any thing to command determine or give voice but that that which it pleaseth the King to like or dislike to command or bid is holden for Law wherein they which have written of the duty of Magistrates have deceived themselves in maintaining that the power of the people is greater than the Prince a thing which causeth oft true Subjects to revolt from their obedience to their Prince and ministreth matter of great troubles in Common-wealths of which their opinion there is neither reason nor ground for if the King be subject unto the Assemblies and Decrees of the people he should neither be King nor Soveraign and the Common-wealth neither Realm nor Monarchy but a meer Aristocracie So we see the principal point of Soveraign Majesty and absolute power to consist principally in giving Laws unto the Subjects in general without their consent Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. To confound the state of Monarchy with the Popular or Aristocratical estate is a thing impossible and in effect incompatible and such as cannot be imagined for Soveraignty being of it self indivisible how can it at one and the same time be divided betwixt one Prince the Nobility and the people in common The first mark of Soveraign Majesty is to be of power to give Laws and to command over them unto the Subjects and who should those Subjects be that should yield their obedience to the Law if they should have also power to make the Laws who should he be that could give the Law being himself constrained to receive it of them unto whom himself gave it so that of necessity we must conclude That as no one in particular hath the power to make the Law in such a State that then the State must needs be a State popular Never any Common-wealth hath been made of an Aristocracy and popular Estate much less of the three Estates of a Common-weal Such States wherein the rights of Soveraignty are divided are not rightly to be called Common-weals but rather the corruption of Commonweals as Herodotus has most briefly but truly written Common-weals which change their state the Sovereign right and power of them being divided find no rest from Civil wars and broils till they again recover some one of the three Forms and the Soveraignty be wholly in one of the states or other Where the rights of the Soveraignty are divided betwixt the Prince and his Subjects in that confusion of state there is still endless stirs and quarrels for the superiority until that some one some few or all together have got the Soveraignty Id. lib. 2. c. 1. This Judgment of Bodin's touching Limited and Mixed Monarchy is not according to the mind of our Author nor yet of the Observator who useth the strength of his Wit to overthrow Absolute and Arbitrary Government in this Kingdom and yet in the main body of his discourse le ts fall such Truths from his pen as give a deadly wound to the Cause he pleads for if they be indifferently weighed and considered I will not pick a line or two here and there to wrest against him but will present a whole Page of his Book or more together that so we may have an entire prospect upon the Observators mind Without society saith the Observator men could not live without Laws men could not be sociable and without Authority somewhere to judge according to Law Law was vain It was soon therefore provided that Laws according to the dictate of Reason should be ratified by common consent when it afterward appeared that man was yet subject to unnatural destruction by the Tyranny of entrusted Magistrates a mischief almost as fatal as to be without all Magistracy How to provide a wholsome remedy therefore was not so easie to be invented it was not difficult to invent Laws for the limiting of Supream Governours but to invent how those Laws should be executed or by whom interpreted was almost impossible Nam quis Custodiet ipsos Custodes to place a Superiour above a Supream was held unnatural yet what a lifeless thing would Law be without any Iudge to determine and force it If it be agreed upon that limits should be prefixed to Princes and Iudges to decree according to those limits yet another inconvenience will presently affront us for we cannot restrain Princes too far but we shall disable them from some good long it was ere the world could extricate it self out of all these extremities or find out an orderly means whereby to avoid the danger of unbounded Prerogative on this hand and to excessive liberty on the other and scarce has long experience yet fully satisfyed the minds of all men in it In the Infancy of the world when man was not so artificial and obdurate in cruelty and oppression as now and Policy most rude most Nations did choose rather to subject themselves to the meer discretion of their Lords than rely upon any limits and so be ruled by Arbitrary Edicts than written Statutes But since Tyranny being more exquisite and Policy more perfect especially where Learning and Religion flourish few Nations will endure the thraldome which usually accompanies unbounded and unconditionate Royalty Yet long it was ere the bounds and conditions of Supream Lords was so wisely determined or quietly conserved as now they are for at first when as Ephori Tribuni Curatores c. were erected to poise against the scale of Soveraignty much blood was shed about them and States were put into new broils by them and some places