clear indeed from the fault by reason of his invincible Ignorance which was impossible to be helped and consequently he ought to be free from the punishment which justly is due to no man but for the fault neverthelesse he shall not only sustain the Dammage by reason of the nullity of the Contract which he entred into but he is bound also to sustain it according to Conscience both by the force of obedience which is due unto the Law and by his reflection on the publick profit The like is to be determined in many other Laws of the like nature For examples sake In those Laws by which persons are disabled by which privileges are revoked In those Laws by which Usury is moderated and in those by which certain prices of things to be sold are constituted and in the like of which the Canonists and the Divines do treat at large Neither ought this seem to be unjust to any man for although a Dammage be sometimes called a Punishment it is only analogically and very improperly for otherwise there is a great difference betwixt a Dammage and a Penalty or punishment properly so called If an innocent person be punished a great injury is done unto him but often it comes to passe that an innocent person may be dammaged and yet no great injury done unto him And thus much as conduceth to our present purpose may suffize to be spoken of the promulgation of the Law X. In the next place we are to speak of the penal Law in which many things being omitted which unprofitably are accustomed to be disputed by many of the Casuists and which pertain rather to the external and pleading Courts as that of the Canonists and Papists than to the internal Court of Conscience we shall be contented to give a view unto you of some few and the most remarkable of them and which most neerly we conceive do conduce to the Government of Conscience In this kind we meet first of all with this doubt Whether the Constitution of the punishment doth any wayes pertain to the Essence of the Law I answer It seemeth that it doth not as something that is extrinsecally requisite to compleat the Essence of it so that the Law were not a Law if the penalty were not annexed to it but only consequently as something necessary to this that the Law may effectually obtain the end which it intended For the Form and Essence of the Law consisteth in the Precept of it I here understand Precept as it is largely taken to comprehend a prohibition with it as in the Scriptures are the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and amongst the Divines as well Negative Commandments as Affirmative are commonly called Precepts And from this Precept alone both the powers do depend which we have said to be in the Law viz. the power of directing the Action and of obliging the Consciences of the Subjects For the Subject hath a sufficient Rule according to which he ought to direct his Actions and to the observation whereof unlesse he will be wanting in his duty he is bound in Conscience as soon as he understands that his lawful Superior hath commanded this or that by Law whether there be any punishment annexed to that Law or not Therefore this necessity of annexing the punishment doth not arise from the Nature of the Law it self which consisteth in the meer Precept but that the Precept which of it self would not barely suffice Tatitè permittitur quod sâ—ne ultiâ—ne prohibetur Tert. 1. contra Marcion 26. may with the greater vigour obtain its effect from another double Hypothesis the one of the Subject the other of the End For it is expedient that the Laws should be most religiously observed which is the Hypothesis in respect of the End neverthelesse the inbred Depravity of mans heart being supposed w ch is another Hypothesis in respect of the Subject it can very hardly or almost never come to passe but that the most profitable Laws will be despised either by the negligence or the perversenesse of most men unlesse by fear they are contained within their bounds Qui ratione traduci ad meliora non possunt solo metu continentur Quintil. 12. Instit who make but a mock of the Dictates of Conscience From this double Hypothesis it comes to passe that the wisest Law-makers have alwayes judged it necessary and saving to the Common-wealth to add more force to the observation of the Laws by the fear of punishments and that after the example of God himself who pronounced not the first Law which he gave to man without the threatning of a punishment Gen. 3. Some good Citizens peradventure whose number are but few induced only by the Conscience of their Duty and their Love unto Virtue and their Country would render Obedience unto the Laws although there were no punishment propounded but the Turba or the greatest number are inforced only by the fear of punishment to the performance of their Duties It is manifest hereby that the Constitution of punishments in the making of Laws is necessary XI The second Doubt is concerning the obligation of the penal Law as to the extension of it whether the penal Law doth oblige only unto the penalty or whether it obligeth unto the fault also Which is to demand if a Subject may so satisfie the Law and his Duty if being prepared to undergoe and by undergoing the penalty constituted by the Law he may be no longer guilty of the Delinquency although he observeth not the command of the Law Or whether for all that he is not bound in Conscience to the performance of that which is by the is Law commanded That more clearly and distinctly we may answer to this doubt it being a Question of great Moment and of which in the Common Lives of Men there is a most frequent use It will not be amisse the better to unfold it to premise some things which are very profitable before hand to be known We are to understand therfore in the first place that that positive Humane Law ought only to be called Penal which by the will of the Legislator doth expresly determine some temporal punishment for the Transgressors of it And in all this discourse as often as mention is made of punishment you are to understand no other but only a Temporal punishment This word Temporal punishment is taken in a twofold Consideration either as 't is opposed to the Spiritual or as it is opposed to Eternal punishment And for the most part in common discourse they are taken as Members contradistinct to one another sometimes Spiritual opposed to Temporal and sometimes Eternal unto Temporal there are therefore three kinds of punishments or if you will you may call them Species or manners of punishments or degrees of punishments For whatsoever comes under the name of punishment is first Either a spiritual punishment as the losse or the deprivation of Grace
of Nature are said to be the sins of Nature In the second place you are to know that the effect of this Law that is the obligative power of it is grounded on the Will and the power of the Lawgiver so that to speak properly the Law it self doth not bind so effectually as the Will and Power of the Law-giver by causing and inducing an obligation by the means of the efficient Cause but it may be said and indeed usually so it is that the Law doth oblige terminatively that is as a Term of obligation and by the vertue of an exemplar Cause because it is that to which a man is so obliged that he may work according to the Rule of it as an Artist in working is directed by the Copy that is propounded to him In the third place it is to be observed that to oblige the Conscience is so to bind a man up unto obedience under a mortal fault as the Schoolmen speak it that if he prove disobedient he is not only lyable to a temporal punishment either ordained by the Lawes or to be inflicted according to the sentence of the Magistrate but he is deservedly checked by his own Conscience as guilty of the neglect of his Duty and thereby of the Anger of God contracted on him V. The sense therefore of the Question is Whether Humane Lawes have the power to oblige the Consciences of those men to whom they are exhibited in the same way as I have now explained amongst the Protestants Calvin doth deny it as Bellarmin at least doth object against him it is denyed also by Beza and many others Amongst the Papists it is denyed by Gerson Bellarmin himself confessing it and by Almain Bellarm. 3 de laic 9. And as some affirm by Navarrus Amongst the Protestants again it is affirmed by Musculus Ursine and others And amongst the Papists it is confirmed by the Jesuits and a great number of the Schoolmen Some there are who do distinguish on it Rom. 13. as David Paraeus and others And it must needs indeed be acknowledged if by the heat of too much opposition and the affectation of contradiction they had not on both sides erred this controversy had long ago been cast out of the world In disputations such as these I oftentimes do call that to mind which when I was a young man I did read in Aristotle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is manifest that it is so but not why another doth dispute it so In which place he disputes An principia sunt contraria Whether Principles are contrary An detur infinitum Whether there be an infinitenesse or not and the like And therefore in these doubts for this is the true sense and reading of that place in the third of the Physicks we had more need of an Arbitrator who may reconcile both opinions differing rather in shew than in substance than of a Judge who while he determins one part doth condemn the other And this indeed would prevail much in a great part of the controversies which with such contention of minds and bitternesse of stile are now amongst parties carried on in the Christian world if Divines would not suffer themselves to be swayed rather by faction than affection Indeed in this present question as far as I can judge by the perusal of those few books which the infirmity of my health and the streightnesse of my time doth permit to look over the height of the Spirit of contention being on both sides taken away they neither of them do seem to me to be in any great errour but I conceive that those who affirmatively have defined this question to speak freely what I think have spoken more commodiously to the institution of our lives more carefully safely to avoid the danger of error and more properly to the form of sound Doctrine than those who have defined it negatively But that more distinctly I may propose unto you what I conceive is to be determined in this question I will as briefly and as cleerly as I can with some Conclusions comprehend and terminate the whole Subject I will confim my own opinion with some reasons as need shall require and I will answer the arguments which commonly are alleged by the adverse party VII The first Conclusion is that Humane Laws if injust do not oblige unto obedience The thing is manifest enough if the words be rightly understood and that no man might give a misunderstanding to them we are to be advertised that a Law may be said to be unjust either in respect of the End or the Manner or of some Circumstance extrinsecal to the Law it self or in respect of the Matter and Object of the Law For it differeth if that be commanded which is manifestly unjust or whether that which peradventure is not otherwise unjust be yet unjustly commanded That kind of Injustice which adhereth to the Law it self per se that is of it self in respect of the thing commanded doth take away the obligation but it taketh not away that obligation which commeth unto it extrinsecally and as it were by accident that is to say by the fault of the Commander For suppose that a Prince should by a Law made command something to be done the doing whereof of it self were not unlawfull to be done or should forbid that to be done which were not simply necessay And suppose withall there should be no such just cause why he should command this or forbid that being induced to it either by the desire of filthy Lucre or the meer Lust of exercising his Tyranny or by some other depraved affection of his mind this Law is unjust indeed on the part of the King that did command it but the Subject neverthelesse is obliged to the obedience of it The Reason is because that Injustice doth hold altogether on the part of the party commanding and not of the thing commanded So that although the King could not without sin make such a Law yet the Subject without sin could perform that which by that Law is commanded And whatsoever the Subject can perform without sin he is bound if commanded to perform by the Duty of obedience Let the Prince himself look to it by what Counsel or Intention â—e inacted such a Law It doth not belong to me who am but his Subject to examine it neither shall it be imputed unto me if he hath offended in it but as long as nothing is commandmanded but what Lawfully may be performed it shall be imputed to me if I am wanting in my Duty and shall not obey him VIII Moreover I add this also if the Law it self either in respect of the Object or the Matter be peradventure unjust and grievous to the Subject as for examples sake if he demands the payment of a greater Subsidy than the occasion doth require the Conscience of the Subject is not here freed from the obligation But here again we are to distinguish For a thing may be
go with him twayn A man therefore may and if occasion so requires he ought to depart from his own right for his own peace but much more for the publick tranquillity and obey him who hath no lawful power to command But above all he must have this Reserve so to depart from his own right that by so doing he taketh not any thing away from the right of another And Abraham in this did justly and wisely Gen. 14. who though he made the King of Sodom partaker of the spoils which by the right of war was his portion from the five Kings that were overthrown yet he cautelously provided that both the Priest should have his Tenths and his three Associates in the War should not want of their full proportions In the like manner obedience is so to be payed to an Usurper that the fidelity due unto the lawful Heir be no ways violated and that his right suffers no prejudice by it XXI But it may be objected How can this be done That which is grateful to an Usurper cannot but be most ungrateful to the lawful Prince No man can serve two Masters that look so contrary all whose Votes Mat. â— Studies and Counsels are violently carryed on to the ruine and destruction of one another I answer the account being well computed there is no reason that we should think that this obsequiousness of the Citizen so ordered and bounded as we before have delivered should be unpleasing to the lawful Prince but altogether to the Uâ—urper nay we may presume that with the consent of the true Prince himself it ought to be so For by this obedience the Citizen is not to be accounted to have assisted so much the unjust Possessor as the whole Commonalty or Republick the safety whereof doth no lesse concen the true Heir than the unjust Possessor Nay peradventure much more because being the true Father of his Country he is to be believed to love it sincerely to wish it more happinesse than the other who having excluded him hath thrust himself into his house and hath excercised a command over his Family and by how much the affections of a Mother to her Children are more pure vehement than a Step-mothers as may appear by that remarkable contestation of the two Harlots before Solomon the true Mother who knew the Child to be her own desiring the safety of it and that it should be given rather to another nay unto her Adversary than that it should perish by the Sword so it is most likely and it is to be presumed that the lawful Heir hath a greater care of the safety of his people whom although for the present under the yoak of a Stranger yet he doth acknowledge them to be his own hopeth well that in time they will prove profitable to him than he who having newly usurped the supreme Magistracy will be more careful it is likely to establish his newly acquired Greatness than to procure the safety of the publick and therefore the lawful Heir had rather that as modestly as they could they should accommodate themselves to the present affairs for their own safety than to run into a certain destruction by making an unseasonable and an unsuccessful opposition against one that overpowers them And thus I have given you my opinion concerning this most difficult and high question determining possitively of nothing but being ready if any man shall render more certain reasons to correct what hath been spoken and to jump in to the same Judgment with him XXII The fourth Conclusion followeth Humane Laws concerning things not unlawful do by themselves and directly in the general oblige the Conscience Which is as much as to say This general precept that Subjects should obey humane Laws being duly made is obligatory directly and by its self And this Calvin himself who doth not use to attribute too much to humane constitutions doth acknowledge who in the 4 Institute 10. § 5. doth advise that such a distinction be made inter Genus et Speciem betwixt the General and the Special that although it be denied that Laws in the Special do oblige the Conscience yet it must be granted that they have an obliging power in the General The reason is perspicuous for this general precept doth pertain to the eternal and Divine Law every part whereof doth directly and by it self and not only by consequence oblige our Consciences It pertains to the Law of God in a double respect First Because natural Reason dictates that Peace and Order which is the Soul of Common-wealths and of all humane Societies cannot be preserved but by an Obedience to the Lawes according to the solemn Constitution of them Secondly Because that God in the Holy Scripture doth command us to be subject unto those who are over us in that Order as God hath appointed and to obey 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he Higher Powers as may appear in the first and second verses of this Chapter and not to draw back our necks from their yoaks upon a bare pretext that they are meet men 2 Pet. 2. 13. and Creatures such as we are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Sons of Adam of the same â—ace of mankind and subject to the same Affections Sufferings Inâ—irmities and Casualties as our selvs but rather being mindful that Almighty God by a delegated Power did set them over us as his Vicegerents on Earth and hath been pleased to vouchsafe them so much honour as to communicate his own Name unto them as to so many visible and mortal Gods Psal 82. 6. I have said you are Gods we should reverence honour and obey them with the greatest Reverence and though not for their own sakes who are but men as we are nor composed of better Clay yet in respect to the Divine Oâ—dination who making them to bâ— Prâ—nces hath preferred them into a higher place abovâ— other men and in some measure made them Partakers of his own Power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the Lord as the Apostle Sâ— Peter â—n another place and by consequence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—ccording unto Conscience as the Apostle Sâ— Paul hath it in this place XXIII The fifth Conclusion Humane Lawes according to the solemn Constitution of them doe oblige theâ—â—â—science even in particular and although not directly and by themselves yet by Consequent and by 〈◊〉 of the general Divine Commandment I say in the first place Lawes solemnly and rightly constituted that is both by reason of the efficient Cause being made by him who is indued with lawful Power and by reason of the matter commanding nothing unlawful dishonest or filthy or any wayes unworthy the Duty of a Christian For we already have asserted that the Lawes which do offend in either of those two senses are not obligatory I say in the second place In the particular that is to a particular Determination in things of a middle Nature and in others As what and how
God which they call positive and from which they would have us freed by the death of Christ whether they be ritual or judicial were only imposed on the Jews but not on us who are Christians Again where it is manifest what God would have done it doth not belong to us by any collation of Comparatives too saucily to determine what ought to be done Now it is manifest that God would have both he would have that his positive Laws delivered to the Israelits by Moses should not oblige the Christians and that the Laws of men rightly and solemnly constituted by the Magistrates should oblige the people under their Authority Thirdly If this Argument indeed were of any force those that make use of it do not observe that by it they do not only take away the obligation but altogether the use also of all humane Lawes For Christ hath no otherwise freed us from the obligation of the Mosaâ—ck Laws than so by taking away the use of them that by us they are no more to be esteemed as Laws Therefore if in the same manner he would have us to be free from the obligation of humane Laws it must of necessity follow that he would have no humane Laws to be any longer extant amongst us So wild a proposition is this of the Anabaptists and other fanatick persons neither is it admitted by themselves who do propound it XXXVI Again they object that of Saint James Chapter the fourth there is but one Law-giver to wit God and Christ who is only Lord of the Conscience He is an invader thereof of Christs right and thrusts himself into the Throne of God whosoever he is that assumeth unto himself a power of obliging the Consciences of other men I answer There is indeed but one supreme Law-giver who hath a direct and Soveraign command over the Consciences of men as by himself and by his own virtue and authority to oblige them which Law-giver is God and Christ as the Apostle hath it But this hinders not but that there may be other Law-givers of an inferiour order and degree who by a power granted and derived to them from that supreme Lawgiver have of themselves a right of making Laws which may consequently oblige the Conscience Just as a King who solely in his own Kingdom hath a peculiar Legislative power yet notwithstanding by his Charter he may give to some College or Corporation a right of making Laws which may oblige all the members of that body not by their own power but by the force of the royal Donation and the Authority granted to them from the King Our Universities as you all know are happy and rejoice in this privilege that in a Legitimate Convocation they may make Laws which we call Statutes and ordain punishments for Delinquents and if it be expedient they may abrogate again and cancel the same Statutes Now there is no man of a sober understanding who will conceive that the excercise of this power doth any wayes derogate from the Legislative right of the King or can be any deceit or prejudice unto it unless it be extended beyond the limits of the Donation defined in the Charter Nay it is rather an excellent and a singular mark of the royal autocrasy that the King hath not only the Legislative power himself but that he can vouchsafe it unto others to be had and used his own right being notwithstanding safe and entire into himself XXXVII The other objections relying on one the same Foundation may be resolved by one a and the same labour I will briefly run them over In the third place they object that the Civil power is meerly temporal therefore belongeth not unto the Conscience which is spiritual Fourthly the end of Humane Laws is the external peace of the Common-wealth and not the internal peace of the Conscience therefore the Laws themselves do only oblige the outward man and not the Conscience which lyeth within Fifthly the Magistrate cannot judge of Consciences and therefore can make no Laws over them it being the same extent of power to give Laws and to judge according to them Sixtly the Magistrate in making of Laws hath no intention of binding the Consciences of the people but only to oblige them to perform that which the Law commandeth which if it be done it is all one to the profit of the Commonwealth whether it be done out of any Conscience of duty or not and it is enough if the effects of Actions be commensurated to the intention of the Agents and they ought not further to be extended XXXVIII I answer and first universally to them all By all these Arguments this only is obtained that humane Laws do not oblige directly and by themselves or by their proper force which of our own accord we grant for we assert no other obligation but what comes to them ex consequenti by Consequence and by the virtue of the general command of God of rendring obedience to the higher powers And from this ground I answer to the particular objections And as the to third I say that the Civil power being meerly temporal cannot of it self and in respect of the Object in which properly and immediately it verseth have a spiritual effect and therefore of it self cannot induce a spiritual obligation neverthelesse by consequence it may have a spiritual effect by a derivation from the power of some superiour cause in the virtue whereof it worketh Now every Magistrate as long as rightly and dâ—ely he doth exercise the Legislative Power which God hath put into his hands he worketh in the virtue of God himself and by ordination of him who is himself a Spirit and as the Lord and Father of Spirits hath a Command over the Spirits of men XXXIX I answer to the fourth that although peace be an external blessing of a Commonalty yet the internal Conscience is obliged to the uttermost to the procuring and preserving of it by all lawful and honest means because that God the Lord of Conscience hath commanded us to love and follow peace and if private certainly much more publick peace Neither is it any way inconsistent that although Conscience be internal yet it is obliged to a thing external for the obligation of Conscience doth not arise from the Nature or any condition of the thing or Object into which it is carryed but from the will of him who hath the right of obliging that is God himself XL. I answer to the fifth that the Legislative and Judicial power doth originally pertain to the same person that is to him who hath the supreme jurisdiction over the Subjects nevertheless dispensatively and by the will of the supreme Magistrate it may both of them and both ways be administred by other persons as he shall think expedient Therefore although God alone hath in himself a peculiar power over the Consciences of the Creature and maketh as well as judgeth Laws by an original proper and absolute right yet
Duty so from a double Duty there ariseth a double Obligation for every Duty doth infer an Obligation and every Obligation doth suppose a Duty Therefore one kind of the Obligation of Humane Laws is that by which Subjects are bound to obey the precepts of the Law it self and the other by which they are bound to submit themselves to the power of the Law-giver one of the Obligations belongeth to Active Obedience the other unto that Obedience which is called passive and to which we give the Name of Submission III. If it be here demanded how farr Humane Laws can oblige the Consciences of the Subject It is to be said in the first place that all Laws made by one invested by a lawful Power do oblige to Subjection so that it is not lawful for a Subject to resist the Supreme Power by force of Arms whether things just or unjust be commanded This wâ—â— evermore the mind and practice of the Christians in the first Age of the Church living under the most grievâ—us Tyranny of the greatest Enemies to the name of Christ to make no mention herein of the Conduct and the instinct of Nature and the light of right Reason this is most manifest by the Doctrine of the two chiefest of the Apostles For so Peter the Apostle of Circumcision doth diligently instruct the Jews And so Paul the Doctor of the Gentiles doth as carefully instruct the Gentiles St. Peter in the first book and second chapter commands Servants to be subject to their Masters not only good and gentle Masters but those severer ones who would punish them with Scourges when they had not deserved it Saint Paul Rom. 13. doth urge in many words the necessity of Subjection but granteth unto none the Liberty of Resistance be their case or their pretence never so good In the second place I say That although this Subjection is simply necessary yet it is not satisfactory as to Duty unlesse the command of the Law be obeyed where it can be done without Sin And therefore the Subject is bound to Obedience in Conscience in all things that are lawful and honest Hence it is that this word be Obedient is so often and so expressely inculcated by the Apostle Eph. 6. Col. 3. and in other places In the third place I say Where the precept of the Law cannot be observed without sin if the Subject shall patiently submit himself to the Power of the Law-giver he hath satisfied his Duty and is not obliged in Conscience to perform that which the Law commandeth nay he is obliged not to do it for there can be no Obligation to things unlawful It is alwayes necessary therefore to be subject but not alwayes necessary to obey IV. Furthermore seeing both are certain that the Consciences of Men are free Servitus in totum hominem uon descendit Sen. de Bencf 20. and ought to be so which Liberty no Humane Power can or may infringe And that an Obligation is a kind of a Bond and doth induce a necessity which seemeth to be opposite and to fight with just Liberty for neither is he any wayes free who is bound neither can he be free to both who by some necessity is bound to either that it plainly may appear that this Obligation of Conscience of which we now do treat may consist with the just Liberty of Conscience we must necessarily in this place give you another distinction which is that the Precepts of Humane Law may be taken two wayes either formally for the Act it self of giving the precepts or materially for the thing precepted If the Law-giver therefore should intend an Obligation or impose on the Subject a necessity of obeying from giving the Precept of his Law taken materially that is from the necessity of the thing it self which is precepted which notwithstanding in the truth of the thing was not necessary before that Law was made he in that very fact should lay a force upon the Conscience of the Subject which should be repugnant to the Liberty of it But if he should derive his Obligation from giving the precept of his Law taken formally thâ—â— is from the legitimate Authority with w ch he himself is invested that gives it a moral indifferency of the thing precepted in the mean time remaining and in the same state in which it was before the Law was made although the obligation followeth which imposeth on the Conscience a necessity of obeying yet the inward Liberty of the Conscience remaineth uninjuried and intire V. If this seems obscure to any I will illustrate it unto him by an Example A Civil Law being made that no man should eat flesh during all the time of Lent if the Law-giver either in the preface or in the body of that Law should signify that he laid this Command upon his Subjects because it were ungodly and unlawful for them in that time to eat flesh This were to throw a Snare on the Consciences of his Subjects as much as in him lay to weaken their Liberty But if expressely he should signify that the thing being otherwise free in it self he did so ordain it for the profit of the Commonwealth that his Subjects according to the Example of the antient Church should thereby take an occasion to exercise a more abstemious and severer Discipline or if by the words of the Law it self or elsewhere it might appear that the Law-giver intended not by that Law to fasten any opinion of necessity on the thing so commanded there would on this account no injury be done to the Consciences of the Subjects and the liberty thereof For there is a great difference when one thing is commanded by the Magistrate because it is thought to be necessary oris prohibited because it is conceived to be unlawful And when another thing begins then only to be thought necessary and lawful after that it is commanded by the Magistrate and unlawful because it is forbidden by him The first Necessity which anteceded the Law and is supposed by it to be some cause of it is contrary to the liberty of the Conscience but the other which followeth the Law and proceedeth from it as an essect thereof is not repugnant to it The reason of this difference is because the antecedent necessity which the Law supposeth doth necessarily require some assent of the practical judgement but to the following necessity which proceedeth from the Law the consent of the will is sufficient to the performance of that outward work which by the Law is commanded Now an Act of the Will cannot prejudice the liberty of Conscience as an Act of the judgment doth for the Act of the Will doth follow the dictates of the Conscience as the effect followeth its cause but the Act of the Judgment doth precede those Dictates as the Cause goeth before its effect VI. These distinctions being premised I proceed unto the Doubts where in the first place those which we meet with concerning the material Cause
Barnabas and others also who followed him and did consent to the same dissimulation were to be noted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as men that did not tread with an upright foot nor walked according to the simplicity of the truth of Christ By which it is most evident that St. Paul being Judge it would render no great advantage unto uncertain Barnabas and halting as it were betwixt Judaism and Christianism to call into the patronage of his dissimulation the example of St. Peter although of the highest estimation amongst the Apostles but grant that Peter was worthy of a sharper reprehension because that by his example he became a stumbling block to another nevertheless Barnabas is not the more to be excused that he transgressed by following the example of another And this may suffice concerning our first argument taken from the Text of St. Paul VI. The second argument is derived from the difficulty of judging for seeing that all the deeds of the righteous are not to be imitated it is no obvious thing to understand what deeds of theirs are to be examplar and what not and that by reason of a twofold uncertainty that is in them For it may so come to passe both ways that what a righteous man hath done may not be well done and hath been well done by him is nevertheless not to be imitated by us In the first place most certain it is that those deeds of theirs which are ill done are not to be imitated and that the most holy of men have had their blemishes and infirmities it having pleased the most wise God to permit them to fall sometimes into the most grievous sins of murder adultery idolatry and the renouncing of their faiths that they might consider that they are but men and by their own experience that they as well do pertake with as they do pardon the mistreadings of another that so they might not trust in their own strengths against temptations but depend altogether on the assistance of God and if unconquered unshaken or unhurt they have sustayned the most violent assaults of temptations that they may acknowledge it to proceed wholy from the providence and the grace of God and it hath pleased him who worketh all in all according to the counsels of his own will that some of their foulest defects should punctually be expressed in the book of holy Writ that so illustrious and never dying examples should remain unto all ages on the one side of humane frailty and inconstancy and on the other of the Divine goodness and mercy VII Peradventure it will be here objected It is true indeed that those Examples of the Saints are not to be imitated which in the word of God are expressely noted to be ill done for what sober man will propound unto himself either the abnegation of St. Peter or the adultery of David as examples for him to imitate Neverthelesse it doth seem that we may safely take examples from those acts of theirs which are so recorded in the Scriptures that they are there as free from dispraise as from any tincture of guilt I make answer that this is not to be done for in the Scriptures as every where in other Histories the deeds of many men are only historically and nakedly related just as they were done are neither expressely commended or discommended by the Writers notwithstanding it is not to be doubted that some of them were unjust some of them dishonest and far from the duty of a godly man And many other things there are recorded of which we may not undeservedly doubt whether they were well done or ill done concerning which the Interpreters are accustomed to express themselves probably and liberally on both sides Of such a nature is that act of Lot offering the violation of his Daughters Virginities to the impure Citizens of Sodom and that act of Joseph swearing as it is thought by the life of Pharaoh Gen. 19. â— 42. 15. 16. and that act of Jacob craftily stealing from Esau his brother the benediction of his father and many other examples of the same nature which if any man shall adventure to follow on this presumption only that he hath read the same things to be acted by godly men and not to be condemned he shall object himself to a most certain danger of errour and of sin by subjecting his Conscience to a most uncertain Law VIII But you will say we may safely howsoever follow those examples which expressely are commended in the world of God I make answer that even this also is not simply to be granted for in the first place I say that whatsoever deeds of men are openly condemned in the word of God to be vitious they are simply to be eschewed for the strength and use of bad examples are more powerfull to argue negatively upon them than of good examples to argue affirmatively which manner of arguing out Apostle useth 1 Cor. 10 6. c. where having propounded out of the Hostory of the old Testament the examples of several sorts of sins as also of the judgments of God upon the prevaricators of his Law he doth admonish that all of us would look upon them as types and examples not to imitate but to eschew them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ut fugerem exemplis vitiâ—rum quaeque notaâ—do 1 Satyr 4. That we may not lust after evil things as some of them lusted nor worship Idols nor commit fornication nor tempt Christ nor murmur in afflictions as they have done Hoc quidem non bellè nunquid ego illi Imprudens olìm faciam simile Horat. ibid. This is not well but filly Elf Shall not I do the like my self IX In the second place I do affirm that what Deeds in the Scriptures are expressely praysed and are so praysed that they may seem to be propounded to us for Examples are notwithstanding not suddainly and headily to be followed by us neither must we imagine that the whole aggregate Action as it was at first performed is commended unto us to imitate But we must use choyce and caution to imitate those things which are commendable on that part only of them and intirely on that account for which they are commended The reason of this Caution is because that God oftentimes in a mixt Action according to his infinite goodnesse doth approve and look upon that only in it which is Good and doth passe by and as it were takes no notice of that in it which is Evil As in the 16 Luke 8. The Lord praysed the unjust Steward because he had done wisely although in the same Act he had hazarded the Reputation of his Trust The Wisdome therefore and not the Injustice of that Steward is to be imitated Again in that commended Example of the Egyptian Midvives preserving the new-born of the Iâ—raelites and by a Lye excusing their contempt of the Kings Commandement their Lye is not to be numbred with their humanity and their piety but carefulâ—y
Conscience that the said obligation doth not signifie any compulsion for to speak properly the Conscience can no more be compelled than the free-Will but a power rather and authority which she is bound to obey to urge her to the performance of that which belongs unto her duty In the very same manner altogether as a King who hath the Legislative power by enacting lawes doth oblige his subjects to the observation of them As therefore in the external Courts Subjects properly and formally are obliged to obedience not so much by the law it self as by the power of the Law-giver howsoever the Law it self is said to oblige but when it is so spoken it is to be understood improperly and as it were materially and terminatively because the obligation is made by it and to it so the Law is said to judge John 7. 5. Doth our Law judge any one although the Law it self doth not judge but the Magistrate because the Magistrate ought to judge according to the Law so in the internal Court the Rule or the Law imposed on Conscience doth not properly oblige it but the power and authority of the Imposer yet so as by the Consequent truly and not unaptly although not so properly the Rule it self may be said to carry with it an obliging Virtue When therefore it is demanded what is that which obligeth Conscience to the performance of her duty At the same time both these questions are propounded First and principally who is the Lord of Conscience who hath right and power to impose a Rule or Law upon it to which it ought to conforme it self And then secondly and consequently what is that Rule of Conscience or that Law which is imposed on it by the Lord thereof and to which by his dominion and Empire over it it is bound to conform it self VI. In the fifth place it is to be understood when any thing is attributed to another it is attributed either by it self or not by it self that is to say by accident Those things therefore to which the power of obliging the Conscience is any ways to be attributed do fall under a threefold consideration For in the first place they either oblige the Conscience simply by themselves that is they do directly oblige by themselves and by their own power not only as the Term by it self is opposed to the Term by accident but as it opposed also to this Term by another Or in the second place they do oblige by themselves respectively that is as the Term by it self is opposed to the Term by accident and not as it is opposed to the Term per aliud that is by another The meaning is they do not oblige by their own proper power but by the vertue of another having a power to oblige Or thirdly they do oblige by accident only and in neither of the considerations by it self It is besides observable that in those things which do oblige the Conscience in the second consideration there is some difference to be made according to the different account of the cause from whence the obligation doth arise For it is one thing when the obligation is forcibly imposed by the authority of another and another thing when it is willingly contracted and of its own accord By this that hath been spoken it is manifest that there are four degrees of those things which do oblige the Conscience For examples sake to give you a short view of what hath been already spoken and of what as yet remaineth to be spoken you are to understand in the first place that the express Commandment of God doth oblige properly by it self and by its own force In the second place the Laws of men and the mandates and orders of our Superiours do oblige the Conscience but by no power or authority but by the vertue of the Commandement of God Thirdly Vows and promises being made of our own accord when it was wholy in our own choice to do otherwise do in their proper fact and freedom of election oblige our Consciences to the performance of them Fourthly and lastly the Law of consideration of Scandal and offence doth by accident oblige the Conscience VII We are here to understand that only that obligation which consisteth in the first degree is absolute and universal the other three are relative and particular I say it is absolute because it doth directly and alwayes oblige and because it obligeth all persons and the obligation of it is never to be cancell'd The others may be said to be relative both because they do not bind of themselves or by their own power but by a relation to some precept or institution of God as also because they do not always or every where oblige and in every case but when those considerations do require which they do bear a reference and respect unto The obligation therefore of the first degree is predominant over any obligation whatsoever in the other three insomuch that it is able to make them of no effect but it is impossible for them to render it frustrate Nay if we take it universally the obligation in any superiour degree the other being equall is more valid than the obligation in any inferiour degrees whatsoever and doth judge over them either by taking away what was done and contracted as oftentimes or at least by hindring what was to be done as always Therefore as to the power of obligation the Laws of men must give place to the Laws of God private contracts and promises to publick constitutions and the Law or consideration of offence or scandal to them both VIII These things being thus premised that we may be happy in a certain Rule by which we may know how to live I will according to my promise comprehend in some few conclusions those which are most necessary to be understood concerning the Rule of Conscience and the passive obligation of it The first conclusion is That God alone hath a most proper and direct command on the Consciences of all men So that none but God alone hath power to impose a Law upon the Conscience of any man to which it ought to be subjected as obliging by it self I say by it self for we are all bound in our Consciences to observe the just Laws of men to keep our vows and promises made to God or men and to be careful that we become not a scandal or an offence unto others But we are bound unto all these things upon no other tye but as they are reduceable to the will of God commanding them as in its due place we shall give an account unto you of the particulars thereof IX This Conclusion is proved first by the words of the Apostle already mentioned There is but one Law-giver who can both save and destroy In which words two arguments do prefer themselves to our observation In the first place they assert there is but one Legislator not one picked out amongst many not one above many but one
performance of them because they did not pertain unto him but were only peculiar to the Israelites and it is known that the Law doth not oblige all men unto whom it is known but all those only to whom it is given XXII In the third place I say the will of God in what way soever it be revealed for the will of God receiveth its authority from it self and not from the manner of revealing it So that the Church of Rome in their controversie concerning Traditions need not to take so much pains to prove That the word of God unwritten is of equal authority with the word of God that is written for this we willingly do grant unto them We only â—ain would understand how we may satisfie our selves that the Tradition unwritten may appear to be the word of God as undoubtedly as the word which is written The will of God therefore in what manner soever it be revealed is the Rule of the Conscience provided it be so revealed that it either actually be made known or may be so made known unto the mind if culpable negligence doth not hinder And it doth oblige the Conscience to acknowledge it and to propound it unto our own will as the will of God to which it is bound to conform it self and not only so but to command the executive potentiaes to bestirre themselves for the fulfilling of this will of God Remarkable is that of Damascene 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 what God willeth mâ—st of necessity be good for his will is the measure of goodnesse but the Law of God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—hat commandment by which 〈…〉 that good will of his he proceeds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of God comming to our â—ind doth attract it to it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it doth incite instimâ—late and as it were spurs it doth urge our Consciences to the performance of their duties by representing and inculcating into our wills the will of God And this is that most proper and exact obligation of Conscience which we before have spoken of XXIII The force and effect of this obligation is variously expressed by St. Paul Sometimes he confesseth himself a Debator to the Grecians and Barbarians Rom. 1. 14. As if he should say seeing I know by the will of God that I am set apart to preach the Gospel to the Gentiles without difference whether they are Graecians or Barbarians I acknowledge that in this respect I am a Debtor to them And in the 2 Cor. 2. 14. he saith that he is tyed and bound as men are bound with bonds to the performance of this duty And in the first of the Corinthians the ninth Chapter and the sixteenth verse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The preaching of the Gospel is intrusted to me so that I have not the leasure to be idle for a great necessity doth presse me and wo unto me if I should neglect it The like necessity to be imposed upon them and not to be shaken off was openly and before St. Pauls time acknowledged by two of the greatest of the Apostles and for a long time individual Companions S. Peter and St. John Acts 4. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For we cannot but speak God hath commanded us to speak with authority and you command us to hold our peace Whether it be better to obey him or to obey you Do you judge We are free and can be so from your command for you have no power upon our Consciences but the command of God doth hold us fast and haâ—h such a coercive power over us that unlesse we wil perish we cannot be free nor do any thing but that only which he commandeth XXIV Moreover when it is asserted that the next and immediate Rule of the Conscience is the light of the mind and the primary and the supreme Rule is the written word of God and the proper and the Adaequate Rule of it the will of God by manner whatsoever revealed or which is to the same sence The Law imposed by God on the reasonable Creature That these things may more fully be understood we are to know that the light of the mind is threefold as God in three ways hath manifested his will to the reasonable Creature There is the light innate the light inferred and the light acquired or the light of nature the light of Scripture and the light of Doctrine The first light which I do call the light Innate doth proceed from the Law of nature For in the first creation of the World as God endued brute and inanimate Creatures with a natural instinct by which they are inclined unto those things which are congruous to their natures and the conservatives of it which is as a Law unto them as it is so expressed by David Psal 148. 6. Thou hast given them a Law which they may not transgresse So a certain natural Law is given unto man and proportionated to his nature as he is a reasonable Creature that is more sublime and noble and if I may so speak it more Divine than what is given to other Creatures of this inferiour Oâ—h And this Law doth incite him to the performance of those things which are agreeable to his nature as he is a man that is to say a living Creature indued with reason or to live according to reason Now this Law is natural impression and as it were a figure of that eternal Law which is in the mind of God and it is a part of that Divine Image after which man at the first was said to be made Gen. 1. by which knowing of a certainty that there are some things in our reasonable nature that are congruous to the will of God the Creator and other things which are not so we do conclude that the one is good and ought to be performed by us and the other evil altogether to be abhomined The light proceeding from this law is extremely obscured by that grievous ruine which folowed the fall of Adam and from hence arise those thick clouds of Ignorance and Error in which all his posterity whilst we live in this World are invelopped But the providence of God hath so most wisely ordered it that in the common wrack it hath come off more unhurt than many other of the Faculties for it hath pleased God that certain propositions and practical principles Quae animis imprimuntur inâ—â—â—atae intelligentiae Cic. 1 de leg which the Philosophers call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Basilius most acutely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 spark of the Divine Fire which in the great conflagration was preserved in the ashes of it should still remain that so in our breasts and most inward parts Haec tamen exigua lucis scintillula râ—mansit Calvin Instit 10. Sect. 5. he might have the Preachers of his will These 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These common Notions are that Law of God which the Apostle Rom. 1. doth say is
assign some Notes and Critisms and betwixt those which were of a particular right it is not necessary that any such distinction should be made Nay we may roundly affirm that those Laws of Moses which are called Political or Judicial do none of them oblige Christian Magistrates to a strict observation of them but it is lawfull for them according to their own discretion and as they shall find find it expedient for the safety and profit of the Common-wealth either to revive them into power or to make them of no effect XXXI I affirm in the fourth place That the moral Law delivered by Moses that is to say the praecepts of the Decalogue or the ten Commandements do oblige all Christians as well as Jews to the observation of them All Protestants that I do know of do with one mouth acknowledge this truth Bellarmine therefore doth us the greater injury who feigneth that we do make Christian liberty to consist in this not to be bound in Conscience to be subjected to any Law and that Moses with his Decalogue doth not pertain unto us Let him see how he can clear himself of this scandal and vindicate those of his part from this crime if we are in it For the Controversie amongst his School-men is agitated Whether Christians are bound to the praecepts of the Decalogue only as they are the Declaratives of the Law of Nature or as they were also delivered by God to Moses and by Gods Commandement given by Moses to the people of God and transmitted into the holy Books Some there are of them that do deny the one others that do affirm both And in our Churches the same diversity of opinions is to be found if it be not rather a diversity in words than in opinions For seeing they amongst themselves and we do agree with them in this which is the main of all that the Moral Law which is delivered by Moses and is contained in the precepts of the Decalogue hath the power to oblige the Consciences of Christians it will peradventure be not worth our labour from whence it doth obtain that power to oblige In my judgement they speak more unto the purpose who say that this Law of Moses doth not oblige Christians formally and as it is delivered by Moses but onely by reason of the matter as it is the Declarative of the Law of Nature and it receiveth therefore all its force of obliging not from Moses bringing or delivering it but from the Dictates of the Law of Nature which God in the first Creation did inspire into our minds and after the Fall would have it to remain in them as the Remembrancer of his will And this may suffice to be spoken of the old Law or the Law of Moses XXXII The new Law or the Law of Christ that is to say the Gospel doth contain these three things 1. Mysteries of Faith to be believed in which chapter I comprehend the promises of God by Grace 2. Sacred Institutions Ceremonial and Ecclesiastick And 3. The Moral Precepts of which I speak and universally of all of them That the Gospel obligeth none but those only who are called those only to whom it is preached For where there is no Law there can be no transgression for moraly especially in Supernaturals it is the same thing Non esse et non apparere not to be and not to appear or not to be so sufficiently propounded as it may be known The words of our Saviour are expressly to this sence Ioh. 15. 22. If I had not come and spoken to them they had not had sin that is they had not been guilty of despising the Gospel But it obligeth all men to whom it is preached to an obedience as well of Faith as of Life so that we are all bound to whom the Gospel is preached both to believe in Christ as our Redeemer and to obey him as our Law-giver And whosoever shall fail in the performance of these two things shall suffer everlasting punishment for the neglect of his duty XXXIII I say in the third place That the Christian Church is obliged to the Sacred Institutions that is to the preaching of the word the administration of the Sacraments the Ordination of Ministers of the Gospel and the exercise of the Keyes as well of Knowledg as of Power it is bound I say in all those things which pertain to the essence of them according to the institution of Christ and the Apostles so that it is not lawful for the Church much lesse for any particular congregation or person either willingly to diminish or to change any thing at all therein But the external circumstances of the Sacred Institution are so free that any particular Church may determine of them according to Time and Place and to the custome of the People of God and as it shall seem most expedient to Edification XXXIV In the third place I affirm That the Moral Precepts of the New Testament are the same according to their substance with the Morals of the Old Testament and they are both of them to be reduced to the Law of Nature which is contained in the ten Commandements as omnia Entia realia all real Beings are reduced to the ten Predicaments But the Precepts of Christ in the new Law as the holy Fathers of the Church do every where acknowledge are in many things far more excellent than the Precepts of Moses in the old Law not onely in that respect that they are propounded more fully and clearly but because they ascend also higher and do advance the true Christian to a more eminent degree of perfection and that with most effectual inducements on both sides the past Example of Christ being propounded to him on the one side and the inestimable reward to come in the Kingdom of Heaven on the other And this most clearly may appear in those two great Duties of a Christians life commanded in the new Law viz. of loving our enemies and taking up the cross For as some have dreamed these are not so onely to be esteemed as if they were onely Counsels to a more perfect life propounded to all men under the condition of a more large reward and oblige no man under sin and punishment but those onely who by a vow have obliged themselves to the observation of them But they expresly in themselves are Precepts and properly so called and universally obliging to the observation whereof all those who profess the Name of Christ are bound under the guilt of the most grievous sin to wit the abnegation of Christ and the punishment of eternal damnation unless they truly do repent And thus much concerning the second Light of the mind XXXV The third remaineth which we call the light acquired which surely is nothing else but an addition or increase of that light whether of Nature or Revelation which was before in the minde to some more eminent degree of clearness as when the will of God the
many obligations as there are Lawes being correspondent to them as to their Terms Neither is this Multiplicare entia sine necessitate to multiply Beings without necessity for the causes being multiplied it is necessary that the effects of those causes should be multiplied also And that it may seem incredible to none we may behold it or something very like unto it to come to passe every day both in things natural and moral It is evident to the sense that a man may be tyed to a Pillar with two or three cords as Peter Acts 12. 6. He slept 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bound with two chains And it is to be doubted by none but that a man having obliged himself to the performance of such a duty which by the Law of God was incumbent on him he notwithstanding that first obligation may again oblige himself by Vow or Oath or Promise to render that obligation the more effectual Thus Jacob the Patriarch vowed that Jehovah should be his only God Gen. 28. 21. And David swore that he would keep the righteous Judgments of God Psal 119. 106. And all of us who are Christians when we were sprinkled at the Fount did by a new Covenant of Baptism bind our selves to Faith in Christ to renounce the Devill the World and the Flesh and to keep the commandements of God to the performance of all which duties most sure it is that we were obliged before XI The third Conclusion Humane Lawes whether things unlawful or necessary or things indifferent be commanded being made by a single Person or by a Commonalty not having a lawful power do not oblige in Conscience As if the Mayor of this City should impose Laws on this University or my next Neighbour should command my servant to yoak my Oxen to bring in his harvest c. Or as if a company of seditious Persons being met in some one County of England as they did heretofore under the conduct of Ket in Norfolk and many times in other places should demand of the inhabitants a certain Sum of money or should publish Edicts to exact a servitude of their persons not due unto them and by force of Armes should compel them to obedience although it peradventure were lawful for them to do as they were commanded it being found they were unable to make resistance yet certainly their commands should oblige no man in Conscience to the observation of them Aquin. 1. 2. quaest 96. art 4. First because the said Laws are Laws only in name and aequivocally But in deed and in earnest they are rather violences than Laws and an aequivocal Cause doth inferr no effect as a sentence spoken by one who is no Judge doth not oblige the Parties And Secondly Because the Power of obliging as already hath been mentioned is not effectively derived from the Law it self but from a will joyning with the power of the Law-maker therefore where Power is wanting the Cause that is properly the efficient of that obligation is wanting also and the proper Cause being defective it is necessary that its Effect should be deficient also And this is easie to be collected by the words of the Apostle in this place who deduceth the Duty of obedience on the part of the Subject from the Power of Jurisdiction in the Magistrate from whence it is no man is bound to obey him who hath not the Right of Commanding XII If you shall object that an unâ—uly multitude of factious persons such as before I have made mention of have the Power of Commanding because they can compel those to the performance of their commands over whom they exercise their Tyranny I answer that the Power of which I speak and on which Obligation doth depend is not that Power which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is Might or Puissance which by most is used in this sense by which a man is potent to give such an effect to his Intention that it finally cannot be hindered but that Power which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is a lawful Power which cometh by some Right of Nature or of Nations or by a Civil Right in respect both of the person who bears it and of those who are any wayes substituted under him This Power in this present Argument the Apostle doth so much presse that in the space almost of three Verses he names it five times and makes not the least mention of the other XIII But you will allege that those who in the time of the Apostles were the supreme Governors did ascend unto the height of the Empire not by any Right of Inheritance nor by the free Suffrages of the people or any lawful Authority but by Force and Treachery or military Tumult and yet the Apostle notwithstanding doth expressly attribute an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is a lawful Authority to them as unto legitimate Magistrates and imposeth on their Subjects a necessity of obeying them and that not for fear of Punishment but for Conscience sake We must confesse indeed that the first Emperors of Rome after the eversion of the Common-wealth did not attain unto the Empire by any great lawfulnesse of Right yet withall we must confess that they were invested with the Right of the Sword and a legitimate Jurisdiction to which all whosoever were under the Roman Power ought to be subject for there was not then any single person that could challenge it as due unto him by more Right and the Senate and People of Rome in whose Power not long before and for many Ages also was the chief Command what by fear and what by obsequiousness did give way to the losse of their Privileges and acknowledged those for their lawful Princes who had obtained the Empire by unlawful Acts. This being granted which certainly in my opinion can no wayes be denyed there can remain no other doubt concerning the necessity of obeying But in a dubious case what is the duty of a Christian whether and how far he is obliged in the Court of Conscience to give way unto the Times and to accommodate himself to the present manners and be obedient to the Lawes the Edicts and the Commands of one who in his Judgment at least hath attained to the Soveraignty de facto that is by Power and by no Right at all it is no easy thing to judge neither is it the part of a wise man to determine any thing on so great and so high a Point XIV I here therefore do conclude on nothing positively but that I may not be censured to be wanting in my duty or at least to your expectation if I should make mention of a Question and give you not the least satisfaction in it I will in a a few words expound unto you what seemeth to me having been very serious hereupon to be most consentaneous to true reason unless peradventure some circumstances as oftentimes it comes about in such deliberations shall grow too much upon
the duties of Divine worship but at what hour the people shall meet and in what place what form of words are to be used and what must be the gesture of the body the several parts of the service and other things of the same nature are all of them to be determined by Humane constitutions In the same manner the Law of God forbiddeth Theft to be commited but what kind of Theft is to be animadvertised against with such a punishment and what with another punishment is from the Laws of man From this determination of a general thing and undetermined by the Law of God the Law of man hath this privilege that it can induce a new obligation on the Conscience of the Subject not only different from the first obligation in number and in respect of the Term because it is of another dependency but also diverse in the Species and in respect of the matter because it is exercised on another object for the first obligation which ariseth from the Law of God is to the thing it self as it is a substance but this obligation which the Lawes of men do super-induce is to the manner of the thing or to the circumstance of it X. The fourth Doubt is of a thing that is foul and unlawful which is indeed a Doubt of great moment and containeth many cases for almost all the Conditions which are required to the right Constitution of Lawes a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristot 5. Ethic. 3 are reduced to Justice alone And not only for that reason that universal Justice doth in her Circle comprehend all Vertues but especially for this reason that particular Justice and more specifically that Justice which is called Legal Justice is above all other Vertues the chief and the only Pillar of Common-wealths and all humane Societies Concerning this Doubt In the first place it is questioned Whether an unjust Law ought to be made for the publick profit Of which opinion was Nicho. Machiavel who affirmed that the due matter of Laws whether just or unjust was that which was most commodious for the preserving the encreasing of a politick State for when in his opinion the end of Civil Power is the preservation of it self and the encrease of Soveraignty which Power cannot vigorously be preserved much less the Soveraignty enlarged if all the Lawes and Councils of Princes were examined according to the exact Rule of Justice and Honesty It concerned those who sate at the Helm so to bend as occasion should require the Rule of Honesty as to make it subservient to the publick advantage for the end in all things is to know how best to measure those things that are of a middle nature what so ever was the opinion of Machiavel this was certainly the Judgment of a personage of great account amongst the Lacaedemonians who openly pronounced that was most honest to the Spartans which was most profitable to them To confirm this opinion that of Horace is alleged Ipsa utilitas justi propè mater et aequi Hor. 1 â—aâ—yr 3. Profit almost the very mother of Justice and Equity And how thriving a Principle this is may be proved by the Example and successe of the Turks who relying on this Foundation most happily have far and near extended the bounds of their Empire throughout Asia Africa and Europe And to speak the truth had not some men who above all others do professe themselves to be Christians nay the only Christians and delight to be called the Reformers and the Restorers oâ— the purer Religion made a great use of this most wicked principle the Christian World had not every where groaned under so many Sacrileges Perjuries Seditions Warrs Tumults and Tyrannies XI But on the other side Princes on earth ought not to abuse that power which they have received from God against his will or otherwise than he intended for this power is not given them so much as to Lords as it is intrusted to them by God as his Ministers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 13. 4 6. It is intrusted to them upon that account that they should work righteousnesse and not exercise Tyranny and an unjust Domination And this is manifest by the very words of the Text By me Kings Reign and Princes decree just things As if to Reign and truly to be a Prince were nothing else but to decree those things which are just and righteous And the Prophets do every where denounce the most severe anger Esai 10. 1. and vengeance of God against those Kings Princes who had decreed unjust Judgements Psal 94. 20. and had meditated iniquity as a Law Neither is the inlargement of Empire the â—nd of Civil Power as the Politicians of this world do affirm but the preservation of the people in Tranquillity and peace with all Godlinesse and Honesty 1 Tim. 2. 2. For Justice if there be any other is the best preserver of the publick peace And as the Righteousness of Faith doth procure and conserve the inward peace of the Conscience so legal Justice doth preserve the outward peace of the Common-wealth Esai 32. 17. the fruit of Justice saith the Prophet Pindaâ— shall be Peace and the Theban Poet calleth Quietnesse the Daughter of Justice Neither is that the meaning of Horace as if Honesty were meerly to be measured by profit the scope of his sense is far otherwise to wit that men wild at first and wandring by the observation of the publick profit and the common good were brought at the last to draw together into one Body and maintain Societies and by just Laws and Punishments to restrain injuries and wickednesse The Arguments drawn from the Turks whom it appears that God especially had raised up and made them as his Scourge to correct the great perfidiousnesse and other Sins of the Christians or from any others to maintain a bad Cause by the prosperous successe that did attend it do favour rather of the Alcoran of some abhominable miscreant than of the Purity of the Gospel of our Saviour Christ XII The second Question is Whether an unjust Law though it ought not to be made yet being made may oblige the Conscience of the Subject so far as to be bound to observe it For many things there are which ought not to be done yet being done are valid And it may so come to passe that what could not without sin be commanded yet without sin may be performed as abundantly we have confirmed in our fore-going Lectures The reason of this doubt is Because that true obedience is no Disputresse for the practice of obedience doth properly consist in this to subject ones self to the will of another without the least murmur or dispute Nimis delicata est obedientia saith Bernard quae transit in genus causae deliberativum That Obedience is too delicate when it comes once to be so deliberate as to inquire after the Cause thereof But I answer briefly the Conscience of the