us lyes not here as it is generally mistaken What Form of Government comes the nearest to Apostolical practice but Whether any one individual form be founded so upon Divine Right that all Ages and Churches are bound unalterably to observe it The clearing up of which by an impartial inquiry into all the grounds produced for it being of so great tendency to an accommodation of our present differences was the only motive which induced me to observe Aristotles wild Politicks of exposing this deformed conception to the entertainment of the wide World And certainly they who have espoused the most the interest of a jus divinum cannot yet but say that if the opinion I maintain be true it doth exceedingly conduce to a present settlement of the differences that are among us For then all parties may retain their different opinions concerning the Primitive form and yet agree and pitch upon a form compounded of all together as the most suitable to the state and condition of the Church of God among us That so the peoples interest be secured by consent and suffrage which is the pretence of the congregational way the due power of Presbyteries asserted by their joynt-concurrence with the Bishop as is laid down in that excellent model of the late incomparable Primate of Armagh and the just honour and dignity of the Bishop asserted as a very laudable and ancient constitution for preserving the Peace and Unity of the Church of God So the Learned Is. Casaubon describes the Polity of the Primitive Church Episcopi in singulis Ecclesiis constituti cum suis Prebyteriis propriam sibi quisque peculiari cura universam omnes in commune curantes admirabilis cujusdam Aristocraâ—iae speciem referebant My main design throughout this whole â—reatise is to shew that there can be no argument drawn from any pretence of a Divine Right that may hinder men from consenting and yielding to such a form of Government in the Church as may bear the greatest correspondency to the Primitive Church and be most advantagiously conduceable to the peace unity and settlement of our divided Church I plead not at all for any abuses or corruptions incident to the best form of Government through the corruption of men and times Nay I dare not harbour so low apprehensions of persons enjoying so great dignity and honour in the Church that they will in any wise be unwilling of themselves to reduce the Form of Church Government among us to its Primitive state and order by retrenching all Exorbitances of Power and restoring those Presbyteries which no law hath forbidden but onely through disuse have been laid aside Whereby they will give to the world that rare example of self-denial and the highest Christian prudence as may raise an honourable opinion of them even among those who have hitherto the most slighted so ancient and venerable an Order in the Church of God and thereby become the repairers of those otherwise irreparable breaches in the Church of God I conclude with the words of a late learned pious and moderate Prelate in his Via media I have done and now I make no other account but that it will fall out with me as it doth commonly with him that offers to part a fray both parts will perhaps drive at me for wishing them no worse than peace My ambition of the publike tranquillity shall willingly carry me through this hazzard let both beat me so their quarrel may cease I shall rejoyce in those blows and scars which I shall take for the Churches safety The Contents of the Chapters PART I. CHAP. I. THings necessary for the Churches peace must be clearly revealed The Form of Government not so as appears by the remaining controversie about it An evidence thence that Christ never intended any one Form as the only means to peace in the Church The Nature of a divine Right discussed Right in general either makes things lawful or else due For the former a non-prohibition sufficient the latter an express command Duty supposeth Legislation and promulgation The Question stated Nothing binds unalterably but by vertue of a standing Law and that two fold The Law of Nature and positive Lawes of God Three wayes to know when Positive Lawes are unalterable The Divine right arising from Scripture-examples divine acts and divine approbation considered p. 1. CHAP. II. SIX Hypotheses laid down as the basis of the following Discourse 1. The irreversible Obligation of the Law of Nature either by humane or divine positive Lawes in things immediately flowing from it 2. Things agreeable to the Law of nature may be lawfully practised in the Church of God inlarged into five subservient Propositions 3. Divine positive Lawes conâ—erning the manner of the thing whose substance is determined by the Law of nature must be obeyed by vertue of the obligation of the natural Law 4. Things undetermined both by the natural and positive laws of God may be lawfully determin'd by the supream authority in the Church of God The Magistrates power in matters of Religion largely asserted and cleared The nature of Indifferency in actions stated Matters of Christian liberty are subject to restraints largely proved Proposals for accommodation as to matters of Indifferency 5. What is thus determined by lawful authority doth bind the Consciences of men subject to that authority to obedience to those determinations 6. Things thus determined by lawful authority are not thereby made unalterable but may be revoked limited and changed by the same authority p. 27 CHAP. III. HOW far Church Government is founded upon the Law of nature Two things in it founded thereon 1. That there must be a Society of men for the Worship of God 2. That this Society be governed in the most convenient manner A Society for Worship manifested Gen 4. 26. considered The Sons of God and the sons of men who Societies for worship among Heathens evidenced by three things 1. Solemnity of Sacrifices sacrificing how far natural The antiquity of the Feast of first-fruits largely discovered 2. The Original of Festivals for the honour of their Deities 3. The sâ—crecy and solemnity of their mysteries This further proved from mans sociable nature the improvement of it by Religion the honour redounding to God by such a Society for his Worship p. 72 CHAP. IV. THE second thing the Law of Nature dictates that this Society be maintained and governed in the most convenient manner A further inquiry what particular Orders for Government in the Church come from the Law of Nature Six laid down and evidenced to be from thence First a distinction of some persons and their superiority over others both in power and order cleared to be from the Law of Nature The power and application of the power distinguished this latter not from any Law of Nature binding but permissive therefore may be restrained Peoples right of chosing Pastors considered Order distinguished from the form and manner of Government the former Natural the other not The
Forraign Churches Calvin and Beza both approving Episcopacy and Diocesan Churches Salmatius c. 3 Those who judge Episcopacy to be the Primitive Form yet look not on it as necessary Bishop Iewel Fulk Field Bishop Downam Bishop Bancroft Bishop Morton Bishop Andrews Saravia Francis Mason and others The Conclusion hence laid in Order to Peace Principles conducing thereto 1. Prudence must be used in Church-Government at last confessed by all parties Independents in elective Synods and Church Covenants admission of Members number in Congregations Presbyterians in Classes and Synods Lay-Elders c. Episcopal in Diocesses Causes Rites c. 2. That Prudence best which comes nearest Primitive practice A Presidency for life over an Ecclesiastical Senate shewed to be that Form in order to it Presbyteries to be restored Diocesses lessened Provincial Synods kept twice a year The reasonableness and easiness of accommodation shewed The whole concluded p. 383. 384. A Weapon-Salve for the Churches Wounds OR The Divine Right of particular Forms of Government in the Church of God discussed and examined according to the Principles of the Law of Nature the Positive Laws of God the Practice of the Apostles and the Primitive Church and the Judgement of Reformed Divines PART I. CHAP. I. Things necessary for the Churches Peace must be clearly revealed The Form of Church-Government not so as appears by the remaining Controversie about it An Evidence thence that Christ never intended any one Form as the only means to Peace in the Church The Nature of a Divine Right discussed Right in general either makes things Lawful or else Due For the former a Non-prohibition sufficient the later an Express Command Duty supposeth Legislation and Promulgation The Question stated Nothing binds unalterably but by virtue of a standing Law and that two-fold The Law of Nature and Positive Laws of God Three ways to know when Positive Laws are unalterable The Divine Right arising from Scripture-Examples Divine Acts and Divine Approbation considered HE that imposeth any matter of Opinion upon the belief of others without giving Evidence of Reason for it proportionable to the confidence of his Assertion must either suppose the thing propounded to carry such unquestionable Credentials of Truth and Reason with it that none who know what they mean can deny it entertainment or else that his own understanding hath attained to so great perfection as to have authority sufficient to oblige all others to follow it This latter cannot be presumed among any who have asserted the freedom of their own understandings from the dictates of an Infallible Chair but if any should forget themselves so far as to think so there needs no other argument to prove them not to be Infallible in their Assertions then this one Assertion that they are infallible it being an undoubted Evidence that they are actually deceived who know so little the measure of their own understandings The former can never be pretended in any thing which is a matter of Controversie among men who have not wholly forgot they are Reasonable Creatures by their bringing probable arguments for the maintaining one part of an opinion as well as another In which case though the Arguments brought be not convincing for the necessary entertaining either part to an unbiassed understanding yet the difference of their Opinions is Argument sufficient that the thing contended for is not so clear as both parties would make it to be on their own side and if it be not a thing of necessity to salvation it gives men ground to think that a final decision of the matter in controversie was never intended as a necessary means for the Peace and Unity of the Church of God For we cannot with any shew of reason imagine that our Supreme Law giver and Saviour who hath made it a necessary duty in all true members of his Church to endeavour after the Peace and Unity of it should suspend the performance of that duty upon a matter of Opinion which when men have used their utmost endeavors to satisfie themselves about they yet find that those very grounds which they are most inclinable to build their Judgements upon are either wholly rejected by others as wise and able as themselves or else it may be they erect a far different Fabrick upon the very same foundations It is no ways consistent with the Wisdom of Christ in founding his Church and providing for the Peace and Settlement of it to leave it at the mercy of mens private judgments and apprehensions of things than which nothing more uncertain and thereby make it to depend upon a condition never like to be attained in this world which is the agreement and Uniformity of mens Opinions For as long as mens faces differ their judgements will And until there be an Intellectus Averroisticus the same understanding in all persons we have little ground to hope for such an Universal Harmony in the Intellectual World and yet even then the Soul might pass a different judgement upon the colours of things according to the different tincture of the several Optick-Glasses in particular bodies which it takes a prospect of things through Reason and Experience then give us little hopes of any peace in the Church if the unity of mens judgements be supposed the condition of it the next inquiry then is how the Peace of the Church shall be attained or preserved when men are under such different perswasions especially if they respect the means in order to a Peace and Settlement For the ways to Peace like the fertile soils of Greece have been oft-times the occasion of the greatest quarrels And no sickness is so dangerous as that when men are sick of their remedy and nauseate that most which tends to their recovery But while Physitians quarrel about the Method of Cure the Patient languisheth under their hands and when men increase Contentions in the behalf of Peace while they seem to Court it they destroy it The only way left for the Churches Settlement and Peace under such variety of apprehensions concerning the Means and Method in order to it is to pitch upon such a foundation if possible to be found out whereon the different Parties retaining their private apprehensions may yet be agreed to carry on the same work in common in order to the Peace and Tranquillity of the Church of God Which cannot be by leaving all absolutely to follow their own ways for that were to build a Babel instead of Salem Confusion instead of Peace it must be then by convincing men that neither of those ways to peace and order which they contend about is necessary by way of Divine Command though some be as a means to an end but which particular way or form it must be is wholly left to the prudence of those in whose Power and Trust it is to see the Peace of the Church be secured on lasting Foundations How neerly this concerns the present Debate about the Government of the Church any one
our present case According to this sense of jus for that which is lawful those things may be said to be jure divino which are not determined one way or other by any positive Law of God but are left wholly as things lawful to the prudence of men to determine them in a way agreeable to natural light and the general Rules of the Word of God In which sense I assert any particular form of Government agreed on by the Governours of the Church consonant to the general Rules of Scripture to be by Divine Right i. e. God by his own Laws hath given men a power and liberty to determine the particular form of Church-Government among them And hence it may appear that though one form of Government be agreeable to the Word it doth not follow that another is not or because one is lawful another is unlawful but one form may be more agreeable to some parts places people and times then others are In which case that form of Government is to be setled which is most agreeable to the present state of a place and is most advantagiously conducible to the promoting the ends of Church-Government in that place or Nation I conclude then according to this sense of jus that the Ratio regiminis Ecclesiastici is juris divini naturalis that is that the reason of Church-Government is immutable and holds in all times and places which is the preservation of the peace and unity of the Church but the modus regiminis Ecclesiastici the particular form of that Government is juris divini permissivi that both the Laws of God and Nature have left it to the Prudence of particular Churches to determine it This may be cleared by a parallel Instance The reason and the Science of Physick is immutable but the particular prescriptions of that Science are much varied according to the different tempers of Patients And the very same reason in Physick which prescribes one sort of Physick to one doth prescribe a different sort to another because the temper or disease of the one calls for a different method of cure yet the ground and end of both prescriptions was the very same to recover the Patient from his distemper So I say in our present case the ground and reason of Government in the Church is unalterable by divine right yea and that very reason which determines the particular forms but yet these particular forms flowing from that immutable reason may be very different in themselves and may alter according to the several circumstances of times and places and persons for the more commodious advancing the main end of Government As in morality there can be but one thing to a man in genere summi boni as the chief good quò tendit in quod dirigit aroum to which he refers all other things yet there may be many things in genere boni conducentis as means in order to attaining that end So though Church-Government vary not as to the ground end and reason of it yet it may as to the particular forms of it As is further evident as to forms of Civil Government though the end of all be the same yet Monarchy Aristocracy and Democracy are in themselves lawful means for the attaining the same common end And as Alensis determines it in the case of Community of goods by the Law of Nature that the same reason of the Law of Nature which did dictate Community of goods to be most suitable to man in the state of Innocency did in his faln estate prescribe a propriety of goods as most agreeable to it so that herein the modus observantiâ—â— dissered but the ratio praecepti was the same still which was mans comfortable enjoyment of the Accommodations of life which in Innocency might have been best done by Community but in mans degenerate condition must be by a Propriety So the same reason of Church-Government may call for an Equality in the persons acting as Governours of the Church in one place which may call for Superiority and subordination in another Having now dispatched the first sense of a Divine Right I come to the other which is the main seat of the Controversie and therefore will require a longer debate And so jus is that which makes a thing to become a duty so jus quasi jussum and jussa jura as Festus explains it i. e. that whereby a thing is not only licitum in mens lawful power to do it or no but is made dâ—bitum and is constituted a duty by the force and virtue of a Divine Command Now mans obligation to any thing as a duty doth suppose on the part of him from whose authority he derives his obligation both legislation and promulgation First there must be a Legislative Power commanding it which if it respects only the outward actions of a man in a Nation imbodied by Laws is the supreme Magistrate but if the obligation respect the consciences of all men directly and immediately then none have the power to settle any thing by way of an universal standing Law but God himself Who by being sole Creator and Governour of the World hath alone absolute and independent Dominion and Authority over the souls of men But besides Legislation another thing necessary to mans obligation to duty is a sufficient promulgation of the Law made Because though before this there be the ground of obedience on mans part to all Gods Commands yet there must be a particular Declaration of the Laws whereby man is bound in order to the determination of Mans duty Which in Positives is so absolutely necessary that unless there be a sufficient promulgation and declaration of the will of the Law-giver mans ignorance is excusable in reference to them and so frees from guilt and the obligation to punishment But it is otherwise in reference to the dictates of the natural Law wherein though man be at a loss for them yet his own contracted pravity being the cause of his blindness leaves him without excuse Hence it is said with good reason that though man under the Moral Law was bound to obey Gospel-precepts as to the reason and substance of the duties by them commanded as Faith Repentance from dead works and New Obedience yet a more full and particular revelation by the Gospel was necessary for the particular determination of the general acts of obedience to particular objects under their several Modifications expressed in the Gospel And therefore Faith and Repentance under the Moral Law taken as a transcript of the Law of Nature were required under their general notion as acts of obedience but not in that particular relation which those acts have under the Covenant of Grace Which particular determination of the general acts to special objects under different respects some call New Precepts of the Gospel others New Light but taking that light as it hath an influence upon the consciences of men the difference is so small that it deserves not to be
positive Laws for God being the Supreme Governour of the World hath the Legislative Power in his hands to bind to the performance of what duties be please which carry no repugnancy in them to his Divine Nature and Goodness Hence arise all those positive Laws of God which we have in Scripture for God's end in his written Law was that man should have a Copy of all Divine constitutions by him that he might therein read what his duty was toward his Maker The Precepts of the Law of Nature are by the Jews call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 absolutely without any addition because they are of such things as do perpetually bind which because they are known to all by natural light they sometimes call them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 praecepta scientia and being that their righteousness is so evident and apparent they call them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verba rectitudinis but the clearest difference between the precepts of the Law of Nature and other positive commands is that which the famous Is. Casaubon takes notice of out of the Jewish Doctors Observant doctissimi è Rabbinis inter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hanâ— esse differentiam quod Mitsvoth sive prâ—ceptorum ratio aperta est ut Deum cole Honora patrem matrem at Chukim statuta sive decreta earum rerum esse dicunt quarum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ratio soli Deo sit nota ut Circumcisionis similium The reason of the Laws of Nature is evident but of positive Laws there is no reason to be given 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non est alia praeter decretum regis no other account to be given of them but the will of God The Laws of Nature are by the LXX often call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so used Rom. 2. 16. by Iustin Martyr 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Iosephus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but Gods positive Laws are call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thence we read of Zachary and Elizabeth Luke 1. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. walking in all the Ordinances and Commandments of God blameless and those are call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by S. Paul Ephes. 2. 15. the Law of Commandments in Ordinances Now although this difference be not always observed in the words in Scripture yet there is a vast difference between the things themselves though both equally commanded by God That which is most to our present purpose to observe is that Positives being mutable and alterable in themselves a bare Divine Command is not sufficient to make them immutable unless there be likewise expressed that it is the Will of God that they should always continue This was that which the Jews stumbled at so much and do to this day because they are assured their Law came once from God therefore it must of necessity have a perpetual obligation as may be seen in their two great Doctors Maimonides and Abarbinel who both of them make the Eternity of the Law one of the Fundamental Articles of their Creed But Abarbinel splits this Article into two whereof the first is that the Law of Moses shall never be changed the other that no other Law shall come instead of it The original of which grand errour is from want of observing the difference between things commanded by God some of which are good and therefore commanded others commanded and therefore good In which latter if the reason of the Command ceaseth the Command its self obligeth no longer As the Ceremonial Law was to be their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is not meant in regard of the sharp severe nature of the Law to drive them unto Christ as it is by many interpreted but the Law is a Paedagogue in regard of its tutorage and conduct as it signified him whose office it was to conduct Noblemens Children to the School as a learned man observes This being then the office of the Law when the Church was now entred into Christs School the office of this Paedagogue then ceased And so the Ceremonial Law needed no abrogation at all exspiring of its self at Christs coming as Laws made for the times of war do when peace comes Only because the Jews were so hardly perswaded that it should exspire the believing Jews conceiving at first the Gospel came rather to help them to obey the Law of Moses then to cancel the obligation of it therefore it was necessary that a more honourable burial should be given to it and the Apostles should pro rostris declare more fully that believers were freed from that yoke of Ceremonies under which the neck of their fore-fathers had groaned so long It appears then that a positive Law coming from God doth not meerly by virtue of its being enacted by God bind perpetually all persons unless there be a Declaration of Gods Will adjoyned that it should do so It will be here then well worth our inquiry to find out some 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or notes of difference whereby to know when positive laws bind immutably when not I shall â—ay down these following First when the same reason of the Command continues still then we cannot conceive how that which was instituted upon such an account as remains still should not have the same force now which it had at first That positive Law under which Adam was in his state of Innocency touching the forbidden fruit did not bind any longer then his fall because the reason of the Command ceased which was the tryal of mans obedience For which God made choice of a very facile and easie Command according to that rule of Politicians In minimis obedientiae periculum faciunt Legislatores of which they give this rational account Quia legislatoris ad obedientiam obligantis potius habenda est ratio quà m rei de quâ lex est lata thence arose that Law of the Ephori at Sparta barbam tondere to which no other reason was annexed but this obtemperare legibus to learn them to obey the Laws This was Gods aim in that easie Command given to Adam to make thereon an experiment of mans willingness to obey his Maker and wherein man soon lost that Obsequii gloria as he in Tacttus calls it which as Pliny saith is in to major quod quis minus velit But had this Law been a standing Law for all mankind it would have continued its obligation still but since we see that it was only a personal temporary probative precept for no sooner was man fallen but its obligation ceased So likewise those precepts of the Judicial Law which immediately respected the Commonwealth of the Jews as such their obligation reacheth not to Christians at all nor as it is generally conceived to the Jews themselves when out of the Consines of their own Countrey because the reason of those Laws doth neither descend to Christians nor did travel abroad with the Jews
power is alwayes to be understood in all Laws to be reserved to God where he hath not himself declared that he will not use it which is done either by the annexing an Oath on a Promise which the Apostle calls the two immutable things in which it is impossible for God to lie For though God be free to promise yet when he hath promised his own nature and faithfulness binds him to performance in which sense I understand those who say God in making promises is bound only to himself and not to men that is that the ground of performance ariseth from Gods faithfulness For else if we respect the right coming by the promise that must immediately respect the person to whom it is made and in respect of which we commonly say that the promiser is bound to performance But the case is otherwise in penal Laws which thoughâ— never so strict do imply a power of relaxation in the Legislator because penall Laws do only constitute the debstum poenae and bind the sinner over to punishment but do not bind the Legislator to an actual execution upon the debt Which is the ground that the person of a Mediator was admittable in the place of faln man because it was a penal Law and therefore relaxable But because the debt of punishment is immediately contracted upon the breach of the Law therefore satisfaction was necessary to God as Law-giver either by the person himself or another for him because it was not consistent with the holiness of Gods nature and his wisdom as Governor to relax an established Law without valuable consideration Now for the third kind of Gods Laws besides promissory and penall viz such as are meerly positive respecting duties which become such by vertue of an express command these though they be revocable in themselves yet being revocable only by God himself and his own power since he hath already in his Word fully revealed his Will unlesse therein he hath declared when their obligation shall cease they continue irreversible This is the case as to the Sacraments of the New Testament which being commands meerly positive yet Christ commanding Christians as Christians to observe them and not as Christians of the first and second Ages of the Church his mind can be no otherwise interpreted concerning them then that he did intend immutably to bind all Christians to the observance of them For al though the Socinians say that Baptism was only a Rite instituted by Christ for the passing men from Judaism and Gentilism to Christianity yet we are not bound to look upon all as reason that comes from those who professe themselves the admirers of it For Christs Command nowhere implying such a limitation and an outward visible profession of Christianity being a duty now and the Covenant entred into by that Rite of initiation as obligatory as ever we have no reason to think that Christs command doth not reach us now especially the promise being made to as many as God shall call and consequently the same duty required which was then in order to the obtaining of the same ends A third way to discern the immutability of positive Laws is when the things commanded in particular are necessary to the being succession and continuance of such a Society of men professing the Gospel as is instituted and approved by Christ himself For Christ must be supposed to have the power himself to order what Society he please and appoint what Orders he please to be observed by them what Rites and Ceremonies to be used in admission of Members into his Church in their continuing in it in the way means manner of ejection out of it in the preserving the succession of his Church and the administration of Ordinances of his appointment These being thus necessary for the maintaining and upholding this Society they are thereby of a nature as unalterable as the duty of observing what Christ hath commanded is How much these things concern the resolution of the Question proposed will appear afterwards Thus we have gained a resolution of the second thing whereon an unalterable Divine Right is founded viz either upon the dictates of the Law of Nature concurring with the rules of the written word or upon express positive Laws of God whose reason is immutable or which God hath declared shall continue as necessary to the being of the Church The next thing is to examine the other pretences which are brought for a Divine Right which are either Scripture examples or Divine acts or Divine approbation For Scripture-examples First I take it for granted on all hands that all Scripture examples do not bind us to follow them such are the Mediatory acts of Christ the Heroical acts of extraordinary persons all accidentall and occasionall actions Example doth not bind us as an example for then all examples are to be followed and so we shall of necessity go quà itur non quà eundum walk by the most examples and not by rule There is then no obligatory force in example it self Secondly there must be then some rule fixed to know when examples bind and when not for otherwise there can be no discrimination put between examples which we are to follow and which to avoid This rule must be either immediately obligatory making it a duty to follow such examples or else directive declaring what examples are to be â—ollowed And yet even this latter doth imply as well as the former that the following these examples thus declared is become a duty There can be no duty without a Law making it to be a duty and consequently it is the Law making it to be a duty to follow such example which gives a Divine Right to those examples and not barely the examples themselves We are bound to follow Christs example not barely because he did such and such things for many things he did we are not bound to follow him in but because he himself hath by a command made it our duty to follow him in his humility patience self-denyal c. and in whatever things are set out in Scripture for our imitation When men speak then with so much confidence that Scripture-examples do bind us unalterably they either mean that the example it self makes it a duty which I have shewn already to be absurd or else that the morall nature of the action done in that example or else the Law making it our duty to follow the example though in its self it be of no morall nature If the former of these two then it is the morality of the action binds us without its being incarnate in the example For the example in actions not morall binds not at all and therefore the example binds only by vertue of the morality of it and consequently it is the morality of the action which binds and not the example If the latter the rule making it our duty then it it is more apparent that it is not the example which
binds necessarily but that rule which makes it a duty to follow it for examples in indifferent things do not bind without a Law making it to be a duty And so it evidently appears that all obligatory force is taken off from the examples themselves and resolved into one of the two former the morall nature of the action or a positive Law And therefore those who plead the obligatory nature of Scripture-examples must either produce the morall nature of these examples or else a rule binding us to follow those examples Especially when these examples are brought to found a New positive Law obliging all Christians necessarily to the end of the world Concerning the binding nature of Apostolicall practice I shall discourse largely afterwards The next thing pleaded for a Divine Right is by Divine Acts. As to this â—t is again evident that all Divine Acts do not constitute such a Right therefore there must be something expressed in those Acts when such a Divine Right follows them whence we may infallibly gather it was Gods intention they should perpetually oblige as is plain in the cases instanced in the most for this purpose as Gods resting on the seventh day making the Sabbath perpetual For it was not Gods resting that made it the Sabbath for that is only expressed as the occasion of its institution but it was Gods sanctifying the day that is by a Law setting it apart for his own service which made it a duty And so Christs resurrection was not it which made the Lords day a Sabbath of Divine Right but Christs resurrection was the occasion of the Apostles altering only a circumstantiall part of a morall duty already which being done upon so great reasons and by persons indued with an insallible spirit thereby it becomes our duty to observe that morall command in this limitation of time But here it is further necessary to distinguish between acts meerly positive and acts donative or legall The former conâ—er no right at all but the latter do not barely as acts but as legall acts that is by some declaration that those acts do conserr right And so it is in all donations and therefore in Law the bare delivery of a thing to another doth not give a legall title to it without express transferring of dominion and propriety with it Thus in Christs delivering the Keys to Peter and therest of the Apostles by that act I grant the Apostles had the power of the Keyes by Divine Right but then it was not any bare act of Christ which did it but it was only the declaration of Christs will conferring that authority upon them Again we must distinguish between a right conferâ—'d by a donative act and the unalterable nature of that Right for it is plain there may be a Right personall as well as successive derivative and perpetuall And therefore it is not enough to prove that a Right was given by any act of Christ unless it be made appear it was Christs intention that Right should be perpetuall if it oblige still For otherwise the extent of the Apostolical Commission the power of working miracles as well as the power of the Keyes whether by it we mean a power declarative of duty or a power authoritative and penall must continue still if a difference be not made between these two and some rule sound out to know when the Right conferr'd by Divine Acts is personall when successive Which rule thus found out must make the Right unalterable and so concerning us and not the bare donative act of Christ For it is evident they were all equally conferr'd upon the Apostles by an act of Christ and if some continue still and others do not then the bare act of Christ doth not make an unalterable Divine Right And so though it be proved that the Apostles had superiority of order and jurisdiction over the Pastors of the Church by an act of Christ yet it must further be proved that it was Christs intention that superiority should continue in their successors or it makes nothing to the purpose But this argument I confess I see not how those who make a necessary Divine Right to follow upon the acts of Christ can possibly avoid the force of The last thing pleaded for Divine Right is Divine approbation but this least of all constitutes a Divine Right For if the actions be extraordinary Gods approbation of them as such cannot make them an ordinary duty In all other actions which are good and therefore only commendable they must be so either because done in conformity to Gods revealed Will or to the nature of things good in themselves In the one it is the positive Law of God in the other the Law of Nature which made the action good and so approved by God and on that account we are bound to do it For God will certainly approve of nothing but what is done according to his Will revealed or natural which Will and Law of his is that which makes any thing to be of Divine Right i. e. perpetually binding as to the observation of it But for acts of meerly positive nature which we read Gods approbation of in Scripture by vertue of which approbation those actions do oblige us in this case I say it is not Gods meer approbation that makes the obligation but as that approbation so recorded in Scripture is a sufficient testimony and declaration of Gods intention to oblige men And so it comes to be a positive Law which is nothing else but a sufficient declaration of the Legislators will and intention to bind in particular actions and cases Thus now we have cleared whereon a necessary and unalterable Divine Right must be founded either upon the Law of Nature or some positive Law of God sufficiently declared to be perpetually binding CHAP. II. Six Hypotheses laid down as the basis of the following Discourse 1. The irreversible obligation of the Law of Nature either by humane or Divine positive Laws in things immediately flowing from it 2. Things agreeable to the Law of Nature may be lawfully practised in the Church of God where there is no prohibition by positive Laws inlarged into 5 subservient Propositions 3. Divine positive Laws concerning the manner of the thing whose substance is determined by the Law of Nature must be obeyed by vertue of the obligation of the natural Law 4. Things undetermined both by the naturall and positive Laws of God may be lawfully determined by the supream authority in the Church of God 5. What is thâ—â— determined by lawfull authority doth bind the consciences of men subject to that authority to obedience to those determinations 6. Things thus determined by lawfull authority are not thereby made unalterable but may be revoked limited and changed by the same authority HAving shewed what a Divine Right is and whereon it is founded our next great inquiry will be How far Church-Government is founded upon Divine Right taken either of these two wayes
before Covenants made and things thereby determined may be so far from being lawful after that the doing of them may contradict a Principle of the Obligatory Law of Nature Thus in a state of liberty every one had right to what he thought fit for his use but Propriety and Dominion being introduced which was a free voluntary act by mens determining Rights it now becomes an offence against the Law of Nature to take away that which is another mans In which sense alone it is that Theft is said to be forbidden by the Law of Nature And by the same reason he that resists and opposeth the lawful Authority under which he is born doth not only offend against the Municipal Laws of the place wherein he lives but against that Original and Fundamental Law of Societies viz standing to Covenants once made For it is a gross mistake as well as dangerous for men to imagine That every man is born in a state of Absolute Liberty to chuse what Laws and Governours he please but every one being now born a Subject to that Authority he lives under he is bound to preserve it as much as in him lies Thence Augustus had some reason to say He was the best Citizen qui praesentem reipublicae statum mutari â—â—â— vult That doth not disturb the present state of the Commonwealth and who as Alcibiades saith in Thucydides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 endeavours to preserve that form of Government he was born under And the reason of it is that in Contracts and Covenants made for Government men look not only at themselves but at the benefit of Posterity if then one Party be bound to maintain the Rights of the others Posterity as well as of his person the other party must be supposed to oblige his Posterity in his Covenant to perform Obedience which every man hath power to do because Children are at their Parents disposal And Equity requires that the Covenant entred should be of equal extent to both parties And if a man doth expect Protection for his Posterity he must engage for the Obedience of his Posterity too to the Governorâ— who do legally protect them But the further prosecution of these things belongs to another place to consider of my purpose being to treat of Government in the Church and not in the State The sum of this is that the Obligation to the performance of what things are determined which are of the permissive Law of Nature by Positive Laws doth arise from the Obligatory Law of Nature As the Demonstration of the particular Problemes in the Mathematicks doth depend upon the Principles of the Theoremes themselves and so whoever denies the truth of the Probleme deduced by just Consequence from the Theoreme must consequentially deny the truth of the Theoreme its self So those who violate the particular Determinations of the Permissive Law of Nature do violate the Obligation of the Preceptive part of that Law Obedience to the other being grounded on the Principles of this 4. God hath Power by his Positive Laws to take in and determine as much of the Permissive Law of Nature as he please which being once so determined by an Universal Law is so far from being lawful to be done that the doing of them by those under an Obligation to his Positive Laws is an offence against the Immutable Law of Nature That God may restrain mans Natural Liberty I suppose none who own Gods Legislative Power over the world can deny especially considering that men have power to restrain themselves much more then hath God who is the Rector and Governor of the World That a breach of his positive Laws is an offence against the common Law of Nature appears hence because man being Gods creature is not only bound to do what is in general suitable to the principles of reason in flying evil and choosing good but to submit to the determinations of Gods will as to the distinction of good from evil For being bound universally to obey God it is implyed that man should obey him in all things which he discovers to be his will whose determination must make a thing not only good but necessary to be done by vertue of his supreme authority over men This then needs no further proof being so clear in its self 5. Lastly What things are left undetermined by divine positive Laws are in the Churches power to use and practise according as it judgeth them most agreeable to the rule of the Word That things undetermin'd by the Word are still lawfull evidently appears because what was once lawfull must have some positive Law to make it unlawfull which if there be none it remains lawfull still And that the Church of God should be debarr'd of any priviledge of any other Societies I understand not especially if it belong to it as a Society considered in its self and not as a particular Society constituted upon such accounts as the Church is For I doubt not but to make it evident afterwards that many parts of Government in the Church belong not to it as such in a restrained sense but in the general notion of it as a Society of men imbodyed together by some Laws proper to its self Although it subsist upon a higher foundation viz. of divine institution and upon higher grounds reasons principles ends and be directed by other Laws immediately then any other Societies in the World are The third Hypothesis is this Where the Law of Nature determines the thing and the Divine Law determines the manner and circumstances of the thing there we are bound to obey the divine Law in its particular determinations by vertue of the Law of Nature in its general obligation As for instance the Law of Nature bindeth man to worship God but for the way manner and circumstances of Worship we are to follow the positive Laws of God because as we are bound by Nature to worship him so we are bound by vertue of the same Law to worship him in the manner best pleasing to himself For the light of Nature though it determine the duty of worship yet it doth not the way and manner and though acts of pure obedience be in themselves acceptable unto God yet as to the manner of those acts and the positives of worship they are no further acceptable unto God then commanded by him Because in things not necessarily determined by the Law of Nature the goodnesse or evill of them lying in reference to Gods acceptance it must depend upon his Command supposing positive Laws to be at all given by God to direct men in their worship of him For supposing God had not at all revealed himself in order to his worship doubtlesse it had been lawfull for men not only to pray to God express their sense of their dependance upon him but to appoint waies times and places for the doing it as they should judge most convenient agreeable to natural light Which is evident from the
may be a real confederation without this explicite covenant as appears in those Churches of Christ both in the primitive times and since the Reformation who have never used it which none I suppose who maintain this opinion will deny to have been true visible Churches of Christ. 2. If the Gospel-covenant entred into by any gives a right to Gospel-Ordinances by its self then an explicite covenant is not that which makes one a member of a Church but the Gospel-covenant gives that right to all Gospel-Ordinances If by Baptism the person baptized have a legal title to all Gospel-Ordinances then c. The Minor appears in that they are admitted Church-members by Baptism and how can any be a Member of a Church and not have right to all Ordinances in it supposing capacity to receive them A right once received continues till it be forfeited especially when it is such a right as is not limited to any particular priviledges but to all the priviledges of that Society into which they are entred 3. The reality of consent may be sufficiently manifested without an explicite covenant as in the joyning with those who are under the same profession in the common acts of the Society and acceptance of and submission to the Rulers of that Society which implicitely is that Covenant which they would have expressed and actions in this case are as declarative and significative as words 4. If a Church may cease to be a true Church without explicite disowning such a Covenant then it is not explicite covenanting which makes a Church but a Church may cease to be a true Church without explicite disowning it as in case of universall corruption as to Word and Sacraments as in the Church of Rome that still owns her self for a Church The ground of the consequence is from the parity of reason as to contraries But though I see no reason at all why an explicite Covenant should be so necessary to a Church that we cannot suppose a true Church without it yet I no wayes deny the lawfulnesse or expediency in many cases of having a personal profession from all baptized in Infancy when they come to age which we may if we please call Confirmation and the necessity of of desiring admission in order to participation of all Ordinances which desire of admission doth necessarily imply mens consenting to the Laws of that Society and walking according to the duties of it and so they are consequentially and virtually though not expresly and formally bound to all the duties required from them in that relation When Churches are over-run with loosnesse ignorance and prophanesse or when Christians are under persecution an externall profession of the Gospel-covenant and declaring their owning the Society they are entred into and submitting to the Laws of it may be if not wholly necessary yet very usefull and expedient And indeed at all times we see people understand so little of their duty or engagements and are so hardly brought under the exercise of Gospel-discipline that an open profession of their submission to the Rules of the Gospel seems the most likely way to advance the practise Power and purity of Religion But of this much is spoken by others lately and therefore I supersede From all this we see that every Society implying a joyning together in some common duties Nature tells us there must be a reall consenting together explicite or implicite in all persons who enter into such a Society CHAP. VIII The last thing dictated by the Law of Nature is that every Offender against the Laws of the Society must give an account of his actions to the Governours of it and submit to the censures inflicted upon him by them The originall of penalties in Societies The nature of them according to the nature and ends of Societies The penalty of the Church no civil mulct because its Laws and ends are different from civill Societies The practice of the Druids in excommunication Among the Iews whether a meer civill or sacred penalty The latter proved by six arguments Cherem Col Bo objections answered The originall of the mistake shewed The first part concluded NAture dictates further that in a well-ordered Society every offender against the Rules of that Society must give an account of his actions to the Governours of that Society and submit to the censures of it according to the judgement of the Rulers of it In all Societies subsisting by Laws men being more ruled by hopes and fears then by a sense of duty or love of goodness it is necessary for maintaining a Society that there must be not only a declaration of what men ought to do but a setting forth the penalties which they must undergo upon violation of the Laws whereon the Society doth subsist And as there must be penalties annexed as the sanction of the Law so it must of necessity be implyed in a well-ordered Society that every person as he doth promise obedience to the Law so by the same obligation he is bound to submit to the penalties upon disobedience For whatever Laws binds to duty where there is a penalty threatned doth bind likewise to punishment upon neglect of duty for no sooner is the Law broken but the offender lyes under the penall sanction of that Law and is thereby bound to give an account of himself and actions to those Governours who are bound to see the Laws obeyed or offenders punished Guilt follows immediately upon the breach of the Law which is nothing else but the offenders obligation to punishment From this obligation on the offenders part ariseth a new relation between the Governour of the Society and the offender On the Governours part a right to punish vindictive justice supposing offences committed and on the offender◠part an obligation to undergo what shall be inflicted upon him for his offence Punishment being nothing else but malum passionis ob malum actionis There must be then these things supposed in any well ordered Society Laws to be governed by Rulers to see the Laws kept or offenders punished penalties made known for offenders submission of the persons in the Societies to the penalties if they deserve them But now of what kind nature and degree the penalties must be must be resolved according to the nature end and design of the constitution of the Society If it be a Society for preservation of the rights of Bodies or Estates the penalties must be either pecuniary or corporal And the ground is because the end of legall punishment is not properly revenge but the preservation of the Society which without punishments could not be A threefold end is therefore assigned to punishments the reformation of the offending person the prevention of further offences in the Society of the same kind and the being a terrour and example to others the first is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The second 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being for the preservation of the honour of the
vacuae observationis superstitioni deputanda as superstitious which are done sine ulliâ—s Dominici aâ—t Apostolici praecepti autoritate without the Warrant of Divine Command Although even here we may say too that it is not meerly the want of a Divine Precept which makes any part of Divine Worship uncommanded by God unlawful but the General Prohibition that nothing should be done in the immediate Worship of God but what we have a Divine Command for However in matters of meer Deceâ—cy and Order in the Church of God or in any other civil action of the lives of men it is enough to make things lawful if they are not forbidden But against this that a Non-prohibition is warrant enough to make any thing lawful this Objection will be soon leavied that it is an Argument ab authoritate negativè and therefore is of no force To which I answer that the Rule if taken without limitation upon which this Objection is founded is not true for although an Argument ab authoritate negativè as to matter of Fact avails not yet the Negative from Authority as to matter of Law and Command is of great force and strength I grant the Argument holds not here we do not read that ever Christ or his Apostles did such a thing therefore it is not to be done but this we read of no Law or Precept commanding us to do it therefore it is not unlawful not to do it and we read of no Prohibition forbidding us to do it therefore it may be lawfully done this holds true and good and that upon this two-fold Reason First From Gods Intention in making known his Will which was not to record every particular fact done by himself or Christ or his Apostles but it was to lay down those general and standing Laws whereby his Church in all Ages should be guided and ruled And in order to a perpetual obligation upon the Consciences there must be a sufficient promulgation of those Laws which must bind men Thus in the case of Infant-Baptism it is a very weak unconcluding Argument to say that Infants must not be baptized because we never read that Christ or his Apostles did it for this is a Negative in matter of Fact but on the other side it is an Evidence that Infants are not to be excluded from Baptism because there is no Divine Law which doth prohibit their admission into the Church by it for this is the Negative of a Law and if it had been Christs intention to have excluded any from admission into the Church who were admitted before as Insants were there must have been some positive Law whereby such an Intention of Christ should have been expressed For nothing can make that unlawful which was a duty before but a direct and express Prohibition from the Legislator himself who alone hath power to reâ—cind as well as to make Laws And therefore Antipaedobaptists must instead of requiring a Positive Command for baptizing Infants themselves produce an express Prohibition excluding them or there can be no appearance of Reason given why the Gospel should exclude any from those priviledges which the Law admitted them to Secondly I argue from the intention and end of Laws which is to circumscribe and restrain the Natural Liberty of man by binding him to the observation of some particular Precepts And therefore where there is not a particular Command and Prohibition it is in Nature and Reason supposed that men are left to their Natural freedom as is plain in Positive Humane Laws wherein men by compact and agreement for their mutual good in Societies were willing to restrain themselves from those things which should prejudice the good of the Community this being the ground of mens first inclosing their Rights and common Priviledges it must be supposed that what is not so inclosed is left common to all as their just Right and Priviledge still So it is in Divine Positive Laws God intending to bring some of Mankind to happiness by conditions of his own appointing hath laid down many Positive Precepts binding men to the practise of those things as duties which are commanded by him But where we find no Command for performance we cannot look upon that as an immediate duty because of the necessary relation between Duty and Law and so where we find no Prohibition there we can have no ground to think that men are debarred from the liberty of doing things not forbidden For as we say of Exceptions as to General Laws and Rules that an Exception expressed firmat regulam in non exceptis makes the Rule stronger in things not expressed as excepted so it is as to Divine Prohibitions as to the Positives that those Prohibitions we read in Scripture make other things not-prohibited to be therefore lawful because not expresly forbidden As Gods forbidding Adam to taste of the fruit of one Tree did give him a liberty to taste of all the rest Indeed had not God at all revealed his Will and Laws to us by his Word there might have been some Plea why men should have waited for particular Revelations to dictate the goodness or evil of particular actions not determined by the law of nature but since God hath revealed his will there can be no reason given why those things should not be lawful to do which God hath not thought fit to forbid men the doing of Further we are to observe that in these things which are thus undetermined in reference to an obligation to duty but left to our natural liberty as things lawful the contrary to that which is thus lawful is not thereby made unlawful But both parts are left in mens power to do or not to do them as is evident in all those things which carry a general equity with them and are therefore consonant to the Law of Nature but have no particular obligation as not flowing immediately from any dictate of the natural Law Thus community of goods is lawful by the law and principles of nature yet every man hath a lawful right to his goods by dominion and propriety And in a state of Community it was the right of every man to impropriate upon a just equality supposing a preceding compact and mutual agreement Whence it is that some of the School-men say that although the Law of Nature be immutable as to its precepts and prohibitions yet not as to its demonstrations as they call them as Do as you would be done to binds always indispensably but that in a state of nature all things are common to all This is true but it binds not men to the necessary observance of it These which they call Demonstrations are only such things as are agreeable to nature but not particularly commanded by any indispensable precept of it Thus likewise it is agreeable to nature that the next of the kindred should be heir to him who dies intestate but he may lawfully wave his interest if he please Now to apply this to
named a Controversie But that which I am now clearing is this that whatsoever binds Christians as an universal standing Law must be clearly revealed as such and laid down in Scripture in such evident terms as all who have their senses exercised therein may discern it to have been the will of Christ that it should perpetually oblige all believers to the Worlds end as is clear in the case of Baptism and the Lords Supper But here I shall add one thing by way of caution That there is not the same necessity for a particular and clear revelation in the alteration of a Law unrepealed in some circumstances of it as there is for the establishing of a New Law As to the former viz. the change of a standing Law as to some particular circumstance a different practice by persons guided by an infallible spirit is sufficient which is the case as to the observation of the Lords day under the Gospel For the fourth Command standing in force as to the Morality of it a different practice by the Apostles may be sufficient for the particular determination of the more ritual and occasional part of it which was the limitation of the observation of it to that certain day So likewise that other Law standing in force that persons taken into Covenant with God should be admitted by some visible sign Apostolical practice clearly manifested may be sufficient ground to conclude what the mind of Christ was as to the application of it to particular persons and what qualifications are requisite in such as are capable of admission as in the case of Infants Whereby it is clear why there is no particular Law or command in reference to them under the Gospel because it was only the application of a Law in force already to particular persons which might be gathered sufficiently from the Apostles practice the Analogy of the dispensation the equal reason of exclusion under the Law and yet notwithstanding the continual admission of them then into the same Gospel-Govenant Circumcision being the Seal of the Righteousness of Faith But this by the way to prevent mistakes We must now by parity of reason say that either the former Law in those things wherein it was not typical must hold in reference to the form of Government in the Church of Christ or else that Christ by an universal Law hath setled all order in Church Government among the Pastors themselves or else that he hath left it to the prudence of every particular Church to determine its own form of Government which I conceive is the direct state of the Question about Divine Right viz. Whether the particular form of Government in the Church be setled by an universal binding Law or no But for a further clearing the state of the Question we must consider what it is that makes an unalterable Divine Right or a standing Law in the Church of God for those who found forms of Government upon a Divine Right do not plead a Law in express terms but such things from whence a Divine Right by Law may be inferred Which I now come to examine and that which I lay down as a Postulatum or a certain conclusion according to which I shall examine others â—ssertions concerning Divine Right is That nothing is founded upon a Divine Right nor can bind Christians directly or consequentially as a positive Law but what may be certainly known to have come from God with an intention to oblige Believers to the worlds end For either we must say it binds Christians as a Law when God did not intend it should or else Gods intentions to bind all Believers by it must be clearly manifested Now then so many ways and no more as a thing may be known to come from God with an intention to oblige all perpetually a thing may be said to be of an unalterable Divine Right and those can be no more then these two Either by the Law of Nature or by some positive Law of God Nothing else can bind universally and perpetually but one of these two or by virtue of them as shall be made appear I begin with the Law of Nature The Law of Nature binds indispensably as it depends not upon any arbitrary constitutions but is founded upon the intrinsecal nature of good and evil in the things themselves antecedently to any positive Declaration of Gods Will. So that till the nature of good and evil be changed that Law is unalterable as to its obligation When I say the Law of Nature is indispensable my meaning is that in those things which immediately flow from that Law by way of precept as the three first Commands of the Moral Law no man can by any positive Law be exempted from his obligation to do them neither by any abrogation of the Laws themselves nor by derogation from them nor interpretation of them nor change in the object matter or circumstance whatsoever it be Now although the formal reason of mans obedience to the precepts of this Law be the conformity which the things commanded have to the Divine Nature and goodness yet I conceive the efficient cause of mans obligation to these things is to be fetched from the Will Command and Pleasure of God Not as it is taken for an arbitrary positive will but as it is executive of Divine purposes and as it ingraves such a Law upon the hearts of men For notwithstanding mans Reason considered in it self be the chiefest instrument of discovery what are these necessary duties of humane nature in which sense Aristotle defines a Natural Law to be that which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hath every where the same force and strength i. e. as Andronicus Rhodius very well interprets it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among all that have the free use of their reason and faculties yet I say it is not bare Reason which binds men to the doing of those things commanded in that Law but as it is expressive of an Eternal Law and deduceth its obligation from thence And so this Law if we respect the rise extent and immutability of it may be call'd deservedly the Law of Nature but if we look at the emanation efflux and original of it it is a Divine Law and so it is call'd by Molina Alphonsus à Castrâ—â— and others For the sanction of this Law of Nature as well as others depends upon the Will of God and therefore the obligation must come from him it being in the power of no other to punish for the breach of a Law but those who had the Legislative Power to cause the obligation to it It appears then from hence that whatever by just consequence can be deduced from the preceptive Law of Nature is of Divine Right because from the very nature of that Law it being indispensable it appears that God had an intent to oblige all persons in the world by it The second way whereby we may know what is of Divine Right is by Gods
But for our more distinct clear and rationaâ—â— proceeding I shall lay down some things as so many Postulata or generall Principles and Hypotheses which will be as the basis and foundation of the following Discourse which all of them concern the obligation of Laws wherein I shall proceed gradually beginning with the Law of Nature and so to Divine positive Laws and lastly to speak to humane positive Laws The first Principle or Hypothesis which I lay down is That where the Law of Nature doth determine any thing by way of duty as flowing from the principles of it there no positive Law can be supposed to take off the obligation of it Which I prove both as to humane positive Laws and Divine First as to humane For first the things commanded in the Law of Nature being just and righteous in themselves there can be no obligatory Law made against such things Nemo tenetur ad impossibile is true in the sense of the Civil Law as well as in Philosophy as impossibile is taken for turpe and turpe for that which is contrary to the dictates of Nature A man may be as well bound not to be a man as not to act according to principles of reason For the Law of Nature is nothing else but the dictate of right reason discovering the good or evil of particular actions from their conformity or repugnancy to natural light Whatever positive Law is then made directly infringing and violating natural principles is thereby of no force at all And that which hath no obligation in it self cannot dissolve a former obligation Secondly the indispensablenesse of the obligation of the Law of Nature appears from the end of all other Laws which are agreed upon by mutual compact which is the better to preserve men in their rights and priviledges Now the greatest rights of men are such as flow from Nature its self and therefore as no Law binds against the reason of it so neither can it against the common end of Laws Therefore if a humane positive Law should be made that God should not be worshipped it cannot bind being against the main end of Laws which is to make men live together as reasonable creatureâ— which they cannot do without doing what Nature requires which is to serve God who made it Again it overturns the very foundation of all Government and dissolves the tye to all humane Laws if the Law of Nature doth not bind indispensably for otherwise upon what ground must men yield obedience to any Laws that are made Is it not by vertue of this Law of Nature that men must stand to all compacts and agreements made If Laws take their force among men from hence they can bind no further then those compâ—cts did extend which cannot be supposed to be to violate and destroy their own natures Positive Laws may restrain much of what is only of the permissive Law of Nature for the intent of positive Laws was to make men abate so much of their naturall freedom as should be judged necessary for the preservation of humane Societies but against the obligatory Law of Nature as to its precepts no after-Law can derogate from the obligation of it And therefore it is otherwise between the Law of Nature and positive Laws then between Laws meerly civil for as to these the rule is that posterior derogat priori the latter Law cassats and nulls the obligation of the former but as to natural Laws and positive prior derogat posteriori the Law oâ— Nature which is firstâ— takes away the obligation of a positive Law if it be contrary to it As Iustellus observe it was in the primitive Church in reference to the obligation of the Canons of the Councils that such as were inserted in the Codex Canonum being of the more ancient Councils did render the obligation of later Canons invalid which were contrary to them unlesse it were in mâ—tteâ—s of small moment We see then that supposing the Law of Nature doth not continue obligatory the obligation of all humane positive Laws will fall with it as the superstructure needs must when the foundation is removed for if any other Law of Nature may be dissolved why not that whereby men are bound to stand to Covenants and contracts made and if that be dissolved How can the obligation to humane Laws remain which is founded upon that basis And so all civil Societies are thereby overturned Thirdly it appears from the nature of that obligation which follows the Law of Nature so that thereby no humane Law can bind against this for humane Laws bind only outward humane actâ—ons directly and internall acts only by vertue of their necessary connexion with and influence upon outward actions and not otherwise but the Law of Nâ—ture immediately binds the soul and conscience of man And therefore obligatio naturalis and nexus conscientiae are made to be the same by Lessius Suarâ—z and others For Lessius dâ—sputing Whether a Will made without solemnity of Law doth bind in conscience or no He proves it doâ—h by â—his argument from the opinion of the Lawyers that without those solemnities there doth arise from it a natural obligation and the hresae ab Intestato who is the next of Kin is bound to make it good therefore it doth bind in conscience So then there ariseth a necessary obllgation upon conscience from the dictâ—tes of the Law of Nature which cannot be removed by any positive Law For although there lye no action in the civil Law against the breach of a meerly natural Law as in the former case of succession to a Will not legally made in covenants made without conditions expressed in recovery of debtâ— from a person to whom money was lent in his Pupillage without consent of his Tutor in these cases though no action lie against the persons yet this proves not that these have no obligation upon a man but only that he is not responsible for the breach of morall honesty in them before civil Courts In which sense those Lawyers are to be understood which deny the obligation of the Law of Nature But however conscience binds the offender over to answer at a higher tribunal before which all such offences shall be punished Thus then we see no positive humane Law can dispence with or dissolve the obligation of thâ— Law of nature Much lesse Secondly can we suppose any positive Divine Law should For although Gods power be immense and infinite to do what pleaseth him yet we must always suppose this power to be conjoyned with goodnesse else it is no divine power and therefore posse malum non est posse it is no power but weakness to do evil and without this posse malum there can be no alteration made in the nature of good and evil which must be supposed if the obligation of the natural Law be dispensed with Therefore it was well said by Origen when Câ—lsus objected it as the common speech of
of the Magistrate though he is not subject to the power of the Ministers yet both as a Christian and as a Magistrate he is subject to the Word of God and is to be guided by that in the Administration of his Function So on the other side in a Minister of the Gospel there are these things considerable the Object of his Function the Function its self the Liberty of exercising it and the Person who doth exercise it As for the Object of this Function the Word and Sacraments these are not subject to the Civil Power being setled by a Law of Christ but then for the Function its self that may be considered either in the Derivation of it or in the Administration of it As for the derivation of the power and authority of the Function that is from Christ who hath setled and provided by Law that there shall be such a standing Function to the end of the world with such authority belonging to it But for the Administration of the Function two things belong to the Magistrate First to provide and take care for due administration of it anâ— to see that the Ministers preach the true Doctrine though he cannot lawfully forbid the true Doctrine to be taught and that they duly administer the Sacraments though he cannot command them to administer them otherwise then Christ hath delivered them down to us This for due Administration Secondly in case of male-administration of his Function or scandal rendring him unfit for it it is in the Magistrates power if not formally to depose yet to deprive them of the liberty of ever exercising their Function within his Dominions as Solomâ—n did Abiathar and Iustinian Sylverius as Constantius did Vigilius For the liberty of exercise of the Function is in the Magistrates power though a right to exercise it be derived from the same power from which the Authority belonging to the Function was conveyed And then lastly as to the persons exercising this Function it is evident As they are members of a Civil Society as well as others so they are subject to the same Civil Laws as others are Which as it is expresly affirmed by Chrysostom on Rom. 13. 1. Let every Soul be subject to the Higher Powers that is saith he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Be he an Apostle Evangelist Prophet Priest Monk be he who he will So it is fully largely irrefragably proved by our Writers against the Papists especially by the learned Is. Casaubon in his piece de libertate Ecclesiasticâ So then we see what a fair amicable and mutual aspect these two powers have one upon another when rightly understood being far from clashing one with the other either by a subjection of the Civil Power to the Ecclesiastical or the Civil powers swallowing up and devouring the peculiarity of the Ministerial Function And upon these grounds I suppose Beza and Erastus may as to this shake hands So that the Magistrate do not usurp the Ministerial Function which Videlius calls Papatus politicus nor the Ministers subject the Civil power to them which is Papatus Ecclesiasticus Thirdly we distinguish between an absolute Architectonical and Nomothetical Power independent upon any other Law and a Legislative Power absolute as to persons but regulated by a Higher Law The former we attribute to none but God the latter belongs to a Supreme Magistrate in reference to things belonging to his power either in Church or Commonwealth By an Architectonical Nomothetical Power we mean that power which is distinguished from that which is properly call'd Political The former lies in the making Laws for the good of the Commonwealth the latter in a due execution and administration of those Laws for the Common Good This we have asserted to the Magistrate already We now come to assert the other where we shall first set down the bounds of this power and then see to whom it belongs First then we say not that the Magistrate hath a power to revoke repâ—al or alter any Divine positive Law which we have already shewn Secondly we say not that the Magistrate by his own will may constitute what new Laws he please for the Worship of God This was the fault of Ieroboam who made Israel to sin and therefore by the Rule of Reason must be supposed to sin more himself So likewise Ahab Ahaz and others Religion is a thing setled by a Divine Law and as it is taken for the Doctrine and Worship of God so it is contained in the Word of God and must be fetched wholly from thence But then thirdly The Magistrate by his power may make that which is a Divine Law already become the Law of the Land Thus Religion may be incorporated among our Laws and the Bible become our Magna Charta So the first Law in the Codex Theod. is about the believing the Trinity and many others about Religion are inserted into it Now as to these things clearly revealed in the Word of God and withall commanded by the Civil Magistrate although the primary obligation to the doing them is from the former determination by a Divine Law yet the Sanction of them by the Civil Magistrate may cause a further obligation upon Conscience then was before and may add punishments and rewards not expressed before For although when two Laws are contrary the one to the other the obligation to the Higher Law takes away the obligation to the other yet when they are of the same Nature or subordinate one to the other there may a New Obligation arise from the same Law enacted by a New Authority As the Commands of the Decalogue brought a New Obligation upon the Consciences of the Jews though the things contained in them were commanded before in the Law of Nature And as a Vow made by a man adds a new â—ye to his Conscience when the matter of his Vow is the same with what the Word of God commands and renewing our Covenant with God after Baptism renews our Obligation So when the Faith of the Gospel becomes the Law of a Nation men are bound by a double Cord of duty to entertain and profess that Faith Fourthly in matters undetermined by the Word concerning the External Polity of the Church of God the Magistrate hath the power of determining things so they be agreeable to the Word of God This last Clause is that which binds the Magistrates power that it is not absolutely Architectonicall because all his Laws must be regulated by the generall rules of the Divine Law But though it be not as to Laws yet I say it is as to persons that is that no other persons have any power to make Laws binding men to obedience but only the civil Magistrate This is another part of the Controversie between the Civil and Ecclesiastical Power about the power of determining matters belonging to the Churches Government But there is here no such breach between those two but what may be made up with a distinction or
two We distinguish then between a power declarative of the obligation of former Laws and a power authoritative determining a New Obligation between the office of counselling and advising what is fit to be done and a power determining what shall be done between the Magistrates duty of consulting in order to the doing it and his deriving his authority for the doing it These things premised I say First that the power of declaring the obligation of former Laws and of consulting and advising the Magistrate for setling of New Laws for the Policy of the Church belongs to the Pastors and Governours of the Church of God This belongs to them as they are commanded to teach what Christ hath commanded them but no authority thereby given to make new Laws to bind the Church but rather a tying them up to the commands of Christ already laid down in his Word For a power to bind mens consciences to their determinations lodged in the Officers of the Church must be derived either from a Law of God giving them this right or else only from the consent of parties For any Law of God there is none produced with any probability of reason but that Obey those that are over you in the Lord. But that implies no more then submitting to the Doctrine and Discipline of the Gospel and to those whom Christ hath constituted as Pastors of his Church wherein the Law of Christ doth require obedience to them that is in looking upon them and owning them in their relation to them as Pastors But that gives them no authority to make any new Laws or Constitutions binding mens consciences any more then a Command from the Supreme authority that inferiour Magistrates should be obeyed doth imply any power in them to make new Laws to bind them But thus far I acknowledge a binding power in Ecclesiastical Constitutions though they neither bind by virtue of the matter nor of the authority commanding there being no legislative power lodged in the Church yet in respect of the circumstances and the end they should be obey'd unlesse I judge the thing unlawfull that is commanded rather then manifest open contempt of the Pastors of the Church or being a scandall to others by it But as to the other power arising from mutual compact and consent of Parties I acknowledge a power to bind all included under that compact not by vertue of any Supream binding power in them but from the free consent of the parties submitting which is most agreeable to the Nature of Church-power being not coactive but directive and such was the confederate discipline of the primitive Church before they had any Christian Magistrate And thence the decrees of Councils were call'd Canons and not Laws Secondly Though it be the Magistrates duty to consult with the Pastors of the Church to know what is most agreeable to the Word of God for the settlement of the Church yet the Magistrate doth not derive his authority in commanding things from their sentence decree and judgement but doth by vertue of his own power cause the obligation of men to what is so determin'd by his own enacting what shall be done in the Church The great use of Synods and Assemblies of Pastors of Churches is to be as the Council of the Church unto the King in matters belonging to the Church as the Parliament is for matters of civil concernment And as the King for the settling civil Laws doth take advice of such persons who are most versed in matters of Law so by proportion of reason in matters concerning the Church they are the fittest Council who have been the most versed in matters immediately belonging to the Church In the management of which affairs as much if not more prudence experience judgement moderation is requisite as in the greatest affairs of State For we have found by dolefull experience that if a fire once catch the Church and Aarons Bells ring backward what a Combustion the whole State is suddenly put into and how hardly the Churches Instruments for quenching such fires lachrymae preces Ecclesiae do attain their end The least peg serued up too high in the Church soon causeth a great deal of discord in the State and quickly puts mens spirits out of Tune Whereas many irregularities may happen in the State and men live in quietnesse and peace But if Phaâ—tons dâ—ive the Chariot of the Sun the World wil be soon on fire I mean such in the Church whose brains like the Unicorns run out into the length of the Horn Such who have more fury then zeal and yet more zeal then knowledge or Moderation Persons therefore whose calling â—temper office and experience hath best acquainted them with the State-actions Policy of the primitive Church and the incomparable Prudence and Moderation then Used are fittest to debate consult deliberate and determine about the safest expedients for repairing breaches in a divided broken distracted Church But yet I say when such men thus assembled have gravely and maturely advised and deliberated what is best and fitted to te done the force strength and obligation of the things so determin'd doth depend upon the power and authority of the Civil Magistrate for taking the Church as incorporated into the civill state as Ecclesia est in republicâ non respublica in Ecclesia according to that known speech of Optatus Milivetanus so though the object of these constitutions and the persons determining them and the matter of them be Ecclesiasticall yet the force and ground of the obligation of them is wholly civill So Peter Martyr expresly Nam quod ad potestatem Ecclesiasticam attinet satis est civilis Magistratus is enim â—urare debet ut omnes officium faciant But for the judgement of the reformed Divines about this see Vedelius de Episcopatis Constant. M Officium Magistratus Christiani annexed to Grotius de Imper. c. I therefore proceed to lay down the reason of it First That whereby we are bound either to obedience or penalty upon disobedience is the ground of the obligation but it is upon the account of the Magistrates power that we are either bound to obedience or to submit to penalties upon disobedience For it is upon the account of our general obligation to the Magistrate that we are bound to obey any particular Laws or Constitutions Because it is not the particular determinations made by the civil Magistrate which do immediately bind Conscience but the general Law of Scripture requires it as a duty from us to obey the Magistrate in all things lawfull Obedience to the Magistrate is due immediately from Conscience but obedience to the Laws of the Magistrate comes not directly from Conscience but by vertue of the general obligation And therefore disobedience to the Magistrates Laws is an immediate sin against Conscience because it is against the general obligation but obedience to particular Laws ariseth not immediately from the obligation of Conscience to
them in particular but to the Magistrate in general So that in things left lawfull and undetermin'd by the Word where there ariseth no obligation from the matter it must arise from our subjection and relation to the Magistrate and what is the ground of obedience is the cause of the obligation Secondly He hath only the power of obligations who hath the power of making Sanctions to those Laws By Sanctions I mean here in the sense of the civil Law eas legum partes quibus poenas constituimus adversus eos qui contra leges fecerint those parts of the Law which determine the punishments of the violaters of it Now it is evident that he only hath power to oblige who hath power to punish upon disobedience And it is as evident that none hath power to punish but the civill Magistrate I speak of legall penalties which are annexed to such Laws as concern the Church Now there being no coercive or coactive power belonging to the Church as such all the force of such Laws as respect the outward Polity of the Church must be derived from the civill Magistrate Thirdly He who can null and declare all other obligations void done without his power hath the only power to oblige For whatsoever destroys a former obligation must of necessity imply a power to oblige because I am bound to obey him in the abstaining from that I was formerly obliged to But this power belongs to the Magistrate For suppose in some indifferent Rites and Ceremonies the Church representative that is the Governors of it pro tempore do prescribe them to be observed by all the Supreme power fâ—rbids the doing of those things if this doth not null the former supposed obligation I must inevitably run upon these absurdities First that there are two supreme powers in a Nation at the same time Secondly that a man may lie under two different Obligations as to the same thing he is bound to do it by one power and not to do it by the other Thirdly the same action may be a duty and a sin a duty in obeying the one power a sin in disobeying the other Therefore there can be but one power to oblige which is that of the Supreme Magistrate Having thus far asserted the Magistrates due power and Authority as to matters of Religion we proceed to examine the extent of this power in determining things left at liberty by the Word of God in order to the Peace and Government of the Church For our clear and distinct proceeding I shall ascend by these three steps First to shew that there are some things left undetermined by the Word Secondly that these things are capable of positive Determinations and Restraint Thirdly that there are some bounds and limits to be observed in the stating and determining these things First That there are some things left undetermined by the Word By Determining here I do not mean determining whether things be lawful or no for so there is no Ritâ— or Ceremony whatsoever but is determined by the Scripture in that sense or may be gathered from the application of particular actions to the general Rules of Scripture but by Determining I mean whether all things concerning the Churches Polity and Order be determined as Duties or no viz. that this we are bound to observe and the other not As for instance what time manner method gesture habit be used in preaching the Word whether Baptism must be by dipping or sprinkling at what day time place the Child shall be baptized and other things of a like Nature with these Those who assert any of these as duties must produce necessarily the Command making them to be so For Duty and Command have a necessary respect and relation to one another If no Command be brought it necessarily follows that they are left at liberty So as to the Lords Supper Calvin saith whether the Communicants take the Bread themselves or receive it being given them whether they should give the Cup into the hands of the Deacon or to their next Neighbour whether the Bread be leavened or not the Wine red or white nihil refert it matters not Haec indifferentia sunt in Ecclesiae libertate posita they are matters of indifferency and are left to the Churches liberty But this matter of Indifferency is not yet so clear as it is generally thought to be we shall therefore bare the ground a little by some necessary distinctions to see where the root of indifferency lies Which we shall the rather do because it is strongly asserted by an Honourable person that there is no Indifferency in the things themselves which are still either unlawful or necessary if lawful at this time in these circumstances but all indifferency lies in the darkness and shortness of our understandings which may make some things seem so to us But that Honourable person clearly runs upon a double mistake First that Indifferency is a medium participationis of both extremes and not only negationis viz. that as intermediate colours partake both of black and white and yet are neither so in morality between good and bad there is an intermediate entity which is neither but indifferent to either Whereas the Nature of Indifferency lies not in any thing intermediate between good and bad but in some thing undetermined by Divine Laws as to the necessity of it so that if we speak as to the extremes of it it is something lying between a necessary duty and an intrinsecal evil The other mistake is that throughout that Discourse he takes Indifferency as Circumstantiated in Individual actions and as the morality of the action is determined by its Circumstances whereas the proper notion of Indifferency lies in the Nature of the action considered in its self abstractly and so these things are implyed in an indifferent action First absolute undetermination as to the general nature of the act by a Divine Law that God hath left it free for men to do it or no. Secondly that one part hath not more propension to the Rule then the other for if the doing of it comes nearer to the rule then the omission or on the contrary this action is not wholly indifferent Thirdly that neither part hath any repugnancy to the Rule for that which hath so is so far from being indifferent that it becomes unlawful So that an indifferent action is therein like the Iron accosted by two Loadstones on either side of equal virtue and so hovers in medio inclining to neither but supposing any degree of virtue added to the one above the other it then inclines towards it or as the Magnetical Needle about the Azores keeps its self directly parallel to the Axis of the world without variation because it is supposed then to be at an equal distance from the two Great Magnets the Continents of Europe and America But no sooner is it removed from thence but it hath its variations So indifferency taken in
reason they that hold any one posture at receiving the Lords Supper necessary as sitting leaning kneeling do all equally destroy their own Christian-liberty as to these things which are undetermined by the Word So a Magistrate when commanding matters of Christian-liberty if in the preface to the Law he declares the thing necessary to be done in its self and therefore he commands it he takes away as much as in him lyes our Christian-liberty And in that case we ought to hold to that excellent Rule of the Apostle Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath set you free and be not intangled again with the yoke of bondage But if the Magistrate declare the things to be in themselves indifferent but only upon some prudent considerations for peace and order he requires persons to observe them though this brings a necessity of obedience to us yet it takes not away our Christian-liberty For an antecedent necessity expressed in the Law as a learned and excellent Casuist of our own observes doth not necessarily require the assent of the practical judgement to it which takes away our liberty of judgement or our judgement of the liberty of the things but a consequentiall necessity upon a command supposed doth only imply an act of the Will whereby the freedom of judgement and conscience remaining it is inclined to obedience to the commands of a superior Law Now that liberty doth lye in the freedom of Judgement and not in the freedom of Practise and so is consistent with the restraint of the exercise of it appears both in the former case of scandall and in the actions of the Apostles and primitive Christians complying with the Jews in matters of liberty yea which is a great deal more in such ceremonies of which the Apostle expresly saith that if they observed them Christ would profit them Nothing and yet we find Paul himself circumcising Timothy because of the Jews Certainly then however these ceremonies are supposed to be not only mortuae but mortiferae now the Gospel was preached and the Law of Christian-liberty promulged yet Paul did not look upon it as the taking away his liberty at any time when it would prevent scandall among the Jews and tend to the furtherance of the Gospel to use any of them It was therefore the opinion of the necessity of them was it which destroyed Christian-liberty and therefore it is observable that where the opinion of the necessity of observing the Judaicall Rites and Ceremonies was entertained the Apostle sets himself with his whole strength to oppose them as he doth in his Epistles to the Galatians and Colossians Whom yet we find in other places and to other Churches not leaven'd with this doctrine of the necessity of Judaicall Rites very ready to comply with weak Brethren as in his Epistles to the Romans and Corinthians From which we plainly see that it was not the bare doing of the things but the doing them with an opinion of the necessity of them is that which infringeth Christian-liberty and not the determination of one part above the other by the Supream Magistrate when it is declared not to be for any opinion of the things themselves as necessary but to be only in order to the Churches peace and unity Secondly It appears that Liberty is consistent with the restraint of the exercise of it because the very power of restraining the exercise of it doth suppose it to be a matter of liberty and that both antecedently and consequentially to that restraint Antecedently so it is apparent to be a matter of liberty else it was not capable of being restrained Consequentially in that the ground of observance of those things when restrained is not any necessity of the matter or the things themselves but only the necessity of obeying the Magistrate in things lawfull and undertermin'd by the Word which leads to another argument Thirdly Mens obligation to these things as to the ground of it being only in point of contempt and scandall argues that the things are matter of liberty still I grant the Magistrates authority is the ground of obedience but the ground of the Magistrates command is only in point of contempt and scandall and for preserving order in the Church For I have already shewed it to be unlawfull either to command or obey in reference to these things from any opinion of the necessity of them and therefore the only ground of observing them is to shew that we are not guilty of contempt of the power commanding them nor of scandall to others that are offended at our not observing them Tota igitur religio est in fugiendo scandalo vitando contemptu saith our learned Whitaker All our ground of obedience is the avoiding scandall and contempt of authority To the same purpose Pet. Martyr speaking of the obligation of Ecclesiasticall Laws Non obstringunt si removeatur contemptus scandalum So that non-observance of indifferent things commanded when there there is no apparent contempt or scandall do not involve a man in the guilt of sin as suppose a Law made that all publike prayer be performed kneeling if any thing lies in a mans way to hinder him from that posture in this case the man offends not because there is no contempt or scandall So if a Law were made that all should receive the Lords Supper fasting if a mans health calls for somwhat to refresh him before he sins not in the breach of that Law And therefore it is observable which Whitaker takes notice of in the Canons of the Councils of the primitive Church that though they did determine many things belonging to the externall Polity of the Church yet they observed this difference in their Censures or Anathema's That in matteâ—s of meer order and decency they never pronounced an Anathema but with the supposition of â—ppâ—rent contempt and inserted Si quis contrà praesumpserit si quis contumaciter contrà fecerit but in matters of Doctrine or Life fully determin'd by the Law of God they pronounced a simple Anathema without any such clause inserted Now from this we may take notice of a difference between Laws concerning indifferencies in civill and Ecclesiastical matters That in civils the Laws bind to indifferencies without the case of contempt or scandall because in these the publike good is aimed aâ— of which every private person is not fit to judge and therefore it is our duty either to obey or suffer but in Ecclesiasticall constitution only peace and order is that which is looked at and therefore Si nihil contra 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 feceris non teneris illis is the rule here If nothing tending to apparent disorder be done men break not those Laws For the end and reason of a Law is the measure of its obligation Fourthly Mens being left free to do the things forbidden either upon a repeal of the former Laws or when a man is from under
thing in reference to religious Societies which Nature dictates is That all things either pertaining to the immediate worship of God or belonging to the Government of that Society be performed with the greatest solemnity and decency that may be Which dictate ariseth from the nature of the things themselves which being most grave and serious do require the greatest gravity and seriousnesse in the doing of them And therefore any Ceremonies Actions or Gestures which tend to the discomposing mens Spirits are upon that account to be exploded out of any religious Societies as being so directly repugnant to the Nature design and performance of religious duties Wherefore that is the standing Rule of all instituted Ceremonies by the Law of Nature in the Worship of God that they be such as tend immediately to the advancing the serenity tranquillity and composure of their minds who observe them and not such which in their own nature or by continuall custome of the users of them do either rarifie mens spirits too much into a superficiall lightnesse and vanity of spirit or elâ—e sink them too much below the command of reason into the power of unruly passions A clear and composed spirit is only fit for converse with things of so high a Nature That Region which is nearest Heaven is the freest from clouds and vapours as well as those dancing Meteors which hover about in a light uncertain motion It strangely unbecomes the Majesty of religious worship to have any thing vulgar triviall much more ridiculous in it The Worship of God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a rationall worship as well in regard of that real on which should moderate and govern the manner of service as in regard of those faculties which should be most â—mployed in it or the foundation which the service hath upon the dictates of mens naturall reason And as Nature tells us there should be nothing too light or superficiall so neither any thing whereby men are carried beyond the bounds of their own reason For what men do at such a time is not their own proper act but is more properly to be ascribed to the power strength and excess of a Melancholy fancy or else to a higher Enthusiasticall spirit which then actuates and informs their sancies And therefore it hath been well observed as a Characteristicall difference between the true Propheticall spirit and the false and counterfeit that the one leaves men in the free use of their reason and faculties the other alienates them by Panick fears tremblings and consternations both of body and mind To which purpose many evidences are brought by a late learned Writer in his Discourse of Prophecy out of the Heathen and Christian Authors These latter discovering the vanity of the Montanisticall spirit by this one observation which besides the Authors there cited viz. Clemens Alexandrinus Miltiades in Eusebius Ierom and Chrysostome may appear from Epiphanius who largely and excellently discourseth on this Subject when he discovers the folly of Montanus and his followers And gives this reason why they could be no true Prophets for those that were so had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A great consistency of sense reason and discourse and instanceth in Isaiah and Ezekiel for saith he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A true Prophet had alwayes the free use of his reason and faculties and spake from the spirit of God with consistency and coherence of Discourse But it was quite otherwise with the Mâ—ntanists 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They were alwayes trembling both in body and mind used no consequence of reason in discourse their words had no proper sense but were all dark intricate and obscure An exact description of a late prevailing Sect among us who have their names from those consternations they were wont to fall into and whose language carries as much obscurity with it as any of the followers of Montanus could wrap up theirs into Only instead of Montanus his Paraclete they tell us of a Light within whose office is much of the same nature with the other And one of the great errours of Montanus was the adhering to Enthusiasms and revelations beyond and beside the written Word which is the Helena of our late Opinionists because it gives a liberty for venting any conceptions of their own brains under the pretence and disguise of a Light within But we see hence how far such tremblings and consternations of body and mind are from a true sober Prophetick spirit and how those Christians who lived in the time when the Spirit of Propheâ—y had not yet left the Church of Christ as appears by Origen Tertullian and others yet they alwayes looked upon any violent extasie or fury as an evidence of a false Prophet And therefore Tertullian when grown a Proselyte of Montanus endeavours strongly to remove that apprehension of the exstaticall fury of Montanus and Prisca and Maximilla granting if it were true that it was a mark of a false and counterfeit prophetical spirit The true Prophets I grant of old were by the strength of the impression of their visions upon their Animal spirits sometimes thrown into a fit of trembling but then it was not continually so and when it was it might be rather a prefent astonishment from so strange and unwonted sight as is common in such cases or else from the strong apprehension they had of the dismall judgements God threatned to the people but however it never took from them the free use of their reason and faculties which were alwayes conversant about the matters reveased unto them But as Prooâ—pius Gazâ—â—â— observes of the false Prophets 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they were acted like mad mâ—â— Which he takes notice of upon occassion oâ— Saâ—â—â— propheâ—ying when the evil spirit came upon him and interprets with the Jewish Writers of a madnesse rather then true Prophecy Such as that of Cassandra when she is brought in by Lycophron 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Utt'ring a strange confused noise Much like unto black Sphinx's voice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith Tzâ—tzes that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is fully described by Lucan of one pretending Enthusiasm sub pectore ficta quiâ—to Verba refert nullo confus a murmure vociâ— Instinctam sacro mentem testata furore And soon after non rupta trementi Verba sono nec vox antri complere capacis Sufficiens spatium Whereby he discovers her not to be a true Enthusiast because she used not such a strange confused voice and tremblings as they did who were their proper Enthusiasts as the Sybils and the Pythian prophetess By this we see that these Earthquakes of violent passions are caused by the Prince of the ayr and not by the gentle breathings of the Divine Spirit That these convulsions of mens spirits are not the consequents of the inhabitation of the good Spirit but of the violent intrusion of the evil one That that temper
comparison of Christ with Moses from the equal necessity of forms of Government now which there is for other Societies from the perfection and sufficiency of the Scriptures all other arguments are reducible to these three Heads Of these in their order First From the comparison of Christ with Moses they argue thus If Moses was faithfull in his house as a servant much more Christ as a Son now Moses appointed a particular form of Government for the Church under the old Testament therefore Christ did certainly lay down a form of Church Government for the New Testament To this I answer first Faithfulnesse implyes the discharge of a trust reposed in one by another so that it is said vers 2. he was faithful to him that appointed him Christs faithfulnesse then lay in discharging the Work which his Father laid upon him which was the Work of mediation between God and us and therefore the comparison is here Instituted between Moses as typical Mediator and Christ as the true Mediator that as Moses was faithfull in his Work so was Christ in his Now Moses his faithfulnesse lay in keeping close to the Pattern received in the Mount that is observing the commands of God Now therefore if Christs being faithfull in his office doth imply the setling any one form of Goverment in the Church it must be made appear that the serling of this form was part of Christs Mediatory Work and that which the Father commanded him to do as Mediator and that Christ received such a form from the Father for the Christian Church as Moses did for the Jewish To this it is said That the Government is laid upon Christs shoulders and all power in his hands and therefore it belongs to him as Mediatour Christ I grant is the King of the Church and doth govern it outwardly by his Laws and inwardly by the conduct of his Spirit but shall we say that therefore any one form of Government is necessary which is neither contained in his Laws nor dictated by his Spirit the main original of mistakes here is the confounding the external and internal Government of the Church of Christ and thence whensoever men read of Christs power authority and government they fancy it refers to the outward Government of the Church of God which is intended of his internal Mediatory power over the hearts and consciences of men But withall I acknowledge that Christ for the better government of his Church and people hath appointed Officers in his Church invested them by vertue of his own power with an authority to preach and baptize and administer all Gospel-Ordinances in his own Name that is by his authority for it is clearly made known to us in the Word of God that Christ hath appointed these things But then whether any shall succeed the Apostles in superiority of power over Presbyters or all remain governing the Church in an equality of power is nowhere determined by the Will of Christ in Scripture which contains his Royal Law and therefore we have no reason to look upon it as any thing flowing from the power and authority of Christ as Mediator and so not necessarily binding Christians Secondly I answer If the correspondency between Christ and Moses in their work doth imply an equal exactnesse in Christs disposing of every thing in his Church as Moses did among the Jews then the Church of Christ must be equally bound to all circumstances of Worship as the Jews were For there was nothing appertaining in the least to the Worship of God but was fully set down even to the pins of the Tabernacle in the Law of Moses but we find no such thing in the Gospel The main Duties and Ordinances are prescribed indeed but their circumstances and manner of performance are left as matters of Christian-liberty and only couched under some general Rules which is a great difference between the legal and Gospel-state Under the Law all Ceremonies and Circumstances are exactly prescribed but in the Gospel we read of some general Rules of direction for Christians carriage in all circumstantial things These four especially contain all the directions of Scripture concerning Circumstantials All things to be done decently and in order All to be done for edification Give no offence Do all to the glory of God So that the particular circumstances are left to Christian-liberty with the observation of general Rules It is evident as to Baptism and the Lords Supper which are unquestionably of divine Institution yet as to the circumstances of the administration of them how much lesse circumstantial is Christ then Moses was As to circumcision and the pass-over under the Law the age time persons manner place form all fully set down but nothing so under the Gospel Whether Baptism shall be administred to Infants or no is not set down in expresse words but left to be gathered by Analogy and consequences what manner it shall be administred in whether by dipping or sprinkling is not absolutely determined what form of words to be used whether in the name of all three persons or sometimes in the Name of Christ only as in the Acts we read if that be the sense and not rather in Christs Name i. e. by Christs authority Whether sprinkling or dipping shall be thrice as some Churches use it or only once as others These things we see relating to an Ordinance of Divine Institution are yet past over without any expresse command determining either way in Scripture So as to the Lords Supper What persons to be admitted to it whether all visible professors or only sincere Christians upon what terms whether by previous examination of Church-officers or by an open profession of their faith or else only by their own tryal of themselves required of them as their duty by their Ministers whether it should be alwayes after Supper as Christ himself did it whether taking fasting or after meat whether kneeling or sitting or leaning Whether to be consecrated in one form of words or several These things are not thought fit to be determined by any positive command of Christ but left to the exercise of Christian-liberty the like is as to preaching the Word publike Prayer singing of Psalmes the duties are required but the particular Modes are left undetermined The case is the same as to Church-governwent That the Church be governed and that it be governed by its proper Officers are things of Divine appointment but whether the Church should be governed by many joyning together in an equality or by Subordination of some persons to others is left to the same liberty which all other Circumstances are this being not the Substance of the thing it self but onely the manner of performance of it 3. I answer That there is a manifest disparity between the Gospel and Jewish state and therefore Reasons may be given why all Punctilioes were determined then which are not now as 1. The perfection and
and the sense of the names must neither be fetched from the custome now used nor from the Etymologie of the word but from the undoubted practice of Apostolical times if that can be made appear what it was Which will be best done if we can once find out what course and order the Apostles took in the forming and modelling the Churches by them planted That which we lay then as a foundation whereby to clear what Apostolical practice was is that the Apostles in the forming Churches did observe the customes of the Jewish Synagogues Totum regimen Ecclesiarum Christi conformatum fuit ad Synagogarum exemplar saith Grotius truly Praesides curatores Ecclesiarum ad instar Presbyterorum Synagogae Iudaicae constitutos fuisse constat as Salmasius often affirms In which sense we understand that famous speech of the Author of the Commentary on St. Pauls Epistles which goes under the name of Ambrose but now judged by most to be done by Hilary a Deacon of the Church of Rome under which name St. Augustine quotes some words on the fifth to the Romanes which are found still in those Commentaries Nam apud omnes utique gentes honorabilis est senectus unde Synagoga postea Ecclesia Seniores habuit sine quorum consilio nihil agebatur in Ecclesiâ which words are not to be understood of a distinct sort of Presbyters from such as were employed in preaching the Word but of such Presbyters as were the common Council of the Church for the moderating and ruling the affairs of it which the Church of Christ had constituted among them as the Jewish Synagogue had before And from hence we observe that the Ebionites who blended Judaism and Christianity together whence Ierome saith of them Dum volent Iudai esse Christiani nec Iudaei sunt nec Christiani they made a Linsey-woolsey Religion which was neither Iudaism nor Christianity These as Epiphanius tells us called their publike Meeting-place 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Pastors of their Churches 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thereby implying the resemblance and Analogy between the form of Government in both of them But this will best be made appear by comparing them both together For which we are to take notice how much our Saviour in the New Testament did delight to take up the received practices among the Jews only with such alterations of them as were suitable to the Nature and Doctrine of Christianity as hath been abundantly manifested by many learned men about the Rites of the Lords Supper taken from the post-coenium among the Jews the use of Baptism from the Baptism used in initiating Proselytes Excommunication from their putting out of the Synagogue As to which things it may be observed that those Rites which our Saviour transplanted into the Gospel-soyl were not such as were originally founded on Moses his Law but were introduced by a confederate Discipline among themselves And thus it was in reference to the government of the Synagogues among them for although the reason of erecting them was grounded on a command in the Levitical Law Levit. 23. 3. where holy Convocations are required upon the Sabbath-dayes yet the building of Synagogues in the Land was not as far as we can find till a great while after For although Moses require the duty of assembling yet he prescribes no orders for the place of meeting nor for the manner of spending those dayes in Gods service nor for the persons who were to super-intend the publike worship performed at that time These being duties of a moral nature are left more undetermined by Moses his Law which is most punctual in the Ceremonial part of Divine Service And therefore even then when God did determine the positives of Worship we see how much he left the performance of morals to the wisdom and discretion of Gods people to order them in a way agreeable to the mind and will of God We shall not here discourse of the more elder Customs and observations of the Synagogues but take the draught of them by the best light we can about our Saviours time when the Apostles copyed out the Government of Christian-Churches by them About the time of Christ we find Synagogues in very great request among the Jews God so disposing it that the moral part of his service should be more frequented now the Ceremonial was expiring and by those places so erected it might be more facile and easie for the Apostles to disperse the Gospel by preaching it in those places to which it was the custome for the people to resort And as Paul at Athens observing the Altar inscribed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To the unknown God takes his Text from thence and begins to preach God and Christ to them so the Apostles in every Synagogue meet with a Copy of the Law from whence they might better take their rise to discover him who was the end of the Law for Righteousness to all that believe For Moses of old time hath in every City them that Preach him being read in the Synagogues every Sabbath day It was their constant custome then every Sabbath day to have the Law publickly read for which every Synagogue was furnished with a most exact Copy which was looked upon as the great Treasure and Glory of their Synagogue in the Copying out of which the greatest care and diligence was used In their Synagogues they read onely the Law and the Prophets the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Hagiographa were not ordinarily read in publick the Law for the more convenient reading it was distributed into fifty four Sections which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every week one Section being read joyning twice two lesser Sections together the whole Law was read through once every year But here I cannot say that the Jews were absolutely bound up to read the several Sections appointed for the dayes as it is commonly thought from which Paraschae and the times prefixed of reading them Cloppenburgh fetched a new Interpretation of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is that the first Sabbath was that of the civil year which began with the Section 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upon the twenty fourth of the month Tisri but the second Sabbath after the first was the first Sabbath of the sacred Year which began with the Section 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upon the Calends of Nisan but I doe not see any such Evidence of so exact and curious a Division of the several Sections so long since as the time of our Saviour is which appears by our Saviours reading in the Synagogue at Nazareth where it seems he read after the Synagogue custome as one of the seven called out by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to read before the people but we find no Section assigned him by him that delivered the book to him the Office of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but it is said of him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
understanding of the truth and certainty of Christian Religion For when once the mind of any rational man is so far wrought upon by the influence of the Divine Spirit as to discover the most rational and undoubted evidences which there are of the truth of Christianity he is presently obliged to profess Christ openly to worship him solemnly to assemble with others for instruction and participation of Gospel Ordinances and thence it follows that there is an antecedent Obligation upon Conscience to associate with others and consequently to consent to be governed by the Rulers of the Society which he enters into So that this submission to the power of Church Officers in the exercise of Discipline upon Offenders is implyed in the very conditions of Christianity and the solemn professing and undertaking of it 2. It were impossible any Society should be upheld if it be not laid by the founder of the Society as the necessary Duty of all members to undergo the penalties which shall be inflicted by those who have the care of governing that Society so they be not contrary to the Laws Nature and Constitution of it Else there would be no provision made for preventing divisions and confusions which will happen upon any breach made upon the Laws of the Society Now this Obligation to submission to censures doth speak something antecedentaly to the confederation although the expression of it lies in the confederation its self By this I hope we have made it evident that it is nothing else but a mistake in those otherwise Learned persons who make the power of censures in the Christian Church to be nothing else but a Lex confederata Disciplinae whereas this power hath been made appear to be deâ—ived from a higher Original than the meer Arbitrary consent of the several members of the Church associating together And how farre the examples of the Synagogues under the Law are from reaching that of Christian Churches in reference to this because in these the power is conveyed by the Founder of the Society and not left to any arbitrary constitutions as it was among the Iews in their Synagogues It cannot be denied but consent is supposed and confederation necessary in order to Church power but that is rather in regard of the exercise then the original of it For although I affirm the original of thiâ— power to be of Divine Institution yet in order to the exercise of it in reference to particular persons who are not mentioned in the Charter of the power its self it is necessary that the persons on whom it is exerted should declare their consent and submission either by words or actions to the Rules and Orders of this Society Having now proved that the Power of the Church doth not arise from meer consent of parties the next grand Inquiry is concerning the extent of this power Whether it doth reach so far as to Excommunication For some men who will not seem wholly to deny all power in the Church over Offenders nor that the Church doth subsist by Divine Institution yet do wholly deny any such power as that of Excommunication and seem rather to say that Church-Officers may far more congrâ—ously to their Office inflict any other mulct upon Offenders then exclude them from participation of Communion with others in the Ordinances and Sacraments of the Gospel In order therefore to the clearing of this I come to the third Proposition That the power which Christ hath given to the Officers of his Church doth extend to the exclusion of contumacious Offenders from the priviledges which this Society enjoyes In these terms I rather choose to fix it then in those crude expressions wherein Erastus and some of his followers would state the question and some of their imprudent adversaries have accepted it viz. Whether Church Officers have power to exclude any from the Eucharist ob moralem impuritatem And the reasons why I wave those terms are 1. I must confess my self yet unsatisfied as to any convincing Argument whereby it can be proved that any were denyed admission to the Lords Supper who were admitted to all other parts of Church-Society and owned as members in them I cannot yet see any particular Reason drawn from the Nature of the Lords-Supper above all other parts of Divine worship which should confine the censures of the Church meerly to that Ordinance and so to make the Eucharist bear the same Office in the Body of the Church which our new Anatomists tell us the parenchyme of the Liver doth in the natural Body viz. to be colâ—â—â— sanguinis to serve as a kind of strainer to separate the more gross and faeculent parts of the Blood from the more pure and spirituous so the Lord's Supper to strain out the more impure members of the Church from the more Holy and Spiritual My judgement then is that Excommunication relates immediately to the cutting a person off from Communion with the Churches visible Society constituted upon the ends it is but because Communion iâ— not visibly discerned but in Administration and Participation of Gospel Ordinances therefore Exclusion doth chiefly referre to these and because the Lords Supper is one of the highest privilledges which the Church enjoyes therefore it stands to reason that censures should begin there And in that sense suspension from the Lords Supper of persons apparently unworthy may be embraced as a prudent lawful and convenient abatement of the greater penalty of Excommunication and so to stand on the same general grounds that the other doth for Qui pâ—test majus potest etiam minus which will hold as well in moral as natural power iâ— there be no prohibition to the contrary nor peculiar Reason as to the one more then to the oâ—her 2. I dislike the terms ob moralem impuritatem on this account Because I suppose they were taken up by Erastus and from him by others as the Controversie was managed concerning Excommunication among the Iâ—wes viz. whether it were â—meerly because of Ceremonial or else likewise because of moral impurity As to which I must ingenuously acknowledge Erastus hath very much the advantage of his adversaries clearly proving that no persons under the Law were excluded the Temple Worship because of moral impurity But then withall I think he hath gained little advantage to his cause by the great and successfull pains he hath taken in the proving of that My reason is because the Temple-Worship or the sacrifices under the Law were in some sense propitiatory as they were the adumbrations of that grand Sacrifice which was to be offered up for the appeasing of Gods wrath viz. The Blood of Christ therefore to have excluded any from participation of them had been to exclude them from the visible way of obtaining pardon of sin which was not to be had without shedding of Blood as the Apostle tells us and from testifying their Faith towards God and Repentance from dead works But now under the Gospel those
specie as to the Nature of the act inclines neither way but supposing it lye under Positive Determinations either by Laws or Circumstances it then necessarily inclines either to the Nature of Good or Eâ—il Neither yet are we come to a full understanding of the Nature of indifferent actions we must therefore distinguish between indifferency as to goodness necessitating an action to be done and as to goodness necessary to an action to make it good For there is one kind of goodness propter quam fit actio in order to which the action must necessarily be done and there is another kind of goodness sine quâ non benè fit actio necessary to make an action good when it is done As following after peace hath such a goodness in it as necessitates the action and makes it a necessary duty but handling a particular Controversie is such an action as a man may let alone without sin in his course of studies yet when he doth it there is a goodness necessary to make his doing it a good action viz. his referring his study of it to a right end for the obtaining of truth and peace This latter goodness is twofold either bonitas directionis as some call it which is referring the action to its true end in reference to which the great Controversie among the Schoolmen is about the indifferency of particular actions viz. Whether a particular direction of a mans intention to the ultimate end be not so necessary to particular actions as that without that the action is of necessity evil and with it good or whether without that an action may be indifferent to good or evil which is the state of the Question between Thomas and Scotus Bonaventure and Durandus but we assert the necessity of at least an habitual direction to make the action in individuo good and yet the act in its self may notwithstanding be indifferent even in individuo as there is no antecedent necessity lying upon mens Consciences for the doing of it because men may omit it and break no Law of God Besides this to make an action good there is necessary a bonitas Originis or rather Principii â—â— good Principle out of which the action must flow which must be that Faith which whatsoever is not of is sin as the Apostle tells us Which we must not so understand as though in every action a man goes about he must have a full perswasion that it is a necessary duty he goes about but in many actions that Faith is sufficient whereby he is perswaded upon good ground that the thing he goes about is lawful although he may as lawfully omit that action and do either another or the contrary to it There may be then the necessity of some things in an action when it is done to make it good and yet the action its self be no ways necessary but indifferent and a matter of Liberty This may be easily understood by what is usually said of Gods particular Actions that God is free in himself either to do or not to do that action as suppose the Creation of the World but when he doth it he must necessarily do it with that goodness holiness and wisdom which is suitable to his Nature So may many actions of men be in themselves indifferent and yet there must be a concomitant necessity of good intention and Principle to make the action good But this concomitant necessity doth not destroy the Radical Indifferency of the action it self it is only an antecedent necessity from the obligation of the Law is that which destroys indifferency So likewise it is as to evil there is such an evil in an action which not only spoils the action but hinders the person from the liberty of doing it that is in all such actions as are intrinsecally evil and there is such a kind of evil in actions which though it spoils the goodness of the action yet keeps not from performance which is such as ariseth from the manner of performance as praying in hypocrisie c. doing a thing lawful with a scrupulous or erring Conscience We see then what good and evil is consistent with indifferency in actions and what is not And that the Nature of Actions even in individuo may be indifferent when as to their Circumstances they may be necessarily determin'd to be either good or evil As Marrying or not Marrying as to the Law of God is left at liberty not making it in its self a necessary duty one way or other but supposing particular Circumstances make it necessary pro hîc nunc yet the Nature of it remains indifferent stâ—ll and supposing Marriage it is necessary it should be in the Lord and yet it is not necessary to make choice of this person rather then of that so that not only the absolute indifferency of the action is consistent with this concomitant necessity but the full liberty both of contradiction and contrariety Again we must distinguish between an Indifferency as to its Nature and Indifferency as to its use and end or between an indifferency as to a Law and indifferency as to order and peace Here I say that in things wholly indifferent in both respects that is in a thing neither commanded nor forbidden by God nor that hath any apparent respect to the Peace and Order of the Church of God there can be no rational account given why the Nature of such indifferencies should be alter'd by any Humane Laws and Constitutions But matters that are only indifferent as to a Command but are much conducing to the Peace and Order of a Church such things as these are the proper matter of Humane Constitutions concerning the Churches Polity Or rather to keep to the words of the Hypothesis it self where any things are determin'd in general by the Word of God but left at Liberty as to manner and Circumstances it is in the power of Lawful Authority in the Church of God to determine such things as far as they tend to the promoting the good of the Church And so I rise to the second step which is That matters of this Nature may be determin'd and restrained Or that there is no necessity that all matters of Liberty should remain in their primary indifferency This I know is asserted by some of great Note and Learning that in things which God hath left to our Christian Liberty man may not restrain us of it by subjecting those things to Positive Laws but I come to examine with what strength of reason this is said that so we may see whether men may not yield in some lawful things to a restraint of their Christian Liberty in order to the Peace of the Church of God Which I now prove by these Arguments First What may be lawfully done when it is commanded may be so far lawfully commanded as it is a thing in it self lawful but matters of Christian Liberty may be lawfully done when they are commanded to be done
though it were lawful not to do them before that Command The truth of the Proposition appears because Lawful Authority may command any thing that may be lawfully done Because nothing can exempt from obedience to a lawful Magistrate but the unlawfulness of the thing commanded and therefore nothing can debar the Magistrate from commanding these things for nothing can hinder him from Commanding but what may hinder the Subject from Obedience I grant in many cases it may be lawful to obey when it is very inconvenient for the Magistrate to command but inconveniency and unlawfulness are two things nay and in some cases a man may lawfully obey when he is unlawfully commanded but then the matter of the Command it self is unlawful As in executing an unjust Sentence granting that a Princes Servants may lawfully do it especially when they know it not yet in that case the ground of their lawful obedience is the ground of the Magistrates lawful Command which is the supposed Justice of the Execution But that which makes the Magistrates Command unlawful is the intrinsecal evil of the thing its self So for unlawful Wars though the Subjects may lawfully obey yet the Prince sins in commanding not but that he hath right to command so far as they are bound to obey which is only in things lawful but that which in this case alters the matter is the Princes knowing his cause to be unjust So that however the Proposition holds in things not manifestly unjust But however this be it is hereby granted that the things may be lawfully done when they are restrained by the Magistrates Command and by that it appears that liberty may be restrained else it could not be lawful to act under that restraint not as it respects the things themselves but under that formality as they are the restraint of that which ought to be left free The Restraint however then is lawful as to the persons acting under Authority who are the Subjects of this liberty though it were granted unlawfull as to the authority doing it Which former is sufficient for my purpose viz. that Christian liberty as to the subjects of it may be lawfully restrained Secondly A lesser duty ceaseth to be a duty when it hinders from the performance of greater but the preserving Christian liberty is a lesser duty which may hinder the peace of the Church which is a greater therefore in that case it may be restrained The Major is granted by Divines and Casuists when duties stand in competition the lesser ceaseth to bind as is evident in that God will have mercy rather then sacrifice Positives yield to morals and naturals Thence the obligation of an Oath ceaseth when it hinders from a natural duty as the Corban among the Jews from relief of Parents And therefore Grotius saith that an Oath taken concerning a thing lawfull if it doth hinder majus bonum morale the obligation of that Oath ceaseth Now that preserving-liberty is a lesser duty then the looking after the peace of the Church is evident because the one is only a matter of liberty and left undetermin'd by the Word and the other a matter of necessity and absolutely and expresly required of all as a duty as much as possibly lyes in them to endeavour after Thirdly If an occasional offence of weaker Brethren may be a ground for restraining Christian liberty then much more may commands from lawfull authority do it but the offence of weaker Brethren may restrain Christian liberty as to the exercise of it as appears by the Apostles discourse Rom. 14. 21. The reason of the consequence lies here that a case of meer offence which is here pleaded towards weak Brethren cannot have that obligation upon Conscience which a known duty of obeying lawfull Authority in things in themselves lawfull hath Nay further insisting only on the Law of scandall I would fain know whether it be a greater offence and scandall to Christians consciences to infringe the lawfull authority of the Magistrate and to deny obedience to his commands in things undetermin'd by the Law of God or else to offend the Consciences that is go against the judgements of some well-meaning but less-knowing Christians Or thus whether in the matter of scandall it be a greater offence to go against the judgements of the weaker and more ignorant or the more knowing and able when the one have only their own weak apprehension to byasse them the other are backed by and grounded upon an established Law And whether it be not a greater scandall to Religion to disobey a Christian Magistrate then it is to offend some private Christians Let these things be examined and then let us see whether the argument will not hold à majori if the Law of scandall as to private Christians may restrain liberty then may a command from the Magistrate do it Fourthly I argue thus If the nature of Christian-liberty may be preserved under the restraint of the exercise of it then it is not against the nature of Christian-liberty to have the exercise restrained but the former is true and therefore the latter Now that the nature of Christian-liberty may be preserved under the restraint of its exercise I prove by these arguments First Because the nature of Christian-liberty is founded upon the freedom of judgement and not the freedom of practice The case is the same in moral and natural liberty as in Christian. Now we say truly that the radical liberty of the soul is preserved though it be determined to a particular action For the liberty of the Will lying in the power of determining its self either way as it is generally thought the actuall determination of the Will doth not take away the internal power in the soul and in that respect there may be a potentia faciendi where there is not possibilit as effectûs a power of doing when there is no possibility the thing should be done when the event is otherwise determined by a divine decree as in breaking the bones of Christ upon the Crosse. So it is in reference to Christian liberty though the exercise of it be restrained yet the liberty remains because Christian-liberty lyes in the freedom of judgement that is in judging those things to be free which are so so that if any thing that is in its self free be done by a man with an opinion of the necessity of doing it antecedent to the Law commanding it or without any Law prescribing it thereby his Christian liberty is destroyed but if it be done with an opinion of the freedom and indifferency of the thing it self but only with a consequential necessity of doing it supposing the Magistrates command he retains the power of his Christian-liberty still though under the restraint of the exercise of it And therefore it would be well observed that the opinion of the necessity of any one thing undetermined by Scripture destroys Christian-liberty more then a Magistrates command doth And by this
far Church Government is founded upon the Law of Nature Two things in it founded thereon 1. That there must be a Society of men for the Worship of God 2. That this Society be governed in the most convenient manner A Society for Worship manifested Gen. 4. 26. considered The Sons of God and the Sons of Men who Societies for Worship among Heathens evidenced by three things 1. Solemnity of Sacrifices Sacrificing how far Natural the antiquity of the Feast of first-fruits largely discovered 2. The Original of Festivals for the Honour of their Deities 3. The Secrecy and Solemnity of their Mysteries This further proved from Mans Sociable Nature the improvement of it by Religion the Honor redounding to God by such a Society for his Worship HAving now laid our Foundation we proceed to raise a superstructure upon it And we now come closely to inquire how far Government in the Church is founded upon an unalterable Divine Right That we have found to be built upon a double Foundation the Dictates of the Law of Nature and Divine Positive Laws We shall impartially inquire into both of them and see how far Church-Government is setled upon either of these two I begin then with the Law of Nature Two general things I conceive are of an unalterable Divine Right in reference to this First That there be a Society and joyning together of men for the Worship of God Secondly That this Society be governed preserved and maintained in a most convenient manner First That there must be a Society of men joyning together for the Worship of God For the Dictate of Nature being common to all that God must be served Nature requires some kind of Mutual Society for the joynt performance of their common duties An Evidence of which Dictate of Nature appears in the first mention we find of any Publick Society so that a Society for Religious Worship was as ancient as the first Civil Societies we have any Records of Nay the very first Publick Society we read of was gathered upon this account For we read in the early days of the world that the Charter for this Society was soon made use of Gen. 4. 26. In the days of Enosh men began to call upon the Name of the Lord. Now Enosh was Seths Son whom Adam had given to him in the place of Abel and assoon as the number of men did increase that men grew into Societies they then had their publike societies for Gods Worship For we cannot understand that place absolutely as though God had not been called on before but now he was called on more signally and solemnly when men were increased that they began to imbody themselves into Societies Coepit congregare populum ad tractandum simul Dei cuâ—tum saith Pererius Tunc coeptum est populariter coli Deus Mariana Invocare i. e. palam colere Emanuel Sa. relating all to the publike societies being then gathered for the worship of the true God From which time in all probability did commence that Title of those who joyned in those societies that they were called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The sons of God which we read of soon after Gen. 6. 2. as they are distinguished from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sons of men which Titles as I am far from understanding in the sense of the Fathers taking them for the Angels which in likely-hood they took from that supposititious piece going under the name of Enochs Prophesie so I cannot understand them as commonly they are taken for meer discretive Titles of the posterity of Seth and Cain as though all that came of Seth were the Sons of God and all of Cain were the sons of men For as there certainly were many bad of Seths Posterity because the flood destroyed all of them Noah only and his Family excepted so there might be some good of the other vice being no more entaâ—ld then vertue is and Jewels may sometimes lye in a heap of dung and so this name of the sons of God might be appropriated to those who joyned themselves to those Societies for Gods worship In which sense some understand the very words of the Text 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 then began men to be called by the Name of the Lord which I suppose is the sense of Aquila who thus renders the place 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 although it be brought by Dionys. Vossius to justifie the former interpretation of the words This sense if the construction of the words will bear it which Drusius questions but others are much for it and Theodoret The French and Piscator so render it seems most genuine and natural and not at all impugning what I have formerly gathered from the words but implying it For this distinction of Names and Titles did argue a distinction of Societies among them I am not ignorant that the generality of Jewish Expositors and many of their followers do carry the sense of the words quite another way from the ambiguity of the signification of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which may be interpreted as well to Prophane as Begin and so they read it tunc prophanatum est ad invocandum nomen Domini Then men prophaned the Name of the Lord And accordingly Maimonides begins Idolatry 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the dayes of Enosh But the words will scarce bear this construction as Vossius upon him observes and besides there is no mention at all of the name of any false Gods but only of the true one So much then for the first originall of this Society for Religion which we see began assoon as there was matter for a Society to be gathered up of Some indeed derive this Society a great deal higher and because we read that Abel and Cain brought their sacrifices they thence infer that it was to Adam who was the publike Priest then and performed all publike duties of worship in his own person and so was indeed Occumenicall Bishop of the whole world and yet had but four persons or but few more for his Charge Such a Diocess we might be content to allow him that pleads for the same Office and derives his Title somewhat higher then Adam For Pope Boniface the eighth proved there must be but one chief Priest and so one Pope because it is said Gen. 1. 1. That God created the world in Principio not in Principiis mark the number therefore there must be but one beginning and so one Bishop and not many What excellent Disputants an Infallible Chair makes men Much good may his argument do him As a further evidence How much Nature dictates that such a Society there should be for Divine Worship we shall inquire into the practise of men in their dispersion after the Flood And what we find unanimously continued among them under such gross Idolatry as they were given to and which did arise not from their Idolatry as such but from the general nature of it as a kind of
used to say that their Gods beg'd them all their play-days After telling us of the mirth and jollity used after their sacrifices which was alwayes the second course at these Festivalls thence the Jews called their High Festival days 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good days or days of Mirth We read of few Nations but had these Festival Solemnities for the honour of their Gods The Persians had theirs for their God Mithras The Babylonians saith Athenaeus out of Berosus had their Feast Sacaea which Casaubon would have called Sesacaea because Babylon in Scripture is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sesac as the Ludi Romani were from Rome It is to no purpose to mention the Festivals observed by the Greeks and Romans in honour of their Gods being so many that whole books have been composed of them That which I observe from hence is that Societies for the Worship of God are Natural because of their solemn resting from their ordinary labour upon days appointed for the honour of their Gods Thereby shewing they looked upon those as peculiar days and themselves as peculiar Societies upon those days from what they were at other times One thing more evidenceth this among them their solemn and secret Mysteries which were Societies on purpose as pretended for this very end in honor of their Gods Their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as they were wont to call them preserved with the greatest secrecy by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Their great and lesser Eleusinian Samothracian Cotyttian Mithriacal Mysteries to which none were admitted without passing through many degrees 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before they came to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perfectly initiated Wherein they were much imitated by the Christians in the Celebration of the Lords Supper about the fourth or fifth Century as is largely showed by Casaubon in a most learned Diutriba on this Subject in his Exercitations to which I refer the Reader We see what strict Rules they had for Admission of any into these pretendedly Sacred but truly most impious Societies In those of Mithras as Suidas and Nonnus tell us they passed through eighty degrees before they were throughly initiated and seldome escaped with life However we may gain from them this general notion that they looked on a peculiar distinct Society as necessary for the worship and honor of the Deity they served Thus we see à posteriori how a distinct Society for Gods Worship appears to be a Dictate of Nature We shall now see if we can evidence à priori that it is a Dictate of Nature that there must be some Society for the Worship of God Three things will make that appear First The sociableness of Mans Nature Man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Creature that loves to herd it self with those of his own kind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If a man had all other comforts of life and wanted Society he would not think his life worth leading as Aristotle observes who further takes notice of the sociableness of mans Nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the general commendation that is given to courteous and affable men I deny not but in the entring into a Civil State or Society either fear or profit might be a main inducement to it but though it be an inducement yet there must be supposed an inclinableness to a Society or a Commonwealth might be assoon set up among Tygers as Men. So that they have very little ground of Reason who from the external inducements of fear or profit in entring into Civil Societies do conclude against the sociableness of Mans Nature If then Mans Nature be sociable in all other things then Nature will tell men they ought to be so in things of common concernment to them all and which is every ones work or duty as Religion is if in other things men are sociable much more in this For Secondly Religion gives a great improvement to mans sociable Nature and therefore Plutarch well calls Religion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Foundation that knits and joynts Societies together And thence wisely observes that in the Constitution of Laws 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first and greatest thing to be looked at is the Religion established or the Opinions men entertain of the Gods To which he subjoyns this excellent reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That it is more impossible for a Commonwealth either to be formed or subsist without Religion then a City to si and without Foundations Thence a prudent States-man called Religion the best Reason of State It appears then evidently both from reason and experience that Religion hath a great influence upon the modelling and ordering Civil Societies whence as the same Moralist observes Lycurgus did as it were consecrate the Lacedaemonians with Religious Rites as Numa the Romans Ion the Athenians and Deucalion the Hellens Whence some half-witted men but I know not whether more defective in wit or grace have observing the great influence Religion hath to keep men in order been ready to look upon it as only a Politick device to awe men with greater ease It is not here a place largely to Examine and Refute this unworthy pretence Only I adjure them by their onely Goddess Reason to tell me whence come men to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Plutarch expresseth it To be so easily awed by the hopes and fears of another life more then other creatures are Why are they at all affected with the discourse of them Why cannot they shake off the thoughts of these things when they please Are not men hereby made the most miserable of creatures For no other creature can be perswaded that it shall ever quench its thirst in those Rivers of pleasures nor make its bed in everlasting flames The beasts of Sardinia that have their only refreshment by the Dew of Heaven yet have never any hopes to â—ome there The Lyon never keeps from his prey by the thoughts and fears of a great Tribunal But suppose onely mankind of all creatures should be liable to be thus imposed on as is pretended How comes it to pass that in no age of the world this Imposture hath not been discovered confuted and shaken off by some people as wise as themselves Or have there never been any such in the world But whence come some men then to be wiser then others Whence come some to know things which all the Reason in the World could never finde out without Revelation Whence comes a power to doe any thing above the course of Nature if there be nothing but Nature Or are all men deceived that believe such things If so then there must be somewhat that must deceive men men would not deceive themselves and they could not be so long imposed upon by other men there must be then some evil spirit must do it and whence should that come from Nature too but then whence comes Nature its self from its self too or some thing ' else
of mind is most suitable to Religion which is as well free from the bleaknesse and turbulency of passion as the saint gleams of Lightnesse and Vanity But a further solemnity then this is required by the dictates of Nature too which lyes in the circumstantiating of time and place and a dedication of both to the end of Worship That these are very consonant to natural Reason appears by the universall consent of all Nations agreeing in any form of the Worship of a Deity who have all had their set-times and fixed places to perform this Worship in I shall not insist as some have done that the Seventh day hath been particularly and solemnly observed for the worship of God by the consent of Nations Although there be many probable arguments and plausible testimonies brought for a peculiarity of honour to if not service on the Seventh-day out of Iosephus Aristobulus Iudaeus and by him from Linus Hesiod Homer Clemens Alexandrinus Tertullian Lampridius Seneca Tibullus and many others From which Testimonies it appears that some kind of reverence and honour was given to the Seventh-day but whether that day was the seventh of the week or the seventh of the month which was consecrated among the Greeks to Apollo upon which the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the seventh of every month were observed in honour of him whether the title of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did belong to the seventh as one of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Festivall or inauspicious dayes for it was common to both Whether observed by any publike religious custome or by some private superstition are things too large to inquire into too difficult now to determine and not necessary for my present purpose It being sufficient in order to that if they had any set times at all for worship which shews how solemn the worship of God ought to be And this is not denyed by any it being so necessary a consectary from the duty of Worship that there must be a time for performance of it And not only in generall that there must be some time but a sufficient proportion of time to be consecrated to the publike exercise of piety both from the consideration of mans obligation to divine service from his nature from the weight and concernment of the things that time is imployed in and the inward sense of immortality upon the soul of man But then what this proportion of time must exactly be I see not how meer natural light could determine it but it would rather suggest it to be highly reasonable to wait for and expect such a determination from the supream Rector and Governour of the world It being far more fit for the Master to prescribe unto the servant what proportion of service he expects from him then that the servant should both divide and choose his own time and the proportion of service which he owes to his Master Nay it being so much more reasonable for us to wait for Gods order then for a servant for his Masters as Gods power and Dominion over the creature is greater then that of a Master over his servant as it is the voyce and sense of nature that Gods commands cannot otherwise be but just holy reasonable and good which may be otherwise from men as the acceptance of our persons with God lies not barely in the work done but in the doing it out of obedience to the commands of God which is otherwise with men as God can give strength to perform what he commands which man cannot which things considered make it evident to be highly reasonable that God himself should prescribe the proportion of time and not mans nature But when God hath thus determined it nature cannot but assent to that particular determination that in consideration of the works of God it is most reasonable that rather one day in a week then one in a month should be dedicated to Gods service that the seventh day of the week upon Gods resting on that day and sanctifying it should be the precise day unlesse some reason equivalent to that of the first institution and approved by God for that end be the ground of its alteration to another of the seven which is the reason of the change under the Gospel As an evidence of the solemnity of times for worship the Romans as well as other Nations had their several feriae their dayes set apart for the honour of their Gods In which Macrobius tells us the Priests held them polluted si indictis conceptisque opus aliquod fieret praetereâ regem sacrorum flamines que non licebat videre feriis opus fieri ideò per praeconem denuntiabatur nè quid tale ageretur praecepti negligens multabatur If any work were done upon those dayes of Rest the day was polluted and the person punished unlesse it were as Umbro there affirms in order to the honour of their Gods or for necessaries of life To which purpose Scaevola answered him that asked what work must be done upon the Feria Quod pratermissum noceret What would be spoiled by letting alone as taking an Ox out of a ditch strengthening a beam like to fall and ruine men and thence Maro allowed it lawfull to wash sheep if it were to cure and not only to cleanse them Balautumque gregem fluvio mersare salubri By which last word Macrobius saith it was only lawfull to do it for healing them and not in order to gain Servius informs us likewise that the Priests when they went to sacrifice sent their servants before to bid all Tradesmen leave working nè pro negotio suo ipsorum oculos Deorum ceremonias attaminent Feria enim operae Deorum creditae sunt Lest by following their work they both offend them and the Gods too For these Holy-dayes are devoted to the service of the Gods Festus saith that upon their dies religiosi nisi quod necesse est nefas habetur facere nothing but works of pure necessity were to be done But by dies religiosi probably he means the dies atr◠nefasti their ominous unlucky dayes as they accounted them But however Macrobius distinguisheth the dayes among the Romans into Dies festi profesti intercisi The Festi were dedicated to the Gods the Profesti to their own works the Intercisi were divided between both at some hours of which it was lawfull to follow their civill employments at others not Nam cum hostiacaeditur fari nefas est inter caesa porrecta fari licet rursus cum adoletur non licet While the sacrifice was killing no Courts of Judicature were opened in which the Praetor might fari tria verba solemnia Do dico addico thence called dies fasti but between the killing the sacrifice and offering up the entrails called Porrecta from porricere which was verbum sacrificale pervetustum saith Turnebus an old
And we find by Pliny that when the hetaeriae were forbidden he brought the Christians in under that Law the ground of those Societies was onely a mutual compact and agreement among the persons of it Such as among the Essens of the Jewes and the Schools of Philosophers among the Greeks Iosephus mentions the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of those who were admitted into the Society of the Essens And so in all other Societies which subsist onely from mutuall confederation in a Common-wealth Thus I acknowledge it to be in Christianity that there must be such a supposed contract or voluntary consent in the persons engaged in such Societies But with this observable difference that although there must be a consent in both yet the one is wholly free as to any pre-engagement or obligation to it as well as to the act its self but in religious societies though the Act of consent be free yet there is an antecedent Obligation upon men binding them to this voluntary consent The want of the understanding this Difference is the very Foundation of that Opinion men call Erastianism For the followers of Erastus when they finde that Christians did act ex confoederatâ disciplinâ they presently conclude all Church-power lay onely in mutuall consent It is granted Church-power doth suppose consent but then all Christians are under an Obligation from the Nature of Christianity to express this consent and to submit to all censures Legally inflicted About the hetaeriae and Societies among the Romans we may take notice of the Law of Twelve Tables So in the collection of Lud. Charondus Sodalibus qui ejusdem Collegii sunt jus cotundi habent potestas esto pactionis quam volent inter se ineunda dum nè quid ex publicâ lege corrumpant Ex Caio c. 4. D. de Collec corp I confesse when persons are entred into a visible Church-So ciety by Baptism if they will own that profession they were baptized into and are not guilty either of plain ignorance of it or manifest scandall and demand as their right the other Ordinances of the Gospel I see not by what power they may be excluded If we fix not in a serious visible prosession as the ground of giving right but require positive evidences of grace in every one to be admitted to Ordinances as the only thing giving right for my part setting aside the many inconveniences besides which attend that in reference to the persons to be admitted I see not how with a safe and good conscience Ordinances can be administred by any My reason is this Every one especially a Minister in that case ought to proceed upon certain grounds that the person admitted hath right to the Ordinance to be administred but if positive signs of grace be required a mans conscience cannot proceed upon any certainty without infallible knowledge of anothers spiritual state which I suppose none will pretend to My meaning is that which gives right must be something evident to the person admitting into it if it be his duty to enquire after it but if only positive signs of grace be looked on as giving right the ground of right can never be so evident to another person as to proceed with a good conscience i. e. with a full perswasion of another right to the administration of any Ordinance to him If it be said that these are required only as tokens of a true visible profession and it is that which gives the right I reply Our knowledge of and assent to the conclusion can be no stronger nor more certain then to the premisses from whenâ—â— it is inferred if therefore true profession gives right and our knowledge of that proceeds upon our knowledge of the work of grace we are left at the same uncertainty we were at before But if we say that an outward profession of the Gospel where there is nothing rendring men uncapable of owning it which is ignorance nor declaring they do not own it which is sâ—andall is that which gives a visible right to the Ordinances of the Church as visible we have something to fix our selves upon and to bottom a perswasion of the right of persons to Ordinances Christ when he instituted Churches did institute them as visible Societies that is to have marks whereby to be known and distinguished as other Societies in the world are now that which puts a difference between this and other Societies is an open profession of Christianity which profession is looked upon as the outward expression of the internal consent of the soul to the Doctrine and Laws of the Gospel Which outward evidence of consent where there is nothing evidently and directly oppugning it is that which the Church of God in admission of visible members is to proceed upon I nowhere find that ever Christ or his Apostles in making disciples or admitting to Church-membership did exact any more then a professed willingnesse to adhere to the Doctrine which they preached nor that they refused any who did declare their desire to joyn with them An owning Christianity is all we read of antecedent to admission of Church-members And if any thing else be further required as necessary we must either say the Word of God is defective in institutions of necessity to the Church which I suppose the assertors of it will not be so inconsistent to their own principles as to do or else must produce where any thing further is required by the Word of God By this we may see what to answer those who require an explicite Covenant from all members of the Church as that which gives the form and being to a Church If they mean only in the first constitution of a visible Church an expresse owning of the Gospel-covenant there is none will deny that to be necessary to make one a member of the visible Church of Christ. If they further mean that there must be a real confederation between those who joyn together in Gospel-Ordinances in order to their being a Church I know none will question it that know what it is that makes a Society to be so which is such a real confederation with one another If they mean further that though Christians be bound by vertue of their Gospel-covenant to joyn with some Church Society yet not being determined by Scripture to what particular Church they should joyn therefore for Christians better understanding what their mutuall duty is to one another and who that Pastor is to whom they owe the relation of member that there should be some significant declaration either by words or actions of their willingnesse to joyn with such a particular Society in Gospel-Ordinances I shall grant this to be necessary too But if beyond this their meaning be that a formal explicite covenant be absolutely necessary to make any one a member of a Church I see no reason for it For 1. If there may be a real confederation without this then this is not necessary but there
mean such Differences as respect persons and not things which our Saviour layes down these Rules for the ending of And therefore I cannot but wonder to see some men insist so much on that place against such an Exposition of this Luke 12. 14. where Christ saith Who made me a Iudge and a Divider among you For doth it any wayes follow Because Christ would not take upon him to be a temporal Judge among the Jewes therefore he should take no course for the ending differences among his Disciples and the taking away all animosities from among them Nay on the contrary doth not our Saviour very often designedly speak to this very purpose to root out all bitterness malice envy and rancour from mens spirits and to perswade them to forgive injuries even to pray for persecutours and by any means to be reconciled to their Brethren Which he makes to be a Duty of so great necessity that if a man had brought his gift to the Altar and remembred his brother had ought against him he bids him leave his gift there and go be reconciled to his Brother and then offer up the Gift We see hereby how suitable it was to our Saviours Doctrine and Design to lay down Rules for the ending of any differences arising among his Disciples and this being now cleared to be the state of the Case it will not be difficult to resolve what is meant by telling the Church Which I make not to be any appeal to a juridical court acting authoritatively over the persons brought before it but the third and highest step of Charity in a man towards a person that hath offended him viz. That when neither private admonition nor before two or three witnesses would serve to reclaim the offendor then to call a select company together which is the Natural importance of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and before them all to lay open the cause of the breach and difference between them and to refer it to their Arbitration to compose and end it Which Sense of the place I humbly conceive to have the least force in it and in every part of it to be most genuine and natural and fully agreeable to the received practice among the Jewes which the Author of the Book Musar cited by Drusius fully acquaints us with whose words I shall Transcribe as being a plain Paraphrase on these of our Saviour Qui arguit socium suum debet primum hoc facere placide inter se ipsum solum verbis mollibus ita ut non pudefaciat eum Si resipiscit bene est sin debet eum acritèr arguere pudefacere inter se ipsum Si non resipiscit debet adhibere socios ipsumque coram illis pudore afficere si nec modo quicquam proficit debet eum pudefacere coram multis ejusque delictum publicare Nam certe detegendi sunt hypocritae That which this Authour calls pudefacere eum coram multis is that which our Saviour means when he bids him tell the Church or the Congregation as our Old Translation renders it This the Jews called reproving of men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before a multitude as the Vulg. Latin though falsly renders that place Lâ—viticus 19. 17. publicè argue eum and to this the Apostle may allude when he speaks of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Corinth 2. 6. censure of many and the reproof 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before all 1 Tim. 5. 20. which was to be in matters of publike scandal upon Religion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Jewes call them but in case the offendor should still 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 slight this overture of Reconciliation before the company selected for hearing the Case then saith our Saviour look upon him as an obstinate refractory creature and have no more to do with him then with a Heathen and a Publican by which terms the most wilful obstinate sinners were set out among the Jewes and by which our Saviour means a mans withdrawing himself as much as in him lies from all familiar society with such a person And thus saith Christ Whatsoever you bind in Earth shall be bound in Heaven and whatsoever you loose on Earth shall be loosed in Heaven v. 18. that is If after all your endeavours of Reconciliation the offender will hearken to no agreement it is an evidence and token that mars sin is bound upon him that is shall not be pardoned so long as he continues impenitent but if he repent of his offence and you be reconciled as the offence is removed on Earth thereby so the sin is loosed in Heaven that is forgiven The guilt of sin that binds it being an Obligation to punishment and so the pardon of sin that looseth as it cancels that Obligation And so Grotius observes that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 what is called retaining in one place is binding in another and what is loosing in one place is remitting in the other But now although I assert this to be the true proper genuine meaning of this difficult place yet I deny not but that this place hath influence upon Church-Government but I say the influence it hath is onely by way of Accommodation and by Analogy deduced from it According to which these things I conceive have Foundation in these words First gradual appeals from the Method here laid down by our Saviour Secondly Church censures and the Duty of submitting to Church-authority For although before any Church Power was actually set up as when our Saviour spake these words then there was none yet after that Church-Government was fixed and set up it must in Reason be supposed that all matters of the Nature of scandals to the Church must be decided there Thirdly The lawfulness of the Use of excommunication in Christian Churches for if every particular person might withdraw from the Society of such a one as continues refractory in his Offences then much more may a whole Society and the Officers of it declare such a one to be avoided both in religious and familiar civil Society which is the formal Nature of Excommunication Herein we see the wisdom of our Saviour who in speaking to a particular case hath laid down such general Rules as are of perpetual use in the Church of God for accommodating differences arising therein Thus have we hitherto cleared that our Saviour hath determined no more of Church-Govern-ment then what is appliable to a diversity of particular Forms and so hath not by any Law or practice of his own determined the necessity of any one form CHAP. VI. The next thing pleaded for determining the Form of Government is Apostolical practice two things inquired into concerning that What it was How far it binds The Apostles invested with the power and authority of Governing the whole Church of Christ by their Commission Io. 20. 21. Matth.