it it seemeth that the goodnesse of the Act doth altogether depend on the goodness of the Intention that adaequately so that what power an evil intention hath to corrupt an Act although otherwise good the same power a good intention hath to approve and to render an Act good which otherwise is evil for a good or a single eye is as efficatious to inlighten the whole body as an evil eye is to infuse darkness on it To adde more strength to this opinion much may be alledged from the Fathers and other Divines of this nature is that in the Glosse As much good as you do intend so much you do perform And that verse in the mouth of every Scool-boy Quicquid agunt homines Intentio judicat illud It is th' Intention judgeth true Of whatsoever things we do XI But in the way of answer as to that place in the 6 of St. Mat. I am not ignorant in the first place that some learned men of this age do give an interpretation to it far different from that of the antient Fathers and not consonant to that we have now in hand But in reverence to those antient Doctors be it granted that those words of our Saviour had a proper relation to the Intentions of men I make answer that the intention when it is a motion of the Will tending to some ends by certain mediums is taken into a twofold consideration first whether it be for the intention of that good into which the Will is finally and precisely carryed being taken from all consideration of the mediums to attain it As if a man should say he intends the glory of God or his own profit and pleasure or secondly whether it be for an entire ordination of the whole progresse of the work from the beginning of the work unto the end including also the mediums or the means to attain it As if a man should say that he intends the glory of God by building a Temple or staining an Idolater or that he intends his own profit by getting riches by his honest labour or by theft and plunder And as he may be said that he intends a journey to Rome who only thinks of going thither and hath not yet resolved with himself which way or upon what accounts he will go as well as he who hath resolved with himself when to go which way and upon what occasions We speak in this whole discourse of the Intention taken the first way viz. on the intention which looks altogether upon the end and not on the means which is so taken in the common use of speaking but those words of the Fathers and other Divines which seem by the intention alone to measure the goodness or the badnesse of mens actions and which are grounded on those words of our Saviour in relation to a single eye and to an eye that is evil do receive their intention in the latter signification as they include the means with the end observable is that of St Bernard That the eye saith he be single two things are necessary viz. that truth be in the election and Charity in the intention That is that our intention be absolutely right both are required that so we may not propound unto our selves such an end which is averse unto the love of God and of our neighbour and that we make not choice of any means that are not joyned with honesty righteousness In every work therefore we must not only look to propound unto our selves a good end but we must withall endeavour to the end so propounded by apt lawful honest means for seeing that the election of the means or the mediums do arise from the intention of the end is so necessarily joyned to it that in the respect thereof it hath the place of an accident inseperable or a necessary circumstance Animum laudô Consilium reprehendâ—â— Cic. 9. ad Attic 11. the School-men do almost all of them conclude that an evil election doth corrupt an intention that is otherwise good by rendring that evil which before was good in the very same manner as evil circumstances do corrupt those Actions to which they are retayners XII The fourth argument is taken from the perfection and obligation of the Law of God For there is a Law propounded from God to men a most perfect Law which commandeth things to be done and forbiddeth those things which are not to be done It hath shewed unto thee O man what is good what the Lord requireth of thee Mich. 6. 8. This is the Law which we must obey if we will fulfil our duties by this Law we are commanded as the Scriptures every where do declare to do good and to eschew evil But if we on the contrary without the least regard to the law of God shall measure out unto our selves things to be avoyded or performed according to our own profit and as we shall think good and shall either omit those good things which God commandeth to be done for the fear of some following evil or shall commit those evil things which God forbiddeth for the vain hope of some good to come what is this but worms as we are to preferre our own Counsels above the expresse will of Almighty God and the wisdome of the flesh above the Authority of the most holy Spirit Farre otherwise did that holy man David By thy precepts saith he have I gotten understanding therefore have I hated all unjust wayes Psal 119. 104. As if he should say being instructed by thy Law which both night and day is in my heart my mouth before mine eyes I do plainly understand what I have to do and what I have to eschew wherefore I do not only decline but hate every way which is not consentaneous to thy Law whither soever it may seem to lead me Therefore since every sin is forbidden by the Law of God and that Law of his containeth not the least exception of any good Intention or Event and we ought not to distinguish where the Law maketh no distinction nor to except where the Law maketh no exception it is most manifest that he whosoever he is who for what Intention or what cause soever it be doth knowingly and willingly do that which is evil he doth sin against the Law of God XIII The fifth argument followeth drawn from the examples of those who under the pretence of a good end being so bold as to disobey the express Commandment of God have satisfied his anger by the just punishment of their rashness and disobedience The Prophet Samuel being sent to Saul the King of Israel who saved some of the cattle of the Amalekites which God had commanded should be totally destroyed for no other end as he pretended than by the bulk and fatness of his sacrifice to make it the more acceptable the said Prophet did lay before his eyes the grievousness of his sin and for the punishment of so great a disobedience did prophesy
my Judgment In the first place therefore I say That he who de facto is chief Magistrate in a City or Nation although he hath attained to that power by evil Arts is neverthheless to be esteemed by the Citizen as his lawful Prince and by the obligation of his Conscience he is accordingly bound to obey him provided there be no just cause of any doubt to the contrary And in this case this seems to be the only and just cause of doubt when most certainly it is manifest or at least when it seems very probable to the Citizen that there is some other person to whom the chief power is due by greater right If this be not so the Citizen cannot in a good Conscience refuse the commands of the present Possessor For ordinarily it doth not belong unto a Citizen too curiously to enquire by what right the possessor doth possesse it may suffice him for the security of his Conscience that he doth possesse de facto and there is no other man at least so far as he knows who ought by right to possesse that place And besides that which I have already spoken concerning the Roman Emperors the Government of that Common-wealth being subverted to this the whole History almost of all the Kings of Israel doth pertain many of whom relyiug not so much as on the least shaddow of Right but having obtained the Kingdom by unjust Arms and nefarious wickednesse the Royal off-spring of their Predecessors being utterly extinguished that not one of them might remain to succeed in their Fathers Dignities did ascend the Royal Throne and governed the Kingdom by a full and as it were a proper Power and the people rendred obedience to them no otherwise than if they had been invested in it by the greatest right Neither do we find that the people were ever blamed for it But right reason rather perswaded that it so ought to be done For it concerned the publick safety that there should be one who should sit at the Helm of Government and it could not otherwise be better provided for the affairs of his people and himself than that he should be esteemed to have the greatest right who as a true possessor had no right at all And by the Law of Nations those things which belong to none do passe into the right of the present possessors of them XV. In the second place I say That in an Hereditary Kingdom where the right is doubtful betwixt two or more Competitors it is the part of a good Citizen whiles the contention is yet depending and the right to be descerned by a friendly treaty or by war to obey him as his lawful Prince who is in present possession of the Soveraign command Of this Histories can every where afford us very many examples amongst those which are most remarkable are the many differences which happened amongst the competitors of the Kingdom of Portugall after the death of King Sebastian And the six contestations at least for the Kingdom of Scotland after the death of Alexander the King And the most fierce and lasting contention for the Government of the English Nation between the most noble families of York and Lancaster Most certain it is by the consent of all nations throughout the world that the Law did alwayes favour the Person possessing And in these Cases that remarkable saying of the Civilians always prevailed In rebus dubiis melior est conditio possidentis In doubtful things the condition of the Possessor is always the better XVI But again the lawful Prince and Heir of the Kingdom being forced away by the Power of Arms or being so oppressed that he cannot prosecute his own Right If any person whatsoever the said Prince yet living shall violently take into his own hands the Reigns of Government and deport himself as a King when he is more truly an Usurper so that now it is no longer a doubtful right but an open injury If you demand of me what a good Ciâ—â—zen shall do in this condition who peradventure hath taken the Oath of Allegiance in the bâ—halâ— of his lawfull Prince or if he hath not yet he is no lesse indutyed to him than if he had taken it I say in the third place that a good Citizen may not only lawfuly obey the Laws of him who Governs de facto and not de jure that is by present power and not by right and perform all his commands provided there be nothing in them that is uniust or foul but according to the condition of humane affairs there may be such an exigence of necessity as oftentimes it so comes to passe that he may be adjudged to fail even in his duty if he doth not do it It may be objected that but even now it was said that Laws made by one who hath no lawful power do not oblige in Conscience It was so said indeed and it was truly said so and I believe what I have now proposed is not repugnant to it For suppose that a Subject be obliged to perform what by the Law is forbidden yet he is not bound to the Law but to himself and to his Country The obligation is annexed to that Law which is truly so of it self as it is a Law and it necessarily followeth it as the Effect followeth its Cause We have already said that a Law made by one who hath no right unto the Government is not a Law properly but aequivocally therfore hath no power to oblige Therefore whatsoever obligation doth from hence appear to charge the Conscience of the Subject doth arise from another account and not from the Law it self to whom this obligation comes extrinsecally and only by accident as if a professor of Musick should act the part of a Mason XVII You will demand If not from the Law from whence then proceedeth this obligation of the Subject I answer It being the part of a pious and prudent man not only to attend on that which is lawful but also to observe what becometh himself and is expedient for others A good Citizen may be obliged to do that for the advantage of himself and his fellow-Citizens to the performance whereof he is not upon any account or by any right obliged For this obligation doth arise from that double part of duty by which every man is a debtor to himself and a debtor to his Country In the first place it belongs to a prudent man to provide for himself and for his own affairs and it belongs to an honest man to consider in what present condition he is For no man will deny even by the Dictates of Nature but that all must endeavour by all lawful ways and means to defend their lively-hood and themselves and so to deport themselves that they may live safely and in peace to have and to hold to themselves their own Fields Houses and possessions and be careful not to offend those who at their pleasure can take from them both their lives
of Nature are said to be the sins of Nature In the second place you are to know that the effect of this Law that is the obligative power of it is grounded on the Will and the power of the Lawgiver so that to speak properly the Law it self doth not bind so effectually as the Will and Power of the Law-giver by causing and inducing an obligation by the means of the efficient Cause but it may be said and indeed usually so it is that the Law doth oblige terminatively that is as a Term of obligation and by the vertue of an exemplar Cause because it is that to which a man is so obliged that he may work according to the Rule of it as an Artist in working is directed by the Copy that is propounded to him In the third place it is to be observed that to oblige the Conscience is so to bind a man up unto obedience under a mortal fault as the Schoolmen speak it that if he prove disobedient he is not only lyable to a temporal punishment either ordained by the Lawes or to be inflicted according to the sentence of the Magistrate but he is deservedly checked by his own Conscience as guilty of the neglect of his Duty and thereby of the Anger of God contracted on him V. The sense therefore of the Question is Whether Humane Lawes have the power to oblige the Consciences of those men to whom they are exhibited in the same way as I have now explained amongst the Protestants Calvin doth deny it as Bellarmin at least doth object against him it is denyed also by Beza and many others Amongst the Papists it is denyed by Gerson Bellarmin himself confessing it and by Almain Bellarm. 3 de laic 9. And as some affirm by Navarrus Amongst the Protestants again it is affirmed by Musculus Ursine and others And amongst the Papists it is confirmed by the Jesuits and a great number of the Schoolmen Some there are who do distinguish on it Rom. 13. as David Paraeus and others And it must needs indeed be acknowledged if by the heat of too much opposition and the affectation of contradiction they had not on both sides erred this controversy had long ago been cast out of the world In disputations such as these I oftentimes do call that to mind which when I was a young man I did read in Aristotle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is manifest that it is so but not why another doth dispute it so In which place he disputes An principia sunt contraria Whether Principles are contrary An detur infinitum Whether there be an infinitenesse or not and the like And therefore in these doubts for this is the true sense and reading of that place in the third of the Physicks we had more need of an Arbitrator who may reconcile both opinions differing rather in shew than in substance than of a Judge who while he determins one part doth condemn the other And this indeed would prevail much in a great part of the controversies which with such contention of minds and bitternesse of stile are now amongst parties carried on in the Christian world if Divines would not suffer themselves to be swayed rather by faction than affection Indeed in this present question as far as I can judge by the perusal of those few books which the infirmity of my health and the streightnesse of my time doth permit to look over the height of the Spirit of contention being on both sides taken away they neither of them do seem to me to be in any great errour but I conceive that those who affirmatively have defined this question to speak freely what I think have spoken more commodiously to the institution of our lives more carefully safely to avoid the danger of error and more properly to the form of sound Doctrine than those who have defined it negatively But that more distinctly I may propose unto you what I conceive is to be determined in this question I will as briefly and as cleerly as I can with some Conclusions comprehend and terminate the whole Subject I will confim my own opinion with some reasons as need shall require and I will answer the arguments which commonly are alleged by the adverse party VII The first Conclusion is that Humane Laws if injust do not oblige unto obedience The thing is manifest enough if the words be rightly understood and that no man might give a misunderstanding to them we are to be advertised that a Law may be said to be unjust either in respect of the End or the Manner or of some Circumstance extrinsecal to the Law it self or in respect of the Matter and Object of the Law For it differeth if that be commanded which is manifestly unjust or whether that which peradventure is not otherwise unjust be yet unjustly commanded That kind of Injustice which adhereth to the Law it self per se that is of it self in respect of the thing commanded doth take away the obligation but it taketh not away that obligation which commeth unto it extrinsecally and as it were by accident that is to say by the fault of the Commander For suppose that a Prince should by a Law made command something to be done the doing whereof of it self were not unlawfull to be done or should forbid that to be done which were not simply necessay And suppose withall there should be no such just cause why he should command this or forbid that being induced to it either by the desire of filthy Lucre or the meer Lust of exercising his Tyranny or by some other depraved affection of his mind this Law is unjust indeed on the part of the King that did command it but the Subject neverthelesse is obliged to the obedience of it The Reason is because that Injustice doth hold altogether on the part of the party commanding and not of the thing commanded So that although the King could not without sin make such a Law yet the Subject without sin could perform that which by that Law is commanded And whatsoever the Subject can perform without sin he is bound if commanded to perform by the Duty of obedience Let the Prince himself look to it by what Counsel or Intention â—e inacted such a Law It doth not belong to me who am but his Subject to examine it neither shall it be imputed unto me if he hath offended in it but as long as nothing is commandmanded but what Lawfully may be performed it shall be imputed to me if I am wanting in my Duty and shall not obey him VIII Moreover I add this also if the Law it self either in respect of the Object or the Matter be peradventure unjust and grievous to the Subject as for examples sake if he demands the payment of a greater Subsidy than the occasion doth require the Conscience of the Subject is not here freed from the obligation But here again we are to distinguish For a thing may be
shall be examined and discussed at this time The first doubt is De materia impossibili of a matter in it self impossible concerning which I say in the first place That no Law ought to be made concerning a matter altogether impossible If such a Law be made it is tyrannical and by right null and obligeth no man in Conscience The first reason is because that Laws are made in relation to Acts as to be acted by a man who is a free Agent now liberty speaketh a power unto both but in things impossible there is no such liberty of power as by it self is manifest Secondly No man by right can be obliged to the performance of that the omission whereof cannot be imputed as a fault unto him nor ought to be imputed to him for punishment for every obligation is either to a fault or to a punishment or to both but the omission of a thing impossible cannot be imputed to any man for a fault nor ought it to be imputed to any one for a punishment Ergo c. But that there is no obligation of a thing impossible whether it be impossible by the Nature of the thing or by circumstances Praelect 2. Sect. 12. or any other way hath already by me been proved in my treatise of the obligation of an oath and there is no need of repetition VII I say in the second place A Law which is possible to some but seemeth to any other or to but few or peradventure but to one or two to be impossible may lawfully be made if it be useful to the Common-wealth but not unless there be some extraordinary great cause and a manifest necessity doth require it but being made it doth oblige all those who are able to keep it but not those who cannot keep it as if some great Tribute were commanded for the necessary use of the Common-wealth for the payment whereof some of the Subjects are nothing so able as others Those who are so poor that they cannot pay the sum which the Law lays upon them are not bound in Conscience to do that which they are unable to perform as is already apparent by the proposition above mentioned Neverthelesse they are obliged to make their addresses to those who are over them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nazianz. Orat. 9. Debeone omittere quod possum quoniam quod debeo minime possum Bernard and openly and sincerely and without the least falshood to professe the slendernesse of their Estate and unless they can prevail to be quite exempted from the Law or to procure a remission of some part of the sum with which they are taxed they are to bring into the publick as great a part of it as possibly they can for he who cannot do what he ought to do he yet ought to do what he is able to do VIII The second doubt is concerning a thing commanded by the Law not impossible but very grievous and very burthensome and which the Subject cannot perform without great inconvenience losse danger of life and the ruine of hiâ— whole Estate I say in the first place That in this case the Law-giver if he foreseeth this will come to passe ought to use some caution in the clauses of that Law and as conveniently as he can he is to provide a remedy for this Evil And if it cannot so well be done in the form of the Law it self leâ—t subtile and deceitful Knaves and too much intent to their own profit may thereby find a hole to escape 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Isae â—s ap Stob. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so elude the force of the Law yet what possibly in him lyeth he ought to provide that in the execution of that Law some qualification may be had leâ—t a Law otherwise profitable and necessary may become a snâ—re or a detriment to any honest man I say in the second place That the Subject though so heavily taxed is neverthelesse bound in Conscience to obey that Law although with the ruine of his whole Estate if any evident or necessary Cause for the good of the Common-wealth doth so require For example suppose a hostile Army be invading the Kingdom if a Law be made that all the corn in the Fields for some miles not far from the Shore be spoiled and all the Corn in the Barnes or Ricks which cannot be carried away be burned and that all the Houses in the Suburbs be pulled down and that all the Sluces thereabouts shall be opened and the Fields be drowned every Citizen and Subject is directly bound to obey this Law and cheerfully and willingly to obey the Commands thereof and with the loss of his own goods to redeem the publick safety not only upon that account that his Country being betrayed to his Enemies by his unseasonable parsimoniousness it is sure enough that every private person will be suddenly sensible of the ensuing calamity but especially out of the Conscience of his duty because that every good man is to preferâ— the publick above all private interests I say in the third place That a Subject unlesse some remarkable necessity doth appear or fear of publick danger is ordinarily not obliged to obey a Law that is so extremely burthensome as to bring with it the certain ruine of his whole Estate or the imminent danger of his life But he is bound as generally hath been already spoken and which almost in all cases I would have you to observe that we may need not any more to repeat it to you to make not the least resistance but patiently to endure whatsoever injury or contumely shall be brought upon him by the superiour powers IX The third doubt is concerning things necessary as if the Law of men should command any thing which was necessary before and commanded by the Law of God or forbid any thing which was before unlawful and prohibited by the Law of God What is the obligation in this case I answer briefly That the Subject by this Law is absolutely obliged For first the obligation which was in force before the Law of God doth not hinder the effect of the Law of man by excluding a new obligation for a man by many bonds may be obliged to the performance of one and the same duty as I have already declared in the former Lecture to which reason we may also adde another which is that oftentimes the Law of man doth adde something to the Law of God to wit by determining the Act as to the substance of it commanded by the Law of God and therefore necessary as to the manner quantity or some other circumstanceâ— of it which was free before or by adding some determination to the Law of God prohibiting a thing unlawfull as to the degree of the Crime or the manner of the punishment or the measure of it or other things of the like nature for examples sake it is by Divine right that there should be publick congregations to perform
Subject is not bound by that Law It was my first Conclusion in the former Lecture and confirmed by many Arguments and if any man be yet unsatisfied it may be further proved For no inferior power can oblige against the will of the superior power therefore the power of God being above all the power of Men there is no power of any man whatsoever that can oblige against the will of God who by his Law hath forbidden all wicked and filthy things from whence is that of Saint Augustin There can be seen no Law which is not just And by this reason the Argument drawn from that of obedience is answered by granring that the Subject ought to submit himself without dispute to the will of his Superior to wit the supreme superior into whose will all obedience is ultimately resolved Quod jubet homo prohibet Deus ego audiam hominem surdus Deo Beâ—nard Epist 7. and not of the subordinate Superior if it appeareth that his will is averse to the supreme superior Now God is absolutely the chief Commander the bare signification of whose will is sufficient to induce an obligation of Obedience especially since it is most certain that his will cannot be unjust Therefore Abraham obeyed God commanding those things which if God himself had not given him the charge might seem not only to be hard and unjust but impious and full of wickednesse To wit that his Father his Country and kindred being all abandoned he should become a poor banished Man and travel into a remote and an unknown Country nay that with his own hand he should cut the throat of his own Son in whom alone was not only all the Comfort and the Succour of his Age but all the Hope of the Promises of God and that he should lay him on the Altar and offer him as a Sacrifice to that God who commanded of him such cruel things He did rightly indeed and as it became a man who deserved to be called the Father of the Faithful and to be the singular Example of an unshaken Faith to all the world without the least haesitation and with a most willing obedience he made himself ready to put in Execution the Commands of God But as for the Commandments of men seeing that every man is lyable to Errour and sin and his Will may be depraved it is very lawful nay where there is a just Cause of suspition it is needful also to examine and to try them That admonition of the Apostle 1. Thess 5. 2. Try all things and keep that which is good may with great right and as fitly be applyed to the commands of the Superiors as to the Instructions of Teachers of whom notwithstanding St. Paul in that place doth especially speak Away then with the haughtiness and proud commands of over-lording Spirits sic volo sic jubeo This will I have This I do command Away with the base flattery of the Papists who think it a sin for any man in any manner whatsoever to suspect the Dictates of their Lateran Jove Away with their blind obedience by which those that enter into their Religious Houses do by a vow oblige themselves to obey their Superiors in every thing and in all things without distinction XIII In the third place it is propounded Whether it be Lawful for a Subject to depart from his own right Pura mala ut nunquam justè juberi sic nec licite possunt fieri Bernard Epist 7. and although he be not obliged yet of his own accord to obey such an evil Law I answer it is not lawful for the law of God doth simply oblige to the not doing of any thing that is evil or unlawful Therefore an unjust Law I understand unjust in that sense in which we now speak as unjust in relation to the matter cannot lawfully be kept because God cannot lawfully be offended For whatsoever is repugnant to the Law of God or to the light of Nature known and written in our hearts or revealed in the written word is not to be admitted by a Christian either to avoyd any particular detriment whatsoever or the scandal of our Neighbours or to promote the favour or to decline the hatred of our Superiors Daveniam Imperator tu Carcerem ille Gehennam were the words of the primitive Christians Excuse us Emperor you can only condemn us to prison but God unto Hell And so before them said the Apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ Whether it be right in the sight of God Act. 41. 9. to hearken unto you rather than unto God judge yee And before them the three young men of the Hebrews in the third of Daniel Dan. 3. 18. Be it known unto thee O King that we will not serve thy Gods nor worship the Golden Image which thou hast set up XIV In the fourth place it is demanded What Law is to be thought so unjust that it is not only not obliging but moreover it is unlawful to obey it I answer a Law may be said to be unjust for manifold considerations First if it be made by one who is not invested with a lawful power and so it is unjust Proper defectum Justitiae Commutativae for the defect of Justice commutative because the Lawgiver assumeth more than is due or by right doth belong unto him it doth not therefore oblige the Subject to obedience neverthelesse the Subject if it seems expedient to him and he be not otherwise hindred may depart from his own right and obey that Law Secondly in consideration of the Final cause if it doth not tend to the publick good nor preserve the rights due unto the Commonalty And this Law is unjust by reason of the defect of that Justice which they call Legal which alwayes intendeth the common good and that the republick may receive no detriment a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Homer 〈◊〉 ad â— But this Law howsoever it be unjust doth notwithstanding oblige the Subject for the Subject is no competent nor fit Judge of Legal Justice and if by his obedience any thing doth follow which is either incommodious or noxious to the Commonwealth it is not to be imputed to him who performed his part well enough but to the Supreme Magistrate whose duty it was to provide for the preservation and advancement of the publick good Thirdly in consideration of the Formal Cause if the Law by an unequal proportion and not by merit of the Citizens doth dispence and distrbute Burdens and Favors Pâ—nishments and Rewards This Law is unjust by reason of the defect of Justice distributive which commandeth to give all things by equity to every one as every one hath deserved And this Law howsoever it be unjust doth notwithstanding oblige as well as that of which but now I spoke of and for the same Cause for the dispensation of these things doth not belong to the office of a Subject but of the Supreme Magistrate Fourthly in consideration of
clear indeed from the fault by reason of his invincible Ignorance which was impossible to be helped and consequently he ought to be free from the punishment which justly is due to no man but for the fault neverthelesse he shall not only sustain the Dammage by reason of the nullity of the Contract which he entred into but he is bound also to sustain it according to Conscience both by the force of obedience which is due unto the Law and by his reflection on the publick profit The like is to be determined in many other Laws of the like nature For examples sake In those Laws by which persons are disabled by which privileges are revoked In those Laws by which Usury is moderated and in those by which certain prices of things to be sold are constituted and in the like of which the Canonists and the Divines do treat at large Neither ought this seem to be unjust to any man for although a Dammage be sometimes called a Punishment it is only analogically and very improperly for otherwise there is a great difference betwixt a Dammage and a Penalty or punishment properly so called If an innocent person be punished a great injury is done unto him but often it comes to passe that an innocent person may be dammaged and yet no great injury done unto him And thus much as conduceth to our present purpose may suffize to be spoken of the promulgation of the Law X. In the next place we are to speak of the penal Law in which many things being omitted which unprofitably are accustomed to be disputed by many of the Casuists and which pertain rather to the external and pleading Courts as that of the Canonists and Papists than to the internal Court of Conscience we shall be contented to give a view unto you of some few and the most remarkable of them and which most neerly we conceive do conduce to the Government of Conscience In this kind we meet first of all with this doubt Whether the Constitution of the punishment doth any wayes pertain to the Essence of the Law I answer It seemeth that it doth not as something that is extrinsecally requisite to compleat the Essence of it so that the Law were not a Law if the penalty were not annexed to it but only consequently as something necessary to this that the Law may effectually obtain the end which it intended For the Form and Essence of the Law consisteth in the Precept of it I here understand Precept as it is largely taken to comprehend a prohibition with it as in the Scriptures are the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and amongst the Divines as well Negative Commandments as Affirmative are commonly called Precepts And from this Precept alone both the powers do depend which we have said to be in the Law viz. the power of directing the Action and of obliging the Consciences of the Subjects For the Subject hath a sufficient Rule according to which he ought to direct his Actions and to the observation whereof unlesse he will be wanting in his duty he is bound in Conscience as soon as he understands that his lawful Superior hath commanded this or that by Law whether there be any punishment annexed to that Law or not Therefore this necessity of annexing the punishment doth not arise from the Nature of the Law it self which consisteth in the meer Precept but that the Precept which of it self would not barely suffice Tatitè permittitur quod sâ—ne ultiâ—ne prohibetur Tert. 1. contra Marcion 26. may with the greater vigour obtain its effect from another double Hypothesis the one of the Subject the other of the End For it is expedient that the Laws should be most religiously observed which is the Hypothesis in respect of the End neverthelesse the inbred Depravity of mans heart being supposed w ch is another Hypothesis in respect of the Subject it can very hardly or almost never come to passe but that the most profitable Laws will be despised either by the negligence or the perversenesse of most men unlesse by fear they are contained within their bounds Qui ratione traduci ad meliora non possunt solo metu continentur Quintil. 12. Instit who make but a mock of the Dictates of Conscience From this double Hypothesis it comes to passe that the wisest Law-makers have alwayes judged it necessary and saving to the Common-wealth to add more force to the observation of the Laws by the fear of punishments and that after the example of God himself who pronounced not the first Law which he gave to man without the threatning of a punishment Gen. 3. Some good Citizens peradventure whose number are but few induced only by the Conscience of their Duty and their Love unto Virtue and their Country would render Obedience unto the Laws although there were no punishment propounded but the Turba or the greatest number are inforced only by the fear of punishment to the performance of their Duties It is manifest hereby that the Constitution of punishments in the making of Laws is necessary XI The second Doubt is concerning the obligation of the penal Law as to the extension of it whether the penal Law doth oblige only unto the penalty or whether it obligeth unto the fault also Which is to demand if a Subject may so satisfie the Law and his Duty if being prepared to undergoe and by undergoing the penalty constituted by the Law he may be no longer guilty of the Delinquency although he observeth not the command of the Law Or whether for all that he is not bound in Conscience to the performance of that which is by the is Law commanded That more clearly and distinctly we may answer to this doubt it being a Question of great Moment and of which in the Common Lives of Men there is a most frequent use It will not be amisse the better to unfold it to premise some things which are very profitable before hand to be known We are to understand therfore in the first place that that positive Humane Law ought only to be called Penal which by the will of the Legislator doth expresly determine some temporal punishment for the Transgressors of it And in all this discourse as often as mention is made of punishment you are to understand no other but only a Temporal punishment This word Temporal punishment is taken in a twofold Consideration either as 't is opposed to the Spiritual or as it is opposed to Eternal punishment And for the most part in common discourse they are taken as Members contradistinct to one another sometimes Spiritual opposed to Temporal and sometimes Eternal unto Temporal there are therefore three kinds of punishments or if you will you may call them Species or manners of punishments or degrees of punishments For whatsoever comes under the name of punishment is first Either a spiritual punishment as the losse or the deprivation of Grace
he feared if he should make a halt there and pursue them no further by reason of the fear of the Laws they might escape away he was therefore so venturous that for all the Law he brought the trayned Bands into the County that was contigious to it where having overtaken the Traitors he reduced them unto his Power and took along with him the Ringleaders of them with the rest of that desperate Rabble He conceived to himself as indeed he ought to do if he should throughly perform the duty of a good Subject he could never express it in a more honourable service and in that point of Necessity the more strict observance of the Laws was unseasonable he was therefore to obey the supreme Law that is to say the safety of his Country and to disregard all things in respect to the publick profit The Business being thus dispatched according to his own Desire the wise and active Gentleman least the Authority of the Laws should be disparaged by his Example which indeed was to be imputed to Necessity and being sensible withal to how greivous a Punishment they are lyable in the Rigor of the Law who are the violators of it believed he had not done enough to acquiesce in the consciousnesse only of what he had atchieved unlesse withal he had made a provision for his safety for the Time to come and took as much care as in him lay that no man should abuse his Example by peradventure too boldan undertaking of any new Design He therefore posts away unto King James of happy memory and prostrating himself at his feet he humbly craved pardon for the violation of the Law and as he deserved he not only from the most prudent King obtained pardon for the not observance of the Law but praise for preferring the publick safety above it XXIII To give satisfaction to some friends I have here my Auditors expounded to you a little more largely then my Custome is what is the sence of that Axiom Salus populi suprema Lex The safety of the people is the supreme Law and to stop withal the Mouths of some importunate Men who to speak with Solomon do force blood from the too much wringed Nose that is by misinterpreting a pious saying and indeed if it be rightly understood salubrious to the publick they perversly render it impious and destructive unto mankind To be short the sum of all is this If some private persons be hurt or injured If the Subjects have some publick Grievances of which they justly may complain they must not presently have a recourse as if the safety of the people were in the extremest Jeopardy to extraordinary Remedyes and which are contrary to the Laws But if there be a just fear that the Common-wealth will be ruinated either by forein Enimyes or seditious Subjects unless somthing be effected which is not permited by the Laws It is then lawful for the Prince by the Prerogative of his own Power nay it is lawful for the Subjects by the presumed Will of their Prince provided nothing be acted to his prejudice and the present exigence of Necessity so requireth to recede from the word and sence of particular Laws to assist the endangered Country and to be serviceable to the safety thereof as to the supremest Law I shall suddenly proceed to prosecute the rest as God shall permit and opportunity shall inable me The Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ c. Thus far I have committed the Sayls unto the Winds although in a blustring season and the face of Heaven being masked with many Clouds yet God being my Pilot I safely proceeded in my intended course and now I did begin to stand more off to Sea being resolved if the Times would give me leave to have reached the desired Port when behold a suddain and over-powering Tempest did over my head admonish me that for the time to come it would be very unsafe to adventure further or to continue ploughing through these unquiet Deeps I perceived therefore that new Counsels were forthwith to be taken and unless I would be come the reproach and sport of the Winds I must no longer stay on such a dangerous and such a vaunting Sea I suddenly therefore tacked about and timely brought my Ship into the Haven for it seemed to me more honourable gradually to retreat than to be beaten back by force and more profitable for my affairs to live within my own doors with ease and umbrage than to be seen in the Market place or on the Theatre attended with noyse and fear and envy Hinc eadem FINIS discriminis atque laboris Therefore till Heaven some calmer days shall send The Work and Dangers here together END THE END THE FOLGER SHAKESPEARE LIBRARY
8. c. No nor all those deeds neither which are praised 78 12. It is an easy thing to erre in the application of examples 82 14. c. Some examples of perverse Imitation 85 16. c. An argument from the example examined against the custom of kneeling in the holy Supper 87 23. c. What is the use of examples 95 25. c. It is unsafe to subject the Conscience to the opinions of every man 99 28. The tyranny of the Pope of Rome over the Consciences of men 102 29. c. Not to impute too much to the judgements of other men ibid. 31. Nor yet too little 104 The Summary of the Fourth Lecture 1. c. What is that Rule of Conscience to be enquired after 106 4. c. To which we ought to conform our selves 109 6. c. Diverse Degrees of those things which do oblige the Conscience 111 9. c. The first Conclusion God alone hath a peculiar and a direct command over the Conscience 113 12. c. The second Conclusion The next Rule of Conscience is right reason 116 14. c. The third Conclusion The Scripture is not the Adaequate Rule of Conscience 119 18. c. And nothing hereby derogated from the perfection of it 124 20. c. The fourth The Adaequate Rule of Conscience is the will of God which way soever it be manifested 126 23. Which is also the Fundamental of the Obligation 13 24. c. The three parts of this rule first the light by nature infused into the mind which is the Law of Nature 131 26. Secondly the light conveyed into the mind by the written Word of God 27. c. 32. c. In the old Law or the Law of Moses 137 In the new Law the Law of the Gospel 142 35. Thirdly the â—ight acquired 143 Which consisteth by 36. The discourse of Reason 145 37. And the Authority of the Church ibid. The Summary of the Fifth Lecture 1. c. A rehearsal of what before hath been spoken 147 2. c. What is to be understood by the word LAW 149 5. And what by the word OBLIGATION ibid. 6. Question Whether Humane Laws do oblige the Conscience 154 7. c. The first Conclusion Unjust Laws do not oblige the Conscience 155 Which is unfolded 157 9. And confirmed 158 10. The Second Conclusion The Law of man can superinduce a new Obligation to the former 159 11. The Third Conclusion A Law made by one not invested with lawful doth not oblige 162 14. c. A Discourse concerning the Office of a Subject when de Facto it is manifest that he commandeth who hath no right to command 166 22. The Fourth Conclusion Humane Laws do oblige of themselves in general 175 23. And in particular also by consequence 177 24. c. Which is variously confirmed 178 31. c. An Objection is answered drawn from the liberty of a Christian Man 184 36 As also from the allegation that there is but one Law-giver God and Christ 190 37. And from what else is disputed against this opinion 191 The Summary of the Sixth Lecture 1. A proposal of the most remarkable things here treated of 2. The duty of Obedience and the difference of the either sort of Subjection 197 4. The Conscience is free under that obligation which the Laws induce 20â— 6. c. The first Doubt Of a Law commanding a thing impossible 202 8. Second Doubt Or a thing possible but very burthensome 204 9. Third Or what before was necessary 205 10. c. Fourthly Or a thing filthy and unlawful wherein are Questions and Answers 207 10. 13. 14. 1 Whether an unjust Law ought to be made for the publick profit ibid. 2 Whether the Subject be bound to observe it so made 210 3 Whether it be lawful for him to observe it so made 4 what unjust Law he may obey and what not 213 15. 16. c. What is required to make a Law obligatory 214 What a Subject is to do being not satisfied whether the Law be just or unjust 215 18. c. The Fifth of the Obligation of a Law permiting evil 217 22. c. Sixth Of a Law determining a thing indifferent 222 26. The Seventh Of Ecclesiastical Laws in specie 226 27. Those things are refelled which are alleaged against them by the adverse party 228 The Summary of the Seventh Lecture 1. A Rehearsal of what hath been already spoken 238 2. c. The first Doubt who it is to whom it belongeth to make Laws 237 Where it is stated that That the Power of making Laws is the Power of a Superior 238 4. Having an external Jurisdiction 239 5. And that in the highest Command 241 6. c. Which conclusion is largely unfolded 243 9. c. And diversly confirmed 246 11. c. The late fiction of a Co-ordinate Power confuted 248 13. The second Doubt Whether the Consent of the people be required to the obligation of a Law 250 14. c. The chief Command or Soveraignty is from God 253 19. And is an off-spring of Fatherly Power 255 17. c. What are the Peoples parts in constituting a Prince 259 21. The People having given the supreme Power to the Prince have not any right to re-assume that Power again 261 22. c. How it comes to passe that some consent of the people is thought to be necessary to the obligation of a Law 264 25. c. The third Doubt what And how far the consent of the people is required 266 28. The fourth Doubt Of the Laws of lesse Commonaltyes 268 The Summary of the Eighth Lecture 1. A Proposal of things to be spoken 273 2. Of the PROMULGATION of a LAW 274 The first Doubt Whether it be necessary 275 3. c. The second Doubt When a Law is conceived to be sufficiently published 276 6. The third Doubt When a Law that is promulgated or published beginneth to oblige 279 7. c. The Fourth Doubt Whether and how far that man is obliged to the observance of a Law who is ignorant of the Promulgatian of it 281 10. Of a LAW PENAL 28â— The first Doubt How far the Constitution of the penalty pertaineth to the Essence of a Law ibid. 1. c. The second Doubt Of the Obligation of it And what a penalty is 287 3. c. What manner of Law a Penal Law is and how manifold it is 290 5. c. The first Conclusion A Penal Law doth so far oblige as the Legislator doth intend it 293 7. c. The second Conclusion A Law purely Penal doth of it self and ordinarily oblige only unto the penalty 295 9. c. Diverse Objections are answered 299 4. The third Conclusion A mixt Penal Law doth oblige unto the Fault also 304 5. The third Doubt How far the transgressor of the Law is bound to undergoe the penalty ipso facto The Summary of the Ninth Lecture â— The end of the Law is the good of the
prove being now as I conceive sufficiently confirmed I hope it will not be inconsonant nor ungratefull certainly not unprofitable to you to derive some corallaries from it which may be usefull to us all for the institution of our lives and manners It followeth therefore in the first place from that which is already spoken that all pious men must take heed least being transported by a zeal to the glory of God they be carryed away to unlawfull Acts. There is no true Christian will deny but that the glory of God is the supreme and ultimate end of all our actions Whether we eat or drink or whatsoever we do it must be all done to the glory of God 1 Cor. 10 31. But being transported with too hasty and too prepostrous a zeal to the glory of God what contumelies what slaughters did not those men of that faction amongst the people of the Jews commit who peculiarly were called Zelots And amongst Christians in the memory of our Fathers the same things have been recorded by men worthy of belief and who were no ways ignorant of the transactions of the affairs of their times to have been done in Germany and other places by the Anabaptists in whose Chronologies such horrid acts and so far from all humanity are reported that we should hardly have given any belief unto them if we had not of late seen the same tragedies every day to be prodigiously acted to the life by their unhappy off-spring the dismal scene being translated into our Britannies XVI That none of you may be deceived therefore with so splendid a deceit and that you may not deceive others Consider with your selves in the first place that all Seducers the ministers of Satan and instructed by Satan himself the chief Seducer 1 Cor. 11. 14. who is accustomed to transform himself into an Angel of light have not more advanced themselves by any artifice nor imposed more upon the belief of the common people of Christendom nor more vigorously troubled the peace of our Churches and Common-wealths than under the pretence of the glory of God and of the reformation of Religion and of the propagation of the Gospell and of rooting out superstition and of the exalting of the Kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ The most eminent of the Protestant Ministers in the preceeding age as Calvin Bucer Zuinglius and others have all along in their writeings grievously complayned of this Amongst whom Jerome Zanchius a man second unto few in learning modesty and piety hath this expression Ego non intelligo istam reformatorum mundi Theologiam Zanchius I do not understand this divinity of the new Reformers of the world I would to God that the experience of what is dayly acted amongst us did not confirm too much the truth of that vulgar Proverb In nomine Domini incipit omne malum Secondly Consider with your selves with how great and how perverse a heat of Spirit the glory of God is pretended to all wars tumults quarrelling contentions and unprofitable disputations of which the holy Apostles of our Lord Jesus did hardly ever make mention of and full often they have mentioned it but in order to peace and brotherly-love and that sweet deportment in things indifferent which especially becommeth Christians that so no man might abuse that liberty which we do by the benefit of Christ to be an offence or a stumbling-block unto his Brother In the third place consider that the man who doth propound unto himself the glory of God to be his End must also propound unto himself the Law of God to be the Rule of all his actions Ad Legem Testimonium to the Law and to the Testimony Isa 8. 20. Grant that the respect unto the glory of God is the final cause of thy acting as it is fit it should be so but the Rule and as it were the formal Reason of thy acting is not to be the glory of God but his revealed Will In the whole course of our lives the glory of God is to be looked upon as the mark or the Gole to which we run but we must look upon the Rule also that so we may go the right way which doth bring us to it lest that deservedly be objected to us which is commonly spoken Benè curritis sed extrà viam You run well but you run out of the way Lastly consider that the glory of God in the respect of singular actions hath the estimation of an end transcendental Now it is manifest that to a Transcendent no Individual can immediately be subjected so not of any singular Ens or being whether it be substantial or accidental is immediately subjected to the summum Ens or the chief being Therefore as Ens transcendentale the transcendental being is verified of every very being which is in one of the ten praedicaments whether it be universal or singular so the glory of God is the end of all duties of all acts thereto pertaining which expressly and virtually are contained in any praecept of the Decalogue God is to be worshipped our Parents honoured our Neighbours beloved our promises performed Justice Truth and Chastity preserved and other duties of Piety and Charity performed to the honour and glory of God Now as nothing hath truly the condition of an Ens or being which may not aptly be reduced to some species of it in some one of the ten praedicaments so no particular action let men that mind their own ends say what they will to the contrary can ever truly and properly be referred to the glory of God as to its end which is not reducible to some duty of piety and charity grounded in some one of the ten Commandments of the Law of God He but deludes you therefore whosoever he is who obstreperously cries out the glory of God the glory of God and yet is not able to tell you by what commandment in the Law of God he can maintain that which he vainly professeth that he performeth for the glory of God XVII From the Conclusion above named it followeth in the second place that they are in a great error who think it is lawfull for them to commit a lesse sin that a greater sin might be avoyded many things are alledged to maintain this error as in the first place that common saying which is in the mouth of every man * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist 2. Ethic. 9. Of evils we must choose the least and to give a reason for what they say they alledge that of Aristot that a †〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Id. 5. Ethic. 7. lesse evil being compared with a greater may be taken for a good To which is added that of Gregorius magnus Dum mens inter minora et maxima peccata constringitur si nullus omninò sine peccato evadendi aditus pateat minorà semper elegantur When the mind is perplexed betwixt less sins and those of a higher nature if there be no possibility
and proceed XXIII The fourth argument is taken from the end and proper use of examples for we must duely confesse that examples in themselves are of great use both for the institution of our manners and for the amendment of our lives And certainly otherwise so many precepts had not been left us in the word of God for whatsoever is there written is written for our instruction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom 15 4. And for our admonition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither would the Apostles otherwise have so constantly inclucated them My brothers take the Prophets for an example of patience you have heard of the patience of Job Elias prayed James 5. 19 11. 17. Again Be you followers of me as I am of Christ 1 Cor. 11. 1. What you have heard and seen in me do those things Philip. 4. 9. Observe those who so do walk as you have us for an example Phil. 3. 17. And the like in many places But the use and end of examples are not to be rules unto us for good liveing but only as helps and as it were spurs to shake off our dulness and to rouze our sloth when we are more heavy and dull in the performance of our duties than indeed we ought to be For humane frailty especially upon some great temptations and violent suggestions of the Devil and the World is commonly attended with many murmurings and complaints against the security of the Law of God and the difficulty of giving obedience to it nay oftentimes it is heard to cry out that there are Lyons in our way and that there are snares and stumbling blocks laid under our feet to cause us to trip and fall that we must endure injuries contumelies and calumnies the plundring of our goods the sequestering of our Estates the loss of our dear parents and of those dearer pledges our Wives and Children and that with the losse of our friends that we must lose our Countrey nay even life it self and become a hatred even to those who most of all are obliged to love us How unpleasing are these discourses How unsupportable is the burden of this oppression As often as these thoughts and the like do invade our minds so that we even begin to despond all hope and even to abandon the care of all our duties as of things impossible which in vain we do endeavour to perform our languishing spirits are revived and raysed by the seasonable authority of examples Tuâ—â—iter desperatur quicquid fieri potest Quint. 1. Instit 10. cum quid difficile videtur difficiliora alios obeuntes reâ—â—â— amus Tert. 1. ad uxor â— and are by degrees encouraged and armed to despise all difficulties overcome all temptations and to endure all contumelies whatsoever when I say we seriously thus do consider that pious godly men and obnoxious to the same troubles and temptations with us being assisted by the grace of God which will not be wanting unto us if we wholy depend upon it and faithfully adde our endeavours thereunto have performed and endured all those things which by the help of God are to be performed and to be endured by us our spirits will begin to return and our brests grow warm with a godly emulation the fire will burn within ns as we are musing and in the fulnesse of the heart these or the like expressions will break forth Behold Lord I am ready to perform what thou commandest and to undergo what thou layest upon me The same cloud of witnesses that which way soever we look doth every where surround us will perswade us also that all revenge distemper of spirit being cast away as also the importunity of sin which as it doth closely embrace us so if we use our best endeavours by the grace of God will with no great difficulty abandon us we couragiously constantly and patiently do run the race that is set before us XXIV St. James the Apostle in his fifth Chapter doth exhort us to a fervency in prayer after the example of Elias who by the importunity of his prayer did as it were at his pleasure lock and unlock the Gates of Heaven And that no man might conceive that it was to be imputed rather to the sanctity and the merits of Elias than to the promise of God to the prayers of the faithfull by the Covenant of Grace The Apostle in the very begining of this narration doth take away all occasion of suspition Elias saith he was a man the same passions with us verse 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He was a man not a God or an Angell nor made of better clay but out of the same masse out of which all other men are fashioned This here urged is the most proper the most profitable use of examples we ought therefore to bear in our minds that examples are not the rule it self neither do they carry with them the weight or estimation of a rule nay if any doubt be made of the uprightness or the pravity of the act they are themselves to be brought and diligently to be examined by the Rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith St. James in his fifth Chapter and the 〈◊〉 verse where I know not well if that word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth carry with it a special force of signification Certainly it seemeth unto me to imply that the acts of the holy Prophets are no◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal coppy and example which is to be observed by us but as it were the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the second example which is not of authority of it self or for it self but so far to be believed and received as it agreeeth with the original From what hitherto hath been spoken it may be now made manifest that it doth not suffice to prove the goodness of any humane act that it is comformable to the example of some good and holy man and therefore no mans Conscience can securely and safely acquiesse therein unless the example it self be comformable to the rule XXV Again that we may now come to the other part of our proposition The account is almost the same of another mans judgment as of his example and that almost for the same Causes so that we need not to make many words to enlarge our selves upon this Subject I will therefore run it over in as few as I can And in the first place all men though godly and learned are no less lyable unto errours than they are to sins nay peradventure much more and therefore we ought to have a more acute investigation of the mind to discover the difference betwixt Truth and Falshood then betwixt Good and Evil First by reason of that natural ignorance with which our minds are darkened and vaild as with a cloud Secondly by reason of our education which fashione and formeth our minds as yet but tender and doth imprint certain notions on them which it is no easy task to expunge Thirdly by reason of
long use and Custome which is as it were another nature Fourthly by reason of the depraved affections which do ecclipse our judgments and do hinder the right use of them From these and many other causes it is so obvious unto men to erre to fall and to be deceived that it hath been long agoe a proverb Humanum est errare It is the property of a man to erre XXVI Adde to this in the second place that not we our selves do not alwayes sincerely judge of their piety and wisdome whose Judgments we do desire to follow it being very customary with those men who permit themselves to be governed by the arbitration of other men to make choice of such Conductors whom they before are confident will lead them in that way in which before hand they had determined to go themselves Thus doth Satan hold fast unwary men being as it were inclosed in his circle If you demand of them why they suppose such a thing to be true and right they answer Because this or that wise and godly man hath so taught us If you again shall demand of them how they do know their Teacher to be a pious and a prudent man they answer or at least would so answer if they would speak according to their hearts because he thinketh as we do think Et sapit mecum facit Jove judicat aequo The man is wise and doth as I intend And judgeth rightly having Jove his friend Many there are indeed who do measure the piety of other men not according to the practice of the duties of a Christians life and by the works of righteousnesse Mercy Charity and Devotion but by an affection to that faction to which they have bequeathed themselves and by the hatred to another party to which they professe themselves to be Enemies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith the Apostle 2 Tim. 4. 3. They shall heap up unto themselves Teachers according to their own desires The Metaphor following is most proper 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when their ears do itch they seek those that will tickle them and thus the same doth befall them which in the old proverb is expressed Muli se mutuo scabunt One Mule doth scratch another XXVII Thirdly the word of God doth expressely forbid us to subject our Consciences to the judgment of any other or to usurp a Dominion over the Consciences of any one Ne vocemini Rabbi unus est enim vester 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Magister Praeceptor Doctor Unctor Christus Be not ye called Rabbi for one is your Master who is Christ the word in the original signifies as well School-master Tutor Leader as Master And my brethren be you not many masters saith St. James Chap. 3. verse 5. To this purpose is that of St Peter in his first Book Chap 5. verse 2. Feed you the Flock of God which is committed to you 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as holding forth a light before them that is the Doctrine of the true faith and the example of a godly life but not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not as excercising a domination and an uncontrouled empire over the Clergy or the people of God And again 1 Cor. 7. 23. Empâ—i estis pretio nolite fieri servi hominum You are bought with a price be you not made the servants of men that is do not submit your Consciences to be governed by the Authority of any man according to his pleasure and command XXVIII From these things which are thus stated and proved to give you now some few Corallaryes and those in a few words it followeth in the first place that the insupportable pride and tyranny of the Pope of Rome ought most deservedly to be hated by every true Christian who by arrogating an infallible judgment to himself and to his chair doth by that name exercise an usurping power and domination over the Consciences of men and pretendeth so much right thereunto that if he should say virtues were vices and vices virtues all Christians are bound under the penalty of mortal sin to submit to his judgment without the least doubt or scruple We are therefore with all thankfulnes to acknowledg the great and Singular goodnes and mercy of Almighty God who for these many years hath freed us and our fore-fathers and the Church of England from so unconscionable a Tyranny and hath again restored us to our just liberties XXIX But we must all of us and every one of us take heed that being freed now from that Tyranny we do not stoop our necks to a new bondage least we be found not so much to have shaken off our yoak as to have changed it Quae bellua ruptis Quùm semèl effugit reddit se prava catenis Horat. Like to the Beast who having broke his chain Fondly returns to have it on again 2 Satyr 9. It doth indeed concern us highly if seriously we would provide for the peace of our own Consciences or of the Church and Common-wealth to take care least what heretofore was spoken of the Church of Corinth I am of Paul I of Apollos and I of Cephas be not heard of us I am of Luther I of Calvin I of Arminius and I of Socinius No let God be true and every man a Lyar He is not worthy to be Christs Disciple who is not the Disciple of Christ alone The simplicity and sincerity of the Christian Faith hath suffered a great prejudice since we have been divided into parties neither is there any hope that Religion should be restored to her former vigour and purity until the wounds made wider by our daily quarrels and dissentions being anointed with the Oyl of Brotherly Love as with a Balsome shall begin to close again and to grow intire into the same unity of Faith and Charity XXX In the third place we are to take heed lest being too indulgent to our depraved affections we do suffer our selves to be so drawn aside into the admiration of some men that we wholly depend upon their Authority Jude 1◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In which words the Apostle with a finger pointeth at the very Fountain of all this evill For this perverse admiration of Names hath no other Spring from whence it floweth but from this desperate self-admiration viz. whiles every man studyeth his own profit is ambitious of Honour and pursueth vain-glory and esteemeth no otherwise of all other men than according to the advantage he may receive from them And his Judgement being corrupted with these sordid affections he is most ready to admire those persons whom he thinks will be most ready to advance his Profit Honour Glory and his other inordinate desires And the very same thing another of the Apostles whom already I have cited doth expressely intimate they did choose unto them Master 2. Tim. 4. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to their own desires XXXI Neverthelesse that due Authority may be given to the Catholick Church
Conscience that the said obligation doth not signifie any compulsion for to speak properly the Conscience can no more be compelled than the free-Will but a power rather and authority which she is bound to obey to urge her to the performance of that which belongs unto her duty In the very same manner altogether as a King who hath the Legislative power by enacting lawes doth oblige his subjects to the observation of them As therefore in the external Courts Subjects properly and formally are obliged to obedience not so much by the law it self as by the power of the Law-giver howsoever the Law it self is said to oblige but when it is so spoken it is to be understood improperly and as it were materially and terminatively because the obligation is made by it and to it so the Law is said to judge John 7. 5. Doth our Law judge any one although the Law it self doth not judge but the Magistrate because the Magistrate ought to judge according to the Law so in the internal Court the Rule or the Law imposed on Conscience doth not properly oblige it but the power and authority of the Imposer yet so as by the Consequent truly and not unaptly although not so properly the Rule it self may be said to carry with it an obliging Virtue When therefore it is demanded what is that which obligeth Conscience to the performance of her duty At the same time both these questions are propounded First and principally who is the Lord of Conscience who hath right and power to impose a Rule or Law upon it to which it ought to conforme it self And then secondly and consequently what is that Rule of Conscience or that Law which is imposed on it by the Lord thereof and to which by his dominion and Empire over it it is bound to conform it self VI. In the fifth place it is to be understood when any thing is attributed to another it is attributed either by it self or not by it self that is to say by accident Those things therefore to which the power of obliging the Conscience is any ways to be attributed do fall under a threefold consideration For in the first place they either oblige the Conscience simply by themselves that is they do directly oblige by themselves and by their own power not only as the Term by it self is opposed to the Term by accident but as it opposed also to this Term by another Or in the second place they do oblige by themselves respectively that is as the Term by it self is opposed to the Term by accident and not as it is opposed to the Term per aliud that is by another The meaning is they do not oblige by their own proper power but by the vertue of another having a power to oblige Or thirdly they do oblige by accident only and in neither of the considerations by it self It is besides observable that in those things which do oblige the Conscience in the second consideration there is some difference to be made according to the different account of the cause from whence the obligation doth arise For it is one thing when the obligation is forcibly imposed by the authority of another and another thing when it is willingly contracted and of its own accord By this that hath been spoken it is manifest that there are four degrees of those things which do oblige the Conscience For examples sake to give you a short view of what hath been already spoken and of what as yet remaineth to be spoken you are to understand in the first place that the express Commandment of God doth oblige properly by it self and by its own force In the second place the Laws of men and the mandates and orders of our Superiours do oblige the Conscience but by no power or authority but by the vertue of the Commandement of God Thirdly Vows and promises being made of our own accord when it was wholy in our own choice to do otherwise do in their proper fact and freedom of election oblige our Consciences to the performance of them Fourthly and lastly the Law of consideration of Scandal and offence doth by accident oblige the Conscience VII We are here to understand that only that obligation which consisteth in the first degree is absolute and universal the other three are relative and particular I say it is absolute because it doth directly and alwayes oblige and because it obligeth all persons and the obligation of it is never to be cancell'd The others may be said to be relative both because they do not bind of themselves or by their own power but by a relation to some precept or institution of God as also because they do not always or every where oblige and in every case but when those considerations do require which they do bear a reference and respect unto The obligation therefore of the first degree is predominant over any obligation whatsoever in the other three insomuch that it is able to make them of no effect but it is impossible for them to render it frustrate Nay if we take it universally the obligation in any superiour degree the other being equall is more valid than the obligation in any inferiour degrees whatsoever and doth judge over them either by taking away what was done and contracted as oftentimes or at least by hindring what was to be done as always Therefore as to the power of obligation the Laws of men must give place to the Laws of God private contracts and promises to publick constitutions and the Law or consideration of offence or scandal to them both VIII These things being thus premised that we may be happy in a certain Rule by which we may know how to live I will according to my promise comprehend in some few conclusions those which are most necessary to be understood concerning the Rule of Conscience and the passive obligation of it The first conclusion is That God alone hath a most proper and direct command on the Consciences of all men So that none but God alone hath power to impose a Law upon the Conscience of any man to which it ought to be subjected as obliging by it self I say by it self for we are all bound in our Consciences to observe the just Laws of men to keep our vows and promises made to God or men and to be careful that we become not a scandal or an offence unto others But we are bound unto all these things upon no other tye but as they are reduceable to the will of God commanding them as in its due place we shall give an account unto you of the particulars thereof IX This Conclusion is proved first by the words of the Apostle already mentioned There is but one Law-giver who can both save and destroy In which words two arguments do prefer themselves to our observation In the first place they assert there is but one Legislator not one picked out amongst many not one above many but one
written in the Hearts of men in the very same manner as the Lawes of Cities or oâ— the Prince are accustomed to be inscribed in Tables of Brasse For they have the same authority and estimation of a Law or of a Rule imposed by God upon us as the Will of the Law-giver signified in a publick instrument and exposed to the peoples view is adjudged to be a Law XXV This natural Law doth consist of diveâ— practical principles which notwithstanding are redâ—ced to one first and universal Law which doth contain the other This universal Law though but short is bipartite of two parts viz. Good is to be done Evil is to be avoyded In the same manner all the Commandements in the Decalogue are reduced to one Universal Law to wit the love of God and the love of our neighbour To this Universal Law conserved in the Synteresis there are other particular Laws subordinated which are derived from it as Conclusions are from Premises some whereof are of the first Dictate of Nature and next of all adjoyning to that principal Law others stand farther off and have only a Secondary relation and by the virtue of those which are more neere Those which are of the first dictate of Nature as soon as they are presented to our minds and cogitations they presently command our belief and by reason of the undeniable evidence of them they do inforce us to assent unto them for it is not lawful to doubt of the truth of them nor is it possible for any one who understands the sence of the words to erre concerning them for no sooner it is propounded that God is to be worshiped and no man to be injured but the mind presently is at rest and without delay assenteth to it but in the latter by reason of the difference which may arise from Circumstances it most often comes to passe that we both doubt and erre and the more remote we are from those first Principles the more prone we are to run into error For the first and universal Principles are so much the more certain than the posterior and the particular as they are the lesse circumstanced For by Circumstances and by descending as commonly it is spoken we oftentimes do fall into errors The precepts of the first kind are that Parents are to be honoured Children nursed the life of our neighbours to be preserved the pledge to be restored which as they are commonly and for the most part to be observed yet they are not absolutely and simply if the thing and place which might so come to passe should otherwise require it For the Commands of the Parents are to be despised in comparison of the Love of God and there may be a just cause of disclayming unreclaymed Children and taking away the life of our neighbour neither is the sword to be restored to the mad man Near unto this distinction is that distribution of Offices Cicer. lib. 1. Offic. in Cicero which he hath taken from the Stoicks for with them a right and perfect Duty which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is one thing and a mean or a common duty which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is another Wherefore that the Conscience may judge more rightly and more certainly what is the will of God so far as is pertaining to this part of the Rule of it it will be requisite to direct it to the most universal precepts that possibly may be had and to those first Axioms which are of themselves to be believed But because I must make haste to other observations I shall here put a period to my discourse concerning this Law of Nature and present you with that of Cicero in his lost books de Republica which by Lactantius 6. Instit 8. is expressely thus recorded Est quidem verò lex recta ratio naturae congruens diffusa in omnes constans sempiterna quae vocet ad officium jubendo vetando à fraude detereat Huic legi nec obrogari fas est nec derogari ex hac aliquid licet neque tota abrogari potest Nec verò aut per Senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus Nec est quaerendus explanator aut interpres ejus alius Nec erit alia Lex Romae alia Athenis alia nunc alia posthac sed omnes gentes omni tempore una lex sempiterna immortalis continebit Unúsque erit communis quasi Magister imperator omnium Deus ille Legis hujus inventor disceptator lator cui qui non parebit ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernabitur atque hoc ipso luet maximas poenas etiamsi caetera supplicia quâ—e putantur effugerit The Law is right Reason agreeable to nature diffused into all constant everlasting which calleth unto duty by commanding and by forbidding deterreth from deceit This Law is not to be contradicted neither is it lawfull for any man to derogate from it neither is it possible that it should be altogether abrogated We cannot be discharged from it either by the Senate or the People It needs not an Expounder or Interpreter It will not bear one construction at Rome and another at Athens it will not be one now and another hereafter but being the same Law perpetual and immortal it includeth all Nations and at all times And there is as it were one common master and Soveraign Commander over all the one God the Inventor Discussor and Communicator of this Law whom whosoever shall not obey he shall fly from himself and be unworthy of the nature of man and for this alone shall grievously be tormented although he escapeth other punishments that are conceived A remarkable place and which so cleerly unfoldeth the force and nature of this inbred light that we need not to make any addition to it XXVI The second light which is conveyed into the mind as I have said doth come unto it from without and proceedeth from Divine Revelation to wit from that light which God hath held forth unto us in the holy Scriptures in which more fully he hath made known his will unto man that there nothing might be wanting which is necessary for the institution of his manners and the attainment of everlasting happinesse And the rather because the inward natural light as already I have shewed doth not suffice thereto Now this light differs from the natural light not only in its original but in its perfection First because it manifesteth the will of God in those things to which the light of Nature cannot attain Secondly because it ordinateth the moral actions dictated by the light of Nature to a higher end Thirdly because that whereas the Law ingraven in the mind is instituted by God as he is the Author of Nature This Law revealed in the word is instituted by him as he is the Author of Grace and Salvation Therefore where the light of nature is either weak or defective as it is
assign some Notes and Critisms and betwixt those which were of a particular right it is not necessary that any such distinction should be made Nay we may roundly affirm that those Laws of Moses which are called Political or Judicial do none of them oblige Christian Magistrates to a strict observation of them but it is lawfull for them according to their own discretion and as they shall find find it expedient for the safety and profit of the Common-wealth either to revive them into power or to make them of no effect XXXI I affirm in the fourth place That the moral Law delivered by Moses that is to say the praecepts of the Decalogue or the ten Commandements do oblige all Christians as well as Jews to the observation of them All Protestants that I do know of do with one mouth acknowledge this truth Bellarmine therefore doth us the greater injury who feigneth that we do make Christian liberty to consist in this not to be bound in Conscience to be subjected to any Law and that Moses with his Decalogue doth not pertain unto us Let him see how he can clear himself of this scandal and vindicate those of his part from this crime if we are in it For the Controversie amongst his School-men is agitated Whether Christians are bound to the praecepts of the Decalogue only as they are the Declaratives of the Law of Nature or as they were also delivered by God to Moses and by Gods Commandement given by Moses to the people of God and transmitted into the holy Books Some there are of them that do deny the one others that do affirm both And in our Churches the same diversity of opinions is to be found if it be not rather a diversity in words than in opinions For seeing they amongst themselves and we do agree with them in this which is the main of all that the Moral Law which is delivered by Moses and is contained in the precepts of the Decalogue hath the power to oblige the Consciences of Christians it will peradventure be not worth our labour from whence it doth obtain that power to oblige In my judgement they speak more unto the purpose who say that this Law of Moses doth not oblige Christians formally and as it is delivered by Moses but onely by reason of the matter as it is the Declarative of the Law of Nature and it receiveth therefore all its force of obliging not from Moses bringing or delivering it but from the Dictates of the Law of Nature which God in the first Creation did inspire into our minds and after the Fall would have it to remain in them as the Remembrancer of his will And this may suffice to be spoken of the old Law or the Law of Moses XXXII The new Law or the Law of Christ that is to say the Gospel doth contain these three things 1. Mysteries of Faith to be believed in which chapter I comprehend the promises of God by Grace 2. Sacred Institutions Ceremonial and Ecclesiastick And 3. The Moral Precepts of which I speak and universally of all of them That the Gospel obligeth none but those only who are called those only to whom it is preached For where there is no Law there can be no transgression for moraly especially in Supernaturals it is the same thing Non esse et non apparere not to be and not to appear or not to be so sufficiently propounded as it may be known The words of our Saviour are expressly to this sence Ioh. 15. 22. If I had not come and spoken to them they had not had sin that is they had not been guilty of despising the Gospel But it obligeth all men to whom it is preached to an obedience as well of Faith as of Life so that we are all bound to whom the Gospel is preached both to believe in Christ as our Redeemer and to obey him as our Law-giver And whosoever shall fail in the performance of these two things shall suffer everlasting punishment for the neglect of his duty XXXIII I say in the third place That the Christian Church is obliged to the Sacred Institutions that is to the preaching of the word the administration of the Sacraments the Ordination of Ministers of the Gospel and the exercise of the Keyes as well of Knowledg as of Power it is bound I say in all those things which pertain to the essence of them according to the institution of Christ and the Apostles so that it is not lawful for the Church much lesse for any particular congregation or person either willingly to diminish or to change any thing at all therein But the external circumstances of the Sacred Institution are so free that any particular Church may determine of them according to Time and Place and to the custome of the People of God and as it shall seem most expedient to Edification XXXIV In the third place I affirm That the Moral Precepts of the New Testament are the same according to their substance with the Morals of the Old Testament and they are both of them to be reduced to the Law of Nature which is contained in the ten Commandements as omnia Entia realia all real Beings are reduced to the ten Predicaments But the Precepts of Christ in the new Law as the holy Fathers of the Church do every where acknowledge are in many things far more excellent than the Precepts of Moses in the old Law not onely in that respect that they are propounded more fully and clearly but because they ascend also higher and do advance the true Christian to a more eminent degree of perfection and that with most effectual inducements on both sides the past Example of Christ being propounded to him on the one side and the inestimable reward to come in the Kingdom of Heaven on the other And this most clearly may appear in those two great Duties of a Christians life commanded in the new Law viz. of loving our enemies and taking up the cross For as some have dreamed these are not so onely to be esteemed as if they were onely Counsels to a more perfect life propounded to all men under the condition of a more large reward and oblige no man under sin and punishment but those onely who by a vow have obliged themselves to the observation of them But they expresly in themselves are Precepts and properly so called and universally obliging to the observation whereof all those who profess the Name of Christ are bound under the guilt of the most grievous sin to wit the abnegation of Christ and the punishment of eternal damnation unless they truly do repent And thus much concerning the second Light of the mind XXXV The third remaineth which we call the light acquired which surely is nothing else but an addition or increase of that light whether of Nature or Revelation which was before in the minde to some more eminent degree of clearness as when the will of God the
said to be unjust either as it is unfit or grievous to be born or unlawful to be done In the first Interpretation if it be unjust what by the Law is commanded that is if it be unequitable and not dishonest yet if it be done it is the fault only of him who doth command it He that obeyeth the Command is so far from fault that he should be a great Transgressor if he did not obey it But in the latter sense if any thing what is commanded be unjust that is not only grievous to be born but also shamefull to be done and notwithstanding it is done the Sin lyes heavy on both First on the Magistrate who commanded an unjust thing Secondly on the Subject who acted an unlawful one The sense of the Conclusion is this Wheresoever the Law by its Command doth forbid any thing to be done which is so necessary that it cannot be omitted by the Subject without Sin or wheresoever the Law doth Command any thing to be done which is so unlawful that iâ— cannot be put in execution without Sin that Law doth not oblige in Conscience IX My first reason is De jura praelec 2. Because as elsewhere I have fully explaned there is no obligation for an unlawful Act. Sect. 13. Secondly because as there also I have expressed the first Obligation doth prejudge the following insomuch that a new obligation contrary to the former cannot be superinduced Now any Law commanding a thing unlawful as homicide Perjury Sacrilege or forbidding a necessary duty as the worship of the true God or the performance of our Dutyes to our Prince or Parents c. doth exact that of us which is contrary to our former obligation by the vertue of which divine Precept we were before obliged therefore that humane Law cannot induce any obligation on us The third Reason is Because that no man can at the same time be obliged to Contradictories but if that Law were obligatory it would oblige to the performance of that thing which the Law of God at the same time doth oblige to the not performance of it Now to do and not to do are Contradictories The fourth Reason is deduced from the examples of godly men who have been always so instructed by the principles of their Faith that with a cheerfull spirit they have undertaken and performed the grievous but not dishonest Commands of the Emperours But if any thing though by the authority of Law was required of them which was against Faith or good manners or any ways repugnant to common honesty they openly and couragiously did deny the Command and for the fear of God despised all humane Laws and institutions The Decree being made at Babylon that the concent of musick being heard they all should worship the great golden Image which the most mighty monarch had set up and a most severe punishment threatned to those who should do otherwise the three young men of the Hebrews would not suffer themselves to be obliged by that Law Dan. 3. Because an unlawful thing the worshiping of an Idol was commanded In the Law again of the Persians it being commanded that no man for certain days should make a Petition to any God or man for any thing but to the King of Persians only Daniel did not obey that Law but as his Custom was at his set houres he prayed unto God Dan. 16. And Peter and John being forbidden to speak any more in the Name of Jesus they not only disobeyed the Command but confidently answered Whether it be right in the sight of God to obey you rather than God judge yee Acts. 4. The Reason indeed was because the things that were forbidden were necessary viz. The worship of the true God and the preaching of the Gospel committed to their Chatge X. The second Conclusion The Law of man prohibiting a thing simply evil as Theft Adultery Sacrilege or commanding a thing good and necessary as the worship of God the discharge of Debts the Honour of Parents doth induce a new obligation in the Conscience My first reason is because the proper Cause being given the necessary effect of it will follow unless it be hindred by some other means But an obligation is so necessary an effect of the Law that some have thought that the very Name of the Law hath received its derivation from it as already I have menâ—ioned And nothing seems to be here assigned which may hinder the consecution of its effect The second reason is a Minori ad majus from the Less to the Greater By the confession of all men a Law prohibiting a thing otherwise Lawful or commanding a thing otherwise free doth oblige therefore much more prohibiting a thing unlawful or commanding a thing free But something there appears that may be objected to both these reasons viz. Non esse multiplicanda Entia sine necessitate Beings are not to be multipled without necessity For every man by the power of the Divine Law being obliged to the performance of what is necessary and the eschewing of what is unlawful the same obligation doth exclude that which we think to obtain by humane Laws as superfluous as water praeexistent in a full vessel doth hinder the infusion of new moysture And it seemes that two obligations to the same thing can no more be admitted in one Conscience than can two Accidents of the same Species in one Subject To this I answer that it is usuâ—ly spoken and indeed truly enough Obligationem priorem praejudicare posteriori The former obligation doth prejudice and take place of the posterior which Argument we our selves have even now made use of for the confirmation of the former Conclusion But this Saying hath place only amongst those obligations which are Destructive to one another and whose effects have so great a Contrariety and Repugnancy amongst themselves that one being admitted the other of necessity must be taken away Notwithstanding this doth not hinder but that another and a new obligation may come unto the former provided it be of the same reference and can be consistent with it Neither in this consideration is that of any moment as is alleged of water in a full vessel for the impediment why the full vessel admits of no more liquor doth not consist in the part of the liquor but proceeds from the incapacity of the vessel and the nature of the place which cannot at once receive more bodies And nothing hindreth but there may be many Accidents of the same Species in one and the same Subject provided they be Relative and not Absolute as suppose that Socrates had ten Sons there must be in Socrates ten Paternities for relations are multiplied according to the multiplication of their Terms And we said but even now that the Law did oblige according to the manner of the Term. Therefore seeing that every Law according to the nature of it and as it is a Law is an Inductive to an obligation there will be so
many obligations as there are Lawes being correspondent to them as to their Terms Neither is this Multiplicare entia sine necessitate to multiply Beings without necessity for the causes being multiplied it is necessary that the effects of those causes should be multiplied also And that it may seem incredible to none we may behold it or something very like unto it to come to passe every day both in things natural and moral It is evident to the sense that a man may be tyed to a Pillar with two or three cords as Peter Acts 12. 6. He slept 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bound with two chains And it is to be doubted by none but that a man having obliged himself to the performance of such a duty which by the Law of God was incumbent on him he notwithstanding that first obligation may again oblige himself by Vow or Oath or Promise to render that obligation the more effectual Thus Jacob the Patriarch vowed that Jehovah should be his only God Gen. 28. 21. And David swore that he would keep the righteous Judgments of God Psal 119. 106. And all of us who are Christians when we were sprinkled at the Fount did by a new Covenant of Baptism bind our selves to Faith in Christ to renounce the Devill the World and the Flesh and to keep the commandements of God to the performance of all which duties most sure it is that we were obliged before XI The third Conclusion Humane Lawes whether things unlawful or necessary or things indifferent be commanded being made by a single Person or by a Commonalty not having a lawful power do not oblige in Conscience As if the Mayor of this City should impose Laws on this University or my next Neighbour should command my servant to yoak my Oxen to bring in his harvest c. Or as if a company of seditious Persons being met in some one County of England as they did heretofore under the conduct of Ket in Norfolk and many times in other places should demand of the inhabitants a certain Sum of money or should publish Edicts to exact a servitude of their persons not due unto them and by force of Armes should compel them to obedience although it peradventure were lawful for them to do as they were commanded it being found they were unable to make resistance yet certainly their commands should oblige no man in Conscience to the observation of them Aquin. 1. 2. quaest 96. art 4. First because the said Laws are Laws only in name and aequivocally But in deed and in earnest they are rather violences than Laws and an aequivocal Cause doth inferr no effect as a sentence spoken by one who is no Judge doth not oblige the Parties And Secondly Because the Power of obliging as already hath been mentioned is not effectively derived from the Law it self but from a will joyning with the power of the Law-maker therefore where Power is wanting the Cause that is properly the efficient of that obligation is wanting also and the proper Cause being defective it is necessary that its Effect should be deficient also And this is easie to be collected by the words of the Apostle in this place who deduceth the Duty of obedience on the part of the Subject from the Power of Jurisdiction in the Magistrate from whence it is no man is bound to obey him who hath not the Right of Commanding XII If you shall object that an unâ—uly multitude of factious persons such as before I have made mention of have the Power of Commanding because they can compel those to the performance of their commands over whom they exercise their Tyranny I answer that the Power of which I speak and on which Obligation doth depend is not that Power which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is Might or Puissance which by most is used in this sense by which a man is potent to give such an effect to his Intention that it finally cannot be hindered but that Power which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is a lawful Power which cometh by some Right of Nature or of Nations or by a Civil Right in respect both of the person who bears it and of those who are any wayes substituted under him This Power in this present Argument the Apostle doth so much presse that in the space almost of three Verses he names it five times and makes not the least mention of the other XIII But you will allege that those who in the time of the Apostles were the supreme Governors did ascend unto the height of the Empire not by any Right of Inheritance nor by the free Suffrages of the people or any lawful Authority but by Force and Treachery or military Tumult and yet the Apostle notwithstanding doth expressly attribute an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is a lawful Authority to them as unto legitimate Magistrates and imposeth on their Subjects a necessity of obeying them and that not for fear of Punishment but for Conscience sake We must confesse indeed that the first Emperors of Rome after the eversion of the Common-wealth did not attain unto the Empire by any great lawfulnesse of Right yet withall we must confess that they were invested with the Right of the Sword and a legitimate Jurisdiction to which all whosoever were under the Roman Power ought to be subject for there was not then any single person that could challenge it as due unto him by more Right and the Senate and People of Rome in whose Power not long before and for many Ages also was the chief Command what by fear and what by obsequiousness did give way to the losse of their Privileges and acknowledged those for their lawful Princes who had obtained the Empire by unlawful Acts. This being granted which certainly in my opinion can no wayes be denyed there can remain no other doubt concerning the necessity of obeying But in a dubious case what is the duty of a Christian whether and how far he is obliged in the Court of Conscience to give way unto the Times and to accommodate himself to the present manners and be obedient to the Lawes the Edicts and the Commands of one who in his Judgment at least hath attained to the Soveraignty de facto that is by Power and by no Right at all it is no easy thing to judge neither is it the part of a wise man to determine any thing on so great and so high a Point XIV I here therefore do conclude on nothing positively but that I may not be censured to be wanting in my duty or at least to your expectation if I should make mention of a Question and give you not the least satisfaction in it I will in a a few words expound unto you what seemeth to me having been very serious hereupon to be most consentaneous to true reason unless peradventure some circumstances as oftentimes it comes about in such deliberations shall grow too much upon
go with him twayn A man therefore may and if occasion so requires he ought to depart from his own right for his own peace but much more for the publick tranquillity and obey him who hath no lawful power to command But above all he must have this Reserve so to depart from his own right that by so doing he taketh not any thing away from the right of another And Abraham in this did justly and wisely Gen. 14. who though he made the King of Sodom partaker of the spoils which by the right of war was his portion from the five Kings that were overthrown yet he cautelously provided that both the Priest should have his Tenths and his three Associates in the War should not want of their full proportions In the like manner obedience is so to be payed to an Usurper that the fidelity due unto the lawful Heir be no ways violated and that his right suffers no prejudice by it XXI But it may be objected How can this be done That which is grateful to an Usurper cannot but be most ungrateful to the lawful Prince No man can serve two Masters that look so contrary all whose Votes Mat. â— Studies and Counsels are violently carryed on to the ruine and destruction of one another I answer the account being well computed there is no reason that we should think that this obsequiousness of the Citizen so ordered and bounded as we before have delivered should be unpleasing to the lawful Prince but altogether to the Uâ—urper nay we may presume that with the consent of the true Prince himself it ought to be so For by this obedience the Citizen is not to be accounted to have assisted so much the unjust Possessor as the whole Commonalty or Republick the safety whereof doth no lesse concen the true Heir than the unjust Possessor Nay peradventure much more because being the true Father of his Country he is to be believed to love it sincerely to wish it more happinesse than the other who having excluded him hath thrust himself into his house and hath excercised a command over his Family and by how much the affections of a Mother to her Children are more pure vehement than a Step-mothers as may appear by that remarkable contestation of the two Harlots before Solomon the true Mother who knew the Child to be her own desiring the safety of it and that it should be given rather to another nay unto her Adversary than that it should perish by the Sword so it is most likely and it is to be presumed that the lawful Heir hath a greater care of the safety of his people whom although for the present under the yoak of a Stranger yet he doth acknowledge them to be his own hopeth well that in time they will prove profitable to him than he who having newly usurped the supreme Magistracy will be more careful it is likely to establish his newly acquired Greatness than to procure the safety of the publick and therefore the lawful Heir had rather that as modestly as they could they should accommodate themselves to the present affairs for their own safety than to run into a certain destruction by making an unseasonable and an unsuccessful opposition against one that overpowers them And thus I have given you my opinion concerning this most difficult and high question determining possitively of nothing but being ready if any man shall render more certain reasons to correct what hath been spoken and to jump in to the same Judgment with him XXII The fourth Conclusion followeth Humane Laws concerning things not unlawful do by themselves and directly in the general oblige the Conscience Which is as much as to say This general precept that Subjects should obey humane Laws being duly made is obligatory directly and by its self And this Calvin himself who doth not use to attribute too much to humane constitutions doth acknowledge who in the 4 Institute 10. § 5. doth advise that such a distinction be made inter Genus et Speciem betwixt the General and the Special that although it be denied that Laws in the Special do oblige the Conscience yet it must be granted that they have an obliging power in the General The reason is perspicuous for this general precept doth pertain to the eternal and Divine Law every part whereof doth directly and by it self and not only by consequence oblige our Consciences It pertains to the Law of God in a double respect First Because natural Reason dictates that Peace and Order which is the Soul of Common-wealths and of all humane Societies cannot be preserved but by an Obedience to the Lawes according to the solemn Constitution of them Secondly Because that God in the Holy Scripture doth command us to be subject unto those who are over us in that Order as God hath appointed and to obey 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he Higher Powers as may appear in the first and second verses of this Chapter and not to draw back our necks from their yoaks upon a bare pretext that they are meet men 2 Pet. 2. 13. and Creatures such as we are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Sons of Adam of the same â—ace of mankind and subject to the same Affections Sufferings Inâ—irmities and Casualties as our selvs but rather being mindful that Almighty God by a delegated Power did set them over us as his Vicegerents on Earth and hath been pleased to vouchsafe them so much honour as to communicate his own Name unto them as to so many visible and mortal Gods Psal 82. 6. I have said you are Gods we should reverence honour and obey them with the greatest Reverence and though not for their own sakes who are but men as we are nor composed of better Clay yet in respect to the Divine Oâ—dination who making them to bâ— Prâ—nces hath preferred them into a higher place abovâ— other men and in some measure made them Partakers of his own Power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the Lord as the Apostle Sâ— Peter â—n another place and by consequence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—ccording unto Conscience as the Apostle Sâ— Paul hath it in this place XXIII The fifth Conclusion Humane Lawes according to the solemn Constitution of them doe oblige theâ—â—â—science even in particular and although not directly and by themselves yet by Consequent and by 〈◊〉 of the general Divine Commandment I say in the first place Lawes solemnly and rightly constituted that is both by reason of the efficient Cause being made by him who is indued with lawful Power and by reason of the matter commanding nothing unlawful dishonest or filthy or any wayes unworthy the Duty of a Christian For we already have asserted that the Lawes which do offend in either of those two senses are not obligatory I say in the second place In the particular that is to a particular Determination in things of a middle Nature and in others As what and how
much tribute is to be paid What merchandise is lawful and what unlawful to be exported or to be imported in such and such a Country What habits are suitable to such and such degrees in an University What Statutes are dispensable and what not c. I say in the third place that such Lawes doe not oblige by themselves and directly I prove first because that God alone is that Law-maker who hath a most peculiar and direct Command over the Consciences of men There is but one Law-giver who is able to save and destroy James 4. 12. In things of a middle nature which are indifferent which for the most part are the subjects of humane Laws we do suppose that God made no Law in particular but left them all to the arbitration of those who are his Vice-gerents on Earth It is proved thus in the second place because that those things only do oblige directly and by themselves which oblige by reason of the matter as of an internal Cause without any respect to the external Causes the Efficient and the Final which would have obliged of themselves if they had not been commanded by Men But things indifferent and of a middle Nature determined by a particular and positive humane Law when they are so qualified in themselves that before the Determination of them they may freely be made or nor be made by any they doe not oblige in respect of the matter therefore not of themselves I say in the third place that the same Lawes notwithstanding doe oblige in particular by the Consequent and by Vertue of the general Divine Commandement And because in this last position the hindge of the whole controversy is turned I will more plainly propound the Conclusion which by and by I will more fully confirm The Conclusion is this Positive humane Laws being rightly and lawfully constituted which contain particular determinations concerning things of a middle Nature and in themselves indifferent and which before they are determined are free to be made or to be unmade do by the vertue of of the Divine Commandement by which we are bound to obey those who are set over us by God so oblige the Consciences of the Subjects to perform obedience to them that they are bound under the penaâ—ty of moâ—tal Sin and the fear of Gods displeasure to give obedience to the said Laws and if they shall fail in the performance thereof they shall endure the checks and sâ—ings of their accusing CoÌ„sciences XXIV This Conclusion is confirmed by divers Reasons the first whereof is taken from this present Text we must therefore be subjected not only for wrath but for Conscience sake The words in themselves are perspicuous enough In the former verses the Apostle had largely insisted upon the necessity of Christian Subjection which he urged chiefly by two Arguments the one from the Institution and the Ordination of God in the two first verses and the other from the fear of the Punishment of man in the two verses following In the way of recapitulation he briefly recollecteth either Argument and repeateth them in this fifth verse and as it is very usual in the Scripture in an order inverted beginning the repetition from the latter and the next member As if he should have said A great necessity of Obedience doth lye upon you in both respects whether the fear of punishment may deterr you or the Conscience of the Duty may incite you If you despise the Power and Authority of the Lawes and do evil consider with your selves that the Magistrate who is set over you is the Minister of God the Revenger of your neglected Duty and ready to draw the Sword with which God hath intrusted him to inflict a corporal punishment due to the despisers of his Lawes But if these things move you not being deluded by a vain hope to find out one subterfuge or another to escape the force of his Arm yet think on God the just Remembrancer of aâ—l Acts committed whether they be good or evil stand in awe of him as of a just Judge Fear your own Consciences those severe accusers those faithful witnesses and importunate Tormentors you cannot avoid them by any Artifices not elude them by any Inventions From the scope of this place the Argument is thus framed Those things which being violated do leave a Remorse upon the Conscience do oblige the Conscience for so it must necessarily be that all remorse or reproof of Conscience must proceed from the sense of some obligation as all other effects do follow their causes but humane Laws being violated do leave a remorse upon the Conscience for that is the expreâ—â—e sense of those words in the Text Necesse est subjici propter Conscientiam You must of necessity be subject for Conscience sake you cannot keep your Consciences upright and safe unlesse you be subjected Therefore humane Laws do oblige the Conscience XXV But some there are who to un-nerve the force of this Argument do in this place give another Interpretation unto Conscience and chiefly herein they defend themselves by the Authority of Chrysostome as if no other Conscience was to be understood in this place but a Conscience only of benefits which is derived unto Subjects from the Political Government I have made mention of this heretofore and praysed it for the sense I confesse is pious though not so genuine And I have thus much against it For in the first place amongst the Ancients Chysostome is singular in this Interpretation whom hardly one or two amongst so many Interpreters have followed Theophyâ—act only and Oecumenius excepted Who are not to be reputed in the number of witnesses for they so tread in the footsteps of Chrysostome that all three of them do make only but one witnesse Secondly No place can be aleged in the Scripture in which either St. Paul or any other of the Apostles have made use of the word Conscience in that sense as Chrysostome here doth feign unto himself Thirdly the Apostle in this place as it is very manifest would induce something which should be of more moment and more effectual to stir up the minds of men than temporal punishment for which end it was better to affright them with the fear of the Divine anger than to admonish them of any benefits received from men Fourthly and lastly the Apostle here in a short repetition of those reasons before alleged would conclude his discourse of Christian Subjection now in the two first Verses of this Chapter he did bring the reason not from the Conscience of the benefit but of the duty XXVI The second reason followeth from the use and the end of the Laws It being most necessary that they should be made and observed for the preservation of humane societies in peace and publick tranquillity for otherwise there would be no certain rule of Contracts no measure of Faith and Civil Justice which are the firmest bands of Cities and societies for the natural and the
written Law of God although both of them by themselves are most perfect in their own kind and being joyned do contain the particular Principles of supernatural faith and the general Principles of things to be done accommodated to all parts of life yet neither of them doth descend to all those particulars which either may be or for the most part are necessary for the preservation of Peace and Order in Cities and Governments For examples sake the Law of reason which is the same with the Law of Nature doth dictate and the Scripture also in the next verse of this Chapter doth teach that Tribute is to be paid for the maintainence of Princes and of the charges of Wars and other publick uses but unlesse it be by a Lâ—w determined how much is to be payed and by what proportion and by whom and in what space of time and other circumstances either thâ—â— payment will miscarry or not be made timely enough or else it will not be enough for the use of the Common-wealth If you say that by this Argument the necessity of Laws is proved indeed but the obligation of them is not determined for Subjects may be enforced to their duties by the â—â—nunciation of punishments We confesse indeed the truth of this if we should go no higher but it furthermore we shall consider without selves how headlong man is burryed to forbidden sins and how bold to venture through them all how 〈…〉 a Keeper Fear is of Duty unlesse that withall there be some sense of Religion to contain men in their duties it will most easily appear how wisely Almighty God the most prudent Moderator of all things hath provided for the affairs of men who hath endued their Consciences with a certain religious reverence to the Law which doth grow up together with their use of Reason From hence it comes to passe that amongst the Heathâ—â—â— ignorant of the true God there were scarce any one found of the antient Legislators but pretended to the people that the Laws which â—e made were delivered to him by some God to 〈…〉 need not give you the names of 〈…〉 Lycuâ—gus and many others whoâ— the 〈◊〉 make mention of it being a truth so well known to all XXVII The third argument is this What is to be done for the Lord we are bound in Conscience to the performance of it But we are bound to be subject to Humane Laws rightly established that is so constituted by the supreme power or by others receiving their Authority from it for the Lord â— Pet. 2. 13. Be subject to every Ordinance of man for the Lords sake whether it be to the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Supreme which sufficiently expounds the meaning of St. Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Higher Powers in the first verse of 〈◊〉 Chapter or unto Governours as unto them that are sent by him c. And that these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Lord or for the Love of God as the French Translation hath it doth imply the obligation of Conscience is manifest in the first place by the use of the same expressions in other places of the Scripture as Eph. 6. 1. where speaking of the Duty of Children towards their Parents the words of the Text are Liberi obedite Parentibus vestris 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Domino Children obey your Parents in the Lord And by the Duty of Servants to their Masters in the same Chapter v. 7. With good will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 serving the Lord and not men which in the third of the Col. v. 23. is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to the Lord and not to Men as if he should say For Conscience and not for Wrath only or for the fear of God rather than the dread of Men. It is manifest Secondly from the following words in that place of St. Peter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for so is the will of God And â—o St. Paul in the said sixth chapter of the Ephesians and the sixth verse speaking of the Duty of Servants he exhorts them to obey their Masters in the sincerity of Heart 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doing the will of God from the Heart Now the will of God is the very same Rule of Conscience which I have said to be the Rule Adaequate XXVIII The fourth Argument What Natural Reason doth so prescribe to be done that both the fault and the guilt of the fault are contracted if it be not done we are without all doubt obliged in Conscience to the doing of it For since the sense of Sin pertaineth to the Conscience as also doth the fear of Punishment which ariseth from it whatsoever it is that the Mind rightly conceiveth doth induce the stain of a fault and a guilt of punishment for that fault it doth directly appertain to the obligation of the Conscience Now Natural Reason whose Judgement cannot be indirect doth so far command us to obey Humane Laws that if that obedience be not performed we are immediately conscious to our selves that it is meerly by our own fault that we fayl in that Duty XXIX The fifth Argument â—he Violation of that which necessarily draweth along with it the Violation of the Laws of God doth oblige the Conscience because no man with a safe Conscience can violâ—te the Law of God which is the Rule of the Conscience but the violation of every particular Law solemnly constituted by Men doth necessarily draw along with it the violation of the Law of God to wit of that General Commandment by which God commandeth obedience to the Magistrate Therefore the said Violation of the particular Law of Men doth oblige the Conscience XXX The sixth Argument We are bound in Conscience not to Act that which if it were acted is in a manner to resist God himself For we are bound to be subject and to submit our selves unto God and therefore not to resist him for Subjection and Resistance are contrary unto one another neither can any Man at the same time be subject unto and resist the same person But not to obey Humane Laws solemnly constituted is interpretatively to resist God For he who obeyeth not the Laws doth disobey the Legislative power of the Magistrate which whosoever he is that doth it the said power being ordained by God he doth oppose himself against Gods Ordinance and by Consequence interpretatively he doth oppose God himself which is the Determination of St. Paul in the second verse of this chapter and from whence he orderly concludes the necessity of Subjection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—ccording to Conscience in this veâ—se XXXI From what hath been already spoken it will be no great difficulty to answer to the Arguments which commonly are objected by the Adversaries to this Truth The first and chiefest whereof is taken from Christian Liberty and to the Confirmation of it many places of Scripture are alleged with much pomp circumstance which seem to adstipulate to that Liberty
God which they call positive and from which they would have us freed by the death of Christ whether they be ritual or judicial were only imposed on the Jews but not on us who are Christians Again where it is manifest what God would have done it doth not belong to us by any collation of Comparatives too saucily to determine what ought to be done Now it is manifest that God would have both he would have that his positive Laws delivered to the Israelits by Moses should not oblige the Christians and that the Laws of men rightly and solemnly constituted by the Magistrates should oblige the people under their Authority Thirdly If this Argument indeed were of any force those that make use of it do not observe that by it they do not only take away the obligation but altogether the use also of all humane Lawes For Christ hath no otherwise freed us from the obligation of the Mosaâ—ck Laws than so by taking away the use of them that by us they are no more to be esteemed as Laws Therefore if in the same manner he would have us to be free from the obligation of humane Laws it must of necessity follow that he would have no humane Laws to be any longer extant amongst us So wild a proposition is this of the Anabaptists and other fanatick persons neither is it admitted by themselves who do propound it XXXVI Again they object that of Saint James Chapter the fourth there is but one Law-giver to wit God and Christ who is only Lord of the Conscience He is an invader thereof of Christs right and thrusts himself into the Throne of God whosoever he is that assumeth unto himself a power of obliging the Consciences of other men I answer There is indeed but one supreme Law-giver who hath a direct and Soveraign command over the Consciences of men as by himself and by his own virtue and authority to oblige them which Law-giver is God and Christ as the Apostle hath it But this hinders not but that there may be other Law-givers of an inferiour order and degree who by a power granted and derived to them from that supreme Lawgiver have of themselves a right of making Laws which may consequently oblige the Conscience Just as a King who solely in his own Kingdom hath a peculiar Legislative power yet notwithstanding by his Charter he may give to some College or Corporation a right of making Laws which may oblige all the members of that body not by their own power but by the force of the royal Donation and the Authority granted to them from the King Our Universities as you all know are happy and rejoice in this privilege that in a Legitimate Convocation they may make Laws which we call Statutes and ordain punishments for Delinquents and if it be expedient they may abrogate again and cancel the same Statutes Now there is no man of a sober understanding who will conceive that the excercise of this power doth any wayes derogate from the Legislative right of the King or can be any deceit or prejudice unto it unless it be extended beyond the limits of the Donation defined in the Charter Nay it is rather an excellent and a singular mark of the royal autocrasy that the King hath not only the Legislative power himself but that he can vouchsafe it unto others to be had and used his own right being notwithstanding safe and entire into himself XXXVII The other objections relying on one the same Foundation may be resolved by one a and the same labour I will briefly run them over In the third place they object that the Civil power is meerly temporal therefore belongeth not unto the Conscience which is spiritual Fourthly the end of Humane Laws is the external peace of the Common-wealth and not the internal peace of the Conscience therefore the Laws themselves do only oblige the outward man and not the Conscience which lyeth within Fifthly the Magistrate cannot judge of Consciences and therefore can make no Laws over them it being the same extent of power to give Laws and to judge according to them Sixtly the Magistrate in making of Laws hath no intention of binding the Consciences of the people but only to oblige them to perform that which the Law commandeth which if it be done it is all one to the profit of the Commonwealth whether it be done out of any Conscience of duty or not and it is enough if the effects of Actions be commensurated to the intention of the Agents and they ought not further to be extended XXXVIII I answer and first universally to them all By all these Arguments this only is obtained that humane Laws do not oblige directly and by themselves or by their proper force which of our own accord we grant for we assert no other obligation but what comes to them ex consequenti by Consequence and by the virtue of the general command of God of rendring obedience to the higher powers And from this ground I answer to the particular objections And as the to third I say that the Civil power being meerly temporal cannot of it self and in respect of the Object in which properly and immediately it verseth have a spiritual effect and therefore of it self cannot induce a spiritual obligation neverthelesse by consequence it may have a spiritual effect by a derivation from the power of some superiour cause in the virtue whereof it worketh Now every Magistrate as long as rightly and dâ—ely he doth exercise the Legislative Power which God hath put into his hands he worketh in the virtue of God himself and by ordination of him who is himself a Spirit and as the Lord and Father of Spirits hath a Command over the Spirits of men XXXIX I answer to the fourth that although peace be an external blessing of a Commonalty yet the internal Conscience is obliged to the uttermost to the procuring and preserving of it by all lawful and honest means because that God the Lord of Conscience hath commanded us to love and follow peace and if private certainly much more publick peace Neither is it any way inconsistent that although Conscience be internal yet it is obliged to a thing external for the obligation of Conscience doth not arise from the Nature or any condition of the thing or Object into which it is carryed but from the will of him who hath the right of obliging that is God himself XL. I answer to the fifth that the Legislative and Judicial power doth originally pertain to the same person that is to him who hath the supreme jurisdiction over the Subjects nevertheless dispensatively and by the will of the supreme Magistrate it may both of them and both ways be administred by other persons as he shall think expedient Therefore although God alone hath in himself a peculiar power over the Consciences of the Creature and maketh as well as judgeth Laws by an original proper and absolute right yet
Duty so from a double Duty there ariseth a double Obligation for every Duty doth infer an Obligation and every Obligation doth suppose a Duty Therefore one kind of the Obligation of Humane Laws is that by which Subjects are bound to obey the precepts of the Law it self and the other by which they are bound to submit themselves to the power of the Law-giver one of the Obligations belongeth to Active Obedience the other unto that Obedience which is called passive and to which we give the Name of Submission III. If it be here demanded how farr Humane Laws can oblige the Consciences of the Subject It is to be said in the first place that all Laws made by one invested by a lawful Power do oblige to Subjection so that it is not lawful for a Subject to resist the Supreme Power by force of Arms whether things just or unjust be commanded This wâ—â— evermore the mind and practice of the Christians in the first Age of the Church living under the most grievâ—us Tyranny of the greatest Enemies to the name of Christ to make no mention herein of the Conduct and the instinct of Nature and the light of right Reason this is most manifest by the Doctrine of the two chiefest of the Apostles For so Peter the Apostle of Circumcision doth diligently instruct the Jews And so Paul the Doctor of the Gentiles doth as carefully instruct the Gentiles St. Peter in the first book and second chapter commands Servants to be subject to their Masters not only good and gentle Masters but those severer ones who would punish them with Scourges when they had not deserved it Saint Paul Rom. 13. doth urge in many words the necessity of Subjection but granteth unto none the Liberty of Resistance be their case or their pretence never so good In the second place I say That although this Subjection is simply necessary yet it is not satisfactory as to Duty unlesse the command of the Law be obeyed where it can be done without Sin And therefore the Subject is bound to Obedience in Conscience in all things that are lawful and honest Hence it is that this word be Obedient is so often and so expressely inculcated by the Apostle Eph. 6. Col. 3. and in other places In the third place I say Where the precept of the Law cannot be observed without sin if the Subject shall patiently submit himself to the Power of the Law-giver he hath satisfied his Duty and is not obliged in Conscience to perform that which the Law commandeth nay he is obliged not to do it for there can be no Obligation to things unlawful It is alwayes necessary therefore to be subject but not alwayes necessary to obey IV. Furthermore seeing both are certain that the Consciences of Men are free Servitus in totum hominem uon descendit Sen. de Bencf 20. and ought to be so which Liberty no Humane Power can or may infringe And that an Obligation is a kind of a Bond and doth induce a necessity which seemeth to be opposite and to fight with just Liberty for neither is he any wayes free who is bound neither can he be free to both who by some necessity is bound to either that it plainly may appear that this Obligation of Conscience of which we now do treat may consist with the just Liberty of Conscience we must necessarily in this place give you another distinction which is that the Precepts of Humane Law may be taken two wayes either formally for the Act it self of giving the precepts or materially for the thing precepted If the Law-giver therefore should intend an Obligation or impose on the Subject a necessity of obeying from giving the Precept of his Law taken materially that is from the necessity of the thing it self which is precepted which notwithstanding in the truth of the thing was not necessary before that Law was made he in that very fact should lay a force upon the Conscience of the Subject which should be repugnant to the Liberty of it But if he should derive his Obligation from giving the precept of his Law taken formally thâ—â— is from the legitimate Authority with w ch he himself is invested that gives it a moral indifferency of the thing precepted in the mean time remaining and in the same state in which it was before the Law was made although the obligation followeth which imposeth on the Conscience a necessity of obeying yet the inward Liberty of the Conscience remaineth uninjuried and intire V. If this seems obscure to any I will illustrate it unto him by an Example A Civil Law being made that no man should eat flesh during all the time of Lent if the Law-giver either in the preface or in the body of that Law should signify that he laid this Command upon his Subjects because it were ungodly and unlawful for them in that time to eat flesh This were to throw a Snare on the Consciences of his Subjects as much as in him lay to weaken their Liberty But if expressely he should signify that the thing being otherwise free in it self he did so ordain it for the profit of the Commonwealth that his Subjects according to the Example of the antient Church should thereby take an occasion to exercise a more abstemious and severer Discipline or if by the words of the Law it self or elsewhere it might appear that the Law-giver intended not by that Law to fasten any opinion of necessity on the thing so commanded there would on this account no injury be done to the Consciences of the Subjects and the liberty thereof For there is a great difference when one thing is commanded by the Magistrate because it is thought to be necessary oris prohibited because it is conceived to be unlawful And when another thing begins then only to be thought necessary and lawful after that it is commanded by the Magistrate and unlawful because it is forbidden by him The first Necessity which anteceded the Law and is supposed by it to be some cause of it is contrary to the liberty of the Conscience but the other which followeth the Law and proceedeth from it as an essect thereof is not repugnant to it The reason of this difference is because the antecedent necessity which the Law supposeth doth necessarily require some assent of the practical judgement but to the following necessity which proceedeth from the Law the consent of the will is sufficient to the performance of that outward work which by the Law is commanded Now an Act of the Will cannot prejudice the liberty of Conscience as an Act of the judgment doth for the Act of the Will doth follow the dictates of the Conscience as the effect followeth its cause but the Act of the Judgment doth precede those Dictates as the Cause goeth before its effect VI. These distinctions being premised I proceed unto the Doubts where in the first place those which we meet with concerning the material Cause
the material Cause of which we do now discourse if the Law doth command any thing that is base dishonest or any wayes unlawful the said Law is unjust for the defect of that Justice which is called Universal which requireth a due rectitude in every Action And this alone is so far from obliging the Subject to obedience that it doth altogether oblige him to render no obedience to it XV. It is demanded in the fifth place What Justice is required and how much of it will suffice as to this that a Law may be said to be just and esteemed obligatory For answer I say in the first place It is not necessarily required that what by the Law is commanded should be just positively which the Philosophers call Honest that is that it may be an Act of some Virtue but it doth suffice if it be just negatively that is if it be not unjust or shameful as are the Acts of all Vices Otherwise there could no Laws be made of things of a middle nature or of things indifferent which notwithstanding as by and by shall be manifest are the most apt matter of Laws I say in the second place Grant that some Law be unjust in regard of the Cause efficient or the final or the formal Cause in any of those respects newly mentioned yet if there be no defect of Justice in respect of the material Cause that is If by the force power of the Law the Act to be performed by the Subject be such that he may put it in Execution without any sin of his own that Justice of it is sufficient to induce the obligation XXVI But lest the Subject too licentiously to withdraw himself from the yoak of the Law should give some pretence for his disobedience as it is a wonder to see how many men do suffer themselves to be deceived by this paralogism and should allege that the Law doth seem too unjust unto him and which with a good Conscience he cannot obey therefore ought not to obey for this they say were to obey with a doubting Conscience which cannot be without Sin as the Apostle teacheth Rom. 14. 23. For whatsoever is not of Faith is Sin It is necessary therefore in the sixth place to inquire farther and to demand What certainty is required to know whether any Law be unjust or not that so a Subject may be secure in his Conscience whether he be bound or not bound to the observation of it I answer in the first place If the Law be manifestly notoriously unjust it is certain that the Subject is not bound to the observation of it which is also to be affirmed if by any moral certainty after some due diligence in searching out the Truth he judgeth it to be simply unjust I say in the second place If out of any confirmed Error of his Judgement which it is not easy for him to leave he thinks the Law to be unjust when indeed it is not yet for all that Error in his mind the obligation of the Law doth still remain insomuch that he is guilty of Sin if he doth not obey it but should Sin more grievously if that Error not yet left off he should obey it Of this Case we shall have a greater opportunity to speak when if God shall permit we shall come to the Comparison of both the sorts of obligations I say in the third place If out of some light doubt or scruple he suspects it may be so that the Law is unjust that scruple is to be contemned the Law altogether to be obeyed And no man under the pretence of his tender Conscience is to excuse him self from the necessity of giving obedience to it XVII I say in the fourth place And I would to God that those whose Custom it is to defend their grosse disobedience under the pretence of their tender Consciences would give due attention to it If because of some probable Reasons appearing on both sides the Subject cannot easily determine with himself whether the Law be right or not insomuch that his mind is in a great incertainty and knows not which way to incline he is bound in this case actually to obey it so that he sinneth if he obeyeth it not and doth not sin if he obeyeth it My reason is First Becaâ—se by the Rule of Equity In dubiis potior est conditioâ—â—ossidentis In doubtful things the Condition of the Possessor is the better Therefore when there is a Case at Law betwixt the Law-maker and the Citizen unlesse there be some apparent reason to the contrary it is presumed alwayes to be on the side of the Law-maker against the Citizen as being in the Possession of Right But if there appears any sound reason to the contrary the Case is altered because it is against the supposition of Reason for we then suppose that they contend in Law one having as much Right as the other The second Reason ariseth from another Rule of Law In re dubia tutior pars est eligenda In a doubtful Case the safer part is to be chosen And its safer to obey the Conscience doubting than the Conscience doubting not to obey Because it is safer in the honor due unto Superiors to exceed in the mode that is due unto them than to be defective in it The third Reason proceedeth from the same Rule for generally it is safer for a Man to suppose himself to be obliged when he is free than to suppose himself free when he is indeed obliged For seeing by the inbred depravation of the Heart of Man we sin oftner by too much Boldnesse than by too much Fear and are more prone than it becomes us to the licentiousnesse of the Flesh and lesse patient to bear the burthen unlesse we were throughly before hand resolved to obey those Laws which are not apparently unjust the Wisdom of the flesh the Craft of the old Serpent would suggest unto us excuses enough which would retard and hinder us from the performance of our Duties And so much of the fourth doubt XVIII The fifth followeth Of the permissive Law of Evil Wether it be lawful and how far lawful And whether it be obligatory and how far obliging Where in the first place we are to observe That an evil thing may three wayes be admitted by the Law that is to say privatively negatively and positively Privatively to be permitted is the very same which is pretermitted by the Lawgiver And in this sense all those things are permitted concerning the forbidding of which or the Punishing of which the Laws do determine nothing That negatively is permitted the excercise whereof the Lawes do define and limit with certain bounds within which those are safe and without fault who do contain themselves but those who do exceed them are to be punished by the Law And in this sense the Laws of most Nations do permit of Usury Thirdly that is permitted positively the excercise whereof is tolerated under a
in a threefold consideration And first of all the worship of God properly so called and the chiefest is that inward wordship of the mind which consisteth in the exercise of inward Vertues as of Faith Hope Love Invocation Confidence c. Secondly those outward Acts by which that inward worship of the mind is partly expressed and partly helped and fostered such as are publick Prayers Singing of Psalms the Hearing of the word and the participation of the Sacraments c. may reducibly and lesse properly be called and oftentimes are called the worship of God as they are the outward Testimonies and Helps of that worship which so properly is called Thirdly Seeing it is impossible that any outward action especially if it be a solemn one should be performed without some Circumstances either more or lesse of Time Place and Gesture from whence it comes to passe that the very same Circumstances which if established by Laws or Customes are called also Rites do sometimes receive the appellation of worship although very improperly and only for that Concomitancy which they have to that outward worship which it self also is improperly called a worship It is therefore to be affirmed That the inward primary worship properly so called doth only so acknowledge God to be the only Author of it that it is not lawful for any man either to institute a new worship or being instituted by God to exhibit it to any other besides God himself We are to affirm also That the outward worship according to its substantials is instituted only by God but there is a far different account to be made of the circumstances which are accessary to this outward worship and those which do accompany it If there be any who will Honor them also with the Name of worship For seeing that the outward worship of God cannot be performed without Circumstances and God in the Gospel hath not given any certain particular Circumstances perpetually to be observed in sacred Assemblyes but only hath lay'd down some Generals as may conduce to Order Honesty and Edification it must necessarily follow that the Determination of the said Circumstances which are but Accidental to the worship it self and mutable according to the respect of Times Places and Occasions must pertain unto those who under Christ have a Right and Power of Governing the Churches which that they may be imposed by those who in the several Churches are invested with publick Authority and being imposed may Religiously be observed by all the Members of the said Churches the nature of Holy worship doth not forbid but Solemnity rather Decency doth require We observe also that even those Men themselves who so Lordly bitterly do inveigh against the Canons and Ecclesiastical Constitutions yet as often as they please do use those Rites in the outward worship of God no where prescribed by Christ or his Apostles as the lifting up of their hands in the taking of an Oath the uncovering of the Head in the Holy Conventions and many other things which because we dayly observe to be done it is unnecessary to rehearse them XXX In the fourth place they object that Moses the pattern of the old that is of the Jewish Church who was given by God to the people of the Jews to be their Lawgiver did not only by his Law define the Substantials of the Jewish worship but according to that fidelity which was in him he omitted not the least Circumstances and in building the Tabernacle which was to be a Type of the Christian Church he most compleatly and perfectly finished all things according to the Idaea of the Example which was propounded to him in the Mount And now if Christ the-Lawgiver of the new Testament should not have prescribed all things and every thing even to the least Circumstances which are to be performed in the Ecclesiastical worship it may justly be believed to suspect which is near to Blasphemy that he was lesse faithful in the House of God than Moses and thereupon there is a remarkable injury and contumely done unto Christ if any new Rites never instituted by him should by humane Authority be brought into the Church or be received by the Christian common people But they who do object these things ought in the first place to have considered that by this Argument all humane political Laws are no lesse everted than Eclesiastical for Moses by the commandement of God did give unto the people of Israel a certain and a defined Law not only of those Rites which belonged to the worship of God but also of those Decrees and Judgments which belonged to the Administration of Civil Government XXXI In the second place it is a wonder moreover that they observed not that by this comparison of that fidelity which was in both Law-givers Moses and Christ that they could not more importunately have alleged any thing that could bring a greater dammage to their own Cause or more strongly have confirmed ours For as from that that Moses both in rituals and judicials did give many Laws unto the people of the Jews we do truly collect it was the will of God that the people of the Jews should be so restrained in their duties under that paedagogy and Mosaick Discipline as under a Yoak of servitude so that very few things should be free unto them so from that also that Christ the most faithful Interpreter of his Fathers Will did give unto the Christian Church but a very few Laws of Ceremonies we do truly collect that it is the will of God that the Magistrates and Christian people should be permitted in those things to their own Liberty so that it is now free for any private Man of his own accord no command or prohibition of a superior intervening to do as shall seem in his own Judgement to be most expedient and to the several Churches and their Governors to prescribe those things which according to the condition of the time and place shall seem to them to be most subservient to Order Honesty Edification and Peace XXXII Moreover Those who do make use of this Argument ought in the third place to have considered that under that Paedagogy of Moses the Jews themselves had not all the Liberty of Rites in things pertaining to the worship of God so take away that it was not lawful for them by their own Authority to observe and to institute those things which it is manifest were never commanded either by God himself or by Moses his Servant Of many take these few instances First the solemn feast of the Passover which by the Law of Moses was commanded should be observed but seaven dayes was by a special Law of Hezekias who received a singular testimony of his piety from God himself and by the consent of the people continued seaven dayes longer The History is extant 2. Chron. 30. Secondly Esther and Mordecay did institute that the seast of Purim should be yearly celebrated in memory of
not on another For by the force of Free will a man is master only of his own will and of his own Acts and not of anothers Now on the contrary he who layes a precept upon or who doth command another if he hath right to command he obligeth by commanding that man whom he commandeth but he doth not oblige himself Because a command is an Act of power and Authority and of right upon another and is fit and proper unless peradventure there be something that hinders it to induce an obligation so the Father with Authority commands the Son the Master the Servant the General the Souldier the King the people and God as a Superior commandeth man to such and such duties and by commanding doth oblige him to the performance of them IV. In the second place I suppose that the Legislative power is a power of publick Jurisdiction for it sufficeth not to the power of making Laws that a man hath a Right and power over others to prescribe unto them what is to be done unless he be invested with an external power to compel them to the performance of it and to afflict punishments on the Refusers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith Aristotle Ethick 10. The Law hath a necessitating power The Schoolmen therefore do distinguish that power which a Superior hath over an Inferior into that power which they call Dominative or the power of Masterdome and the power of Jurisdiction The first whereof is less and more private and not admitting an external Jurisdiction the other greater and of a more inforcing Authority These two powers do not a little differ between themselves and that in a three-fold consideration First in respect of the matter or object for the Power Dominative or of mastery is properly exercised on the more imperfect and private Commonalty as a House a School or a Family but the power of Jurisdiction on the more perfect and publick Commonalty as a City an Army a Common-wealth Secondly in respect of the End for the power Dominative by it self and Primarily is ordinated to the profit of the person indued with that power that is the master and but Secondarily and by Consequence to the good of the Commonalty as it is profitable for a Family that the master of it should grow rich Now the power of publick Jurisdiction is Primarily ordinated to the publick good of the Commonalty it self and but Secondarily and Consequently to the good of the person indued with that power which is the Magistrate himself it being profitable for a Prince that the Common-wealth should flourish Thirdly in the respect of the more effectual Administration which is greater in the power of jurisdiction than in the Power Dominative by reason of a greater coactive Power for examples sake The Master of a Family cannot so efficaciously prevail that his Commands may be put in Execution by his Sons or Servants whom he cannot correct but with a rod or Cudgel as may the civil Magistrate who by his Power may enforce his Subjects to Obedience by imprisonment or banishment by confiscating their Goods or by Death it self 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The fatherly Authority hath nothing in it that is enforcing nothing that is necessating saith Aristotle in the place newly quoted Therefore to the making of Laws every superiority is not sufficient but besides that Dominative there is required the power of Jurisdiction so properly called for the Laws cannot be made or established unless by a Person that hath a publick coactive power by this time you understand I believe that I may need no more to admonish you of it that what here hath been spoken by me concerning Laws doth absolutely pertain to the chief Laws of a Nation and not to any others unless analogically after their way the proportion that is due unto them as they come near or are more remote from their perfection V. To these two suppositions which to what sense they tend you shall easily understand from those things which presently I shall represent unto you I in the third place do now adde a responsive position viz. That the power Legislative is a power autocraâ—ical That is the power of making Laws which may oblige the Commonalty doth consist in him alone whether he be a single person as in the state of Monarchical Government or whether they be more as in other Governments who exerciseth the chief power over the whole Commonalty I will in the first place explane this position and afterwards I will confirm it And for the explication of it we are in the first place to understand that for the happiness of humane societies and the more commodious Adminstration of Commonwealths it hath pleased Almighty God the Author of Order not only to constitute a political Government that there may be Magistrates to be set over the people but also in that very Government to constitute a political Order that amongst the Magistrates themselves there might be divers degrees as well of Dignity as of Power And it is likely that the military word of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the Apostle useth in the Romans hath a relation to this sence to show that there is not only an ordination of Magistrates from God but a subordination also such as is seen in a military Army VI. In the second place we are to know that in all things in which there is order to avoid a proceeding to an infinitenesse which Nature doth abhor we must at the last come necessarily to something which is the first and chiefest in that Order where we are to make a stand Therefore seeing that Magistrates of the same Commonalty are some of them superiour unto another in Dignity and power it must of necessity so come to passe that some one of them must be transcendent above the rest that the others may depend on him and he on none In the same construction the head is the highest in the body the Admiral in a Fleet and the Emperour in an Army The supreme Magistrate is only less than God himself and in governing the people committed to his charge hath neither a Superiour nor an Equal St. Peter calls him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Superiour St. Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the higher power 1 〈…〉 13. and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 13. 1. the man in Authority And the Schoolmen 1 Tim. 〈◊〉 2. caput communitatis the head of the Commonalty in whom solely the chief command and the Majesty of the Empire doth consist and to whom all inferiour Magistrates do owe all that power which they do exercise over the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as being sent from him 1 Pet. 2. 14. VII In the third place we are to know that this supreme power which we call Majesty or Autocratical that is governing all by it self according to the diverse form of Commonwealths is placed either in some one person or in more In a popular state which is called
obliged to the punishment I mean a temporal punishment for the account is far otherwise of the Spiritual and Eternal punishment For examples sake suppose a man hath committed a fault as he hath told a lye or betrayed the secrets of his friend or hath privately detracted from the good name of his Neighbour for which the Laws of men do appoint no punishment he therefore cannot be punished by man with any temporal punishment neither is it necessary that God should temporally afflict him But that no man may too boldly flatter himself assume unto himself hereby a greater liberty of sinning because he thinks himself free from temporal punishment he ought duly to call to mind that he is nevertheless obliged to a far more grievous punishment which is a Spiritual and an Eternal punishment Both which punishments are so necessarily and so reciprocally conjoyned with every fault that the punishment doth alwayes presuppose a fault going before it for God punisheth no man that deserves it not and at the last the deserved punishment must necessarily follow the fault unless it be prevented by the mercy of God remitting the fauâ—t in Christ by Faith and by Repentance XV. These things thus premised to answer to the propounded Doubt I will inferre some Conclusions And in the first place we must judge How the penal Law doth oblige the Subject in Conscience by the mind and Intention of the Law-maker If it be manifest that there is any certainty of it that is if it be certain that the Law-maker did intend to oblige the Subjects not only to the penalty but to the fault also they are undoubtedly obliged to observe that which is commanded by the Law and do not satisfie their Duty if they are prepared to undergo the Penalty ordained by the Law But if it be manifest that he intended not to oblige them but only to the Penalty it is certain that the Subjects are not bound beyond that Penalty The Reason is because the Foundation or Ground of the Obligation of the Law as elswhere is shewed is the manifested will of the Law-maker invested with a Lawful power Therefore where the Will of the Law-maker which is the adaequate Measure of that Obligation which the Law induceth is manifest we need not to make any further doubt concerning the extent of the Obligation XVI Peradventure you will demand what assurance may suffice that a Subject may be secure in his Conscience that sufficiently he understands the mind and intention of the Law-maker I answer that a mathemat calcertitude which is manifest by Demonstration and impossible to be false is in vaâ—n to be expected in morals by reason of the infinite variety of Circumstances and uncertainty of Humane affairs nevertheless a certain logical certitude may oftentimes be had of the Intention of the Law-maker which is to be collected from the words of the Law it self from which his Intention may so perspicuously appear that there needeth not any further Evidence The mind of the Legislator may be manifested partly by the form and manner of the Precept he enjoyneth and partly by the greatness of the Punishment that is to be inflicted but especially from the Preface of the Law it self in which that it may be more acceptable to the people he useth to declare the causes and reasons that do induce him to the making of that Law as also how just it is and necessary for the taking away of abuses and for the advantage of the Common-wealth From all which being rightly weighed together by comparing of the circumstances it will be no great difficulty for a wise and apprehensive man so to learn the meaning and intention of the Lawgiver and to have such a sufficient moral certitude thereof for in morals a moral certitude is sufficient as to conclude that undoubtedly he intended such a thing in the making of it But if the Subject be not of so great an apprehension and Judgment as duly to examine all the importances of the reasons or if he be afraid since every man is not a Competent Judge in his own Cause left he might interpretate the mind of the Law-giver more favourably on his side than he ought to do it would be his best course if it be a business of so great Importance that it will be very uncommodious or troublesome to him to observe that which by Law is commanded to addresse himself to some man of approved Piety and Prudence and plainly and sincerely to declare his mind unto him and to acquiesce in his opinion and his judgment XVII But because it may be and oftentimes it so comes to passe that after all diligence there can be obtained but little certainty of the mind of the Law-maker from the Law it self or not so much as the Conscience of a good man may safely acquiesce therein We must seek further in so doubtfull a case examine what interpretation we are to follow in so doubtfull a case whether that which is the more large favourable as many will have it or as others the stricter interpretation Martin Navar a man of great authority amongst the Canonists is said to be of an opinion that he thought no penal Law did oblige to the fault by it self but only to the penalty Other Authors have been of another judgment and have taught that every penal Law unless by the mind of the Law-maker it was manifest to the contrary did oblige to the fault also I must confess that the extremes of both opinions have been always suspected by me it may so come to pass that as some have spoken too favourably so others too severely That therefore in a thing So dubious we may have something to follow which is certain let this be the second Conclusion A Law purely penal doth by it self and ordinarily oblige only unto the penalty and not unto the fault I say in the first place a Law purely penal whether it be categorically taken or disjunctively I say in the second place by it self for by accident and by the supposition of a former obligation it may oblige to the fault also for a penal Law is made to that end that Subjects by fear of punishment be compelled to their Duties to which they were bound before by a former Law divine natural or humane so those penal Laws he that killeth a man let him suffer the pains of Death He that transporteth Merchandize beyond the Seas let him either pay the Custom or lose his Merchandize do oblige to the fault so that whosoever shall undergo the punishment shall not clear his Conscience thereby unless he shall obey the precept of the Law but they do not bind so by themselves and by their own virtue but by the force of a precedent obligation that taketh its rise from the command of a former Law For the Subject was obliged before that Law according to our supposition was made both by the Law of God not to commit murder and