indued with Reason to bee delivered by Repentance from the accusation and guiltinesse of all those things wherein he hath formerly transgressed Yea this Grace is given to MAN onely to all men and ever to man during the continuance of his life in this world and no longer for after Death there is no more Forgivenesse Some there bee who give a reason why the Angels could no more obtaine pardon by repentance after they had fallen and it is this that followes The Fall of Angels was as they affirme a kind of Death unto them and God vouchsafed them the tender of a pardon before their utter falling away when like account was to bee made of them as is made of Men during this life But because they accepted not the grace offered they received afterward as a just reward punishment everlasting without pardon And hereby it plainly appeares that such as refuse Repentance doe reject that which is a speciall good gift of God and peculiar to MAN This also is one of the things proper and peculiar unto MAN that of all other living creatures only the body of MAN should arise againe after Death and aspire to Immortalitie This priviledge the body gaineth in respect of the immortalitie of the soule as likewise the soule obtaineth the other that is to say pardon after Repentance in respect that the Body is weake and troubled with many passions It is a thing proper also to MAN only to learn Arts and Sciences and to worke according unto such Arts For which cause they who define him say thus MAN is a living Creature induced with Reason mortall capable of Consideration and Science He is tearmed a living-creature in that he is a substance having life indued with sense for that is the definition of a living-creature He is said to be indued with Reason that hee may be distinguished from unreasonable-creatures He is called mortall to make a difference betwixt him and the Reasonable-creatures that are immortall And this clause capable of Consideration Science is added thereunto because wee come to Arts and Sciences by learning of them having in us naturally a certaine potentiall ability to receive both understanding and Arts but not actually attaining them save by study and practise There be some who say that this last clause was lately added to the Definition and that it had beene good enough without the same were it not that some bring in their Nymphes and other petty Deities of those kinds who are said to live long and yet not to be immortall And to distinguish MAN from those these words Capable of consideration and science were judged needfull because none of that sort are thought to learne any thing but to know naturally whatsoever they are said to know The Iewes are of opinion on that the whole World was made for MAN even immediately for his sake as Oxen with other beasts for tillage or to bear burthens and as grasse was made for the Beasts For some things were made for their owne sakes and some for the sakes of others All reasonable-creatures were made for their owne sakes Vnreasonable-creatures and things without life were ordained for others not for themselves Now if such things were made in respect of others let us consider for whom they were indeed created Shall wee think they were made for the Angels Doubtlesse no wise man will say that they were made for their sakes because the things made for the respect or sake of another must concern either the making or the continuance or the recreation of those things for which they were made For they are made either in respect of the propagation and succession of their kinde or of their nourishment or to cover them or to cure them or for their better welfare and rest Now the Angels need no such things for they neither have any succession of their kind neither want clothing bodily nourishment nor any thing else And if Angels have no need of such things it is then evident that no other nature having place above the Angels can have need of them because by how much higher the place of it is so much the lesse need hath it of supply or assistance from another This being so we must seek out a Nature which is indued with Reason and yet needeth such things as are aforementioned and what other nature can be found of that sort if MAN be passed over Surely none And if no other can be discovered it followeth by good reason that both things void of life and unreasonable-creatures were made for the sake of MAN and if they were ordained for him as it is evident they were then that was likewise the cause why he was constituted the Governor also of those creatures Now it is the duty of a Governour to use those things which are put under his government in such manner and measure as need and conveniencie shall require and not to abuse them untemperately or to serve voluptuously his owne delicate Appetite Neither ought he to bear himself tyrannously or ungently towards those whom he governes For they that so doe yea and they that use not mercifully their unreasonable-cattell are therein great Offenders neither performing the part of a Governour nor of a just man according to that which is written The just man hath compassion upon the life of his Beast SECT 5. I. It is here proved that neither things without-life nor the unreasonable creatures were made for themselves First by arguments taken from the consideratiō of the nature and use of things without life II. It is proved also by considering those creatures which are void of reason and which are for the most part very serviceable to MAN III. And lastly it is proved by considering those things which seeme to be rather harmfull then profitable to Mankind BUt some perhaps will say that nothing was made inrespect of another but every thing in respect of it selfe Therefore distinguishing first between things inanimate and those that have life let us observe whether things void of life are likely to have beene created onely for their owne sake For if those things were made in respect of themselves how or upon what should living-creatures feed wee see that Nature out of the earth produceth food both of fruits and of plants to every living-creature some few excepted whose feeding is upon flesh yea and those creatures which are nourished by eating flesh doe feed on such beasts as are sustained by eating the fruits of the earth For Lions and Wolves feed on Lambes Goats Harts and Swine Aegles also and all sorts of Hawkes devoure Partridges Doves Hares and such like which are fed with what springeth out of the ground Moreover the nature of those Fishes which devoure one another doth not so extend it self to all fishes that they do generally devoure the flesh of one another but it breaketh off in such as eate weeds and such other things as grow in the water For if all sorts of fishes had
in death For if thereby the soul be divided from the body it is immediately as much without motion as a Workmans Tools when hee hath cast them aside This is manifest that MAN in some things participates with creatures void of life and that he is partaker also of life as those living-creatures be which are unreasonable and that he is indowed likewise with understanding as are Creatures reasonable With inanimate creatures Man partakes in this that he hath a Body and in his mixture of the foure Elements He agrees with Plants not onely in that which is afore-mentioned but in having also both a nourishing and a feeding-power His coherence with unreasonable Creatures over and above all the former particulars is in having a certaine voluntary motion appetite anger and a power enabling him to feele and breathe for all these are common both to Men and unreasonable creatures Furthermore he communicates with Intelligent incorporeall Natures in reasoning understanding judging and in pursuing vertue and a good life which is the chief end of all vertues These things considered MAN standeth in such a Being as comprehends the sensible and intelligible Nature In respect of his Bodily powers and of his Bodily substance which is subject unto sense hee agrees both with living-creatures and with things void of life In respect of his Reasonable part he communicates with Substances which are bodilesse or spirituall as hath been said before For GOD the Creator of all things hath seemed by little and little so to collect and knit together sundry differing natures that all created things should become ONE And indeed it will be a manifest proofe unto us that there is but One Creator of all things if we well consider how fitly he hath united the substance of individuall things by their particular parts and all the severall species thorowout the world by an excellent sympathie For as in every living creature hee hath joyned the parts insensible with such as have sense in them as bones fatt haire and other insensible parts to the flesh and sinewes which are sensible compounding the Living-creature both of sensible and insensible portions and declaring that all these together make but one living-creature Even so he hath joyned one to another every particular species which was created by ordering and compounding that agreement and disagreement which is in their natures In so much that things inanimate doe not greatly differ from Plants which have in them a vegitative and nourishing life neither are Plants wholy differing from sensible living creatures void of reason nor are those unreasonable creatures so alienated in all things from creatures indowed with reason as that they have no naturall allyance or similitude whereby they may be linked one to another For even in stones which are inanimate creatures not having in them for the most part so much as a vegitative life there is otherwise a certaine power making them to differ from each other even in their stony properties but the Loadstone seemeth very far to exceed the nature and vertue of other stones in that it both attracts Iron thereunto and also detaineth it being so attracted as if it would be nourished thereby Neither doth it exercise this vertue upō one peece of Iron alone but by that one peece linketh fast another and imparteth his owne power to all other peeces which are contiguous thereunto yea Iron draweth Iron when it is touched by the Loadstone Moreover when the CREATOR passed from Plants to living-creatures he rushed not as we may say all at once into things whose nature is to remove from place to place and to such as are indowed with sense but he proceeded rather by degrees and by a naturall and most comely progression For the Shell-fishes called Pinnae and Vrticae are so made as if they were certain Plants having sense in them For he fastned them in the Sea with roots and covered them also with shells as with bark And as therein he made them to participate with Plants so he gave them likewise in some measure the feelingsense which is common to living-creatures They agree with Plants in being rooted and fixed and they communicate with living-creatures in their feeling In like manner the Sponge though it be rooted in the Rocks is of it self opened and contracted according as the passenger approcheth toward it or departeth frō it And therefore Wise men have anciently termed such things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in English Life-plants if by a new word I may so name that which is partly a living-creature and partly a Plant. After the Fishes called Pinnae he proceeded unto those which being unable to passe far from their station doe move onely to and fro within some certaine space such as are the most part of those which have shells and are called the bowels of the earth He went further and added in the like maner something to every thing in particular as to some things more senses and to some other more ability to remove themselves from place to place and came next to those unreasonable-creatures which are more-perfect Those I call more-perfect-creatures which have obtained all the senses and can also remove themselves to places far distant And when GOD passed from unreasonable-creatures to MAN a Creature indowed with Reason he did not perfect him in himself and as it were all at once but first ingraffed into some other living-creatures certain naturall wiles sleights and devises for the saving of themselves which make them seeme to be almost reasonable-creatures And having done all this he then brought forth MAN which is indeed the true Reasonable-Creature The same Order if it bee well considered will appeare in the Voice which from the noise of Horses Oxen is brought by little and little from one plaine simple sound unto the voices of Crowes and Nightingales whose voices consisting of many notes can imitate what they are taught and so by degrees it is terminated in the Articulate voice of MAN which is distinct and perfect Furthermore hee made the various expressions of the Tongue to depend upon the Minde and upon Reason ordaining the speech to publish forth the motions of the Minde And in this wise by a sweet Musicall proportion hee collecting all things together incorporated all into ONE aswell things Intelligible as things visible and made MAN as a meanes thereunto SECT 2. I. Why MAN was first made and why he hath in him somewhat of the Nature of all Creatures II. MAN is the Bounder between visible and Intellectuall things and becomes either an Earthly or Spirituall MAN according as he is inclined to Good or Evill A distinction between the Goods of the Mind and Body and betweene the life of MAN as he is Man and as he is meerly a living creature III. The opinion of the Hebrews touching the mortality and immortality of MAN THese things considered Moses in expressing the Creation of the World did very properly affirme that MAN was last made Not only
into one and as it were to hold them fast united And this we say is done by the SOUL Now if the SOUL be corporeall let it be what Body you please yea though it be a body consisting of the most thin and subtile parts what will you say holds that together as that knitteth the Bodie in One For as we declared before every Bodily thing hath need of some other thing to fasten the parts of it together yea the Bodie of this SOUL that knits together our visible BODIE if we should grant the same to be a corporeall SOUL and the next to that also infinitely it would still have need of some other thing to knit and fasten its own parts together untill an incorporeall-essence were found out If they answer as the Stoicks doe that there is a certaine motion pertaining unto Bodies extending both to the inward and outward parts of the Body That the motion tending outward effects the quantity and the qualities of the Body and that the motion tending inward is cause both of uniting the body and of the essence thereof wee will then aske them seeing every motion doth proceed from some power what kinde of power it is which that motion hath in what consisteth it and what gives essence thereunto If this power bee a certaine matter which the Greekes call Hylen wee will use the same reasons against them which wee objected before If they say it is not matter but a materiall thing for matter and materiall things thus differ That which hath matter in it is called a materiall thing wee then aske them whether that which hath matter in it be likewise matter or void of matter If they say it is matter we demand how it can be both materiall and matter If they answer that it is not matter then they must grant it to be void of matter and if it be void of matter wee will easily prove it to be no Body because every body hath matter in it If they alleage that Bodies have the three Dimensions in them and that the SOUL extending it selfe through the whole Body hath in it also the three Dimensions and therefore must necessarily be a Body wee will then thus answer them It is true that all BODIE' 's have in them the three Dimensions but every thing having the three Dimensions is not a BODY For place and Quality which in themselves have no Body have accidentally a Quantity if they bee in such things as have magnitude In like maner the SOUL in respect of it selfe is utterly void of the Dimensions but accidentally it hath Dimensions because the Body in which it is having in it the three Dimensions wee so conceive it together with the Body as though the Soule also had in it the three Dimensions We argue further and say thus Every Body hath his motion either from without it selfe or from within If the motion bee from without it selfe it must then be void of life if it be from within it selfe it must be indued with life now it is absurd to say that the SOUL is either indued with life or without life one of which must necessarily be affirmed if the Soule bee a corporeall substance therefore the soule cannot be a corporeal Essence Againe the SOUL if it be nourished it is nourished by that which is void of Body for knowledge is the nourishment thereof but no corporeal essence is norished by things bodiless therefore the SOUL cannot be a Body Xenocrates thus concluded this argument If said hee the SOUL be not nourished it cannot be a corporeal-substance because the Body of every living-creature must be nourished Thus much in generall in confutation of all those who generally affirm that the SOUL is a bodily thing Now we will treate particularly against them who are of opinion that the SOUL is either Blood or Breath because when either Blood or Breath is taken away the living-creature dyeth Wee will not say as some well accounted of have written that part of the SOUL falleth away when any part of the blood faileth if the SOUL be the Blood for that were but a slender answer In those things which have every part of like nature with the whole the part remaining is the same with the whole Whether the water bee much or little it is every way perfect water In like maner gold silver and every other thing whose parts do not essentially differ from each other are still the same as is afore said And even so that part of blood which remaineth of what quantity soever may be called the SOUL aswell as the whole quantity if the blood be the SOUL We therfore will rather answer them thus If that be rightly accounted the SOUL upon whose taking away the death of the living creature ensues then should it needs bee that flegme and the two choller 's must be also the SOUL seeing if any one of these faileth it brings the living-creature to his death The like falleth out in the Liver in the Braine in the Heart in the Stomach the Reines the Entrails and in many other parts whereof if you bereave a living-creature it will immediatly perish Moreover there are many things without blood which have life in them neverthelesse as some smooth and gristly fishes some also of a softer kind to wit Sepiae Teuthides and Smyli as the Greekes call them and Lobsters Crabs Oysters and all shel-fish whether they have hard or soft shells Now if these things have a living-Soule in them as we know they have and yet are void of blood then it plainely followes that blood cannot bee the SOUL Against those who say that water is the Soule many things may bee said to disprove their opinion though water helps to quicken and nourish all things and though it bee as they say impossible to live without water Wee cannot live without nourishment and therefore if their assertion bee true wee may aswell affirme that all nourishment in generall and every particular nourishment is the SOUL And whereas they have said that no living-creature can live without water wee finde the contrary to bee probable for it is written of some Aegles and of Partridges that they live without drinke And why should water be the SOUL rather then ayre Seeing it is possible to abstaine from water very long whereas wee can hardly live a moment without breathing the Aire And yet neither is Aire the SOUL For there are many creatures which live without breathing the Aire as all Insectae riveted creatures such as Bees Wasps and Ants as also all bloodlesse creatures all those which live in the waters and such as have no Lungs For none of those things that are without Lungs can breath Aire The proposition is true also if it be converted There is no creature having Lungs which doth not breath aire SECT 2. I. The arguments of Cleanthes the Stoick affirming the SOUL to bee corporeall are here confuted logically and by demonstration II. Chrysippus intending to
maintaine the like opinion is here likewise answered and his Fallacies discovered III. A confutation of their Tenet also who affirme that the SOUL is an Harmony SEeing certaine reasons of some account are divulged by Cleanthes the Stoick and by Chrysippus to prove the SOUL a corporeall substance wee will here deliver somewhat in answer of them and it shall be the same which the Platonists have thereunto replyed heretofore Cleanthes composeth a syllogisme in this manner There is saith hee a likenesse betweene us and our parents not in respect of the Body onely but in regard also of the SOVL as in Passions Manners and Affections now it pertaineth to a body to have in it likenesse and unlikenesse and likenesse and unlikenesse cannot belong to things void of Bodie Therefore the Soul is a bodily-thing It is here to be observed first that he proveth things universall by things particular which is not allowable by the Rules of Logick Next whereas he saith that likenesse and unlikenesse cannot pertaine to any thing void of bodie it is false For wee know that Numbers which have their side-numbers answering in proportion are like one to another as the side-numbers to sixe and to foure and twentie The side-numbers to sixe are two and three The side numbers to foure and twenty are foure and sixe Now there is like proportion of two in respect of four and of three in respect of sixe For they have a double proportion each in respect of other foure being twice as much as two and sixe twice as much as three Thus it appears that Nūbers are like unto Nūbers yet Numbers are no bodily thing Likewise Figures in Geometrie are like unto Figures so many of them as have both their corners equall their sides which inclose their equall-corners answering one another in proportion and even the Platonists themselves will confesse that such Figures are no Bodily-things Moreover as it is a propriety in the predicament of Quantity that a thing should be equall or unequall So also it is a propriety in the predicament of Quality that things should be like or unlike Now the predicament of Quality is an Incorporeall thing Therefore a thing incorporeall may be like unto another thing that is incorporeall Cleanthes thus frameth another Argument No Incorporeall thing saith he can suffer together with a thing corporeall neither can a bodily-thing suffer with such a thing as hath no body but things corporeall only may suffer one with another Now it is evident that if the body be diseased and wounded the SOVL suffereth grief with it The Bodie suffereth also with the SOVL for when the mind is afflicted by shame the Bodie blusheth and when the minde feareth the body looketh pale Therefore the SOVL is a corporeall thing One of his Assumptions is false and he taketh unto himself that which no man granteth For whereas he saith that no Incorporeal thing can suffer with a thing having a bodie what if this be true onely in the SOVL This is as if we should argue thus No living-creature moves the upper jaw But a Crocodile moves the upper jaw Therefore a Crocodile is no living-creature The major of this proposition is false because in saying No living-creature moves the upper-jaw hee taketh as granted that which is denied for behold the Crocodile both moveth his upper-jaw and is also a living-creature The like arguing useth he who saith that Nothing void of body suffereth together with a bodily-thing for he taketh unto himself in his negation that which lieth in question But if we should grant for argument sake that no Incorporeall-thing doth suffer together with a thing-corporeall yet that which is inferred thereupon is not fully confessed to wit that the Soul suffereth with the Body if it be sick or wounded For it is yet in controversie whether it be the Body onely that suffereth pain which having taken sense from the Soul leaves the same insensible of sufferings or whether the Soul be grieved together with the Bodie The former opinion hath hitherto been most generally received among learned men and therefore Cleanthes ought not to have made his propositions of things in question but of such onely as are quite out of doubt for in doing otherwise he in vaine laboureth to demonstrate that for which he contendeth And yet to make the fashood of his Assumption more evident it might be proved that some things void of body doe suffer together with such things as have body For Qualities being things-incorporeall doe suffer with corporeall-things when they are altered yea both in the corruption of the body and in the Generation of the same the Quality thereof suffers change and alteration therewith Chrysippus thus argueth Death is a separation of the Soul from the Bodie Now nothing void of body is separated from a body because a thing incorporeall cannot be touched or laid even along by a corporeall-thing But the Soul toucheth and is equally touched by the body and is also separated from the same Therefore the Soul is a corporeall-essence Among these propositions this is true that death is a separation of the soul from the body But this that a thing void of body cannot touch a body is false if it be generally spoken and true if it be affirmed of the soul It is false because a Line which is an incorporeall-thing doth evenly touch a corporeall-essence and is also separated from the same as also whitenesse Yet in the Soul it is true by reason the Soul doth not so touch the Bodie For if the Soul should so touch the body it must needs follow that it must be laid as it were along by it And if that be so then it lieth along by the whole bodie that is by every part of the same which is impossible For how can a wholebody lie along by every part of another body Or if it should be that the Soul so touched the Bodie then the whole Creature should not have life For if it so touched the same it would indeed consequently follow that the Soul were a corporeall-essence but then the thing made alive should not have life in it throughout every part of the same And contrariwise if the whole living-creature hath life in it then the Soul neither touches the Bodie neither is it a bodily-thing But the whole living-creature hath life in it therefore neither doth the Soul touch it neither is the Soul a bodily-thing and being a thing void of body is neverthelesse separated from the bodie contrary to the proposition of Chrysippus It is manifest by what hath been hitherto said that the Soul is no corpreall-substance it now remaines that we prove the same to be a substance And because Dinarchus defines the Soul to be an Harmonie And Simmias contradicting Socrates affirmes the same comparing the Soul to an harmonie and the body to a Harp we will here set downe the same confutations of them which we finde in Plato's Dialogue called Phaedon One of them