Selected quad for the lemma: death_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
death_n	good_a	life_n	see_v	9,943	5	3.4753	3	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A25820	Aristotle's Rhetoric, or, The true grounds and principles of oratory shewing the right art of pleading and speaking in full assemblies and courts of judicature / made English by the translators of The art of thinking ...; Rhetoric. English	Aristotle.; Anaximenes, of Lampsacus. Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. English.	1686 (1686)	Wing A3695; ESTC R21111	145,667	300

Induction and wherein Induction consists But Induction is neither as the whole to the part nor the part to the whole nor as the whole to the whole but as the Part to the Part and as the like to its like as being both subject to the same Genus tho' the one is more perspicuous then the other As for example Dionysius affected a Tyrannical Government because he requir'd a Guard For Pisistratus who affected the same before him demanded a Guard and when it was granted him he became a Tyrant In like manner Timagenes of Megara and whoever were known to have acted in that manner are examples to prove the Intention of Dionysius while the thing was in Consultation whether to allow him a guard or no and before they knew the reason why he demanded it All which Examples fall under the same general Whole that he who affects Tyrannical Government first demands a Guard And thus much to shew from whence seeming Demonstrative Proofs may be drawn But there is a great difference between Enthymemes and besides there are very few that understand the method of Syllogisms in Logic. For some are appropriated to the method of Rhetoric as others to that of Logic some appear in other Arts which are extant others ●eserv'd for other Arts not invented Wherefore they lye hid from the Auditors and they that meddle with 'em more then is fitting wander from themselves All which a further Explanation will make more manifest I say therefore that Logical and Rhetorical Syllogisms are such to which we ascribe their common places These are such as are commonly reduc'd under the Heads of Justice Philosophy Politics and many other things specifically different as the Topics greater and lesser nor is there any restriction from arguing more upon one then another Subject or Topic be it what it will or never so specifically different and these are general Topics Particular Topics are such as belong to every Genus and Species of Proposition as for Example those are Topics or Propositions belonging to natural Philosophy from whence no Enthymeme or Syllogism can be drawn that has any relation to Ethics and others are Propositions proper to Ethics that have no relation to natural Philosophy and so in all other arts and Sciences whatever But these things will not give a Man to understand any one Genus as not being fixt to any Subject But he that can with most Judgment select these Propositions e're he is aware shall frame a Science distinct from Logic and Rhetoric For if he happen upon Principles it is neither Logic nor Rhetoric but that Science whose Principles it contains But most Enthymemes are drawn from those Forms which are particular and proper fewer from those which are common And therefore the Genus's of Enthymemes are to be distinguish'd as are also the places from whence they are taken I call Forms the Propositions proper to every Genus Places such as are alike common to all Now then concerning Forms But first let us take along with us the Genus's of Rhetoric that when we have distinguish'd how many they are we may discourse apart of their Principles and Propositions CHAP. III. Of the three kinds of Causes and their Ends. THE forms of Rhetoric are in number three for so many sorts of Auditors there are that hear Orations The Oration it self also consists of three things the person that speaks the matter discoursed of and the Person to whom the address is made in whom that is to say the Auditor the end is included for the Auditor is either a Spectator or a Judg the Judg is either a Judg of things past or to come The Judg of future things is the Senator the Judg of things past is the determiner of Causes the Judg of the force of the Oration is the Spectator So that of necessity there must be three kinds of Rhetorical Ratiocinations or Discourses Deliberative or appertaining to the Council-Board to the Bar or Judicial and Demonstrative As to that which concerns the Council-Board the one part of it is perswasive the other diswasive For always they who privately debate or publickly harangue intend one of these two things Of the Judicial one part is the accusation the other is the Defence For they that are in Controversy must do one of these two things either complain or defend Of the Demonstrative the one part is Praise the other Disgrace Seasons also are accommodated to every one of these To the Privy-Counsellor the future for he consults about what is to come either to procure or prevent To the Judg of Controversies the time past for all suits relate to what has been done To the Demonstrative the present time is most properly allow'd for they approve or dislike as the Instant of Delivery But they make use of things past and future to the same purpose calling to mind things past well or ill alledg'd and conjecturing of future things whether well or ill judg'd by the Orator But in every one of these there is a different End The end of the Counsellor is either good or bad for he that perswades perswades for the best he that diswades diswades from the worst to which he adds just and unjust bravery and ignominy The Judges of Controversies propose also Justice or Injustice but they that praise or dislike chiefly look upon honour or disgrace including also those other Ends of Good and Bad Just and unjust And the sign that these are the Ends that every one of the three propose is this for that they never call the rest in question As for Example he that is sued at Law will alledge that he never did the thing or that he did no harm in doing it but will never confess that he did unjustly otherwise there would be no need of Determination In like manner they who consult for the public grant all the rest but that they advise what is hurtful and dehort from what is for the common good they will never admit But whether it is just to enslave their Neighbours and such as do them no Injury they never consider In the same manner they who praise or disproove never mind whether the Person has acted for the public good or not but more often applaud him because he never minded his own Interest that he might act like a good Common-wealths Man For they commend Achilles because he undertook to assist his Friend Patroclus tho' he were certain to dye himself and that his friend should live For to him such a death was more honourable Life only beneficial From what has been said it appears therefore necessary to be furnish'd with Propositions in the first place concerning these things For argumentative Marks and Probabilities and Signs are Rhetorical Propositions Seeing that every Syllogism consists of Propositions and every Enthymeme is a Syllogism consisting of the foresaid Propositions But because it is impossible for Impossibilities to be acted or that they will be acted hereafter but only things

Compulsion or else they only restor'd and did not give whether they knew it or no for either way it is but quid for quo and so neither would this be Charity Therefore it is to be consider'd through all the predicaments for Charity is either this or so much or such or when or where But if he has done less then at another time or given to an Enemy these or equal or more considerable reliefs these are signs they were not done for our sakes Or if he knew the relief to be of no value for no man confesses his craving from Indigency it se●f And thus much concerning Favour and Charity CHAP. VIII Of Pity and Compassion PIty is a certain Sorrow proceding from some apparent destructive Mischief causing sadness in one that deserves not to suffer or in any of his Relations and this such as appears to be nearly resembling the sadness of him that suffers For of necessity he who would be thought to be Compassionate must be such a one as believes he suffers the same evil either himself or some one of his friends and some evil of the same nature like to that in the definition Therefore they that are utterly lost never take Pity for they have suffer'd as much as they can Nor they who believe themselves in full Felicity for they generally laugh at others Miserys For while they believe they enjoy compleat happiness 't is apparent they believe they can suffer no evil But there are such who believe they may suffer as having suffer'd and escap'd and these are of the number of those that Pity Also Old men by reason of their Prudence and Experience and the weaker sort as being more timerous The Learned also for they argue from Reason Also they who have Parents Wives and Children And such as are not over Power'd with Anger or Confidence for they have no Consideration of the future Also they they that are given to Contumely for they do not think themselves lyable to suffer Therefore always they that keep the Medium Nor they who are not extreamly timerous For they being once terrify'd Pity none but themselves Also they that believe that there are some good Men for they who believe there are none think all deserve alike And in a word such as can call to mind that the same Misfortunes have happen'd to them and theirs and be Sollicitous for themselves or their friends in reference to the future These are the qualifications of those that take Pity What things are miserable appears from the definition For they are of that sort which procure sadness are destructive and have Power to destroy Of the same Nature are all considerable Calamities occasion'd by Fortune The destructive and efficient causes of Sadness and Grief are Death Stripes Afflictions of the Body old Age Diseases Hunger The Miserie 's occasion'd by Fortune are want of Friends and therefore to be torn from Friends and Acquaintance is a Miserable thing Also Deformity Weakness Lameness and where we expected Good to find Evil and that frequently and when Comfort comes too late Like the relief sent to Diopithis by the King which arriv'd after he was dead And where no relief comes or if come no Power to enjoy it These are in general what things are lamentable with several of the same Nature Now men Pity their Acquaintance so they be not too nerely related for with such we share as if the Miserys were our own Thus Amasis when he saw his Son Ied to death never shed a tear but he wept when he saw his friend beg The latter is miserable the ● rst terrible For terrible is a different thing from miserable and expels Commiseration and therefore more useful sometimes to the adversary Also men take Pity upon the approach of any thing terrible we pity our Relations also according to their Ages Conditions Endowments Quality and Birth For in every one of these things we may be highly damnify'd For this is a Maxim That whatever men are afraid should happen to themselves they are by thesame things mov'd to compassion when they befal others But in regard those Miseries are most prevalent upon our affections that are most visible to the sight whereas the stories of what happen'd ten thousand years ago or Prophesies of what shall happen ten thousand years hence little move us as being past our remembrance and out of the fear of expectation therefore of necessity those things that are represented to us by Postures by the Voice by the Habit and Action make the Miseries seem the greater as being by those means expos'd nere at hand to the Eye And of the same nature are those things lately done or which shall suddenly happen as also the Postures Actions and Habits of those that lately suffer'd or the Speeches and behaviour of Men at their Executions especially if look'd upon as Men of Vertue and Religion For all these things approaching the Eye more effectually move Compassion CHAP. IX Of Indignation OPposite to Compassion lies chiefly that which is call'd Indignation For to grieve by reason of Adversity undeservedly happening is in a manner oppos'd to it and proceeds from the same Inclinations that cause us to be sorry when we see men prosper undeservedly And both these are perturbations of honest Inclinations For it beseem's us to condole when any one is unjusty vex'd as also to be offended at their ill usage For what is contrary to desert is unjust And therefore Indignation is attributted to the Gods themselves Envy also seems to be oppos'd to Pity in the same manner as nearest to it and almost the same thing with Indignation But it is another thing for Envy is a troubl'd sorrow and repining at the Prosperity of one that is unworthy of it but onethat is in the same state of Equality and Similitude of parts and conditions But Indignation arises not because something of adversity happens to himself but because it befals his friend For as they say there ought to be an equal distribution to all men For if a man be perplex'd as fearing lest some evil should betide himself from the happiness of another this is no longer Indignation nor Envy but Fear and it is manifest that contrary Passions will follow these For he that is offended at the evils which befall the undeserving will certainly be glad or at least not be sorry when those that deserve ill are punish'd according to their merits such as Parricides or Murderers whose deserved Executions no good man pities For it behoves us to rejoyce at the punishment of such as we do at the rewards of the Vertuous there being an equal Justice in the two different sorts of Recompences For of necessity we ought to wish the same good fortune to those that are like our selves as to our selves All these things therefore proceed from the same constitution of mind but the contrary to these from contrary dispositions For to rejoyce at other mens Misfortunes is the same