Selected quad for the lemma: death_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
death_n	die_v	hell_n	soul_n	5,199	5	5.0131	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A51660	Malebranch's Search after the truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind. Vol. II and of its management, for avoiding error in the sciences : to which is added, the authors defence against the accusations of Monsieur de la Ville : also, the life of Father Malebranch, of the oratory of Paris, with an account of his works, and several particulars of his controversie with Monsieur Arnaud Dr. of Sorbonne, and Monsieur Regis, professor in philosophy at Paris, written by Monsieur Le Vasseur, lately come over from Paris / done out of French from the last edition.; Recherche de la vérité. English	Malebranche, Nicolas, 1638-1715.; Sault, Richard, d. 1702.	1695 (1695)	Wing M316; ESTC R39697	381,206	555

is impossible that he should have any inclination so pure as to have no mixture of any passion Thus the love of Truth Justice and of God himself is always accompanied with some Traces of the Brain which renders this knowledge more lively but commonly more confused It is true that very often we do not discover that our Imagination is a little employed at the same time we conceive an Abstracted Truth The reason is because these Truths have no Images or Traces instituted by Nature to represent them and all Traces which stir them up have no other relation to them but that of Mans Will or chance which has so placed them For Arithmeticians and even Algebraists who only consider Abstracted Things often make use of their Imaginations to keep their Minds fixt upon these Idea's Cyphers Alphabetical Letters and other Figures which they see or imagine are always joined to these Ideas although the Traces which are formed by these Characters have no relation to them and so can make them neither false nor confused And thus by a regulated use of Figures and Letters they discover the most difficult Truths which otherwise it would be impossible to find out The Idea's of things which can only be perceived by the pure Understanding may then be connected to the Traces of the Brain and the fight of Objects that we love hate and fear by a Natural Inclination may be accompanied with the motion of the Spirits It is plain that the thought of Eternity the fear of Hell the hopes or an Eternal Happiness although they be Objects that strike not the Senses yet may excite violent Passions in us So that we may say we are united after a sensible manner not only to all things that relate to the preservation of Life but also to Spiritual things to which the Mind is immediately united by it self It even happens very often that Faith Charity and Self-love make this union to Spiritual things stronger than that whereby we are joined to all sensible things The Souls of true Martyrs are more united to God than to their Bodies and those who die to maintain the truth of a false Religion sufficiently shew that the fear of Hell has more power over them than the fear of death has There is often so much heat and prejudice on both sides in Religious Wars and in the defence of Superstitions that we cannot doubt but there is some Passions in them and such a one as is stronger and much more constant than any other because it is built upon an appearance of Reason as well in those that are deceived as in others We are then by our Passions united to what ever appears to us to be a good or evil to the Mind as well as to what ever seems to be so to the Body There is nothing which we can discover to have any relation to us which is not capable of affecting us and amongst all the things that we know there is none that has not some relation to us We have always some interest even in the most abstracted Truths when we know them because at least there is that relation of knowledge between them and our Minds They are ours if I may so say by our knowledge We feel that they hurt us when we dispute them and if they hurt us it is certain that they agitate and disquiet us Thus the Passions have so vast a dominion and extension that it is impossible to conceive any thing in respect to them whereof we could be certain although all Men were exempt from their empire But let us now see what their Nature is and endeavour to discover all things they comprehend CHAP. III. A particular Explanation of all the changes that happen to the Body and Soul by means of the Passions WE may distinguish seven things in each of our Passions except in Admiration which also is but an imperfect Passion The first is the Judgment the Mind makes of an Object or rather the confused and distinct view of the relation this Object has to us The second is a new determination of the motion of the Will towards this Object supposing it be or appears to be a good Before this view the Natural Motion of the Soul either was intermixed viz. carried towards good in general or it was otherwise determined by the knowledge of some other particular Object But in that moment the Mind perceived the relation this new Object had to it this general Motion of the Will is forthwith determined conformably to what the Mind perceives The Soul draws near to this Object by its love that it may taste it and discover its good by the sensation of sweetness which the Author of Nature gives it as a Natural Recompence for its inclining to good It judged that this Object was a good by an abstracted Reason which affected it not but it remains convinced by the efficacy of Sensation and the more lively this Sensation is the stronger it unites to the good it seems to produce But if this particular Object be considered as evil or as capable of depriving us of any good no new determination happens to the Motion of our Will but only an augmentation of Motion towards the good opposite to this Object which appears an evil which augmentation is so much the greater as the appearing Evil is more to be feared For indeed we hate only because we love and an External Evil is judged as such only because it deprives us of some good Thus Evil being considered as the privation of Good to fly Evil is but to fly the privation of Good which is the same thing as to incline towards good There happens no new determination then in the natural motion of the Will at the meeting with an Object which displeases us but only a sensation of pain disgust or bitterness that the Author of Nature has imprinted in the Soul as a natural pain because it is deprived of good Reason alone would not be sufficient to carry us to it there must also be stir it up Before Sin sensation was no pain but only a warning because as I have already said Adam might when he would stop the motion of the Animal Spirits which would cause pain so that if he felt pain 't was because he willed it as a good or rather he felt it not because he would not feel it So that in all the Passions all the motions of the Soul towards good are only motions of love But because we are touched by divers Sensations according to the different circumstances which accompany the prospect of the good and motion of the Soul towards it we confound the Sensations with the emotions of the Soul and we imagine as many different motions in the Passions as there are different Sensations Now we must here observe that Pain is a real and true Evil and that it is no more the privation of Pleasure than Pleasure is the privation of Pain for there is a

inclines it to favour the Passions Thus the Passions act upon the Imagination and the Imagination being corrupted fights against Reason by continually representing things to it not according as they are in themselves whereby the Mind might make a true Judgment but as they relate to the present Passion to incline it to make a Judgment in favour of it The Passions do not only corrupt both the Imagination and Mind in favour of 'em but likewise produce in the rest of the Body every disposition that is necessary for their preservation The Spirits which are agitated by them stop not in the Brain but are carried as I have already intimated to all the other parts of the Body They are chiefly dispersed into the Heart Liver Spleen and into the Nerves which encompass the principal Arteries In short they are thrown into all parts whatever which can supply necessary Spirits for the preservation of the ruling Passion But when these Spirits are thus dispersed into the parts of the Body they by little and little destroy whatever can resist their course till at last they make their passage so slippery and smooth that the smallest Object extreamly agitates us and consequently inclines us to form such Judgments as favour the Passions And 't is after this manner that they establish and justifie themselves If we consider how various the constitution of the Fibres of the Brain is how different the agitation and abundance of the Spirits and Blood in different Sexes and at different Ages it will be easie enough to discover very near what Passions certain Persons are most subject to and consequently what Judgments they will make upon such Objects For Instance we may nearly guess by the abundance or scarcity of Spirits which we observe in certain Persons that the very same thing being equally proposed and explained to them many will form Judgments of hope and joy upon it and others of fear and sorrow For those who have abundance of Blood and Spirits as commonly Young Men Sanguine and Cholerick Persons have easily conceive hope because of the secret sense of their Strength They will not believe they shall find any opposition in their designs which they cannot conquer and immediately please themselves with the foretast of a good they hope to possess and will form all sorts of Judgments which are fit to justifie their hope and joy But such as want agitated Spirits as Old Men Melancholy and Flegmatick Persons do being inclined to fear and sorrow because their Soul grows weak and is destitute of Spirits to execute its Orders they form quite contrary Judgments imagining unconquerable difficulties to justifie their fear and abandon themselves to envy sorrow despair and to certain kinds of aversion of which weak Persons are most susceptible CHAP. XII That such Passions as have Evil for their Object are most dangerous and unjust and such as are attended with the least knowledge are the most lively and sensible OF all the Passions those whose Judgments are most unreasonable and most to be feared are all kinds of Aversion There are no Passions whatever that corrupts the Reason more in favour of 'em than hatred and fear do Hatred chiefly in the Cholerick or in such whose Spirits are in continual agitation and Fear in the Melancholic or in those whose gross and heavy Spirits are neither soon agitated nor easily appeased But when Hatred and Fear conspire together to corrupt the Reason which is very common then there are no Judgments so unjust and fantastic but they are capable of producing and maintaining with an insuperable obstinacy The reason of which is because the Soul is in this life more lively affected with evil than good the sensation of pain being more quick than that of pleasure We are much more sensible of injuries and reproaches than praises and applause and if we meet with some Persons that have a great indifference for the enjoyment of certain pleasures or the receiving of certain honours yet would it be very difficult to find any who would quietly suffer pain and contempt Thus Hatred Fear and the other kinds of Aversion which have Evil for their Object are very violent Passions They give the Mind such unforeseen shocks and stupify and discompose it and soon penetrate into the most secret recesses of the Soul They dethrone Reason and upon all sorts of subjects pronounce erroneous and unjust Judgments in favour of their folly and tyranny Of all the Passions these are the most cruel and distrustful the most destructive to Charity and Civil Society and likewise the most ridiculous and extravigant for they form such impertinent and fantastic Judgments as excites the laughter and indignation of all Men. These Passions put these extravagant Speeches in the Mouth of the Pharisees Joh. c. 11.47 What do we this Man works many Miracles If we let him alone all Men will believe in him And the Romans will come and destroy both our City and Nation They agreed that JESVS CHRIST did many Miracles the resurrection of Lazarus was undeniable But what was the Judgment of their Passions To put JESVS CHRIST to death and Lazarus whom he had raised to life And why must JESVS CHRIST die because if we let him alone all Men will believe him and the Romans will come and ruine our Nation And why must Lazarus be put to death because upon his account many Jews went away and believed in JESVS Joh. c. 12.11 These are both cruel and extravagant Judgments together cruel through hatred and extravagant through fear The Romans will come and ruine our City and Nation 'T was the same Passions induced a great Assembly consisting of Annas the High Priest Caiaphas John Alexander and all those who were a kin to the High Priest to speak thus What shall we do with these Men for that indeed a notable Miracle hath been done by them is manifest to all them that dwell in Jerusalem and we cannot deny it Acts c. 4. 16 17. But that it spread no farther amongst the People let us threaten to punish them if henceforward they teach any more in the Name of JESUS All these great Men pronounced both an impertinent and an unjust Judgment because they were agitated by their Passions and blinded by their false Zeal They durst not punish the Apostles because of the People and because the Man who had been miraculously cured was above 40 years old and present in the Assembly But threatened them to hinder 'em from preaching in the Name of JESVS Believing they ought to condemn a Doctrine whose Author they had put to death You intend say they to the Apostles to bring this Man's Blood upon us When false Zeal is joined to Hatred Acts c. 5. it shelters it from the reproaches of Reason and after such a manner justifies it that we do not scruple to follow its motions and when ignorance and weakness accompany fear they extend to an infinite number of subjects and so well

according to Saint Paul see God confusedly as in a Glass but we cannot see him Face to Face Non videbit me homo vivet Nevertheless we may see him ex parte that is confusedly and imperfectly We must nor imagine that Life is equal in all Living Men nor that it consists in an indivisible Point Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem Nunc cognosco ex parte 1 Cor. 15. The Dominion of the Body over the Mind which hinders us from uniting our selves to God by the Knowledge of Truth is capable of more and less The Soul is not equally united to the Body it animates by its Sensations in all Men nor to those towards which it inclines by its Passions and there are some who mortifie the Concupiscence of Pleasure and Pride in themselves to that degree that they hardly any longer have any relation to their Bodies or to the World Thus they are as if they were Dead Saint Paul gives us a great Example of this He chastized his Body and reduced it into subjection and he had humbled and lessened himself to that degree that he thought no more on the World nor the World on him For the World was Dead and Crucified to him as he was Dead and Crucified to the World And 't is for that Reason sayes Saint Gregory that he was so sensible of Truth and so well disposed to receive the Divine Lights that are in his Epistles which as bright as they are only strike those who like him mortifie their Senses and Passions For as he sayes himself The carnal and sensible Man cannot apprehend spiritual things Animalis homo non percipit ea quae sunt Spiritus Dei stultitia enim est illi 1 Cor. 2.14 because the Wisdom of the World the Taste of the Age Wit Niceness Vivacity the Beauty of Imagination by which we live to the World and the World lives in us Ad Moysen dicitur non videbit me homo vivet ae si apertè diceretur Nullus unquam Deum spiritualiter videt qui Mundo carnaliter vivit St. Greg. upon the 28th Chapter of Job communicates to our Mind a sad stupidity and insensibility in respect to all Truths which we cannot perfectly understand without silencing our Senses and Passions Therefore we must wish for Death which unites us to God or at least the Image of that Death which is the mysterious Sleep during which all our External Senses being stupified we may listen to the Voice of inward Truth which is only heard in the silence of Night when Darkness conceals sensible Objects from us and the World is as it were Dead in relation to us 'T is thus sayes St. Gregory That the Spouse had hearkened to the Voice of her Beloved in her Sleep at if she had said I sleep but my Heart wakes I sleep outwardly but my Heart wakes within me because having no Life nor Sensation in reference to visible Objects I become extreamly sensible to the Voice of inward Truth which speaks to me in the most secret part of my Reason Hinc est quod sponsa in Canticis Canticorum sponsi vocem quasi per somnium audieret quae dicebat Ego dormio Cor meum vigilat Ac si diceret dum exteriores sensus ab hujus vitae sollicitudinibus sopio vacante mente vivacius interna cognosco Foris dormio sed intus Cor vigilat quia dum exteriora quasi non sentio interiora solerter apprehendo Bene ergo Eliu ait quod per Somnium loquitur Deus Morals of St. Gregory upon the 33th Chapter of Job AN EXPLANATION OF THE Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of the Third Book In which I prove That we have no clear Idea of the Nature or Modifications of our Soul I Have said in some places and also think I have sufficiently proved it in the Third Book of the Search after Truth that we have no clear Idea of our Soul but only a Conscience or Internal Sensation and for that reason we know it far more Imperfectly than Extension That appear'd so evident to me that I did not think there was any necessity to prove it more at large But the Authority of Des Cartes who says positively That the Nature of the Mind is better known than that of all other things Answer to the fifth Objection against the second Meditation towards the end has prejudiced some of his Disciples so far that what I have written about it has had no other effect with them than to make me pass for a weak Man and one that is incapable of reaching and keeping firmly to abstracted Truths which are improper to beget and preserve the attention of those who consider them I own that I am very weak sensible and heavy and that my Mind depends on my Body in so many respects that I cannot express them I know it I feel it and I endeavour continually to increase that knowledge I have of my self For if we cannot prevent our being miserable it is necessary at least to know it and to feel it since we must at least humble our selves at the sight of our inward Miseries and acknowledge the need we have to be delivered from this Body of Death which disperses Trouble and Confusion throughout all the Faculties of the Soul Nevertheless the Question in hand is so much proportioned to the Mind that I see not why a great application is required to resolve it And this is the reason I did not inlarge upon it For I think I may presume to say that the Ignorance of most Men in relation to their Soul its distinction from the Body its Spirituality its Immortality and its other properties sufficiently prove that we have no clear or distinct Idea of it We may say we have a clear Idea of the Body because we need only to consult the Idea which presents it to discover the modifications whereof it is capable We see clearly that it may be round square at rest or in motion We easily conceive that a Square may be divided into two Triangles two Parallelograms two Trapezias When any one asks us whether any thing belongs or belongs not to Extension we never hesitate upon an Answer because the Idea of Extension being clear we easily at first sight see what it contains and what it excludes But I find not that we have any Idea of our Mind by which we may discover in consulting it the modifications whereof it is capable Had we never felt Pleasure or Pain we should not be able to know whether the Soul were or were not capable of feeling them If a Man had never eaten Melon suffered Pain seen Red or Blue he might consult the pretended Idea of his Soul long enough and never have distinctly discovered from thence whether it were capable or not of such sensations and such modifications I say further although he actually felt Pain or saw Colour he

and each number with any other so we may compare a Square with a Triangle a Circle with an Ellipsis a Square and a Triangle with any other Square and Triangle and by this means clearly discover the relations which these Figures and Numbers have to one another But we cannot compare our Mind with other Beings to discover clearly any relation of them nor can we so much as compare its modifications together We can never clearly discover the relations between Pleasure and Pain Heat and Colour or to speak only of the modifications of the same kind we cannot exactly determine the relations between Green and Red Yellow and Purple nor even between Purple and Purple We see plainly that one is darker or brighter than the other yet do we not evidently know either how much or what it is to be darker or brighter We have therefore no clear Idea of the Soul or its modifications and although I see or feel Colours Tasts Odours I may say as I have before that I know them not by a clear Idea since I cannot clearly discover their relations 'T is true I can discover the exact relation between Sounds as for instance that the Octave is double a fifth as 3 to 2 a fourth as 4 to 3. but I cannot know these proportions by the sensations I have of ' em If I know the Octave is double 't is because I have learnt by experience that the same string sounds an Octave when having struck it whole we strike it again after having divided it into two equal parts or that I know the number of vibrations is double in equal times or something of the like nature and this because the tremblings of the air the vibration of the string and even the string it self are such things as we may compare by clear Ideas and that we distinctly know the relations between the string and its parts as also between the swiftness of different vibrations But we cannot compare Sounds amongst themselves or as they are sensible Qualities and Modifications of the Soul nor this way are their proportions or relations to be discovered And although Musicians very well distinguish the different concords 't is not because they distinguish the proportions of them by clear Ideas They judge of different Sounds only by the Ear Reason has nothing to do in it But we cannot say that the Ear judges by a clear Idea or otherwise than by sensation Musicians therefore have no clear Idea of Sounds as they are Sensations and Modifications of the Soul and consequently we conceive neither the Soul nor its Modifications by a clear Idea but only by Conscience or inward Sensation Nay what is more we do not so much as know wherein consist those Dispositions of the Soul which make it more ready to act and represent Objects to it self we cannot so much as discover in what these Dispositions can consist Nor can we by Reason possitively affirm whether the Soul alone separated from the Body or considered without relation to the Body is capable of Habits and Memory But how could we be ignorant of these things if the Nature of the Soul were better known to us than that of the Body Without any difficulty we perceive wherein consists the facility that the Animal Spirits have to flow into the Nerves they have been many times in or at least we easily discover that whilst the Conduits of the Nerves are enlarged and their Fibres recumbent after a certain manner the Spirits can easily insinuate themselves But what can we conceive to be capable of encreasing the facility the Soul has to act or think For my part I confess I am wholly ignorant of it nor can I instruct my self in it although I have a very lively sensation of the facility whereby it excites certain thoughts in me And if I had no particular Reasons which inclined me to believe that I really have such Dispositions although I know them not in me I should conclude that there was neither Habit nor Spiritual Memory in my Soul But in fine since we have any doubt about it it is a certain mark we are not so well acquainted with it as is pretended for Doubts can never attend Evidence and clear Ideas It is certain that the most understanding Man does not evidently know Eccl. 9.1 whether he deserves Love or Hatred as the Wise-man speaks Sed neque meipsum judico Nihil enim mihi conscius sum sed non in hoc justificatus sum qui autem judicat me Dominus est 1 Cor. 4.4 John 13.37 The inward sensation we have of our selves can give us no assurance of it St. Paul says indeed his Conscience reproached him with nothing yet for all that he does not say he is justified On the contrary he affirms that justifies him not and that he durst not judge himself because he who judges is the Lord. But as we have a clear Idea of Order if we had as clear a one of the Soul by the inward sensation we have of our selves we should evidently know if it were conformable to order we should discover whether we were righteous or not and even exactly discern all its inward dispositions to good or evil whenever we had any sensation of them And if we could know our selves as we are we should not be so subject to presumption 'T is also very probable that then St. Peter would not have said to his Master whom he so soon after denied Why can I not follow thee now I will lay down my life for thy sake Animam meam pro te ponam For having an inward sensation of his Power and Good Will he would have been able evidently to have seen whether he had had a sufficient Strength and Courage in himself to have overcome death or rather the insults of a silly Maid and two or three other Servants If the Nature of the Soul is more known than that of any thing else and the Idea we have of it as clear as that we have of the Body I only demand what is the reason that so many Men confound them together Is it possible to confound two clear Ideas which are entirely different Let us do Justice to all the World Those who are not of our Opinion are as rational as we they have the same Idea of things and partake of the same Reason Why therefore do they confound what we distinguish Do they ever on other occasions confound such Things as they have clear Ideas of Have they ever confounded two different Numbers Or ever taken a Square for a Circle And yet the Soul differs more from the Body than a Square does from a Circle for they are two Substances which agree in nothings and still they confound them The reason must be then because there is some difficulty in discovering their difference and which cannot be done by a simple view but some Arguments must be used to prove that the one is not the other Wherefore the

designed either to maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes or the Nature of Aristotle For although they often spoke after such a manner as favoured Prejudices and the Judgments of the Senses Omnia quippe portenta contra Naturam dicimus esse sed non sunt quomodo enim est contra Naturam quod Dei fit voluntate Cum volantes tanti utique conditorio conditae rei cujusque Natura sit Portentum ergo fit non contra Naturam sed contra quam est nota Natura St. Aug. de Civitate Dei l. 21. c. 8. they sometimes so explained themselves as sufficiently discovered the disposition of their Mind and Heart St. Austin for instance believed the Will of God to be the Power or Nature of every thing as he declares when he speaks thus We are wont to say that Prodigies are against Nature but 't is not true For the Will of the Creator being the Nature of all Creatures how can what is performed by the Will of God be contrary to Nature Miracles or Prodigies therefore are not against Nature but only against what we know of Nature 'T is true St. Austin speaks in many places according to Prejudices But I affirm that proves nothing since we ought to explain literally only such passages as are opposite to Prejudices for the Reasons I have already given If St. Austin in all his Works had never said any thing against the Efficacy of Second Causes but had alwayes favoured this Opinion we might perhaps make use of his Authority to establish it Yet if it does not appear that he ever seriously examined this Question we should alwayes have had Reason to think that his Judgment was not determined upon this Subject and that 't was not impossible but he might be drawn by the impression of his Senses without Reflection to have believed a thing which appeared undoubted until it was carefully examined It is certain for instance that St. Austin alwayes spoke of Beasts as if they had a Soul I don't say a Corporeal one for that Holy Father too well knew the distinction between the Soul and Body to believe there were Corporeal Souls I say a Spiritual Soul for Matter is incapable of Sensation Yet I believe it more reasonable to make use of his Authority to prove that Beasts have no Souls than to prove they have any For from the Principles he has carefully examined and strongly establish'd it manifestly follows they have none Some of St. Austins Principles are these That what has not sinned can never suffer evil Now according to him Pain is the greatest evil and Beasts suffer it That the most noble cannot have the least noble for its end But with him the Soul of Beasts is Spiritual and more noble than the Body and yet has no other end than the Body That what is Spiritual is Immortal and the Soul of Beasts that 's Spiritual is subject to Death There are many such like Principles in the Works of St. Austin from whence it may be concluded that Beasts have no such Spiritual Soul as he admits in them See c. 22 23. de Anima ejus origine as is shown by Ambrose Victor in his Sixth Volume of Christian Philosophy But the Sentiment that Beasts have a Soul or feel Pain when they are beaten being agreeable to Prejudices for there 's no Child who does not believe it we have alwayes reason to think that St. Austin speaks upon this matter according to the general Opinion and never seriously examined the Question and that if he had but begun to doubt and make any reflection upon it he would not have said a thing which is so contrary to his Principles Thus although the Fathers should alwayes have favoured the Efficacy of Second Causes perhaps we should not have been obliged to have had any regard to their Opinion if it had appeared that they had not carefully examined the matter And that what they should have said had been only a Consequence of the Language which is formed and established upon Prejudice But 't is certainly the contrary For the Fathers the most Pious Persons and those who have been best instructed in Religion have commonly snown by some places of their Works what was the disposition of theis Mind and Heart in respect to this matter The most Learned and also the greatest number of Divines seeing on one side that the Holy Scripture was contrary to the Efficacy of Second Causes and on the other that the impression of the Causes publick Laws and chiefly the Philosophy of Aristotle established it For Aristotle thought that God did not concern himself in Sublunary Affairs because it was unworthy his grandeur And that Nature which he supposed in all Bodies was sufficient to produce what happened here below The Divines I say have found this Medium to reconcile Faith with the Heathen Philosophy and Reason with the Senses that Second Causes do nothing except God concurs with them But because this immediate concourse whereby God acts with Second Causes includes great difficulties some Philosophers have rejected it pretending that in order to their acting 't was enough if God preserved them with the same vertue he at first created them And because this Opinion is absolutely conformable to Prejudice and because the operation of God in Second Causes is not sensible it is therefore commonly received by the Vulgar and by those who apply themselves more to the Physicks of the Antients than to Divinity and the Meditation of the Truth The generality of the World believe that God at first Created all things and gave them all the necessary qualities or faculties for their preservation That he has for instance given the first Motions to Matter and afterwards left it to it self to produce by the Communication of its Motions this variety of admirable forms We commonly suppose that Bodies can move one another and even attribute this Opinion to Des Cartes although he expresly speaks against it in the 36th and 37th Articles of the Second Part of his Philosophical Principles Though Man cannot hinder himself from acknowledging that the Creatures depend upon God yet he lessens this dependence as much as possible either through a secret aversion to God or a wretched stupidity and insensibility in respect to his operation But as this Sentiment is chiefly received by those who have not much studied Religion and who often rather follow their Senses and the Authority of Aristotle than their Reason and that of the Holy Scriptures we have not so much reason to fear its establishment in the Minds of those who have any love for Truth and Religion For a little Application in the Examination of this Opinion will easily discover its falsity But that Notion of the immediate concourse of God to each action of Second Causes seems to agree with those passages of Scripture which often attribute the same effect both to God and the Creatures We must consider then that there are