Selected quad for the lemma: country_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
country_n	city_n	mountain_n	river_n	1,763	5	6.9182	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A48871	An abridgment of Mr. Locke's Essay concerning humane [sic] understanding; Essay concerning human understanding	Locke, John, 1632-1704.; Wynne, John, 1667-1743.	1696 (1696)	Wing L2735; ESTC R23044	115,066	330

great weight and then the Sound Gold stands when he uses it for a Complex Idea of a shining Yellow and very weighty substance Thô Words signify properly nothing but the Ideas in Mens Minds yet they are in their Thoughts secretly referred to Two other Things First They suppose their Words to be marks of Ideas in the Minds of other Men with whom they communicate else they could not discourse intelligibly with one another In this case Men stand not to examine whether their Ideas and those of other Men be the same they think it enough that they use the word in the common Acceptation of that Language Secondly They suppose their words to stand also for the reality of Things Words then being immediately the signs of Mens Ideas whereby they express their Thoughts and Imaginations to others there arises by constant use such a connexion between certain Sounds and the Ideas they stand for that the Names heard almost as readily excite certain Ideas as if the Objects themselves were present to the Senses And because we examine not precisely the signification of Words we often in attentive consideration set our Thoughts more on Words than Things Nay some because we often learn Words before we know the Ideas they stand for speak several Words no otherwise than Parrots do without any meaning at all But so far as Words are of use and signification so far there is a constant connexion between the Sound and Idea And a designation that the one stand for the other without which application of them they are nothing but insignificant noise Since then Words signifie only Mens peculiar Ideas and that by an arbitrary Imposition it follows that every Man has an inviolable Liberty to make Words stand for what Ideas he pleases It is true common use by a tacit Consent appropriates certain Sounds to certain Ideas in all Languages which so far limits the signification of each Sound that unless a Man applies it to the same Ideas he cannot speak properly And unless a Man's Words excite the same Ideas in the Hearer which he makes them stand for in speaking he cannot speak intelligibly But whatever be the consequence of any Man's use of Words different either from their publick use or that of the Persons to whom he addresses them this is certain their signification in his use of them is limited to his Ideas and they can be signs of nothing else CHAP. III. Of General Terms ALL Things that Exist being particulars it might be expected that Words should be so too in their signification but we find it quite contrary for most of the Words that make all Languages are general Terms This is the effect of Reason and Necessity For First It is Impossible that every particular Thing should have a distinct peculiar Name because it is impossible to have distinct Ideas of every particular Thing to retain its Name with its peculiar appropriation to that Idea Secondly It would be Useless unless all could be supposed to have these same Ideas in their Minds For Names applyed to particular things whereof I alone have the Ideas in my Mind could not be Significant or Intelligible to another who is not acquainted with all those particular Things which had fallen under my Notice Thirdly It would be of no great Use for the Improvement of Knowledge which thô founded in particular Things enlarges it self by general views to which Things reduced into Sorts under general Names are properly subservient In Things where we have occasion to consider and discourse of Individuals and Particulars we use proper Names as in Persons Countreys Cities Rivers Mountains c. Thus we see that Jockeys have particular names for their Horses because they often have occasion to mention this or that particular Horse when he is out of sight The next thing to be considered is how General Words come to be made Words become general by being made Signs of General Ideas Ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of Time Place or any other Ideas that may determinate them to this or that particular Existence By this way of Abstraction they become capable of representing more Individuals than one each of which having a conformity to that abstract Idea is of that sort But it may not be amiss to trace our Notions and Names from their beginning and observe by what degrees we proceed and enlarge our Ideas from our first Infancy It is evident that the first Ideas Children get are only particular as of the Nurse or Mother and the Names they give them are confined to these Individuals Afterwards observing that there are a great many other things in the World that resemble them in shape and other qualities they frame an Idea which they find those many particulars do partake in to that they give with others the Name Man for example in this they make nothing new but only leave out of the Complex Idea they had of Peter James Mary c. that which is peculiar to each and retain only what is common to all And thus they come to have a general Name and a general Idea By the same method they advance to more general Names and Notions For observing several things that differ from their Idea of Man and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name to agree with Man in some certain Qualities by retaining only those Qualities and uniting them into one Idea they have another more general Idea to which giving a Name they make a Term of a more comprehensive Extension Thus by leaving out the Shape and some other Properties signified by the name Man and retaining only a Body with life Sense and Spontaneous Motion we form the Idea signified by the Name Animal By the same way the Mind proceeds to Body Substance and at last to Being Thing and such Universal Terms which stand for any Ideas whatsoever Hence we see that the whole Mystery of Genus and Species is nothing else but Abstract Ideas more or less comprehensive with Names annexed to them This shews us the reason why in defining Words we make use of the Genus namely to save the labour of enumerating the several Simple Ideas which the next general Term stands for General Terms then belong not to the real Existence of Things they are Inventions of the Understanding and concern only Signs either Words or Ideas It must be considered in the next place what kind of signification it is that general Words have It is evident that they do not barely signify one particular thing for then they would not be general Terms but proper Names neither do they signify a Plurality for then Man and Men would signifie the same thing but that which they signifie is a sort of Things and this they do by being made a sign of an Abstract Idea in the Mind to which Idea as Things existing are found to agree so they come to be ranked under that name or to be of that sort The Essences then