therefore he bindeth his speech with an oath (x) O beatos nos quorum causâ Deus juâ—at O miserrimos si nec juranti domino credimus Happy are we for whose take the Lord vouchsafeth to sweare but most â—nhappy if we beleeve him not when he sweareth Now if God delight not in the destruction of wicked men certainely he never did out of his absolute pleasure seale up so many millions of men lying in the fall under invincible damnation for such a decreeing of men to eternall death is directly opposite to a delight in their repentance and everlasting life Rom. 11.2 God hath shut up all in unbeleefe that he might have mercy over all In these the Apostles words are two All 's of equall extent the one standing against the other An All of unbeleevers and an All of objects of mercy looke how many unbeleevers there be on so many hath God a will of shewing mercy And therefore if all men of all sorts and conditions and every man in every sort be an unbeleever then is every man of every condition under mercy and if every man be under mercy then there is no precise antecedent will of God of shutting up some and those the most from all possibility of obtaining mercy For these two are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and cannot stand together Ioh. 3.16 God so loved the world that he gave his onely begotten Sonne that whosoever beleeveth in him should not perish c. God loved the world sayth the Text that is the whole lumpe of mankinde therefore he did not absolutely hate the greatest part of men Againe God loved it fallen into a gulph of sinne and misery For he so loved them as to send his sonne to redeem them and a Saviour presupposeth sinne He did not therefore hate the most of them lying in the fall for love and hatred are contrary acts in God and cannot be exercised about the same objects Many Expositers I know doe take world here in a restrained sense and understand by it the company of the Elect or the world of Beleevers onely but they have little reason for it in my opinion for 1 I thinke there can be no place of Scripture alledged wherein this word world especially with the addition of whole as 1. Epist of Joh. cap. 2. v. 2. a place equivalent to this for the matter of it and a comment upon it I say no place I thinke can be produced where world doth signifie onely the Elect or onely beleevers but it signifyeth eyther all men or at least the most men living in some certaine place and at some certaine time but without distinction of good and bad or if it be used any where more restraynedly it is applyed onely to wicked and Reprobate men who in their affections are wedded to the world and its transitory delights and therefore do most properly deserve this name 2 Suppose it be granted that World in some Scriptures is restrayned to the Elect yet it cannot beare this signification here because 1 The words then would have a sencelesse construction For thus would they runne God so loved the Elect that whosoever beleeveth in him should not perish c. and if they run thus this would follow There are two sorts of the Elect some that do beleeve and shall be saved others that do not beleeve and shall be damned which is a division or distinction unknowne in Divinity 2 Beleevers and unbeleevers damned and saved comprehend all mankinde for there is no man but he is one of these Now world in this place includeth beleevers and unbeleevers the saved and the damned as appeareth most plainly to him that layeth the 16 17. and 18. verses together Therefore it signifyeth here all mankind without exception of any Who would have all to be saved â— Tim. â— 4 and to come to the knowledge of the truth In these words the Apostle delivereth two things 1 That it is Gods will that men should enjoy a happy end and be saved 2 That it is also his will they should have the meanes and make a good use of them in comming to the knowledge of the truth that so they might be saved There is no let in God but that all men may beleeve and be saved and therefore there is no absolute will that many thousand men shall dye in unbeleefe and be damned Two answers are usually returned which I confesse give me little satisfaction 1 That by All here we are to understand all sorts and not every particular man in those sorts It is true that All is sometimes so taken in Scripture but I beleeve not here for the very context sheweth that we are to understand by it the individuals and not the kinds In the first verse there is a duty enjoyned J will that prayers and supplications be made for all men and in this verse the motive is annexed God will have all to be saved As if he should have sayd Our charity must reach to all whom God extends his love to God out of his love will have all to be saved and therefore in charity we must pray for all Now in the duty All signifyeth every man for no man though wicked and prophane is to be included from our Prayers Pray for them sayth our Saviour that persecute you and pray sayth the Apostle here for Kings and all that are in authority men in those dayes though the greatest yet the worst the very Lyons Wolves and Beares of the Church Pray for them And if for them then for any other Thus in the duty it signifieth every man and therefore it must have the same extent in the motive too or else the motive doth not reach home nor is strong enough to enforce the duty The second answer is that God will have all to be saved with his revealed will but millions to be damned with his secret will But if this answer stand then in my apprehension these inconveniences will follow 1 That Gods words which are his revealed will are not interpretations of his minde and meaning and by consequence are not true for the speech which is not the signification of the minde is a lye 2 That there are two contrary wills in God a secret will that many sonnes of Adam shall irrevocably be damned and a revealed will that all the sonnes of Adam may be saved 3 That one of Gods wills must needs be bad eyther the secret or the revealed will For of contraries if the one be good the other is bad and so of Gods contrary wills if one be good the other must needs be bad For malum est contrarium bono 〈◊〉 3. â— Not willing that any should perish but that all should come to repentance c. This Scripture is not so liable to the exceptions against the former testimony For it is a negative proposition and must be taken distributively and therefore speaketh that in plaine termes which is contrary to absolute reprobatioÌ„
against Pelagius and Caelestius wherein he denyed that Reprobates were properly (h) Vsh hist Gotto pag. 107. praedestinati ad interitum predestinate to destruction answereth that St. Austin said not so but some other man as it is supposed to purge the Church of that calumny which some ill affected ones did cast upon it namely that it taught that God by his predestination did impose upon men a necessity of perishing did withdraw the word Predestination from the point of Reprobates and gave it onely to the Elect and so gave great occasion of further error and mistake In this speech of his is cleerely implyed that it was the constant doctrine of the Church then that Reprobates lye under no necessitating Decree of Perdition The truth of this charge may further appeare by a few particular instances Minutius Foelix brings in the Pagans objecting to the Christians that they held the events of all things to be inevitable and did feigne and frame to themselves an unjust God who did punish in men their unavoydable Destinies not their ill choyses This is the Objection (i) Min. Foelix pag. 32. Quicquid agimus ut alii fato ita vos Deo addicitis iniquum igitur deum singitis qui sortem in hominibus pumat non voluntatem Whatsoever we doe as others to fate so you ascribe to God you make therefore to your selves an unjust God who punisheth in men their lot not their will To this he answereth (k) Illud fatum est quod de unoquoque Deus fatus est Christians hold no other Fates then Gods Decrees who (l) Min. Foelix p 116 Qui cum universam praescit materiam pro meritis qualitatibus singulorum etiam fata determinat ita in nobis non genitura plectitur sed ingenii natura punitur fore-knowing all men and their actions did accordingly determine their retributions St. Hierom an eager opposer of the Pelagians in many places of his Writings saith the same thing (m) Hier. ad Galat. c. 1. v. 15. Ex praescientiá dei evenit ut quem justum futuruÌ„ scit prius diligat quaÌ„ oriatur ex utero quem peccatorem oderit antequam peccet From the fore-knowledge of God it commeth to passe that who he knoweth will be righteous him he loveth before he commeth out of the wombe and who he knoweth will be a sinner him he hateth before he sinneth In another place he speaketh to the same purpose (n) Ad c. 1. Malac. Dilectio odium dei vel ex praescientiâ nascitur futuroruÌ„ vel ex operibus alioquin novimus quod omnia Deus diligat nec quicquam corum oderit quae creavit The love and hatred of God ariseth either from the fore-sight of future things or from the workes otherwise we know that God loveth all things nor doth he hate any thing that he hath made And in his booke against Pelagius he saith (o) Lib. 3. contr Pelag Eligit Deus quem bonum cernit God chooseth whom he seeth to be good The summe of all which speeches is but this that there is no decree of damning or saving men but what is built upon Gods fore-knowledge of the evill and good actions of men Fulgentius is plaine for it too (p) Fulgent lib. 1. ad Monimum Quos praescivit deus hanc vitam in peccato terminaturos praedestinavit supplicio interminabili puniendos Those whom God fore-saw would dye in sinne he decreed should live in endlesse punishment I may take in St. Austin and Prosper also who are judged to be the Patrons of the absolute decree as it is set downe the Sublapsarian way even they doe many times let fall such speeches as cannot fairely be reconciled with absolute Reprobation I will onely cite Prosper for St. Austin speakes in him he discoursing of some that fall away à Sanctitate ad immunditiem from Holinesse to uncleannesse saith (q) Prosp ad obj 3. Gall. Non ex co necessitatem percundi habuâ—runt quia praedestinati non sunt sed ideo praedestinati non sunt quia tales futuri ex voluntariâ praevaricatione praesciâ— sunt They that fall away from holinesse to uncleannesse lye not under a necessity of perishing because they were not predestinate but therefore they were not predestinate because they were foreknowne to be such by voluntary prevarication Not long after speaking of the same men he saith (r) Prosper resp ad Obj. Quia illos ruituros propriâ voluntate praescivit ob hoc à filijs perditionis nulla praedestinatione discrevit Because God foresaw they would perish by their owne free-will therefore he did not by any predestination sever them from the children of perdition And againe in his answer to the 12th Objection he hath these words (s) Ib resp ad Ob. 12 Vires obedientiae non ideo cuiquam subtraxit quia eum non praedestinavit sed quia recessurum ab ipsâ obedientiâ esse praevidit ideo eum non praedestinavit God hath not withdrawne from any man ability to yeeld obedience because he hath not predestinated him but because he foresaw he would fall from obedience therefore he hath not predestinated him I will shut up mine instances of that Age with the judgment of the councell at Arles against the Pelagians in the yeare 490. or thereabout This councell subscribed to the letter which was written by Faustus against Lucidus the Predestinarian and made the Anathemaes and curses which therein he denounceth against him and such like to be their own Some of which were these (t) Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui periâ—t non accepisse ut salvus esse possit Cursed be he that shall say that the man that perisheth might not have been saved and againe (u) Anathema illi qui dixerit quod vas contumeliae non possit affurgere ut sit vas in honorem Cursed be the man that shall say that a vessell of dishonour may not rise to be a vessell of honour A testimony or two I will borrow likewise from some persons of note and those St. Austins followers too who lived about 400 yeares after St Austins time Remigius the great patron of Gottschalk the zealous preacher and publisher of absolute reprobation in those times in his answer â—o that epistle which we suppose to be the Epistle of Rabaâ—s to Rabanus saying that God did (w) Bishop Vsher hist Gottsâ— p. 53. 54. Sanabiles facere nationes orbis terrarum make the nations â—f the world healthfull and that he doth velle omnes homiâ—es salvos fieri will that all men be saved he gives such â—n answer as cannot stand with absolute Reprobation (x) Et hoc omnino verum est quia nemini deus imponit necessitatem pereundi sicut nemini imponit necessitatem maâ— agendi This saith he is very true because God layeth on no â—an a necessity of perishing
or by the concatenation of naturall things and the disposition of the first matter all things being so put together from eternity that one thing must needs follow another as it doth and the prima materia being so disposed that things cannot successively come to passe otherwise then they doe but must of necessity be as they are even invito deo though God would have some things to be otherwise then they are The Maniâ—heâ— held that all mens actions good or evill were determined too good actions by a good God who was the author of all good things that were created and of all good actions that came to passe in the world Evill actions by an evill God who was the primum principium mali the prime author of all evill things or actions that were extant in the world The Maintainers of the Absolute Decree do say one of these two things eyther that all actions naturall and morall good and evill and all events likewise are absolutely necessary so the Supralapsarians or that all mens ends at least are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their wills so the Sublapsarians And this is upon the matter all one with the former For first in vaine is our freedome in the actions and meanes if the end at which they drive be pitched and determined sith all actions are for the ends sake that it might be obtayned by them which without them could not And second the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the meanes that precede that end as if a man be fore-determined to damnation he must unavoydably sinne else he could not be damned Now in these 3 opinions we may note two things 1 The Substance and formality of them which is an unavoydablenesse of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be in this all of them agree all holding that in all things at least in all mens ends undeclinable fates and insuperable necessity do domineere And therefore Melancthon doth not sticke sundry times in his common places to call this Absolute Decree Fatum Stoicum tabulas Parcarum Stoicall fate and the Destinies tables He also chargeth the Church of Geneva the great Patron of it with a labor to bring in the Stoicks error as we may see in a certaine Epistle of Melancthons to Pencer where he hath these words (n) Melanct. in Epist ad Penâ— Scribâ—t ad me Lelius de Stoico fato usque adeo litem Genevae moveri ut quidam in caâ—cerem conjectus sit propterea quòd a Zenone differâ—et O misera tempora Doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam dubitationibus obscuratur Lelius writeth unto me that in Geneva there is such strife about the Stoicks fate that one was cast into prison because he dissented from Zeno. O miserable times c. And by the Testimony of Beza too who speaking of Melancthon sayth (o) Beza in vita Calvini Philippus de his rebus ita scribere caeperat ut Genevenses quasi StoicuÌ„ fatum invehentes notare quibusdam videatur Philip hath so written of these things as if he meant to taxe the Geneva Divines for bringers in of Destiny 2 We may note the circumstance or the grounds of their opinions The Stoicks derive this necessity from the Starres or the first matter The Manichees from two prima principia aeterna â—aeterâ— first principles of all things eternall and coeternall These last from the peremptory decree of Almighty God So that they diffeâ— in their grounds indeed but in this difference the Stoicks and the Manichees in some respects have the better For it is better to derive this necessity of evill actions and unhappy events from an evill God or the course of nature then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good The substance of their opinions is all one the ground wherein they differ is but accidentall to error Which being so for this very reason alone may this doctrine of absolute Reprobation be suspected because those dreames of the Stoicks were exploded by the best Philosophers of all sorts and this of the Manichees was generally cryed downe by the Fathers not onely as foolish but as impious and unworthy of entertainment in a Christian heart or Christian Common-wealth not so much for any thing circumstantiall in it as for the substance of the error because it made all things and events to be necessary and so plucked up the roots of vertue planted vice and left no place for just rewards or punishments These are my reasons of the first sort THe Reasons that have convinced me of the untruth of absolute Reprobation now follow And first of those that fight against the upper way They are drawne ab incommodo from the great evils and inconveniences which issue from it naturally which may be referred to two maine heads 1 The dishonour of God 2 The overthrow of religion and government I. Jnconvenience It dishonoureth God For it chargeth him deeply with two things no wayes agreeable to his nature 1 Mens Eternall torments in Hell 2 Their sinnes on Earth First it chargeth him with mens Eternall torments in hell and maketh him to bee the prime principall and invincible cause of the damnation of millions of miserable soules the prime cause because it reporteth him to have appointed them to destruction of his owne voluntary disposition antecedent to all deserts in them and the principall and invincible cause because it maketh the damnation of Reprobates to be necessary and unavoydable through Gods absolute and uncontrollable Decree and so necessary that they can no more scape it then poore Astyanax could avoid the breaking of his neck when the Grecians tumbled him downe from the Tower of Troy Now this is a heavie charge contrary to Scripture Gods nature and sound reason 1 To Scripture which makes man the principall nay the onely cause in opposition to God of his owne ruine Thy destruction is of thy selfe O Israel but in me is thy help Hos 13.9 As J live saith the Lord I will not the death of the wicked c. Turne ye turne ye why will ye dye Ezech. 33.11 He doth not afflict willingly nor greeve the children of men Lam. 3.33 To which speeches for likenesse sake I will joyne one of Prospers (p) Resp ad 12. Obj. Vincent Praedestinatio dei multis est causa standi nemim est causa labeÌ„di Gods predestination is to many the cause of standing to none of falling 2 It 's contrary to Gods nature (q) Exod. 34.6 who sets forth himselfe to be a God mercifull gracious long suffering abundant in goodnesse c. and he is acknowledged to be so by King David (r) Psal 86.5 Thou Lord art good and mercifull and of great kindnesse to all them that call upon thee And by the Prophets Joel Ionah and Micah He is gracious and mercifull Ioel. 2.13 slow to anger and of great kindnesse saith Ioel. Ionah 4.22 I know sayes Ionah that thou art a gracious
of the action 2 The formall part which is the evill or obliquity of it God is the Author of the action it selfe but not of the obliquity and evill that cleaveth to it as he that causeth a lame horse to goe is the cause of his going but not of his lame going And therefore it followeth not from their opinion that God is the Author of sinne Answ 1 1 All sinnes receive not this distinction because of many sinnes the acts themselves are sinfull as of the eating of the forbidden fruit and Sauls sparing of Agag and the fat beastâ— of the Amalekites 2 It is not true that they make the decree of God onely of actions and not of their aberrations for they make it to be the cause of all those meanes that lead to damnation and therefore of sinfull actions as sinfull and not as bare actions For actions deserve damnation not as actions but as transgressions of Gods law 3 To the Simile I say that the rider or master that shall resolve first to flea his horse or knocke him on the head and then to make him lame that for his halting he may kill him is undoubtedly the cause of his halting and so if God determine to cast men into Hell and then to bring them into a state of sinne that for their sinnes he may bring them to ruine we cannot conceive him to be lesse then the author as well of their sinnes as of those actions to which they doe inseparably adhere and that out of Gods intention to destroy them The will is determined to an Object two wayes Distinct 3. 1 By Compulsion against the bent and inclination of it 2 By necessity according to the naturall desire and liking of it Gods Predestination say they determineth the will to sinne this last way but not the first it forceth no man to doe that which he would not but carryeth him towards that which he would when men sinne it is true they cannot choose and it is as true they will not choose It followeth not therefore from the grounds of their doctrine that Gods decree is the cause of mens sinnes but their owne wicked wils Answ 1 1 The Ancients made no distinction between these two words necessity and compulsion but used them in this argument promiscuously and did deny that God did necessitate men to sinne lest they should grant him hereby to be the Author of sinne as I have touched before and shall intimate againe afterward Nor did the Schoolemen put any difference betweene them as may appeare by the testimony of Mr. Calvin Calv. Instit i. 2. c. 2 Sect â—â— who speaking of the Schoole-distinction of the willes threefold liberty from Necessity from Sinne from Mâ—ery sayth This distinction I could willingly receive but that it confoundeth necessity with coaction 2 That which necessitateth the will to sinne is as truly the cause of sinne as that which forceth it because it maketh the sinne to be inevitably committed which otherwise might be avoyded and therefore if the divine decree necessitate mans will to sinne it is as truly the cause of the sinne as if it did enforce it 3 That which necessitateth the will to sinne is more truely the cause of the sinne then the will is because it over-ruleth the will and beareth all the stroke taketh from it its true liberty by which it should be Lord of it selfe and disposer of its own acts and in respect of which it hath been usually called by Philosophers and Fathers too 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a power which is under the insuperable check and controll of no Lord but it selfe It over-ruleth I say and maketh it become but a servile instrument irresistibly subject to superiour command and determination and therefore is a truer cause of all such acts and sinnes as proceed from the will so determined then the will is For when two causes concurre to the producing of an effect the one a principall over-ruling cause the other but instrumentall and wholly at the devotion of the principal then is the effect in all reasoÌ„ to be imputed to the principall which by the force of its influxe and impression produceth it rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall which is but a meere servant in the production of it We shall finde it ordinary in Scripture to ascribe the effect to the principall Agent It is not ye that speak sayth CHRIST but the spirit of my father that speaketh in you Math. 10.20 J laboured more abundantly then they all yet not J but the grace of God which was in me 1. Cor. 15.10 And I live yet not J but CHRIST liveth in me sayth S. Paul Gal. 2.20 In these and many other places the effect or worke spoken of is taken from the instrument and given to the principall Agent Which being so though mans will work with Gods decree in the commission of sinne and willeth the sinne which it doth yet seeing what the will doth it doth by the commanding power of Gods almighty decree and so it doth that otherwise it cannot doe the sinne committed cannot so rightly be ascribed to mans will the inferior as to Gods necessitating decree the superior cause 4 That which maketh a man sinne by way of necessity only that is with and not against his will is the cause of his sinne in a worse manner then that which constrayneth him to sinne against his will as he which by powerfull perswasions draweth a man to stab or hang or poyson himselfe is in a grosser manner the cause of that evill and unnaturall action then he that by force compelleth him because he maketh him to consent to his own death And so if Gods decree do not onely make men sinne but sinne willingly too not onely cause that they shall malè agere doe evill but malè velle will evill it hath the deeper hand in the sinne Sinne may be considered as sinne Distinct 4. or as a meanes of declaring Gods justice in mens punishments God doth not predestinate men to sinne as it is sinne but as a means of their punishment He is not therefore say they the Author of Sinne. Answ 1 1 A good end cannot moralize a bad action it remayneth evill though the end be never so good bonum oritur ex integris end manner yea and matter too must be good or else the action is naught He that shall steale that hee may give an almes or commit adultery that he may beget children for the Church or oppresse the poore to teach them patience or kill a wicked man that he may doe no more hurt with his example or do any forbidden thing though his end be never so good he sinneth notwithstanding And the reason is because the evill of sinne is greater then any good that can come by sinne for as much as it is laesio divinae majestatis a wronging of Gods majesty and so divino bono opposita directly prejudiciall to the good of Almighty God as much as
are absolutely elected or absolutely reprobated yet 1 It tells no man who in particular is elected who rejected 2 It teacheth that men must get the knowledge of their Election by good works and so by consequent doth rather encourage then stifle holy and honest indeavours For answer to the first of these The ignorance of a mans particular state in my judgment doth not alter the case a â—ot For he that beleeveth in generall that many and they the greatest company without comparison are inevitably ordeyned to destruction and a few others to salvation is able out of these two generall propositions to make these particular conclusions and to reason thus with himself Eyther I am absolutely chosen to grace and glory or absolutely cast off from both If I be chosen I must of necessity beleeve and be saved if I be cast off I must as necessarily not beleeve and be damned What need I therefore take thought eyther way about meanes or end My end is pitched in heaven and the meanes too my finall perseverance in Faith and my Salvation or my continuance in unbeliefe and my damnation If I lye under this necessity of beleeving and being saved or of dying in unbeliefe and being damned in vaine doe I trouble my selfe about meanes or end I have my Supersedeas I may take mine case and so I will enough it is for me to sit downe and wait what God will doe unto mee Thus it is likely did Tiberius reason with himself For Suetonius reports of him that he was (l) Suet. de vit Tib. c. 69. p. 180. Circa Deos religiones negligentior quippe addictus Mathematicae persuasionisque plenus omnia fato agi The more negiigent in religion because he was fully perswaded that all things came to passe by destiny And in this manner it is to be feared doe too many reason in their hearts and by this very ground though they will not perhaps acknowledge it encourage themselves in prophaneness Though men cannot hide their wickednes yet they will hide their grounds which flesh them in it either through modesty or to avoyd some further ignominy The foole hath said in his heart there is no God Psal 14. To the 2d. I answer that men ordinarily will not thinke the getting of the knowledge of their election if that be all worth all those painfull duties of religion that are to be performed and all those sweet and pleasing sinnes which are to be relinquished they will rest contented without it for a while rather then pay so dearly for it and the rather because 1 When they have gotten it it is in most but a weak and conjecturall knowledge obscured with many cloudes and uncertainties 2 It must be mainteyned with a great deale of paines and care or else it will be lost againe To the retaining of it is required a continuall indeavour to keep a cleare conscience which is irkesom and tedious Men therefore had need of a stronger motive to obedience then this is or else they will do nothing Thirdly they that defend and teach this absolute reprobatition say they doe earnestly exhort men to good works and deny that any can be saved except they live honestly So much was also sayd in the behalf of Epicurus viz. That he denyed that any man that lived not honestly could live pleasantly But Tully answereth roundly (m) Cic. offic l. 3. prope finem Quasi ego id curem quid ille ai at aut neget illud quaero quid ei quiâ—n voluptate summum bonum putat consentantum sit dicere As if I cared what he affirmeth or denyeth this I aske what is meet for him to say who placeth happinesse in pleasure And so it mattereth not what these men teach but what they should teach if they will speak consequently to their own conclusions 5th Reason It is an enemy to true Comfort I Come now to my last reason against it drawen from the uncomfortablenesse of it it is a doctrine full of desperation both to them which stand and to those that are fallen to men out of temptation and to men in temptation It leadeth into Temptation leaveth in Temptation And therefore can be no Doctrine of Gods word for that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good newes to men a storehouse of sweet consolations for us in our turbidu lucidis intervallis in our best and worse conditions and changes Rom. 15.4 These things are written sayth the Apostle that by patience and comfort of the Scriptures we might have hope implying that therefore was the word written left to the Church that by the comforts comprised in it those poore soules that look toward Heaven might never want in any changes or chances of this mortall life a sweet gale of hope to refresh them and to carry-on their Ship full merily toward the Haven I. First this Doctrine leadeth men into Temptation and into such a one too as is as sharpe and dangerous as any the Tempter hath The Divell can easily perswade a man that maketh absolute reprobation a part of his creed that he is one of those absolute Reprobates because there are farre more absolute Reprobates even a hundred for one then absolute chosen ones and a man hath a great deale more reason to think that he is one of the most then one of the fewest one of the huge multitude of inevitable castawayes then one of that little flock for whom God hath precisely prepared a kingdom Such a man is not onely capable of but framed and fashioned by his opinion for this suggestion Which is a very sore one if we may beleeve Calvin Bucer and Zanchius Calvin telleth us (n) Calv. Iustit l. 3. c 24. § 4. Quod nullâ tentatione vel gravius vel periculosius fideles percellit Satan that the Divell cannot assault a beleever with a temptation more dangerous And a little after he sayth that it is so much thedeadlyer by how much commoner it is then any other (o) Rarissimus est cujus non interdum animus hac cogitatione feriatur unde tibi salus nisi ex Dei electione Electionis autem quae tibi revelatio quae si apud quempiam semel invaluit aut diris tormentis miserum perpetuò excruciat aut reddit penitus attonitum So ordinary is this temptation that he which is at all times free from it is a rare man we are to conceive that he speaketh of those who hold absolute Reprobation and so dangerous it is that if it get strength he which is under it is either miserably tormented or mightily astonished And a little after he sayth againe (p) Ergo si naufragium timemus sollicitè cavendum ab hoc scopulo in quem nunquam sine exitio impingitur He that will not wrack his soule must avoyd this rock Bucer also hath a passage like to this (q) Bucer in 8. ad Rom. q. de praed Vt caput omnis noxiae