view of humane Knowledge in the whole Extent of it And perhaps if they were distinctly weighed and duly considered they would afford us another sort of Logick and Critick than what we have been hitherto acquainted with § 5. This seems to me the first and most general as well as natural division of the Objects of our Understanding For since a Man can employ his Thoughts about nothing but either the Contemplation of Things themselves for the discovery of Truth Or about the Things in his own Power which are his own Actions for the Attainment of his own Ends Or the Signs the Mind makes use of both in the one and the other and the right ordering of them for its clearer Information All which three viz. Things as they are in themselves knowable Actions as they depend on us in order to Happiness and the right use of Signs in order to Knowledge being toto caelo different they seemed to me to be the three great Provinces of the intellectual World wholly separate and distinct one from another FINIS THE CONTENTS BOOK I. Of Innate Notions CHAP. 1. Introduction 2. No innate speculative Principles 3. No innate practical Principles 4. Other Proofs against innate Principles BOOK II. Of Ideas CHAP. 1. Of Ideas in general 2. Of simple Ideas 3. Of Ideas of one Sense 4. Of Solidity 5. Of simple Ideas of more than one Sense 6. Of simple Ideas of Reflexion 7. Of simple Ideas both of Sensation and Reflexion 8. Other Considerations concerning simple Ideas 9. Of Perception 10. Of Retention 11. Of Discerning 12. Of complex Ideas 13. Of Space and its simple Modes 14. Of Duration 15. Of Extension and Duration considered together 16. Of Number 17. Of Infinity 18. Of other simple Modes 19. Of the Modes of Thinking 20. Of the Modes of Plâ—asure and Pain 21. Of Power 22. Of mixed Modes 23. Of the complex Ideas of Substances 24. Of the collective Ideas of Substances 25. Of Relation 26. Of Cause and Effect and other Relations 27. Of other Relations 28. Of clear and distinct obscure and confused Ideas 29. Of real and phantastical Ideas 30. Of adequate and inadequate Ideas 31. Of true and false Ideas BOOK III. Of Words CHAP. 1. Of Words and Language in general 2. Of the Signification of Words 3. Of general Terms 4. Of the Names of simple Ideas 5. Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations 6. Of the Names of Substances 7. Of abstract and concrete Terms 8. Of the Imperfection of Words 9. Of the Abuse of Words 10. Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses BOOK IV. Of Knowledge and Opinion CHAP. 1. Of Knowledge in general 2. Of the Degrees of our Knowledge 3. Of the extent of Humane Knowledge 4. Of the Reality of our Knowledge 5. Of Truth in general 6. Of universal Propositions their Truth and Certainty 7. Of Maxims 8. Of trifling Propositions 9. Of our Knowledge of Existence 10. Of the Existence of a GOD. 11. Of the Knowledge of the Existence of other Things 12. Of the Improvement of our Knowledge 13. Some other Considerations concerning our Knowledge 14. Of Iudgment 15. Of Probability 16. Of the Degrees of Assent 17. Of Reason 18. Of Faith and Reason as contradistinguished 19. Of wrong Assent or Errourâ— 20. The Division of the Sciences THE CONTENTS BOOK I. CHAP. I. Introduction SECT 1. An Enquiry into the Vnderstanding pleasant and useful 2. Design 3. Method 4. Vseful to know the extent of our Comprehension 5. Our Capacity proportioned to our State and Concerns to discover things useful to us 6. Knowing the extent of our Capacities will hinder us from useless Curiosity Scepticism and Idleness 7. Occasion of this Essay 8. Apology for Idea CHAP. II. No innate speculative Principles SECT 1. The way shewn how we come by any Knowledge sufficient to prove it not innate 2. General Assent the great Argument 3. Vniversal Consent proves nothing innate 4. What is is and It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be not universally assented to 5. Not on the Mind naturally imprinted because not known to Children Idiots c. 6 7. That Men know them when they come to the use of Reason answer'd 8. If Reason discovered them that would not prove them innate 9 11. 'T is false that Reason discovers them 12. The coming to the Vse of Reason not the time we come to know these Maxims 13. By this they are not distinguished from other knowable Truths 14. If coming to the use of Reason were the time of their discovery it would not prove them innate 15 16. The steps by which the Mind attains several Truths 17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood proves them not innate 18. If such an Assent be a mark of innate then that One and Two are equal to Three that Sweetness is not Bitterness and a thousand the like must be innate 19. Such less general Propositions known before these universal Maxims 20. One and One equal to Two c. not general nor useful answered 21. These Maxims not being known sometimes till proposed proves them not innate 22. Implicitly known before proposing signifies that the Mind is capable of understanding them or else signifies nothing 23. The Argument of assenting on first hearing is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching 24. Not innate because not universally assented to 25. These Maxims not the first known 26. And so not innate 27. Not innate because they appear least where what is innate shews it self clearest 28. Recapitulation CHAP. III. No innate practical Principles SECT 1. No moral Principles so clear and so generally received as the forementioned speculative Maxims 2. Faith and Iustice not owned as Principles by all Men. 3. Obj. Though Men deny them in their Practice yet they admit them in their Thoughts answered 4. Moral Rules need a Proof ergo not innate 5. Instance in keeping Compacts 6. Vertue generally approved not because innate but because profitable 7. Men's Actions convince us that the Rule of Vertue is not their internal Principle 8. Conscience no proof of any innate Moral Rule 9. Instances of Enormities practised without remorse 10. Men have contrary practical Principles 11 13. Whole Nations reject several Moral Rules 14. Those who maintain innate practical Principles tell us not what they are 15 19. Lord Herbert's innate Principles examined 20. Obj. Innate Principles may be corrupted answered 21. Contrary Principles in the World 22 26. How men commonly come by their Principles 27. Principles must be examined CHAP. IV. Other Considerations about innate Principles both Speculative and Practical SECT 1. Principles not innate unless their Ideas be innate 2 3. Ideas especially those belonging to Principles not born with Children 4 5. Identity an Idea not innate 6. Whole and Part not innate Ideas 7. Idea of Worship not innate 8 11. Idea of GOD not innate 12. Suitable to GOD's Goodness that all Men should have an Idea of Him therefore
a hard matter any other way to account for the contrary Tenets which are firmly believed confidently asserted and which great numbers are ready at any time to seal with their Blood And indeed if it be the privilege of innate Principles to be received upon their own Authority without examination I know not what may not be believed or how any ones Principles can be questioned If they may and ought to be examined and tried I desire to know how first and innate Principles can be tried or at least it is reasonable to demand the marks and characters whereby the genuine innate Principles may be distinguished from others that so amidst the great variety of Pretenders I may be kept from mistakes in so material a point as this When this is done I shall be ready to embrace such welcome and useful Propositions and till then I may with modesty doubt since I fear universal Consent which is the only one produced will scare prove a sufficient mark to direct my Choice and assure me of any innate Principles From what has been said I think it is past doubt that there are no practical Principles wherein all Men agree and therefore none innate CHAP. IV. Other Considerations concerning innate Principles both speculative and practical § 1. HAD those who would perswade us that there are innate Principles not taken them together in gross but considered separately the parts out of which those Propositions are made they would not perhaps have been so forward to believe they were innate Since if the Idea's which made up those Truths were not it was impossible that the Propositions made up of them should be innate or our Knowledge of them be born with us For if the Idea's be not innate there was a time when the Mind was without those Principles and then they will not be innate but be derived from some other Original For where the Idea's themselves are not there can be no Knowledge no Assent no Mental or Verbal Propositions about them § 2. If we will attently consider new born Children we shall have little Reason to think that they bring many Idea's into the World with them For bating perhaps some faint Idea's of Hunger and Thirst and Warmth and some Pains which they may have felt in the Womb there is not the least appearance of any setled Idea's at all in them especially of Idea's answering the Terms which make up those universal Propositions that are esteemed innate Principles One may perceive how by degrees afterwards Idea's come into their Minds and that they get no more nor no other than what Experience and the Observation of things that come in their way furnish them with which might be enough to satisfie us that they are not Original Characters stamped on the Mind § 3. It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be is certainly if there be any such an innate Principle But can any one think or will any one say that Impossibility and Identity are two innate Idea's Are they such as all Mankind have and bring into the World with them And are they those that are the first in Children and antecedent to all acquired ones If they are innate they must needs be so Hath a Child an Idea of Impossibility and Identity before it has of White or Black Sweet or Bitter And is it from the Knowledge of this Principle that it concludes that Wormwood rubb'd on the Nipple is not the same Taste that it used to receive from thence Is it the actual Knowledge of impossibile est idem esse non esse that makes a Child distinguish between its Mother and a Stranger or that makes it fond of the one and fly the other Or does the Mind regulate it self and its assent by Idea's that it never yet had Or the Understanding draw Conclusions from Principles which it never yet knew or understood The Names impossibility and Identity stand for two Idea's so far from being innate or born with us that I think it requires great Care and Attention to form them right in our Understandings They are so far from being brought into the World with us so remote from the thoughts of Infancy and Childhood that I believe upon Examination it will be found that many grown Men want them § 4. If Identity to instance in that alone be a native Impression and consequently so clear and obvious to us that we must needs know it even from our Cradles I would gladly be resolved by one of Seven or Seventy Years old Whether a Man being a Creature consisting of Soul and Body be the same Man when his Body is changed Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras having had the same Soul were the same Man tho' they lived several Ages asunder Nay Whether the Cock too which had the same Soul were not the same with both of them Whereby perhaps it will appear that our Idea of sameness is not so setled and clear as to deserve to be thought innate in us For if those innate Idea's are not clear and distinct so as to be universally known and naturally agreed on they cannot be the Subjects of universal and undoubted Truths but will be the unavoidable Occasion of perpetual Uncertainty For I suppose every ones Idea of Identity will not be the same that Pythagoras and Thousands others of his Followers have And which then shall be the true Which innate Or are there two different Idea's of Identity both innate § 5. Nor let any one think that the Questions I have here proposed about the Identity of Man are bare empty Speculations which if they were would be enough to shew That there was in the Understandings of Men no innate Idea of Identity He that shall with a little Attention reflect on the Resurrection and consider that Divine Justice shall bring to Judgment at the last Day the very same Persons to be happy or miserable in the other who did well or ill in this Life will find it perhaps not easie to resolve with himself what makes the same Man or wherein Identity consists And will not be forward to think he and every one even Children themselves have naturally a clear Idea of it § 6. Let us examine that Principle of Mathematicks viz. That the whole is bigger than a part This I take it is reckon'd amongst innate Principles I am sure it has as good a Title as any to be thought so which yet no Body can think it to be when he considers the Idea's it comprehends in it Whole and Part are perfectly Relative but the Positive Idea's to which they properly and immediately belong are Extension and Number of which alone Whole and Part are Relations So that if Whole and Part are innate Idea's Extension and Number must be so too it being impossible to have an Idea of a Relation without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs and in which it is founded Now Whether the Minds of Men have
naturally imprinted on them the Idea's of Extension and Number I leave to be considered by those who are the Patrons of innate Principles § 7. That God is to be worshipped is without doubt as great a Truth as any can enter into the mind of Man and deserves the first place amongst all practical Principles But yet it can by no means be thought innate unless the Idea's of God and Worship are innate That the Idea the Term Worship stands for is not in the Understanding of Children and a Character stamped on the Mind in its first Original I think will be easily granted by any one that considers how few there be amongst grown Men who have a clear and distinct Notion of it And I suppose there cannot be any thing more ridiculous than to say that Children have this practical Principle innate That God is to be worshipped and yet that they know not what that Worship of God is which is their Duty But to pass by this § 8. If any Idea can be imagin'd innate the Idea of God may of all others for many Reasons be thought so since it is hard to conceive how there should be innate Moral Principles without an innate Idea of a Deity Without a Notion of a Law-maker it is impossible to have a Notion of a Law and an Obligation to observe it Besides the Atheists taken notice of amongst the Ancients and left branded upon the Records of History hath not Navigation discovered in these latter Ages whole Nations at the Bay of Soldania in Brasil and the Caribee Islands c. amongst whom there was to be found no Notion of a God Nicolaus del Techo in literis ex Paraquaria de Caaiguarum conversione haec habet Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere quod Deum Hominis animam significet nulla sacra habet nulla Idola Relatio triplex de rebus Indicis Caaiguarum â—â— 70. And perhaps if we should with attention mind the Lives and Discourses of People not so far of we should have too much Reason to â—ear that many in more civilized Countries have no very strong and clear Impressions of a Deity upon their Minds and that the Complaints of Atheism made from the Pulpits are not without Reason And though only some profligate Wretches own it too barefacedly now yet perhaps we should hear more than we do of it from others did not the fear of the Magistrate's Sword or their Neighbour's Censure tie up Peoples Tongues which were the Apprehensions of Punishment or Shame taken away would as openly proclaim their Atheism as their Lives do § 9. But had all Mankind every where a Notion of a God whereof yet History tells us the contrary it would not from thence follow that the Idea of him was innate For though no Nation were to be found without a Name and some few dark Notions of him yet that would not prove them to be natural Impressions on the Mind no more than the Names of Fire or the Sun Heat or Number do prove the Idea's they stand for to be innate because the Names of those things and the Idea's of them are so universally received and known amongst Mankind Nor on the contrary is the want of such a Name or the absence of such a Notion out of Men's Minds any Argument against the Being of a God any more than it would be a Proof that there was no Load-stone in the World because a great part of Mankind had neither a Notion of any such thing nor a Name for it or be any shew of Argument to prove that there are no distinct and various species of Angels or intelligent Beings above us because we have no Idea's of such distinct species For Men being furnished with Words by the common Language of their own Countries can scarce avoid having some kind of Idea's of those things whose Names those they converse with have occasion frequently to mention to them and if it carry with it the Notion of Excellency Greatness or something extraordinary if Apprehension and Concernment accompany it if the Fear of absolute and irresistible Power set it on upon the Mind the Idea is likely to sink deeper and spread the farther especially if it be such an Idea as is agreeable to the common light of Reason and naturally deducible from every part of our Knowledge as that of a God is For the visible marks of extraordinary Wisdom and Power appear so plainly in all the Works of the Creation that a rational Creature who will but seriously reflect on them cannot miss the discovery of a Deity And the influence that the discovery of such a Being must necessarily have on the Minds of all that have but once heard of it is so great and carries such a weight of Thought and Communication with it that it seems stranger to me that a whole Nation of Men should be any where found so brutish as to want the Notion of a God than that they should be without any Notion of Numbers or Fire § 10. The Name of God being once mentioned in any part of the World to express a superior powerful wise invisible Being the suitableness of such a Notion to the Principles of common Reason and the Interest Men will always have to mention it often must necessarily spread it far and wide and continue it down to all Generations though yet the general reception of this Name and some imperfect and unsteady Notions conveyed thereby to the unthinking part of Mankind prove not the Idea to be innate but only that they who made the Discovery had made a right use of their Reason thought maturely of the Causes of things and traced them to their Original from whom other less considering People having once received so important a Notion it could not easily be lost again § 11. This is all could be inferr'd from the Notion of a God were it to be found universally in all the Tribes of Mankind and generally acknowledged by Men grown to maturity in all Countries For the generality of the acknowledging of a God as I imagine is extended no farther than that which if it be sufficient to prove the Idea of God innate will as well prove the Idea of Fire innate since I think it may truly be said That there is not a Person in the World who has a Notion of a God who has not also the Idea of Fire I doubt not but if a Colony of young Children should be placed in an Island where no Fire was they would certainly neither have any Notion of such a thing nor Name for it how generally soever it were received and known in all the World besides and perhaps too their Apprehensions would be as far removed from any Name or Notion of a God till some one amongst them had imployed his Thoughts to enquire into the Constitution and Causes of things which would easily lead him to the Notion of a God which having once taught to others
Reason but I deny that the coming to the use of Reason is the precise time when they are first taken notice of and that if it were that it would prove them innate All that can with any Truth be meant by this Proposition That Men assent to them when they come to the use of Reason is no more but this That the making of general abstract Idea's and the Understanding of general Names being a Concomitant of the rational Faculty and growing up with it Children commonly get not those general Idea's nor learn the Names that stand for them till having for a good while exercised their Reason about familiar and more particular Idea's they are by their ordinary Discourse and Actions with others acknowledged to be capable of rational Conversation If assenting to these Maxims when Men come to the use of Reason can be true in any other Sence I desire it may be shewn or at least how in this or any other Sence it proves them innate § 15. The Senses at first let in particular Idea's and furnish the yet empty Cabinet And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them they are lodged in the Memory and Names got to them Afterwards the Mind proceeding farther abstracts them and by Degrees learns the use of general Names By this manner the Mind comes to be furnish'd with Idea's and Language the Materials about which to exercise its discursive Faculty And the use of Reason becomes daily more visible as these Materials that give it Employment increase But though the having of general Idea's and the use of general Words and Reason usually grow together yet I see not how this any way proves them innate The Knowledge of some Truths I confess is very early in the Mind but in a way that shews them not to be innate For if we will observe we shall find it still to be about Idea's not innate but acquired It being about those first which are imprinted by external Things with which Infants have earliest to do and which make the most frequent Impressions on their Senses In Idea's thus got the Mind discovers That some agree and others differ probably as soon as it has any use of Memory as soon as it is able to retain and receive distinct Idea's But whether it be then or no this is certain it does so long before it has the use of Words or comes to that which we commonly call the use of Reason For a Child knows as certainly before it can speak the difference between the Idea's of Sweet and Bitter i. e. That Sweet is not Bitter as it knows afterwards when it comes to speak That Worm-wood and Sugar-plumbs are not the same thing § 16. A Child knows not that Three and Four are equal to Seven till he comes to be able to count to Seven and has got the Name and Idea of Equality and then upon the explaining those Words he presently assents to or rather perceives the Truth of that Proposition But neither does he then readily assent because it is an innate Truth nor was his Assent wanting till then because he wanted the Vse of Reason but the Truth of it appears to him as soon as he has setled in his Mind the clear and distinct Idea's that these Names stand for And then he knows the Truth of that Proposition upon the same Grounds and by the same means that he knew before That a Rod and Cherry are not the same thing and upon the same Grounds also that he may come to know afterwards That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be as we shall more fully shew hereafter So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general Idea's about which those Maxims are or to know the Signification of those general Terms that stand for them or to put together in his Mind the Idea's they stand for the later also will it be before he comes to assent to those Maxims whose Terms with the Idea's they stand for being no more innate than those of a Cat or a Weesel he must stay till Time and Observation have acquainted him with them and then he will be in a Capacity to know the Truth of these Maxims upon the first Occasion that shall make him put together those Idea's in his Mind and observe whether they agree or disagree according as is expressed in those Propositions And therefore it is That a Man knows that Eighteen and Nineteen are equal to Thirty Seven by the same self-Evidence that he knows One and Two to be equal to Three Yet a Child knows that not so soon as the other not for want of the use of Reason but because the Idea's the Words Eighteen Nineteen◠and Thirty seven stand for are not so soon got as those which are signify'd by One Two and Three § 17. This Evasion therefore of general Assent when Men come to the use of Reason failing as it does and leaving no difference between those supposed-innate and other Truths that are afterwards acquired and learnt Men have endeavoured to secure an universal Assent to those they call Maxims by saying they are generally assented to as soon as proposed and the Terms they are propos'd in understood Seeing all Men even Children as soon as they hear and understand the Terms assent to these Propositions they think it is sufficient to prove them innate For since Men never fail after they have once understood the Words to acknowledge them for undoubted Truths they would inferr That certainly these Propositions were first lodged in the Understanding which without any teaching the Mind at very first Proposal immediately closes with and assents to and after that never doubts again § 18. In Answer to this I demand whether ready assent given to a Proposition upon first hearing and understanding the Terms be a certain mark of an innate Principle If it be not such a general assent is in vain urged as a Proof of them If it be said that it is a mark of innate they must then allow all such Propositions to be innate which are generally assented to as soon as heard whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate Principles For upon the same ground viz. of Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms That Men would have those Maxims pass for innate they must also admit several Propositions about Numbers to be innate That One and Two are equal to Three That Two and Two are equal to Four and a multitude of other the like Propositions in Numbers that every Body assents to at first hearing and understanding the Terms must have a place amongst these innate Axioms Nor is this the Prerogative of Numbers alone and Propositions made about several of them But even natural Philosophy and all the other Sciences afford Propositions which are sure to meet with Assent as soon as they are understood That two Bodies cannot be in the same place is a Truth that no
them no more than their Names but got afterwards So that in all Propositions that are assented to at first hearing the Terms of the Proposition their standing for such Idea's and the Idea's themselves that they stand for being neither of them innate I would fain know what there is remaining in such Propositions that is innate For I would gladly have any one name that Proposition whose Terms or Idea's were either of them innate We by degrees get Idea's and Names and learn their appropriated connection one with another and then to Propositions made in such Terms whose signification we have learnt and wherein the Agreement or Disagreement we can perceive in our Idea's when put together is expressed we at first hearing assent though to other Propositions in themselves as certain and evident but which are concerning Idea's not so soon nor easily got we are at the same time no way capable of assenting For though a Child quickly assent to this Proposition That an Apple is not Fire when by familiar Acquaintance he has got the Idea's of those two different things distinctly imprinted on his Mind and has learnt that the Names Apple and Fire stand for them yet it will be some years after perhaps before the same Child will assent to this Proposition That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be Because that though perhaps the Words are as easie to be learnt yet the signification of them being more large comprehensive and abstract than of the Names annexed to those sensible things the Child hath to do with it is longer before he learns their precise meaning and it requires more time plainly to form in his Mind those general Idea's they stand for Till that be done you will in vain endeavour to make any Child assent to a Proposition made up of such general Terms But as soon as ever he has got those Idea's and learn'd their Names he forwardly closes with the one as well as the other of the forementioned Propositions and with both for the same Reason viz. because he finds the Idea's he has in his Mind to agree or disagree according as the Words standing for them are affirmed or denied one of another in the Proposition But if Propositions be brought to him in Words which stand for Idea's he has not yet in his Mind to such Propositions however evidently true or false in themselves he affords neither assent nor dissent but is ignorant For Words being but empty sounds any farther than they are signs of our Idea's we cannot but assent to them as they correspond to those Idea's we have but no farther than that But the shewing by what Steps and Ways Knowledge comes into our Minds and the grounds of several degrees of assent being the Business of the following Discourse it may suffice to have only touched on it here as one Reason that made me doubt of those innate Principles § 24. To conclude this Argument of universal Consent I agree with these Defenders of innate Principles That if they are innate they must needs have universal assent For that a Truth should be innate and yet not assented to is to me as unintelligible as for a Man to know a Truth and be ignorant of it at the same time But then by these Men's own Confession they cannot be innate since they are not assented to by those who understand not the Terms nor by a great part of those who do understand them but have yet never heard nor thought of those Propositions which I think is at least one half of Mankind But were the Number far less it would be enough to destroy universal assent and thereby shew these Propositions not to be innate if Children alone were ignorant of them § 25. But that I may not be accused to argue from the thoughts of Infants which are unknown to us and to conclude from what passes in their Understandings before they express it I say next That these two general Propositions are not the Truths that first possess the Minds of Children nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious Notions which if they were innate they must needs be Whether we can determine it or no it matters not there is certainly a time when Children begin to think and their Words and Actions do assure us that they do so When therefore they are capable of Thought of Knowledge of Assent can it rationally be supposed they can be ignorant of those Notions that Nature has imprinted were there any such Can it be imagin'd with any appearance of Reason That they perceive the Impressions from things without and be at the same time ignorant of those Characters which Nature it self has taken care to stamp within Can they receive and assent to adventitious Notions and be ignorant of those which are supposed woven into the very Principles of their Being and imprinted there in indelible Characters to be the Foundation and Guide of all their acquired Knowledge and future Reasonings This would be to make Nature take Pains to no Purpose Or at least to write very ill since its Characters could not be read by those Eyes which saw other things very well and those are very ill supposed the clearest parts of Truth and the Foundations of all our Knowledge which are not first known and without which the undoubted Knowledge of several other things may be had The Child certainly knows that the Nurse that feeds it is neither the Cat it plays with nor the Blackmoor it is afraid of That the Wormseed or Mustard it refuses is not the Apple or Sugar it cries for this it is certainly and undoubtedly assured of But will any one say it is by Virtue of this Principle That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be that it so firmly assents to these and other parts of its Knowledge Or that the Child has any Notion or Apprehension of that Proposition at an Age wherein yet 't is plain it knows a great many other Truths He that will say Children join these general abstract Speculations with their sucking Bottles and their Rattles may perhaps with Justice be thought to have more Passion and Zeal for his Opinion but less Sincerity and Truth than one of that Age. § 26. Though therefore there be several general Propositions that meet with constant and ready assent as soon as proposed to Men grown up who have attained the use of more general and abstract Idea's and Names standing for them yet they not being to be found in those of tender Years who nevertheless know other things they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent Persons and so by no means can be supposed innate It being impossible that any Truth which is innate if there were any such should be unknown at least to any one who knows any thing else Since if they are innate Truths they must be innate thoughts there being nothing a Truth in the Mind that it has never
his Providence I answer What they might be in their original I will not here enquire but that they were so in the Thoughts of the Vulgar I think no body will affirm And he that will consult the Voyage of the Bishop of Beryte c. 13. not to mention other Testimonies will find that the Theology of the Siamites professedly owns plurality of Gods Or as the Abbé de Choisy more judiciously remarks in his Journal du Voiage de Syam 107 177 it consists properly in acknowledging no God at all § 15. If it be said That wise Men of all Nations came to have true Conceptions of the Unity and Infinity of the Deity I grant it But then this First Excludes universality of Consent in any thing but the name for those wise Men being very few perhaps one of a thousand this universality is very narrow Secondly It seems to me plainly to prove That the truest and best Notions Men had of God were not imprinted but acquired by thought and meditation and a right use of their Faculties since the wise and considerate Men of the World by a right and careful employment of their Thoughts and Reason attained true Notions in this as well as other things whilst the lazy and inconsiderate part of Men making the far greater number took up their Notions by chance from common Tradition and vulgar Conceptions without much beating their heads about them And if it be a reason to think the notion of God innate because all wise Men had it Vertue must be thought innate for that also wise Men have always had § 16. This was evidently the case of all Gentilism Nor hath even amongst Iews Christians and Mahometans who acknowledge but One God this Doctrine and the care is taken in those Nations to teach Men to have true notions of a GOD prevailed so far as to make Men to have the same and true Idea's of Him How many even amongst us will be found upon enquiry to fansie him in the shape of a Man sitting in Heaven and to have many other absurd and unfit conceptions of him Christians as well as Turks have had whole Sects owning and contending earnestly for it That the Deity was corporeal and of humane shape And though we find few now amongst us who profess themselves Anthropomorphites though some I have met with that own it yet I believe he that will make it his business may find amongst the ignorant and uninstructed Christians many of that Opinion Talk but with Country-people almost of any Age or young people almost any where and you shall find that though the Name of GOD be frequently in their mouths yet the notions they apply this Name to are so odd low and pitiful that no body can imagine they were taught by a rational Man much less that they were the Characters writ by the finger of God Himself Nor do I see how it derogates more from the Goodness of God that he has given us Minds unfurnished with these Idea's of Himself than that he hath sent us into the World with Bodies uncloathed and that there is no Art or Skill born with us For being fitted with Faculties to attain these it is want of Industry and Consideration in us and not of Bounty in Him if we have them not 'T is as certain that there is a God as that the opposite Angles made by the intersection of two strait Lines are equal There was never any rational Creature that set himself sincerely to examine the truth of these Propositions that could fail to assent to them Though yet it be past doubt that there are many Men who having not applied their Thoughts that way are ignorant both of the one and the other If any one think fit to call this which is the utmost of its extent universal Consent such an one I easily allow But such an universal Consent as this proves not the Idea of God no more than it does the Idea of such Angles innate § 17. Since then though the knowledge of a GOD be the most natural discovery of humane Reason yet the Idea of him is not innate as I think is evident from what has been said I imagine there will be scarce any other Idea found that can pretend to it since if God had left any natural impressions on the Understanding of Men it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some Characters of Himself as far as our weak Capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an Object But our Minds being at first void of that Idea which we are most concerned to have it is a strong presumption against all other innate Characters I must own as far as I can observe I can find none and would be glad to be informed by any other § 18. I confess there is another Idea which would be of general use for Mankind to have as it is of general talk as if they had it and that is the Idea of Substance which we neither have nor can have by Sensation or Reflection If Nature took care to provide us any Idea's we might well expect it should be such as by our own Faculties we cannot procure to ourselves But we see on the contrary that since by those ways whereby other Ideas are brought into our Minds this is not We have no such clear Idea at all and therefore signifie nothing by the word Substance but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what i. e. of something whereof we have no Idea which we take to be the substratum or support of those Idea's we do know § 19. Whatever then we talk of innate either speculative or practical Principles it may with as much probability be said That a Man hath a 100 l. sterling in his pocket and yet deny that he hath there either Penny Shilling Crown or any other Coin out of which the Sum is to be made up as to think that certain Propositions are innate when the Idea's about which they are can by no means be supposed to be so The general reception and assent that is given doth not at all prove that the Idea's expressed in them are innate For in many cases however the Idea's came there the assent to Words expressing the agreement or disagreement of such Idea's will necessarily follow Every one that hath a true Idea of God and Worship will assent to this Proposition That God is to be worshipped when expressed in a Language he understands And every rational Man that hath not thought on it to day may be ready to assent to this Proposition to morrow and yet millions of Men may be well supposed to want one or both of those Idea's to day For if we will allow Savages and most Country-people to have Idea's of God and Worship which conversation with them will not make one forward to believe yet I think few Children can be supposed to have those Idea's which therefore they must begin to have sometime or
of the Operations of our own Minds within us as it is employ'd about the Idea's it has got which Operations when the Soul comes to reflect on and consider do furnish the Understanding with another sett of Ideas which could not be had from things without and such are Perception Thinking Doubting Believing Reasoning Knowing Willing and all the different actings of our own Minds which we being conscious of and observing in our selves do from these receive into our Understanding as distinct Ideas as we do from Bodies affecting our Senses This Source of Ideas every Man has wholly in himself And though it be not Sense as having nothing to do with external Objects yet it is very like it and might properly enough be call'd internal Sense But as I call the other Sensation so I call this REFLECTION the Ideas it affords being such only as the Mind gets by reflecting on its own Operations within it self By REFLECTION then in the following part of this Discourse I would be understood to mean that notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations and the manner of them by reason whereof there come to be Ideas of these Operations in the Understanding These two I say viz. External Material things as the Objects of SENSATION and the Operations of our own Minds within as the Objects of REFLECTION are to me the only Originals from whence all our Idea's take their beginnings The term Operations here I use in a large sence as comprehending not barely the Actions of the Mind about its Ideas but some sort of Passions arising sometimes from them such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought § 5. The Understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any Ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two Eternal Objects furnish the Mind with the Ideas of sensible qualities which are all those different perceptions they produced in us And the Mind furnishes the Vnderstanding with Ideas of its own Operations These when we have taken a full survey of them and their several modes and the Compositions made out of them we shall find to contain all our whole stock of Ideas and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of these two ways Let any one examine his own Thoughts and throughly search into his Understanding and then let him tell me Whether all the original Ideas he has there are any other than of the Objects of his Senses or of the Operations of his Mind considered as Objects of his Reflection and how great a mass of Knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there he will upon taking a strict view see that he has not any Idea in his Mind but what one of those two have imprinted though perhaps with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the Understanding as we shall see hereafter § 6. He that attentively considers the state of a Child at his first coming into the World will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of Ideas that are to be the matter of his future Knowledge 'T is by degrees he comes to be furnished with them And though the Ideas of obvious and familiar qualities imprint themselves before the Memory begins to keep a Register of Time and Order yet 't is often so late before some unusual qualities come in the way that there are few Men that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them And if it were worth while no doubt a Child might be so ordered as to have but a very few even of the ordinary Ideas till he were grown up to a Man But being surrounded with Bodies that perpetually and diversly affect us variety of Idea's whether care be taken about it or no are imprinted on the Minds of Children Light and Colours are busie and at hand every-where when the Eye is but open Sounds and some tangible Qualities fail not to sollicite their proper Senses and force an entrance to the Mind but yet I think it will be granted easily That if a Child were kept in a place where he never saw any other but Black and White till he were a Man he would have no more Ideas of Scarlet or Green than he that from his Childhood never tasted an Oyster or a Pine-Apple has of those particular Relishes § 7. Men then come to be furnished with sewer or more simple Ideas from without according as the Objects they converse with afford greater or lesser variety and from the Operation of their Minds within according as they more or less reflect on them For though he that contemplates the Operations of his Mind cannot but have plain and clear Ideas of them yet unless he turn his Thoughts that way and considers them attentively he will no more have clear and distinct Ideas of all the Operations of his Mind and all that may be observed therein than he will have all the particular Ideas of any Landscape or of the Parts and Motions of a Clock who will not turn his Eyes to it and with attention heed all the Parts of it The Picture or Clock may be so placed that they may come in his way every Day but yet he will have but a confused Idea of all the Parts they are made up of till he applies himself with attention to consider them each in particular § 8. And hence we see the Reason why 't is pretty late before most Children get Ideas of the Operations of their own Minds and some have not any very clear or perfect Ideas of the greatest part of them all their Lives Because though they pass there continually yet like floating Visions they make not deep Impressions enough to leave in the Mind clear and distinct lasting Ideas till the Understanding turn inwards upon its self and reflect on its own Operations and make them the Object of its own Contemplation Whereas Children at their first coming into the World seek particularly after nothing but what may ease their Hunger or other Pain but take all other Objects as they come are generally pleased with all new ones that are not painful and so growing up in a constant attention to outward Sensations seldom make any considerable Reflection on what passes within them till they come to be of riper Years and some scarce ever at all § 9. To ask at what time a Man has first any Ideas is to ask when he begins to perceive having Ideas and Perception being the same thing I know it is an Opinion that the Soul always thinks and that it has the actual Perception of Ideas in its self constantly as long as it exists and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the Soul as actual Extension is from the Body which if true to enquire after the beginning of a Man's Idea's is the same as to enquire after the beginning of his Soul For by this Account Soul and Ideas as Body and Extension will begin to exist both at the same
which was about the Five or Six and Twentieth Year of his Age. I suppose the World affords more such Instances At least every ones Acquaintance will furnish him with Examples enough of such as pass most of their Nights without dreaming § 15. To think often and never to retain it so much as one moment is a very useless sort of thinking and the Soul in such a state of thinking does very little if at all excel that of a Looking-glass which constantly receives variety of Images or Ideas but retains none they disappear and vanish and there remain no footsteps of them the Looking-glass is never the better for such Ideas nor the Soul for such Thoughts Perhaps it will be said that in a waking Man the materials of the Body are employ'd and made use of in thinking and that the memory of Thoughts is retained by the impressions that are made on the Brain and the traces there left after such thinking but that in the thinking of the Soul which is not perceived in a sleeping Man there the Soul thinks apart and making no use of the Organs of the Body leaves no impressions on it and consequently no memory of such Thoughts Not to mention again the absurdity of two distinct Persons which follows from this Supposition I answer farther That whatever Ideas the Mind can receive and contemplate without the help of the Body it is reasonable to conclude it can retain without the help of the Body too or else the Soul or any separate Spirit will have but little advantage by thinking If it has no memory of its own Thoughts if it cannot record them for its use and be able to recall them upon any occasion if it cannot reflect upon what is past and make use of its former Experiences Reasonings and Contemplations to what purpose does it think They who make the Soul a thinking Thing at this rate will not make it a much more noble Being than those do whom they condemn for allowing it to be nothing but the subtilest parts of Matter Characters drawn on Dust that the first breath of wind effaces or Impressions made on a heap of Atoms or animal Spirits are altogether as useful and render the Subject as noble as the Thoughts of a Soul that perish in thinking that once out of sight are gone for ever and leave no memory of themselves behind them Nature never makes excellent things for mean or no uses and it is hardly to be conceived that our infinitely wise Creator should make so admirable a Faculty as the power of Thinking that Faculty which comes nearest the Excellency of his own incomprehensible Being to be so idlely and uselesly employ'd at least ¼ part of its time here as to think constantly without remembring any of those Thoughts without doing any good to its self or others or being any way useful to any other part of the Creation If we will examine it we shall not find I suppose the motion of dull and sensless matter any where in the Universe made so little use of and so wholly thrown away § 16. 'T is true we have sometimes instances of Perception whilst we are asleep and retain the memory of those Thoughts but how extravagant and incoherent for the most part they are how little conformable to the Perfection and Order of a rational Being those who are acquainted with Dreams need not be told This I would willingly be satisfied in Whether the Soul when it thinks thus apart and as it were separate from the Body acts less rationally then when conjointly with it or no If its separate Thoughts be less rational then these Men must say That the Soul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the Body If it does not 't is a wonder that our Dreams should be for the most part so frivolous and irrational and that the Soul should retain none of its more rational Soliloquies and Meditations § 17. Those who so confidently tell us That the Soul always actually thinks I would they would also tell us what those Ideas are that are in the Soul of a Child before or just at the union with the Body before it hath received any by Sensation The Dreams of sleeping Men are as I take it all made up of the waking Man's Ideas though for the most part oddly put together 'T is strange if the Soul has Ideas of its own that it derived not from Sensation or Reflection as it must have if it thought before it received any impressions from the Body that it should never in its private thinking so private that the Man himself perceives it not retain any of them the very moment it wakes out of them and then make the Man glad with new discoveries Who can find it reason that the Soul should in its retirement during sleep have so many hours thoughts and yet never light on any of those Ideas it borrowed not from Sensation or Reflection or at least preserve the memory of none but such which being occasioned from the Body must needs be less natural to a Spirit 'T is strange the Soul should never once in a Man's whole life recal over any of its pure native Thoughts and those Ideas it had before it borrowed any thing from the Body never bring into the waking Man's view any other Ideas but what have a tangue of the Cask manifestly derive their Original from that union If it always thinks and so had Ideas before it was united or before it received any from the Body 't is not to be supposed but that during sleep it recollects its native Ideas and during that retirement from communicating with the Body whilst it thinks by it self the Ideas it is busied about should be sometimes at least those more natural and congenial ones had in it self underived from the Body or its own operations about them which since the waking Man never remembers we must from this Hypothesis conclude that Memory belongs only to Ideas derived from the Body and the Operations of the Mind about them or else that the Soul remembers something that the Man does not § 18. I would be glad also to learn from these men who so confidently pronounce that the humane Soul or which is all one that a man always thinks how they come to know it nay how they come to know that they themselves think when they themselves do not perceive it This I am afraid is to be sure without proofs and to know without perceiving 'T is I suspect a confused Notion taken up to serve an Hypothesis and none of those clear Truths that either their own Evidence force us to admit or common Experience makes it impudence to deny For the most that can be said of it is That 't is possible the Soul may always think but not always retain it in memory And I say it is as possible that the Soul may not always think and much more probable that it should sometimes not think than that it
considered these Qualities of Light and Warmth which are Perceptions in me when I am warmed or enlightned by the Sun are no otherwise in the Sun than the changes made in the Wax when it is blanched or melted are in the Sun They are all of them equally Powers in the Sun depending on its primary Qualities whereby it is able in the one case so to alter the Bulk Figure Texture or Motion of some of the insensible parts of my Eyes or Hands as thereby to produce in me the Ideas of Light or Heat and in the other it is able so to alter the Bulk Figure Texture or Motion of the insensible Parts of the Wax as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct Ideas of White and Fluid § 25. The Reason Why the one are ordinarily taken for real Qualities and the other only for bare Powers seems to be because the Ideas we have of distinct Colours Sounds c. containing nothing at all in them of Bulk Figure or Motion we are not apt to think them the Effect of these primary Qualities which appear not to our Senses to operate in their Production and with which they have not any apparent Congruity or conceivable Connexion Hence it is that we are so forward to imagine that those Ideas are the resemblances of something really existing in the Objects themselves Since Sensation discovers nothing of Bulk Figure or Motion of parts in their Production nor can Reason shew how Bodies by their Bulk Figure and Motions should produce in the Mind the Ideas of Blue or Yellow c. But in the other Case in the Operations of Bodies changing the Qualities one of another we plainly discover that the Quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it wherefore we look on it as a bare Effect of Power For though receiving the Idea of Heat or Light from the Sun we are apt to think 't is a Perception and Resemblance of such a Quality in the Sun yet when we see Wax or a fair Face receive change of Colour from the Sun we cannot imagine that to be the Reception or Resemblance of any thing in the Sun because we find not those different Colours in the Sun it self For our Senses being able to observe a likeness or unlikeness of sensible Qualities in two different external Objects we forwardly enough conclude the Production of any sensible Quality in any Subject to be an Effect of bare Power and not the Communication of any Quality which was really in the efficient when we find no such sensible Quality in the thing that produced it But our Senses not being able to discover any unlikeness between the Idea produced in us and the Quality of the Object producing it we are apt to imagine that our Ideas are resemblances of something in the Objects and not the Effects of certain Powers placed in the Modification of their primary Qualities with which primary Qualities the Ideas produced in us have no resemblance § 26. To conclude beside those before mentioned primary Qualities in Bodies viz. Bulk Figure Extension Number and Motion of their solid Parts all the rest whereby we take notice of Bodies and distinguish them one from another are nothing else but several Powers in them depending on those primary Qualities whereby they are fitted either by immediately operating on our Bodies to produce several different Ideas in us or else by operating on other Bodies so to change their primary Qualities as to render them capable of producing Ideas in us different from what before they did The former of these I think may be called Secundary Qualities immediately perceivable The later Secundary Qualities mediately perceivable CHAP. IX Of Perception § 1. PErception as it is the first faculty of the Mind exercised about our Ideas so it is the first and simplest Idea we have from Reflection and is by some called Thinking in general Though Thinking in the propriety of the English Tongue signifies that sort of operation of the Mind about its Ideas wherein the Mind is active where it with some degree of voluntary attention considers any thing For in bare naked Perception the Mind is for the most part only passive and what it perceives it cannot avoid perceiving § 2. What Perception is every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself when he sees hears feels c. or thinks than by any discourse of mine Whoever reflects on what passes in himself in his own Mind cannot miss it And if he does not reflect all the words in the World cannot make him have any notion of it § 3. This is certain That whatever alterations are made in the Body if they reach not the Mind whatever impressions are made on the outward parts if they are not taken notice of within there is no Perception Fire may burn our Bodies with no other effect than it does a Billet unless the motion be continued to the Brain and there the sense of Heat or Idea of Pain be produced in the Mind wherein consists actual Perception § 4. How often may a Man observe in himself that whilst his Mind is intently employ'd in the contemplation of some Objects and curiously surveying some Ideas that are there it takes no notice of impressions of sounding Bodies which are brought in though the same alteration be made upon the Organ of Hearing that uses to be for the producing the Idea of a Sound A sufficient impulse there may be on the Organ but it not reaching the observation of the Mind there follows no perception And though the motion that uses to produce the Idea of Sound be made in the Ear yet no sound is heard Want of Sensation in this case is not through any defect in the Organ or that his Ears are less affected than at other times when he does hear but that which uses to produce the Idea though conveyed in by the usual Organ not being taken notice of in the Understanding there follows no Sensation So that where-ever there is Sense or Perception there some Idea is actually produced and present in the Vnderstanding § 5. Therefore I doubt not but Children by the exercise of their Senses about Objects that affect them in the Womb receive some few Ideas before they are born as the unavoidable effects either of the Bodies that environ them or else of those Wants or Diseases they suffer amongst which if one may conjecture concerning things not very capable of examination I think the Ideas of Hunger and Warmth are two which probably are some of the first that Children have and which they scarce ever part with again § 6. But though it be reasonable to imagine that Children receive some Ideas before they come into the World yet these simple Ideas are far from those innate Principles which some contend for and we above have rejected These here mentioned being the effects of Sensation are only from some Affections of the Body
which happen to them there and so depend on something exterior to the Mind no otherwise differing in their manner of production from other Ideas derived from Sense but only in the precedency of Time Whereas those innate Principles are supposed to be of quite another nature not coming into the Mind by the accidental alterations in or operations on the Body but as it were original Characters impressed upon it in the very first moment of its Being and Constitution § 7. As there are some Ideas which we may reasonably suppose may be introduced into the Minds of Children in the Womb subservient to the necessity of their Life and being there So after they are born those Ideas are the earliest imprinted which happen to be the sensible Qualities which first occur to them amongst which Light is not the least considerable nor of the weakest efficacy And how covetous the Mind is to be furnished with all such Ideas as have no pain accompanying them may be a little guess'd by what is observable in Children new-born who always turn their Eyes to that part from whence the Light comes lay them how you please But the Ideas that are most familiar at first being various according to the divers circumstances of Childrens first entertainment in the World the order wherein the several Ideas come at first into the Mind is very various and uncertain also neither is it much material to know it § 8. We are farther to consider concerning Perception that the Ideas we receive by sensation are often in grown People alter'd by the Iudgment without our taking notice of it When we set before our Eyes a round Globe of any uniform colour v. g. Gold Alabaster or Jet 't is certain that the Idea thereby imprinted in our Mind is of a flat Circle variously shadow'd with several degrees of Light and Brightness coming to our Eyes But we having by use been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex Bodies are wont to make in us what alterations are made in the reflexions of Light by the difference of the sensible Figures of Bodies the Judgment presently by an habitual custom alters the Appearances into their Causes So that from that which truly is variety of shadow or colour collecting the Figure it makes it pass for a mark of Figure and frames to it self the perception of a convex Figure and an uniform Colour when the Idea we receive from thence is only a Plain variously colour'd as is evident in Painting § 9. But this is not I think usual in any of our Ideas but those received by Sight Because Sight the most comprehensive of all our Senses conveying to our Minds the far different Ideas of Light and Colours which are peculiar only to that Sense and also of Space Figure and Motion the several varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper Objects viz. Light and Colours it accustoms it self by use to judge of the one by the other This in many cases by a setled habit in things whereof we have frequent experience is performed so constantly and so quick that we take that for the Perception of our Sensation which is but an Idea formed by our Judgment so that one viz. that of Sensation serves only to excite the other and is scarce taken notice of it self as a Man who reads and hears with attention and understanding takes little notice of the Characters or Sounds but of the Ideas that are excited in him by them § 10. Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice if we consider how very quick the actions of the Mind are performed For as it self takes up no space has no extension so its actions seem to require no time but many of them seem to be crouded into an Instant I speak this in comparison to the actions of the Body Any one may easily observe this in his own Thoughts who will take the pains to reflect on them How as it were in an instant does our Minds with one glance see all the parts of a demonstration which may very well be called along one if we consider the time it will require to put it into words and step by step shew it another Secondly we shall not be so much surprized that this is done in us with so little notice if we consider how the facility we get of doing things by a custom of doing makes them often pass in us without our noticeâ— Habits especially such as are begun very early come at last to produce actions in us which often scape our observation How frequently do we in a day cover our Eyes with our Eye-lids without perceiving that we are at all in the dark Men that by custom have got the use of a By-word do almost in every sentence pronounce soundsâ— which though taken notice of by others they themselves neither hear nor observe And therefore 't is not so strange that our Mind should often change the Idea of its Sensation into that of its Judgment and make one serve only to excite the other without our taking notice of it § 11. This faculty of Perception seems to me to be that which puts the distinction betwixt the â—nimal Kingdom and â—he inferior parts of Nature For however Vegetables have many of them some degrees of Motion and upon the different application of other 〈◊〉 it s to them do very briskly alter their Figures and Motions and so have obtained the name of sensitive Plants from a motion which has some resemblance to that which in Animals follows upon Sensationâ— Yet I suppose it is all bare Mechanism and no otherwise produced than the turning of a wild Oat-beard by the insinuation of the Particles of Moisture or the shortning of a Rope by the affusion of Water All which is done without any sensation in the Subject or the having or receiving any Ideas § 12. Perception I believe is in some degree in all sorts of Animals though in some possibly the Avenues provided for the reception of Sensations are so few by Nature and the Perception they are received with so obscure and dull that it comes extreamly short of the quickness and variety of Sensations which is in other Animals but yet it is sufficient for and wisely adapted to the state and condition of that sort of Animals who are thus constituted by Nature So that the Wisdom and Goodness of the Maker plainly appears in all the Parts of this stupendious Fabrick and all the several degrees and ranks of Creatures in it § 13. We may I think from the Make of an Oyster or Cockle reasonably conclude that it has not so many nor so quick Senses as a Man or several other Animals nor if it had would it in that state and incapacity of transferring it self from one place to another be better'd by them What good would Sight and Hearing do to a Creature that cannot move it self to or from the Objects wherein at a distance it perceives Good or
Evil And would not quickness of Sensation be an Inconvenience to an Animal that must lie still where Chance has once placed it and there receives the afflux of colder or warmer clean or foul Water as it happens to come to it § 14. But yet I cannot but think there is some small dull Perception whereby they are distinguished from perfect Insensibility And that this may be so we have plain instances even in Mankind it self Take one in whom decrepid old Age has blotted out the Memory of his past Knowledge and clearly wiped out the Ideas his Mind was formerly stored with and has by destroying his Sight Hearing and Smell quite and his Taste to a great degree stopp'd up almost all the Passages for new ones to enter Or if there be some of the inlets yet half open the Impressions made are scarce perceived or not at all retained How far such an one notwithstanding all that is boasted of innate Principles is in his Knowledge and intellectual Faculties above the Condition of a Cockle or an Oyster I leave to be considered And if a Man had passed Sixty Years in such a State as 't is possible he might as well as three Days I wonder what difference there would have been in any intellectual Perfections between him and the lowest degrees of Animals Perception then being the first step and degree towards Knowledge and the inlet of all the Materials of it the fewer Senses any Man as well as any other Creature hath and the fewer and duller the Impressions are that are made by them and the duller the Faculties are that are employed about them the more remote are they from that Knowledge which is to be found in some Men. But this being in great variety of Degrees as may be perceived amongst Men cannot certainly be discovered in the several Species of Animals much less in their particular Individuals It suffices me only to have remarked here that Perception is the first Operation of all our intellectual Faculties and the inlet of all Knowledge into our Minds And I am apt too to imagine That it is Perception in the lowest degree of it which puts the Boundaries between Animals and the inferior ranks of Creatures But this I mention only as my conjecture by the bye it being indifferent to the Matter in Hand which way the Learned shall determine of it CHAP. X. Of Retention § 1. THE next Faculty of the Mind whereby it makes a farther Progress towards Knowledge is that I call Retention or the keeping of those simple Ideas which from Sensation or Reflection it hath received which is done two ways First either by keeping the Idea which is brought into it for some time actually in view which is called Contemplation § 2. The other is the Power to revive again in our Minds those Ideas which after imprinting have disappeared or have been as it were laid aside out of Sight And thus we do when we conceive Heat or Light Yellow or Sweet the Object being removed and this is Memory which is as it were the Store-house of our Ideas For the narrow Mind of Man not being capable of having many Ideas under View and Consideration at once it was necessary to have a Repository to lay up those Ideas which at another time it might have use of And thus it is by the Assistance of the Memory that we are said to have all those Ideas in our Understanding which though we do not actually contemplate yet we can bring in sight and make appear again and be the Objects of our Thoughts without the help of those sensible Qualities which first imprinted them there § 3. Attention and Repetition help much to the fixing any Ideas in our Memory But those which naturally at first make the deepest and most lasting Impression are those which are accompanied with Pleasure or Pain The great Business of the Senses being to make us take notice of what hurts or advantages the Body it is wisely ordered by Nature as has been shewn that Pain should accompany the Reception of several Ideas which supplying the Place of Consideration and Reasoning in Children and acting quicker than Consideration in grown Men makes both the Young and Old avoid painful Objects with that haste which is necessary for their Preservation and in both settles in the Memory a caution for the Future § 4. But concerning the several degrees of lasting wherewith Ideas are imprinted on the Memory we may observe First That some of them being produced in the Understanding either by the Objects affecting the Senses once barely and no more especially if the Mind then otherwise imployed took but little notice of it and set not on the stamp deep into it self or else when through the Temper of the Body or otherwise the Memory is very weak such Ideas quickly fade ad vanish quite out of the Understanding and leave it as clear without any Foot-steps or remaining Characters as Shadows do flying over Fields of Corn and the Mind is as void of them as if they never had been there § 5. Thus many of those Ideas which were produced in the Minds of Children in the beginning of their Sensation some of which perhaps as of some Pleasures and Pains were before they were born and others in their Infancy if in the future Course of their Lives they are not repeated again are quite lost without the least glimpse remaining of them This may be observed in those who by some Mischance have lost their sight when they were very young in whom the Ideas of Colours having been but slightly taken notice of and ceasing to be repeated do quite wear out so that some years after there is no more Notion nor Memory of Colours left in their Minds than in those of People born blind The Memory in some Men 't is true is very tenacious even to a Miracle But yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our Ideas even those which are struck deepest and in the Minds the most retentive so that if they be not sometimes renewed by repeated Exercise of the Senses or Reflection about those kind of Objects which at first occasioned them the Print wears out and at last there remains nothing to be seen Thus the Ideas as well as Children of our Youth often die before us And our Minds represent to us those Tombs to which we are approaching where though the Brass and Marble remain yet the Inscriptions are effaced by time and the Imagery moulders away The Pictures drawn in our Minds are laid in fading Colours and if not sometimes refreshed vanish and disappear How much the Constitution of our Bodies are concerned in this and whether the Temper of the Spirits and Brain make this difference that some retain the Characters drawn on it like Marble others like free Stone and others little better than Sand I shall not here enquire though it may seem probable that the Constitution of the Body does sometimes influence the Memory
from another where there is but the least difference consists in a great measure the exactness of Judgment and clearness of Reason which is to be observed in one Man above another And hence perhaps may be given some Reason of that common Observation That Men who have a great deal of Wit and prompt Memories have not always the clearest Judgment or deepest Reason For Wit lying most in the assemblage of Ideas and putting those together with quickness and variety wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity thereby to make up pleasant Pictures and agreeable Visions in the Fancy Iudgment on the contrary lies quite on the other side in separating carefully Ideas one from another wherein can be found the least difference thereby to avoid being misled by Similitude and by affinity to take one thing for another This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Allusion wherein for the most part lies that entertainment and pleasantry of Wit which strikes so lively on the Fancy and therefore so accepable to all People because its Beauty appears at first sight and there is required no labour of thought to examine what Truth or Reason there is in it The Mind without looking any farther rests satisfied with the pleasantness of the Picture and the gayety of the Fancy And it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it by the severe Rules of Truth and good Reason whereby it appears that it consists in something that is not perfectly conformable to them § 3. To the well distinguishing our Ideas it chiefly contributes that they be clear and determinate And when they are so it will not breed any confusion or mistake about them though the Senses should as sometimes they do convey them from the same Object differently on different occasions and so seem to err For though a Man in a Fever should from Sugar have a bitter taste which at another time would produce a sweet one yet the Idea of Bitter in that Man's Mind would be as clear and distinct from the Idea of Sweet as if he had tasted only Gall. Nor does it make any more confusion between the two Ideas of Sweet and Bitter that the same sort of Body produces at one time one and at another time another Idea by the taste than it makes a confusion in the two Ideas of White and Sweet or White and Round that the same piece of Sugar produces them both in the Mind at the same time And the Ideas of Orange-colour and Azure that are produced in the Mind by the same parcel of the infusion of Lignum Nephriticum are no less distinct Ideas than those of the same Colours taken from two very different Bodies § 4. The COMPARING them one with another in respect of Extent Degrees Time Place or any other circumstances is another operation of the Mind about its Ideas and is that upon which depends all that large tribe of Ideas comprehended under Relation which of how vast an extent it is I shall have occasion to consider hereafter § 5. How far Brutes partake in this faculty is not easie to determine I imagine they have it not in any great degree For though they probably have several Ideas distinct enough yet it seems to me to be the Prerogative of Humane Understanding when it has sufficiently distinguished any Ideas so as to perceive them to be perfectly different and so consequently two to cast about and consider in what circumstances they are capable to be compared And therefore I think Beasts compare not their Ideas farther than some sensible Circumstances annexed to the Objects themselves The other power of Comparing which may be observed in Men belonging to general Ideas and useful only to abstract Reasonings we may probably conjecture Beasts have not § 6. The next Operation we may observe in the Mind about its Ideas is COMPOSITION whereby it puts together several of those simple ones it has received from Sensation and Reflection and combines them into complex ones Under this of Composition may be reckon'd also that of ENLARGING wherein though the Composition does not so much appear as in more complex ones yet it is nevertheless a putting several Ideas together though of the same kind Thus by adding several Unites together we make the Idea of a dozen and putting together the repeated Ideas of several Perches we frame that of a Furlong § 7. In this also I suppose Brutes come far short of Man For though they take in and retain together several Combinations of simple Ideas as possibly the Shape Smell and Voice of his Master make up a complex Idea a Dog has of him or rather are so many distinct Marks whereby he knows him yet I do not think they do of themselves ever compound them and make complex Ideas And perhaps even where we think they have complex Ideas 't is only one simple one that directs them in the knowledge of several things which possibly they distinguish less by their Sight than we imagine For I have been credibly infomed that a Bitch will nurse play with and be fond of young Foxes as much as and in place of her Puppies if you can but get them once to suck her so long that her Milk may go through them § 8. When Children have by repeated Sensations got Ideas fixed in their Memories they begin by degrees to learn the use of Signs And when they have got the skill to apply the Organs of Speech to the framing of articulate Sounds they begin to make use of Words to signifie their Ideas to others which words they sometimes borrow from others and sometimes make themselves as one may observe among the new and unusual Names Children often give to things in their first use of Language § 9. The use of Words then being to stand as outward Marks of our internal Ideas and those Ideas being taken from particular things if every particular Idea we take in should have a distinct Name Names must be endless To prevent this the Mind makes the particular Ideas received from particular Objects to become general which is done by considering them as they are in the Mind such Appearances separate from all other Existencies and the circumstances of real Existence as Time Place or any other concomitant Ideas This is called ABSTRACTION whereby Ideas taken from particular Beings become general Representatives of all of the same kind and their Names general Names applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract Ideas Such precise naked Appearances in the Mind without considering how whence or with what others they came there the Understanding lays up with Names commonly annexed to them as the Standards to rank real Existencies into sorts as they agree with these Patterns and to denominate them accordingly Thus the same Colour being observed to day in Chalk or Snow which the Mind yesterday received from Milk it considers that Appearance alone makes it a representative of all of
every smaller or greater multitude of Unites So that he that can add one to one and so to two and so go on with his Tale taking still with him the distinct Names belonging to every Progression and so again by subtracting an Unite from each Collection retreat and lessen them is capable of all the Ideas of Numbers within the compass of his Language or for which he hath names though not perhaps of more For the several simple Modes of Numbers being in our Minds but so many Combinations of Unites which have no variety nor are capable of any other difference but more or less Names or Marks for each distinct Combination seem more necessary than in any other sort of Ideas For without such Names or Marks we can hardly well make use of Numbers in reckoning especially where the Combination is made up of any great multitude of Unites which put together without a Name or Mark to distinguish that precise Collection will hardly be kept from being a heap in Confusion § 6. This I think to be the reason why some Americans I have spoken with who were otherwise of quick and rational Parts enough could not as we do by any means count to 1000 nor had any distinct Idea of that Number though they could reckon very well to 20. Because their Language being scanty and accommodated only to the few necessaries of a needy simple Life unacquainted either with Trade or Mathematicks had no Words in it to stand for 1000 so that when they were discoursed with of those greater Numbers they would shew the Hairs of their Head to express a great multitude which they could not number which inability I suppose proceeded from their want of Names The Tououpinambos had no Names for Numbers above 5 any Number beyond that they made out by shewing their Fingers and the Fingers of others who were present Histoire d'un Voiage fait en la Terre du Brasil par Iean de Lery c. 20. 107 382. And I doubt not but we our selves might distinctly number in Words a great deal farther than we usually do would we find out but some fit denominations to signifie them by whereas in the way we take now to name them by Millions of Millions of Millions it is hard to go beyond eighteen or at most four and twenty decimal Progressions without confusion But to shew how much distinct Names conduce to our well reckoning or having useful Ideas of Numbers let us set all these following Figures in one continued Line as the Marks of one Number v. g. Nevilions Octilions Septilions Sextilions Quintilions Quatrilions Trilions Bilions Milions Vnites 857324. 162486. 345896. 437916. 423147. 248106. 235421. 261734. 368149. 623137. The ordinary way of naming this Number in English will be the often repeating of Millions of Millions of Millions of Millions of Millions of Millions of Millions of Millions which is the denomination of six second Figures In which way it will be very hard to have any distinguishing Notions of this Number But whether by giving every six Figures a new and orderly denomination these and perhaps a great many more Figures in progression might not easily be counted distinctly and Ideas of them both got more easily to our selves and more plainly signified to others I leave it to be considered This I mention only to shew how necessary distinct Names are to Numbering without pretending to introduce new ones of my invention § 7. Thus Children either for want of Names to mark the several Progressions of Numbers or not having yet the faculty to collect scattered Ideas into complex ones and range them to a regular Order and so retain them in their Memories as is necessary to reckoning do not begin to number very early nor proceed in it very far or steadily till a good while after they are well furnished with good store of other Ideas and one may often observe them in discourse and reason pretty well and have very clear conceptions of several other things before they can tell 20. And some through the default of their Memories who cannot retain the several Combinations of Numbers with their Names annexed in their distinct orders and the dependence of so long a train of numeral Progressions and their relation one to another are not able all their life-time to reckon or regularly go over any moderate Series of Numbers For he that will count Twenty or have any Idea of that Number must know that Nineteen went before with the distinct Name or Sign of every one of them as they stand marked in their order for where-ever this fails a gap is made the Chain breaks and the Progress in numbering can go no farther So that to reckon right it is required 1. That the Mind distinguish carefully two Ideas which are different one from another only by the addition or subtraction of one Unite 2. That it retain in memory the Names or Marks of the several Combinations from an Unite to that Number and that not confusedly and at random but in that exact order that the Numbers follow one another in either of which if it trips the whole business of Numbring will be disturbed and there will remain only the confused Idea of multitude but the Ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be attained to § 8. This farther is observable in Number That it is that which the Mind makes use of in measuring all things that by us are measurable which principally are Expansion and Duration and our Idea of Infinity even when applied to those seems to be nothing but the Infinity of Number For what else are our Ideas of Eternity and Immensity but the repeated additions of certain Ideas of imagined parts of Space and Expansion or Duration with the Infinity of Number in which we can come to no end of Addition For such an inexhaustible stock Number of all other our Ideas most clearly furnishes us with as is obvious to every one For let a Man collect into one Sum as great a Number as he pleases this Multitude how great soever lessens not one jot the power of adding to it or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhaustible stock of Number where still there remains as much to be added as if none were taken out And this endless addition of Numbers so apparent to the Mind is that I think which gives us the clearest and most distinct Idea of Infinity of which more in the following Chapter CHAP. XVII Of Infinity § 1. HE that would know what kind of Idea it is to which we give the name of Infinity cannot do it better than by considering to what Infinity is by the Mind more immediately attributed and then how the Mind comes to frame it Finite and Infinite seem to me to be looked upon by the Mind as the Modes of Quantity and to be attributed primarily in their first designation only to those things which have parts and are capable of increase or diminution by the addition or
saying that the World was supported by a great Elephant was asked what the Elephant rested on to which his answer was A great Tortoise But being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-back'd Tortoise replied something he knew not what And thus here as in all other cases where we use Words without having clear and distinct Ideas we talk like Children who being questioned what such a thing is which they know not readily give this satisfactory answer That is something which in truth signifies no more when so used either by Children or Men but that they knew not what and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of is what they have no distinct Idea of at all and so are perfectly ignorant of it and in the dark The Idea then we have to which we give the general name Substance being nothing but the supposed but unknown support of those Qualities we find existing which we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante without something to support them we call that Support Substantia which according to the true import of the Word is in plain English standing under or upholding § 3. An obscure and relative Idea of Substance in general being thus made we come to have the Ideas of particular sorts of Substances by collecting such Combinations of simple Ideas as are by Experience and Observation of Mens Senses taken notice of to exist together and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal Constitution or unknown Essence of that Substance Thus we come to have the Ideas of a Man Horse Gold Water c. of which Substances whether any one has any other clear Idea farther than of certain simple Ideas coexisting together I appeal to every one 's own Experience 'T is the ordinary Qualities observable in Iron or a Diamond put together that make the true complex Idea of those Substances which a Smith or a Jeweller commonly knows better than a Philosopher who whatever substantial forms he may talk of has no other Idea of those Substances than what is framed by a collection of those simple Ideas are to be found in them only we must take notice that our complex Ideas of Substances besides all these simple Ideas they are made up of have always the confused Idea of something to which they belong and in which they subsist and therefore when we speak of any sort of Substance we say it is a thing having such or such Qualities as Body is a thing that is extended figured and capable of Motion a Spirit a thing capable of thinking and so Hardness Friability and Power to draw Iron we say are Qualities to be found in a Loadstone These and the like fashions of speaking intimate that the Substance is supposed always something besides the Extension Figure Solidity Motion Thinking or other observable Ideas though we know not what it is § 4. Hence when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal Substances as Horse Stone c. though the Idea we have of either of them be put the Complication or Collection of those several simple Ideas of sensible Qualities which we use to find united in the thing called Horse or Stone yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone nor one in another we suppose them to exist in and supported by some common subject which Support we denote by the name Substance though it be certain we have no clear or distinct Idea of that thing we suppose a Support § 5. The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind viz. Thinking Reasoning Fearing c. which we concluding not to subsist of themselves nor apprehending how they can belong to Body or be produced by it we are apt to think these the Actions of some other Substance which we call Spirit whereby yet it is evident that having no other Idea or Notion of Matter but something wherein those many sensible Qualities which affect our Senses do subsist by supposing a Substance wherein Thinking Knowing Doubting and a power of Moving c. do subsist We have as clear a Notion of the Nature or Substance of Spirit as we have of Body the one being supposed to be without knowing what it is the Substratum to those simple Ideas we have from without and the other supposed with a like ignorance of what it is to be the Substratum to those Operations which we experiment in our selves within 'T is plain then that the Idea of corporeal Substance in Matter is as remote from our Conceptions and Apprehensions as that of Spiritual Substance or Spirit and therefore from our not having any notion of the Substance of Spirit we can no more conclude its non-Existence than we can for the same reason deny the Existence of Body It being as rational to affirm there is no Body because we cannot know its Essence as 't is called or have no Idea of the Substance of Matter as to say there is no Spirit because we know not its Essence or have no Idea of a Spiritual Substance § 6. Whatever therefore be the secret and abstract Nature of Substance in general all the Ideas we have of particular distinct Substances are nothing but several Combinations of simple Ideas coexhisting in such though unknown Cause of their Union as makes the whole subsist of it self 'T is by such Combinations of simple Ideas and nothing else that we represent particular Substances to our selves such are the Ideas we have of their several sorts in our Minds and such only do we by their specifick Names signifie to others v. g. Man Horse Sun Water Iron upon hearing which Words every one who understands the Language frames in his Mind a Combination of those several simple Ideas which he has usually observed or fancied to exist together under that denomination all which he supposes to rest in and be as it were adherent to that unknown common Subject which inheres not in any thing else Though in the mean time it be manifest and every one upon Enquiry into his own thoughts will find that he has no other Idea of any Substance v. g. let it be Gold Horse Iron Man Vitriol Bread but what he has barely of those sensible Qualities which he supposes to inhere with a supposition of such a Substratum as gives as it were a support to those Qualities or simple Ideas which he has observed to exist united together Thus the Idea of Sun What is it but an aggregate of these several simple Ideas Bright Hot Roundish having a constant regular motion at a certain distance from us and perhaps some other As he who thinks and discourses of the Sun has been more or less accurate in observing those sensible Qualities Ideas or Properties which are in that thing which he calls the Sun § 7. For he has the perfectest Idea of any particular Substance who has gathered and put together most of those simple Ideas which do exist in it among which are to
forbidden by God I call it Good or Evil Sin or Duty and if I compare it to civil Law the Rule made by the Legislative of the Country I call it lawful or unlawful a Crime or no Crime So that whencesoever we take the Rule of Moral Actions or by what Standard soever we frame in our Minds the Ideas of Vertues or Vices they consist only and are made up of Collections of simple Ideas which we originally received from Sense or Reflection and their Rectitude or Obliquity consists in the Agreement or Disagreement with those Patterns prescribed by some Law § 15. To conceive a Right of Moral Actions we must take notice of them under this two-fold Consideration First As they are in themselves each made up of such a Collection of simple Ideas Thus Drunkenness or Lying signifie such or such a Collection of simple Ideas which I call mixed Modes and in this Sense they are as much positive absolute Ideas as the drinking of a Horse or speaking of a Parrot Secondly Our Actions are considered as Good Bad or indifferent and in this respect they are Relative it being their Conformity to or Disagreement with some Rule that makes them to be regular or irregular Good or Bad and so as far as they are compared with a Rule and thereupon denominated they come under Relation Thus the challenging and fighting with a Man as it is a certain positive Mode or particular sort of Action by particular Ideas distinguished from all others is called Duelling which when considered in relation to the Law of God will deserve the Name Sin to the Law of Fashion in some Countries Valour and Vertue and to the municipal Laws of some Governments a capital Crime In this Case when the positive Mode has one Name and another Name as it stands in relation to the Law the distinction may as easily be observed as it is in Substances where one Name v. g. Man is used to signifie the thing another v. g. Father to signifie the Relation § 16. But because very frequently the positive Idea of the Action and its Moral Relation are comprehended together under one Name and the same Word made use of to express both the Mode or Action and its Moral Rectitude or Obliquity therefore the Relation it self is less taken notice of and there is often no distinction made between the positive Idea of the Action and the reference it has to rule By which confusion of these two distinct Considerations under one Term those who yield too easily to the Impressions of Sounds and are forward to take Names for Things are often misâ—ed in their Judgment of Actions Thus the taking from another what is his without his Knowledge or Allowance is properly called Stealing but that Name being commonly understood to signifie also the Moral pravity of the Action and to denote its contrariety to the Law Men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called Stealing as an ill Action disagreeing with the Rule of Right And yet the private taking away his Sword from a Mad-man to prevent his doing Mischief though it be properly denominated Stealing as the Name of such a mixed Mode yet when compared to the Law of God when considered in its relation to that supreme Rule it is no Sin or Transgression though the Name Stealing ordinarily carries such an intimation with it § 17. And thus much for the Relation of humane Actions to a Law which therefore I call Moral Relations 'T would make a Volume to go over all sorts of Relations 't is not therefore to be expected that I should here mention them all It suffices to our present purpose to shew by these what the Ideas are we have of this comprehensive Consideration call'd Relation which is so various and the Occasions of it so many as many as there can be of comparing things one to another that it is not very easie to reduce it to Rules or under just Heads Those I have mentioned I think are some of the most considerable and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our Ideas of Relations and wherein they are founded But before I quit this Argument from what has been said give me Leave to observe § 18. First That It is evident That all Relation terminates in and is ultimately founded on those simple Ideas we have got from Sensation or Reflection So that all that we have in our Thoughts our selves if we think of any thing or have any meaning or would signifie to others when we use Words standing for Relations is nothing but some simple Ideas or Collections of simple Ideas compared one with another This is so manifest in that sort called proportional that nothing can be more For when a Man says Honey is sweeter than Wax it is plain that his Thoughts in this Relation terminate in this simple Idea Sweetness which is equally true of all the rest though where they are compounded or decompounded the simple Ideas they are made up of are perhaps seldom taken notice of v. g. when the Word Father is mentioned First There is meant that particular of Species or collective Idea signified by the Word Man Secondly Those sensible simple Ideas signified by the Word Generation And Thirdly The Effects of it and all the simple Ideas signified by the Word Child So the Word Friend being taken for a Man who loves and is ready to do good to another has all those following Ideas to the making of it up First all the simple Ideas comprehended in the Word Man or intelligent Being Secondly the Idea of Love Thirdly The Idea of Readiness or Disposition Fourthly The Idea of Action which is any kind of Thought or Motion Fifthly The Idea of Good which signifies any thing that may advance his Happiness and terminates at last if examined in particular simple Ideas of which the Word Good in general signifies any one but if removed from all simple Ideas quite it signifies nothing at all And thus also all Moral Words terminate at last though perhaps more remotely in a Collection of simple Ideas the immediate signification of Relative Words being very often other supposed known Relations which if traced one to another still end in simple Ideas § 19. Secondly That in Relations we have for the most part if not always as clear a Notion of the Relation as we have of those simple Ideas wherein it is founded Agreement or Disagreement whereon Relation depends being Things whereof we have commonly as clear Ideas as of any other whatsoever it being but the distinguishing simple Ideas or their Degrees one from another without which we could have no distinct Knowledge at all For if I have a clear Idea of Sweetness Light or Extension I have too of equal or more or less of each of these If I know what it is for one Man to be born of a Woman viz. Sempronia I know what it is for another Man to be born of the same Woman
adapted to that purpose come to be made use of by Men as the Signs of their Ideas not by any natural connection that there is between particular articulate Sounds and certain Ideas for then there would be but one Language amongst all Men but by a voluntary Imposition whereby such a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of such an Idea The use then of Words is to be sensible Marks of Ideas and the Ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate Signification § 2. The use Men have of these Marks being either to record their own Ideas for the Assistence of their own Memory or as it were to bring them out and lay them before the view of others Words in their primary and immediate Signification stand for nothing but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them how imperfectly soever or carelesly those Ideas are collected from the Things which they are supposed to represent When a Man speaks to another it is that he may be understood and the end of the Speech is that those Sounds as Marks may make known his Ideas to the Hearer That then which Words are the Marks of are the Ideas of the Speaker Nor can any one apply them as Marks immediately to any thing else but the Ideas that he himself hath For this would be to make them Signs of his own Conception and yet apply them to other Ideas which would be to make them Signs and not Signs of his Ideas at the same time and so in Effect to have no Signification at all Words being voluntary Signs they cannot be voluntary Signs imposed by him on Things he knows not That would be to make them Signs of nothing Sounds without Signification A Man cannot make his Words the Signs either of Qualities in Things or of Conceptions in the Mind of another whereof he has none in his own Till he has some Ideas of his own he cannot suppose them to correspond with the Conceptions of another Man nor can he use any Signs for them For it would be the Signs of he knows not what which is in Truth to be the Sign of nothing But when he represents to himself other Men's Ideas by some of his own if he consent to give them the same Names that other Men do 't is still to his own Ideas to Ideas that he has and not to Ideas that he has not § 3. This is so necessary in the use of Language that in this respect the Knowing and the Ignorant the Learned and Unlearned use the Words they speak with any meaning all alike They in every Man's Mouth stand for the Ideas he has and which he would express by them A Child having taken notice of nothing in the Metal he hears called Gold but the bright shining Yellow-Colour he applies the Word Gold only to his own Idea of that Colour and nothing else and therefore calls the same Colour in a Peacock's Tail Gold Another that hath better observed adds to shining Yellow great Weight And then the Sound Gold when he uses it stands for a complex Idea of a shining Yellow and very weighty Substance Another adds to those Qualities Fusibility And then the Word Gold to him signifies a Body bright yellow fuâ—ible and very heavy Another adds Malleability Each of these uses equally the Word Gold when they have Occasion to express the Idea they have apply'd it to But it is evident that each can apply it only to his own Idea nor can he make it stand as a Sign of such a complex Idea as he has not § 4. But though Words as they are used by Men can properly and immediately signifie nothing but the Ideas that are in their Minds yet they in their Thoughts give them a secret reference to two other Things First They suppose their Words to be Marks of the Ideas in the Minds also of other Men with whom they communicate For else they should talk in vain and could not be understood if the Sounds they applied to one Idea were such as by the Hearer were apply'd to another which is to speak two Languages But in this Men stand not usually to examine whether the Idea they and he they discourse with be the same But think it enough that they use the Word as they imagine in the common Acceptation of that Language in which case they suppose that the Idea they make it a Sign of is precisely the same to which the Understanding Men of that Country apply that Name § 5. Secondly Because Men would not be thought to talk barely of their own Imaginations but of Things as really they are therefore they often suppose their Words to stand also for the Reality of Things But this relating more particularly to Substances and their Names as perhaps the former does to simple Ideas and Modes we shall speak of these two different ways of applying Words more at large when we come to treat of the Names of mixed Modes and Substances in particular Though give me leave here to say that it is a perverting the use of Words and brings unavoidable Obscurity and Confusion into their Signification whenever we make them stand for any thing but those Ideas we have in our own Minds § 6. Concerning Words also this is farther to be considered First That they being immediately the Signs of Men's Ideas and by that means the Instruments whereby Men communicate their Conceptions and express to one another those Thoughts and Imaginations they have within their own Breasts there comes by constant use to be such a Connexion between certain Sounds and the Ideas they stand for that the Names heard almost as readily excite certain Ideas as if the Objects themselves which are apt to produce them did actually affect the Senses Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible Qualities and in all Substances that frequently and familiarly occurr to us § 7. Secondly That though the proper and immediate Signification of Words are Ideas in the Mind of the Speaker yet because by familiar use from our Cradles we come to learn certain articulate Sounds very perfectly and have them readily on our Tongues and Memories but yet are not always careful to examine or settle their Significations perfectly it often happens that Men even when they would apply themselves to an attentive Consideration do set their Thoughts more on Words than Things Nay because Words are many of them learn'd before the Ideas are known for which they stand Therefore some not only Children but Men speak several Words no otherwise than Parrots do only because they have learn'd them and have been accustomed to those Sounds But so far as Words are of Use and Signification so far is there a constant connexion between the Sound and the Idea and a Designation that the one stand for the other without which Application of them they are nothing but so much insignificant Noise § 8. Words by long and familiar use as has been said come to excite in
Men certain Ideas so constantly and readily that they are apt to suppose a natural connexion between them But that they signifie only Men's peculiar Ideas and that by a perfectly arbitrary Imposition is evident in that they often fail to excite in others even that use the same Language the same Ideas we take them to be the Signs of And every Man has so inviolable a Liberty to make Words stand for what Ideas he pleases that no one hath the Power to make others have the same Ideas in their Minds that he has when they use the same Words that he does And therefore the great Augustus himself in the Possession of that Power which ruled the World acknowledged he could not make a new Latin Word which was as much as to say that he could not arbitrarily appoint what Idea any Sound should be a Sign of in the Mouths and common Language of his Subjects 'T is true common use by a tacit Consent appropriates certain Sounds to certain Ideas in all Languages which so far limits the signification of that Sound that unless a Man applies it to the same Idea he cannot speak properly And it is also true that unless a Man's Words excite the same Ideas in the Hearer which he makes them stand for in speaking he cannot speak intelligibly But whatever be the consequences of his use of any Words different either from the Publick or that Person to whom he addresses them This is certain their signification in his use of them is limited to his Ideas and they can be Signs of nothing else CHAP. III. Of General Terms § 1. ALL Things that exist being Particulars it may perhaps be thought reasonable that Words which ought to be conformed to Things should be so too I mean in their Signification but yet we find the quite contrary The far greatest part of Words that make all Lauguages are general Terms which has not been the Effect of Neglect or Chance but of Reason and Necessity § 2. First It is impossible that every particular Thing should have a distinct peculiar Name For the signification and use of Words depending on that connection which the Mind makes between its Ideas and the Sounds it uses as Signs of them it is necessary in the Application of Names to Things that the Mind should have distinct Ideas of the Things and retain also the particular Name that belongs to every one with its peculiar appropriation to that Idea But it is beyond the Power of humane Capacity to frame and retain distinct Ideas of all the particular Things we meet with every Bird and Beast Men saw every Tree and Plant that affected the Senses could not find a Place in the most capacious Understanding If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious Memory That some Generals have been able to call every Soldier in their Army by his proper Name We may easily find a Reason why Men have never attempted to give Names to each Sheep in their Flock or Crow that flies over their Heads much less to call every Leaf of Plants or Grain of Sand that came in their way by a peculiar Name § 3. Secondly If it were possible it would yet be useless because it would not serve to the chief end of Language Men would in vain heap up Names of particular Things that would not serve them to communicate their Thoughts Men learn Names and use them in Talk with others only that they may be understood which is then only done when by Use or Consent the Sound I make by the Organs of Speech excites in another Man's Mind who hears it the Idea I apply it to in mine when I speak it This cannot be done by Names apply'd to particular Things whereof I alone having the Ideas in my Mind the Names of them could not be significant or intelligible to another who was not acquainted with all those very particular Things which had fallen under my notice § 4. Thirdly But yet granting this also fecible which I think is not yet a distinct Name for every particular Thing would not be of any great use for the improvement of Knowledge which though founded in particular Things enlarges it self by general Views to which Things reduced into sorts under general Names are properly subservient These with the Names belonging to them come within some Compass and do not multiply every Moment beyond what either the Mind can contain or Use requires And therefore in these Men have for the most part stopp'd but yet not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular Things by appropriated Names where Convenience demands it And therefore in their own Species which they have most to do with and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular Persons there they make use of proper Names and distinct Individuals have distinct Denominations § 5. Besides Persons Countries also Cities Rivers Mountains and other the like Distinctions of Place have usually found peculiar Names and that for the same Reason they being such as Men have often an Occasion to mark particularly and as it were set before others in their Discourses with them And I doubt not but if we had Reason to mention particular Horses as often as we have to mention particular Men we should have proper Names for the one as familiar as for the other and Bucephalus would be a Word as much in use as Alexander And therefore we see that amongst Jockeys Horses have their proper Names to be known and distinguished by as commonly as their Servants Because amongst them there is often Occasion to mention this or that particular Horse when he is out of Sight § 6. The next thing to be considered is how general Words come to be made For since all Things that exist are only particulars how come we by general Terms or where find we those general Natures they are supposed to stand for Words become general by being made the signs of general Ideas and Ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of Time or Place or any other Ideas that may determine them to this or that particular Existence By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more Individuals than one each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract Idea is as we call it of that sort § 7. But to deduce this a little more distinctly it will not perhaps be amiss to trace our Notions and Names from their beginning and observe by what degrees we proceed and by what steps we enlarge our Ideas from our first infancy There is nothing more evident than that the Ideas of the Persons Children converse with to instance in them alone are like the Persons themselves only particular The Ideas of the Nurse and the Mother are well framed in their Minds and like Pictures of them there represent only those Individuals The Names they first give to them are confined to these Individuals and the names of Nurse and Mamma the
of Discourse and Communication Thus we see that killing a Man with a Sword or a Hatchet are looked on as no distinct Species of Action But if the Point of the Sword first enter the Body it passes for a distinct Species where it has a distinct Name as in England in whose Language it is called Stabbing But in another Country where it has not happened to be specified under a peculiar Name it passes not for a distinct Species But in the Species of corporeal Substances though it be the Mind that makes the nominal Essence yet since those Ideas which are combined in it are supposed to have an Union in Nature whether the Mind joins them or no therefore those are looked on as distinct Species without any operation of the Mind either abstracting or giving a Name to that complex Idea § 12. Conformable also to what has been said concerning the Essences of the Species of mixed Modes that they are the Creatures of the Understanding rather than the Works of Nature Conformable I say to this we find that their Names lead our Thoughts to the Mind and no farther When we speak of Iustice or Gratitude we frame to our selves no Imagination of any thing existing which we would conceive but our Thoughts terminate in the abstract Ideas of those Vertues and look not farther as they do when we speak of an Horse or Iron whose specifick Ideas we consider not as barely in the Mind but as in Things themselves which afford the original Patterns of those Ideas but in mixed Modes at least the most considerable part of them which are moral Beings we consider the original Patterns as being in the Mind and to those we refer for the distinguishing of particular Beings under Names And hence I think it is That these Essences of the Species of mixed Modes are by a more particular Name called Notions as by a peculiar Right appertaining to the Understanding § 13. This also shews us the Reason Why the complex Ideas of mixed Modes are commonly more compounded and decompounded than those of natural Substances Because they being the Workmanship of the Understanding pursuing only its own ends and the conveniency of expressing in short those Ideas it would make known to another does with great liberty unite often into one abstract Idea Things that in their Nature have no coherence and so under one Term bundle together a great variety of compounded and decompounded Ideas Thus the Name of Procession what a great mixture of independent Ideas of Persons Habits Tapers Orders Motions Sounds does it contain in that complex one which the Mind of Man has arbitrarily put together to express by that one Name Whereas the complex Ideas of the sorts of Substances are usually made up of only a small number of simple ones and in the Species of Animals those two viz. Shape and Voice commonly make the whole nominal Essence § 14. Another thing we may observe from what has been said is That the Names of mixed Modes always signifie when they have any distinct Signification the real Essences of their Species For these abstract Ideas being the Workmanship of the Mind and not referred to the real Existence of Things there is no supposition of any thing more signified by that Name but barely that complex Idea the Mind it self has formed which is all it would have express'd by it and is that on which all the properties of the Species depend and from which alone they all flow and so in these the real and nominal Essence is the same which of what Concernment it is to the certain Knowledge of general Truths we shall see hereafter § 15. This also may shew us the Reason Why for the most part the Names of mixed Modes are got before the Ideas they stand for are perfectly known Because there being no Species of these ordinarily taken notice of but what have Names and those Species or rather their Essences being abstract complex Ideas made arbitrarily by the Mind it is convenient if not necessary to know the Names before one endeavour to frame these complex Ideas unless a Man will fill his Head with a Company of abstract complex Ideas which others having no Names for he has nothing to do with but to lay by and forget again I confess that in the beginning of Languages it was necessary to have the Idea before one gave it the Name And so it is still where making a new complex Idea one also by giving it a new Name makes a new Word But this concerns not Languages made which have generally pretty well provided for Ideas which Men have frequent Occasion to have and communicate And in such I ask whether it be not the ordinary Method that Children learn the Names of mixed Modes before they have their Ideas What one of a thousand ever frames the abstract Idea of Glory or Ambition before he has heard the Names of them In simple Ideas and Substances I confess it is otherwise which being such Ideas as have a real Existence and Union in Nature the Ideas or Names are gotten one before the other as it happens What has been said here of mixed Modes is with very little difference applicable also to Relations which since every Man himself may observe I may spare my self the Pains to enlarge on Especially since what I have here said concerning Words in this Third Book will possibly be thought by some to be much more than what so slight a Subject required I allow it might be brought into a narrower Compass but I was willing to stay my Reader on an Argument that appears to me new and a little out of the way I am sure 't is one I thought not of when I began to write That by searching it to the bottom and turning it on every side some part or other might meet with every one's Thoughts and give Occasion to the most averse or negligent to reflect on a general Miscarriage which though of great consequence is little taken notice of When it is considered what a pudder is made about Essences and how much all sorts of Knowledge Discourse and Conversation are pester'd and disorder'd by the careless and confused Use and Application of Words it will perhaps be thought worth while throughly to lay it open And I shall be pardon'd if I have dwelt long on an Argument which I think therefore needs to be inculcated because the Faults Men are usually guilty of in this kind are not only the greatest hinderances of true Knowledge but are so well thought of as to pass for it Men would often see what a small pittance of Reason and Truth or possibly none at all is mixed with those huffing Opinions they are swell'd with if they would but look beyond fashionable Sounds and observe what Ideas are or are not comprehended under those words with which they are so armed at all points and with which they so confidently lay about them I shall imagine I
find the Colour of Gold we are apt to imagine all the other Qualities comprehended in our complex Idea to be there also and we commonly take these two obvious Qualities viz. Shape and Colour for so presumptive Ideas of several Species that in a good Picture we readily say this is a Lion and that a Rose this is a Gold and that a Silver Goblet only by the different Figures and Colours represented to the Eye by the Pencil § 29. But though this serves well enough for gross and confused Conceptions and unaccurate ways of Talking and Thinking yet Men are far enough from having agreed on the precise number of simple Ideas or Qualities belonging to any sort of Things signified by its name Nor is it a wonder since it requires much time pains and skill strict enquiry and long examination to find out what and how many those simple Ideas are which are constantly and inseparably united in Nature and are always to be found together in the same Subject Most Men wanting either Time Inclination or Industry enough for this even to some tolerable degree content themselves with some few obvious and outward appearances of Things thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for the common Affairs of Life And so without farther examination give them names or take up the names already in use Which though in common Conversation they pass well enough for the signs of some few obvious Qualities co-existing are yet far enough from comprehending in a setled signification a precise number of simple Ideas much less all those which are united in Nature He that shall consider after so much stir about Genus and Species and such a deal of talk of specifick Differences how few Words we have yet setled Definitions of may with Reason imagine that those Forms there hath been so much noise made about are only Chimaeras which give us no light into the specifick Natures of Things◠And he that shall consider how far the names of Substances are from having Significations wherein all who use them do agree will have reason to conclude that though the nominal Essences of Substances are all supposed to be copied from Nature◠yet they are all or most of them very imperfect Since the composition of those complex Ideas are in seveveral Men very different and therefore that these Boundaries of Species are as Men and not as Nature makes them if at least there are in Nature any such prefixed bounds 'T is true that many particular Substances are so made by Nature that they have agreement and likeness one with another and so afford a fundation of being ranked into Sorts But the sorting of Things by us or the making of determinate Species being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms I cannot see how it can be properly said that Nature sets the Boundaries of the Species of Things Or if it be so our Boundaries of Species are not exactly conformable to those in Nature For we having need of general names for present use stay not for a perfect discovery of all those Qualities which would best shew us their most material differences and agreements but we our selves divide them by certain obvious appearances into Species that we may the easier under general names communicate about them For having no other knowledge of any Substance but of the simple Ideas that are united in it and observing several particular Things to agree with others in several of those simple Ideas we make that collection our specifick Idea and give it a general name that in recording our own Thoughts and Discourse with others we may in one short word design all the Individuals that agree in that complex Idea without enumerating the simple Ideas that make it up and so not waste our Time and Breath in tedious Descriptions which we see they are fain to do who would discourse of any new sort of Things they have not yet a name for § 30. But however these Species of Substances pass well enough in ordinary Conversation it is plain enough that this complex Idea wherein they observe several Individuals to agree is by different Men made very differently by some more and others less accurately In some this complex Idea contains a greater and in others a smaller number of Qualities and so is apparently such as the Mind makes it The yellow shining colour makes Gold to Children others add Weight Malleableness and Fusibility and others yet other Qualities they find joined with that yellow Colour as constantly as its Weight or Fusibility For in all these and the like Qualities one has as good a right to be put into the complex Idea of that Substance wherein they are all join'd as another And therefore different Men leaving out or putting in several simple Ideas which others do not according to their various Examination Skill or Observation of that subject have different Essences of Gold which must therefore be of their own and not of Nature's making § 31. If the number of simple Ideas that make the nominal Essence of the lowest Species or first sorting of Individuals depend on the Mind of Man variously collecting them it is much more evident that they do so in the more comprehensive Classes which by the Masters of Logick are called Genera which are complex Ideas designedly imperfect out of which are purposely left out several of those Qualities that are to be found in the Things themselves For as the Mind to make general Ideas comprehending several particulars leaves out those of Time and Place and such other that make them incommunicable to more than one Individual so to make other yet more general Ideas that may comprehend different sorts it leaves out those Qualities that distinguish them and puts into its new Collection only such Ideas as are common to several sorts The same convenience that made Men express several parcels of yellow Matter coming from Guiny and Peru under one name sets them also upon making of one name that may comprehend both Gold and Silver and some other Bodies of different sorts which it does by the same way of leaving out those Qualities which are peculiar to each sort and retaining a complex Idea made up of those that are common to each Species to which the name Metal being annexed there is a Genus constituted the Essence whereof being that abstract Idea containing only Malleableness and Fusibility with certain degrees of Weight and Fixedness wherein Bodies of several kinds agree leaves out the Colour and other Qualities peculiar to Gold and Silver and the other sorts comprehended under the name Metal Whereby it is plain that Men follow not exactly the Patterns set them by Nature when they make their general Ideas of Substances since there is no Body to be found which has barely Malleableness and Fusibility in it without other Qualities as inseparable as those But Men in making their general Ideas seeking more the convenience of Language and quick
the Reader consider Man as he is in himself and whereby he is really distinguished from others in his internal Constitution or real Essence that is by something he knows not what looks like trifling and yet thus one must do who would speak of the supposed real Essences and Species of Things as thought to be made by Nature if it be but only to make it understood that there is no such thing signified by the general Names Substances are call'd by But because it is difficult by known familiar Names to do this give me leave to endeavour by an Example to make the different Consideration the Mind has of specifick Names and Ideas a little more clear and to shew how the complex Ideas of Modes are referr'd sometimes to Archetypes in the Minds of other intelligent Beings or which is the same to the signification annexed by others to their receive Names and sometimes to no Archetypes at all Give me leave also to shew how the Mind always refers its Ideas of Substances either to the Substances themselves or to the signification of their Names as to their Archetypes and also to make plain the Nature of Species or sorting of Things as apprehended and made use of by us and of the Essences belonging to those Species which is perhaps of more Moment to discover the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledge than we at first imagine § 43. Let us suppose Adam in the State of a grown Man with a good Understanding but in a strange Country with all Things new and unknown about him and no other Faculties to attain the Knowledge of them but what one of this Age has now He observes Lamech more melancholy than usual and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his Wife Adah whom he most ardently loved that she had too much Kindness for another Man Adam discourses these his Thoughts to Eve and desires her to take care that Adah commit not Folly And in these Discourses with Eve he makes use of these two new Words Kinneah and Niouph In time Adam's mistake appears for he finds Lamech's Trouble proceeded from having kill'd a Man But yet the two Names Kinneah and Niouph the one standing for suspicion in a Husband of his Wive's Disloyalty to him and the other for the Act of committing Disloyalty It is plain then that here were two distinct complex Ideas of mixed Modes with Names to them two distinct Species of Actions essentially different I ask wherein consist the Essences of these two distinct Species of Actions and 't is plain it consisted in a precise Combination of simple Ideas different in one from the other I ask whether the complex Idea in Adam's Mind which he call'd Kinneah were adequate or no And it is plain it was for it being a Combination of simple Ideas which he without regard to any Archetype without respect to any thing as a Pattern voluntarily put together abstracted and gave the Name Kinneah to to express in short to others by that one sound all the simple Ideas contained and united in that complex one it must necessarily follow that it was an adequate Idea His own choice having made that Combination it had all in it he intended it should and so could not but be perfect could not but be adequate it being referr'd to no other Archetype which it was supposed to represent § 44. These Words Kinneah and Niouph by degrees grâ—w into common use and then the case was somewhat altered Adam's Children had the same Faculties and thereby the same Power that he had to make what complex Ideas of mixed Modes they pleased in their own Minds to abstract them and make what Sounds they pleased the Signs of them But the use of Names being to make our Ideas within us known to others that cannot be done but when the same Sign stands for the same Idea in two who would communicate their Thoughts and Discourse together Those therefore of Adam's Children that found these two Words Kinneah and Niouph in familiar use could not take them for insignificant sounds but must needs conclude they stood for something for certain Ideas abstract Ideas they being general Names which abstract Ideas were the Essences of the Species distinguished by those Names If therefore they would use these Words as Names of Species already establish'd and agreed on they were obliged to conform the Ideas in their Minds signified by these Names to the Ideas that they stood for in other Men's Minds and to conform their Ideas to them as to their Patterns and Archetypes and then indeed their Ideas of these complex Modes were liable to be inadequate as being very apt especially those that consisted of Combinations of many simple Ideas not to be exactly conformable to the Ideas in other Men's Minds using the same Names though for this there be usually a Remedy at Hand which is to ask the meaning of any Word we understand not of him that uses it it being as impossible to know certainly what the Words Jealousie and Adultery which I think answer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 stand for in another Man's Mind with whom I would discourse about them as it was impossible in the beginning of Language to know what Kinneah and Niouph stood for in another Man's Mind without Explication they being voluntary Signs in every one § 45. Let us now also consider after the same manner the Names of Substances in their first Application One of Adam's Children roving in the Mountains lights on a glittering Substance which pleases his Eyes Home he carries it to Adam who upon Consideration of it finds it to be hard to have a bright yellow Colour and an exceeding great Weight These perhaps at first are all the Qualities he takes notice of in it and abstracting this complex Idea consisting of a Substance having that peculiar bright Yellowness and a Weight very great in proportion to its Bulk he gives it the Name Zahab to denominate and mark all Substances that have these sensible Qualities in them 'T is evident now that in this Case Adam acts quite differently from what he did before in forming those Ideas of mixed Modes to which he gave the Name Kinneah and Niouph for there he put Ideas together only by his own Imagination not taken from the Existence of any thing and to them he gave Names to denominate all Things that should happen to agree to those his abstract Ideas without considering whether any such thing did exist or no the Standard there was of his own making But in the forming his Idea of this new Substance he takes the quite contrary Course here he has a Standard made by Nature and therefore being to represent that to himself by the Idea he has of it even when it is absent he puts in no simple Idea into his complex one but what he has the Perception of from the thing it self He takes Care that his Idea be
the same precise signification since one Man's complex Idea seldom agrees with anothers and often differs from his own from that which he had yesterday or will have to morrow § 7. II. Because the Names of mixed Modes for the most part want Standards in Nature whereby Men may rectifie and adjust their significations therefore they are very various and doubtful They are assemblages of Ideas put together at the pleasure of the Mind pursuing its own ends of Discourse and suited to its own Notions whereby it designs not to copy any thing really existing but to denominate and rank Things as they come to agree with those Archetypes or Forms it has made He that first brought the word Sham Wheedle or Banter in use put together as he thought fit those Ideas he made it stand for And as it is with any new Names of Modes that are now brought into any Language so was it with the old ones when they were first made use of Names therefore that stand for Collections of Ideas which the Mind makes at pleasure must needs be of doubtful signification when such Collections are no-where to be found constantly united in Nature nor no Patterns to be shewn whereby Men may adjust themâ— what the word Murther or Sacrilege c. signifie can never be known from Things themselves There be many of the parts of those complex Ideas which are not visible in the Action it self the Intention of the Mind or the Relation of holy Things which make a part of Murther or Sacrilege have no necessary connexion with the outward and visible Action of him that commits either and the pulling the Trigger of the Gun with which the Murther is committed and is all the Action that perhaps is visible has no natural connexion with those other Ideas that make up the complex one named Murther â— They have their union and combination only from the Understanding â—hich unites them under one Name but uniting them without any Rule or Pattern it cannot be but that the signification of the Name that stands for such voluntary Collections should be often various in the Minds of different Men who have scarce any standing Rule to regulate themselves and their Notions of such arbitrary Ideas by § 8. 'T is true common Vse that is the Rule of Propriety may be supposed here to afford some aid to settle the signification of Language and it cannot be denied but that in some measure it does Common use regulates the Meaning of Words pretty well for common Conversation but no body having an Authority to establish the precise signification of Words nor determine to what Ideas any one shall annex them common Use is not sufficient to adjust them to philosophical Discourses there being scarce any Name of any very complex Idea to say nothing of others which in common Use has not a great latitude and which keeping within the bounds of Propriety may not be made the sign of far different Ideas Besides the rule and measure Propriety of it self being no where established it is often matter of dispute whether this or that way of using a Word be propriety of Speech or noâ— From all which it is evident that the Names of such kind of very complex Ideas are naturally liable to this imperfection to be of doubtful and uncertain signification and even in Men that have a Mind to understand one another do not always stand for the same Idea in Speaker and Hearer Though the names Glory and Gratitude be the same in every Man's mouth through a whole Country yet the complex collective Idea which every one thinks on or intends by that Name is apparently very different by Men using the same Language § 9. The way also wherein the Names of mixed Modes are ordinarily learned does not a little contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification For if we will observe how Children learn Languages we shall find that to make them understand what the Names of simple Ideas or Substances stand for People ordinarily shew them the thing whereof they would have them have the Idea and then repeat to them the Name that stands for it as White Sweet Milk Sugar Cat Dog But as for mixed Modes especially the most material of them moral Words the Sounds are usually learn'd first and then to know what complex Ideas they stand for they are either beholden to the explication of others or which happens for the most part are lest to their own Observation and Industry which being little laid out in the search of the true and precise meaning of Names these moral Words are in most Mens mouths little more than bare Sounds or when they have any 't is for the most part but a very obscure and confused signification And even those themselves who have with more attention setled their Notions do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience to have them stand for complex Ideas different from those which other even intelligent and studious Men make them the signs of Where shall one find any either controversial Debate or familiar Discourse concerning Honour Faith Grace Religion Church c. wherein it is not easie to observe the different Notions Men have of them which is nothing but this that they are not agreed in the signification of those Words have not the same complex Ideas they make them stand for And so all the contests that follow thereupon are only about the meaning of a Sound And hence we see that in the interpretation of Laws whether Divine or Humane there is no end Comments beget Comments and Explications make new matter for Explications And of limitting distinguishing varying the signification of these moral Words there is no end These Ideas of Mens making are by Men still having the same Power multiplied in infinitum Many a Man who was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a Text of Scripture or Clause in the Code at first reading has by consulting Commentators quite lost the sense of it and by those Elucidations given rise or increase to his Doubts and drawn obscurity upon the place I say not this that I think Commentaries needless but to shew how uncertain the Names of mixed Modes naturally are even in the mouths of thâ—se who had both the Intention and the Faculty of Speaking as clearly as Language was capable to express their Thoughts § 10. What obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the Writings of Men who have lived in remote Ages and different Countries it will be needless to take notice Since the numerous Volumes of learned Men employing their Thoughts that way are proofs more than enough to shew what Attention Study Sagacity and Reasoning is required to find out the true Meaning of ancient Authors But there being no Writings we have any great concernment to be very sollicitous about the meaning of but those that contain either Truths we are required to believe or Laws we are to obey and draw Inconveniencies on us when we mistake
part by Colour join'd with some other sensible Qualities do well enough to design the Things they would be understood to speak of And so Men usually conceive well enough the Substances meant by the Word Gold or Apple to distinguish the one from the other But in Philosophical Enquiries and Debates where general Truths are to be established and Consequences drawn from Positions laid down there the precise signification of the names of Substances will be found not only not to be well established but also very hard to be so For Example he that shall make Malleability or a certain degree of Fixedness a part of his complex Idea of Gold may make Propositions concerning Gold and draw Consequences from them that will truly and clearly follow from Gold taken in such a signification But yet such as another Man can never be forced to admit nor be convinced of their Truth who makes not Malleableness or the same degree of Fixedness part of that complex Idea that the name Gold in his use of it stands for § 16. This is a natural and almost unavoidable Imperfection in almost all the names of Substances in all Languages whatsoever which Men will easily find when once passing from confused or loose Notions they come to more strict and close Enquiries For then they will be convinced how doubtful and obscure those Words are in their Signification which in ordinary use appeared very clear and determined I was once in a Meeting of very learned and ingenious Physicians where by chance there arose a Question whether any Liquor passed through the Filaments of the Nerves the Debate having been managed a good while by variety of Arguments on both sides I who had been used to suspect that the greatest part of Disputes were more about the signification of Words than a real difference in the Conception of Things desired That before they went any farther on in this Dispute they would first examine and establish amongst them what the Word Liquor signified They at first were a little surprized at the Proposal and had they been Persons less ingenious they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or extravagant one Since there was no one there that thought not himself to understand very perfectly what the Word Liquor stood for which I think too none of the most perplexed names of Substances However they were pleased to comply with my Motion and upon Examination found that the signification of that Word was not so settled and certain as they had all imagined but that each of them made it a sign of a different complex Idea This made them perceive that the Main of their Dispute was about the signification of that Term and that they differed very little in their Opinions concerning some fluid and subtile Matter passing through the Conduits of the Nerves though it was not so easie to agree whether it was to be called Liquor or no a thing which when each considered he thought it not worth the contending about § 17. How much this is the Case of the greatest part of Disputes that Men are engaged so hotly in I shall perhaps have an occasion in another place to take notice Let us only here consider a little more exactly the fore-mentioned instance of the Word Gold and we shall see how hard it is precisely to determine its Signification Almost all agree that it should signifie a Body of a certain yellow shining Colour which being the Idea to which Children have annexed that name the shining yellow part of a Peacock's Tail is properly to them Gold Others finding Fusibility join'd with that yellow Colour in Gold think the other which contain'd nothing but the Idea of Body with that Colour not truly to represent Gold but to be an imperfect Idea of that sort of Substance And therefore the Word Gold as referr'd to that sort of Substances does of right signifie a Body of that yellow Colour which by the Fire will be reduced to Fusion and not to Ashes Another by the same Reason adds the Weight which being a Quality as straitly join'd with that Colour as its Fusibility he thinks has the same Reason to be join'd in its Idea and to be signified by its name And therefore the other made up of Body of such a Colour and Fusibility to be imperfect and so on of all the rest Wherein no one can shew a Reason why some of the inseparable Qualities that are always united in Nature should be put into the nominal Essence and others left out Or why the Word Gold signifying that sort of Body the Ring on his Finger is made of should determine that sort rather by its Colour Weight and Fusibility than by its Colour Weight and Solubility in aq regia Since the dissolving it by that Liquor is as inseparable from it as the Fusion by Fire and they are both of them nothing but the relation that Substance has to two other Bodies which have a Power to operate differently upon it For by what Right is it that Fusibility comes to be a part of the Essence signified by the Word Gold and Solubility but a property of it Or why is its Colour part of the Essence and its Malleableness but a property That which I mean is this That these being all but Properties depending on its real Constitution and nothing but Powers either active or passive in reference to other Bodies no one has Authority to determine the signification of the Word Gold as referr'd to such a Body existing in Nature more to one Collection of Ideas to be found in that Body than to another◠Whereby the signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain Since as has been said several People observe Properties in the same Substance and I think I may say no Body all And therefore we have but very imperfect descriptions of Things and Words have very uncertain Significations § 18. By what has been before said it is easie to observe that the Names of simple Ideas are of all others the least liable to Mistakes First Because the Ideas they stand for are much easier got and more clearly retain'd than those of more complex ones and therefore they are not liable to the uncertainty or inconvenience of those very compounded mixed Modes and Secondly because they are never referr'd to any other Essence but barely that Perception they immediately signifie Which reference is that which renders the signification of the names of Substances naturally so perplexed and gives occasion to so many Disputes Men that do not perversly use their Words or on purpose set themselves to cavil seldom mistake in any Language they are acquainted with the Use and Signification of the names of simple Ideas White and Sweet Yellow and Bitter carry a very obvious meaning with them which every one precisely comprehends or easily perceives he is ignorant of and seeks to be informed But what precise Collection of simple Ideas Modesty or Frugality stand for
stand for therefore to define their Names right natural History is to be enquired into and their Properties are with care and examination to be found out For it is not enough for the avoiding Inconveniences in Discourses and Arguings about natural Bodies and substantial Things to have learned from the Propriety of the Language the common but confused or very imperfect Idea to which each Word is applied and to keep them to that Idea in our use of them but we must by acquainting our selves with the History of that sort of Things rectifie and setle our complex Idea belonging to each specifick Name and in discourse with others if we find them mistake us we ought to tell what the complex Idea is that we make such a Name stand for This is the more necessary to be done by all those who search after Knowledge and philosophical Verity in that Children being taught Words whilst they have but imperfect Notions of Things apply them at random and without much thinking or framing clear distinct Ideas which Custom it being easie and serving well enough for the ordinary Affairs of Life and Conversation they are apt to continue when they are Men And so begin at the wrong end learning Words first and perfectly but make the Notions to which they apply those Words afterwards very overtly By this means it comes to pass that Men speaking the proper Language of their Country i. e. according to Grammar-Rules of that Language do yet speak very improperly of Things themselves and by their arguing one with another make but small progress in the discoveries of useful Truths and the knowledge of Things as they are to be found in themselves and not in our Imaginations and it matters not much for the improvement of our Knowledge how they are call'd § 25. It were therefore to be wished That Men versed in physical Enquiries and acquainted with the several sorts of natural Bodies would set down those simple Ideas wherein they observe the Individuals of each sort constantly to agree This would remedy a great deal of that confusion which comes from several Persons applying the same Name to a Collection of a smaller or greater number of sensible Qualities proportionably as they have been more or less acquainted with or accurate in examining the Qualities of any sort of Things which come under one denomination But a Dictionary of this sort containing as it were a Natural History requires too many hands as well as too much time cost pains and sagacity ever to be hoped for and till that be done we must content our selves with such Definitions of the Names of Substances as explain the sense Men use them in And 't would be well where there is occasion if they would afford us so much This yet is not usually done but Men talk to one another and dispute in Words whose meaning is not agreed between them out of a mistake that the signification of common Words are certainly established and the precise Ideas they stand for perfectly known and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them Both which Suppositions are false no Names of complex Ideas having so setled determined Significations that they are constantly used for the same precise Ideas Nor is it a shame for a Man not to have a certain knowledge of any thing but by the necessary ways of attaining it and so it is no discredit not to know what precise Idea any Sound stands for in another Man's Mind without he declare it to me by some other way than barely using that Sound there being no other way without such a Declaration certainly to know it Indeed the necessity of Communication by Language brings Men to an agreement in the signification of common Words within some tolerable latitude that may serve for ordinary Conversation and so a Man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the Ideas which are annexed to Words by common Use in a Language familiar to him But common Use being but a very uncertain Rule which reduces it self at last to the Ideas of particular Men proves often but a very variable Standard But though such a Dictionary as I have above mentioned will require too much time cost and pains to be hoped for in this Age yet methinks it is not unreasonable to propose that Words standing for Things which are known and distinguished by their outward shapes should be expressed by little Draughts and Prints made of them A Vocabulary made after this fashion would perhaps with more ease and in less time teach the true signification of many Terms especially in Languages of remote Countries or Ages and setle truer Ideas in Mens Minds of several Things whereof we read the Names in ancient Authors than all the large and laborious Comments of learned Criticks Naturalists that treat of Plants and Animals have found the benefit of this way And he that has had occasion to consult them will have reason to confess that he has a clearer Idea of Apium or Ibex from a little Print of that Herb or Beast than he could have from a long definition of the Names of either of them And so no doubt he would have of Strigil and Sistrum if instead of a Curry-comb and Cymbal which are the English names Dictionaries render them by he could see stamp'd in the Margin small Pictures of these Instruments as they were in use amongst the Ancients Toga Tunica Pallium are Words easily translated by Gown Coat and Cloak but we have thereby no more true Ideas of the fashion of those Habits amongst the Romans than we have of the Faces of the Taylors who made them Such Things as these which the Eye distinguishes by their shapes would be best let into the Mind by Draughts made of them and more determine the signification of such Words than any other Words set for them or made use of to define them But this only by the bye § 26. Fifthly If Men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their Words and Definitions of their Terms are not to be had yet this is the least that can be expected that in all Discourses wherein one Man pretends to instruct or convince another he should use the same Word constantly in the same sense If this were done which no body can refuse without great disingenuity many of the Books extant might be spared many of the Controversies in Dispute would be at an end several of those great Volumes swollen with ambiguous Words now used in one sense and by and by in another would shrink into a very narrow compass and many of the Philosophers to mention no others as well as Poets Works might be contained in a Nut-shell § 27. But after all Words are so scanty in respect of that infinite variety is in Mens Thoughts that Men wanting Terms to suit their precise Notions will notwithstanding their utmost caution be forced often to use the same Word in somewhat different senses And though in the
take from the five Fingers of one Hand two and from the five Fingers of the other Hand two the remaining number will be equal These and a thousand other such Propositions may be found in Numbers which at very first hearing force the assent and carry with them an equal if not greater clearness than those mathematical Axioms § 7. Fourthly As to real Existence since that has no connexion with any other of our Ideas but that of our selves and of a first Being we have in that concerning the real existence of all other Beings not so much as demonstrative much less a self-evident Knowledge And therefore concerning those there are no Maxims § 8. In the next place let us consider what influence those received Maxims have upon the other parts of our Knowledge The Rules established in the Schools that all Reasonings are ex praecognitis prac incessis seem to lay the foundation of all other Knowledge in these Maxims and to suppose them to be praecognita whereby I think is meant these two things First That these Axioms are those Truths that are first known to the Mind and secondly That upon them the other parts of our Knowledge depend § 9. First That they are not the Truths first known to the Mind is evident to Experience Who perceives not that a Child certainly knows that a Stranger is not its Mother that its Sucking-bottle is not the Rod long before he knows that 't is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be◠And how many Truths are there about Numbers which it is obvious to observe that the Mind is perfectly acquainted with and ully convinced of before it ever thought on these general Maxims to which Mathematicians in their Arguings do sometimes refer them Whereof the reason is very plain For that which makes the Mind assent to such Propositions being nothing else but the perception it has of the agreement or disagreement of its Ideas according as it finds them affirmed or denied one of another in Words it understands and every Idea being known to be what it is and every two distinct Ideas not to be same it must necessarily follow that such self-evident Truths must be first known which consist of Ideas that are first in the Mind and the Ideas first in the Mind 't is evident are those of particuliar Things from whence by slow degrees the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Sense are setled in the Mind with general Names to them Thus particular Ideas are first received and distinguished and so Knowledge got about them and next to them the less general or specifick which are next to particular For abstract Ideas are not so obvious or easie to Children or the yet unexercised Mind as particular ones If they seem so to grown Men 't is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so For when we necely reflect upon them we shall find that general Ideas are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind that carry difficulty with them and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine For example Does it not require some pains and skill to form the general Idea of a Triangle which is yet none of the most abstract comprehensive and difficult for it must be neither Oblique nor Rectangle neither Equilateral Equicrural nor Scalenon but all and none of these at once In effect it is something imperfect that cannot exist an Idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent Ideas are put together 'T is true the Mind in this imperfect state has need of such Ideas and makes all the haste to them it can for the conveniency of Communication and Enlargement of Knowledge to both which it is naturally very much enclined But yet one has reason to suspect such Ideas are marks of our Imperfection at least this is enough to shew that the most abstract and general Ideas are not those that the Mind is first and most easily acquainted with nor such as its earliest Knowledge is conversant about § 10. Secondly From what has been said it plainly follows that these magnified Maxims are not the Principles and Foundations of all our other Knowledge For if there be a great many other Truths which have as much self-evidence as they and a great many that we know before them it is impossible they should be the Principles from which we deduce all other Truths Is it impossible to know that One and Two are equal to Three but by virtue of this or some such Axiom viz. the Whole is equal to all its Parts taken together Many a one knows that One and Two are equal to Three without having heard or thought on that or any other Axiom by which it might be proved and knows it as certainly as any other Man knows that the Whole is equal to all its Parts or any other Maxim and all from the same Reason of self-evidence the Equality of those Ideas being as visible and certain to him without that or any other Axiom as with it it needing no proof to make it perceived Nor after the Knowledge That the Whole is equal to all its Parts does he know that one and two are equal to three better or more certainly than he did before For if there be any odds in those Ideas the Whole and Parts are more obscure or at least more difficult to be setled in the Mind than those of One Two and Three And indeed I think I may ask these Men who will needs have all Knowledge besides those general principles themselves to depend on general innate and self-evident Principles What Principle is requisite to prove that One and One are Two that Two and Two are Four that Three times Two are Six which being known without any proof do evince That either all Knowledge does not depend on certain Praecognita or general Maxims called Principles or else that these are Principles and if these are to be counted Principles a great part of Numeration will be so To which if we add all the self-evident Propositions may be made about all our distinct Ideas Principles will be almost infinite at least innumerable which Men arrive to the Knowledge of at different Ages and a great many of these innate Principles they never come to know all their Lives But whether they come in view of the Mind earlier or later this is true of them that they are all known by their native Evidence are wholly independent receive no Light nor are capable of any proof one from another much less the more particular from the more general or the more simple from the more compounded the more simple and less abstract being the most familiar and the easier and earlier apprehended But whichever be the clearest Ideas the Evidence and Certainty of all such Propositions is in this That a Man sees the same Idea to be the same Idea and infallibly perceives two
But if another shall come and make to himself another Idea different from Cartes of the thing which yet with Cartes he calls by the same name Body and make his Idea which he expresses by the word Body to consist of Extension and Solidity together he will as easily demonstrate that there may be a Vacuum or Space without a Body as Cartes demonstrated the contrary because the Idea to which he gives the name Space being bare Extension and the Idea to which he gives the name Body being the complex Idea of Extension and Resistibility or Solidity together these two Ideas are not exactly one and the same but in the Understanding as distinct as the Ideas of One and Two White and Black or as of Corporeity and Humanity if I may use those barbarous terms And therefore the predication of them in our Minds or in Words standing for them is not identical but the negation of them one of another as certain and evident as that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be § 14. But yet though both these Propositions as you see may be equally demonstrated viz. That there may be a Vacuum and that there cannot be a Vacuum by these two certain Principles viz. What is is and the same thing cannot be and not be yet neither of these Principles will serve to prove to us that any or what Bodies do exist for that we are leâ—t to our Senses to discover to us as far as they can Those universal and self-evident Principles being only our constant clear and distinct Knowledge of our own Ideas more general or comprehensive can assure us of nothing that passes without the Mind their certainty is founded only upon the Knowledge we have of each Idea by its self and of its distinction from others about which we cannot be mistaken whilst they are in our Minds though we may and often are mistaken when we retain the Names without the Ideas or use them confusedly sometimes for one and sometimes for another Idea In which cases the sorce of these Axioms reaching only to the Sound and not the Signfication of the Words serves only to lead us into Confusion Mistake and Errour § 15. But let them be of what use they will in verbal Propositions they cannot discover or prove to us the least Knowledge of the Nature of Substances as they are found and exist without us any farther than grounded on Experience And though the consequence of these two Propositions called Principles be very clear and their use not very dangerous or hurtful in the probation of such Things wherein there is no need at all of them for proof but such as are clear by themselves without them viz. where our Ideas are clear and distinct and known by the Names that stand for them yet when these Principles viz. What is is and It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be are made use of in the probation of Propositions wherein are Words standing for complex Ideas v. g Man Horse Gold Vertue there they are of infinite danger and most commonly make Men receive and retain Falshood for manifest Truth and Uncertainty for Demonstration upon which follows Errour Obstinacy and all the mischiefs that can happen from wrong reasoning The reason whereof is not that these Principles are less true in such Propositions consisting of Words standing for complex Ideas than in those of simple Ideas But because Men mistake generally thinking such Propositions to be about the reality of Things and not the bare signification of Words when indeed they are for the most part nothing else as is clear in the demonstration of Vacuum where the word Body sometimes stands for one Idea and sometimes for another But shall be yet made more manifest § 16. As for instance Let Man be that concerning which you would by these first Principles demonstrate any thing and we shall see that so far as demonstration is by these Principles it is only verbal and gives us no certain universal true Proposition or knowledge of any Being existing without us First a Child having framed the Idea of a Man it is probable that his Idea is just like that picture which the Painter makes of the visible appearances joined together and such a complexion of Ideas together in his Understanding makes up the single complex Idea which he calls Man whereof White or Flesh-colour in England being one the Child can demonstrate to you that a Negro is not a Man because White-colour was one of the constant simple Ideas of the complex Idea he calls Man and therefore he can demonstrate by the Principle It is impossible for the same Thing to be and not to be that a Negro is not a Man the foundation of his Certainty being not that universal Proposition which perhaps he never heard nor thought of but the clear distinct perception he hath of his own simple Ideas of Black and White which he cannot be persuaded to take nor can ever mistake one for another whether he knows that Maxim or no And to this Child or any one who hath such an Idea which he calls Man Can you never demonstrate that a Man hath a Soul because his Idea of Man includes no such Notion or Idea in it And therefore to him the Principle of What is is proves not this matter but it depends upon Collection and Observation by which he is to make his complex Idea called Man § 17. Secondly Another that hath gone farther in framing and collecting the Idea he calls Man and to the outward Shape adds Laughter and rational Discourse may demonstrate that Infants and Changelings are no Men by this Maxim It is impossible for the same Thing to be and not to be And I have discoursed with very rational Men who have actually denied that they are Men. § 18. Thirdly Perhaps another makes us the complex Idea which he calls Man only out of the Ideas of Body in general and the Powers of Language and Reason and leaves out the Shape wholly This Man is able to demonstrate that a Man may have no Hands but be Quadrupes neither of those being included in his Idea of Man and in whatever Body or Shape he found Speech and Reason join'd that was a Man because having a clear knowledge of such a complex Idea it is certain that What is is § 19. So that if rightly considered I think we may say that where our Ideas are clear and distinct and the Names agreed on that shall stand for each clear and distinct Idea there is little need or no use at all of these Maxims to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them He that cannot discern the Truth or Falshood of such Propositions without the help of these and the like Maxims will not be helped by these Maxims to do it since he cannot be supposed to know the Truth of these Maxims themselves without proof if he cannot know
naturally imprinted by Him answered 13 16. Ideas of GOD various in different Men. 17. If the Idea of GOD be not innate no other can be supposed innate 18. Idea of Substance not innate 19. No Propositions can be innate since Ideas are innate 20. Principles not innate because of little use or little certainty 21. Difference of Men's Discoveries depends upon the different application of their Faculties 22. Men must think and know for themselves 23. Whence the Opinion of innate Principles 24. Conclusion BOOK II. CHAP. I. Of Ideas in general SECT 1. Idea is the Object of Thinking 2. All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflexion 3. The Objects of Sensation one Sourse of Ideas 4. The Operations of our Minds about sensible Ideas the other Sourse of them 5. All our Ideas are of the one or the other of these 6. Observable in Children 7. Men are differently furnished with these according to the different Objects they converse with 8. Ideas of Reflexion had later because they need Attention 9. The Soul begins to have Ideas when it begins to perceive 10. The Soul thinks not always for First it wants Proofs 11. Secondly It is not always conscious of it 12. Thirdly If a sleeping Man thinks without knowing it the sleeping and waking Man are two persons 13. Fourthly Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming that they think 14. Fifthly That Men dream without remembring it in vain urged 15. Sixthly Vpon their Hypothesis the Thoughts of a sleeping Man ought to be most rational 16. Seventhly On this Hypothesis the Soul must have Ideas not derived from Sensation or Reflexion of of which there is no appearance 17. Eightly If I think when I know it not no body else can know it 18. Ninthly How knows any one that the Soul always thinks For if it be not a self-evident Proposition it needs proof 19. Tenthly That a Man shoulâ— be busie in thinking and yet not retain it the next moment very improbable 20 24. No Ideas but from Sensation or Reflexion evident if we observe Children 25. In the reception of simple Ideas the Vnderstanding is most of all passive CHAP. II. Of simple Ideas SECT 1. Vncompounded Appearances 2 3. The Mind can neither make nor destroy them CHAP. III. Of Ideas of one Sense SECT 1. As Colours of Seeing Sounds of Hearing 2. Few simple Ideas have Names CHAP. IV. Of Solidity SECT 1. We receive this Idea from touch 2. Solidity fills Space 3. Distinct from Space 4. From Hardness 5. On Solidity depends Impulse Resistence and Protrusion 6. What it is CHAP. V. Of simple Ideas by more than one Sense CHAP. VI. Of simple Ideas of Reflexion SECT 1. Are the Operations of the Mind about its other Ideas 2. The Idea of Perception and Idea of Willing we have from Reflexion CHAP. VII Of Simple Ideas both of Sensation and Reflexion SECT 1 6. Pleasure and Pain 7. Existence and Vnity 8. Power 9. Succession 10. Simple Ideas the Materials of all our Knowledge CHAP VIII Other Considerations concerning simple Ideas SECT 1 6. Positive Ideas from privative Causes 7 8. Ideas in the Mind Qualities in Bodies 9 10. Primary and Secondary Qualities 11 12. How primary Qualities produce their Ideas 13 14. How Secondary 15 23. Ideas of primary Qualities are resemblances of secondary not 24 25. Reason of our mistake in this 26. Secondary Qualities two-fold First Immediately perceivable Secondly Mediately perceivable CHAP. IX Of Perception SECT 1. It is the first simple Idea of Reflexion 2 4. Perception is only when the Mind receives the Impression 5 6. Children though they have Ideas in the Womb have none innate 7. Which Ideas first is not evident 8 10. Ideas of Sensation often changed by the Iudgment 11 14. Perception puts the difference between Animals and inferior Beings 15. Perception the inlet of Knowledge CHAP. X. Of Retention SECT 1. Contemplation 2. Memory 3. Attention Repetition Pleasure and Pain fix Ideas 4 5. Ideas fade in the Memory 6. Constantly repeated Ideas can scarce be lost 7. In remembring the Mind is often active 8. Two defects in the Memory Oblivion and Slowness 9. Brutes have Memory CHAP. XI Of Discerning c. SECT 1. No Knowledge without it 2. The difference of Wit and Iudgment 4. Clearness alone hinders Confusion 4. Comparing 5. Brutes compare but imperfectly 6. Compounding 7. Brutes compound but little 8. Naming 9. Abstraction 10 11. Brutes abstract not 12 13. Idiots and mad Men. 14. Method 15. These are the beginnings of humane Knowledge 16. Appeal to Experience 17. Dark room CHAP. XII Of Complex Ideas SECT 1. Made by the Mind out of simple ones 2. Made voluntarily 3. Are either Modes Substances or Relations 4. Modes 5. Simple and mixed Modes 6. Substances Single or Collective 7. Relation 8. The abstrusest Ideas from the two Sources CHAP. XIII Of Space and its simple Modes SECT 1. Simple Modes 2. Idea of Space 3. Space and Extension 4. Immensity 5 6. Figure 7 10. Placeâ— 11 14. Extension and Body not the same 15 17. Substance which we know not no proof against Space without Body 18 19. Substance and Accidents of little use in Philosophy 20. A Vacâ—um beyond the utmost bounds of Body 21. The power of annihilation proves a Vacuum 22. Motion proves a Vacuum 23. The Ideas of Space and Body distinct 24 25. Extension being inseparable from Body proves it not the same 26. Ideas of Space and Solidity distinct 27. Men differ little in clear simple Ideas CHAP. XIV Of Duration SECT 1. Duration is fleeting Extension 2 4. It s Idea from Reflexion on the train of our Ideas 5. The Idea of Duration applicable to Things whilst we sleep 6 8. The Idea of Succession not from Motion 9 11. The train of Ideas has a certain degree of quickness 12. This train the measure of other Successions 13 15. The Mind cannot fix long on one invariable Idea 16. Ideas however made include no sense of Motion 17. Time is Duration set out by Measures 18. A good measure of Time must divide its whole Duration into equal periods 19. The Revolutions of the Sun and Moon the properest Measures of Time 20. But not by their motion but periodical appearances 21. No two parts of Duration can be certainly known to be equal 22. Time not the measure of Motion 23. Minutes Hours and Tears not necessary measures of Duration 24. The measure of Time two ways applied 25 27. Our measure of Time applicable to Duration before Time 28 31. Eternity CHAP. XV. Of Duration and Expansion considered together SECT 1. Both capable of greater and less 2. Expansion not bounded by Matter 3. Nor Duration by Motion 4. Why Men more easily admit infinite Duration than infinite Expansion 5. Time to Duration is as Place to Expansion 6. Time and Place are taken for so much of either as are set out by the Existence and Motion of Body 7. Sometimes for so much of either as we design by measures
taken from the bulk or motion of Bodies 8. They belong to all Beingsâ— 9. All the parts of Extension are Extension and all the parts of Duration are Duration 10. Their parts inseparable 11. Duration is as a Line Expansion as a Solid 12. Duration has never two parts together Expansion altogether CHAP. XVI Of Number SECT 1. Number the simplest and most universal Idea 2. It s Modes made by Addition 3. Each Mode distinct 4. Therefore Demonstrations in Numbers the most precise 5 6. Names necessary to Numbers 7. Why Children number not earlier 8. Number measures all Measurables CHAP. XVII Of Infinity SECT 1. Infinity in its original intention attributed to Space Duration and Number 2 3. How we come by the Idea of Infinity 4. Our Idea of Space boundless 5. And so of Duration 6. Why other Ideas are not capable of Infinity 7. Difference between infinity of Space and Space infinite 8. We have no Idea of infinite Space 9. Number affords us the clearest Idea of Infinity 10 11. Our different conception of the Infinity of Number Duration and Expansion 12. Infinite Divisibility 13 14 17 18. No positive Idea of Infinite 15 16 19. What is positive what negative in our Idea of Infinite 20. Some think they have a positive Idea of Eternity and not Space 21. Supposed positive Ideas of Infinity cause of Mistakes 22. All these Ideas from Sensation and Reflexion CHAP. XVIII Of other simple Modes SECT 1 2. Modes of Motion 3. Modes of Sounds 5. Modes of Tastes 7. Modes of Colours 8. Why some Modes have and others have not Names CHAP. XIX Of the Modes of Thinking SECT 1 2. Sensation Remembrance Contemplation c. 3. The various attention of the Mind in Thinking 4. Hence probable that Thinking is the Action not Essence of the Soul CHAP. XX. Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain SECT 1. Pleasure and Pain simple Ideas 2. Good and Evil what 3. Our Passions moved by Good and Evil. 4. Love 5. Hatred 6. Desire 7. Ioy. 8. Sorrow 9. Hope 10. Fear 11. Despair 12. Anger 13. Envy 14. What Passions all Men have 15 16. Pleasure and Pain what 17. Shame 18. These instances to shew how our Ideas of the Passions are got from Sensation and Reflexion CHâ—P XXI Of Power SECT 1. This Idea how got 2. Power active and passive 3. Power includes Relation 4. The clearest Idea of active Power had from Spirit 5. Will and Vnderstanding two Powers 6. Faculties 7. Whence the Ideas of Liberty and Necessity 8 12. Liberty what 9. Supposes the Vnderstanding and Will 10. Belongs not to Volition 11. Voluntary opposed to involuntary not to Necessary 13. Necessity what 14 20. Liberty belong not to the Will 21. But to the Agent or Man 22 24. In respect of willing a Man is not free 25 28. The Will determined by something without it 29. The greater apparent Good determines the Will 30 32. This is a Perfection of humane Nature 33. And takes not away Liberty 34 35. Why Men chuse differently 36. Why they chuse amiss 38. From the different appearance of Good 39. And judging amiss on these Appearances 40 42. First in comparing present and future 43. Secondly In thinking wrong of the greatness or certainty of the Consequence of any Action 44. Causes of wrong Iudgment Ignorance Inadvertency Sloth Passion Fashion c. 45. Preference of Vice to Vertue a manifest wrong Iudgment 47. Recapitulation CHAP. XXII Of Mixed Modes SECT 1. Mixed Modes what 2. Made by the Mind 3. Sometimes got by the Explication of their Names 4. The Name ties the Parts of the mixed Modes into one Idea 5. The Cause of making mixed Modes 6. Why Words in one Language have none answering in another 7. And Languages change 8. Mixed Modes where they exist 9. How we get the Ideas of mixed Modes 10. Motion Thinking and Power have been most modified 11. Several Words seeming to signifie Action signifie but the Effect 12. Mixed Modes made also of other Ideas CHAP. XXIII Of the Complex Ideas of Substances SECT 1. Ideas of Substances how made 2. Our Idea of Substance in general 3 6. Of the sorts of Substances 4. No clear Idea of Substance in general 5. As clear an Idea of Spirit as Body 7. Powers a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances 8. And why 9. Three sorts of Ideas make our complex ones of Sustances 10 11. The now secondary Qualities of Bodies would disappear if we could discover the primary ones of their minute Parts 12. Our Faculties of Discovery suited to our State 13. Conjecture about Spirits 14. Complex Ideas of Substances 15. Idea of spiritual Substances as clear as of bodily Substances 16. No Idea of abstract Substance 17. The Cohesion of solid Parts and impulse the primary Ideas of Body 18. Thinking and Motivity the primary Ideas of Spirit 19 21. Spirits capable of Motion 22. Idea of Soul and Body compared 23 27. Cohesion of solid Parts in Body as hard to be conceived as Thinking in a Soul 28 29. Commâ—nication of Motion by Impulse or by Thought equally intelligible 30. Ideas of Body and Spirit compared 31. The Notion of Spirit involves no more difficulty in it than that of Body 32. We know nothing beyond our simple Ideas 33 35. Idea of God 36. No Ideas in our Complex one of Spirits but those got from Sensation or Reflexion 37. Recapitulation CHAP. XXIV Of Collective Ideas of Substances SECT 1. One Idea 2. Made by the Power of composing in the Mind 3. All artificial Things are collective Ideas CHAP. XXV Of Relation SECT 1. Relation what 2. Relations without correlative Terms not easily perceived 3. Some seemingly absolute Terms contain Relations 4. Relation different from the Things related 5. Change of Relation may be without any Change in the Subject 6. Relation only betwixt two Things 7. All Things capable of Relation 8. The Ideas of Relations clearer often than of the Subjects related 9. Relations all terminate in simple Ideas 10. Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated are Relative 11. Conclusion CHAP. XXVI Of Cause of Effect and other Relations SECT 1. Whence their Ideas got 2. Creation Generation making Alteration 3 4. Relations of Time 5. Relations of Place and Extension 6. Absolute Terms often stand for Relations CHAP. XXVII Of other Relations SECT 1. Proportional 2. Natural 3. Instituted 4. Moral 5. Moral Good and Evil. 6. Moral Rules 7. Laws 8. Divine Law the measure of Sin and Duty 9. Civil Law the measure of Crimes and Innocence 10 11. Philosophical Law the measure of Vertue and Vice 12. Its Inforcements Commendation and Discredit 13. These three Laws the Rules of moral Good and Evil. 14 15. Morality is the Relation of Actions to these Rules 16. The denominations of Actions often mislead us 17. Relations innumerable 18. All Relations terminate in simple Ideas 19. We have ordinary as clear or clearer Notion of the Relation as of its Foundation 20. The Notion of
Child uses determine themselves to those Persons Afterwards when time and a larger acquaintance has made them observe that there are a great many other Things in the World that in some common agreements of Shape and several other Qualities resemble their Father and Mother and those Persons they have been used to they frame an Idea which they find those many Particulars do partake in and to that they give with others the name Man for example And thus they come to have a general Name and a general Idea Wherein they make nothing new but only leave out of the complex Idea they had of Pete◠and Iames Mary and Iane that which is peculiar to each and retain only what is common to them all § 8. By the same way that they come by the general Name and Idea of Man they easily advance to more general Names and Notions For observing that several Things that differ from their Idea of Man and cannot therefore be comprehended under that Name have yet certain Qualities wherein they agree with Man by retaining only those Qualities and uniting them into one Idea they have again another and a more general Idea to which having given a Name they make a term of a more comprehensive extension Which new Idea is made not by any new addition but only as before by leaving out the shape and some other Properties signified by the name Man and retaining only a Body with Life Sense and spontaneous Motion comprehended under the name Animal § 9. That this is the way whereby Men first formed general Ideas and general Names to them I think is so evident that there needs no other proof of it but the considering of a Man's self or others and the ordinary proceedings of their Minds in Knowledge And he that thinks general Natures or Notions are any thing else but such abstract and partial Ideas of more complex ones taken at first from particular Existences will I fear be at a loss where to find them For let any one reflect wherein does his Idea of a Man differ from that of Peter and Paul or his Idea of an Horse from that of Bucephalus but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each Individual and retaining so much of those particular complex Ideas of several particular Existences as they are found to agree in Of the complex Ideas signified by the names Man and Horse leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ and retaining only those wherein they agree and of those making a new distinct complex Idea and giving the name Animal to it one has a more general term that comprehends with Man several other Creatures Leave out the Idea of Animal Sense and spontaneous Motion and the remaining complex Idea made up of the remaining simple ones of Body Life and Nourishment becomes a more general one under the more comprehensive term Vivens And not to dwell longer upon this particular so evident in it self by the same way the Mind proceeds to Body Substance and at last to Being Thing and such universal terms which stand for any of our Ideas whatsoever To conclude this whole mystery of Genera and Species which make such a noise in the Schools and are with Justice so little regarded out of them is nothing else but abstract Ideas more or less comprehensive with Names annexed to them In all which this is constant and unvariable That every more general term stands for such an Idea as is but a part of any of those contained under it § 10. This may shew us the reason why in the defining of Words which is nothing but declaring their signification we make use of the Genus or next general Word that comprehends it Which is not out of necessity but only to save the labour of enumerating the several simple Ideas which the next general Word or Genus stands for or perhaps sometimes the shame of not being able to do it But though defining by Genus and Differentia I crave leave to use these terms of Art though originally Latin since they most properly suit those Notions they are applied to I say though defining by the Genus be the shortest way yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the best This I am sure it is not the only and so not absolutely necessary For Definition being nothing but making another understand by Words what Idea the term defined◠stands for a definition is best made by enumerating those simple Ideas that are combined in the signification of the term Defined and if instead of such an enumeration Men have accustomed themselves to use the next general term it has not been out of necessity or for greater clearness but for quickness and dispatch sake For I think that to one who desired to know what Idea the word Man stood for if it should be said that a Man was a solid extended Substance having Life Sense spontaneous Motion and the Faculty of Reasoning I doubt not but the meaning of the term Man would be as well understood and the Idea it stands for be at least as clearly made known as when it is defined to be a rational Animal which by the several definitions of Animal Vivens and Corpus resolves it self into those enumerated Ideas I have in explaining the term Man followed here the ordinary Definition of the Schools which though perhaps not the most exact yet serves well enough to my present purpose And one may in this instance see what gave occasion to that Rule that a Definition must consist of its Genus and Differentia and it suffices to shew us the little necessity there is of such a Rule or advantage in the strict observing of it For Definitions as has been said being only the explaining of one Word by several others so that the meaning or Idea it stands for may be certainly known Languages are not always so made according to the Rules of Logick that every term can have its signification exactly and clearly expressed by two others Experience sufficiently satisfies us to the contrary or else those who have made this Rule have done ill that they have given us so few Definitions conformable to it But of Definitions more in the next Chapter § 11. To return to general Words it is plain by what has been said That General and Vniversal belong not to the real existence of Things but are the Inventions and Creatures of the Vnderstanding made by it for its own use and concern only Signs whether Words or Ideas Words are general as has been said when used for signs of general Ideas and so are applicable indifferently to many particular Things And Ideas are general when they are set up as the Representatives of many particular Things but Universality belongs not to Things themselves which are all of them particular in their Existence even those Words and Ideas which in their signification are general When therefore we quit Particulars the Generals that rest are only