I may not pray for him except conditionally but against him as an enemy of Christ's so I may also lawfully resist him with violence 6. It is cleare from other perfsons or things against whom or which I may lawfully pray as inward or outward Enemics forraigne or domestick be they inferiour or superiour against these I may use resistence in my ovvne sinlesse defence 7. The lavves of the land make the one treasonable as vvel as the other and that deservedly vvhen the Prince is doing his duty but vvhen he turneth Tyrant neither can justly be condemned 8. We have seen the one practiced in Scripture and other Histories as vvell as the other 24. If it be lavvful for meer privat persons to refuse obedience unto the unjust and iniquous commands of Princes Then it is also lavvfull for them to resist the unjust and illegal Tyranny of such But the former is undengable Therefore so is the latter The connexion is cleare For 1. Subjection is no more expresly pressed in Scripture then is obedience to Superiours Therefore if not withstanding of this command non-obedience be allowed yea and necessary vvhy not also non-subjection or resistence 2. The lavv of God doth not presse this as more absolute and unlimited then the other 3. Non-obedience to the povver commanding just things is a resisting of the ordinance of God as well as non-subjection thereunto if notwithstanding hereof non-obedience to unjust commands be allowed why also shall not non-subjection to tyranny be allowed 4. The one doth no more derogate from the lawful authority of the Soveraigne then the other 5. The one is no more a wronging of the Minister of God as such then the other because he is no more the Minister and vicegerent of God in acts of Tyranny then in commanding unjust things And therefore 6. such as resist unjust violence can no more procure to themselves damnation then the such as disobey unjust commands CAP. XIII The Surveyer's grounds taken from Scripture for absolute Submission to Suffering examined HAving thus proved the lawfulnesse of private persones resisting in cases of necessity the unjust violence of Superiour powers by many arguments and having vindicated the same from what this Surveyer had to say against them We come now to examine his grounds for the contrary assertion Out of Scripture he adduceth Three grounds Pag. 28. c. The first is taken from the duty of Children toward Paents unjustly afflicting them Heb. 12 ver 9 10. where their reverend subjection under unreasonable and unjust dealing is commended and from the duty of Servants to suffer at the hands of unjust and froward Masters 1 Pet. 2 18 19 20. To which we answere 1. That these examples are so far from making against us that they fully comfirme our poynt as we have shewed above For notwithstanding of what is said in these places he cannot deny but Parents may be resisted by their Children in several cases and Masters by their Servants It would be strange if he should presse this subjection so close home that now no Servant might lawfully resist and withstand the fury of his Master nor no Childe might hold his furious Father's hands and defend himself against his unjust acts of cruelty And Althusius Pol. c. 38. n. 88 89. tels us that in several cases the father lòseth the right of his fatherly power over Children masters power from the law Tit. lust quib mod jus Pat. Pot. amit § Domin lust de his qui sunt sui vel alieni juris l. 5. § sivel Par. de agant vel alend. lib. L. necfilium Cap. de Patr. potcst L. 2. L. 3. Cap. de Inf. expos Novel 115. Cap. 3. 2. If these simititudes be hardly pressed it shall not now be lawful for Subjects to resist so much as by flying for the reverence and subjection required of Children unto their parents will not suffer that to evite every smal injurie from their parents they should ran away from under their power and subjection nor might servants in those dayes run away from their Masters who had another dominion over them then Masters now have over their Servants who are free to goe off when they will himself acknowledgeth this Pag. 31. 3. We have shewed above what a vast difference there is betwixt the power of Parents over their Children and the power of Magistrates over their Subjects And he himself doth confesse there is a difference yet sayes he Pag. 29. There is a full parity and agreement in this that in the inflicting of evils upon these who are under them such as are competent to them to inflict within their sphaere a patient reverent subjection is due from their inferiours even when they abuse their power Ans This is the question if the parity hold even here in all poynts for seing these Relations are different one from another even in their nature and ground it is but rational to think that there must also be some difference betwixt them as to the consequent or result that floweth from that relation else it would follow that as Children are so Subject as that they can never but be subject to their Parents so Subjects could never be free of their Superiours and yet himself tells us that they may by going under another government or removing to other dominions 2. Who shall be judge whether the Superior keepeth within his spaere yea or not If the Superiour then there is no remedy at all for when he doth most exceed his bounds he may judge that he keepeth within bounds and so whether he keep within his sphaere or not there must no resistence be used but a stupide subjection 3. Whether may the Superiour be resisted by the inferiour when he doth what is not incumbent to him to do within his sphaere or not If he may not then why is this parenthesis added As a restriction or limitation of the Subjection required If he may be resisted when he really goeth without his sphaere then this makes for us for he must grant that the Magistrate doth nor prescribe the limites of his owne povver but God and nature and the constitution of the Realme Novv God hath never put it in the povver of Princes to presse their subjects to perjury or to a complyance with a sinful abhominable and abjured course so that vvhn he doth thus he goeth beyond his sphaere His sphaere is to rule for God and the good of the land and not to destroy the interest of Christ and the Commongood and if he may be resisted vvhen he goeth beyond this sphaere then vve have all vve aske It vvas never vvithin his sphaere to break his compact vvith his People and vvhen he doth so he is vvithout his sphaere and may be resisted and this is also for us Againe he tells us in the 2 place That though Kings are not fathers by generation yet as Kings and Magistrats should have fatherly hearts to their subjects they being a sort of official fathers
the Magistrate abuse his power not in some particulars only but in many and in many maine particulars if not in all Having thus cleared and vindicated the 6. thing The 7. And last is this which followeth also from the former viz. That when the Prince doth violate his compact as to all its conditions or as to it 's cheef maine and most necessary condition the Subjects are de Iure free from subjection to him and at liberty to make choise of another The very nature of a compact doth clear this For it is absurd to say that in a mutual conditional compact one party shall still be bound to performe his conditions though the other performeth none of his conditions or performeth not the maine and principal one It is absurd to say that when one hath given a benefite upon a certaine condition that he is still bound to bestow that benefite though the condition on which he promised it be no way performed Were it the rational act of rational creatures to set up Soveraignes upon these tearmes or to say wee choose thee to be our Soveraigne upon condition thou rule us according to justice and equity and not tyrannize over us and yet we shall always hold thee for our Prince and lawful Soveraigne Though thou should transgresse all lawes of equity humanity and reason and deal with us as so many sheep kill whom thou will for thy sport and lust c. will any body think that rational men would do so The law tells us L. si fund c. de pactis c. That cessante causâ propter quam res est data pignus debet reddi Before we come to draw our arguments from what is said we shall first roll out of our way what this Surveyer speaks further against these Covenants Pag. 88 89 90 91 92 93. He hath five particulars which he toucheth on The first is this It is easily conceded sayes he that there is a mutual obligation betwixt Magistrats and Subjects to mutual dutyes which is indeed essential to the constitution of the politike body but his obligation ariseth not from any tacite or expresse Covenant betwixt them but from the ordinance and will of God enjoyning them these dutyes in these relations in that society wherein they are combined Answ 1. Subordinata non pugnant This mutual obligation may arise both from the Law of God and from the Covenant without any repugnancy 2. If this obligation arise only from the Law of God neither partyes shall be formally obliged unto other but both obliged only unto God and yet we heard himself say Pag. 100. that Where a Covenant is made betwixt a King and a People that the Covenant on the King's part binds him not only unto God in relation to the People as the object of the duty but doth bind him to the People formally Now whence ariseth this formal obligation if not from the Covenant 3. By this meanes the obligations of fidelity in the subjects unto their Princes have no rise from their oath of allegiance which he elsewhere calleth Foedus unilaterum 4. To what purpose then are Covenants and compacts made If by vertue of these each party be not formally obliged unto other For if David's Covenant with the People of Israel laid no obligation upon him he could not be said to have made a Covenant with them more then with the Phalistimes and yet the Scripture tells us he made a Covenant with Israel And King Ioash made a Covenant with the People 5. I do not well understand how an obligation to future dutyes can be called essential to a constitution which neither floweth from the constitution nor giveth a being to the constitution 6. Againe if there be no obligation unto these mutual dutyes until there be a constitution by compact and if then the obligation be essential how is it imaginable that the obligation shall have no subordinat rise from the constitution or compact whereupon the constitution is founded The 2. thing he sayeth is That though this obligation be mutual yet is it not conditional and how proves he this There is sayes he a mutual obligation to mutual dutyes betwixt Parents and Children but it is not conditional that if Parents be undutiful Children shall be loosed from their duty or on the contrary So is it sayes he betwixt King and People and the citeth Calvin Inst. Lib. 4. Cap. 20. § 29. But it is easily answered That there is a vast disparity betwixt the rise of that relation which is betwixt King and People and that which is betwixt Father and Son And this being once discovered the parity disappeareth And 1. Subjects come not out of the loyns of their King as Children do out of the loines of their Fathers 2. The Son createth not the Father as the Subjects create the King 3. Yea Children do not so much as give their consent that such an one shall be their Father before the relation have being yet Royalists will grant this much unto the People in relation to their King 4. The relation betwixt Father and Son hath no dependence less or more upon any act of will in the Son or upon any Covenants Agriements or Compact expresse or tacite betwixt the Father the Son it is not so as to the relation betwixt King and People for before this mutual relation arise there must be a constitution and this constitution includeth at least some act of the will in subjects some previous consent 5. This relation can never cease so long as both are in life but the other may by a Subject's chooseing to live under another Soveraigne 6. Let the Father do what he wil the relation betwixt him and his Son shall never be loosed or weakened But the greatest Royalists will grant that in some cases the King may be made no King and his relation either wholly taken away or much diminished So then the consequence is null that because Children are not bound to their Parents conditionally therefore Subjects are bound conditionally to there Prince For Children have no hand in making up that relation betwixt Parents and them their consent is not so much as required but in making up the relation betwixt King and Subjects there is a previous compact required in which compact the People have their great share Children give not paternity unto their Parents but Subjects give the Kingship at least instrumentally under God and they set up Kings when they might set up Nobles and set up his Man when they might have set up Another can Children do so How then shall the case be alike And the one be no more conditional then the other Next as for Calvin we willingly with him grant that Subjects are to obey evill Magistrates and to do their duty to them though the Magistrates should come short of theirs as Wives Children are bound to love and be Subject unto undutiful Husbands and Fathers But Calvin will not say that in no case a
to them to procure their good and defend them from evil so subjects ought to have such hearts to their King as Children have to their fathers giving them speical reverence subjection and obedience from their very soul and inward affection Answ All this sayes that as Kings are metaphorical Fathers so Subjects are metaphorical Children But as it doth not say that Kings should become Tyrants not carry fatherly affection tovvards their Subjects so it doth not say that Subejcts may not resist their tyrannical rage and fury vvherein they acte not as fathers but as Tygers 2. It is true special reverence subjection obedience is due to Magistrats but alvvayes in the Lord The relation is mutual if they carry not as official fathers seeking the good of the subjects and defending them but as devouring Lyons seeking the destruction of their Subjects both in soul and body they cannot expect according to vvhat he sayeth that hearty subjection and obedience vvhich othervvise they might have 3. Being but official fathers appoynted by the subjects and set over them by their vvill and consent they must have lesse povver to vvronge the Subjects then Parents have to vvronge their Children vvho have not that relation by vertue of any formal compact with or consent of their Children So that when they do injuries Subjects are in a greater capacity to help themselves then Children are vvhen their Parents to injure them He addeth Although some times they are not such as they ought to be yet they ought to account their persons sealed with Gods ordinance and the image of of his Soveraignity sacred and inviolable resolving to suffer any thing of them rather then be guilty of parricide although under the colour of self defence Gods law in the fift command hath injoyned reverence subjection to Princes under the title of Parents Calv. Iustit Lib. 4. Cap. 8. c. Answ We are not speaking of doing violence unto the persons of Soveraignes or of committing parricide but only of the matter of resistance and of natural sinlesse selfe defence vvhich is far different from Killing of Kings If he think the one of the same nature vvith the other he vvrongeth the King's life more then he is avvare of Though Children as Children may not Kill their parents yet they may defend themselves from their unjust violence 2. We grant Kings are comprehended in the fift commandement under the title of parents as Calvin doth and not only Kings but all Superiours yet he will not say I suppose that we are not to resist the unjust violence of any superiour but that they are all so sacred and inviolable as that in all things they must be subjected unto without the least resistence and therefore what he addeth is not to the poynt 4. We have shewed above that there is a vaste disparity betvvixt Masters and Kings in reference to their slaves and subjects He himself acknovvledgeth this Pag. 31. Yet sayes he though there be these differences betwixt the dominative or masterly and the Royal or Magistratical power the inferiours subjection in suffering even wrongfully if God permit in his providence the power to be abused is no lesse under the one power then under the other by vertue of Divine Law Subjects serve the Soveraigne though they be not slaves and not only conquered people are called Servants 2 Sam. 8 v. 14. but also ordinary subjects 2 Sam. 11 V. 24. 1 King 12 V. 4. Though he also be in a sense their servant not in relation of an inferiour to a superiour for so the Magistrate is only the Minister of God for the Peoples good and never called their Minister but in relation of the meanes to the end as Angles are ministring spirits for the heires of salvation and Ministers are Servants to the People c. Answ That the subjection is alike in both these relations can with no colour of reason be asserted for it is absurd to say that Subjects who set up the Magistrate who limite his power who binde him by Covenants and designe their owne good in setting him up do it in a voluntary way are the same way subject to their Princes as slaves who are as other goods for the profite of the Master are both in bodyes goods otherwise subject unto their Masters and that in a manner against their will either being sold or redeeming their life in war by giving themselves up as slaves 2. As there are various Kindes of Superiours so the relation varyeth and is more or lesse closse and efficacious and the subjection must accordingly vary I am not alike subjected to every one that is over me as I am subjected to my Soveraigne nor am I so subjected to him as to my natural parents or as a wife is to her husband 3. Though the Subejcts in some sense call themselves servants to the soveraigne which yet is often a tearme of civil respect for Naaman called himself Elisha's servant 2 King 5 15. and Obadiah said the like to Elijah 1 King 18 9. yet if they be not slaves they must have more allowance then slaves have and so have more povver to resist unjust violence then they had 4. If the Magistrate be the peoples servant in relation of the meanes to the end then the relation betvvixt him and his Subejcts is not such a relation as is betvvixt Parents and Children or betwixt Masters and Slaves for the end of these relations is not the good of Children and slaves And next Subejcts must have more power allowed them to see to the end which is their owne good and to see that the means prove not destructive of the end and if the meanes prove no meanes the relation falleth and he is no more a servant seeking their good but a Tyrant seeking his owne 5. It is sooner said then proved that the People who set up the King are not superiour to the King He should have aswered Lex Rex as to this but it is like he thinketh that his saying thus is more firme and irrefragable then Lex Rex reasonings to the contrary But I know not who will think so with him 6. There is a great difference betwixt Angels serving the saints or rather serving God that way and the King serving his People The saints have no hand in setting up angels to protect them as People have in setting up Magistrates 7. If they be servants as ministers are then though in regard of their official power they should not be subject to the People yet they may be resisted as was shevved above and this is all vve presse for 5. There is a great difference betwixt suffering of Buffettings and correction and such like petty private personal injuries at the hands of Parents or Masters and the suffering of losse of Liberties Life Lands Religion and such like which tend to the ruine of the Commonwealth To this our Surveyer replyeth two things Pag. 32. as 1. The grounds that such men
without wronging of justice But we averre that it vvas the duty of privat persones to hinder so far as lay in their power the shedding of innocent blood the oppressing of the innocent and wronging the vvidow and fatherlesse If a Magistrate in a rage run upon an innocent person going by to kill him It is the part of any private person that is next to hinder the Magistrate from committing manifest murther without breach of justice order or the extent of his calling Bacause in that case he is not acting the part of a judge So a judge perverting judgment and manifestly oppressing the innocent is no judge authorized of God for that but a privat person and may as justly be withheld from murthering or oppressing as any other Man 2. They might presse them to relieve the oppressed though they did not incite them to pul the svvord out of the Magistrat's hand viz by hindering according to their povver oppression to be committed and this might be vvithout the least violence done to the Magistrate's power and authority as is shevved So might they move them to execute judgment not formally but materially by hindering justice according to their povver or labouring to have the lavv executed according to God's vvord 3. Lex Rex speaketh no such thing in that place as any vvill see vvho read it 4. It is but his ignorance to say that in this vve fearfully pervert the holy scripture 5. Hovv vvill he shovv that this doctrine tends to horrid confusion He tels us Pag. 50. That such pretences will not be wanting to the worst of men and the best Magistrate proceeding most legally shall never have security from seditious partyes Answ But sure his doctrine tendeth more to confusion for by it every Magistrat of the land hath povver to kill and destroy vvhom he vvill and thus Magistrates should be formally constituted wolves 2. But how oft will he put us to tell him that the best truth may be abused 3. But let him speak in earnest what would he do if he saw his wife carryed away by some drunken officers before a judge drunk as a beast so as he could neither hear nor speak sense who yet without further processe would condemne her to be brunt as a witch or executed as a harlot would he not labour if he had power to relieve his innocent wife out of the hands of these bloody oppressours What would he then do with his pretences Would these scar his tender conscience I suppose not And what if he saw the King without ground or colour of reason possibly upon a mistake runing in a rage to kill his wife or only son would he not help the innocent in that case and hold the King with force Or would he only assist them by prayers to God for them by consolatory words by giving counsel to them or by supplications to the Magistrate with all dutiful respects and if nothing could avail sit dovvne as having discharged his duty and vvould not resist more vvhich he thinketh is all vvhich is required of private persones Pag. 49. If so many might think he vvere accessory to the death of his vvife or childe and so possibly might the King when he came to himself and his rage was off him and he convinced of his mistake And if he vvould hinder innocent blood to be shed as rational people will easily think he might hovv shall he salve the matter for the vvorst of men may resist the best Magistrate proceeding most legally upon pretences that the King is in a rage he hath no shaddow of law or reason for him he is mistaken of the persones c. And would he think that in this case there were a necessary connexion betvvixt resistence and revenge and if he should have the upper hand in the matter of resistence could he not sit dovvn satisfied If he could then he may think that these tvvo may be seperated in exercise and practice in other cases as vvell as in his ovvne unlesse the fault be on the Magistrate's side Thus is answered also vvhat he hath P ag 49. for it is but the same thing which he hath in the place before considered He is tedious in his repetitions and therefore we Proceed to our arguments And. 1. If Humanity Brotherly Affection Christian Love Tendernesse and Compassion to a suffering injured brother call for help and releef at the hands of others according to their power and capacities Then none can justly blame or condemne the late risers for endeavouring in their places according to their power the releife of their oppressed brethren with violence when no other meane was left feasible or practicable Their Solemne covenants did engadge them to account each injury done unto any Covenanter upon that account as done unto themselves And to vindicate and maintaine the libertyes of the Subjects in all these things which concerne their Consciences persones and Estates and who can blame them for paying their vowes unto God 2. If this same duty was expresly required of the people of God of old that they should endeavour to relieve the oppressed and to prevent the shedding of innocent blood Then none can justly blame those late valient vindicators of justice and relievers of the oppressed But the former is true as the places above cited do show Therefore c. 3. If their forebearing had made them guilty before God of the oppression and bloodshed committed vvhen it vvas in their povver to help it Then they could not forbeare to do what they did without sin But the former is true The very Egyptians knew so much by the light of nature when by their law such as did not relieve the oppressed when it was in their povver vvere accused upon their head and if they vvere not able to help they vvere bound to accuse the oppressour or else they vvere to be vvhipped to endure three dayes hunger I shall close this chapter as I did the former with a testimony of famous Mr. Knox that it may be seen to be no nevv doctrine of ours In his admonition to the Commonalty of Scotland he hath these words neer the end These vaine excuses I say will nothing availe you in the presence of God who requireth no lesse of the Subjects then of their Rulers and if yee think that ye are innocent because you are not the chief actors of such iniquity ye are utterly deceived for God doth not only punish the chiefe offenders but with them doth he condemne the consenters to such iniquity and all are judged to consent that knowing impiety committed give no testimony that the same displeaseth them To speak this matter more plaine As your Princes and Rulers are criminal with your Bishops of all Idolatry committed and of all the innocent blood that is shed for the testimony of Christs truth and that because they maintaine them in their tyranny So are yee I meane so many of you as give no plaine confession to the